The question whether the Cabinet and Senate would support Mr. Gallatin

was, therefore, the necessary point to decide in advance. In the

Cabinet, Mr. Robert Smith was the dangerous element. In the Senate,

General Samuel Smith and his friend Mr. Giles were the chief disturbing

forces, since without them the fulminations of Leib and the Aurora

offered, after all, no very serious danger. Unfortunately, a

circumstance had now occurred which seriously embittered the relations

between Mr. Gallatin and the Smiths. The failure and disappearance of

the navy agent at Leghorn disclosed a somewhat loose way of managing

business in the Navy Department, which had bought exchange on Leghorn,

largely in bills on Samuel Smith and his relations, in excess of its

wants, while at the same time it had neglected to make its naval

officers draw on Leghorn, so that they had drawn on London at

considerable extra expense. Thus, at the close of the Tripoli war a

large balance had remained in the hands of the navy agent at Leghorn,

which was partly sent back in specie to America by a ship of war, and

partly carried off by the navy agent to Paris, where he was arrested by

the interposition of our minister, General Armstrong, and compelled to

disgorge. In all this there was enough to irritate Mr. Gallatin, who had

for eight years endured, with such patience as he could command, the

loose and extravagant habits of the Navy Department, and who was now

making a new effort to enforce a thorough system of accountability in

that department. But there appeared at first sight to be something still

more objectionable in this transaction. Mr. Robert Smith, as Secretary

of the Navy, had bought bills of exchange to the amount of a quarter of

a million dollars, within two years, from his brother General Smith and

his connections, and on the face of the accounts it appeared that these

were to some extent accommodation bills; in other words, that the

government money had been by collusion left in the hands of General

Smith's firm until it suited their convenience to remit it to Leghorn.

The effect of this operation was to give the firm of Smith & Buchanan

the use of public money without obliging them to make the same immediate

provision for honoring their bills as would in other cases have been

necessary; to give them also the almost exclusive privilege of selling

bills on Leghorn, and to throw upon the public the risk arising from

protested bills. This affair came to the knowledge of Mr. Gallatin at

the time when General Smith was, with the aid of Mr. Giles and Dr. Leib,

forcing Mr. Robert Smith upon Mr. Madison as Secretary of State, and in

conjunction with his brother-in-law, Mr. Wilson Cary Nicholas,

overthrowing Mr. Gallatin's plans of public expenditure. He was very

indignant, and expressed his opinions to his friend Joseph H. Nicholson,

who made no secret of the story and used it to prevent the re-election

of General Smith to the Senate. In the extra session in June, 1809, John

Randolph, at the urgent request of Judge Nicholson, procured the

appointment of an investigating committee, which published the facts.

Mr. Gallatin was called upon for a report, which he made in February,

1811. General Smith on his side made a statement which certainly

relieved him to a considerable extent from the weight of some of the

most doubtful parts of the transaction. Mr. Gallatin had nothing to do

with Judge Nicholson's proceeding, and gave it no encouragement, but his

feeling in regard to the scandal was very strong, and after the attacks

made upon the Smiths, both by the investigating committee of the House

and by the Baltimore press, the following exchange of letters occurred:

GENERAL SAMUEL SMITH TO GALLATIN.

BALTIMORE, 26th June, 1809.

SIR,--I do myself the honor to enclose two papers for your perusal. The

editors of the Federal Republican make use of your name to bolster them

up in the nefarious charge they have made against me, in the following

manner, to wit: "Mr. Gallatin, we understand, spoke of this transaction

in terms of great indignation." I will not believe that any of that

indignation could have been directed at me. I believe it impossible that

any man who has the least pretensions to character would commit an act

so base as that charged on me, to wit: "to secure a debt which I

considered bad by transferring the same to the Navy Department, and thus

involving the United States in the loss." Some time after my house drew

the last bill (for I was at Washington), an evil report had been sent

from Leghorn relative to Degen, Purviance & Co., in consequence whereof

Mr. Oliver (who had a ship ready to sail to their address) sent an

agent, who, finding the house in as good credit as any in that city, did

put the cargo under their care. I thought the house superior to any in

Leghorn.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

S. SMITH.

GALLATIN TO GENERAL SMITH.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT, 29th June, 1809.

SIR,--I received the day before yesterday your letter of 26th inst.,

enclosing two Baltimore papers.

I have no other knowledge of the circumstances connected with the naval

agency of Degen and Purviance than what is derived from their account as

stated by the accountant of the Navy Department. The transaction, such

as it appears there, is, under all its aspects, the most extraordinary

that has fallen within my knowledge since I have been in this

Department. It has certainly left very unfavorable impressions on my

mind, and these have on one occasion been communicated verbally to a

friend. Yet I hardly need say that I never supposed that the bills had

been sold to government for the purpose "of securing a debt which you

then considered bad, and of thus throwing the loss on the United

States." But I did believe that you had drawn without having previously

placed sufficient funds in the hands of Degen and Purviance, and that

they had accepted your bills and passed the amount to the credit of the

United States, without having at the time in their hands sufficient

funds belonging to you. That this was my impression you will perceive by

the enclosed extract of a letter to Mr. Armstrong; and Mr. Purviance's

statement, which you enclosed to me, shows that I was not mistaken. I do

not intend to comment on this and other circumstances of the case.

Taking them altogether, I have believed that, if we failed in our

endeavors to recover the money from Degen and from Mr. Purviance, we

might have recourse against the drawers of the bills.

I am, sir, &c.

Such a letter was not calculated to conciliate the Smiths, and appears

to have received no reply. General Smith ultimately secured his

re-election to the Senate. As the case stood, therefore, Mr. Gallatin

could count with absolute certainty upon the determined personal

hostility of General Smith, Mr. Giles, and Dr. Leib, backed by the

vigorous tactics of Duane and the Aurora, and he had to decide the very

serious question whether he should remain in the Cabinet in the face of

so alarming a party defection, or whether he should give way to it and

retire. On the 11th May, 1809, he wrote to Judge Nicholson that the

ensuing session would decide this point. Judge Nicholson replied in his

own impetuous style: "Your retiring from office is a subject upon which

I do not like to reflect, because I believe that you will be a great

public loss. It will be a loss that Mr. Madison will feel immediately,

but the public will not perceive it in its full extent for some years.

When the government gets entirely in the possession of those men who are

resolved to seize it, and their selfish and mercenary motives and

conduct are hereafter exposed, as they must be, the public will then

perceive how important it would have been to retain a man who was at

once capable and honest. But I think, were I in your situation, I

should not continue in the present state of the Cabinet, and I should

tell Mr. Madison that it was impossible to serve with Mr. Smith after a

development of the late transaction. The most perverse man must

acknowledge the absolute dishonesty that is apparent on the face of it.

I have never believed that you took as strong ground in the Cabinet as

you ought to do, and it is time that you should do more than content

yourself with a bare expression of opinion. I should say that Mr. Smith

or myself must go out, and Mr. Madison ought to know you too well to

believe that this contained anything of a threat. If you are disposed to

continue in the Treasury, the Department of State might certainly be

filled with an abler and a better man. Our love to Mrs. Gallatin. Tell

her I agree with her that vice and corruption do rule everywhere, and it

arises entirely from the ill-timed modesty of virtue."

This last paragraph is in reply to the concluding paragraph of Mr.

Gallatin's letter: "Mrs. Gallatin says that vice and intrigue are

all-powerful here and there [in Baltimore]. I tell her that virtue is

its own reward, and she insists that that language is mere affectation."

What Mr. Gallatin's frame of mind now was may be seen from a letter to

his old friend Badollet, whom he had sent out to the land-office at

Vincennes, in the Indiana Territory, and who, discovering that vice and

intrigue ruled even there, was carrying on a fierce and passionate

struggle with General W. H. Harrison, the governor, to prevent the

introduction of negro slavery.

GALLATIN TO BADOLLET.

WASHINGTON, 12th May, 1809.

I have received your letter of 7th March, and am as desirous as yourself

of a refreshing interview. The summer session has prevented my going to

Fayette this spring, but I must go there either in August or September.

I cannot yet determine the precise week or month, and will not be able

to stay more than four or five days, unless I return at that time with

my family for the purpose of permanently residing there, which is not

impossible, though not yet decided on. The decision, not to induce you

into mistake, rests entirely with myself. Will it be prudent for you to

incur the expense and trouble of so long a journey merely in order to

see me? It was with regret that I saw you go to Vincennes; for I

apprehended the climate, and I hated the distance. But there was no

option. The Ohio representative claimed for residents there the

exclusive right of filling the Federal offices in that State, and it was

your express opinion that you could not subsist in Greene County. The

same obstacles seem to oppose a change. I see no prospect of your being

transferred to a nearer district, and you will find the same difficulty

in supporting your family in case you should return to Pennsylvania.

Still, I not only feel your situation, but I _think_ that your happiness

in the eve of life will in part depend on our spending it in the same

vicinity. I _know_ that it will be the case with me. If you can perceive

any means in which I can assist to attain that object, state it fully

and in all its details; that we may attempt whatever is practicable, but

nothing rashly. What would your little property in Indiana sell for?

What would be the expenses of bringing your family up the river? What

are the precise ages and capacities of your children? I do not know what

you can do yourself without an office, but I will not prejudge, and I

earnestly wish that we may discover some means of _reunion_.

As to your squabbles and disappointment, they are matters of course. At

what time or in what country did you ever hear that men assumed the

privilege of being more honest than the mass of the society in which

they lived, without being hated and persecuted? unless they chose to

remain in perfect obscurity and to let others and the world take their

own course, and in that case they can never have been heard of. All we

can do here is to fulfil our duty, without looking at the consequences

so far as relates to ourselves. If the love and esteem of others or

general popularity follow, so much the better. But it is with these as

with all other temporal blessings, such as wealth, health, &c., not to

be despised, to be honestly attempted, but never to be considered as

under our control or as objects to which a single particle of integrity,

a single feeling of conscience should be sacrificed. I need not add that

I preach better than I practise. But I may add that you practise better

than I do, your complaining of the result only excepted. The purity with

which you shall have exercised the duties of land-officer may be felt

and continue to operate after you have ceased to act. And if you have

had a share in preventing the establishment of slavery in Indiana, you

will have done more good, to that part of the country at least, than

commonly falls to the share of man. Be that feeling your reward. When

you are tired of struggling with vice and selfishness, rest yourself,

mind your own business, and fight them only when they come directly in

your way.

Give my best and affectionate love to your worthy wife, who has been

your greatest comfort in this world, and on whose judgment you may rely

with great safety in any plan you may form.

Ever yours.

Mr. Gallatin did not follow the advice of Judge Nicholson. After the

summer session of this year was over, the sudden disavowal by the

British government of Mr. Erskine's arrangement threw pressing burdens

upon his shoulders. In reply to his summons to Washington, Mr. Madison

wrote from Montpelier that he did not think his presence there

necessary. On the 9th August the President's proclamation was issued,

accompanied by a circular from the Treasury reviving the Non-Importation

Act, and the country settled back to its old condition of chronic

complaint and discomfort. Nothing more could be done till the arrival of

the new British envoy, Mr. Jackson, and the meeting of Congress, nor

could energetic action be expected even then.

After the proclamation was issued, Mr. and Mrs. Gallatin went into

Virginia to visit the Madisons, and the whole party, towards the end of

August, arrived at Monticello. While there, Mr. Gallatin opened his mind

fully to his friends, and the triumvirate deliberated solemnly upon the

situation. What passed can only be inferred from the two following

letters. No decisive action was taken or asked. Mr. Gallatin went no

further than to explain his difficulties, leaving Mr. Madison to act as

he pleased.

JEFFERSON TO GALLATIN.

MONTICELLO, October 11, 1809.

DEAR SIR--...I have reflected much and painfully on the change of

dispositions which has taken place among the members of the Cabinet

since the new arrangement, as you stated to me in the moment of our

separation. It would be indeed a great public calamity were it to fix

you in the purpose which you seemed to think possible. I consider the

fortunes of our Republic as depending in an eminent degree on the

extinction of the public debt before we engage in any war; because that

done we shall have revenue enough to improve our country in peace and

defend it in war without recurring either to new taxes or loans. But if

the debt should once more be swelled to a formidable size, its entire

discharge will be despaired of, and we shall be committed to the English

career of debt, corruption, and rottenness, closing with revolution. The

discharge of the debt, therefore, is vital to the destinies of our

government, and it hangs on Mr. Madison and yourself alone. We will

never see another President and Secretary of the Treasury making all

other objects subordinate to this. Were either of you to be lost to the

public, that great hope is lost. I had always cherished the idea that

you would fix on that object the measure of your fame and of the

gratitude which our country will owe you. Nor can I yield up this

prospect to the secondary considerations which assail your tranquillity.

For sure I am, they never can produce any other serious effect. Your

value is too justly estimated by our fellow-citizens at large, as well

as their functionaries, to admit any remissness in their support of you.

My opinion always was that none of us ever occupied stronger ground in

the esteem of Congress than yourself, and I am satisfied there is no one

who does not feel your aid to be still as important for the future as it

has been for the past. You have nothing, therefore, to apprehend in the

dispositions of Congress, and still less of the President, who above all

men is the most interested and affectionately disposed to support you. I

hope, then, you will abandon entirely the idea you expressed to me, and

that you will consider the eight years to come as essential to your

political career. I should certainly consider any earlier day of your

retirement as the most inauspicious day our new government has ever

seen. In addition to the common interest in this question, I feel,

particularly for myself, the considerations of gratitude which I

personally owe you for your valuable aid during my administration of

public affairs, a just sense of the large portion of the public

approbation which was earned by your labors and belongs to you, and the

sincere friendship and attachment which grew out of our joint exertions

to promote the common good, and of which I pray you now to accept the

most cordial and respectful assurances.

GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON.

WASHINGTON, November 8, 1809.

DEAR SIR,--I perused your affectionate letter of the 11th ult. with

lively sensations of pleasure, excited by that additional evidence of

your continued kindness and partiality. To have acquired and preserved

your friendship and confidence is more than sufficient to console me for

some late personal mortifications, though I will not affect to conceal

that these, coming from an unexpected quarter, and being as I thought

unmerited, wounded my feelings more deeply than I had at first been

aware of. [Had I listened only to those feelings, I would have resigned

and probably taken this winter a seat in Congress, which as a personal

object would have been much more pleasing than my present situation, and

also better calculated to regain the ground which to my surprise I found

I had lost at least in one of the branches of the Legislature. After

mature consideration I relinquished the idea, at least for that time, in

a great degree on account of my personal attachment to Mr. Madison,

which is of old standing, I am sure reciprocal, and strengthened from

greater intimacy; and also because I mistrusted my own judgment, and

doubted whether I was not more useful where I was than I could be as a

member of Congress. All this passed in my mind before the last session;

and the communication which I made to you at Monticello arose from

subsequent circumstances.][98]

Yet I can assure you that I will not listen to those feelings in forming

a final determination on the subject on which I conversed with you at

Monticello. The gratitude and duty I owe to the country which has

received me and honored me beyond my deserts, the deep interest I feel

in its future welfare and prosperity, the confidence placed by Mr.

Madison in me, my personal and sincere attachment for him, the desire of

honorably acquiring some share of reputation, every public and private

motive would induce me not to abandon my post, if I am permitted to

retain it, and if my remaining in office can be of public utility. But

in both respects I have strong apprehensions, to which I alluded in our

conversation. It has seemed to me from various circumstances that those

who thought they had injured were disposed to destroy, and that they

were sufficiently skilful and formidable to effect their object. As I

may not, however, perhaps see their actions with an unprejudiced eye,

nothing but irresistible evidence both of the intention and success will

make me yield to that consideration. But if that ground which you have

so forcibly presented to my view is deserted; if those principles which

we have uniformly asserted and which were successfully supported during

your Administration are no longer adhered to, you must agree with me

that to continue in the Treasury would be neither useful to the public

or honorable to myself.

The reduction of the public debt was certainly the principal object in

bringing me into office, and our success in that respect has been due

both to the joint and continued efforts of the several branches of

government and to the prosperous situation of the country. I am sensible

that the work cannot progress under adverse circumstances. If the United

States shall be forced into a state of actual war, all the resources of

the country must be called forth to make it efficient, and new loans

will undoubtedly be wanted. But whilst peace is preserved the revenue

will, at all events, be sufficient to pay the interest and to defray

necessary expenses. I do not ask that in the present situation of our

foreign relations the debt be reduced, but only that it shall not be

increased so long as we are not at war. I do not pretend to step out of

my own sphere and to control the internal management of other

Departments. But it seems to me that, as Secretary of the Treasury, I

may ask that whilst peace continues the aggregate of expenditure of

those Departments be kept within bounds, such as will preserve the

equilibrium between the national revenue and expenditure without

recurrence to loans. I cannot, my dear sir, consent to act the part of a

mere financier, to become a contriver of taxes, a dealer of loans, a

seeker of resources for the purpose of supporting useless baubles, of

increasing the number of idle and dissipated members of the community,

of fattening contractors, pursers, and agents, and of introducing in all

its ramifications that system of patronage, corruption, and rottenness

which you so justly execrate. I thought I owed it to candor and

friendship to communicate as I did to Mr. Madison and to yourself my

fears of a tendency in that direction, arising from the quarter and

causes which I pointed out, and the effect such a result must have on my

conduct. I earnestly wish that my apprehensions may have been

groundless, and it is a question which facts and particularly the

approaching session of Congress will decide. No efforts shall be wanted

on my part in support of our old principles. But, whatever the result

may be, I never can forget either your eminent services to the United

States, nor how much I owe to you for having permitted me to take a

subordinate part in your labors.

* * * * *

Mr. Jefferson's letter was obviously written not merely to encourage Mr.

Gallatin, but to be shown to members of Congress. From it one would

suppose that Mr. Gallatin had in the moment of departure merely

suggested the possibility of his retirement; from Mr. Gallatin's reply,

which has no such semi-official reticence, the real import of the

conversation, and the fact that it was addressed to Mr. Madison, are

made evident.

"Those who thought they had injured were disposed to destroy, and were

sufficiently skilful and formidable to effect their object." Mr.

Gallatin's life for the next four years was little more than a

commentary on this paragraph. There has, perhaps, never in our history

been a personal contest more determined, more ferocious, more

mischievous than this between Mr. Gallatin, with the Executive behind

him, and the knot of his enemies who controlled the Senate; it is not

too much to say that to this struggle, complicating itself with the

rising spirit of young nationality, we owe the war of 1812, and some of

the most imminent perils the nation ever incurred. It was not unlike the

great contest of ten years before between John Adams and a similar group

of Senators; it went through a similar phase, and in each case the

result was dependent on the question of war or peace. There are few more

interesting contrasts of character in our history than that between the

New England President, with his intense personality and his overpowering

bursts of passion, confronting his enemies with a will that could not

control or even mask its features, and "the Genevan," as the Aurora

called him, calm, reticent, wary, never vehement, full of resource,

ignoring enmity, hating strife. Perhaps a combination of two such

characters, if they could have been made to work in harmony, might have

proved too much even for the Senate; and, if so, a problem in American

history might have been solved, for, as it was, the Senate succeeded in

overthrowing both.

As Mr. Gallatin had predicted, the mission of Mr. Jackson proved to be

merely one more insult, and our government very soon put an end to its

relations with him and sent him away; but, in doing so, Mr. Madison

expressly declared the undiminished desire of the United States to

establish friendly relations with Great Britain, so that the only effect

of this episode was to procure one year more of delay; precisely the

object which Mr. Canning had in view. As the country now stood, Mr.

Canning's policy had been completely successful; he had taken away the

neutral commerce of the United States, and the United States had

submitted to his will; he had taken away her seamen, and she forced her

seamen to go. Just at this moment Mr. Canning himself was thrown out of

office; his dictatorial temper met more resistance from his colleagues

than from America, and he found himself a private man, with a duel on

his hands, at the instant when his administration of foreign affairs was

most triumphant. His successor was the Marquess Wellesley, whose

reputation for courtesy and liberality was high, and therefore inspired

the United States with a hope of justice, for even Mr. Madison, as his

letters show, could never quite persuade himself that the British

government meant what its acts proclaimed.

The dismissal of Mr. Jackson immediately preceded the meeting of

Congress; the interval was hardly sufficient to supply time for

elaborating a new policy. The President's message, sent in on the 29th

November, 1809, was very non-committal on the subject of further

legislation, and only expressed two opinions as to its character; he was

confident that it would be worthy of the nation, and that it would be

stamped with unanimity. What ground Mr. Madison had for this confidence,

nowhere appears; and if he was honest in expressing this as an opinion

rather than as a hope, he was very little aware of the condition of

Congress; even Mr. Jefferson never was more mistaken.

As usual, the task of creating and carrying through Congress the

Executive policy fell upon Mr. Gallatin, and as usual, bowing to the

necessities of the situation, he set himself to invent some scheme that

would have a chance of uniting a majority in its support and of giving

government solid ground to stand upon. The task was more than difficult,

it was impossible. Since the war-policy broke down and the embargo was

abandoned, no solid ground was left; Mr. Gallatin, however, had this

riddle to solve, and his solution was not wanting in ingenuity.

His report, sent in on December 8, 1809, for the first time announced a

deficit. "The expenses of government, exclusively of the payments on

account of the principal of the debt, have exceeded the actual receipts

into the Treasury by a sum of near $1,300,000." This was a part of the

price of the embargo. For the next year authority for a loan of

$4,000,000 would be required in case the military and naval expenditure

were as large as in 1809; if Congress should resolve on a permanent

increase in the military and naval establishments, additional duties

would be requisite; if not, a continuation of the Mediterranean Fund

would be sufficient.

But the essence of the report lay in its last paragraph. "Whatever may

be the decision of Congress in other respects, there is a subject which

seems to require immediate attention. The provisions adopted for the

purpose of carrying into effect the non-intercourse with England and

France, particularly as modified by the act of last session, under an

expectation that the orders of council of Great Britain had been

revoked, are inefficient and altogether inapplicable to existing

circumstances. It will be sufficient to observe that exportation by land

is not forbidden, and that no bonds being required from vessels

ostensibly employed in the coasting-trade, nor any authority vested by

law which will justify detention, those vessels daily sail for British

ports without any other remedy but the precarious mode of instituting

prosecutions against the apparent owners. It is unnecessary and it would

be painful to dwell on all the effects of those violations of the laws.

But without any allusion to the efficiency or political object of any

system, and merely with a view to its execution, it is incumbent to

state that from the experience of the last two years a perfect

conviction arises that either the system of restriction, partially

abandoned, must be reinstated in all its parts and with all the

provisions necessary for its strict and complete execution, or that all

the restrictions, so far at least as they affect the commerce and

navigation of the citizens of the United States, ought to be removed."

[Sidenote: 1810.]

This report, as already said, was sent to Congress on the 8th December,

1809. On the 19th December, Mr. Macon, from the Committee on Foreign

Relations, reported a bill which was understood to come from the

Treasury Department, and which explained the somewhat obscure suggestion

in the last lines of the report. This bill, commonly known as Macon's

bill, No. 1, contained twelve sections. The 1st and 2d excluded English

and French ships of war from our harbors; the 3d excluded English and

French merchant vessels from our harbors; the 4th restricted all

importations of English and French goods to vessels owned wholly by

United States citizens; the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th restricted these

importations to such as came directly from England and France; the 9th

authorized the President to remove these restrictions whenever either

England or France should remove theirs; the 11th repealed the old

non-intercourse, and the 12th limited the duration of the act to the

4th March, 1810.

The bill was in short a Navigation Act of the most severe kind, and met

the orders in council and the French edicts on their own ground. The

Federalists at once pointed out that the measure was a violent one; that

it would be immediately met by Great Britain with retaliatory measures,

and that the result must amount to a new embargo or to war. To this the

supporters of the bill replied that government contemplated such

retaliation; that it was intended to throw the burden upon England and

compel her to carry it; that Congress had tried an embargo, the

principle of which was non-exportation; that it had tried

non-intercourse, the principle of which was non-importation; and now,

since both these had failed, it must try a navigation law that could

only be countervailed by restrictive measures to be carried out by

England herself.

The fact soon appeared that this bill was a very difficult one for its

opponents to deal with; it did in fact strike out the only policy, short

of war, which was likely to bring England to terms, and which, according

to Mr. Huskisson's assertion some years later,[99] she has always found

herself powerless to meet. The opponents of the bill at once showed

their embarrassment in a manner which is always proof of weakness; they

adopted in the same breath two contradictory arguments; the bill was too

strong, and it was too weak. For the Federalists it was too strong; they

wished frankly to take sides with England. For Duane and Leib it was too

weak, a mean submission, a futile and disgraceful measure; not that they

wished war, for they did not as yet venture to take that ground; not

that they suggested any practical measure that would stand a moment's

criticism; but that they were decidedly opposed to this special plan. So

far as war was concerned, the President was still in advance of

Congress, for not only was Macon's bill a stronger measure than the

majority relished, but the President was calling upon Congress to fill

up the army and the navy, and Mr. Gallatin was steadily pressing for war

taxes.

After more than a month of debate, Macon's bill passed the House by 73

to 52, and went up to the Senate, where it was consigned to the tender

mercies of General Smith and Mr. Giles. On the motion of General Smith,

February 21, 1810, all the clauses except the 1st, 2d, and 12th were

struck out by a vote of 16 to 11. The Senate debates are not reported,

but General Smith subsequently made a speech on the bill, which he

printed, and in which he took the ground that the measure was feeble,

and that it was so strong as to justify England in confiscating all our

trade. This was the ground also taken by the Aurora. General Smith

proposed to arm our merchant vessels and furnish them convoy, a measure

over and over again rejected. By a vote of 17 to 15 the Senate

ultimately adhered to its amendments and killed the bill, Gallatin's

personal enemies deciding the result.

Throughout all this transaction the Secretary of State had acted a

curious part. Silent or assenting in the Cabinet, where, notwithstanding

rumors to the contrary, there was always apparent cordiality, Mr.

Smith's conversation out-of-doors, and especially with opponents of the

Administration, was very free in condemnation of the whole policy which

he officially represented.[100] No one, indeed, either in or out of the

Cabinet, pretended an enthusiastic admiration of Macon's bill; Mr.

Madison, Mr. Gallatin, Mr. Macon himself, only regarded it as "better

than nothing," and "nothing" was the alternative. Congress had put the

country into a position equally humiliating, ridiculous, and

unprofitable; it had for two sessions refused to follow the

Administration and had refused to impose any policy of its own. The

influence of General Smith, solitary and unsupported except by Leib and

the Aurora faction, now barred the path of legislation and held Congress

down to its contemptible and crouching attitude of impotent

gesticulation and rant. The Secretary of State was a party to his

brother's acts, and although too dull a man to have any distinct scheme

of his own or any depth of intrigue; although obliged to let the

President write his official papers and Mr. Gallatin control both his

foreign and his domestic policy, he nevertheless used the liberty thus

obtained to talk with unreserved freedom both to Federalists and

discontented Republicans about the characters of his associates and the

contents of his despatches.

Thus the policy of a Navigation Act was defeated, and another year was

lost. Only at the very close of the session, when it became apparent

that something must be done, Mr. Macon got his bill No. 2 before the

House. This was on April 7, and on the 10th he wrote to Nicholson: "I am

at a loss to guess what we shall do on the subject of foreign relations.

The bill in the enclosed paper, called Macon's No. 2, is not really

Macon's, though he reports it as chairman. It is in truth Taylor's. This

I only mention to you because when it comes to be debated I shall not

act the part of a father but of a step-father." After a violent struggle

between the two Houses, a bill was at length passed, on May 1, 1810,

which has strong claims to be considered the most disgraceful act on the

American statute-book. It surrendered all resistance to the British and

French orders and edicts; it repealed the non-importation law; it left

our shipping unprotected to the operation of foreign municipal laws; it

offered not even a protest against violence and robbery such as few

powerful nations had ever endured except at the edge of the sword; and

its only proposition towards these two foreign nations, each of which

had exhausted upon us every form of insult and robbery, was an offer

that if either would repeal its edicts, the United States would prohibit

trade with the other.

The imagination can scarcely conceive of any act more undignified, more

cowardly, or, as it proved, more mischievous; but in the utter paralysis

into which these party quarrels had now brought Congress, this was all

the legislation that could be got, although, in justice to Congress, it

is but fair to add that even this was universally contemned. The

Administration had nothing to do but to execute it, and to make what it

could of the policy it established.

In the contest upon Macon's bill, Mr. Gallatin had the President's full

support and co-operation. But in another and to him a much more serious

struggle he stood quite alone, and all he could obtain from the

President was that the Executive influence should not be thrown against

him. The charter of the United States Bank was about to expire. In the

present condition of the country, with war always in prospect and public

and private finances seriously disordered, the bank was an institution

almost if not quite indispensable to the Treasury. To abolish it was to

create artificially and unnecessarily a very serious financial

embarrassment at the moment when the national existence might turn on

financial steadiness. To create a new system that would answer the same

purposes would be the work of years, and would require the most careful

experiments. The subject had been referred to Mr. Gallatin by the

Senate, and he had at the close of the last session sent in a report

representing in strong language the advantages derived from the bank. He

now drew up a bill by which the existing charter was to be considerably

modified; the capital raised to thirty millions, three-fifths of which

was to be lent to the government; branch banks to be established in each

State, and half the directors appointed by the State; with various other

provisions intended to secure the utmost possible advantage to the

government. Parties at once divided on this question as on the foreign

intercourse question, but with a change of sides. The Federalists

favored, the old Republicans resisted, the bank, and General Smith

resisted Mr. Gallatin. During this session, however, little more was

done than to introduce the bills; the matter was then thrown aside until

next year.

These subjects, and a hasty report on domestic manufactures, occupied

the session almost exclusively, so far as Mr. Gallatin was concerned.

When Congress rose, on the 1st May, 1810, every one was obliged to

concede that a more futile session had never been held, and the Aurora

fulminated against Mr. Gallatin as the cause of all its shortcomings.

More and more the different elements of personal discontent made common

cause against the Secretary of the Treasury, and before the end of the

year 1810 the Aurora and its allies opened a determined assault upon him

with the avowed intention of driving him from office.

It was in reference to these attacks, which incessantly recurred to the

old stories of 1806, that Mr. Jefferson wrote to Mr. Gallatin as

follows:

JEFFERSON TO GALLATIN.

16 August, 1810.

I have seen with infinite grief the set which is made at you in the

public papers, and with the more as my name has been so much used in it.

I hope we both know one another too well to receive impression from

circumstances of this kind. A twelve years' intimate and friendly

intercourse must be better evidence to each of the dispositions of the

other than the letters of foreign ministers to their courts, or tortured

inferences from facts true or false. I have too thorough a conviction of

your cordial good-will towards me, and too strong a sense of the

faithful and able assistance I received from you, to relinquish them on

any evidence but of my own senses. With entire confidence in your

assurance of these truths I shall add those only of my constant

affection and high respect.

* * * * *

"The letters of foreign ministers to their courts" were Mr. Erskine's

despatches of December, 1808, to Mr. Canning, which had been printed in

England, and, on reaching America, compelled Mr. Gallatin very

reluctantly to make a public denial of their accuracy.[101] They

represented Mr. Gallatin as acquiescing in the belief that Mr. Jefferson

was under French influence. Mr. Gallatin, with the aid of Mr. Madison,

drew up a paper correcting Mr. Erskine's errors, and of course

stimulating the attacks of the Aurora. To Mr. Jefferson's letter

Gallatin replied:

GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON.

10th September, 1810.

I need not say how much shocked I was by Mr. Erskine's despatch. However

reluctant to a newspaper publication and to a denial on matters of fact,

I could not permit my name to be ever hereafter quoted in support of the

vile charges of foreign partialities ascribed to you, and I knew that in

that respect my disavowal would be decisive, for, if my testimony was

believed, they did not exist, and if disbelieved, no faith could be

placed in whatever I might be supposed to have said to Erskine.

Although I never for a moment supposed that either his letter or any

newspaper attack could, after so long and intimate acquaintance, create

a doubt in your mind of the sincerity and warmth of my sentiments

towards you, or alter your friendship for me, the assurance was highly

acceptable and gratefully received. The newspaper publications to which

you allude, I have heard of, but not seen, having not received the

papers south of this place [New York] during my stay here. But I had

anticipated that from various quarters a combined and malignant attack

would be made whenever a favorable opportunity offered itself. Of the

true causes and real authors I will say nothing. And however painful the

circumstance and injurious the effect, the esteem of those who know me

and the consciousness of having exclusively devoted my faculties to the

public good, and of having severely performed public duties without

regard to personal consequences, will, I hope, support me against evils

for which there is no other remedy. Yet that a diminution of public

confidence should lessen my usefulness will be a subject of deep regret.

* * * * *

Meanwhile, the situation of affairs abroad was more and more becoming

the measure of American politics, and the question of war or peace was

more and more clearly defined as the turning-point of Mr. Gallatin's

life. The exhaustion of the Treasury was alone, for him, a sufficient

argument against war. He began to believe, and he was right in

believing, that the worst had now passed; that, as America could hardly

suffer more humiliation than she had already borne, her objects could

perhaps be attained by peaceful methods; and almost mechanically, as the

government became impressed with this conviction, the opposition, so far

as it was personal, tended to the opposite side, and advocated war.

There was no other ground to stand upon, unless they went frankly over

to the Federalists, which was rapidly becoming inevitable if they

continued their old tactics.

Curiously enough, the feeble and disgraceful law of May 1, 1810, known

as Macon's law, had a more immediate effect on the situation abroad than

any of the stronger measures which had been tried. Ever since the

repeal of the embargo on March 4, 1809, England had been the favored

nation; our people, in fact, gave her our commerce on her own terms, and

were glad to do so. Macon's law did away with even the pretence of

resistance to her authority on the ocean. Disgraceful as such a result

doubtless was to the honor and dignity of the United States, it was in

its effects on France a very vigorous engine, for it was nothing more

nor less than taking active part with England against her; and inasmuch

as Bonaparte had within his limited range shown, if possible, somewhat

more disposition to rob us, and a still greater latitude of personal

insult, than had been displayed even by Mr. Canning, this result might

fairly be viewed with indifference, or perhaps with some slight

satisfaction, by the people of the United States. Upon the Emperor it

acted, as with a man of his temper was not unnatural, in a most decided

manner; he was furious; he seized all the American property he could get

within his clutches; he stormed at the American minister, and heaped

outrage upon insult; but the fatal arrow could not be shaken out; random

as the shot had been, it struck a vital spot, and Bonaparte had to

submit. The change which he was thus forced to make illustrates his

character.

When the Act of May 1, 1810, commonly known as Macon's Act, reached

Paris, General Armstrong communicated it inofficially to the minister of

foreign affairs, Champagny, Duke de Cadore, who laid it before the

Emperor. According to all ordinary theories, the Act of May 1, by which

the non-intercourse was repealed, would work against France and against

France alone; by it America abandoned even the pretence of resisting the

absolute domination of England on the seas, and accepted whatever

commercial law she chose to impose. The Emperor, moreover, had no means

of counteracting or punishing it. He had already resorted to the

strongest measure at his command, and seized all the American vessels he

could lay his hands on. These were now waiting condemnation. The next

step was war, which would, of course, operate only to the advantage of

England. For once Bonaparte was obliged to retrace his steps, or at

least affect to do so.

On the 5th August, therefore, the Duke de Cadore wrote to General

Armstrong a letter, in which, with the usual effrontery of the imperial

government, he took the ground that the Act of May 1 was a concession to

France, and that France recognized its obligations. "The Emperor loves

the Americans;" the Emperor revoked his decrees of Berlin and Milan,

which, after the 1st November next, would cease to have effect, it being

understood that, in consequence of this declaration, the English should

revoke their orders in council and renounce their new principles of

blockade, or that America should carry out the terms of the Act and

cause her rights to be respected.

This letter was curious in many ways, but it is to be observed more

particularly that while Macon's law required either belligerent to "so

revoke or modify her edicts as that they shall cease to violate the

neutral commerce of the United States," the Emperor as a matter of fact

revoked only the Berlin and Milan decrees, and said nothing of others

still more offensive, especially the Rambouillet decree, then only four

months old, under which he now held and meant to continue holding

possession of all the American property in France,--a decree unknown to

Congress when the law of May 1 was passed.

Then came the Emperor's master-stroke, which was to punish the Americans

for blundering into success. Long unknown to our government, it was only

revealed by accident to Mr. Gallatin when minister to France in 1821,

after Napoleon and his decrees had been forgotten by all but the unhappy

merchants whom he had plundered. At that time the Duke de Bassano,

Napoleon's Minister of State, had been allowed by the government of

Louis XVIII. to return to Paris. He had preserved a register of the

various acts and decrees of Napoleon, and was more intimate with their

nature and bearing than any one even in the government of that time. To

him the claimants sometimes applied for copies of documents to support

their memorials, and he furnished them. On one occasion they sought the

text of an order by which the proceeds of certain cargoes sequestered at

Antwerp were transferred to the Treasury. The Duke furnished what he

supposed to be the paper, and it was brought to Mr. Gallatin. The

following extract from his despatch of 15th September, 1821, to the

Department of State explains what this paper was, and what his

sensations were in regard to it.

"The enclosed copy of a decree dated at Trianon on the 5th of August,

1810, which has never been published nor, to my knowledge, communicated

to our ministers or government, was obtained through a private

channel.... It bears date the same day on which it was officially

communicated to our minister that the Berlin and Milan decrees would be

revoked on the first day of the ensuing November, and no one can suppose

that if it had been communicated or published at the same time, the

United States would, with respect to the promised revocation of the

Berlin and Milan decrees, have taken that ground which ultimately led to

the war with Great Britain. It is indeed unnecessary to comment on such

a glaring act of combined injustice, bad faith, and meanness, as the

enactment and concealment of that decree exhibits."

The text of this decree which proved how "His Majesty loves the

Americans. Their prosperity and their commerce are within the scope of

his policy;" and which was written with the same pen on the same day as

that celebrated declaration of Napoleonic affection,--the full text of

this decree may be seen attached to Mr. Gallatin's despatch.[102] Under

the pretext of reprisals for American confiscations which had never in

fact been made,[103] it confiscated into the imperial treasury, without

trial or delay, all American property in France, both that which had

been already sequestered and sold, subject to final judgment, and that

which was still in the form of merchandise or ships brought into France

previous to the 1st May, 1810, the date of Macon's Act. And it further

provided that until November 1, when the Berlin and Milan decrees were

to be conditionally revoked, American ships should be allowed to enter

French ports, but not to unload, and presumably not to depart, without a

permission from the Emperor.

When Mr. Gallatin, at sixty years of age, used language so strong as

that just quoted and characterized an act as one of combined injustice,

bad faith, and meanness, the world may very reasonably conclude that he

was unusually moved. On another occasion he called it "a mean and

perfidious act." There was good reason why he should have been deeply

exasperated at the discovery, for of that meanness and perfidy he was

principal victim.

What share Mr. Gallatin now had in deciding the action of the President

is unknown. In the absence of evidence to the contrary it is to be

presumed that he at least acquiesced in the decision of the Cabinet, yet

not only is it clear that the letter of Champagny of August 5 was not a

compliance with the terms of Macon's Act; did not revoke or modify

Napoleon's edicts so as that "they shall cease to violate the neutral

commerce of the United States," and, therefore, that the President had

no legal power to act as though it did; but it is clear, from Secretary

Smith's letter on the subject to General Armstrong, dated November 2,

1810, that the President was aware of the fact and escaped it only by

strange subterfuge. Already on the 5th July Mr. Smith had instructed

General Armstrong that "a satisfactory provision for restoring the

property lately surprised and seized by the order or at the instance of

the French government must be combined with a repeal of the French

edicts, with a view to a non-intercourse with Great Britain, such a

provision Union being _an indispensable evidence_ of the just purpose of

France toward the United States." Yet, on the 2d November, writing to

General Armstrong that the President had issued his proclamation against

England on the strength of the French revocation of the Berlin and Milan

decrees alone, Mr. Smith could only justify this evident abandonment of

his former and correct ground by adding: "You will, however, let the

French government understand that this has been done _on the ground_

that the repeal of these decrees does involve an extinguishment of all

the edicts of of France actually violating our neutral rights.... It is

to be remarked, moreover, that in issuing the Proclamation _it has been

presumed_ that the requisition contained in that letter [of July 5], on

the subject of the sequestered property, will have been satisfied;" and

the writer goes on to show on what evidence this presumption rested.

That is to say, President Madison did an act which he recognized as one

of doubtful propriety, on the ground of two assumptions of fact, neither

of which had the smallest foundation. These objections and criticisms

were made at the time, and they were semi-officially answered by Joel

Barlow in the National Intelligencer of July 9, 1811, by drawing a

distinction between "belligerent maritime edicts violating our neutral

rights, and edicts authorizing other depredations on the property of our

citizens." The Berlin and Milan decrees, it appears, were maritime; the

Rambouillet decree was municipal, not a violation of our neutral rights

contemplated by Macon's Act. Similar British depredations had been

disregarded in accepting Erskine's arrangement.

If this were the case in November, Mr. Madison would have done better

not to have said in July that a revocation of the Rambouillet decree was

an _indispensable_ evidence of the Emperor's intentions, and also that

he assumed, on the part of the French government, an extinguishment of

all its edicts and a restoration of the sequestered property as the

ground of his proclamation. Moreover, if this were the case, it is not

quite plain why Mr. Gallatin should have declared in 1821 that a

knowledge of the secret Trianon decree would have prevented Mr. Madison

from issuing that proclamation. The Trianon decree was merely the

authority for acts which were notorious.

Although there is not a shadow of evidence to show what Mr. Gallatin's

opinions on this question were, yet the result of the decision was so

important in its ultimate bearings upon his fortune that the subject

could not be left unmentioned. In Mr. Madison's private letters of this

time there is a disposition clearly evident to subordinate all other

considerations to the object of bringing England to terms, and this

doubtless was the tendency of public feeling. Acting on this principle,

the Administration decided that Champagny's announcement of the intended

revocation of the Berlin and Milan decrees was a sufficient fulfilment

of the terms of Macon's Act, and accordingly, on the 1st November,

issued the proclamation to that effect. Simultaneously Mr. Gallatin

issued a circular to the collectors announcing that after the 2d

February, 1811, all intercourse with Great Britain and her dependencies

would cease.

In this there was nothing unfair to England. Napoleon had in appearance

been compelled to give way, and the United States had a perfect right

to make the most of her success. If in doing so she submitted to more

robbery, this was no more than she had done when she had attempted

similar arrangements with England; it was less than she had done every

day for nearly twenty years, in submitting to the impressments of her

seamen for the benefit of the British navy. Nevertheless, the ground on

which she stood was very weak as regarded argument, for there could be

no reasonable doubt then, any more than there was ten years later, that

Bonaparte had acted a "mean and perfidious" part, and yet she called

upon England to act as though it were an honest one. England rightly

enough replied that Napoleon was attempting another fraud to which

England would not be a party; thus the situation was rendered more

critical than ever, and Napoleon, by a course of conduct which was

precisely what Mr. Gallatin described it in 1821, plunged the United

States into a war with England on ground that, so far as France was

concerned, would not bear examination.

[Sidenote: 1811.]

Though there is reason to regret that Mr. Madison should have made

himself so eagerly the dupe of Napoleon, and though there seems to be

something surprising in the irritation of Mr. Gallatin on discovering

only one among the many instruments of the Emperor's duplicity, the good

faith of the American government cannot fairly be called in question.

The situation of the United States as regarded England was intolerable,

and Mr. Madison snatched at any fair expedient to escape it. England

alleged that the Berlin and Milan decrees were the cause of her orders

in council. The United States, by a lucky stroke of legislation,

compelled Napoleon to promise revocation of those decrees on a certain

day, and then turned that promise against England. England refused

belief in it, which was reasonable enough, but in reality had those

decrees been the only cause of the orders in council, the alleged

revocation would have afforded ample excuse for England's concession. On

both sides the diplomatic veil was transparent. Napoleon, in fact, had

not revoked his decrees, as he unblushingly avowed within the next year,

while England cared nothing for those decrees, except so far as they

were mere municipal regulations; so far as they violated international

law on the ocean they were, indeed, quite ineffective. England's real

object was to maintain her clutch on American shipping and sailors.

Such was the situation of affairs when Congress met on the 3d December,

1810. One more step had been taken, but no man could certainly say

whether it was towards a solution. Meanwhile, Mr. Gallatin was burdened

with an undertaking that plunged him deeper into the miserable

complications of political warfare, disorganizing his followers and his

friends, stimulating personal hostilities, and yet leaving him no choice

of action. The question of the bank charter was to be decided this

winter before the Congress expired on the 4th March, 1811. As a matter

of public welfare, more especially in the situation the country now

occupied, Mr. Gallatin was obliged to do his utmost to prevent the

destruction of the bank. It was no mere matter of party or of personal

feeling; the bank at that moment was essential to public safety; to lose

it might be a question of national life.

Every argument which Mr. Gallatin could use was put to the service of

the bill. He was its open and earnest advocate both in his special

reports and in his conversation, yet even the malignity of the Aurora

and the less bitter but perhaps more dangerous hostility of the Richmond

Enquirer failed to find in them a single expression that could be made

to rouse personal irritation or popular feeling. He conducted his case

with all his usual temper, tact, and persistence; it is due also to his

opponents in Congress to say that they avoided personal attacks upon

him, at least for the most part, and left vituperation to the press. Not

the less, however, was it distinctly understood that the bank was the

test of Mr. Gallatin's power; that its overthrow was one and the most

important step towards driving him from office; and that nothing less

than the overshadowing growth of his influence could possibly make the

continued existence of the bank even a subject of discussion in the

Republican party.

The debate in the House was long and able, but when a vote was reached

on January 24, 1811, the numbers stood 65 to 64 in favor of indefinite

postponements. Many of Mr. Gallatin's best friends voted with the

majority; the Federalists in a mass voted on his side; his personal

enemies turned the scale. Whatever Mr. Gallatin's feelings were at this

defeat, he made no display of them even to his intimates. On the 28th

January, Mr. Macon wrote to Judge Nicholson: "I was at Gallatin's

yesterday; all well. He is, I fear, rather mortified at the indefinite

postponement of the bill to renew the charter of the Bank of the United

States. I am really sorry that my best judgment compelled me on that

question to vote agreeable to what I believe to be the anxious wish of

the invisibles. Mr. Madison was at the last session, I am informed, in

favor of the renewal; that he considered it, according as my informant

gave his words, _res adjudicata_. What cause has produced the change in

his mind I have not heard. I have also been told that Mr. Giles was of

the same opinion then and that he also has changed. These are natural

rights, and ought to be exercised whenever the mind is convinced that

opinions are founded in error; but when great men, or rather men in

high, responsible stations, change their deliberate opinions it seems to

me that they in some way or other ought to give the reason of the

change. I incline to think that Mr. Madison's opinion last winter had a

good deal of weight, and it is presumed it may have been the means of

inducing a few members to take pretty strong hold of the constitutional

side of the question. Now that he has changed, they are thrown with

Gallatin on the Federal side of the question. I also incline to think

that his present opinion has had some weight in the late decision."

Mr. Macon was probably mistaken in thinking that the President had

changed his position; the letter is curious as showing what confusion

Mr. Madison's course created, but the story itself was apparently a mere

rumor set afloat by the enemies of the bank, those "invisibles," as the

Smith faction were significantly called by Mr. Macon and his friends,

and whose alliance with the Aurora was now complete. A few days later,

on the 9th February, Mr. Macon wrote: "It seems to me not very

improbable that Mr. Madison's Administration may end something like Mr.

Adams's. He may endeavor to go on with the government with men in whom

he has not perfect confidence, until they break him down, and then, as

John did, turn them out after he has suffered all that they can do to

injure him. It is true, if he means ever to turn out, he has now

delayed it almost too long, because the senatorial elections are over,

while these people retained their influence, if they can be said to have

a fixed influence in the nation."

Meanwhile the debate on the bank charter had begun in the Senate, and a

curious debate it was. Mr. William H. Crawford, of Georgia, appeared as

Mr. Gallatin's champion, and supported the charter with such energy,

courage, and ability as earned Mr. Gallatin's lasting gratitude, and

made Mr. Crawford the representative of the Administration in the

Senate, and the favorite candidate of the Jeffersonian triumvirate for

succession to the Presidency. Mr. Giles, on the other hand, spoke

judicially. The Legislature of Virginia, like the Legislatures of

Pennsylvania and Kentucky, had instructed their Senators to vote against

the charter. Mr. Giles declared himself a representative of the people

of the United States, not a mere agent of the Virginia Legislature, and

his speech was an elaborate effort at candid investigation, unaffected,

as he averred, by his personal sentiments towards the Secretary of the

Treasury. But he, too, at last concluded that the bank was a British

institution, which had not prevented the orders in council or the attack

on the Chesapeake, and therefore should be suppressed. He admitted that

the time was inauspicious for putting an end to the establishment, but

the danger from British influence was greater than the danger from

financial confusion. Henry Clay, the young Senator from Kentucky,

followed and ridiculed the ponderous Mr. Giles, who had "certainly

demonstrated to the satisfaction of all who heard him, both that it was

constitutional and unconstitutional, highly proper and improper, to

prolong the charter of the bank." Mr. Clay was not disposed to enlist

with Mr. Giles in factious opposition to the government, but he was

still less disposed to join Mr. Crawford in its support; he hotly denied

the constitutionality of the charter, and, like Mr. Giles, he declared

that the bank was responsible for not preventing impressments and orders

in council. Then General Smith, in a speech covering two days, proved

that the whole theory of the usefulness of a national bank was a

delusion; that State institutions were better depositaries of the public

money; that the Secretary of the Treasury was quite mistaken in all his

statements about the convenience of the bank, even in regard to

remittances, and knew nothing about foreign exchange; that no possible

trouble could arise from abolishing the bank; and that the

constitutional objection was final.

On the 20th February, 1811, the Senate reached a vote. It was 17 to 17,

and the Vice-President, George Clinton, whose personal hostility to the

President was notorious, decided the question in the negative. Among the

votes which then settled the fate of the bank, and incidentally the fate

of Mr. Gallatin, were those of Joseph Anderson, of Tennessee, Henry

Clay, of Kentucky, William B. Giles, of Virginia, Michael Leib, of

Pennsylvania, and Samuel Smith, of Maryland. Readers who are curious in

matters of biography will naturally ask how the opinions of these men

stood the test of time. Less than four years later, after Mr. Gallatin

had been fairly driven from the Treasury, his most intimate friend,

Alexander J. Dallas, was called to fill the place. Government was

bankrupt, the currency in frightful disorder, and loans impracticable.

Mr. Dallas, as his last resource, insisted upon a bank, and he got it.

Michael Leib was then no longer in the Senate; his political career had

come to an untimely end. Gideon Granger, Postmaster-General, and one of

the factious number, had exhausted President Madison's patience by

appointing Leib postmaster at Philadelphia, and had lost his office in

consequence; Leib was removed, and disappeared into political obscurity.

Giles was consistent in opposing the bank, and in 1816, so soon as his

senatorial term expired, he too subsided into obscurity, from which he

only rescued himself by his success in using the same tactics against

John Quincy Adams that he had used against Albert Gallatin. Anderson,

Clay, and Smith have left their names recorded among the supporters of

the new charter.

Thus, in the face of difficulties and dangers such as might well have

appalled the wisest head and the stoutest heart, the Legislature

deprived the Executive of the only efficient financial agent it had ever

had. What the financial consequences of destroying the bank actually

were will be seen presently; it is enough to say that Congress acted in

this instance with a degree of factious incompetence that cost the

nation infinite loss and trouble, and was not far from imperilling its

existence. No one knew better than Mr. Giles, General Smith, and George

Clinton that whatever the objections to a bank might be, this was no

time to destroy it, and even Henry Clay, with all his youthful

self-confidence, had intelligence enough to make him inexcusable in

refusing to prolong, if only for a very few years, the existence of an

agent which the Treasury considered indispensable, in the face of a war

which he was, against the will of the Administration, forcing upon its

hands.

John Randolph was one of those who saw most clearly through the

intrigues that beset the government. Never strong in common sense,

Randolph's mind was yielding more and more to those aberrations which

marked his later years. Though all intimacy of relation between the two

men had long ceased, Randolph had yet preserved as much respect for

Gallatin as his universal misanthropy permitted, while at the same time

his contempt for "the invisibles" was unbounded. Whatever mistakes

Randolph made, he at least never descended so low as to make the Aurora

his ally. On the 14th February he wrote to Judge Nicholson: "Giles made

this morning the most unintelligible speech on the subject of the Bank

of the United States that I ever heard. He spoke upwards of two hours;

seemed never to understand himself (except upon one commonplace topic of

British influence), and consequently excited in his hearers no other

sentiment but pity or disgust. But I shall not be surprised to see him

puffed in all the newspapers of a certain faction. The Senate have

rejected the nomination of Alex. Wolcott to the bench of the Supreme

Court--24 to 9. The President is said to have felt great mortification

at this result. The truth seems to be that he is President _de jure_

only. Who exercises the office _de facto_ I know not, but it seems

agreed on all hands that 'there is something behind the throne greater

than the throne itself.' I cannot help differing with you respecting

[Gallatins]'s resignation. If his principal will not support him by his

influence against the cabal _in the ministry itself_, as well as out of

it, a sense of self-respect, it would seem to me, ought to impel him to

retire from a situation where, with a tremendous responsibility, he is

utterly destitute of power. Our Cabinet presents a novel spectacle in

the political world; divided against itself, and the most deadly

animosity raging between its principal members, what can come of it but

confusion, mischief, and ruin? Macon is quite out of heart. I am almost

indifferent to any possible result. Is this wisdom or apathy? I fear the

latter."

A few hours later he added: "Since I wrote to you to-night, Stanford has

shown me the last Aurora,--a paper that I never read, but I could not

refrain, at his instance, from casting my eyes over some paragraphs

relating to the Secretary of the Treasury. Surely, under such

circumstances, Mr. G. can no longer hesitate how to act. It appears to

me that only one course is left to him,--to go immediately to the P.,

and to demand either the dismissal of Mr. [Smith] or his own. No man can

doubt by whom this machinery is put in motion. There is no longer room

to feign ignorance or to temporize. It is unnecessary to say to you that

I am not through you addressing myself to another. My knowledge of the

interest which you take not merely in the welfare of Mr. G., but in that

of the State, induces me to express myself to you on this subject. I

wish you would come up here. There are more things in this world of

intrigue than you wot of, and I should like to commune with you upon

some of them."

Again, on February 17, Randolph wrote: "I am not convinced by your

representations respecting [Gallatin], although they are not without

weight. Surely it would not be difficult to point out to the President

the impossibility of conducting the affairs of the government with such

a counteraction in the very Cabinet itself, without assuming anything

like a disposition to dictate. Things as they are cannot go on much

longer. The Administration are now in fact aground at the pitch of high

tide, and a spring tide too. Nothing, then, remains but to lighten the

ship, which a dead calm has hitherto kept from going to pieces. If the

cabal succeed in their present projects, and I see nothing but

promptitude and decision that can prevent it, the nation is undone. The

state of affairs for some time past has been highly favorable to their

views, which at this moment are more flattering than ever. I am

satisfied that Mr. G., by a timely resistance to their schemes, might

have defeated them and rendered the whole cabal as impotent as nature

would seem to have intended them to be, for in point of ability

(capacity for intrigue excepted) they are utterly contemptible and

insignificant."

Randolph did not know that even as early as the autumn of 1809 Mr.

Gallatin had strained his influence to the utmost to offer "timely

resistance to their schemes;" and even Randolph, on reflection, doubted

"whether Madison will be able to meet the shock of the Aurora, Whig,

Enquirer, Boston Patriot, &c., &c.; and it is highly probable that,

beaten in detail by the superior activity and vigor of the Smiths, he

may sink ultimately into their arms, and unquestionably will, in that

case, receive the law from them."

In all this confusion one thing was clear,--Mr. Gallatin's usefulness

was exhausted. There are moments in politics when great results can be

reached only by small men,--a maxim which, however paradoxical, may

easily be verified. Especially in a democracy the people are apt to

become impatient of rule, and will at times obstinately refuse to move

at the call of a leader, when, if left to themselves, they will blunder

through all obstacles, blindly enough, it is true, but effectually. Mr.

Gallatin was now an impediment to government, even though it was

conceded that the Treasury could not go on without him; that the party

contained no man who could fill his place; that if he retired, confusion

must ensue. To Mr. Madison the loss would of course be extremely

embarrassing; for ten years Gallatin had taken from the President's

shoulders the main burden of internal administration and a large part of

the responsibilities of foreign relations; his immense knowledge, his

long practical experience, his tact, his fertility of resource, his

patience, his courage, his unselfishness, his personal attachment, his

retentive memory, even his reticence, were each and all impossible to

replace. The material from which Mr. Madison would have to draw was, in

comparison, ridiculously unequal to the draft. For ten years the

triumvirate had looked about them to find allies and successors; John

Randolph had failed them from sheer inability to follow any straight

course; John Breckenridge, of Kentucky, had died at the outset of his

career; Monroe had not developed great powers, and had repeatedly

disappointed their expectations, yet Monroe was still the best they had;

William H. Crawford was a crude Georgian, with abilities not yet tried

in administration; as for Giles, General Smith, and the other minor

luminaries of the old party, their relations with Mr. Madison were

hardly better than Randolph's. Whom, then, could he put in the Treasury?

What dozen men in the party could pretend to make good to him the loss

of his old companion? How could the Administration stand without him?

All this was urged at the time, and was obvious enough to the great body

of Republicans in Congress; and yet, granting all this, it was answered

that Mr. Gallatin had better retire. Undoubtedly the business of the

Treasury would break down; that is to say, the public interests would

for a time be ignorantly, wastefully, and perhaps corruptly managed;

undoubtedly Mr. Madison would be left in a most unpleasant situation,

and would find his personal difficulties vastly increased; Congress and

the press would precipitate themselves upon him instead of upon Mr.

Gallatin, and he would inevitably be swept away by the torrent. This,

however, would be only temporary; the evil would cure itself; faction

would produce force to oppose it, and a generation of younger men would

invent its own processes to solve its own problems.

Mr. Gallatin saw the situation as clearly as any disinterested spectator

could have done, and fully accepted it. At the close of the bank

struggle he recognized that he was defeated and that his power for good

was gone. It was at once rumored that he would resign. Judge Nicholson

wrote on the 6th March, two days after the session ended: "Randolph is

here, and told me that a friend mentioned to him that you would probably

resign in September, as it would take you till that time to arrange the

matters in the Treasury. He did not say in express terms, but I

collected that he alluded to Crawford, and I fear that the joint

remonstrances of his friends here have not had their due weight with Mr.

M."

The following letter, printed from a first draft without date, was

probably written at this time, and delivered on the adjournment of

Congress, March 4, or immediately afterwards:

GALLATIN TO MADISON.

[March 4, 1811.?]

DEAR SIR,--I have long and seriously reflected on the present state of

things and on my personal situation. This has for some time been

sufficiently unpleasant, and nothing but a sense of public duty and

attachment to yourself could have induced me to retain it to this day.

But I am convinced that in neither respect can I be any longer useful

under existing circumstances.

In a government organized like that of the United States, a government

not too strong for effecting its principal object, the protection of

national rights against foreign aggressions, and particularly under

circumstances as adverse and embarrassing as those under which the

United States are now placed, it appears to me that not only capacity

and talents in the Administration, but also a perfect, heartfelt

cordiality amongst its members, are essentially necessary to command the

public confidence and to produce the requisite union of views and action

between the several branches of government. In at least one of those

points your present Administration is defective, and the effects,

already sensibly felt, become every day more extensive and fatal. New

subdivisions and personal factions equally hostile to yourself and the

general welfare daily acquire additional strength. Measures of vital

importance have been and are defeated; every operation, even of the most

simple and ordinary nature, is prevented or impeded; the embarrassments

of government, great as from foreign causes they already are, are

unnecessarily increased; public confidence in the public councils and in

the Executive is impaired, and every day seems to increase every one of

those evils. Such state of things cannot last; a radical and speedy

remedy has become absolutely necessary. What that ought to be, what

change would best promote the success of your Administration and the

welfare of the United States, is not for me to say. I can only judge for

myself, and I clearly perceive that my continuing a member of the

present Administration is no longer of any public utility, invigorates

the opposition against yourself, and must necessarily be attended with

an increased loss of reputation by myself. Under those impressions, not

without reluctance and after having perhaps hesitated too long in hopes

of a favorable change, I beg leave to tender you my resignation, to take

place at such day within a reasonable time as you will think most

consistent with the public service. I hope that I hardly need add any

expressions of my respect and sincere personal attachment to you, of the

regret I will feel on leaving you at this critical time, and the

grateful sense I ever will retain of your kindness to me.

* * * * *

This letter, backed by the remonstrances of Crawford and others,

produced a Cabinet crisis. Mr. Madison declined to accept it, and

appears either to have returned it to Mr. Gallatin or to have burned it,

for it is not to be found among his papers. He then took a step

necessary in any event; he dismissed his Secretary of State, and

authorized Mr. Gallatin to sound James Monroe, then Governor of

Virginia, as to his willingness to enter the Cabinet. Mr. Gallatin

applied to Richard Brent, a Senator from Virginia, who appears to have

written to Mr. Monroe somewhere about the 7th March, but who did not

receive a reply till the 22d.[104] A portion of this reply is worth

quoting.

"You intimate," said Mr. Monroe, "that the situation of the country is

such as to leave me no alternative. I am aware that our public affairs

are far from being in a tranquil and secure state. I may add that there

is much reason to fear that a crisis is approaching of a very dangerous

tendency; one which menaces the overthrow of the whole Republican party.

Is the Administration impressed with this sentiment and prepared to act

on it? Are things in such a state as to allow the Administration to take

the whole subject into consideration and to provide for the safety of

the country and of free government by such measures as circumstances may

require and a comprehensive view of them suggest? Or are we pledged by

what is already done to remain spectators of the interior movement in

the expectation of some change abroad, as the ground on which we are to

act? I have no doubt, from my knowledge of the President and Mr.

Gallatin, with the former of whom I have been long and intimately

connected in friendship, and for both of whom in great and leading

points of character I have the highest consideration and respect, that

if I came into the government the utmost cordiality would subsist

between us, and that any opinions which I might entertain and express

respecting our public affairs would receive, so far as circumstances

would permit, all the attention to which they might be entitled. But if

our course is fixed and the destiny of our country dependent on

arrangements already made, on measures already taken, I do not perceive

how it would be possible for me to render any service at this time in

the general government."

Mr. Monroe received the desired assurances, and assumed the new office

on the 1st April, 1811. Mr. Robert Smith went out, and issued a

manifesto against the government, in which, among numerous ill-digested

and incongruous subjects of complaint, there were one or two which

showed how serious a misfortune his incompetence had been. A newspaper

war ensued, and curious readers may find in the National Intelligencer

all the literature of the Smith controversy which they will need to

satisfy their doubts. Mr. Smith had much the same fate as Colonel

Pickering ten years before; he found that even his friends showed a

certain unwillingness to fight his battles. Before the end of the summer

it had become evident that Mr. Smith was reduced to insignificance, and

it hardly needed the mild severity of Mr. Madison or the newspaper

rhetoric of Joel Barlow to accomplish this; Mr. Smith's own clerk was

equal to the task.[105]

The change in the State Department was a great relief to the President,

and perhaps he may have asked the question why he had ever allowed

himself to be dragooned into the fatal appointment of Mr. Smith; but

Monroe came too late to save Gallatin. To him the change brought only an

increase of annoyance. Although, as between Mr. Madison and Mr. Smith in

the controversy about the removal, the name of Gallatin was not

mentioned, the public well knew that the dismissal of Mr. Smith was the

work of the Secretary of the Treasury, and the chorus of newspapers, led

by the Aurora, joined in a cry of savage hostility against him. His

course in regard to the bank had necessarily thrown a considerable

portion of the press and the party into antagonism; Pennsylvania had

long since abandoned him; Virginia now threw him over. The confidence of

Mr. Madison and his own supereminent qualities alone sustained him. All

this was notorious, and was little calculated to diminish the zeal of

personal enmity. Duane's attacks were in themselves not formidable; his

long articles of financial and political criticism were impressive only

to the very ignorant; his colossal and audacious untruthfulness was

evident to any intelligent reader, and had been evident ever since the

Aurora had begun its existence; but nevertheless their effect was

serious from the fact that they operated in a way perhaps not intended

or fully understood by Duane himself. In discussing the next

Presidential election, for example, the Aurora said:[106] "We are at

present led into these considerations in consequence of the assertions

of certain adherents of Mr. Gallatin, namely, 'that this gentleman

possesses more talents than all the other officers in the Administration

put together, including Mr. Madison himself; that Mr. Madison could not

stand, nor the executive functions of the government be performed,

without him.' This is verbatim the language that is held forth at

present. Now, what do these assertions amount to? Why, clearly, that Mr.

Gallatin is, to all intents and purposes, the President, and even more

than President of the United States." "This comes from the particular

friends of the Secretary of the Treasury,--can it be true? It is a fact

that the people of the United States, in nominally electing Mr. Madison

President, have in reality placed Mr. Gallatin in that high station....

It is said Mr. Gallatin aspires to the Presidency himself, but that we

do not believe; no man knows better the impracticability of such a

desire than himself; but if those assertions of Mr. Gallatin's friends

are true, it cannot be so much an object to him, since the salary is

very little compared with the profits to be made by the Treasury." Then

comes the inevitable "extract of a letter from a gentleman of high

standing" in New York to Dr. Leib: "The events at Washington have not at

all surprised me; nay, they were such as I had been looking for for some

time, knowing the ascendency which Gallatin had acquired over the mind

of Mr. Madison, and knowing too the secret and invisible agency which

was operating to produce it and to keep this crafty Genevan in place."

Under the form of an allegory the same idea is intensified:[107] "He was

a man of singular sagacity and penetration; he could read the very

thoughts of men in their faces and develop their designs; a man of few

words; made no promises but to real favorites that would help him out at

a dead lift, and ever sought to enhance his own interest, power, and

aggrandizement by the most insatiate avarice on the very vitals of the

unsuspecting nation."

The charges of embezzlement and wholesale speculation in public lands,

of immense wealth and limitless corruption, were probably harmless; they

affected only the groundlings; but the insidious elevation of Mr.

Gallatin, the displaying him as an irresistible magician whose touch was

superhuman; the ascribing to him every power and every act that emanated

from government, and the concentration upon him of the whole blaze of

attack, destroyed his usefulness by indirection. No man can afford to

stand in this attitude; it creates jealousies, estranges precisely the

men of force and character who value their own independence, exposes to

the attacks and obstructions of those who wish to be known by the

greatness of their enmities, and in a manner stifles direct and warm

co-operation. In such cases every newspaper, every Congressman, and

every small politician thinks it necessary to protest that he is not

under the alleged influence; that he is not afraid to oppose it; and

that he holds a position of judicial neutrality. The Virginians thought

it a matter of regret that Mr. Gallatin had not retired with Mr. Smith.

Gallatin was fortunate if the men who disavowed him in public did not

offer him an additional insult by assuring him in secret of their

friendship.

"These repeated attacks are enough to beat down even you," wrote Judge

Nicholson. And Mr. Dallas, in a letter dated 21st April, 1811, added:

"If Mr. Jefferson and his powerful friends at Washington, in the year

1805, had not given their countenance to the proscriptions of the

Aurora, the evils of the present time would not have happened. I do not

say this by way of reproach, but to point out the true cause why no man

of real character and capacity in the Republican party of Pennsylvania

has the power to render any political service to the Administration. It

rests with Duane and Binns to knock down and set up whom they delight to

destroy or to honor. In the present conflict, so far as you are

personally concerned, I see with pride and pleasure that the influence

of Duane is at an end."

Even Mr. Jefferson was now obliged to choose sides. It is, perhaps,

useless to expect that a public or private man will deal harshly with

followers and flatterers; Duane had served Jefferson well, and Jefferson

clung to him as to a wayward child; but now that Mr. Gallatin had at

last forced the issue, Mr. Jefferson came to the President's support,

and, stimulated by the blunt response of Wirt and the Richmond

Republicans that Duane might go to the Smiths for money but would not

get it from them, he wrote Duane a letter to say, with a degree of

tenderness that seems to the cold critic not a little amusing, that the

Aurora had gone too far and was to be read out of the party. This was

well enough; but the curb, as Mr. Dallas very properly said, should have

been applied five years before; the harm was done, and it made very

little difference whether the Aurora were in opposition or not; perhaps,

indeed, it was already more dangerous in friendship than in enmity.

Mr. Gallatin himself was far from exulting over the fall of Robert

Smith. There was something humiliating in the mere thought that he

should have been pitted against so unsubstantial an opponent: there was

a loss of power, an exhaustion of reserved force in the very effort he

had been obliged to make. His success, if it were success, deprived him

of freedom of action, tied him beyond redemption to the chariot of

government, and took away his last means of escape from the humiliations

his enemies might inflict. As he wrote to Judge Nicholson on the 30th

May, a few weeks after the Cabinet crisis: "Notwithstanding the change,

I feel no satisfaction in my present situation, and the less so because

that circumstance has made me a slave. Perhaps for that reason I feel an

ineffable thirst for retirement and obscurity." Further Cabinet changes

were imminent. Dr. Eustis, who had succeeded General Dearborn as

Secretary of War, was unequal to the growing responsibilities of the

office. Among prominent Republicans the only conspicuous candidate for

the place was General Armstrong, just returned from France, one of the

Clinton family, whom Mr. Gallatin always disliked, and who cordially

returned the sentiment. There could be no real harmony between Mr.

Gallatin and General Armstrong. Meanwhile, Justice Chase of the Supreme

Court was dead, and the Attorney-General, Rodney, wished to be appointed

to the bench. Mr. Madison passed him over to appoint Gabriel Duval, of

Maryland; he resigned, and William Pinkney, recently minister to

England, took the post of Attorney-General. The following letters of Mr.

Dallas show the discontent aroused by these changes:

A. J. DALLAS TO GALLATIN.

24th June, 1811.

DEAR SIR,--I do not know the arrangements to fill the vacancy occasioned

by the death of Judge Chase. I do not wish to suggest any name from

personal feelings. But perhaps it may be useful that you should know

that Mr. Ingersoll would accept the appointment, as far as I can infer

from his conversations during the vacancy occasioned by Judge Cushing's

death.

Do you not think Pennsylvania entitled to some notice? Everybody else

seems to think so.

A. J. DALLAS TO GALLATIN.

_Private and confidential: if such a thing can be._

24th July, 1811.

DEAR SIR,--I wrote to you respecting the vacancy on the bench of the

Supreme Court. I have, perhaps, no right to expect an answer in these

times. But reports are so strange upon the succession to Judge Chase

that I beg you explicitly to understand the sense of the Pennsylvania

profession, Federal, Republican, Quid, and Quadroon. We do not think

that the successor named in the public prints is qualified in any

respect for the station. I care not who is appointed, provided he is fit

in talents, in experience, and in manners; but, for Heaven's sake, do

not make a man a judge merely to get rid of him as a statesman.

Poor Pennsylvania! Except yourself, who has been distinguished by

Federal favor? Local offices must have local occupants; but from the

commencement of the Federal government, and particularly from the

commencement of the Republican Administration, what citizen of

Pennsylvania has been invited by the Executive to share in Federal

honors? There are the exceptions of Judge Wilson and Mr. Bradford,

appointed by President Washington; but they are merely exceptions to my

remark.

Look at the judiciary establishment! There are seven judges. Four reside

on the south of the Potomac. Two reside in Virginia. The

Attorney-General resides in Delaware. For the whole region beyond the

Potomac, north-east, there are two judges. The report states that

another judge is to be taken from Delaware, and an Attorney-General from

Maryland!

I am cordially attached to the whole Administration. Of you personally I

only think and speak as of a brother. But really, knowing that no

confidence has ever been placed in me upon political subjects, and not

knowing where your confidence is now placed, I do not understand your

measures, nor am I acquainted with your friends. It is not the puff of a

toast nor the flattery of a newspaper squib that can maintain the

Republican cause or vindicate the Administration from reproach. A free

press is an excellent thing, but a newspaper government is the most

execrable of all things. The use of the press is to give information;

its abuse is to impose the law upon private feeling and public

sentiment. Do, therefore, think less of the denunciations of Duane and

of the blandishments of Binns, and let your friends _know_ that you act

right, in order that they may _think_ so.[108]

This letter I have a strong inclination to address to Mrs. Gallatin; for

as men have ceased to keep secrets, I hope it will cease to be a wonder

that a lady should keep them. But I will content myself with requesting

you to tell her that if there is a special session of Congress, Mrs.

Dallas and M.... will visit Washington.

* * * * *

Had Mr. Gallatin controlled the action of the Executive, he would long

since have thrown Duane into open opposition, where he would have been

harmless. Duane was simply a blackguard, of a type better understood now

than then. That he had good qualities is evident from the descendants he

left behind him, but these qualities had not been trained to excellence.

The only way to deal with him was the direct way, and the only argument

he would listen to was the coarse argument of the truth. From the first,

however, both Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Madison sacrificed their Secretary

of the Treasury to this profligate adventurer, whom they conciliated,

flattered, persuaded, argued with, and supported by public and private

aid. On this subject Mr. Gallatin never opened his lips; the letter of

Mr. Dallas, quoted above, shows that even to him, his oldest and most

intimate political friend, he never mentioned it. He even submitted to

bear, without reply, the sharp criticisms of Mr. Dallas on his own

silence, and reflections manifestly unjust. That the manner of Mr.

Jefferson and Mr. Madison towards Duane cut deeply into the

susceptibilities of Mr. Gallatin is certain; but, with the exception of

one single expression, he never by word or sign intimated his sense of

the indignity he felt himself to be receiving at their hands. His

loyalty to his chiefs was too entire to be shaken for so mean a cause.

With this wound incessantly smarting at his heart; with all his great

schemes and brilliant hopes of administrative success shattered into

fragments; with a majority of bitter personal enemies in the Senate

eager to obstruct every inch of his path; with a great part of his

administrative machinery snatched out of his hands, and utter financial

confusion around him; with a war against the richest and most powerful

nation in the world staring him in the face, and almost certain domestic

treason behind; with his own expedients invariably defeated, and with

the most contemptible and shifting experiments in politics forced into

his hands, Mr. Gallatin was now called upon to take up his burden again

and march. He could not escape. Mr. Madison's friendship, when forced

to the final test, proved true, and Gallatin was fettered by his own

act.

Of his whole public life, the next year, which should be the most

important, is the most obscure. He wrote none but public letters. He

never recurred to the time with pleasure, and he left no notes or

memoranda to explain his course. Much, therefore, must be left to

inference, something may be drawn from scattered hints, and most must

depend on the well-known traits of his character and his habits of

thought.

The last Congress had, before adjournment, sanctioned the President's

course in reviving the non-intercourse with England on the strength of

the supposed revocation of the Berlin and Milan decrees by Napoleon. The

Administration party, in doing this, took the ground that the act was

the necessary result of a contract with France already carried into

effect by her. Thus the United States took one more step towards war

with England by precluding herself from acting in any other direction

than as the Emperor wished; even the most flagrant deception on his part

could not shake the compact so far as America was concerned. For the

wholesale robbery committed on American property in Europe by the

Emperor's order, the United States mildly asked compensation. At about

the same time Russia, then on the friendliest terms with France,

directed her minister at Paris to intercede in favor of a similar claim

on the part of Denmark. To Count Romanzoff's representation Bonaparte

only replied: "Give them a very civil answer: that I will examine the

claim, et cetera; mais on ne paye jamais ces choses-là, n'est-ce

pas?"[109] The American claim had small chance of success, but perhaps

all that, under the circumstances, it deserved. On the other hand, all

the events of the summer tended to war with England. Mr. Foster, the new

British minister, instead of lessening the conditions of repeal of the

orders in council, increased them. The British Court of Admiralty

resumed its sweeping condemnations. The affair of the Chesapeake was at

last settled by Mr. Foster, but the British sloop-of-war Little Belt was

fired upon and nearly sunk by the United States frigate President; and,

what was of far more consequence than all this, the people of the United

States, more especially in the south and west, and the younger

generation, which cared little for old Jeffersonian principles, were at

last in advance of their government and ready for war. Henry Clay, John

C. Calhoun, Langdon Cheves, William Lowndes, Felix Grundy, the leaders

of the new sect, were none of them more than thirty-five years of age at

this time, or about the age at which Mr. Gallatin had entered Congress

more than fifteen years before.

The President and his Cabinet did not want war, but, if the people

demanded it, they were not disposed to resist. Mr. Madison would not

allow his Administration to fall behind the public feeling in its

assertion and maintenance of national dignity; nevertheless, Mr. Madison

seems at this moment to have had only a very vague conception of what he

himself did want. Although he had a superfluity of only too good causes

for war with Great Britain, he allowed himself to be hoodwinked by

France into an untenable statement of his case against the British

government. He then called Congress together on the 4th November, which

was hardly a peace measure. Possibly he underestimated the temper of

that body, for his message, sent in on the 5th November, 1811, though

high in tone, did not recommend war; it recommended that "a _system_ of

more ample provisions for maintaining" national rights should be

provided; it recommended Congress to put the country "into an armor and

an attitude demanded by the crisis," namely, the filling up the regular

army, providing an auxiliary force, volunteer corps and militia

detachments, and organizing the militia; but government had urged nearly

all this for years past. Yet on the 15th November, only ten days later,

Mr. Madison fully understood the situation, for he wrote to Europe that,

as between submission and hostilities, Congress favored the latter,

though it would probably defer action till the spring.

Mr. Gallatin's report, which was sent in on the 25th November, was

equally cautious. For the past year the Treasury showed a surplus of

over $5,000,000, owing to the large importations under the system of

open trade previous to February, 1810; but for the next year the

estimated expense of increased armaments and the diminished receipts

under the non-intercourse with England would cause a deficit of over one

million dollars and necessitate a loan.

The public debt of the United States extinguished between the 1st April,

1801, and the 31st December, 1811, amounted to the sum of $46,022,810,

and there remained on the 1st January, 1812, $45,154,189 of funded debt,

bearing an annual interest of $2,222,481. This represents all that was

directly accomplished by Mr. Gallatin towards his great object of the

extinction of debt. This result had been accompanied by the abandonment

of the internal taxes and the salt tax, but also by the imposition of

the 2-1/2 per cent. ad valorem duties known as the Mediterranean Fund.

"It therefore proves decisively," said the report, "the ability of the

United States with their ordinary revenue to discharge in ten years of

peace a debt of forty-two millions of dollars; a fact which considerably

lessens the weight of the most formidable objection to which that

revenue, depending almost solely on commerce, appears to be liable. In

time of peace it is almost sufficient to defray the expenses of a war;

in time of war it is hardly competent to support the expenses of a peace

establishment. Sinking at once under adverse circumstances from fifteen

to six or eight millions of dollars, it is only by a persevering

application of the surplus which it affords in years of prosperity to

the discharge of the debt, that a total change in the system of

taxation, or a perpetual accumulation of debt, can be avoided."

The report went on to discuss the provision to be made for ensuing

years. The present revenue, under existing circumstances, was estimated

at $6,600,000; the expenditure at $9,200,000. To provide for the

deficiency an addition of fifty per cent. to the existing duties on

imports would be required, and was preferable to any internal tax. "The

same amount of revenue would be necessary, and, with the aid of loans,

would, it is believed, be sufficient in case of war." By inadvertence,

Mr. Gallatin made here an important omission. He was speaking only of

"fixed revenue," sufficient to defray the ordinary expenses of

government; and, as he was afterwards obliged to explain, this

expression was wrongly applied to the case of war. He omitted to add

that with each loan, provision to meet its interest must be made by

increasing taxation; this fact had already been pointed out in the

financial paragraph of the President's message, quoted in a previous

part of the report, but the oversight gave rise to subsequent sharp

attacks upon the Secretary.