still in a belligerent temper, for the effect of Mr. Vansittart's
remonstrances and of the Duke of Wellington's advice had not yet made
itself felt. Mr. Goulburn wrote on the same day to Lord Bathurst that
the greater part of the American projet was by far too extravagant to
leave any doubt in his mind and that of his colleagues as to the mode in
which it could be combated.[147] An entire fortnight passed before his
government startled him with the announcement that he must again give
way, and it was only then, on November 25, that the fishery question was
seriously taken up on the British side.
In Lord Castlereagh's original instructions of July 28,[148] the British
commissioners had been told that the provisions of the treaty of 1783 in
respect to the in-shore fisheries on the coast of Newfoundland had been
productive of so much inconvenience as to determine the government not
to renew them in their present form or to concede any accommodation to
the Americans in this respect except on the principle of an equivalent
in frontier or otherwise. Supplementary instructions, dated August
14,[149] had also declared that the free navigation of the Mississippi
must be provided for. Lord Bathurst had now to settle his policy on
these points, and he seems to have instructed Mr. Goulburn, in letters
dated the 21st and 22d November, that the treaty might be concluded
without noticing the fishery question, since the crown lawyers were of
the opinion, although he himself thought otherwise, that the American
rights, unless expressly renewed, would necessarily terminate. These
letters of Lord Bathurst, however, have not been printed, and their
tenor can only be inferred from Mr. Goulburn's reply on the 25th
November, from which it appears that the British were almost as much in
doubt as the Americans in regard to the fishery rights: "Had we never
mentioned the subject of the fisheries at all," said Mr. Goulburn, "I
think that we might have argued the exclusion of the Americans from them
on the general principle stated by Sir W. Scott and Sir C. Robinson; but
having once brought forward the subject, having thus implied that we had
(what Lord Castlereagh seemed really to have) a doubt of this principle;
having received from the American plenipotentiaries a declaration of
what they consider to be their right in this particular, and having left
that declaration without an answer, I entirely concur in your opinion
that we do practically admit the Americans to the fisheries as they
enjoyed them before the war, and shall not, without a new war, be able
to exclude them. I ought to add, however, that Dr. Adams and Lord
Gambier do not agree in this opinion. You do us but justice in supposing
that, without positive instructions, we shall not admit any article in
favor of the American fishery even if any such should be brought forward
by them; indeed, we did not at all understand your letter, either public
or private, as implying any such concession."
The British counter-projet, sent in on November 26, contained
accordingly no allusion to the fisheries and took no notice of Mr.
Clay's paragraph in regard to the treaty of 1783, but, on the other
hand, contained a clause stipulating for the free navigation of the
Mississippi. When this counter-projet came up for discussion in the
American commission on the 28th November, another hot dispute arose. Mr.
Gallatin proposed to accept the British clause in regard to the
Mississippi, and to add another clause to continue the liberty of
taking, drying, and curing fish, "as secured by the former treaty of
peace." To this proposition Mr. Clay offered a stout resistance; he
maintained that the fisheries were of little or no value, while the
Mississippi was of immense importance, and he could see no sort of
reason in treating them as equivalent. Mr. Adams maintained just the
opposite view, and after the dispute had lasted the better part of two
days, "Mr. Gallatin brought us all to unison again by a joke. He said he
perceived that Mr. Adams cared nothing at all about the navigation of
the Mississippi and thought of nothing but the fisheries. Mr. Clay cared
nothing at all about the fisheries and thought of nothing but the
Mississippi. The East was perfectly willing to sacrifice the West, and
the West equally ready to sacrifice the East. Now he was a Western man,
and would give the navigation of the river for the fisheries. Mr.
Russell was an Eastern man, and was ready to do the same."
The proposition was accordingly made, and met with a prompt refusal from
the British government, which proposed to adopt a new article by which
both subjects should be referred to a future negotiation. This offer
gave rise among the commissioners to a fresh contest, waged hotly about
the point whether or not the United States should concede that a right
fixed by the treaty of 1783 was open to negotiation. Here Mr. Gallatin
parted company with Mr. Adams. He was unwilling to pledge the government
to the doctrine that liberties granted by the treaty of 1783 could not
be discussed, and he carried all his colleagues with him, Mr. Adams only
excepted, in favor of a qualified acceptance of the British proposition,
provided the engagement to negotiate applied to all the subjects of
difference not yet adjusted, and provided it involved no abandonment of
any right in the fisheries claimed by the United States.
Mr. Goulburn had flattered himself upon having at length gained a point.
On the 10th December he had written to Lord Bathurst: "I confess my own
opinion to be that the question of the fisheries stood as well upon the
result of the last conference as it can do upon any reply which they may
make to our proposition of this day. The arguments which they used at
the time will certainly be to be learnt only from the _ex parte_
statements of the negotiators; but the fact of their having attempted to
purchase the fisheries is recorded, and is an evidence (to say the least
of it) that they doubt their right to enjoy them without a stipulation.
If they receive our proposition, all will be well; but if they reject
it, they may derive from that rejection an argument against what we wish
to deduce from the protocol."[150]
Even the poor consolation which Mr. Goulburn thus hugged was
disappointed, for Mr. Gallatin's note neither accepted nor rejected the
British offer to negotiate, but expressed a willingness to agree to do
so only with the most emphatic reservation of all rights claimed by the
United States. Mr. Goulburn was obliged to contemplate the abandonment
of his last stronghold; he mildly wrote to Lord Bathurst, suggesting
that all stipulations respecting the Mississippi and the fisheries
should be omitted.[151]
After Mr. Gallatin had, with no little difficulty, succeeded in carrying
his point, and after the usual delay consequent on the inevitable
reference to London, an answer was returned on the 22d December.
Somewhat to the discomfiture of both Mr. Clay and Mr. Adams, the Eastern
and Western belligerents, this reply suddenly drew their war-chariots
from under them. The British government was now more eager for peace
than the American commissioners; it declared that it cared nothing about
its proposed article by which the fisheries and the Mississippi were to
be referred to negotiation, and would withdraw it with pleasure, so that
the treaty might be silent on the subject. The practical result was that
Mr. Adams's view of the treaty of 1783 inevitably became the doctrine of
his government, and that Mr. Clay was overset. Mr. Clay saw this, and
was nettled by it; but Mr. Gallatin's very delicate management, and the
now clearly avowed desire of the British government to make peace, had
clinched the settlement; further discussion or delay was out of the
question, and three days later, on Christmas-Day, the treaty was signed.
Far more than contemporaries ever supposed or than is now imagined, the
treaty of Ghent was the special work and the peculiar triumph of Mr.
Gallatin. From what a fearful collapse it rescued the government, every
reader knows. How bitterly it irritated the war-party in England, and
what clamors were raised against it by the powerful interests that were
bent on "punishing" the United States, can be seen in the old leaders of
the London Times. What Lord Castlereagh at Vienna thought of it may be
read in his letter of January 2, 1815, to Lord Liverpool: "The courier
from Ghent with the news of the peace arrived yesterday morning. It has
produced the greatest possible sensation here, and will, I have no
doubt, enter largely into the calculations of our opponents. It is a
most auspicious and seasonable event. I wish you joy of being released
from the millstone of an American war."[152] The peace was due primarily
to the good sense of Lord Castlereagh, Lord Liverpool, and the Duke of
Wellington; but there is fair room to doubt whether that good sense
would have been kept steady to its purpose, and whether the American
negotiators could have been held together in theirs, without the
controlling influence of Mr. Gallatin's resource, tact, and authority;
whether, indeed, any negotiation at all could have been brought about
except through Mr. Gallatin's personal efforts, from the time he
supported the mission in the Cabinet to the time when he took the
responsibility of going to England. Sooner or later peace must have
come, but there may be fair reason to think that, without Mr. Gallatin,
the United States must have fought another campaign, and, Mr. Clay to
the contrary notwithstanding, the position of New England and of the
finances made peace vitally necessary. On that subject Mr. Gallatin's
knowledge of New England and of finance made him a wiser counsellor than
Mr. Clay. Yet if Mr. Clay really had thought as he talked, he would not
have crossed the ocean to assist in doing precisely what Mr. Gallatin's
policy dictated; he well knew that the United States could possibly win
in the field no advantages to compensate for the inevitable mischief
that another year of war must have caused to the government.
[Sidenote: 1815.]
Be this as it may, the task done was done in the true spirit of Mr.
Gallatin's political philosophy and in the fullest sympathy with his old
convictions. Stress of circumstances had wrested control from his hands,
had blocked his path as Secretary of the Treasury, and had plunged the
country headlong into difficulties it was not yet competent to manage.
Gallatin had abandoned place and power, had thrown himself with all his
energy upon the only point where he could make his strength effective,
and had actually succeeded, by skill and persistence, in guiding the
country back to safe and solid ground. He was not a man to boast of his
exploits, and he never claimed peculiar credit in any of these
transactions, but as he signed the treaty of Ghent he could fairly say
that no one had done more than himself to serve his country, and no one
had acted a more unselfish part.
After a furious parting quarrel between Mr. Clay and Mr. Adams, in which
Mr. Gallatin again exercised all his tact to soothe the angry feelings
of the two combatants, while he quietly threw his weight on Mr. Adams's
side, the commissioners separated, and he found himself free to follow
his own fancy. As might be expected, his first act was to revisit his
family and his birthplace; he took the road to Geneva.
Of this visit very little can be said. His letters to his wife during
all the period of this stay in Europe have been lost, and their place
cannot be supplied. No man, however, can go through the experience of
returning to the associations of his youth, after more than thirty years
of struggle like his, without sensations such as he would not care to
express in words. He left only one allusion to the subject: he said
that, as he approached Geneva, calm as his nature was, his calmness
deserted him.
The citizens of his native town received him with the most cordial
welcome; they were proud of him, and he was greeted with all the
distinction he could have expected or wished. He passed a short time in
renewing his relations with the surviving members of his family and with
his old friends; then, departing again for Paris, he arrived there in
season to witness the return of Napoleon from Elba, and to receive the
information of his own appointment as minister to France in place of
Mr. Crawford, who had decided to return home. In April he crossed the
channel to England. He had not yet determined to accept the French
mission, and in any case his family and his private affairs made a
return to America necessary; meanwhile, he and his colleagues lingered,
hoping to effect still further negotiation under their powers for a
commercial treaty.
The following letter is a memento of his stay in Paris.
ALEXANDER VON HUMBOLDT TO GALLATIN.
Je n'ai pas été assez heureux pour vous trouver ce matin, mon illustre
ami. J'aurais bien désiré cependant vous parler de mon attachement
constant et tendre, de mon vif intérêt pour la paix que vous avez eu la
gloire de conclure dans des circonstances difficiles. J'aurais aussi
voulu vous féliciter sur cette belle et noble défense de la
Nouvelle-Orléans qui fera respecter les armées de la Liberté, comme les
flottes qui voguent sous votre pavillon se sont couvertes de gloire
depuis longtemps. Que dans ces temps malheureux mes yeux se fixent avec
attendrissement sur ces contrées qui seront bientôt le centre de la
civilisation humaine! Je ferai d'autres tentatives pour vous trouver et
vous recommander de nouveau Mr. Warden, mon ami et celui de Messrs.
Berthollet, Thenard, Gay Lussac, et de tout ce qui aime les sciences. Je
ne puis croire qu'un homme aussi instruit, aussi doux, aussi honnête,
aussi attaché aux États-Unis, à M. Jefferson et aux doctrines vertueuses
puisse être rejetté par votre gouvernement. Je supplie Madame Gallatin
d'agréer l'hommage de mon respectueux dévouement. Quel contraste entre
cette époque et celle où vous me vîtes à Londres ennuyé des "magnanimous
Soverains" et de la croisade des héros!
HUMBOLDT.
Quai Malaquais, No. 3.
Jeudi.
* * * * *
Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Clay arrived in London early in April and began
negotiations with Lord Castlereagh. Mr. Adams, now appointed minister to
England, joined his colleagues in the following month, but Mr. Bayard
remained in Paris or on shipboard. The President had appointed him
minister to Russia, but he was not in a condition to accept the post
even if he had cared to take it; broken down by illness, he was destined
to reach home only to die. The negotiation with Lord Castlereagh was
carried on almost entirely by Mr. Gallatin, and was the first of a long
series of similar negotiations mainly conducted by him during the next
fifteen years.
So far as England was concerned, excepting the questions of the
fisheries, impressment, and boundary, the only source of serious
difficulty arose in her colonial policy and the complications
necessarily springing from it. These complications were numerous, but
became threatening only when England was engaged in maritime war; at
other times they were merely annoying, and kept our government
incessantly employed in efforts to obtain the relaxation or abandonment
of vexatious commercial restrictions. To obtain this result, however,
the United States had left herself no inducements to offer. Most of the
maritime powers in Europe had colonies, which they regarded as mere
farms of the State; private property with regard to other nations;
industrial speculations with which foreigners had no more to do than
with their arsenals and dock-yards; places where they were admitted only
on tolerance, and where they dealt not with the colonist, but with the
imperial government. England especially had created a great system of
this kind, and, to protect it, she had enacted a long series of
navigation laws whose object was to secure all her own colonial trade to
her own ships, and as much of her neighbors' trade as she could gather
into her ubiquitous hands. Between European nations there was a sort of
colonial compact; they bargained one colonial trade against another, and
admitted one another's ships into their colonial ports provided their
own ships were admitted in return; but when the United States claimed
the same privilege, the European governments, with the spirit and in the
language of so many small hucksters, asked what equivalent the United
States could offer; where were the American colonies whose trade could
be exchanged for that of the European? Mr. Gallatin pointed out where
the American colonies lay, a long uninterrupted succession stretching
from Lake Erie and Lake Superior to Mobile and New Orleans,--colonies
whose growth surpassed that of the most prosperous European settlement
as absolutely as the American continent surpassed in size and wealth the
largest and richest island of either Indies. To this there was but one
reply. The United States had already thrown the trade of her colonies
open to the world; she could not now bargain for an equivalent. Even
retaliation was precluded, for her own constitution would neither permit
her to close any of her ports without closing all, nor to lay a duty on
exports.
The English colonial system was the most difficult to deal with, since
it was not only the most extensive, the most valuable, and the English
colonies among the nearest to the United States, but its complications
and inconsistencies were the most elaborate and perplexing, while to the
British nation there was no absurdity in the whole mass that was not
twisted deeply about some strong moneyed interest and that was not
sanctified by age and English blood. To the United States there were
three groups of questions involved in commercial relations with the
British colonies. The first group included Canada and the whole trade
with the provinces on our northern frontier, and was further complicated
by our claim to the right of navigating the St. Lawrence. The second
group included the British West India islands and their indirect trade
with the United States through Nova Scotia. The third group consisted of
the East Indies, and involved the trade between Calcutta, Europe, and
the United States. These were the subjects which Mr. Gallatin attempted
to settle by a commercial convention in the summer of 1815, and which
detained him, much against his will, in England at a time when he was
extremely anxious to be again at home.
Lord Castlereagh was friendly, and did what he could to smooth
negotiation. Mr. Goulburn and Dr. Adams were continued in the British
commission; but, in place of Lord Gambier, the American commissioners
had a man to deal with whose qualifications and temper were of a very
different kind. This was Frederic Robinson, afterwards Lord Goderich and
Earl Ripon, who played a distinguished part in reforming the worst
faults of the English commercial system. He was now vice-president of
the Board of Trade, and treated the American ministers with courtesy and
kindness, although able to do little more. Mr. Gallatin succeeded in
disposing of none of the more difficult points in dispute. Not only did
the British government politely decline to open the questions of
impressment, blockade, and the trade with enemies' colonies in time of
war, but it withdrew the whole subject of the West India trade from
discussion, and refused to listen to the American proposition for
regulating the traffic with Canada and opening the river St. Lawrence.
There remained only the East Indies, and a convention was ultimately
signed which secured the Americans for four years in the enjoyment of
this branch of commerce. In discussing with the Secretary of State the
merits of this commercial convention of 1815, Mr. Gallatin afterwards
declared that the only portion of it which appeared to him truly
valuable was that which abolished discriminating duties, "a policy
which, removing some grounds of irritation, and preventing in that
respect a species of commercial warfare, may have a tendency to lay the
foundation of a better understanding between the two nations on other
points."[153] This result of three months' labor was small enough, but
Mr. Gallatin might derive some encouragement from the fact that the
British government looked upon itself as having done a very generous
act, since, in the words of its last note, "it considers itself as
granting to the United States a privilege in regard to the East Indies
for which it is entitled to require an equivalent."
The negotiation did not close without its inevitable accompaniment of
discord.[154] Mr. Adams, who commonly recorded all his own sins of
temper with conscientious self-reproach, seems in this case to have
thought Mr. Gallatin at fault, and accuses him of speaking in a
peremptory and somewhat petulant manner against a point of form in which
Mr. Adams was undoubtedly right. The charge may very possibly be in this
instance correct. The whole matter was trivial, so far as the dispute
was concerned, and, like all these diplomatic irritations, had no
lasting effect except to associate in Mr. Gallatin's mind the
recollection of Mr. Adams with ideas of deplorable wrong-headedness.
This was not necessarily a correct conclusion, and Mr. Adams was
naturally led to retaliate by thinking Mr. Gallatin tortuous. In point
of fact, Mr. Adams was but one representative of a common New England
type, little understood beyond the borders of that province; a type
which, with an indurated exterior, was sinewy and supple to the core.
The true Yankee wrested from man and from nature all he could get by
force, but when force was exhausted he could be as pliable as his
neighbors. In the present case, Mr. Adams attempted an experiment of
this kind at the risk of some personal inconvenience to Mr. Gallatin.
The nearly futile negotiation had detained Gallatin and Clay in England
much beyond their intention; meanwhile, Bayard and Crawford, on June 18,
had sailed in the Neptune, leaving their two companions to get home as
they best could. It was now the 2d of July, and the treaty was waiting
to be signed, when Mr. Adams made in the final draft some changes of
form, which were certainly proper as a matter of national dignity, but
which threatened to create further delay. This appears for a moment to
have disturbed Gallatin's equanimity; but Mr. Adams carried his point,
Mr. Robinson made no difficulty, and the disagreement ended by Gallatin
saying to Adams: "Well, they got over the transpositions very easily;
but you would not have found it so if Dr. Adams had had the reading of
your copy instead of Robinson." "I said, that might be," was Mr. Adams's
final entry.
That evening Mr. Gallatin dined for the last time during these
negotiations with Mr. Alexander Baring, now and ever afterwards his warm
friend, who had done more than any other man in England, or perhaps,
with one exception, even in America, to hasten the peace, and who had,
with the knowledge and consent of his own government, rendered very
important financial assistance even while the war was going on. There
had been much social entertainment in London, part of which is recorded
in Mr. Adams's Diary; but the only English friend Mr. Gallatin ever made
whose society he greatly enjoyed, and whose character he deeply
respected, was Mr. Baring.
On July 4, Mr. Gallatin began his homeward journey, and, after the usual
delays, he reached America early in September. On the 4th of that month
he wrote from New York to President Madison: "I received the account of
my appointment to France with pleasure and gratitude, as an evidence of
your undiminished friendship and of public satisfaction for my services.
Whether I can or will accept, I have not yet determined. The season will
be far advanced for taking Mrs. Gallatin across the Atlantic, and I have
had no time to ascertain what arrangements, if any, I can make for my
children and private business during a second absence. The delay has
been rather advantageous to the public, as it was best to have no
minister at Paris during the late events."
GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON.
6th September, 1815.
I was much gratified by the receipt of your kind letter of March last,
brought by Mr. Ticknor. Your usual partiality to me is evinced by the
belief that our finances might have been better directed if I had
remained in the Treasury. But I always thought that our war expenses
were so great; perhaps necessarily so in proportion to the ordinary
resources of the country; and the opposition of the moneyed men so
inveterate, that it was impossible to avoid falling into a paper system
if the war should be much longer protracted. I only regret that specie
payments were not resumed on the return of peace. Whatever difficulties
may be in the way, they cannot be insuperable, provided the subject be
immediately attended to. If delayed, private interest will operate here
as in England, and lay us under the curse of a depreciated and
fluctuating currency. In every other respect I must acknowledge that the
war has been useful. The character of America stands now as high as ever
on the European Continent, and higher than ever it did in Great Britain.
I may say that we are favorites everywhere except at courts, and even
there, although the Emperor of Russia is perhaps the only sovereign who
likes us, we are generally respected and considered as the nation
designed to check the naval despotism of England. France, which alone
can have a navy, will, under her present dynasty, be for some years a
vassal of her great rival, and the mission with which I have been
honored is in a political view unimportant. The revolution has not,
however, been altogether useless. There is a visible improvement in the
agriculture of the country and the situation of the peasantry. The new
generation belonging to that class, freed from the petty despotism of
nobles and priests, and made more easy in their circumstances by the
abolition of tithes and by the equalization of taxes, have acquired an
independent spirit, and are far superior to their fathers in intellect
and information. They are not republicans, and are still too much
dazzled by military glory, but I think that no monarch or ex-nobles can
hereafter oppress them long with impunity.
* * * * *
The first question that pressed for an answer regarded the mission to
France, but behind this a more serious subject presented itself; Mr.
Gallatin must now decide what provision he could make for his children.
This anxiety weighed upon his mind and caused much anxious thought and
much hesitation in his conclusions. Fortunately, he had but the trouble
of choice. In the course of a few months, one by one, the doors of every
avenue to distinction or wealth were thrown open to him. The mission to
France came first, and this, on the 23d November, he declined, alleging
as his reason the private duties which required his attention to the
interests of his children. Meanwhile, on the 23d September, 1815,
Richard Bache wrote to him from Philadelphia, as follows: "A number of
the conferees appointed to nominate a Democratic candidate to represent
this district in the next Congress having met together last evening, it
was unanimously agreed to nominate you, should you consent to serve....
We all anxiously hope that it will be consistent with your views to
stand as a candidate, and we assure you that we are confident of
success."
If ambition were his object, this invitation opened to Mr. Gallatin the
path to Congress, and a seat in the Senate might reasonably be assumed
as standing not far in the distance. Mr. Gallatin's reply was written
the next day: "I am more gratified by the mark of confidence given me by
the Republican conferees of the Philadelphia district than I can
express. But I cannot serve them in the station with which they would
honor me. My property is not half sufficient to support me anywhere but
in the western country. To my private business and to making
arrangements for entering into some active business I must necessarily
and immediately attend. It is a duty I owe to my family."
A few days later, on the 9th October, his friend Mr. John Jacob Astor
wrote him a long letter proposing that he should become a partner in Mr.
Astor's commercial house. He had, he said, at that time a capital of
about $800,000 engaged in trade. He estimated his probable profits at
from $50,000 to $100,000 per annum, interest and all expenses deducted.
"I propose to give you an interest of one-fifth, on which I mean to
charge you the legal interest; if you put any funds to the stock,
interest will be allowed to you of course."
On the 4th December, Mr. Monroe wrote to him: "To your other letter I
have felt a repugnance to give a reply. We have been long in the public
service together, engaged in support of the same great cause, have acted
in harmony, and it is distressing to me to see you withdraw. I will
write you again on this subject soon." He did write again, on the 16th,
urging new reasons why Mr. Gallatin should accept the French mission. To
this letter Mr. Gallatin made the following reply:
GALLATIN TO MONROE.
NEW YORK, 26th December, 1815.
[Sidenote: 1816.]
DEAR SIR,--I have received your friendly letters of 4th and 16th
instant, and have a grateful sense of the motives which dictated them. I
can assure you that I feel a great reluctance to part with my personal
and political friends, and that every consideration merely personal to
myself and detached from my family urges a continuance in public life.
My habits are formed and cannot be altered. I feel alive to everything
connected with the interest, happiness, and reputation of the United
States. Whatever affects unfavorably either of them makes me more
unhappy than any private loss or inconvenience. Although I have nothing
to do with it, the continued suspension of specie payments, which I
consider as a continued unnecessary violation of the public faith,
occupies my thoughts more than any other subject. I feel as a passenger
in a storm,--vexed that I cannot assist. This I understand to be very
generally the feeling of every statesman out of place. Be this as it
may, although I did and do believe that for the present at least I could
not be of much public utility in France, I did in my private letter to
the President place my declining on the ground of private
considerations. In that respect my views are limited to the mere means
of existence without falling in debt I do not wish to accumulate any
property. I will not do my family the injury of impairing the little I
have. My health is frail; they may soon lose me, and I will not leave
them dependent on the bounty of others. Was I to go to France, and my
compensation and private income (this last does not exceed $2500 a year)
did not enable me to live as I ought, I must live as I can. I ask your
forgiveness for entering in those details, but you have treated me as a
friend, and I write to you as such. You have from friendship wished that
I would reconsider my first decision, and I will avail myself of the
permission. It will be understood that in the mean while, if the delay
is attended with any public inconvenience, a new appointment may
immediately take place. My motive for writing when I did was a fear
that, specially with respect to other missions, the belief that I would
go to France might induce the President to make different arrangements
from those he would have adopted on a contrary supposition.
* * * * *
On the 27th January, 1816, Mr. Monroe replied by again urging Mr.
Gallatin to accept, and pressing for a quick decision. On the 2d
February Mr. Gallatin wrote his final acceptance.
GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON.
WASHINGTON, 1st April, 1816.
... After what I had written to you you could hardly have expected that
I would have accepted the French mission. It was again offered to me in
so friendly a manner and from so friendly motives that I was induced to
accept. Nor will I conceal that I did not feel yet old enough, or had I
philosophy enough, to go into retirement and abstract myself altogether
from public affairs. I have no expectation, however, that in the present
state of France I can be of any utility there, and hope that I will not
make a long stay in that country....
* * * * *
Mr. Gallatin, like most men, had the faculty of deceiving himself. In
writing these lines, he was so inconsistent as to ignore the fact that
he had already refused to return to public life on the ground that he
must provide for his family. He was driven into still greater
inconsistencies a few days later.
MADISON TO GALLATIN.
WASHINGTON, April 12, 1816.
DEAR SIR,--Mr. Dallas has signified to me that, it being his intention
not to pass another winter in Washington, he has thought it his duty to
give me an opportunity of selecting a successor during the present
session of Congress; intimating a willingness, however, to remain, if
desired, in order to put the National Bank in motion.
Will it be most agreeable to you to proceed on your mission to France,
or are you willing again to take charge of a department heretofore
conducted by you with so much reputation and usefulness, on the
resignation of Mr. Dallas, which will, it is presumed, take effect about
the 1st of October? In the latter case it will be proper that a
nomination be forthwith made for the foreign appointment. Favor me with
your determination as soon as you can make it convenient, accepting in
the mean time my affectionate respects.
* * * * *
There could be no possible doubt that in this case ambition and public
duty went hand in hand. If Mr. Gallatin still felt a passion for power,
or still thought himself able to do good, this was his opportunity. His
warm friend Joseph H. Nicholson wrote at once with all his old
impetuosity to urge his acceptance.
JOSEPH H. NICHOLSON TO GALLATIN.
13th April, 1816.
MY DEAR SIR,--I have this moment learned that Dallas is certainly going
out. For God's sake come into the Treasury again. I think you must be
satisfied that you _can_ if you will; and _I_ am satisfied, and so is
all the world, that you can be infinitely more useful there than in
France, where you have nothing to gain and may lose. I think you will be
looked to for the Treasury by all parties except Duane's.
GALLATIN TO MADISON.
NEW YORK, April 18, 1816.
DEAR SIR,--Your letter of the 12th reached me only the day before
yesterday, and, not willing to make a hasty decision, I have delayed an
answer till to-day. I feel very grateful for your kind offer, which I
know to have been equally owing to your friendship for me and to your
views of public utility. I decline it with some reluctance, because I
think I would be more useful at home than abroad, and I had much rather
be in America than in Europe. The reasons which induce me nevertheless
to decline, under existing circumstances, preponderate. With these I do
not mean to trouble you, and will only mention that, although competent
as I think to the higher duties of office, there is for what I conceive
a proper management of the Treasury a necessity for a mass of mechanical
labor connected with details, forms, calculations, &c., which, having
now lost sight of the thread and routine, I cannot think of again
learning and going through. I know that in that respect there is now
much confusion due to the changes of office and the state of the
currency, and I believe that an active young man can alone reinstate and
direct properly that department. I may add that I have made a number of
arrangements founded on the expectation of the French mission, of a
short residence there, and of a last visit to my Geneva relations, which
could not be undone without causing inconvenience to me and
disappointment to others. Accept my grateful thanks and the assurance
of my constant and sincere attachment and respect.
Your obedient servant.
This letter shows rather a wish to find excuses than a faith in the
weight of those alleged. There was clearly no weight in them such as
could justify Mr. Gallatin's refusal; had he accepted the Treasury he
would probably have held it twelve years, unless he had himself chosen
to retire, for although he appears rather to have favored the candidacy
of Mr. Tompkins, of New York, than of Mr. Monroe, for the succession to
President Madison, this probably indicated merely his unwillingness to
exhaust public patience with indefinite Virginia supremacy, and did not
imply hostility to Monroe, who would doubtless have retained him in the
Cabinet, and to whom he would have been far more acceptable than the
actual Secretary, William H. Crawford. Gallatin, too, would have made a
much better Secretary than Crawford, and Mr. Monroe would have been
spared most of the political intrigue in his Cabinet that caused him
such incessant vexation; the national finances would have been better
managed, and Mr. Gallatin would have enjoyed the triumph of restoring
specie payments, practically extinguishing the national debt, and
possibly carrying out his schemes for internal improvement.
On the other hand, one evident fact sufficiently explains why he was
unwilling to resume his old post. The signature of the treaty of Ghent,
on the 25th December, 1814, had closed one great epoch in his life, and,
looking back from that stand-point upon the events of his political
career, he could not avoid some very unpleasant conclusions. Riper,
wiser, and infinitely more experienced than in 1800, Gallatin had still
lost qualities which, to a politician, were more important than either
experience, wisdom, or maturity. He had outgrown the convictions which
had made his strength; he had not, indeed, lost confidence in himself,
for, throughout all his trials and disappointments, the tone of his mind
had remained as pure as when he began life, and he had never forfeited
his self-respect; but he had lost something which, to his political
success, was even more necessary; that sublime confidence in human
nature which had given to Mr. Jefferson and his party their single
irresistible claim to popular devotion. His statesmanship had become,
what practical statesmanship always has and must become, a mere struggle
to deal with concrete facts at the cost of philosophic and _a priori_
principles. Gallatin, like Madison and Monroe, like Clay and Calhoun,
had outgrown the Jeffersonian dogmas. There was no longer any great
unrealized conviction on which to build enthusiasm; and even on those
questions which were likely to arise, Mr. Gallatin was rather in
sympathy with his old opponents than with his old friends or his old
self. The following letter could hardly have been written in 1801 by Mr.
Gallatin or received by Matthew Lyon.
GALLATIN TO MATTHEW LYON.
NEW YORK, May 7, 1816.
... The war has been productive of evil and good, but I think the good
preponderates. Independent of the loss of lives and of the losses in
property by individuals, the war has laid the foundation of permanent
taxes and military establishments which the Republicans had deemed
unfavorable to the happiness and free institutions of the country. But
under our former system we were becoming too selfish, too much attached
exclusively to the acquisition of wealth, above all, too much confined
in our political feelings to local and State objects. The war has
renewed and reinstated the national feelings and character which the
Revolution had given, and which were daily lessened. The people have now
more general objects of attachment with which their pride and political
opinions are connected. They are more Americans; they feel and act more
as a nation, and I hope that the permanency of the Union is thereby
better secured.... I have lost three old friends: Mr. Savary, Thomas
Clare, and Mr. Smilie.
* * * * *
He had come into office in 1801, with power more complete than he could
ever hope to enjoy again; his aims and his methods had been pure,
unselfish, and noble; yet he had been the sport of faction and the
victim of bitter personal hatred. He had no fancy for repeating the
experience. Moreover, there was no longer any essential disagreement
among the people in regard to political dogmas. Federalists and
Republicans had fused their theories into a curious compound, of which
this letter to Matthew Lyon gives an idea, and upon the ground thus
formed all parties were now glad to unite, at least for a time. There
remained no sufficient force, perhaps no sufficient prejudice, to
overbalance the natural tendency of Mr. Gallatin's mind towards science
and repose.
The seven years he passed in Paris were the most agreeable years of his
life. Far the best diplomatist in the service, he was indispensable to
his government, and was incessantly employed in all its most difficult
negotiations, so far as they could be brought within his reach.
Conscious of his peculiar fitness for diplomacy, weary of domestic
intrigue, and indifferent to the possession of power, he dismissed his
early ambitions and political projects not only without regret, but with
positive relief.
GALLATIN TO MADISON.
NEW YORK, 7th June, 1816.
... I am urging the captain of the Peacock, and still hope that he will
be ready to sail the day after to-morrow. I almost envy you the happy
time which you will spend this summer in Orange, and which will not, I
hope, be disturbed by any untoward change in our affairs. I think that,
upon the whole, we have nothing to apprehend at this time from any
foreign quarter. You already know how thoroughly impressed I am with the
necessity of restoring specie payments. This subject will not disturb
you in the country, but the present state of the currency is the only
evil of any magnitude entailed by the war, and which it seems incumbent
on us (pardon the expression) to cure radically. Public credit, private
convenience, the sanctity of contracts, the moral character of the
country, appear all to be involved in that question, and I feel the most
perfect conviction that nothing but the will of government is wanted to
reinstate us in that respect. The choice of the Secretary of the
Treasury is, under those circumstances, important, and I am sorry that
Mr. Crawford, as I am informed, has declined the appointment. I wish it
may fall on Mr. Lowndes or on Mr. Calhoun. Our Maryland and Pennsylvania
politicians, without excepting some of the most virtuous and whom I
count amongst my best friends, are paper-tainted. The disease extends,
though more particularly to this State.
I beg you to forgive this digression on a subject which I had no
intention to touch when I began this letter.
* * * * *
On the 9th July, Mr. Gallatin, now accompanied by all his family,
arrived in Paris. There he remained until June, 1823. During these seven
years his connection with American politics was almost absolutely
severed. His only political correspondent was Mr. Crawford, Secretary of
the Treasury, who wrote him long and confidential letters, little
calculated to excite in Mr. Gallatin the slightest desire to share in
the political game. Indeed, politics had now become so exclusively a
game in the United States, all vestige of party principles and all trace
of deep convictions had so entirely vanished, that a statesman of the
old school had no longer a place in public life. Petty factions grouped
themselves about Crawford, Clay, Adams, Calhoun, De Witt Clinton, and
General Jackson, and political action was regulated by antipathies
rather than by public interest. If any one of these leaders seemed to be
gaining an advantage, the followers of all the others combined to pull
him down. Mr. Crawford's correspondence dealt largely in matters of this
sort, and Mr. Gallatin was familiar enough with the style of intrigue to
feel himself happy in escaping it.
[Sidenote: 1817.]
If there was little to regret at Washington, there was much to enjoy in
Paris. There Mr. Gallatin's position was peculiarly enviable. The United
States, though a republic, was, in the royalist jargon of the French
Court, a "legitimate" government. Its minister held a position which in
itself was neither good nor bad, but which was capable of becoming the
one or the other, according to the character of the man. In Gallatin's
hands it was excellent. Not only was Mr. Gallatin a man of refinement in
manners, tastes, and expression, a man of dignified and persuasive
address, such as suited the highly exacting society of Paris under Louis
XVIII.; he had a passport much more effective than this to the heart of
French society. By family he was one of themselves. In Geneva, indeed,
where republican institutions prevailed, there were no titles and no
privileges attached to the name of Gallatin; but in France the family
had been received as noble centuries since, and Mr. Gallatin had
presumedly the right to appear before Louis XVIII. as the Comte de
Gallatin, had he chosen to do so. His distant cousin, then minister of
the King of Würtemberg at Paris, was, in fact, known as Comte de
Gallatin, a royalist and conservative of the purest breed, but closely
intimate with and attached to his democratic relative. This accident of
noblesse was a matter of peculiar and exceptional importance at this
Court, which was itself an accident and an anomaly, a curious fragment
of the eighteenth century, floating, a mere wreck, on the turbulent
ocean of French democracy. As one of an ancient family whom the Kings of
France had from time immemorial recognized as noble, Mr. Gallatin was
kindly received at Court; he was somewhat a favorite with the King and
the royal family, and it is said that on one occasion Louis, in
complimenting him upon his French, maliciously added, "but I think my
English is better than yours;" a remark which must have called up in the
minds of both a curious instantaneous retrospect and comparison of the
circumstances under which they had learned that language,--a retrospect
less agreeable to the King, one might suppose, than to Mr. Gallatin.
There was another aristocratic tie between the minister and Parisian
society. As already shown, Mme. de Staël had established relations with
Mr. Gallatin on his first visit to Paris before the negotiations at
Ghent. She had been very useful in bringing the Emperor Alexander in
contact with American influences. She was herself by birth and residence
a Genevan, and a distant relative of the Gallatins. Her daughter was
married to the Duke de Broglie in February, 1816, and as a consequence
Mr. Gallatin found a new intimacy ready to his hand. American readers of
the Memoirs of George Ticknor will remember how much the Spanish
historian owed to that intimacy with the Broglies, which he obtained
through Mr. Gallatin's introduction, among others, to Mme. de Staël.
But the charm of Parisian society in Mr. Gallatin's eyes did not consist
in his aristocratic affiliations. These indeed smoothed his path and
relieved him from that sense of awkward strangeness which was the lot of
most American diplomates in European society; but his sympathies lay
with another class of men. "There is Talleyrand," said he to Benjamin
Ogle Tayloe, when introducing him at court; "he is a humbug, unworthy of
his reputation, but the world thinks otherwise, and you must not speak
of my opinion." The apostles of legitimacy and the oracles of the
Faubourg St. Germain were never favorites with him, and his old
republican principles were rather revived than weakened by this contact
with the essence of all he had most disliked in his younger and more
ardent days. His real sympathies lay with the men of science; with
Humboldt, with La Place, or with pure diplomatists like Pozzo di Borgo,
the brilliant Russian ambassador at Paris, with whom his relations were
close and confidential; or, finally, with French liberals like La
Fayette, between whom and all Americans the kindest exchange of friendly
civilities was incessant. Insufficient as the salary of American
minister was, Mr. Gallatin had a handsome establishment and entertained
as freely as his position required. The company he selected as a matter
of personal choice may be partly inferred from a dinner at which Mr.
Ogle Tayloe was present in 1819; La Fayette, the Duke de Broglie, his
brother-in-law, De Staël, Lord and Lady Ashburton (Alexander Baring),
and Baron Humboldt. "Humboldt talked nearly all the time in good
English." French society was, however, in a very disturbed condition,
and Mr. Gallatin did not always find it easy to avoid embarrassments.
One example of such difficulties occurred in the case of La Place, who
was somewhat sensitive in regard to his relations with the reigning
family, and who, on finding himself about to be seated at Mr. Gallatin's
table in company with so obnoxious a Republican as La Fayette, was
seized with a sudden illness and obliged to return home.
Social amusements, however, Mr. Gallatin regarded very much as he did
good wine or good cooking,--things desirable in themselves, but ending
with the momentary gratification. He made no record of this evanescent
intellectual flavor. He wrote almost nothing except his official
letters. During no period of his life are his memoranda and his
correspondence so meagre and uninteresting as now. He had little to
occupy him so far as official work was concerned, except at intervals
when some emergency arose, and at first he chafed at this want of
interest. He was indeed always possessed with the idea that he would
rather be at home, and he averred every year with great regularity that
he expected to return in the following summer. This is, however, a very
common if not universal rule among American diplomatists of the active
type. In reality, Mr. Gallatin never was so happy and never so
thoroughly in his proper social sphere as when he lived in Paris and
talked of Indian antiquities with Humboldt, of bi-metallic currency with
Baring, and of Spanish diplomacy with Pozzo di Borgo.
Even his letters to Jefferson show his self-reproachful idleness:
GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON.
PARIS, 17th July, 1817.
DEAR SIR,--...The growing prosperity of the United States is an object
of admiration for all the friends of liberty in Europe, a reproach on
almost all the European governments. At no period has America stood on
higher ground abroad than now, and every one who represents her may feel
a just pride in the contrast between her situation and that of all other
countries, and in the feeling of her perfect independence from all
foreign powers. This last sentiment acquires new force here in seeing
the situation of France, under the guardianship of the four great
potentates. That this state of things should cease is in every respect
highly desirable. Although not immediately affected by it, we cannot but
wish to see the ancient natural check of England resume its place in the
system of the civilized world; and it can hardly be borne in the present
state of knowledge, that Austria or Russia should in the great scale
stand before France. Indeed, it is only physical power that now
prevails, and as I had most sincerely wished that France, when
oppressing others, should be driven back within her own bounds, I may
be allowed to sigh for her emancipation from foreign yoke. I cannot view
the arrangements made at Vienna as calculated to ensure even
tranquillity. There is now a kind of torpid breathing-spell; but the
fire is not extinct. The political institutions do not either here, in
Italy, or even in Germany, harmonize with the state of knowledge, with
the feelings and wishes of the people. What must be the consequence? New
conflicts whenever opportunity will offer, and bloody revolutions
effected or attempted, instead of that happy, peaceable, and gradual
improvement which philanthropists had anticipated, and which seems to be
exclusively the portion of our happy country.
We have lately lost Mme. de Staël, and she is a public loss. Her mind
improved with her years without any diminution of her fine and brilliant
genius. She was a power by herself, and had more influence on public
opinion, and even on the acts of government, than any other person not
in the ministry. I may add that she was one of your most sincere
admirers.
I thirst for America, and I hope that the time is not distant when I may
again see her shores and enjoy the blessings which are found only there.
There I also hope of once more meeting with you.
* * * * *
Nevertheless, Mr. Gallatin was far from idle during these seven years.
The wars in Europe had left a long train of diplomatic disputes behind
them. Commercial treaties were necessary for the protection of American
commerce. The old difficulties with England were still unsettled, and
were pressing for settlement. Spain was always on the verge of war with
the United States, both in respect to her undecided Florida boundary and
the status of her revolted American colonies. Mr. Gallatin was at the
head of the diplomatic service, highly valued both by Mr. Monroe, by Mr.
Adams, who, in 1817, succeeded Mr. Monroe as Secretary of State, and by
Mr. Crawford, who, as Secretary of the Treasury, had much to say in
regard to questions of foreign commerce. Perhaps there was more
unanimity among these three gentlemen, in their opinions of Mr.
Gallatin, than there was on any other political subject. In fact, since
the time of Dr. Franklin, the United States had never sent a minister
abroad with qualifications equal to his, and it will never be possible
to find a minister to France who approaches more nearly the highest
ideal; accordingly, the government mainly depended upon him for its
work, and economized his services by employing him freely in all its
foreign relations.
[Sidenote: 1818.]
The immediate object of sending a minister to France was to press for a
settlement of American claims. These claims ran back ten years or more,
to the time of the Berlin and Milan decrees, when large numbers of
American ships with their cargoes were seized and confiscated, or
destroyed at sea, by order of the Emperor Napoleon, in violation of
every principle of decency, equity, and law. To exact a settlement of
these claims was one of the points on which our country was most
determined; to elude a settlement was a matter of equal determination
with the government of Louis XVIII. No one, least of all the French
ministries of the restoration, denied the indignity and the outrage of
the robberies committed by Napoleon, nor did they quite venture to
assert that Louis was not responsible for the acts of his predecessor;
indeed, in Mr. Gallatin's first interview with the Duke de Richelieu,
that minister frankly admitted the justice of the demand, and only asked
some consideration for the helpless condition of France, weighed to the
ground by indemnities exacted from her by the great European powers. But
this was only a temporary weakness; Mr. Gallatin very soon found that
there was little hope of obtaining any formal recognition, much less any
settlement, of his claims, and he saw with some irritation and some
amusement a host of difficulties, side-issues, petty complaints, and
assumed quarrels, started by one French minister after another to
distract his attention and check his pressure, until year after year
elapsed without his gaining a single step, and at last the minister in
1823, M. de Chateaubriand, ceased to pay his notes any attention at all,
and contented himself with replying that they did not alter his view of
the subject. This exhausted Mr. Gallatin's patience, and he roundly told
M. de Chateaubriand that if France meant to remain friends with America,
her conduct must be changed. Simple as the case was, Mr. Gallatin gained
nothing in seven years of patient effort; his elaborate and admirable
notes were utterly thrown away; and he left the whole question at last,
to all appearance, precisely where he found it.
During the first year of his residence abroad, this subject of the
French claims was the only one which occupied his attention, and when it
became clear that the French government would do nothing about these, he
complained that he was absolutely without occupation. In July, 1817, he
was sent to the Hague to assist Dr. Eustis, then minister there, in
negotiating a commercial treaty with the Netherlands. This negotiation
occupied two months and was also a failure. The Dutch insisted even more
pertinaciously than the English on what Mr. Gallatin called the
"preposterous ground" of colonial equivalents. It was found impossible
even to stipulate for the mutual abandonment of discriminating duties, a
stipulation which Mr. Gallatin regarded as the most valuable part of his
convention with England in 1815. The Dutch insisted that a repeal of
discriminating duties must not be limited merely to importations of the
produce and manufactures of the two countries, and argued with great
force that the geographical position of Holland and Belgium made it
impossible to distinguish between their own produce and that brought
down the Rhine or from across their border. To this Mr. Gallatin could
only reply that his government could not offer more than fair
reciprocity, and that the abolition of discriminating duties such as the
Dutch claimed, would be wholly to the disadvantage of the American
merchant and equally so to that of the American government in its
negotiations with other powers. Yet, if the Dutch would have conceded
the first point of admitting American vessels on favorable terms to
their East India colonies, some compromise might have been effected in
regard to the discriminating duties; in the inability to effect any
transaction of this sort, the negotiation was in a friendly way
adjourned.
In the following year Mr. Gallatin was employed on a more serious
mission. The commercial convention of July 3, 1815, which he had
negotiated in London after the Treaty of Ghent, would expire by
limitation in July, 1819, and a timely agreement with the British
government in regard to its renewal was very desirable. The opportunity
was taken by the President to reopen negotiations on the whole range of
disputed points left unsettled by the Treaty of Ghent, or arising under
that treaty. As for impressment, indeed, Lord Castlereagh had very
recently again declined the American proposals for a settlement, and the
subject was therefore not pressed; but the fisheries, the commercial
intercourse with Canada and the West Indies, and the boundary from Lake
Superior to the Rocky Mountains, were all added to the negotiation;
indemnity for slaves carried away under the Treaty of Ghent was to be
urged; and the serious character of the dispute over the North-West
boundary was just beginning to make itself evident in connection with
Mr. Astor's trading settlement on the Columbia River.
Mr. Richard Rush was then the American minister in England; he had been
called into public life by Gallatin, who made him Comptroller of the
Treasury and presumably urged him for the place of Attorney-General, to
which post he had been appointed on the retirement of William Pinkney in
1811. With him Mr. Gallatin was on most friendly terms, and Mr. Rush
welcomed with great pleasure, what is always a somewhat delicate act,
the intrusion of a third person in his relations with the government to
which he was accredited. Mr. Gallatin was ordered to England, where he
arrived August 16, 1818, and was occupied till the end of October, his
"necessary and reasonable expenses" being, as usual, his only
remuneration.
The negotiation with England of 1818 was not very much more fruitful in
result than that of 1815; nevertheless the two countries had made some
progress. On the one hand, Lord Castlereagh was still far in advance of
public sentiment and had done something towards breaking down the
insular arrogance of the colonial and navigation system; on the other
hand, the United States government had plucked up courage to hasten the
rapidity of British movements by retaliatory legislation of its own.
Early in 1817 Congress passed two acts, by one of which British vessels
were prohibited from importing into the United States any articles other
than those which were produced or manufactured within the British
dominions; by the other a tonnage duty of two dollars a ton was levied
on all foreign vessels entering the United States from any foreign port
with which vessels of the United States were not ordinarily permitted to
trade. A year later, shortly before Mr. Gallatin was sent to England,
Congress had gone one step further, and had absolutely closed the ports
of the United States against every British vessel coming from ports
ordinarily closed against vessels of the United States.
This was the condition of affairs with which Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Rush
had to deal. As in 1815, the British government was represented by Mr.
Frederic Robinson, now president of the Board of Trade, assisted by Mr.
Goulburn. The American commissioners offered five articles, covering the
fisheries, the boundary, the West India trade, that with Nova Scotia and
New Brunswick, and the captured slaves. The English plenipotentiaries
offered a scheme for regulating impressment. Finally, the Americans
proposed a series of rules in regard to contraband and maritime points.
The result of repeated conferences was to throw out the articles on
maritime rights and impressment, and to refer the West India article to
the President. A convention limited to ten years was then signed
covering the fisheries, the boundary between the Lake of the Woods and
the Rocky Mountains, the joint use of the Columbia River, the slave
indemnity, and finally the renewal of the commercial convention of 1815.
On the whole, there was certainly a considerable improvement in the
relations of the two countries; even in the matter of impressments, Lord
Castlereagh was ready to concede very nearly all that was required; the
navigation of the Mississippi was definitively set at rest; even in
regard to the West India trade, Mr. Robinson made very liberal
concessions, and accepted in full the principle that this trade should
be thrown open on principles of perfect reciprocity. That the British
should have got so far as to admit that they were ready to open this
trade at all on principles of reciprocity was no small step, but when
Mr. Gallatin undertook to put upon paper his ideas of perfect
reciprocity, it was found that agreement was still out of the question.
He required that the vessels and their cargoes should on either side be
subject to no charges to which both parties should not be equally
liable, while the British insisted upon reserving the right to impose
discriminating duties in favor of the trade of Nova Scotia and New
Brunswick. Mr. Robinson did not, however, attempt to defend the dogmas
of the British colonial and navigation laws; he only urged the
impossibility of breaking them down at once. To the American argument of
reciprocity he opposed the powerful interests he was obliged to
humor,--the fish and the lumber of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick; the
salted provisions and the flour of Ireland; the shipping of England; and
the influence of the West India planters who sat in Parliament or moved
in the business circles of the city.
There could be little doubt that the new retaliatory legislation of the
United States would sooner or later bring the two countries into
collision on this old subject of controversy; for the United States
government was by no means inclined to look back with pleasure or with
pride upon the humiliations which it had endured, ever since the peace
of 1783, on this point of the colonial trade. Perhaps it had now a
tendency to assert its rights and its dignity in a tone somewhat too
abrupt, and even unnecessarily irritating to European ears. The new-born
sense of nationality with which, since the peace of Ghent, every
American citizen was swelling would tolerate from the national
government nothing short of the fullest assertion of the national pride;
and political parties no longer, as in the days of Mr. Jefferson, shrank
from supporting their rights by force. Mr. Gallatin had done what he
could to prevent mischief, and it remained to be seen whether his
efforts were to be successful. His despatches dwelt repeatedly on the
intimation of Mr. Robinson that Great Britain was certain to recede if
she were allowed time to prepare, and that unlimited intercourse with
the colonies would be the sure result of such a partial intercourse as
he offered. On the other hand, however, the United States were still
better aware that English diplomacy was inclined to respect very little
except strength.
While the colonial dispute was thus left open, another serious question
was only partially closed. On the subject of the fisheries, Mr. Gallatin
effected a compromise not altogether satisfactory even to himself; he
obtained an express recognition of the permanent right, but he was
obliged to concede essential limitations of the practice. Perhaps,
indeed, this question is one of those which admits of no complete
settlement; as Mr. Gallatin wrote on November 6 to Mr. Adams: "The right
of taking and drying fish in harbors within the exclusive jurisdiction
of Great Britain, particularly on coasts now inhabited, was extremely
obnoxious to her, and was considered as what the French civilians call a
servitude.... I am satisfied that we could have obtained additional
fishing-ground in exchange of the words 'for ever.'... Yet I will not
conceal that this subject caused me more anxiety than any other branch
of the negotiations, and that, after having participated in the Treaty
of Ghent, it was a matter of regret to be obliged to sign an agreement
which left the United States in any respect in a worse situation than
before the war.... But ... if a compromise was to take place, the
present time and the terms proposed appeared more eligible than the
chance of future contingencies.... With much reluctance I yielded to
those considerations, rendered more powerful by our critical situation
with Spain, and used my best endeavors to make the compromise on the
most advantageous terms that could be obtained."[155]
On his return to Paris in October, 1818, an entirely different class of
objects forced themselves on Mr. Gallatin's attention. This was the
period when Spain's American colonies were in revolt, and it was of the
highest importance to the United States that Europe should intervene in
no way in the quarrel. Mr. Gallatin's business was to obtain early
information of whatever concerned this subject, and to prepare the
European powers for the recognition by the United States of the South
American republics. The Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle was then sitting,
and its proceedings were an object of intense curiosity throughout the
world. So far as the policy of the United States was concerned, the
result of this congress was very favorable; for Spain, finding herself
abandoned by Europe, was driven into a treaty for the sale of Florida.
This treaty was made, but its ratification was refused by the Spanish
government on various pretexts, until a new revolution in Spain brought
about a change of policy. In all these transactions Mr. Gallatin was
deeply interested, and his advices to the home government furnished much
of its best information.
[Sidenote: 1819.]
Meanwhile, his powers to negotiate a commercial convention with France
had lain nearly dormant, until in 1819 they were called out by a
complication which soon brought the two countries to the verge of a
commercial war. The French commercial system had never been a very
enlightened one, but so long as her shipping remained in the state of
nullity in which the long wars left it, American commerce had hardly
perceived the fact that American ships were loaded with extra charges
and discriminating duties such as made quite impossible all effective
competition with the vessels of France. When at last the French
commercial marine revived, complaints of the excessive burden of these
discriminating duties and charges began to pour in from American consuls
and merchants. The question was one of time only, when all commerce
between the United States and France would be carried on exclusively in
French ships. Well aware that the French government was entirely
controlled in its commercial policy by the spirit of monopoly and narrow
interests, Mr. Gallatin, while remonstrating to the minister of foreign
affairs, warned the President that mere remonstrance would have no
effect and that stronger measures must be used. He would have preferred
an amendment to the Constitution authorizing Congress to lay an export
duty on American produce when exported in foreign vessels; but, rather
than wait for so distant and uncertain a remedy, he recommended that
Congress should at once impose a countervailing tonnage duty of $12.50
per ton on French ships. This despatch was written on the 25th October,
1819. The rest of the story may be found recorded in Mr. Adams's Diary:
[Sidenote: 1820.]
"May 15, 1820.--...Mr. Hyde de Neuville, the French minister, was
there [at the Capitol] much fretted at the passage of a bill for levying
a tonnage duty of $18 a ton upon French vessels, to commence the 1st
July next. It is merely a countervailing duty to balance discriminating
duties in France upon the same articles as imported in French or
American vessels. It passes on the earnest recommendation of Mr.
Gallatin after a neglect of three years by the French government of our
repeated proposals to negotiate a commercial treaty, and after full
warning given by Mr. Gallatin that, if they did not come to some
arrangement with us, countervailing measures would be taken at the
present session of Congress. The bill has been before Congress half the
session, and De Neuville had never mentioned it to me. He probably had
flattered himself that it would not pass. Now, after it had passed both
Houses, he was in great agitation about it, and entreated me to ask the
President to object to its passage, at least to postpone its
commencement till the 1st of October. He said the 1st of July was only
six weeks off, and would not even give the French merchants notice of
what was awaiting them.... I told him it was now too late to make the
amendment. I mentioned, however, his request to the President, who said
it could not be complied with."
"September 5, 1820.--I received a despatch of 14th July from A.
Gallatin, after Mr. Hyde de Neuville had arrived in Paris. Gallatin
encloses a copy of a very able note that he had sent to Baron Pasquier,
the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, concerning the tonnage duty upon
French vessels coming into the ports of the United States, laid at the
last session of Congress, but he complains that the measures of
Congress, which he had recommended, were not adopted, but others more
irritating to France, and also that his letters were published. The law
of Congress was certainly a blister, and his letters were not oil to
soften its application. The commencement of the law was fixed too soon,
and the duty was too high. But France had been so sluggish and so deaf
to friendly representations that it was necessary to awaken her by acts
of another tone."
[Sidenote: 1821.]
Certainly government was much to blame in this matter. Mr. Gallatin sent
over a careful outline of the bill he wished to pass, fixing the duty at
$12.50 and arranging the details so as to facilitate negotiation.
Government proceeded to enact an unjust and extravagant bill, and then
threw the responsibility on Mr. Gallatin. This is the special annoyance
to which diplomatic agents are most frequently subjected. Mr. Gallatin
remonstrated to his government and maintained his position stoutly
against the French minister, who, after at once doubling the French
discriminating duties, at last transferred the negotiation to
Washington, where Mr. Adams was obliged to take it up.
"February 24, 1821.--I called at the President's with a note received of
yesterday's date from the French minister, Hyde de Neuville. I sent him
two or three days since the copy of a full power, made out by the
President's direction, authorizing me to treat with him upon commercial
arrangements. The note of yesterday was introductory to the negotiation.
Its principal object was to ask an answer to a long letter which De
Neuville had written to me the 16th of June, 1818, upon a claim raised
by the French government upon the 8th article of the Louisiana cession
treaty. I had already answered one long note of his upon the subject,
and had left his reply unanswered only to avoid altercation upon a claim
which had no substance and upon which my answer to his first letter was
of itself a sufficient answer to his reply. But when after the Act of
Congress of 15th May last, and the retaliatory ordinances of the King of
France of 26th July, the French government had been dragged into this
negotiation, finding themselves unanswerably pressed by notes of great
ability from Gallatin, they started from the course by setting up again
this Louisiana claim and declaring it indispensably connected with the
arrangement of the question upon discriminating duties. And as Mr.
Gallatin was not instructed upon the Louisiana claim, they made this a
pretext for transferring the negotiation here, and sending De Neuville
back here to finish it, with an ulterior destination to Brazil, held out
to our cotton-planters 'in terrorem.'"
But if Mr. Adams irritated Mr. Gallatin by the manner of carrying out
his recommendation of retaliatory laws against France, Mr. Gallatin
irritated Mr. Adams by his treatment of another diplomatic difficulty
still more delicate. A French ship, the Apollon, had been seized by
order of our government in the river St. Mary's, on the Spanish side,
for infringing and evading our navigation laws. The seizure was a
high-handed act, hardly defensible in law, and of the same class with
many acts rendered, or supposed to be rendered, necessary by the
inefficiency of the Spanish administration in Florida. Mr. Adams, who
rarely allowed himself to be hindered by merely technical impediments
in carrying out a correct policy, defended this act much as he defended
the far more unjustifiable execution of Arbuthnot and Ambrister by
General Jackson; that is, he made the best defence he could, and carried
it off with a high hand. Mr. Gallatin, however, tried to justify the
seizure by proving that it took place in American waters, and in
discussing the subject in correspondence with Mr. Adams he added the
remark which was, to any one who knew his mode of thought, quite
inevitable as his summing up, that the tenor of Mr. Adams's argument was
dangerous and would not find acceptance in Europe. This seems to have
extremely irritated the Secretary, and called out the following entry in
his Diary:
"8th November, 1821.--The most extraordinary part of Gallatin's conduct
is that after a long argument to the French government upon grounds
entirely new and different from those we had taken here, he gives us
distinctly to understand that he considers all these grounds, ours and
his own, as not worth a straw. I asked Calhoun to-day what he thought it
could mean. He said perhaps it was the pride of opinion. I think it lies
deeper. Gallatin is a man of first-rate talents, conscious and vain of
them, and mortified in his ambition, checked, as it has been, after
attaining the last step to the summit; timid in great perils, tortuous
in his paths; born in Europe, disguising and yet betraying a
supercilious prejudice of European superiority of intellect, and holding
principles pliable to circumstances, occasionally mistaking the left for
the right-handed wisdom."
The character thus drawn by Mr. Adams is very interesting as a study of
something more than Mr. Gallatin only. Mr. Gallatin certainly was a man
of first-rate talents and was no doubt conscious of them; he would have
been more than human had he not felt the injustice of that prejudice
which had shut the door of the Presidency in his face because he was
born in another republic; he certainly had the faculty of keeping his
opinions, whatever they were, to himself, which is always an assumption
of superiority; he was moreover an extremely adroit politician, full of
resource, conciliatory and pliable in a remarkable degree; possibly,
too, he may have at times mistaken his path. Timid he was not, but his
courage was of a kind so perfectly self-assured that it often
disregarded imputations of timidity which would have been intolerable to
more sensitive men. Mr. Adams himself long afterwards and in the most
public manner paid a tribute to his absolute honesty such as he would
have been willing to pay hardly any other very prominent man of the
time, unless it were Madison and Monroe. The character may, therefore,
be admitted as at least half true, and as throwing much light on its
subject; but it was very amusing as coming from the sources that
produced it. Ambition is not, within reasonable limits, a deadly sin,
but if it were, there was not a leading man of that time, from Thomas
Jefferson to De Witt Clinton, whose chance of salvation was better than
Mr. Gallatin's. Vanity is a pardonable weakness, but the virtue of
extreme modesty was not among those merits which most characterized the
American statesmen of President Monroe's day. Pliability in politics, if
accompanied by honesty, is a virtue; business can be conducted in no
other way; but in all Mr. Gallatin's long career there was and was to be
no parallel to the political pliability to be found among the Cabinet
officers of President Monroe. Human nature is only relatively perfect;
absolute perfection is a higher standard than statesmen are required to
attain; but even as regards relative perfection, there is a curious
suggestiveness in finding Mr. Gallatin singled out for pride of opinion,
vanity, timidity, and tortuousness, pliability, superciliousness, and
mistakes of judgment, among Mr. Calhoun and Mr. Adams, Mr. Crawford and
Mr. Clay.
This, however, was merely one of those diplomatic quarrels which, like
those at Ghent, have no real significance. Mr. Gallatin was probably
right in the opinion which vexed his chief. At all events, the French
negotiation went on undisturbed, and even after its transfer to
Washington, which a very sensitive man would have felt as a slight, Mr.
Gallatin continued his active assistance to Mr. Adams and pressed upon
the French government with all his weight. Ultimately an agreement was
effected and a treaty signed at Washington which, as Mr. Gallatin seems
to have thought, conceded somewhat more than was necessary, but which at
least put an end to the commercial war.
[Sidenote: 1822.]
The conclusion of this treaty had been the principal object of Mr.
Gallatin's continuance at Paris, but this affair, the anxious condition
of our relations with Spain, and his own increasing sense of
satisfaction in diplomatic life, made him contented and even happy to
remain over the year 1822. Mr. Crawford, whose candidacy for the
succession to Mr. Monroe was then likely to prove successful, took pains
to maintain close relations with Mr. Gallatin, and was especially
anxious for his early return in order that his influence might be felt
in the important State of Pennsylvania. This duty seems, however, to
have little suited Mr. Gallatin's taste. He remained of his own accord
in Paris, his opinion agreeing with that of the President that his
presence there was desirable. At the same time he declined the office of
president of the Bank of the United States. While thus holding himself
aloof from public interests in America, he took a resolution which seems
to show how little he understood the change that time and experience had
worked in his circumstances. He sent his younger son to New Geneva with
directions to build a stone house in extension of the brick building he
had constructed thirty years before; here he proposed to return with his
family and to pass the remainder of his life.
One of Sir Walter Scott's favorite sayings was that the wisest of our
race often reserve the average stock of folly to be all expended upon
some one flagrant absurdity. He might have added that when a shrewd and
cautious man once commits such a folly there is more than a fair
probability of his repeating it. Mr. Calhoun, who should have had some
sympathy with this trait, may have been right in seeking for the source
of unusual acts in "pride of opinion;" or a wider philosophy might trace
such eccentricities to the peculiar structure of individual minds and to
ineradicable habits of thought. Mr. Gallatin had in the pride of youth
and the full fervor of fresh enthusiasm committed the folly of burying
himself in the wilderness, and now, when more than sixty years old,
after an active life of constant excitement, with a family of children
almost entirely educated in Paris, and a wife who even thirty years
before had found the western country intolerable, he proposed to return
there and end his life. Had the great wave of western improvement swept
New Geneva before it in its course, there might have been an excuse for
Mr. Gallatin's determination; but New Geneva remained what he had left
it, a beautiful and peaceful mountain valley, where no human being could
find other employment than that of cultivating the soil with his own
hands. There Mr. Gallatin decided to go, on the extraordinary plea that
he could afford to live nowhere else, and the loss of a part of his
private income in 1823 only fixed him more firmly in his determination.
Had he wished to return to Congress or to political life, there might
have been reason in his course; but the only political position he cared
to hold was that of minister in Paris, and this he relinquished in order
to live on the banks of the Monongahela. The following letters will show
what his friends wished and expected him to do, and what he did. His own
letters from Paris, in reply to Mr. Crawford and Mr. Astor, are lost or
destroyed; but it is clear that he paid very little attention to their
suggestions. His own preference would have been to take only a leave of
absence in 1823, to arrange his affairs and settle his sons in business;
then to return himself to Paris.
CRAWFORD TO GALLATIN.
WASHINGTON, 13th May, 1822.
MY DEAR SIR,--It is now nearly two years since I have received a letter
from you. Your last was dated about the 30th August, 1820.
The negotiation between France and the United States which has been
carried on here for two years past, concerning our commercial relations,
is likely to terminate successfully. I know of nothing which will
probably prevent it, unless our determination to support every officer
of the government in violating the orders, laws, and Constitution of the
government and nation should oppose an insurmountable obstacle to it.
Captain Stockton, of the Alligator, has seized a number of French
vessels under the French flag, with French papers and French officers,
and crews at least not composed of American citizens; yet we have
tendered no satisfaction to the French government for this outrage upon
their flag and upon the principles which we stoutly defend against
England. A disposition to discuss has always characterized our
government, but until recently an appearance of moderation has marked
our discussions. Now our disposition to discuss seems to have augmented,
and the spirit of conciliation has manifestly been abandoned by our
councils. We are determined to say harsher things than are said to us,
and to have the last word. Where this temper will lead us cannot be
distinctly foreseen. We are now upon bad terms with the principal
maritime states, and perhaps on the brink of a rupture with Russia on
account of the prohibition to trade with the north-west coast beyond the
51st degree of north latitude and to approach within 100 Italian miles
of the islands on the Asiatic side. I have labored to restrain this
predominant disposition of the government, but have succeeded only
partially in softening the asperities which invariably predominate in
the official notes of the State Department. If these notes had been
permitted to remain as originally drafted, we should, I believe, have
before this time been unembarrassed by diplomatic relations with more
than one power. The tendency to estrange us from all foreign powers,
which the style of the notes of the State Department has uniformly had,
has been so often demonstrated, yet so often permitted, that I have
almost given up the idea of maintaining friendly relations with those
powers; but of late another embarrassment no less perplexing in its
tendency has arisen. Our Mars[156] has intuitive perceptions not only
upon military organization, but upon fortifications and other military
subjects. These intuitions of his have involved the President in
contests with both Houses of Congress. He has contrived to make them
those of the President instead of his own. A state of irritation
prevails which greatly exceeds anything which has occurred in the
history of this government. The Secretary of War is now, in the
estimation of the public, lord of the ascendant. Certain it is that
every appointment in Florida was made without my knowledge, and even the
appointments connected with my own Department have been made without
regard to my wishes, or rather without ascertaining what they were.
It is understood that an impression has been made on the mind of the
President that the rejection of the military nominations by the Senate
has been effected by my influence.
I have known this for nearly two months, but have taken no step to
counteract it, and shall take none, because I think it will not be
injurious to me to remain in this state or even to be removed from
office.
The latter, however, is an honor which I shall not solicit, although I
do not believe it would be injurious to me in a political point of view.
You will perceive by the newspapers that much agitation has already
prevailed as to the election of the next President. The war candidate,
as Mr. Randolph calls him, is understood to be extremely active in his
operations, and, as it has been said by religious zealots, appears to be
determined to take the citadel by storm.
An impression prevails that Mr. Adams's friends, in despair of his
success, have thrown themselves into the scale of his more youthful
friend, lately converted into a competitor. You will have seen that Mr.
Lowndes has been nominated by the South Carolina Legislature, or rather
by a portion of it. This event, as well as the present course of the
Secretary of War, it is believed may be traced to the election of
Governor Clark, of Georgia. This gentleman is personally my enemy. He
was elected in 1819 in opposition to Colonel Troup by a majority of 13
votes. In 1821 he was opposed by the same gentleman. Mr. Calhoun, Mr.
Adams, and Mr. Lowndes had conceived the idea that, if he should be
re-elected, the electoral vote of Georgia would be against me. He was
re-elected by a majority of 2 votes. Calhoun and Lowndes had through the
year favored Mr. Adams's pretensions; they found, however, that it was
an up-hill work. Considering me _hors du combat_, and finding Mr. A.
unacceptable to the South, each of them supposed that the Southern
interest would become the property of the first adventurer. Mr. C. had
made a tour of observation in Pennsylvania, whilst Mr. L. kept watch at
home. When the result of the Georgia election was known, Mr. C. threw
himself upon Pennsylvania, and Mr. L., who had remained in South
Carolina until after the meeting of its Legislature, was nominated by a
portion of it to the Presidency.
A conference took place between them, but no adjustment was effected, as
each determined to hold the vantage-ground which he was supposed to have
gained. The delusion as to Georgia has passed away, but Mr. C. cannot
now recede, and entertains confident hopes of success. Pennsylvania he
calculates upon, as well as upon many other States. Mr. Clay is held up
by his friends, but has not taken any decided measure. I consider
everything that has passed as deciding nothing. Everything will depend
on the election of Congress, which takes place this year in all the
States except Virginia, North Carolina, and Tennessee. My own impression
is that Mr. C. will be the Federal candidate if his name is kept up. If
he should be put down, and I think he will be, especially if
Pennsylvania should declare against him, Mr. Adams will be the Federal
candidate. Mr. Clay will be up if Pennsylvania, Virginia, or New York
will declare for him. At present there is not much prospect of either.
The stockholders of the Bank of the United States are becoming restive
under the low dividends which they receive. A decided opposition to Mr.
Cheves will be made the next year. I understand that many of the
stockholders are for placing you at the head of that institution. I know
not whether you wish such an appointment. The election of governor comes
on next year. Many persons are spoken of for that office. Bryan, Ingham,
Lowrie, and Lacock are among the number, and some intimations have
reached me that, if you were here, you might be selected. Ingham is
connected with Mr. Calhoun. The others are unfavorable to his views.
Present my respects to Mrs. Gallatin and every member of your family.
I remain, dear sir, your sincere friend.
CRAWFORD TO GALLATIN.
WASHINGTON, 26th June, 1822.
MY DEAR SIR,--On the 24th inst. a commercial convention was signed by
Mr. Adams and Mr. De Neuville. It is published in the Intelligencer of
this day. If it is permitted to operate a few years, all discriminating
duties will cease. I am, however, apprehensive that it will not be
permitted to produce this effect....
In my last letter I suggested the probability that the presidency of the
Bank of the United States might be offered to you if you were in the
United States at the time of the next election. Mr. Cheves has informed
me confidentially that he will resign his office about the latter end of
this year. He will declare this intention when the next dividend shall
be declared.
As the commercial convention with France has been agreed upon, and as I
understand that all the indemnity which will probably ever be obtained
will have been obtained before you receive this letter, all inducement
to a longer residence in France is at an end. Independent of the office
to which I have referred, that of Governor of Pennsylvania will be
disposed of next year. If you intend to engage in any way whatever in
the concerns of this country after your return, I think you ought to be
here during the next autumn. I believe there is no disposition in any
party to re-elect Heister. The schismatics, who, with Binns, opposed
Finley at the last election, are desirous of uniting with their former
friends in the next election. It is understood that they are desirous of
bringing you forward, and I presume the great body of the party will
meet them upon this subject. Ingham will be supported in caucus by those
devoted to F., but that, I believe, is only a small part of those who
supported him in his last effort. Bryan, the late auditor, Lowrie, and
Lacock are spoken of, but no commitment has taken place except by Ingham
and his friends, who, it is understood, wish to connect that question
with the election of Mr. Calhoun as President. The other gentlemen are
understood to be decidedly opposed to the pretensions of the latter
gentleman.
Mr. De Neuville will be able to give you many details upon our local
politics, with which he is pretty well acquainted.
The collision between the President and Senate upon certain military
nominations has very much soured his mind and given a direction to his
actions which I conceive to be unfortunate for the nation as well as for
himself. I hope, however, that a better state of feeling will, after the
first irritation has passed off, be restored and cherished on both
sides. The public seems to have taken less interest in this affair than
I had expected. Two or three criticisms have appeared in the
Intelligencer upon the conduct of the Senate, but they have attracted
but little attention in any part of the Union.
The controversy which is going on between Mr. Adams and Mr. Russell, in
which you are made a party, has attracted considerable notice, and will
probably continue to command attention. You will readily perceive that
the object of the party was less to injure Mr. Adams than to benefit
another by placing him in a conspicuous point of view, and especially by
showing that Western interests could not be safely trusted to persons
residing in the Atlantic States....
J. J. ASTOR TO GALLATIN.
NEW YORK, 18th October, 1822.
... Your leaving Paris will be a great loss to me, if I go, as I expect
to. I really think you will not like it so much in this country as you
did, and I believe you had better remain where you are. For the interest
of the United States Bank I am sorry that you will not take it. For your
own sake I am glad. It is, as you say, a troublesome situation, and I
doubt if much credit is to be got by it. I have been to-day spoken to
about your taking the situation, but I stated that you decline it, and I
think you are right. Matters here go on irregular enough. It's all the
while up and down. So soon as people have a little money they run into
extravagancy, get in debt, and down it goes. Exchange is again 12-1/2 to
13, and people will again ship specie, the banks again curtail
discounts, bankruptcy ensues, exchange will fall for a short time, and
then we have the same scene over again. You know so well this country
and character of the people that I need say no more. We have plenty
candidates for President; Mr. Clay, Mr. Calhoun, and Crawford are the
most prominent. Mr. Crawford, I think, will get it....
GALLATIN TO MONROE.
_Paris_, 13th November, 1822.
[Sidenote: 1823.]
With respect to my longer stay here I entertain a just sense of your
partiality and kind feelings towards me; and I may add that, so far as
I am personally concerned, the station is not only highly honorable, but
more agreeable than any other public employment which [I] might fill.
But considerations connected with my children and with my private
affairs imperiously require my presence in America, at least for some
months. Under those circumstances I will, with your permission, return
next spring, but take leave here as only going with leave of absence. I
would probably be ready to return here in the autumn, and take care that
the public interest should not in the mean while suffer. Mr. Sheldon is
indeed fully equal to the task of managing all the current affairs of
the mission; and France has given us the example of leaving a chargé for
a short time. But this must not by any means prevent you from filling
the place at once on my return, if you think it proper. I will only
thank you to let me know your intention in that respect as soon as
possible after the receipt of this letter.
GALLATIN TO J. Q. ADAMS.
PARIS, 28th February, 1823.
DEAR SIR,--There not being at this time the least prospect of a
settlement of our claims, I do not perceive any reason connected with
the public service for protracting my stay in this country. I will
terminate, as far as this government will allow, what relates to the
fisheries, although I would have wished to hear from you on the subject;
and some heavy losses I have experienced at home, as well as certain
family circumstances, imperiously requiring my presence there, it is my
intention, if nothing new and important of a public nature shall take
place, to take my departure in the course of the spring. I had already
written a private letter on that subject to the President, to which I
had hoped to have received an answer before this time, and in which I
had asked only for leave of absence. But, this being an unusual course,
it may be better at once to appoint a successor, and I wish it to be
done. If the President shall think it more eligible to wait for the
meeting of the Senate, you know that Mr. Sheldon is fully competent to
carry on the current business; and I believe him equally so to act on
any incident that may arise. As to the still uncertain war with Spain,
nothing can possibly be necessary here on our part than perhaps some
remonstrance in case of infractions of our neutral rights. There is no
disposition on the part of France to commit acts of that kind, and that
subject is also quite familiar to Mr. Sheldon.
GALLATIN TO J. Q. ADAMS.
PARIS, 18th April, 1823.
SIR,--I had the honor to receive your despatch No. 55, and intend to
avail myself of the leave of absence granted by the President, and to
take my departure in about a month, leaving Mr. Sheldon as chargé
d'affaires.
I beg you to express my thanks to the President, but to repeat that it
is not my wish that another appointment should be delayed on my account,
if deemed useful.
* * * * *
Mr. Gallatin accordingly left Paris with his family about the middle of
May, 1823, and arrived in New York on the 24th June. The following
letter, the last which Mr. Crawford wrote him, was not received by Mr.
Gallatin in Europe. Whether the intensity of that struggle for the
Presidency in which Mr. Crawford was now engaged had embittered his
mind, or whether the paralysis which struck him down only a short time
afterwards was casting its shadow before it, this letter shows a
peculiar irritation which seems almost ready to make Mr. Gallatin
himself its victim.
CRAWFORD TO GALLATIN.
WASHINGTON, 26th May, 1823.
MY DEAR SIR,--Your letter of the 27th of September last was received
some time in December thereafter, and is the last letter I have had from
you.
Some time in December I understood you had applied for leave of absence,
and shortly after was informed that it had been granted.
In the latter end of April the President showed me a private letter
from you dated in the early part of March, in which you declare your
determination to leave France the 10th of this month, and a few days
afterwards I was informed that Mr. Adams had requested you to remain. I
understand that this request had been made in consequence of the
expected rupture between France and Spain. It would therefore appear
that the reasons you assigned for believing your presence at Paris would
be useless have not been considered good by the Secretary of State. To
me they appeared conclusive when I read the letter, and reflection has
only confirmed my first impressions. It is not pretended that the war
with Spain will favor the efforts which have for twelve years past been
made without success to procure indemnity for unjust spoliations
committed upon our merchants. Infractions of our neutral rights must
then be apprehended before a successor could be sent. The interest of
France to strip Great Britain of an excuse to interfere in the war is
the best guaranty that can be offered for her scrupulous respect for
neutral rights. All that an American minister can do during the present
year at Paris will be to give information of what is going on and
speculate upon what may possibly be done in the progress of the war. If
the Secretary was at Paris, or if his protégé, Mr. [Alexander] Everett,
was there, the curiosity of the government to grasp at future events
would have ample gratification. I do not know Mr. Sheldon well enough to
form an opinion of his capacity to minister to this propensity of man,
but I presume he would supply it with as much, if not as delicate, food
as it would receive from you.
Some of the little people who buzz about the government have, I
understand, been very busy in the expression of their opinions that the
change of relations between France and Spain renders highly important
that you should remain. The people have had their cue, and repeat their
lesson by rote, for if they were capable of reasoning themselves they
would see the folly of their declarations. It is impossible that
reflecting men whose judgments are not led astray by some strong
impression resulting from selfish purposes, can believe that it is of
any importance to have a minister at Paris at this moment.
The reason then assigned for this request is not the true one. That
must be sought not in Paris but in the United States. You will
understand it as well as I do upon a moment's reflection. Your presence
in the United States during the present year may not suit the views and
projects of certain gentlemen; it is, therefore, necessary to devise
some cause for keeping you at Paris. It is possible that if Mr. Rush was
disposed to return, some cause connected with the rupture between France
and Spain would be discovered to render his stay in London necessary. As
that gentleman, however, has written a number of letters to his friends
in Pennsylvania which may have an effect somewhat similar to that which
was apprehended from your return, it is possible that it may facilitate
his return.
I have written this letter under an impression that the request of Mr.
Adams may arrive at Paris before you leave it. Your friends are desirous
of your return, and will be disappointed if you do not. I have
understood that Mr. Astor has received a letter from you as late as the
17th ult. which is indicative of your intention to return, but Mr. Astor
thinks that you will not, and that you ought not. He is probably
governed in this opinion by his interests and wishes. If you do not
return in the Montano, which it is now said will not sail before the
20th of this month, he will see you before this letter reaches you, as I
shall confide it to the care of Mr. Erving, who, it is understood, will
not sail until the arrival of the Montano.
Your friends Lacock and Roberts are very decided on the question which
now attracts the attention of the nation. Indeed, there are but few
exceptions among your old political associates. Many of them,
unfortunately, are no more, and new men have filled their places; the
new-comers, however, have a high respect for your character, talents,
and opinions, and wish to see and converse with you upon this
question....
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