GERMANY'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE AUSTRIAN ULTIMATUM
On June 28, 1914, the Austrian Crown Prince was murdered at Serajevo.
For nearly a month thereafter there was no public statement by
Austria of its intentions, with the exception of a few semi-inspired
dispatches to the effect that it would act with the greatest
moderation and self-restraint. A careful examination made of the files
of two leading American newspapers, each having a separate news
service, from June 28, 1914, to July 23, 1914, has failed to disclose
a single dispatch from Vienna which gave any intimation as to the
drastic action which Austria was about to take.
The French Premier, Viviani, in his speech to the French Senate, and
House of Deputies, on August 4, 1914, after referring to the fact that
France, Russia, and Great Britain had cooperated in advising Servia to
make any reasonable concession to Austria, added:
This advice was all the more valuable in view of the fact
that Austria-Hungary's demands had been inadequately
foreshadowed to the governments of the Triple Entente, _to
whom during the three preceding weeks the Austro-Hungarian
Government had repeatedly given assurance that its demands
would be extremely moderate_.
The movements of the leading statesmen and rulers of the Triple
Entente clearly show that they, as well as the rest of the world, had
been lulled into false security either by the silence of Austria, or,
as Viviani avers, by its deliberate suggestion that its treatment of
the Serajevo incident would be conciliatory, pacific, and moderate.
Thus, on July 20th, the Russian Ambassador, obviously anticipating no
crisis, left Vienna on a fortnight's leave of absence. The President
of the French Republic and its Premier were far distant from Paris.
Pachitch, the Servian Premier, was absent from Belgrade, when the
ultimatum was issued.
The testimony of the British Ambassador to Vienna is to the same
effect. He reports to Sir Edward Grey:
The delivery at Belgrade on the 23d of July of the note to
Servia was preceded by a period of _absolute silence_ at the
Ballplatz.
He proceeds to say that with the exception of the German Ambassador at
Vienna (note the significance of the exception) not a single member of
the Diplomatic Corps knew anything of the Austrian ultimatum and that
the French Ambassador, when he visited the Austrian Foreign Office on
July 23d (the day of its issuance), was not only kept in ignorance
that the ultimatum had actually been issued, but was given the
impression that its tone would be moderate. Even the Italian
Ambassador was not taken into Count Berchtold's confidence.[4]
[Footnote 4: Dispatch from Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, dated
September 1, 1914.]
The Servian Government had formally disclaimed any responsibility for
the assassination and had pledged itself to punish any Servian
citizen implicated therein. No word came from Vienna excepting the
semi-official intimations as to its moderate and conciliatory course,
and after the funeral of the Archduke, the world, then enjoying its
summer holiday, had almost forgotten the Serajevo incident. The whole
tragic occurrence simply survived in the sympathy which all felt with
Austria in its new trouble, and especially with its aged monarch, who,
like King Lear, was "as full of grief as age, wretched in both."
Never was it even hinted that Germany and Austria were about to apply
in a time of peace a match to the powder magazine of Europe.
Can it be questioned that loyalty to the highest interests of
civilization required that Germany and Austria, when they determined
to make the murder of the Archduke by an irresponsible assassin the
pretext for bringing up for final decision the long-standing troubles
between Austria and Servia, should have given all the European nations
some intimation of their intention, so that their _confreres_ in the
family of nations could cooperate to adjust this trouble, as they had
adjusted far more difficult questions after the close of the
Balko-Turkish War?
Whatever the issue of the present conflict, it will always be to the
lasting discredit of Germany and Austria that they were false to this
great duty, and that they precipitated the greatest of all wars in a
manner so underhanded as to suggest a trap. They knew, as no one else
knew, in those quiet mid-summer days of July, that civilization was
about to be suddenly and most cruelly torpedoed. The submarine was
Germany and the torpedo, Austria, and the work was most effectually
done.
This ignorance of the leading European statesmen (other than those of
Germany and Austria) as to what was impending is strikingly shown by
the first letter in the English _White Paper_ from Sir Edward Grey to
Sir H. Rumbold, dated July 20, 1914. When this letter was written it
is altogether probable that Austria's arrogant and unreasonable
ultimatum had already been framed and approved in Vienna and Berlin,
and yet Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Minister of a great and friendly
country, had so little knowledge of Austria's policy that he
asked the German Ambassador to-day (July 20th) if he had any
news of what was going on in Vienna. He replied that he had
not, but Austria was certainly going to take some step.
Sir Edward Grey adds that he told the German Ambassador that he had
learned that Count Berchtold, the Austrian Foreign Minister,
in speaking to the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, had
deprecated the suggestion that the situation was grave, but
had said that it should be cleared up.
The German Minister then replied that it would be desirable "if Russia
could act as a mediator with regard to Servia," so that the first
suggestion of Russia playing the part of the peacemaker came from the
German Ambassador in London. Sir Edward Grey then adds that he told
the German Ambassador that he
assumed that the Austrian Government would not do anything
until they had first disclosed to the public their case
against Servia, founded presumably upon what they had
discovered at the trial,
and the German Ambassador assented to this assumption.[5]
[Footnote 5: English _White Paper_, No. 1.]
Either the German Ambassador was then deceiving Sir Edward Grey, or
the submarine torpedo was being prepared with such secrecy that even
the German Ambassador in England did not know what was then in
progress.
The interesting and important question here suggests itself whether
Germany had knowledge of and approved in advance the Austrian
ultimatum. If it did, it was guilty of duplicity, for the German
Ambassador at St. Petersburg gave to the Russian Minister of Foreign
Affairs an express assurance that
_the German Government had no knowledge of the text of the
Austrian note before it was handed in and had not exercised
any influence on its contents. It is a mistake to attribute
to Germany a threatening attitude._[6]
[Footnote 6: Russian _Orange Paper_, No. 18.]
This statement is inherently improbable. Austria was the weaker of the
two allies, and it was Germany's saber that it was rattling in the
face of Europe. Obviously Austria could not have proceeded to extreme
measures, which it was recognized from the first would antagonize
Russia, unless it had the support of Germany, and there is a
probability, amounting to a moral certainty, that it would not have
committed itself and Germany to the possibility of a European war
without first consulting Germany.
Moreover, we have the testimony of Sir M. de Bunsen, the English
Ambassador in Vienna, who advised Sir Edward Grey that he had "private
information that the German Ambassador (at Vienna) knew the text of
the Austrian ultimatum to Servia before it was dispatched, and
telegraphed it to the German Emperor," and that the German Ambassador
himself "indorses every line of it."[7] As he does not disclose the
source of his "private information," this testimony would not by
itself be convincing, but when we examine Germany's official defense
in the German _White Paper_, we find that the German Foreign Office
admits that it was consulted by Austria previous to the ultimatum and
not only approved of Austria's course but literally gave that country
a carte blanche to proceed_.
[Footnote 7: English _White Paper_, No. 95.]
This point seems so important in determining the sincerity of
Germany's attitude and pacific protestations that we quote _in
extenso_. After referring to the previous friction between Austria
and Servia, the German _White Paper_ says:
In view of these circumstances Austria had to admit that
it would not be consistent either with the dignity or
self-preservation of the Monarchy to look on longer at the
operations on the other side of the border without taking
action. _The Austro-Hungarian Government advised us of its
view of the situation and asked our opinion in the matter.
We were able to assure our Ally most heartily of our
agreement with her view of the situation and to assure her
that any action that she might consider it necessary to take
in order to put an end to the movement in Servia directed
against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy
would receive our approval._ We were fully aware in this
connection that warlike moves on the part of Austria-Hungary
against Servia would bring Russia into the question and
might draw us into a war in accordance with our duties as an
Ally.
Sir M. de Bunsen's credible testimony is further confirmed by the fact
that the British Ambassador at Berlin in his letter of July 22d, to
Sir Edward Grey, states that _on the preceding night_ (July 21st) he
had met the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and an
allusion was made to a possible action by Austria.
His Excellency was evidently of opinion that this step on
Austria's part would have been made ere this. He insisted
that the question at issue was one for settlement between
Servia and Austria alone, and that there should be no
interference from outside in the discussions between those
two countries.
He[8] adds that while he had regarded it as inadvisable that his
country should approach Austria in the matter, he had
[Footnote 8: von Jagow.]
on several occasions, in conversation with the Servian
Minister, emphasized the extreme importance that
Austro-Servian relations should be put on a proper
footing.[9]
[Footnote 9: English _White Paper_, No. 2.]
Here we have the first statement of Germany's position in the matter,
a position which subsequent events showed to be entirely untenable,
but to which it tenaciously adhered to the very end, and which did
much to precipitate the war. Forgetful of the solidarity of European
civilization, and the fact that by policy and diplomatic intercourse
continuing through many centuries a united European State exists, even
though its organization be as yet inchoate, he took the ground that
Austria should be permitted to proceed to aggressive measures against
Servia without interference from any other Power, even though, as was
inevitable, the humiliation of Servia would destroy the status of
the Balkan States and threaten the European balance of power. The
inconsistency between Germany's claim that it could give Austria a
_carte blanche_ to proceed against Servia and agree to support its
action with the sword of Germany, and the other contention that
neither Russia nor any European State had any right to interfere on
behalf of Servia is obvious. It was the greatest blunder of Germany's
many blunders in this Tragedy of Errors.
No space need be taken in convincing any reasonable man that this
Austrian ultimatum to Servia was brutal in its tone and unreasonable
in its demands. It would be difficult to recall a more offensive
document, and its iniquity was enhanced by the short shriving time
which it gave either Servia or Europe. Servia had forty-eight hours to
answer whether it would compromise its sovereignty, and virtually
admit its complicity in a crime which it had steadily disavowed. The
other European nations had little more than a day to consider what
could be done to preserve the peace of Europe before that peace was
fatally compromised.[10]
[Footnote 10: English _White Paper_, No. 5; Russian _Orange Paper_,
No. 3.]
Further confirmation that the German Foreign Office did have advance
knowledge of at least the substance of the ultimatum is shown by the
fact that on the day the ultimatum was issued the Chancellor of the
German Empire instructed its Ambassadors in Paris, London, and St.
Petersburg to advise the English, French, and Russian governments that
the acts as well as _the demands_ of the Austro-Hungarian
Government cannot but be looked upon as justified.[11]
[Footnote 11: German _White Paper_, Annex 1 B.]
How could Germany thus indorse the "demands" if it did not know the
substance of the ultimatum? Is it probable that Germany would have
given in a matter of the gravest importance a blanket endorsement of
Austria's demands, unless the German Government had first been fully
advised as to their nature?
The hour when these instructions were sent is not given, so that it
does not follow that these significant instructions were necessarily
prior to the service of the ultimatum at Belgrade at 6 P.M.
Nevertheless, as the ultimatum did not reach the other capitals of
Europe until the following day, as the diplomatic correspondence
clearly shows, it seems improbable that the German Foreign Office
would have issued this very carefully prepared and formal warning to
the other Powers on July the 23d unless it had full knowledge not
only of Austria's intention to serve the ultimatum but also of the
substance thereof.
While it may be that Germany, while indorsing in blank the policy
of Austria, purposely refrained from examining _the text_ of the
communication, so that it could thereafter claim that it was not
responsible for Austria's action--a policy which would not lessen the
discreditable character of this iniquitous conspiracy against the
peace of Europe,--yet the more reasonable assumption is that the
simultaneous issuance of Austria's ultimatum at Belgrade and Germany's
warning to the Powers was the result of a concerted action and had
a common purpose. No court or jury, reasoning along the ordinary
inferences of human life, would question this conclusion.
The communication from the German Foreign Office last referred
to anticipates that Servia "will refuse to comply with these
demands"--why, if they were justified?--and Germany suggests
to France, England, and Russia that if, as a result of such
noncompliance, Austria has "recourse to military measures," that
"the choice of means must be left to it."
The German Ambassadors in the three capitals were instructed
to lay particular stress on the view that the above question
is one, the settlement of which devolves solely upon
Austria-Hungary and Servia, and one which the Powers should
earnestly strive to confine to the two countries concerned,
and the instruction added that Germany strongly desired
that the dispute be localized, since any intervention of
another Power, on account of the various alliance
obligations, _would bring consequences impossible to
measure_.
This is one of the most significant documents in the whole
correspondence. If the German Foreign Office were as ignorant as its
Ambassador at London affected to be of the Austrian policy and
ultimatum, and if Germany were not then instigating and supporting
Austria in its perilous course, why should the German Chancellor have
served this threatening notice upon England, France, and Russia, that
Austria "_must_" be left free to make war upon Servia, and that any
attempt to intervene in behalf of the weaker nation would "bring
consequences impossible to measure"?[12]
[Footnote 12: German _White Paper_, Annex 1 B.]
A still more important piece of evidence is the carefully prepared
confidential communication, which the Imperial Chancellor sent to the
Federated Governments of Germany shortly after the Servian reply was
given.
In this confidential communication, which was nothing less than a call
to arms to the entire German Empire, and which probably intended to
convey the intimation that without formal mobilization the constituent
states of Germany should begin to prepare for eventualities, von
Bethmann-Hollweg recognized the possibility that Russia might
feel it a duty "to take the part of Servia in her dispute with
Austria-Hungary." Why, again, if Austria's case was so clearly
justified?
The Imperial Chancellor added that
if Russia feels constrained to take sides with Servia in
this conflict, she certainly has a right to do it,
but added that if Russia did this it would in effect challenge the
integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and that Russia would
therefore alone
bear the responsibility if a European war arises from the
Austro-Servian question, which all the rest of the great
European Powers wish to localize.
In this significant confidential communication the German Chancellor
declares the strong interest which Germany had in the punishment of
Servia by Austria. He says, "_our closest interests therefore summon
us to the side of Austria-Hungary_," and he adds that
if contrary to hope, the trouble should spread, owing to the
intervention of Russia, then, true to our duty as an Ally,
we should have to support the neighboring monarchy with the
entire might of the German Empire.[13]
[Footnote 13: German _White Paper_, Annex 2.]
It staggers ordinary credulity to believe that this portentous warning
to the constituents of the German Empire to prepare for "the Day"
should not have been written with advance knowledge of the Austrian
ultimatum, which had only been issued on July 23d and only reached the
other capitals of Europe on July 24th. The subsequent naive disclaimer
by the German Foreign Office of any expectation that Austria's attack
upon Servia could possibly have any interest to other European Powers
is hardly consistent with its assertion that Germany's "closest
interests" were involved in the question, or the portentous warnings
to the States of the Empire to prepare for eventualities.
The German Ambassador to the United States who attempted early in the
controversy and with disastrous results, to allay the rising storm of
indignation in that country, formally admitted in an article in the
_Independent_ of September 7, 1914, that Germany "_did approve in
advance the Austrian ultimatum to Servia_."
Why then was Germany guilty of duplicity in disclaiming, concurrently
with its issuance, any such responsibility? The answer is obvious.
This was necessary to support its contention that the quarrel between
Austria and Servia was purely "local."
NOTE.--In Chapter VII it will appear from the French _Yellow Book_
that the Prime Minister of Bavaria had knowledge of the Austrian
ultimatum before its delivery in Belgrade.