THE SUPPRESSED EVIDENCE
The official defenses of England, Russia, France, and Belgium do not
apparently show any failure on the part of either to submit any
essential diplomatic document in their possession. They have
respectively made certain contentions as to the proposals that they
made to maintain the peace of the world, and in every instance have
supported these contentions by putting into evidence the letters and
communications in which such proposals were expressed.
When the German _White Paper_ is examined it discloses on its very
face the suppression of documents of vital importance. The fact that
communications passed between Berlin and Vienna, the text of which has
never been disclosed, is not a matter of conjecture. Germany asserts
as part of its defense that it faithfully exercised its mediatory
influence on Austria, but not only is such influence not disclosed by
any practical results, such as we would expect in view of her
dominating relations with Austria, but the _text_ of these vital
communications is still kept in the secret archives of Berlin and
Vienna. Germany has carefully selected a part of her diplomatic
records for publication but withheld others. Austria has withheld all.
Thus in the official apology for Germany it is stated that, in spite
of the refusal of Austria to accept the proposition of Sir Edward Grey
to treat the Servian reply "as a basis for further conversations,"
we [Germany] continued our mediatory efforts to the utmost
and _advised_ Vienna to make any possible compromise
consistent with the dignity of the Monarchy.[3]
[Footnote 3: German _White Paper_.]
This would be more convincing if the German Foreign Office had added
the _text_ of the advice which it thus gave Vienna.
A like significant omission will be found when the same official
defense states that on July 29th the German Government advised Austria
"to begin the conversations with Mr. Sazonof." But here again the
_text_ is not found among the documents which the German Foreign
Office has given to the world. The communications, which passed
between that office and its ambassadors in St. Petersburg, Paris,
and London, are given _in extenso_, but among the twenty-seven
communications appended to the German _White Paper it is most
significant that not a single communication is given of the many which
passed from the Foreign Office of Berlin to that of Vienna and only
two which passed from the German Ambassador in Vienna to the German
Chancellor_. While the Kaiser has favored the world with his messages
to the Czar and King George, he has wholly failed to give us any
message that he sent in those critical days to the Austrian Emperor or
the King of Italy. We shall have occasion to refer hereafter to the
frequent failure to produce documents, the existence of which is
admitted by the exhibits which Germany appended to its _White Paper_.
This cannot be an accident. The German Foreign Office has seen fit to
throw the veil of secrecy over the text of its communications to
Vienna, although professing to give the purport of a few of them. The
purpose of this suppression is even more clearly indicated by the
complete failure of Austria to submit any of its diplomatic records to
the scrutiny of a candid world. Until Germany and Austria are willing
to put the most important documents in their possession in evidence,
they must not be surprised that the World, remembering Bismarck's
garbling of the Ems dispatch, which precipitated the Franco-Prussian
War, will be incredulous as to the sincerity of their pacific
protestations.
ADDENDUM
The Austrian _Red Book_, published more than six months
after the declaration of war, simply emphasizes the policy
of suppression of vital documents, which we have already
discussed. Of its 69 documentary exhibits, _there is not one
which passed directly between the Cabinets of Berlin and
Vienna_. The text of the communications, in which Germany
claims to have exercised a mediatory and conciliatory
influence with its ally, is still withheld. _Not a single
document is produced which was sent between July the 6th and
July the 21st_, the period when the great _coup_ was
secretly planned by Berlin and Vienna.
In the _Red Book_ we find eight communications from Count
Berchtold to the Austrian Ambassador at Berlin and four
replies from that official, but not a letter or telegram
passing between Berchtold and von Bethmann-Hollweg or
between the German and Austrian Kaisers. The Austrian _Red
Book_ gives additional evidence that at the eleventh hour,
and shortly before Germany issued its ultimatum to Russia,
Austria did finally agree to discuss the Servian question
with Russia; but the information, which Germany presumably
gave to its ally of its intention to send the ultimatum
to Russia, is carefully withheld. Notwithstanding this
suppression of vital documents, the diplomatic papers of
Germany and Austria, now _partially_ given to the world,
disclose an unmistakable purpose, amounting to an open
confession, that they intended to force their will upon
Europe, even though this course involved the most stupendous
war in the history of mankind.
March 1, 1915.