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THE EVIDENCE
IN THE CASE
A Discussion of the Moral Responsibility for the
War of 1914, as Disclosed by the Diplomatic
Records of England, Germany, Russia,
France, Austria, Italy and Belgium.
BY
JAMES M. BECK, LL.D.
Late Assistant Attorney-General of the U. S.
Author of "The War and Humanity."
With an Introduction by
HON. JOSEPH H. CHOATE
Late U. S. Ambassador to Great Britain
"_Did these bones cost no more the breeding but to play at loggats
with 'em? Mine ache to think on 't._"
HAMLET--Act V., Sc. 1.
_Revised Edition, with Additional Material_
NEW YORK
GROSSET & DUNLAP
PUBLISHERS
Published by Arrangement with G. P. Putnam's Sons
COPYRIGHT, 1914, BY
JAMES M. BECK
COPYRIGHT, 1915, BY
JAMES M. BECK
(_For Revised Edition_)
Thirteenth Impression
BY JAMES M. BECK
The Evidence in the Case. The War and Humanity.
This edition is issued under arrangement with the publishers,
G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS, NEW YORK AND LONDON
TO
ALBERT, OF BELGIUM
"EVERY INCH A KING"
Justum, et tenacem propositi virum
Non civium ardor prava jubentium,
Non vultus instantis tyranni,
Mente quatit solida, neque Auster
Dux inquieti turbidus Adriae,
Nec fulminantis magna manus Jovis.
Si fractus illabatur orbis,
Impavidum ferient ruinae.
HORACE.
=Publishers' Note=
The volume _The Evidence in the Case_ is based upon an article by the
Hon. James M. Beck, which came into print in the "New York Times" of
October 25th. The article in question made so deep an impression with
thinking citizens on both sides of the Atlantic that it has been
translated into a number of European languages, and some 400,000
copies have been sold in England alone.
In making this acknowledgment, which is due for the courtesy of "The
Times" in permitting an article prepared for its columns to be
utilized as the basis for the book, it is in order for the publishers
to explain to the readers that the material in the article has itself
been rewritten and amplified, while the book contains, in addition to
this original paper, a number of further chapters comprising together
more than six times the material of the first article.
The present book is an independent work, and is deserving of
consideration on the part of all citizens who are interested in
securing authoritative information on the issues of the great European
contest.
New York, December 12, 1914
INTRODUCTION
BY THE HON. JOSEPH H. CHOATE, FORMER AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO GREAT
BRITAIN[1]
[Footnote 1: Reprinted, by permission, from the N. Y. _Times_.]
For five months now all people who read at all have been reading about
the horrible war that is devastating Europe and shedding the best
blood of the people of five great nations. In fact, they have had no
time to read anything else, and everything that is published about it
is seized upon with great avidity. No wonder, then, that Mr. James M.
Beck's book, _The Evidence in the Case_, published by G. P. Putnam's
Sons, which has grown out of the article by him contributed to the New
York _Times_ Sunday Magazine, has been warmly welcomed both here and
in England as a valuable addition to the literature of the day.
An able and clear-headed lawyer and advocate, he presents the matter
in the unique form of a legal argument, based upon an analysis of the
diplomatic records submitted by England, Germany, Russia, France, and
Belgium, as "A Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization," and the
conclusions to be deduced as to the moral responsibility for the war.
The whole argument is founded upon the idea that there is such a thing
as a public conscience of the world, which must and will necessarily
pass final judgment upon the conduct of the parties concerned in this
infernal struggle. Many times in the course of the book he refers
emphatically to that "decent respect to the opinions of mankind" to
which Jefferson appealed in our Declaration of Independence as the
final arbiter upon our conduct in throwing off the British yoke and
declaring our right to be an independent nation. That this "public
opinion of the world" is the final tribunal upon all great
international contests is illustrated by the fact that all mankind,
including Great Britain herself, has long ago adjudged that our great
Declaration was not only just, but necessary for the progress of
mankind.
It is evident from his brief preface that Mr. Beck is a sincere
admirer of historic Germany, and on the eve of the war he was at
Weimar, after a brief visit to a little village near Erfurt, where one
of his ancestors was born, who had migrated at an early date to
Pennsylvania, a Commonwealth whose founder had made a treaty with the
Indians which, so far from being treated as a "mere scrap of paper,"
was never broken. Like many Americans, Mr. Beck is of mixed ancestry,
being in part English and in part Swiss-German. He has therefore
viewed the great question objectively, and without any racial
prejudice.
A careful study of the diplomatic correspondence that preceded the
outbreak of the war had convinced Mr. Beck that Germany was chiefly
responsible for it, and he proceeds _con amore_ to demonstrate the
truth of this conviction by the most earnest and forceful presentation
of the case.
Forensic lawyers in the cases they present are about half the time on
the wrong side, or what proves by the final judgment to have been the
wrong side, but it is always easy to tell from the manner of
presentation whether they themselves are thoroughly convinced of the
justice of the side which they advocate. It is evident that Mr. Beck
did not undertake to convince "the Supreme Court of Civilization"
until he was himself thoroughly persuaded of the justice of his cause,
that the invasion of Belgium by Germany was not only a gross breach of
existing treaties, but was in violation of settled international law,
and a crime against humanity never to be forgotten, a crime which
converted that peaceful and prosperous country into a human
slaughterhouse, reeking with the blood of four great nations. How any
intelligent lawyer could have come to any other conclusion it is not
easy to imagine, since Germany confessed its crime while in the very
act of committing it, for on the very day that the German troops
crossed the Belgian frontier and hostilities began, the Imperial
Chancellor at the great session of the Reichstag on August 4th
declared, to use his own words:
Necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg,
and have possibly already entered on Belgian soil. _That is
a breach of international law.... We were forced to ignore
the rightful protests of the Governments of Luxemburg and
Belgium, and the injustice--I speak openly--the injustice we
thereby commit, we will try to make good as soon as our
military aims have been attained._ Anybody who is threatened
as we are threatened and is fighting for his highest
possessions can have only one thought--how he is to hack his
way through.
Thank God, their military aims have not yet been attained, and from
present appearances are not likely to be, but, as Mr. Beck believes,
Germany will still be held by the judgment of mankind to make good the
damage done.
In reviewing the diplomatic correspondence published by Germany that
preceded the outbreak of the war, Mr. Beck lays great stress, and we
think justly, upon the obvious suppression of evidence by Germany, in
omitting substantially all the important correspondence on vital
points that passed between Germany and Austria, and the suppression of
important evidence in judicial proceedings always carries irresistible
weight against the party guilty of it. While England and France and
Russia were pressing Germany to influence and control Austria in the
interests of peace, not a word is disclosed of what, if anything, the
German Foreign Office said to Austria toward that end. To quote Mr.
Beck's own words:
Among the twenty-seven communications appended to the German
_White Paper_, it is most significant that not a single
communication is given of the many which passed from the
Foreign Office of Berlin to that of Vienna, and only two
which passed from the German Ambassador in Vienna to the
German Chancellor, and the purpose of this suppression is
even more clearly indicated by the complete failure of
Austria to submit any of its diplomatic records to the
scrutiny of a candid world.
Notwithstanding the disavowal given by the German Ambassador at
Petrograd to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, that the German
Government had no knowledge of the text of the Austrian note before
it was handed in, and did not exercise any influence on its contents,
Mr. Beck establishes clearly by the admissions of the German Foreign
Office itself that it was consulted by Austria previous to the
ultimatum, and that it not only approved of its course, but literally
gave to Austria _carte blanche_ to proceed. And the German Ambassador
to the United States formally admitted in an article in _The
Independent_ of September 7, 1914, that "Germany had approved in
advance the Austrian ultimatum to Servia."
This brutal ultimatum by a great nation of fifty millions of people,
making impossible demands against a little one of four millions which
had itself just emerged from two conflicts and was still suffering
from exhaustion--an ultimatum which set all the nations of Europe in
agitation--is proved to have been jointly concocted by the two members
of the Triple Alliance, Germany and Austria. But the third member of
that Alliance, Italy, found it to be an act of aggression on their
part which brought on the war, and that the terms of the Triple
Alliance, therefore, did not bind her to take any part.
The peace parleys which passed between the several nations involved
are carefully reviewed by Mr. Beck, who concludes, as we think
justly, that up to the 28th of July, when the German Imperial
Chancellor sent for the English Ambassador and announced the refusal
of his Government to accept the conference of the Powers proposed by
Sir Edward Grey, every proposal to preserve peace had come from the
Triple Entente, and that every such proposal had met with an
uncompromising negative from Austria, and either that or obstructive
quibbles from Germany.
At this point, the sudden return of the Kaiser to Berlin from his
annual holiday in Norway, which his own Foreign Office regretted as a
step taken on his Majesty's own initiative and which they feared might
cause speculation and excitement, and his personal intervention from
that time until his troops invaded Luxemburg and he made his abrupt
demand upon the Belgian Government for permission to cross its
territory are reviewed with great force and effect by Mr. Beck, with
the conclusion on his part that the Kaiser, who by a timely word to
Austria might have prevented all the terrible trouble that followed,
was the supremely guilty party, and that such will be the verdict of
history.
Mr. Beck's review of the case of Belgium is extremely interesting, and
his conclusion that England, France, Russia, and Belgium can await
with confidence the world's final verdict that their quarrel was just,
rests safely upon the plea of "Guilty" by Germany, a conclusion which
seems to have been already plainly declared by most of the civilized
nations of the world.
We think that Mr. Beck's opinion that England and France were taken
unawares and were wholly unprepared for war is a little too strongly
expressed. France, certainly, had been making ready for war with
Germany ever since the great conflict of 1870 had resulted in her
loss of Alsace and Lorraine, and had had a fixed and unalterable
determination to get them back when she could, although it is evident
that she did not expect her opportunity to come just when and as it
did. That Great Britain had no present expectation of immediate war
with Germany is clearly obvious. That she had long been apprehending
the danger of it in the indefinite future is very clear, but that Sir
Edward Grey and the Government and the people that he represented did
all that they possibly could to prevent the war seems to be clearly
established.
Mr. Beck's book is so extremely interesting from beginning to end that
it is difficult when once begun to lay it down and break off the
reading, and we shall not be surprised to hear, not only that it has
had an immense sale in England and America, but that its translation
into the languages of the other nations of Europe has been demanded.
JOSEPH H. CHOATE.
NEW YORK, January 10, 1915.
FOREWORD
On the eve of the Great War I sat one evening in the reading room of
the Hotel Erbprinz in classic Weimar. I had spent ten happy days in
Thuringia, and had visited with deep interest a little village near
Erfurt, where one of my forbears was born. I had seen Jena, from whose
historic university this paternal ancestor had gone as a missionary
to North America in the middle of the eighteenth century. This
simple-minded German pietist had cherished the apparent delusion
that even the uncivilized Indians of the American wilderness
might be taught--the Bernhardis and Treitschkes to the contrary
notwithstanding--that to increase the political power of a nation by
the deliberate and highly systematized destruction of its neighbors
was not the truest political ideal, even of an Indian tribe.
This missionary had gone most fittingly to the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, where its enlightened founder had already given a
demonstration of the truth that a treaty of peace, even though not
formally expressed in a "scrap of paper," might be kept by white men
and so-called savages with scrupulous fidelity for at least three
quarters of a century, for even the cynical Voltaire said in sincerest
admiration that the compact between William Penn and the Indians was
the only treaty which was never reduced to parchment, nor ratified by
an oath and yet was never broken. When Penn, the great apostle of
peace, died in England, a disappointed, ruined, and heart-broken man,
and the news reached the Indians in their wigwams along the banks of
the Delaware, they had for him, whom they called the "white Truth
Teller" so deep a sense of gratitude that they sent to his widow a
sympathetic gift of valuable skins, in memory of the "man of unbroken
friendship and inviolate treaties."
These reflections in a time of broken friendships and violated
treaties are not calculated to fill the man of the twentieth century
with any justifiable pride.
My mind, however, as I spent the quiet evening in the historic inn
of Thackeray's Pumpernickel, did not revert to these far distant
associations but was full of other thoughts suggested by the most
interesting section of Germany, through which it had been my privilege
to pass.
I had visited Eisenach and reverentially stood within the room where
the great master of music, John Sebastian Bach, had first seen the
light of day, and as I saw the walls that he loved and which are
forever hallowed because they once sheltered this divine genius, the
question occurred to me whether he may not have done more for Germany
with his immortal harmonies, which are the foundation of all modern
music, than all the Treitschkes, and Bernhardis, with their gospel of
racial hatred, pseudo-patriotism, and imperial aggrandizement.
I had climbed the slopes of the Wartburg and from Luther's room had
gazed with delight upon the lovely Thuringian forests. Quite apart
from any ecclesiastical considerations that room seemed to suggest
historic Germany in its best estate. It recalled that scene of undying
interest at the Diet of Worms, when the peaceful adherence to an ideal
was shown to be mightier than the power of the greatest empire
since the fall of Rome. The monk of Wittenburg, standing alone
in the presence of the great Emperor, Charles the Fifth, and the
representatives of the most powerful religious organization that the
world has ever known, with his simple, "_Hier stehe ich; ich kann
nicht anders,_" represented the truest soul and highest ideal of the
nobler Germany.
These and other glorious memories, suggested by Eisenach, Frankfort,
Erfurt, Weimar, Jena, and Leipzig, made this pilgrimage of intense
interest, and almost the only discord was the sight of the Leipzig
Voelkerschlacht Denkmal, probably the largest, and certainly the
ugliest monument in all the world. It has but one justification, in
that it commemorates war, and no monument ever more fully symbolized
by its own colossal crudity the moral ugliness of that most ghastly
phenomenon of human life. Let us pray that in the event of final
victory Prussia will not commission the architects of the Leipzig
monument, or the imperial designer of the Sieges-Allee to rebuild
that Gothic masterpiece, the Rheims Cathedral. That day in Leipzig
an Alsatian cartoonist, Hansi, had been sentenced to one year's
imprisonment for a harmless cartoon in a book for children, in which
the most supersensitive should have found occasion for nothing, except
a passing smile.
On the library table of the Erbprinz, I found a large book, which
proved to be a Bismarck memorial volume. It contained hundreds of
pictures glorifying and almost deifying the Iron Chancellor. One
particularly arrested my attention. It was the familiar picture of
the negotiations for peace between Bismarck and Jules Favre in the
terrible winter of 1871. The French statesman has sunk into a chair in
abject despair, struck speechless by the demands of the conqueror.
Bismarck stands triumphant and his proud bearing and arrogant manner
fail to suggest any such magnanimous courtesy as that with which Grant
accepted the sword of Lee at Appomattox. The picture breathed the very
spirit of "_vae victis_." Had a French artist painted this picture,
I could understand it, for it would serve effectively to stimulate
undying hatred in the French heart. It seemed strange that a German
artist should treat a subject, calling for a spirit of most delicate
courtesy, in a manner which represented Prussian militarism in its
most arrogant form.
This unworthy picture reminded me of a later scene in the Reichstag,
in which the Iron Chancellor, after reviewing with complacency the
profitable results of Germany's deliberately provoked wars against
Denmark, Austria, and France, added the pious ejaculation:
_Wir Deutsche fuerchten Gott sonst nichts in der Welt._
(We Germans fear God but nothing else in the world.)
It is not necessary to impeach the sincerity of this pious
glorification of the successful results of land grabbing. The mind in
moments of exaltation plays strange tricks with the soul. Bismarck may
have dissembled on occasion but he was never a hypocrite. It is the
spirit which inspired this boastful and arrogant speech, which has so
powerfully stimulated Prussian Junkerism, to which I wish to refer.
Had an American uttered these words we would have treated the boast as
a vulgar exhibition of provincial "spread-eagleism," such as
characterized certain classes in this country before the Civil War,
and which Charles Dickens somewhat over-caricatured in _Martin
Chuzzlewit_, but in the mouth of Bismarck, with his cynical
indifference to moral considerations in questions of statecraft, this
piece of rhetorical _spread double-eagleism_, manifests the spirit of
the Prussian military caste since its too easy triumph over France in
1870-1871, a triumph, which may yet prove the greatest calamity that
ever befell Germany, not only in the seeds of hatred which it sowed,
of which there is now a harvest of blood past precedent, but also in
the development of an arrogant pride which has profoundly affected to
its prejudice the noble Germany of Luther, Bach, Beethoven, Goethe,
Schiller, Kant, Humboldt, and Lessing.
To say that Germany "fears" nothing save God is contradicted by its
whole diplomatic history of the last half century. In this it is not
peculiar. The curse of modern statecraft is the largely unreasoning
fear which all nations have of their neighbors. England has feared
Germany only less than Germany has feared England and this nervous
apprehension has bred jealousy, hatred, suspicion, until to-day all
civilized nations are reaping a harvest horrible beyond expression.
The whole history of Germany since 1870 has shown a constant, and at
times an unreasoning fear, first of France, then of the Slav, and
latterly and in its most acute form, of England. I do not mean that
Germany has been or is now animated by any spirit of craven cowardice.
There has not been in recorded history a braver nation, and the
dauntless courage with which, even at this hour, thousands of Germans
are going with patriotic songs on their lips to "their graves as to
their beds," is worthy of all admiration.
The whole statecraft of Germany for over forty years has been inspired
by an exaggerated apprehension of the intentions of its great
neighbors. This fear followed swiftly upon the triumph of 1871, for
Germany early showed its apprehension that France might recover its
military strength. When that fallen but indomitable foe again
struggled to its feet in 1875, the Prussian military caste planned to
give the stricken gladiator the _coup de grace_ and was only prevented
by the intervention of England and Russia. Later this acute and
neurotic apprehension took the form of a hatred and fear of Russia,
and this notwithstanding the fact that the Kaiser had in the
Russo-Japanese War exalted the Czar as the "champion of Christianity"
and the "representative of the white race" in the Far East.
When the psychology of the present conflict is considered by future
historians, this neuropathic feature of Germany's foreign policy will
be regarded as a contributing element of first importance.
Latterly the _Furor Teutonicus_ was especially directed against
England, and although it was obvious to the dispassionate observer in
neutral countries that no nation was making less preparations or was
in point of fact so illy prepared for a conflict as England,
nevertheless Germany, with a completeness of preparation such as the
world has never witnessed, was constantly indulging in a very hysteria
of fear at the imaginary designs of England upon Germany's standing as
a world power.
Luther's famous saying, already quoted, and Bismarck's blustering
speech to the Reichstag measure the difference between the Germany of
the Reformation and the Prussia of to-day.
I refuse to believe that this Bismarckian attitude is that of the
German people. If a censored press permitted them to know the real
truth with respect to the present crisis, that people, still sound in
heart and steadfast in soul, would repudiate a policy of duplicity,
cunning, and arrogance, which has precipitated their great nation into
an abyss of disaster. The normal German is an admirable citizen,
quiet, peaceable, thrifty, industrious, faithful, efficient, and
affectionate to the verge of sentimentality. He, and not the Junker,
has made Germany the most efficient political State in the world. If
to his genius for organization could be added the individualism of the
American, the resultant product would be incomparable. A combination
of the German _fortiter in re_ with the American _suaviter in modo_
would make the most efficient republic in the world.
The Germany of Luther, that still survives and will survive when
"Junkerism" is a dismal memory of the past, believes that "the supreme
wisdom, the paramount vitality, is an abiding honesty, the doing of
right, because right is right, in scorn of consequence."
That the German people have rallied with enthusiastic unanimity to the
flag in this great crisis, I do not question. This is, in part, due to
the fact that the truth has never yet been disclosed to them, and is
not likely to be until the war is over. They have been taught that in
a time of profound peace England, France, and Russia deliberately
initiated a war of aggression to destroy the commercial power of
Germany. The documents hereinafter analyzed will show how utterly
baseless this fiction is. Even if the truth were known, no one can
blame the German, who now rallies to his flag with such superhuman
devotion, for whether the cause of his country is just or unjust, its
prestige, and perhaps its very existence, is at stake, and there
should be for the rank and file of the German people only a feeling of
profound pity and deep admiration. Edmund Burke once said, "We must
pardon something to the spirit of liberty." We can paraphrase it and
say in this crisis, "We must pardon something to the spirit of
patriotism." The whole-hearted devotion of this great nation to its
flag is worthy of the best traditions of the Teutonic race. Thor did
not wield his thunder hammer with greater effect than these
descendants of the race of Wotan. If the ethical question depended
upon relative bravery, who could decide between the German, "faithful
unto death"; the English soldier, standing like a stone wall against
fearful odds, the French or Russian not less brave or resolute, and
the Belgian, now as in Caesar's time the "bravest of all the tribes of
Gaul."
No consideration, either of sympathy, admiration, or pity, can in any
manner affect the determination of the great ethical question as to
the moral responsibility for the present crime against civilization.
That must be determined by the facts as they have been developed, and
the nations and individuals who are responsible for this world-wide
catastrophe must be held to a strict accountability. The truth of
history inexorably demands this.
To determine where this moral responsibility lies is the purpose of
these pages.
In determining this question Posterity will distinguish between the
military caste, headed by the Kaiser and the Crown Prince, which
precipitated this great calamity, and the German people.
The very secrecy of the plot against the peace of the world and the
failure to disclose to the German nation the diplomatic communications
hereinafter quoted, strongly suggest that this detestable war is not
merely a crime against civilization, _but also against the deceived
and misled German people_. They have a vision and are essentially
progressive and peace-loving in their national characteristics, while
the ideals of their military caste are those of the dark ages.
One day the German people will know the full truth and then there will
be a dreadful reckoning for those who have plunged a noble nation into
this unfathomable gulf of suffering.
Though the mills of God grind slowly,
Yet they grind exceeding small,
Though with patience He stands waiting,
With exactness grinds He all.
Or to put this ancient Greek proverb in its German form:
"_Gottes Muehle geht langsam aber die mahlt fein._"
JAMES M. BECK.
NEW YORK, November 30, 1914.
The Witnesses
ENGLAND
HIS MAJESTY, KING GEORGE V.
MR. ASQUITH Premier.
MR. BEAUMONT Councilor of Embassy at
Constantinople.
SIR F. BERTIE Ambassador at Paris.
SIR G. BUCHANAN Ambassador at St. Petersburg.
SIR M. DE BUNSEN Ambassador at Vienna.
SIR E. GOSCHEN Ambassador at Berlin.
SIR EDWARD GREY Foreign Secretary.
SIR A. JOHNSTONE Minister at Luxemburg.
SIR ARTHUR NICHOLSON Under Secretary for Foreign
Affairs.
SIR R. RODD Ambassador to Italy.
SIR H. RUMBOLD Councilor of Embassy at Berlin.
SIR F. VILLIERS Minister to Belgium.
GERMANY
HIS MAJESTY, EMPEROR WILLIAM II.
HERR VON BELOW (SALESKE[2]) Minister to Belgium.
DR. VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG Chancellor.
HERR VON BUCH Minister at Luxemburg.
HERR VON HEERINGEN Minister of War.
HERR VON JAGOW Secretary of State.
PRINCE LICHNOWSKY Ambassador at London.
HERR VON MUELLER Minister at The Hague.
COUNT POURTALES Ambassador at St. Petersburg.
BARON VON SCHOEN Ambassador at Paris.
HERR VON ZIMMERMANN Under Secretary of State.
HERR VON TSCHIRSCHKY Ambassador at Vienna.
[Footnote 2: Herr von Below Saleske is referred to in despatches as
Herr von Below.]
FRANCE
PRESIDENT RAYMOND POINCARE
M. VIVIANI Premier of France.
M. BERTHELOT Of the French Ministry for Foreign
Affairs.
M. PAUL CAMBON Ambassador to England.
M. KLOBUKOWSKI Minister to Belgium.
M. DE MARGERIE Of the French Diplomatic Service.
M. JULES CAMBON Ambassador to Germany.
RUSSIA
HIS MAJESTY, EMPEROR NICHOLAS II.
M. SAZONOF Minister of Foreign Affairs.
COUNT BENCKENDORFF Ambassador at London.
M. BRONEWSKY Charge d'Affaires at Berlin.
M. DE ETTER Councilor of Embassy at London.
M. ISVOLSKY Ambassador to France.
PRINCE KUDACHEF Councilor of Embassy at Vienna.
M. SALVIATI Consul General at Fiume.
M. SCHEBEKO Ambassador to Austria.
M. SEVASTOPOULO Charge d'Affaires at Paris.
M. STRANDTMAN Charge d'Affaires at Belgrade.
M. SUCHOMLINOF Minister for War.
M. DE SWERBEEW Ambassador to Germany.
BELGIUM
HIS MAJESTY, KING ALBERT
M. DAVIGNON Minister of Foreign Affairs.
BARON VON DER ELST Secretary General to Ministry
of Foreign Affairs.
COUNT ERREMBAULT DE DUDZEELE Minister at Vienna.
BARON FALLON Minister at The Hague.
BARON GRENIER Minister at Madrid.
BARON GUILLAUME Minister at Paris.
COUNT DE LALAING Minister at London.
SERVIA
HIS MAJESTY, KING PETER
M. PACHITCH Premier and Minister of Foreign
Affairs.
M. BOSCHKOVITCH Minister at London.
DR. PATCHOU Minister of Finance.
AUSTRIA
HIS MAJESTY, EMPEROR FRANCIS JOSEPH
COUNT BERCHTOLD Minister of Foreign Affairs.
COUNT CLARY UND ALDRINGEN Minister at Brussels.
BARON GIESL VON GIESLINGEN Minister at Belgrade.
BARON MACCHIO Councilor of Austrian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.
COUNT MENSDORFF Ambassador to England.
COUNT SZAPARY Ambassador to Russia.
ITALY
HIS MAJESTY, KING VICTOR EMMANUEL III.
MARQUIS DI SAN GIULIANO Minister of Foreign Affairs.
CONTENTS
PAGE
INTRODUCTION v
FOREWORD xv
THE WITNESSES xxvii
CHAPTER I
THE SUPREME COURT OF CIVILIZATION
Existence of the Court--The conscience of mankind--The philosophy
of Bernhardi--The recrudescence of Machiavelliism--Treitschke
and Bernhardi's doctrine--Recent utterances of the Kaiser, Crown
Prince, and representative officials--George Bernard Shaw's
defense--Concrete illustration of Bernhardiism 1
CHAPTER II
THE RECORD IN THE CASE
The issues stated--Proximate and underlying causes--A war of
diplomats--The masses not parties to the war--The official
defenses--The English _White Paper_--The German _White Paper_--The
Russian _Orange Paper_--The Belgian _Gray Paper_--Austria and
Italy still silent--Obligation of these nations to disclose facts 18
CHAPTER III
THE SUPPRESSED EVIDENCE
No apparent suppression by England, Russia, and Belgium--Suppression
by Germany of vital documents--Suppression by Austria of entire
record--Significance of such suppression 27
CHAPTER IV
GERMANY'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE AUSTRIAN
ULTIMATUM
Silence which preceded ultimatum--Europe's ignorance of impending
developments--Duty to civilization--Germany's prior knowledge of
ultimatum--Its disclaimer to Russia, France, and England of any
responsibility--Contradictory admission in its official defense--Further
confirmation in Germany's simultaneous threat to the Powers--Further
confirmation in its confidential notice to States of Germany to prepare
for eventualities 31
CHAPTER V
THE AUSTRIAN ULTIMATUM TO SERVIA
Extreme brutality of ultimatum--Limited time given to Servia and Europe
for consideration--Ultimatum and Servia's reply contrasted in parallel
columns--Relative size of two nations--Germany's intimations to
Servia--Brutality of ultimatum shown by analogy--Disclaimer of intention
to take territory valueless 47
CHAPTER VI
THE PEACE PARLEYS
Possibility of peace not embarrassed by popular clamor--Difficulties
of peaceful solution not insuperable--Policy of Germany and
Austria--Russia's and England's request for time--Germany's
refusal to cooperate--Germany's and Austria's excuses for refusal
to give extension of time--Berchtold's absence from Vienna--Austria's
alleged disclaimer of territorial expansion--Sazonof's conference
with English and French Ambassadors--Their conciliatory counsel
to Servia--Servia's pacific reply to ultimatum--Austria, without
considering Servian reply, declares war--England proposes suspension
of hostilities for peace parleys--Germany refuses--Its specious
reasons--Germany's untenable position as to localization of
conflict--England's proposal for a conference--Germany's
refusal--Austria declines all intervention, refusing to discuss
Servian note--Germany supports her with a quibble as to name of
conference--Russia proposes further discussion on basis of Servian
note--Russia then again proposes European conference--Austria
and Germany decline 61
CHAPTER VII
THE ATTITUDE OF FRANCE
The French _Yellow Book_--Its editors and contents--M. Jules
Cambon--The weakness of German diplomacy--Cambon's experience
and merits--Interview between the German Kaiser and the King of
Belgium--The Kaiser's change of attitude--The influence of the
Moroccan crisis--The condition of the German people in 1913--The
suppression of news in Austria--Attitude of the military
party--Servia's warning to Austria--Germany's knowledge of the Austrian
ultimatum before its issuance--Italy's ignorance of the Austrian
ultimatum--Significance of the fact--Germany's reasons for concealing
its intentions from Italy--The policy of secrecy--Prince Lichnowsky's
anxiety--Cambon's interview with von Jagow--The methods of
deception--Sazonof's frank offer--Germany's attempt to influence
France--Cambon's dramatic interview with von Jagow--His plea "In the
name of humanity"--The different attitudes of the two groups of
powers 102
CHAPTER VIII
THE INTERVENTION OF THE KAISER
The Kaiser's return to Berlin--His inconsistent record and complex
personality--German Foreign Office deprecates his return--Its many
blunders--The Kaiser takes the helm--He telegraphs the Czar--The
Czar's reply--The Kaiser's second telegram--His untenable
position--The Czar's explanation of military preparations and pledge
that no provocative action would be taken by Russia--King George's
telegram proposing temporary occupation by Austria of Belgrade pending
further peace negotiations--The Kaiser's reply--The Kaiser's
telegram to the Czar demanding Russian discontinuance of military
preparations--His insistence upon unilateral conditions--Germany's
preparations for war--Its offer to England to insure its
neutrality--England's reply--Russia's offer to stop conditionally
military preparations--England requests Germany to suggest any peace
formula--Austria expresses willingness to discuss with Russia Servian
note--Motives of Austria for this reversal of policy--The Kaiser
sends ultimatum to Russia--The Czar's last appeal--The Kaiser's
reply--Russia's inability to recall mobilization--England's last
efforts for peace--Germany declares war--The Czar's telegram to King
George 138
CHAPTER IX
THE CASE OF BELGIUM
The verdict of history not affected by result of war--Belgium
at outbreak of war--The Treaty of 1839--Its affirmation by
Bismarck--France's action in 1871--Reaffirmation by Germany of
Belgian neutrality in 1911-1914--The Hague Peace Conference of
1907--England asks Germany's and France's intentions with
respect to Belgium's neutrality--France replies--Germany's
refusal to reply--Germany's second offer to England--Germany's
ultimatum to Belgium--Belgium's reply--France's offer of five
army corps--Belgium refuses aid--Germany's declaration of war
against Belgium--The German Chancellor's explanation in the
Reichstag--The Belgian King appeals to England--England's ultimatum
to Germany--The "scrap of paper" incident--England declares war
against Germany--The apologies for Germany's action discussed--Belgium's
rights independent of Treaty of 1839 or The Hague Convention--Germany's
allegation that France had violated Belgium's neutrality an
afterthought--Von Mach's plea for the suspension of judgment--The
Brussels documents discussed--The negotiations between England
and Belgium--The German Chancellor's belated explanation of the
"scrap of paper" phrase--Invasion of Belgium a recrudescence of
Machiavelliism--The great blunder of Germany's diplomats and
soldiers 196
CHAPTER X
THE JUDGMENT OF THE WORLD
The completeness of the evidence--The force of public opinion--The
judgment of neutral States--The United States as a moral arbiter--A
summary of the probable verdict of history 246
EPILOGUE 252
The Evidence in the Case
CHAPTER I
THE SUPREME COURT OF CIVILIZATION
Let us suppose that in this year of dis-Grace, 1914, there had
existed, as let us pray will one day exist, a Supreme Court of
Civilization, before which the sovereign nations could litigate their
differences without resort to the iniquitous arbitrament of arms and
that each of the contending nations had a sufficient leaven of
Christianity or shall we say commonplace, everyday morality, to have
its grievances adjudged not by the ethics of the cannon, but by the
eternal criterion of justice.
_What would be the judgment of that august tribunal?_
It may be suggested that the question is academic, as no such Supreme
Court exists or is likely to exist within the life of any living man.
Casuists of the Bernhardi school of moral philosophy will further
suggest that to discuss the ethical merits of the war is to start with
a false premise that such a thing as international morality exists,
and that when once the conventionalities of civilization are laid
aside the leading nations commence and make war in a manner that
differs only in degree and not in kind from the methods of Frederick
the Great and Napoleon, and that these in turn only differed in degree
from those of Alaric and Attila. According to this theory, the only
law of nations is that ascribed by the poet to Rob Roy:
"The good old rule
Sufficeth them, the simple plan
That they should take who have the power,
And they should keep who can."
Does the Twentieth Century only differ from its predecessors in having
a thin veneering of hypocrisy, or has there developed in the progress
of civilization an international morality, by which, even though
imperfectly, the moral conduct of nations is judged?
The answer can be an unqualified affirmative. With the age of the
printing press, the steamship, the railroad, and the telegraph there
has developed _a conscience of mankind_.
When the founders of the American Republic severed the tie which bound
them to Great Britain, they stated that "_a decent respect to the
opinions of mankind requires_ that they should declare the causes
which impel them to the separation."
The Declaration assumed that there was a rule of right and wrong that
regulated the intercourse of nations as well as individuals; it
believed that there was a great human conscience, which rises higher
than the selfish interests and prejudices of nations and races, and
which approves justice and condemns injustice. It felt that this
approval is more to be desired than national advantage. It constituted
mankind a judge between contending nations and lest its judgment
should temporarily err it established posterity as a court of last
resort. It placed the tie of humanity above that of nationality. It
proclaimed the solidarity of mankind.
In the years that have intervened since this noble Declaration, the
world has so far progressed towards an enlightened sense of justice
that a "decent respect to the opinions of mankind" has proved an
efficient power in regulating peacefully and justly the intercourse
of nations. Each nation does at least in some measure fear to-day the
disapproval of civilization. The time gives this proof in the eager
desire of Germany to-day--despite its policy of "blood and iron"--to
gain the sympathetic approval of the American people, not with the
remotest hope of any practical cooperation but to avoid that state of
moral isolation, in which the land of Luther now finds itself.
_The Supreme Court of Civilization does exist._ It consists of
cosmopolitan men in every country, who put aside racial and national
prejudices and determine the right and wrong of every issue between
nations by that slowly forming system of international morality which
is the conscience of mankind.
To a certain class of German statesmen and philosophers this Court of
Public Opinion is a visionary abstraction. A group of distinguished
German soldiers, professors, statesmen, and even doctors of divinity,
pretending to speak in behalf of the German nation, have consciously
or unconsciously attempted to revive in the twentieth century the
cynical political morality of the sixteenth.
As Symonds, the historian of the Renaissance, says in his _Age of the
Despots_, Machiavelli was the first in modern times to formulate a
theory of government in which the interests of the ruler are alone
regarded, which assumes
a separation between statecraft and morality, which
recognizes force and fraud among the legitimate means of
attaining high political ends, which makes success alone the
test of conduct and which presupposes the corruption,
baseness, and venality of mankind at large.
Even the age of Cesare Borgia revolted against this philosophy and the
name of Machiavelli became a byword. "Am I a Machiavel?" says the host
in _The Merry Wives of Windsor_, and the implication of this question
indirectly manifests the revolt of the seventeenth century against the
sinister philosophy of the great Florentine.
Nothing can be more amazing than that not only leading militarists of
Germany but many of its foremost philosophers and teachers have become
so intoxicated with the dream of Pan-Germanism that in the utmost
sincerity they have espoused and with a certain pride proclaimed the
vicious principles of Machiavelli in all their moral nudity. There is
an emotional and mystical element in the advanced German thinker,
which makes him capable of accepting in full sincerity intellectual
and moral absurdities of which the more robust common sense of other
nations would be incapable. The advanced German doctrinaire is the
"wisest fool in Christendom." The depth of his learning is generally
in the inverse ratio to the shallowness of his common sense.
Nothing better demonstrates this than the present negation by advanced
and doubtless sincere German thinkers of the very foundations of
public morality and indeed of civilization. They have been led with
Nietzsche to revile the Beatitudes and exalt the supremacy of cruelty
over mercy. Indeed Treitschke in his lectures on _Politik_, which have
become the gospel of Junkerdom, avowedly based his gospel of force
upon the teaching of Machiavelli, for he points out that it was
Machiavelli who first clearly saw that the State is power (_der Staat
ist Macht_). Therefore "to care for this power is the highest moral
duty of the State" and "of all political weaknesses that of feebleness
is the most abominable and despicable; it is the sin against the holy
spirit of politics." He therefore holds that the State as the ultimate
good "cannot bind its will for the future over against other States,"
and that international treaties are therefore only obligatory "for
such time as the State may find to be convenient."
To enforce the will of the nation contrary to its own solemn promises
and to increase its might, war is the appointed means. Both Treitschke
and Moltke conceived it as "an ordinance set by God" and "one of the
two highest functions" of the State. The doctrine is carried to the
blasphemous conclusion that war is an ordinance of a just and merciful
God; that, to quote Bernhardi, "it is a biological necessity" and
that "the living God will see to it that war shall always recur as
a terrible medicine for humanity." Therefore "might is at once the
supreme right and the dispute as to what is right is decided by the
arbitrament of war," which gives a "biologically just decision."
This means that the 42 centimeter howitzer is more moral than a gun
of smaller caliber and that the justice of God depends upon the
superiority of Krupp to other ordnance manufacturers.
Treitschke tells us, and the statement is quoted by Bernhardi with
approval, that "the end all and be all of a state is power, and he who
is not man enough to look this truth in the face should not meddle
with politics." To this Bernhardi adds that the State's highest moral
duty is to increase its power and in so doing "_the State is the sole
judge of the morality of its own action. It is in fact above morality
or, in other words whatever is necessary is moral._"
Again we learn that the State must not allow any conventional
sympathies to distract it from its object and that "conditions may
arise which are more powerful than the most honorable intentions."
All efforts directed towards the abolition of war are denominated as
not only "foolish but absolutely immoral." To indicate that in this
prosecution of war for the increase of dominion, chivalry would be a
weakness and magnanimity a crime, we are finally told that "the State
is a law unto itself" and that "weak nations have not the same right
to live as powerful and vigorous nations." Even as to weak nations, we
are further advised that the powerful and vigorous nation--which alone
apparently has the right to live--must not wait for some act of
aggression or legitimate _casus belli_, but that it is justified in
deliberately provoking a war, and that the happiest results have
always followed such "deliberately provoked wars," for "the prospects
of success are the greatest when the moment for declaring war can be
selected to suit the political and military situation."
As the weak nations have no moral right to live it becomes important
to remember that in the economy of Prussian Junkerdom there is only
one strong race--his own. "_Wir sind die Weltrasse._" The ultimate
goal is the super-nation, and the premise upon which the whole policy
is based is that Germany is predestined to be that super-nation.
Bernhardi believes--and his belief is but the reflex of the
oft-repeated boast of the Kaiser--that history presents no other
possibility. "For us there are two alternatives and no third--world
power or ruin" (_Weltmacht oder Niedergang_). To assimilate Germany to
ancient Rome the Kaiser on occasion reminds himself of Caesar and
affects to reign, not by the will of the people, but by divine right.
No living monarch has said or done more to revive this mediaeval
fetich. To his soldiers he has recently said: "You think each day of
your Emperor. Do not forget God." _What magnanimity!_
At the outbreak of the present war he again illustrated his spirit of
fanatical absolutism, which at times inspires him, by saying to his
army:
Remember that the German people are the chosen of God. On
me, as German Emperor, the spirit of God has descended. I am
His weapon; His sword; His Vicegerent. Woe to the
disobedient! Death to cowards and unbelievers!
The modern world has had nothing like this since Mahomet and,
accepted literally, it claims for the Kaiser the divine attributes
attributed to the Caesars. Even the Caesars, in baser and more primitive
times, found posing as a divine superman somewhat difficult and
disconcerting. Shakespeare subtly suggests this when he makes his
Caesar talk like a god and act with the vacillation of a child.
When the war was precipitated as the natural result of such abhorrent
teachings, the world at large knew little either of Treitschke or
Bernhardi. Thoughtful men of other nations did know that the
successful political immoralities of Frederick the Great had
profoundly affected the policies of the Prussian Court to this day.
The German poet, Freiligrath, once said that "Germany is Hamlet," but
no analogy is less justified. There is nothing in the supersensitive,
introspective, and amiable dreamer of Elsinore to suggest the Prussia
of to-day, which Bebel has called "_Siegesbetrunken_." (Victory-drunk.)
Since the beginning of the present war, the world has become familiar
with these abhorrent teachings and as a result of a general revolt
against this recrudescence of Borgiaism attempts have been made by the
apologists for Prussia, especially in the United States, to suggest
that neither Treitschke nor Bernhardi fairly reflect the political
philosophy of official Germany. Treitschke's influence as an historian
and lecturer could not well be denied but attempts have been made
to impress America that Bernhardi has no standing to speak for his
country and that the importance of his teachings should therefore be
minimized.
Apart from the wide popularity of Bernhardi's writings in Germany, the
German Government has never repudiated Bernhardi's conclusions or
disclaimed responsibility therefor. While possibly not an officially
authorized spokesman, yet he is as truly a representative thinker in
the German military system as Admiral Mahan was in the Navy of the
United States. Of the acceptance by Prussia of Bernhardi's teachings
there is one irrefutable proof. It is Belgium. The destruction of that
unoffending country is the full harvest of this twentieth-century
Machiavelliism.
A few recent utterances from a representative physician, a prominent
journalist, and a distinguished retired officer of the German Army may
be quoted as showing how completely infatuated a certain class of
German thinkers has become with the gospel of force for the purpose of
attaining world power.
Thus a Dr. Fuchs, in a book on the subject of preparedness for war,
says:
Therefore the German claim of the day must be: The family to
the front. The State has to follow at first in the school,
then in foreign politics. _Education to hate. Education to
the estimation of hatred. Organization of hatred. Education
to the desire for hatred. Let us abolish unripe and false
shame before brutality and fanaticism._ We must not hesitate
to announce: To us is given faith, hope, and hatred, _but
hatred is the greatest among them_.
Maximilian Harden, one of the most influential German journalists,
says:
Let us drop our miserable attempts to excuse Germany's
action. Not against our will and as a nation taken by
surprise did we hurl ourselves into this gigantic venture.
_We willed it. We had to will it. We do not stand before
the judgment seat of Europe. We acknowledge no such
jurisdiction. Our might shall create a new law in Europe._
It is Germany that strikes. When she has conquered new
domains for her genius then the priesthoods of all the gods
will praise the God of War.
Still more striking and morally repellent was the very recent
statement by Major-General von Disfurth, in an article contributed by
him to the _Hamburger Nachrichten_, which so completely illustrates
Bernhardiism in its last extreme of avowed brutality that it justifies
quotation _in extenso_.
No object whatever is served by taking any notice of the
accusations of barbarity leveled against Germany by our
foreign critics. _Frankly, we are and must be barbarians, if
by these we understand those who wage war relentlessly and
to the uttermost degree...._
_We owe no explanations to any one. There is nothing for
us to justify and nothing to explain away. Every act of
whatever nature committed by our troops for the purpose of
discouraging, defeating, and destroying our enemies is a
brave act and a good deed, and is fully justified....
Germany stands as the supreme arbiter of her own methods,
which in the time of war must be dictated to the world...._
_They call us barbarians. What of it? We scorn them and
their abuse. For my part I hope that in this war we have
merited the title of barbarians._ Let neutral peoples and
our enemies cease their empty chatter, which may well be
compared to the twitter of birds. Let them cease their talk
of the Cathedral at Rheims and of all the churches and all
the castles in France which have shared its fate. These
things do not interest us. Our troops must achieve victory.
What else matters?
These hysterical vaporings of advanced Junkers no more make a case
against the German people than the tailors of Tooley Street had
authority to speak for England, but they do represent the spirit of
the ruling caste, to which unhappily the German people have committed
their destiny. It would not be difficult to quote both the Kaiser and
the Crown Prince, who on more than one occasion have manifested their
enthusiastic adherence to the gospel of brute force. The world is not
likely to forget the Crown Prince's congratulations to the brutal
military martinet of the Zabern incident, and still less the shameful
fact that when the Kaiser sent his punitive expedition to China, he
who once stood within sight of the Mount of Olives and preached a
sermon breathing the spirit of Christian humility, said to his
soldiers:
When you encounter the enemy you will defeat him. _No
quarter shall be given, no prisoners shall be taken. Let all
who fall into your hands be at your mercy. Just as the Huns
a thousand years ago under the leadership of Etzel (Attila),
gained a reputation in virtue of which they still live in
historical tradition, so may the name of Germany become
known in such a manner in China that no Chinaman will ever
again even dare to look askance at a German._
And this campaign of extermination--worthy of a savage Indian
chief--was planned for the most pacific and unaggressive race, the
Chinese, for it is sadly true that the one nation which has more than
any other been inspired for two thousand years by the spirit of "peace
on earth" is the hermit nation, into which until the nineteenth
century the light of Christianity never shone.
In a recent article, George Bernard Shaw, the Voltaire of the
twentieth century, with the intellectual brilliancy and moral
shallowness of the great cynic, attempts to justify Bernhardiism by
resort to the unconvincing "_et tu quoque_" argument. He contends that
England also has had its "Bernhardis," and refers to a few books which
he affects to think bear out his argument. That these books show that
there have been advocates of militarism in England is undoubtedly
true. The present war illustrates that there was need of such
literature, for a nation which faced so great a trial as the present,
with a standing army that was pitiful in comparison with that of
Germany and without any involuntary service law, certainly had need
of some literary stimulus to self-preparation. No one quarrels with
Bernhardi in his discussions of the problems of war as such. It is
only when the soldier ceases to be a strategist and becomes a moralist
that the average man with conventional ideas of morality revolts
against Bernhardiism. The books to which Mr. Shaw refers can be
searched in vain for any passages parallel to those which have been
quoted from Treitschke, Bernhardi, and other German writers. The
brilliant but erratic George Bernard Shaw cannot find in all English
literature any such Machiavelliisms as those of Treitschke and
Bernhardi.
Shaw's whole defense of Germany, betrays his characteristic desire to
be clever and audacious without regard to nice considerations of
truth. Much as we may admire his intellectual badinage under other
circumstances, it may be questioned whether in this supreme tragedy
of the world it was fitting for Shaw to daub himself anew with his
familiar vermilion and play the intellectual clown.
It was either courage of an extraordinary but unenviable character or
else crass stupidity that led Bernhardi to submit to the civilization
of the present day such a debasing gospel, for if his brain had not
been hopelessly obfuscated by his Pan-Germanic imperialism, he would
have seen that not only would this philosophy do his country
infinitely more harm than a whole park of artillery but would
inevitably carry his memory down to a wondering posterity, like
Machiavelli, detestable but, unlike Machiavelli, ridiculous.
Machiavelli gave to his _Prince_ a literary finish that placed his
treatise among the classics, while Bernhardi has gained recognition
chiefly because his book is a moral anachronism.
One concrete illustration from Bernhardi clearly shows that the
sentences above quoted are truly representative of his philosophy,
and not unfair excerpts. In explaining that it is the duty of every
nation to increase its power and territory without regard for the
rights of others, he alludes to the fact that England committed the
"_unpardonable blunder_ from her point of view of not supporting the
Southern States in the American War of Secession," and thus forever
severing in twain the American Republic. In this striking illustration
of applied Bernhardiism, there is no suggestion as to the moral side
of such intervention. Nothing is said with respect to the moral
question of slavery, or of the obligations of England to a friendly
Power. Nothing as to how the best hopes of humanity would have been
shattered if the American Republic--that "pillar of cloud by day and
pillar of fire by night" to struggling humanity--had been brought to
cureless ruin. All these considerations are completely disregarded,
and all Bernhardi can see in the situation, as it presented itself to
England in 1861, was its opportunity, by a cowardly stab in the back,
to remove forever from its path a great and growing nation.
Poor Bernhardi! He thought to serve his royal master. He has simply
damned him. As Machiavelli, as the eulogist of the Medicis, simply
emphasized their moral nudity, so Bernhardi has shown the world the
inner significance of this crude revival of Caesarism.