THE RECORD IN THE CASE
All morally sane men in this twentieth century are agreed that
war abstractly is an evil thing,--perhaps the greatest of all
indecencies,--and that while it may be one of the offenses which must
come, "woe to that man (or nation) by whom the offense cometh!"
They are of one mind in regarding this present war as a great
crime--perhaps the greatest crime--against civilization, and the only
questions which invite discussion are:
Which of the two contending groups of Powers is morally
responsible?
Was Austria justified in declaring war against Servia?
Was Germany justified in declaring war against Russia and
France?
Was Germany justified in declaring war against Belgium?
Was England justified in declaring war against Germany?
Primarily and perhaps exclusively these ethical questions turn upon
the issues developed by the communications which passed between the
various chancelleries of Europe in the last week of July, for it is
the amazing feature of this greatest of wars that it was precipitated
by the ruling classes and, assuming that all the diplomats sincerely
desired a peaceful solution of the questions raised by the Austrian
ultimatum (which is by no means clear) the war is the result of
ineffective diplomacy.
I quite appreciate the distinction between the immediate causes of a
war and the anterior or underlying causes. The fundamental cause of
the Franco-German War of 1870 was not the incident at Ems nor even the
question of the Spanish succession. These were but the precipitating
pretexts or, as a lawyer would express it, the "proximate causes." The
underlying cause was unquestionably the rivalry between Prussia and
France for political supremacy in Europe.
Behind the Austrian ultimatum to Servia were also great questions
of State policy, not easily determinable upon any tangible ethical
principle, and which involved the hegemony of Europe. Germany's
domination of Europe had been established when by the rattling of its
saber it compelled Russia in 1908 to permit Austria to disturb the
then existing status in the Balkans by the forcible annexation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and behind the Austrian-Servian question of
1914, arising out of the murder of the Crown Prince of Austria at
Serajevo, was the determination of Germany and Austria to reassert
that dominant position by compelling Russia to submit to a further
humiliation of a Slav State.
The present problem is to inquire how far Germany and her ally
selected a just pretext to test this question of mastery.
The pretext was the work of diplomatists. It was not the case of a
nation rising upon some great cause which appealed to popular
imagination. The acts of the statesmen in that last fateful week of
July, 1914, were not the mere echo of the popular will.
The issues were framed by the statesmen and diplomats of Europe
and whatever efforts were made to preserve the peace and whatever
obstructive tactics were interposed were not the acts of any of the
nations now in arms but those of a small coterie of men who, in the
secrecy of their respective cabinets, made their moves and
countermoves upon the chessboard of nations.
The future of Europe in that last week of July was in the hands of a
small group of men, numbering not over fifty, and what they did was
never known to their respective nations in any detail until after the
fell Rubicon had been crossed and a world war had been precipitated.
If all of these men had sincerely desired to work for peace, there
would not have been any war.
So swiftly did events move that the masses of the people had time
neither to think nor to act. The suddenness of the crisis marks it as
a species of "mid-summer madness," a very "witches' sabbath" of
diplomatic demagoguery.
In a peaceful summer, when the nations now struggling to exterminate
each other were fraternizing in the holiday centers of Europe, an
issue was suddenly precipitated, made the subject of communications
between the various chancelleries, and almost in the twinkling of an
eye Europe found itself wrapped in a universal flame. The appalling
toll of death suggests the inquiry of Hamlet: "Did these bones cost
no more the breeding, but to play at loggats with 'em?" and if the
diplomatic "loggats" of 1914 were ineffectively played, some one must
accept the responsibility for such failure.
This sense of responsibility against the dread Day of Accounting has
resulted in a disposition beyond past experience to justify the
quarrel by placing before the world the diplomatic record.
The English Government commenced shortly after the outbreak of
hostilities by publishing the so-called _White Paper_, consisting of a
statement by the British Government and 160 diplomatic documents as an
appendix. This was preceded by Sir Edward Grey's masterly speech in
Parliament. That speech and all his actions in this fateful crisis may
rank him in future history with the younger Pitt.
On August 4th, the German Chancellor for the first time explained to
the representatives of his nation assembled in the Reichstag the
causes of the war, then already commenced, and there was distributed
among the members a statement of the German Foreign Office,
accompanied by 27 Exhibits in the form of diplomatic communications,
which have been erroneously called the German _White Paper_ and which
sets forth Germany's defense to the world.
Shortly thereafter Russia, casting aside all the traditional secrecy
of Muscovite diplomacy, submitted to a candid world its acts and deeds
in the form of the so-called Russian _Orange Paper_, with 79 appended
documents, and this was followed later by the publication by Belgium
of the so-called Belgian _Gray Paper_.
Late in November France published its _Yellow Book_, the most
comprehensive of these diplomatic records. Of the two groups of
powers, therefore, only Austria and Italy have failed to disclose
their diplomatic correspondence to the scrutiny of the world.
The former, as the originator of the controversy, should give
as a matter of "decent respect to the opinions of mankind" its
justification, if any, for what it did. So far, it has only given
its ultimatum to Servia and Servia's reply.
Italy, as a nation that has elected to remain neutral, is not under
the same moral obligation to disclose the secrets of its Foreign
Office, and while it remains on friendly terms with all the
Powers it probably feels some delicacy in disclosing confidential
communications, but as the whole world is vitally interested in
determining the justice of the quarrel and as it is wholly probable
that the archives of the Italian Foreign Office would throw an
illuminating searchlight upon the moral issues involved, Italy, in
a spirit of loyalty to civilization, should without further delay
disclose the documentary evidence in its possession.
While it is to be regretted that the full diplomatic record is not
made up, yet as we have the most substantial part of the record in
the communications which passed in those fateful days between Berlin,
St. Petersburg, Paris, and London, there is sufficient before the
court to justify a judgment, especially as there is reason to believe
that the documents as yet withheld would only confirm the conclusions
which the record already given to the world irresistibly suggests.
Thus we can reasonably assume that the Italian documentary evidence
would fairly justify the conclusion that the war was on the part of
Germany and Austria a war of aggression, for Italy, by its refusal to
act with its associates of the Triple Alliance, has in the most
significant manner thus adjudged it.
Under the terms of the Triple Alliance, Italy had obligated itself to
support Germany and Austria in any purely _defensive_ war, and if
therefore the communications, which undoubtedly passed between Vienna
and Berlin on the one hand, and Rome on the other, justified the
conclusion that Germany and Austria had been assailed by Russia,
England, and France or either of them, then we must assume that Italy
would have respected its obligation, especially as it would thus
relieve Italy from any possible charge of treachery to two allies,
whose support and protection it had enjoyed from the time that the
Triple Alliance was first made.
When Italy decided that it was under no obligation to support its
allies, it effectually affirmed the fact that they had commenced a war
of aggression, and until the contrary is shown, we must therefore
assume that the archives of the Foreign Office at Rome would merely
confirm the conclusions hereinafter set forth as to the moral
responsibility for the war.
Similarly upon considerations that are familiar to all who have had
any experience in the judicial investigation of truth, it must be
assumed that if Austria had in its secret archives any documentary
evidence that would justify it in its pretension that it had been
unjustly assailed by one or more of the Powers with which it is now at
war, it would have published such documents to the world in its own
exculpation. The moral responsibility for this war is too great
for any nation to accept it unnecessarily. Least of all could
Austria--which on the face of the record commenced the controversy by
its ultimatum to Servia--leave anything undone to acquit itself at the
bar of public opinion of any responsibility for the great crime that
is now drenching Europe with blood. The time is past when any nation
can ignore the opinions of mankind or needlessly outrage its
conscience. Germany has recognized this in publishing its defense and
exhibiting a part of its documentary proof, and if its ally, Austria,
continues to withhold from the knowledge of the world the documents in
its possession, there can be but one conclusion as to its guilt.
Upon the record thus made up in the Supreme Court of Civilization,
that tribunal need no more hesitate to proceed to judgment than would
an ordinary court hesitate to enter a decree because one of the
litigants has deliberately suppressed documents known to be in its
possession. It does not lie in the mouth of such a litigant to ask the
court to suspend judgment or withhold its sentence until the full
record is made up, when the incompleteness of that record is due to
its own deliberate suppression of vital documentary proofs.