CHAPTER XLIII.

OPERATIONS DURING THE WINTER AND SPRING. BATTLE OF VITTORIA.

♦NOVEMBER, 1812.

OPINIONS OF THE OPPOSITION.♦

Lord Wellington’s failure at Burgos, and his consequent retreat to

the Agueda, gave the Whigs a last opportunity of repeating their

predictions, that the war in the Peninsula must prove unsuccessful,

and they availed themselves of it with unabated confidence. The more

rancorous radicals insulted the nation for the hopes which had been

entertained, exulted in the reverses which they magnified, and reviled

the ministers and the General, ... the ministers both for having

continued the war, and for “starving” it; Lord Wellington both for

inactivity and for rashness, for doing too little and too much, for

wasting time at Madrid, and for attempting a siege with such inadequate

means, that nothing but the most profuse expenditure of blood could

afford even a forlorn hope of its succeeding. Even when the events

of the Russian campaign made it evident that the formidable tyranny

against which we had so long contended must soon be overthrown, the

opposition, as well as the revolutionists, turned away their eyes from

the prospect.

♦MARQUIS WELLESLEY CALLS FOR INQUIRY.♦

Parliament met at the latter end of November. In the Prince Regent’s

speech it was stated, that the southern provinces of Spain had been

delivered in consequence of the battle of Salamanca; and that, though

it had been necessary to withdraw from the siege of Burgos and to

evacuate Madrid, the effort of the enemy for rendering it so had

occasioned sacrifices on his part, which must materially contribute

to extend the resources and facilitate the exertions of the ♦NOV.

30.♦ Spaniards. On this occasion, Marquis Wellesley called upon the

Peers, to inquire whether the system which had hitherto been pursued

was founded upon just and extended principles; whether an able and

efficient exertion of our resources had been made; whether such means

as the country possessed had been fully employed; and whether the

result had been such as the nation had a right to expect from the

possession of those means, and the right application of them. He wished

it were possible to fix in the minds of their lordships something like

a definite and precise object, as the issue of the contest in the

Peninsula. In his mind, the only legitimate object was, the expulsion

of the French armies from Spain; and the war had been carried on in

a way totally inadequate to the production of that result. The plan

which of all others all mankind must reprobate, was that of employing

our resources with a view rather to what might be spared in expense,

than to what might be effected by exertion: thus exposing the sinews

of our strength to hourly danger, and bearing hard upon our finances,

yet effecting neither economy nor success, but falling dead as it were

between both. A vast expense of blood and treasure had been lavished,

without accomplishing any one definite object. The best assistance we

could afford to Russia was by carrying on the war in Spain upon a broad

and extensive scale; it had not been so carried on, and he charged

upon that system, therefore, a defection from the cause of Russia. He

did not mean to dispute that the last campaign had been beneficial to

Spain; but his objection was, that those benefits were imperfectly

secured, and that they could not expect them to be permanent.

♦LORD GRENVILLE.♦

Lord Grenville repeated and persisted in his old opinion, that the

deliverance of Spain was beyond the utmost means of this country to

effect; and that it was cruel and base to embark the population of

that country in so hopeless a cause, merely for the sake of a little

temporary advantage. The ministers had not advanced one step in

the accomplishment of this object; and this third advance into the

interior of Spain had, by its failure, proved the correctness of the

data on which his opinion was founded. Their boast of having delivered

Andalusia was an empty boast: no one doubted that the deliverance

was more than temporary, and that the French could not re-occupy the

provinces whenever they pleased. It was the want of means, the failure

of supplies and resources, which had led to the unproductive results of

all their exertions. The blame did not lie with the Spaniards, but with

those who encouraged the hopes which they had no right to entertain:

the fault was with the English ministers, who in their ignorance

overrated the condition of Spain, and anticipated more from her than

she could by possibility perform. He asked also, why ministers, with

a revenue of one hundred and five millions, or more, by estimate,

extorted by means the most grinding and oppressive from a suffering

people, were yet unable to supply Lord Wellington’s military chest?

The difficulty arose from their incapacity, not from the deficient

resources of the country, much as they had been drained. They might

diminish by one half the income of every individual in this country,

with as little effect or promise of ultimate success as had attended

those plans which led them to circulate a vile and adulterated currency

in paper coin throughout the nation. When such had been its effects,

why not at this moment stop the contest in Spain?

♦MR. PONSONBY.♦

In the House of Commons, Mr. Ponsonby said, it was useless to carry

farther an unprofitable contest; it was useless to waste the blood and

the treasures of England for an unattainable object; it had been proved

that the power of England was not competent to drive the French out of

the Peninsula.

♦MR. FREEMANTLE.♦

Mr. Freemantle was decidedly of opinion, that by the battle of

Salamanca we had gained nothing but glory; that the deliverance of

Spain was no nearer its accomplishment than when Lord Wellington

was posted at Torres Vedras, and that our prospects at the present

moment were not nearly so bright as at the commencement of the last

session, ... at which time his declared opinion had been, that we could

entertain no rational prospect of making any impression upon ♦MR.

WHITBREAD.♦ the enemy in Spain. Mr. Whitbread’s tone upon that subject

was somewhat modified; he admitted that the situation in which we now

stood in Spain was glorious beyond example, in so far as related to the

achievements of our armies, though with respect to the expulsion of the

French, we were not so near our object as some people supposed. There

was this difference between an offensive and a defensive war; that an

offensive war ought always to be a war of spirit. When vigorous efforts

therefore were to be made in Spain, there ought to be no limit to that

vigour. Let an application therefore be made to the Prince Regent,

to know from him whether the greatest possible use had been made by

ministers of the means with which they were intrusted for carrying on

the war, before coming to a decision on the merits of ministers, or

the probability of the war being in future carried on with success. He

was far from wishing to refuse them the means necessary for carrying

it to a successful issue; but feeling for the people who were groaning

under accumulated burdens and threatened with the Chancellor of the

Exchequer’s financial abilities, he thought the last resources of

the country ought not to be granted without security for their being

properly applied. Under all these circumstances, he was desirous of

imploring the Prince Regent to take into consideration, whether or not

it was at present possible to bring about a pacification. Buonaparte

was on his retreat to his resources, his force not annihilated,

though certainly in great danger, and this was what the House were

to congratulate themselves on, and for which they were to go to the

Prince Regent with an address on the prosperous state of the country!

If the situation of affairs on the continent was good for any thing,

it was this, that the Emperor of France having failed in his object,

an opportunity was now offered when it would not be inglorious, and

when it would certainly be highly useful to propose to the enemy

some arrangement for peace. Buonaparte was at present in a perilous

situation, and every exertion ought to be made, by taking advantage

of it to procure a peace. But a feeling seemed to pervade the minds

of certain persons, that peace should not be concluded with that man,

... a feeling which he wished to eradicate from this country: for, in

the probable course of events, we should be obliged to make peace with

him. Let him therefore be sent to openly and manfully! The fate of the

mission would be speedily known; and the issue would be a conviction on

the mind of every one, whether a permanent and honourable peace could

be procured or not.

♦MOTION OF THANKS TO THE ARMIES. SIR FRANCIS BURDETT.♦

When a motion for thanks to Lord Wellington and his army for the battle

of Salamanca was brought forward, Sir Francis Burdett said, he was far

from wishing; invidiously to detract from the merits of men who had

devoted their exertions to the service of their country, or to withhold

from them any recompense that it was in the power of Parliament to

bestow: but when he heard the battle of Salamanca represented as

having been equal in importance to the battle of Blenheim, and to

other great battles which had completely changed the aspect of the

whole affairs of Europe, he could not suffer such delusions to go

forth uncontradicted, ... delusions which were calculated to plunge

the country, under the direction of the same persons, still more

deeply in a destructive and ruinous war: for after their boasted and

over-praised victories, we were still as far from our object as ever.

What! were we to suffer the French troops to recover from the effect

of their discomfiture and exhaustion, and to wait until the tide of

good fortune which had attended us flowed back on its source? Were

we to be satisfied with a retreat? Yet, where now was the Marquis of

Wellington? In what direction were we to look for the glorious results

of the campaign? In what manner was the diminution of the French

power in Spain evinced? Nothing seemed to have resulted from all our

advantages but calamity and distress; and it followed, therefore,

that either Lord Wellington was not entitled to the praise which the

House was called upon to bestow, or that the fault of our failure was

attributable to the gross negligence and imbecility of the ministers.

Lord Castlereagh, Sir Francis pursued, in the plenitude of his

satisfaction, had not confined himself to Spain, but had travelled out

of his course, and taken the House to Russia, where in the destruction

of from 200,000 to 300,000 human beings, in the burning of Moscow,

and in the devastation of an immense tract of Russian territory, he

found new causes of congratulation, new sources of national pride and

gratitude! Would he be equally inclined to consider it a matter of

triumph, if Buonaparte (which in his opinion was more than probable)

should extricate himself from his perils, and after having found good

winter-quarters, return to the contest with renovated ardour in the

spring? Could he believe it possible that Russia could continue such

a contest, and undergo a repetition of similar dreadful experiments

and sacrifices? Supposing he marched to Petersburgh, which seemed to

be his ultimate intention, would the same mode of defence as at Moscow

be adopted? Would Russia burn Petersburgh too? He for one could not

greatly admire the magnanimity of burning that, the preservation of

which ought to have been fought for; nor could he see the shining

character of the Emperor Alexander, who was not, like the Emperor of

the French, personally sharing in the dangers of the war. He could not

subdue the conviction which arose in his mind on viewing all these

things, of the utter impossibility of the Emperor of Russia’s feeling

any exultation whatever: on the contrary, he thought that unfortunate

individual must be oppressed by a view of the irreparable calamities to

which himself and his people had been, and were ♦DEC. 7.♦ likely still

further to be, exposed. Farther than this, when a grant was moved to

the Marquis of Wellington, Sir Francis said, he did not wish to divide

the House upon it, but he wished to move, that the consideration of

the grant should be deferred till some inquiries had been made into

the late extraordinary campaign. Lord Wellington’s victories had none

of the characteristics which distinguished those of Marlborough. It

had been observed, and by military men too, that he had brought his

army into difficulties, but that his men had fought him out of them

again; and that in the capture of the fortresses which he had won, a

waste of life was to be complained of. The cause of Spain appeared to

him infinitely more hopeless than it was at the commencement of the

campaign, ... the case of the Peninsula more deplorable than ever.

♦M. WELLESLEY MOVES FOR A COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY.

MARCH 12.♦

Marquis Wellesley moved for a committee to inquire into the conduct

of the war in the Peninsula. “My Lords,” said he, “what secret cause

amidst the splendid scene that has been exhibited in the Peninsula,

... what malign influence amidst the rejoicings and acclamations of

triumph, has counteracted the brilliant successes of our arms, and has

converted the glad feelings of a just exultation into the bitterness

of regret and disappointment? With an army in discipline and spirit

superior to any that had ever been assembled, uniting in itself

qualities so various, as never to have entered into the composition

of any other such assemblage of force; ... with a general, pronounced

by the whole world to be unsurpassed in ancient or modern times; the

pride of his country, the refuge and hope of Europe; ... with a cause

in which justice vied with policy, combining all that was ardent in the

one motive, with all that was sober in the other; ... with the eyes of

Europe fixed on our movements; ... with the admiration of the world

excited by our achievements: ... how is it that our hopes have been

raised only to be frustrated? How is it that we have been allowed to

indulge in expectation of an approaching completion of success, only

to behold the utter disappointment of our wishes? Why has a system

of advance suddenly and inevitably been converted into a system of

retreat? When victory actually sprung from the bosom of retreat, why

was the glorious victor compelled to relapse into his retrogression?

Why has it happened that we have seen the great conqueror who chased

the French armies from the plains of Salamanca, pursued in his turn,

by those whom he had conquered, over those plains which had been the

scene of his former triumphs? Why, in conclusion, has a system of

offence shrunk into a system of defence, and what is the reason that

our military operations in the Peninsula have ended where they began?

“I should be lost to every feeling of honour, and to every sense

of duty to the country, if I did not state that the effect of this

campaign altogether has been not to approximate you towards your

object, but to remove you from it; and that this calamity has arisen

from the insufficiency of those means which, by a small addition,

might have been rendered effective. I maintain, that the object we had

in view, (the only honest object ... the only great object ... which

we could pursue, or hope to obtain by our operations in Spain,) was

the expulsion of the French, or, at least, a considerable diminution

of their power, with a view to the freedom of the people, and the

independence of the Spanish monarchy. This was, certainly, the main

object which we ought to have contemplated; the ultimate object of the

British nation was, certainly, by the deliverance of the peninsula of

Spain, to lay a solid foundation for the establishment of a permanent

and honourable peace.

“What I have contended is, that the efforts we have made have not been

equal to the resources of the country; that they have not been such as

the magnitude, the infinite importance of the cause demanded, and as

the favourableness of the opportunity particularly called for; that we

have not made even a faint approximation to the object of the war, the

expulsion of the French from the Peninsula; but that the French have

been enabled, by our reverses, to consolidate their power in Spain,

and to systematize the moral and military subjugation of the country.

We ought to have called forth all our resources, ... and we have made

no extraordinary sacrifices; we ought to have strained every nerve at

this momentous crisis, ... and we have remained little better than

idle spectators of the fate of Spain. We have been deterred by petty

objections; by calculations of expense, which are but as dust in the

balance.”

♦EARL GREY.♦

Earl Grey supported the motion for a committee, saying, that the

great objects of the campaign had not been realized, but that, on

the contrary, there had been a complete failure, ... a great and

lamentable failure; and that it was one of the most important duties

of that house, in cases of ill success, to vindicate the interests

of the country, by visiting with its severest censure the causers of

the misfortune. Aware as the ministers were, he said, of the state

of Europe, and knowing, as they must have known, the effect that at

such a crisis would have been produced by a vigorous and decisive

effort in the Peninsula, it was their bounden duty to have provided

Lord Wellington with ample means for carrying through his enterprising

projects, and crowning them with brilliant and unqualified success.

Nothing had happened which induced him to repent of his opinion, that

the efforts of the Spanish people could alone enable them to withstand

the overwhelming power of France. This sentiment he had uttered

under the supposition that no other power would stand up against the

French Emperor, and that that Emperor would not depart from the unity

of council and of action, by which his greatest successes had been

achieved. And, indeed, if with such a commander and such an army as

ours, and at a time when the army of France in the north had met with

disasters, greater than which never fell upon a host assembled for the

purposes of injustice and ambition, ... if under these circumstances

we had achieved so little in Spain, what would have been the issue, if

one-tenth only of the forces employed against Russia had been turned

against us? The time had called for exertion, and the exertions had

failed, ... failed almost entirely as to their great object: the French

were left in possession of the best parts of Spain; and we had not

advanced in any degree, considering the effects of the last campaign

upon the minds of the Spaniards, to the accomplishment of our object.

Such was the case, and it called loudly for inquiry.

♦THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.♦

To these assertions the Earl of Liverpool replied, that the campaign

which had been thus represented as a failure and a defeat, was, in

fact, the most brilliant that had been achieved by British arms in any

period of our history. They had been seeking as a great object, that

the whole force of Spain should be placed under the command of Lord

Wellington, and that object had at length been accomplished. Every

exertion that could be made had been made, for sending out troops to

the Peninsula and for supplying them there, and the success of the

war was indisputable. Portugal had been rescued from the enemy, and

placed in a state of security, and now one-third of Spain was relieved

from their presence. Spain and Portugal had set the example which

Russia had followed, with the great advantage of having a government

in full activity to direct all its strength. The example thus set and

thus followed would have an effect among the other nations of Europe,

would rouse their spirit, animate their exertions, and teach them

in what manner to resist oppression, ... teach them that an united

nation, determined to resist an invader, could not ♦EARL BATHURST.♦

be conquered! ... Earl Bathurst argued to the same purpose, saying,

that something had been effected, if the views of England were what

Marquis Wellesley had powerfully described them to be at the beginning

of the war in Spain, ... first, to create a diversion in favour of

our allies; secondly, to encourage resistance in other countries, by

showing its effects in Spain; and thirdly, to prevent the commercial

and military means of that country from falling into the hands of our

enemy. Those had been the views of England, those were the views of

the present Government, and those views had been forwarded by the last

campaign. And Lord Wellington was satisfied with the conduct of the

administration during that campaign, ... a declaration which had not

been sought for by the ministers, but which he had voluntarily made.

In these debates the Whigs manifested the same disposition to magnify

our reverses and depreciate our success, and the same propensity

for predicting discomfiture and disgrace which had characterized

their conduct during the whole struggle. The feeling with which they

continued to regard Buonaparte, notwithstanding his ♦APRIL 2. LORD

HOLLAND.♦ inordinate ambition and his remorseless tyranny, was farther

exhibited by Lord Holland, when, upon presenting some petitions for

peace, he expressed his trust that ministers entertained no chimerical

notions of wresting from France what she had acquired during the last

twenty years, nor of humiliating the great prince who now ruled that

country; and his willingness to believe that they had not neglected

the opportunity which the successes of Russia afforded for opening a

negotiation! But they better understood their duty to their allies, and

to Europe, and to their country; and being instructed by experience

as well as encouraged by sure hope, they spared no efforts now for

enabling Lord Wellington to open the ensuing campaign with means which

♦LORD WELLINGTON GOES TO CADIZ.♦ should render success certain. Lord

Wellington went to Cadiz at the close of the year, to make arrangements

with the Spanish ministers for the co-operation of the Spanish

armies. A deputation from the Cortes was sent to compliment him on

his arrival; he paid his respects, in consequence, to that assembly;

expressed his thanks in a brief and modest speech, for the different

marks of honour and confidence which he had received from it; and said,

that not the Spaniards alone looked to it with hope, but the whole

world was concerned in the happy issue of their vigorous endeavours to

save Spain from general destruction, and to establish in that monarchy

a system founded upon just principles, which should promote and secure

the prosperity of all the citizens, and the greatness of the Spanish

nation. In reply, the president complimented him upon his victories,

which had been celebrated, he said, like those of the Genius of Good

over the Genius of Evil. The Cortes did not now hope or trust for new

triumphs from the Duque de Ciudad Rodrigo, they looked upon them as

certain; and looked, not only that the Spanish and allied armies under

such a leader would drive the French beyond the Pyrenees, but that, if

it should be needful, they would pitch their victorious tents upon the

banks of the Seine; it would not be the first time that the Spanish

lions had trampled on its banks upon the old fleur-de-lys of France.

♦ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CO-OPERATION OF THE SPANISH ARMIES.♦

It was arranged that 50,000 Spanish troops should be placed at his

disposal. The army under Castaños formed part of these; it consisted

of what had formerly been called the 5th, 6th, and 7th armies, now

comprehended under the name of the fourth: Castaños was to hold also

the captaincies-general of the province of Extremadura, Old Castille

and Leon, Galicia and Asturias. There was to be an army of reserve

in Andalusia under the Conde de Abisbal, and an army of reserve in

Galicia. The other armies were that of Catalonia, which was the first;

of this Copons held the command: he was also captain-general of that

province, and of that part of Aragon which was on the right of the

Ebro; the second, which Elio, captain-general of Valencia, Murcia, and

New Castille, commanded; and the third (formerly the fourth) under the

Duque del Parque, who was also charged with the captaincies-general of

Jaen and Granada.

♦LORD WELLINGTON GOES TO LISBON.♦

From Cadiz, Lord Wellington repaired to Lisbon. Triumphal arches

were erected in all the towns through which he passed, from Elvas to

the Tagus. The ships, the troops, and the people of Lisbon, received

him with such honours as he deserved; greater could be paid to no

man; and there was a general and voluntary illumination during three

successive nights. A drama was composed to celebrate his victories, and

represented in his presence at the royal theatre of San Carlos, where

all the boxes were decorated with angels bearing crowns and shields,

on which the initials of Lord Wellington were inscribed; _O Nome_,

“The Name,” was the title of the piece, and it was preluded by a hymn

in honour of the Prince of Brazil, and the exhibition of his portrait

under a canopy. The scene then represented the Elysian fields, where,

in the pitiable style of operatic invention, Glory, and Posterity, and

Camoens, and the Great Constable, Nuno Alvares Pereira, with sundry

other Lusitanian worthies, recitatived in praise of Lord Wellington,

Lord Beresford, and the Portugueze and British armies; and down came

angels and genii presenting illuminated scrolls, inscribed with the

names of his victories.

♦RELAXED DISCIPLINE OF THE PORTUGUEZE ARMY.♦

The Portugueze army was, at this time, reproved by Lord Beresford for

its want of discipline during the late retreat, in terms not less

severe than those of Lord Wellington’s letter. Certain officers were

suspended for scandalous neglect and total disregard of their duties:

and it was stated, that, in every instance, complaints had been made

by the commandants of corps or brigades, of inactivity and want of zeal

in the officers of all those corps which had suffered extraordinary

loss during the retreat. That such losses were occasioned by the

negligence of the officers was proved by the fact, that other corps

in the same marches, and under the same circumstances, difficulties,

and privations, had none of their men missing; the officers of those

corps were named with due praise. Marshal Beresford added, he deemed

it important to remind the army, that with all the reasons which he

had (and he was happy to say that he had every reason) for praising

the conduct of the Portugueze officers, when they were in presence of

an enemy, and exposed to fire, valour, nevertheless, was not the only

thing needful; firmness and constancy were equally so for supporting

the reverses, and fatigues, and privations, to which a military life is

subject; and if the officers did not yield under such circumstances,

the soldiers certainly would not; for no soldier, and especially

no Portugueze soldier, ever would be backward in any thing when

his officer set him an example; nor would ever commit any fault or

manifest any discontent, so long as he saw his officer doing his duty

under the same circumstances, and setting him an example of courage,

firmness, and constancy. One of the army surgeons had been brought

before a court-martial for neglecting the sick and wounded under his

care, while they were in the hospital at Madrid. He was sentenced to a

month’s imprisonment, and the loss of a month’s pay. Marshal Beresford,

in confirming the sentence, expressed his disapprobation of it; a

punishment so little in proportion to the crime, he said, was not

likely to impress persons who had neither the proper feelings of men or

of Christians; for what could be more horrible, than to see men who had

been wounded in the service of their Prince and of their country, or

whose health had been broken in that service, neglected by one who had

received rank, honour, and pay, for the express intent of making him

more attentive in his treatment of them? What could be worse than that

such a person should be found preferring his own ease, or interest, or

temporary convenience, to his duty towards his God, and his Prince, and

his fellow-creatures, and leaving them either to perish through his

neglect, or to fall into the hands of the enemy?

♦JANUARY.♦

The consequences of the retreat were severely felt; in January, more

than a third of the British army were on the sick list, fever being

the principal disease, which want of clothing had, with fatigue,

contributed to produce, and want of cleanliness to propagate. In

personal appearance and in clothing, the British troops were at this

time much worse than the Portugueze. But supplies of every kind, as

well as large reinforcements, were received during the winter, no time

being lost, and no care neglected. The infantry had suffered so much

from want of cover, that they were now provided with tents, three for

each company, and these were borne by the animals which used before to

carry the camp kettles, tin kettles being substituted for iron ones,

... one to six men, and light enough for the men to carry it by turns

on their knapsacks. Tents were not thought necessary for the cavalry,

because not being either heated or exhausted so much in their marches,

they were better able to stand the cold at night.

♦BUONAPARTE WITHDRAWS TROOPS FROM SPAIN.♦

While the British force in the Peninsula was increased, and the Spanish

rendered more available than it had been in any former campaign, that

of the French was weakened; the enormous loss which Buonaparte had

suffered in Russia, and the obstinate ambition with which he kept

large garrisons in the north of Germany, rendering it necessary for

him to withdraw troops from Spain. From 10 to 20,000 repassed the

Pyrenees; not fewer than 140,000 were still left, ... good troops,

well-officered, and under commanders of high reputation and approved

skill. But both officers and men had had their confidence abated;

the generals felt that even the resources of the conscription were

exhaustible; and as little hope, when they considered the present

state of their Emperor’s fortunes, could be entertained of subjugating

the Spaniards, the object upon which all seemed to be most intent was

that of enriching themselves by plunder, while it was still in their

power ♦EXACTIONS OF THE FRENCH.♦ to do so. M. Suchet left scarcely one

picture of any value in Valencia, either in the convents, churches, or

private houses; and that city was thus deprived of the finest works of

Juanes, ... works which, precious as they are, were there enhanced in

value by the local and religious feeling with which his fellow-citizens

regarded the productions of their saintly painter. There and everywhere

contributions were imposed and exacted in a manner which made it

apparent that the Intrusive government treated them now not as subjects

who were to be taxed, but as enemies from whom all that could be

extorted was to be taken. Their operations on the side of New Castille

and Leon were at this time confined to periodical circuits for the

purpose of enforcing the payment of contributions. On the side of the

Tagus they fortified the right bank of the river, repaired the Puente

del Arzobispo, and occupied Almaraz, though they did not restore the

bridge there.

♦LONGA ACTS SUCCESSFULLY AGAINST THE ENEMY.

NOV. 28.♦

Meantime the Spaniards were not idle. Longa surprised General Fromant

in the valley of Sedano, when returning to Burgos with the requisitions

which he had collected, and with sixty respectable householders whom

he was taking away as hostages for the contribution: the hostages were

rescued, Fromant with about 700 of his men killed, and nearly 500

taken prisoners. A party of the enemy had entered Bilbao, these also

he surprised, and they suffered the loss of 200 men; then making for

Salinas de Anaña, which was the strongest hold of the French in that

district, he besieged it with 2500 men and five pieces of artillery,

and after three days, the remainder of the garrison, consisting of

250, surrendered at discretion. This so dismayed the enemy that they

abandoned Nauclares and Armiñon, which he was proceeding to attack, and

both fortresses were demolished by his orders. His next object was the

Fuerte del Cubo de Pancorbo, a post of importance for its situation,

and for the care with which it had been strengthened; here too the

garrison were made prisoners and the fort demolished. Caffarelli

meantime was vainly besieging Castro, where he suffered some loss, and

found it necessary to give up the attempt, that he might check Longa

in his career of success. That active partizan was now threatening

Breviesca; he eluded Caffarelli and Palombini when they moved against

him, and retreating to Zovalina, there to refresh his troops, ordered

his retreat so well that they were uncertain what direction he had

taken; Caffarelli therefore reinforced his garrisons, and repairing to

Vittoria himself, left Palombini at Poza with 3000 foot and 300 horse

to protect the high road, and be ready to act against Longa. ♦FEB. 13.♦

But while a third of that force was detached to levy contributions,

Longa surprised the remainder at daybreak: their collected plunder and

some 300 prisoners fell into his hands, and they suffered a further

loss of between two and three hundred in killed and wounded. The

approach of their detachment, and of a large body on its way from

Burgos to Vittoria, then rendered it necessary for him to retire.

While Longa thus harassed the enemy in the north of ♦MINA’S MOVEMENTS.♦

Spain, Mina was assailing them with his wonted activity in Navarre

and Aragon. The English landed two 12-pounders for him in the Deva,

together with clothing, ammunition, and other things of which he was in

need; 600 of his men were ready to receive and escort these. The French

endeavoured to intercept them, and were repulsed in the attempt; and

Mina was no sooner possessed of the guns than he attacked the enemy

in Tafalla, where they had a garrison of 400 men. General ♦FEB. 11.♦

Abbé moved to relieve it with all the disposable force from Pamplona;

but he was beaten back by a part of Mina’s force which had been left

to observe that city, and on the fifth day of the siege the garrison

surrendered as prisoners of war. The wounded he sent under an escort

to Pamplona; destroyed the fort at Tafalla, and the works, ... also a

Franciscan Convent, and an old palace in which the French might have

established a garrison; and he demolished in like manner two other

such edifices at Olite, that the road might be clear between Pamplona

and Tudela. From Tafalla he proceeded to Sos in Upper Aragon, a fort

which the enemy had occupied more than three years, and fortified

sufficiently as long as the Spaniards could bring no guns against it.

They were on the point of surrendering after a four days’ siege, when

General Paris arrived from Zaragoza and carried off the garrison,

leaving the fort half ruined: Mina completed its demolition, and by

this enterprise laid open the road between Pamplona and Jaca. Shortly

after, Fermin de Leguia, who was under ♦FEB. 20.♦ his orders, ventured,

without instructions, upon an adventure which was executed as boldly

as it ♦MARCH 11.♦ was designed. With only fifteen men, being the whole

of his party, he approached the castle of Fuenterrabia in the night,

scaled the wall with one man by the help of spikes and ropes which

supplied the place of a ladder, surprised the sentinel, got possession

of the keys, opened the gates for his men, and took eight artillerymen

prisoners, while the remainder of the garrison, who dreamt of no

danger, were sleeping in the town. He then spiked the guns, threw into

the sea all the ammunition which he could not carry away, set fire to

the castle, and though pursued by the enemy retreated without loss.

Mina was heard of next at Lodosa, where he attacked a detachment of

1000 French, few of whom ♦MARCH 29. CAFFARELLI RECALLED FROM SPAIN.♦

escaped, 635 being made prisoners. Caffarelli had at this time been

called to France, giving up the command in the north to Clausel; that

able general hoped to signalize himself by destroying an indefatigable

enemy who had baffled the efforts of all his predecessors; and this

was the first proof which he made of that enemy’s ability. Mina

next attempted to intercept a convoy which was going from Tolosa to

Pamplona; the convoy was alarmed in time, but the attempt led to an

affair with Abbé’s force, in which the French retired with the loss of

full 300 men.

♦CLAUSEL ENDEAVOURS TO HUNT MINA DOWN.♦

Clausel had left a considerable garrison in Puente la Reyna, well

fortified for the sort of war which they might have to sustain; and

an advanced post of 50 men at Mendigorria, in an old church of S.

Maria, which they had fortified. While he was in pursuit of Mina from

Estella, and Abbé from Pamplona, their skilful antagonist led them to

suppose that he was in the valley of Berrueza, ... then making a rapid

counter-march with one of his regiments, appeared in Mendigorria. The

garrison at Puente outnumbered him both in horse and foot, but they

did not ♦APRIL 21.♦ venture to interrupt him in his operations; and

he set fire to the church. The French had no other resource than to

ascend the tower, and fire upon them from thence. He sent a trumpet

to offer terms, but they would not allow him to approach, either in

the confident expectation of being succoured from Puente, or because

they were confounded by the situation in which they found themselves;

for the smoke and the flames distressed them so dreadfully, that in

the course of half an hour, they prepared to let themselves down by

ropes; but Mina ordered ladders to the roof of the church, from whence

they descended, and were made prisoners. The Guerrilla chief, now

Camp-Marshal in the regular service, took credit to himself for sparing

their lives when by the laws of war they had placed them at his mercy:

by this time indeed both the invaders and the Spaniards in Navarre

had found it their interest to revert to the humanities of civilized

warfare. His own hospital was in the valley of Roncal, and from the

combined movements of Clausel and Abbé he inferred that it was their

intention to deprive him of that retreat, the only one which there was

for his wounded and invalids. Not being strong enough to resist the

force which was now brought against him, he removed all who were in a

condition to bear removal, and left the others to the enemy’s mercy,

calling to mind no doubt with satisfaction his own recent conduct

at Tafalla and Mendigorria: as he had hoped, the men were humanely

treated by General Abbé, though the hospital effects were destroyed,

and Isaba, which had been deserted by its inhabitants, was set on

fire, and 150 houses burnt. Clausel employed the months of April and

May in endeavouring to hunt this formidable enemy down, of whom in an

intercepted letter to the Intruder, he said, that he would be Lord of

Navarre unless it were occupied by a corps of from 20 to 25,000 men;

because when he was weak he always avoided an action, and fell upon

detachments when he was sure of victory. In the course of this attempt

the loss which his own men sustained from fatigue far exceeded any that

he inflicted upon Mina’s hardy troops, who were intimately acquainted

with the country, and accustomed to the hair-breadth scapes of such

campaigns. At no time, however, was so much apprehension entertained

for Mina’s safety, though he himself relied with his wonted confidence

upon his resources and his fortune, now too not without certain

knowledge that his pursuers would soon be called off to a contest which

for them would be of a far more serious kind.

♦RENOVALES MADE PRISONER.♦

On the side of Biscay the enemy were more successful; they surprised

and captured Renovales, with six of his officers, at Carvajalez de

Zamora; and Castro, from which Caffarelli had been repulsed, was taken

by General Foy, after a siege of eighteen days. The Governor Don Pedro

Pablo Alvares ♦CASTRO DE URDIALES TAKEN BY GEN. FOY.♦ discharged his

duty to the utmost, and the Lyra, Royalist, and Sparrow sloops of war,

and the Alphea schooner, under Captain Bloye, assisted in the defence.

Foy brought all the force which he could collect against it, and

proceeded as if he hoped to strike the province as well as the garrison

with terror, ... for he offered no terms, and seemed determined to

take the place by storm, let it cost what it would. When he had made a

breach wide enough to admit twenty men abreast, he turned his guns on

the town and castle, and threw shells incessantly at the bridge that

connected the ♦MAY 11.♦ castle with the landing-place, hoping thus to

cut off the retreat of the garrison, which at the commencement of the

siege consisted of 1200 men. At noon the enemy entered in great numbers

through the breach and by escalade in various parts; the garrison when

they could no longer defend the town retreated into the castle, the

ships’ boats were in readiness to receive them, and they were embarked

by companies under a tremendous fire of musquetry, two companies

remaining to defend the castle, till the last gun was thrown into the

sea. Every soldier was brought off, and many of the inhabitants, and

landed at Bermeo on the following day. The town was burnt. Foy indeed

acted in the spirit of ♦ENORMITIES COMMITTED THERE BY THE FRENCH.♦ his

Portugueze campaign; as he had offered no terms he showed no mercy,

but when the town was entered put the defenders to the bayonet without

distinction. It had been well if the wickedness of the enemy had ended

there; but in one of their unsuccessful attacks many of their men had

been pushed down a ravine by their fellows while pressing forward to

the charge, the bridge by which they expected to cross having been

destroyed by the English; and because the inhabitants had not informed

them of the destruction of this bridge, they butchered men and women,

sparing none, and inflicting upon them cruelties which nothing but a

devilish nature could devise.

Little attempt was made on the enemy’s part to annoy the allies

during the winter and spring. Foy, with 1500 infantry and 100 horse,

had endeavoured, in February, to surprise the post at Bejar, but was

promptly repulsed; and the French in the same month advanced from

Orbigo and Castro Gondoles as far as Astorga and Manzanal in one

direction, and to the Puebla de Sanabria and Mombuey in another,

the Gallician army retreating before them, and then resuming their

former position when the enemy in their turn had retired. Much greater

activity was shown in plundering the inhabitants; and this kind of war,

wherein there could be no resistance, was carried on so shamelessly,

that the Intruder, it was said, deemed it necessary to call one of the

generals to account.

Clausel was of opinion that an error had been committed in not

concentrating their forces more upon the Ebro, which might have been

done, he said, without abandoning Castille, and this error, he feared,

they should find cause to repent. But the Intruder’s council had

determined upon taking the Douro for their line of defence; and with

this view they threw up works on the right bank at every assailable

point, relying, as Soult had formerly done at Porto, upon the security

which that deep ♦M. SOULT CALLED FROM SPAIN.♦ and rapid river might

afford them. Marshal Soult had been called away in March to take part

in the campaign in Germany. The head-quarters of what had been his

army were removed from Toledo to Madrid early in April, and Toledo was

abandoned; but troops were kept at Illescas, and reconnoissances made

by the cavalry towards Escalona, the Alberche, and Añobes del Tajo,

apprehending some movement of Sir Rowland’s army in this direction.

The ♦THE INTRUDER GOES TO VALLADOLID.♦ Intruder, leaving that capital

to which he was never to return, removed his court, or rather his

head-quarters, to Valladolid, where the Palace Gardens were put in

order for his recreation, and some defensive works constructed. On

the 11th of April, General Hugo, who had been left with the command

in Madrid, informed the _Ayuntamiento_ that the troops were about to

depart, and that they must take measures for preserving tranquillity

and guarding the public buildings, civil and military. The most

precious articles in the cabinet of natural history were sent off, with

whatever else could be removed from the other public establishments,

and all arrears of contribution were exacted with the utmost rigour.

Beasts enough were not left in Madrid for the scavengers’ use, so that

the inhabitants were ordered to collect the sweepings of the streets

into the squares, and there burn what used to be carried into the

country for manure. The people of that poor capital had always clung to

the hope of deliverance with a strength of belief which characterizes

the nation, and in the movements of their oppressors they now saw

reasonable ground for expecting that it could not be long delayed.

♦ANGLO-SICILIAN ARMY.♦

The pride of the French too had been at this time abated on the

eastern coast, where Suchet had hitherto boasted of success in all

his undertakings. Major-General William Clinton arrived at Alicante

in November to take the command from which his health had compelled

General Maitland to retire; and notwithstanding the difficulties which

were opposed by a false point of honour, by a jealousy as ill-founded

as it was ill-timed, and perhaps by treasonable intentions, he

succeeded in obtaining consent to garrison the castle with British

troops. In December a reinforcement of 4000 men, British and foreign,

arrived from Palermo, under Major-General James Campbell, who by

seniority superseded General Clinton in the command, which he was to

hold till the then hourly expected arrival of Lord William Bentinck

from Sicily. But Lord William was detained by political circumstances

in that island, where the hopeless attempt had been undertaken of

improving a government before any improvement has been effected either

in those who are to govern or be governed; and, ♦SIR JOHN MURRAY TAKES

THE COMMAND.♦ as no end could be seen to this delay, Lieutenant-General

Sir John Murray was sent out from England to command the allied forces

in that part of Spain. Feeble as that allied force was, and inert as

its feebleness had compelled it to be, it had yet employed Suchet’s

attention during the autumn and winter.

That general had his head-quarters for the most part at San Felippe,

between Alicante and Valencia, and about three leagues from the Xucar.

Some trivial affairs were all that occurred, till Sir John Murray soon

after his arrival took the army out of its cantonments, apparently

with the view of making the French marshal fall back and concentrate

his forces on that river. After an unsuccessful attempt at surprising

an enemy’s detachment in the populous village of Alcoy, he moved

forward and took up a position near the town of Castalla, where in the

preceding summer Don Joseph O’Donnell had sustained a severe defeat.

While Sir John made ♦DEFEAT OF ELIO’S CORPS.♦ this movement on the

right, General Elio with a separate Spanish corps of 12,000 men moved

on the left to Yecla, Villena, and the flat country in that direction.

There was an old castle in Villena, and Elio garrisoned it with 800 of

his best troops. Suchet was not a man to lose any opportunity which

was presented him: he saw that one of Elio’s divisions had taken post

at Yecla, within reach of Fuente-la-Higuera, where his own advance was

placed, and too far from that of the allies which was at Villena, 25

miles distant. During the night he collected the flower of his army

at Fuente-la-Higuera, and marched with one division, the cavalry and

the reserve, upon Villena, while, with the other part of his force,

General Harispe proceeded rapidly to Yecla, ♦APRIL 12.♦ unseen by the

Spaniards. At break of day he came in sight of them; they retreated

from one position to another, but were out-manœuvred and beaten, and

after losing some four or five hundred men, 1200 laid down their arms.

♦SUCHET MARCHES AGAINST THE ANGLO-SICILIAN ARMY.♦

On the afternoon of the same day, Suchet was seen advancing within a

few miles of Villena, which is about two leagues to the westward of

Castalla. Sir John Murray immediately withdrew the Majorcan division

from Alcoy, and concentrating his force, occupied the strong position

of Castalla. His left, consisting of that division, was placed on the

rocky and almost inaccessible hills south of the town, ... the range

terminating there. Major-General Mackenzie’s division, and the 58th

regiment from Lieutenant-General Clinton’s occupied the town, and the

ground to the right; here and in front of the castle some redoubts

and batteries had been constructed. The remainder of the position

was covered by a strong ravine which rendered it almost inaccessible

on that side; and there Lieutenant-General Clinton was stationed,

supported by three battalions of General Roche’s division as a column

of reserve. The position was well taken. The second battalion of the

27th foot, the 1st Italian regiment, and the Calabrian free corps, had

on the first alarm been pushed forward beyond Villena, under Colonel

Adam, and with them a detachment of cavalry commanded by Colonel Lord

Frederick Bentinck. The object of this movement was to observe the

enemy’s motions: it brought on a cannonade, and the French endeavoured

to break in upon our troops, and enter Villena pell-mell with them; but

Colonel Adam, following his instructions, fell back upon Biar without

loss. Sir John, being now assured that Suchet meditated a serious

movement, urged General Elio to withdraw his 800 men from Villena,

where the castle, in its imperfect state of defence, was not tenable

against such an enemy; but the Spanish general was not to be persuaded.

The French entered Villena that evening, pushing their light troops

beyond ♦APRIL 12.♦ it towards Biar; and on the morrow the commandant

surrendered at the first summons, and he and his battalion were made

prisoners of war.

In the afternoon, Suchet advanced in force towards Biar; which village

is situated at the entrance of a strong pass, in a range of hills

running nearly parallel with the position of the allies. About four

o’clock he commenced a serious attack upon Colonel Adam’s detachment.

That officer’s orders were to fall back upon Castalla, but to dispute

the pass; and this he did for five hours against a very superior force,

with the utmost gallantry and skill; till being overpowered by numbers,

and having both flanks turned, he retreated then to the pass, and took

the place which had been allotted to him in the position, on the high

ground to the left of Castalla, having in this unequal conflict both

inflicted and sustained very considerable loss. Two mountain guns fell

into the enemy’s hands; they could not be brought off, because they

were disabled; Colonel Adam therefore directed Captain Arabin to fight

them to the last, and then abandon them. Before day closed, the French

were seen in great force on the road to Biar, and on the hills opposite

the position; but darkness prevented any farther operations for ♦BATTLE

OF CASTALLA. APRIL 13.♦ the night. At daybreak they were perceived

in great numbers along the defile of Biar, and in the plain ground

which separates it from the hills near Castalla; and in the course of

the morning they posted several large masses of infantry, as if in

preparation for a decided attack. Their success against Elio’s corps

had increased their confidence; and they had accustomed themselves to

speak of this army as composed of the rabble of the allied nations, and

to talk of driving them into the sea.

About one, they pushed forward a large column of cavalry to the village

of Onil, about two miles in front of Castalla, and this movement was

continued parallel to the front of the allies, until nearly opposite

the right of the position. Sir John Murray had foreseen this: the

ground was unfavourable for cavalry, and no notice was taken of the

movement. Three masses of infantry at the same time moved rapidly from

their right, crossed the plain ground in front of the pass, and with

a gallantry, which, in the words of the British general, entitled

them to the highest praise, commenced an attack on the centre and the

left. The left had been weakened; for about an hour before the attack,

General Whittingham had been ordered, with the three regiments which

he had in position there, to make a reconnoissance upon the enemy’s

right flank; but this was the key of the position; and the consequence

of thus weakening it might have been disastrous if Colonel D. Julian

Romero had not opportunely arrived there with two regiments from

Alcoy. Upon this point, from whence more than half its force had been

withdrawn, the main attack was made; and notwithstanding the difficult

approach to it, the assailants gained ground. The Spaniards, who had

expended all their cartridges, were observed to be retiring, and the

enemy moving in considerable force to the left of our centre. The

moment was critical. Just as the assailants had gained the summit,

Colonel Adam, whom they were proceeding to attack in front, prevented

them, and giving them no time to recover breath after the exertion of

such an ascent, charged and overthrew their column, killing, wounding,

or taking prisoner, during the pursuit, almost every man opposed to

his brigade. The Spaniards resumed their ground. Whittingham too had

no sooner apprehended the intention of the enemy, than he returned

with all speed, and arrived in time to take part in the action, in

which, and in the pursuit, the Spaniards distinguished themselves.

The total failure of the enemy here seemed to be felt along their

whole line of attack; they retreated every where. The cavalry, which

had now advanced toward the front of the allies, fell rapidly back on

perceiving this unexpected reverse, and entered the defile in such

confusion, that had the advantage been vigorously pursued, a signal

victory might, in all likelihood, have been obtained. Suchet, having

united his broken battalions with those which he kept in reserve, took

up a hasty position at the entrance of the defile. Sir John Murray,

still retaining the height, moved a considerable part of his army into

the plain, and formed it in front of the enemy, within cannon-shot, his

right flank covered with the cavalry, his left resting on the hills. In

this state, Marshal Suchet thought that the English did not choose to

make an attack, and Sir John Murray, that the French did not choose to

wait for one; ... for the line of the allies was scarcely formed when

the enemy began their retreat, and continued it through the night, the

action terminating at dusk with a distant cannonade.

The French had 18,000 infantry in the field, and 1600 cavalry: the

allies were not much inferior in infantry; but greatly so in horse. The

loss of the allies was 670 killed, wounded, and missing, the greater

number of the killed being Spaniards: 800 of the enemy were left dead

in front of the line which they had attacked: no prisoners were taken

except such as were wounded; but Suchet sent 2000 of Elio’s soldiers

prisoners to Tortosa on their way to France, and represented that his

success on the one part of the operations balanced his failure on the

other. If this had been the case numerically, which it was not, it was

far otherwise in reputation. He had suffered a mortifying defeat; but

what must most have tended to console him for it was, his satisfaction

at perceiving that there was no intention on the part of the allies

to pursue their victory. He retreated that night to Villena through

Biar, where he left many dead and dying. Sir John, on the following

day, marched his army in two columns to Alcoy, hoping (though with

little confidence in that hope) that he might force the strong pass of

Albayda, and reach the intrenched position of the enemy at S. Felippe

before they could; this he thought better than a direct pursuit,

because the road which the French had taken was favourable for cavalry,

and he was greatly inferior in that arm. In the vicinity of Alcoy he

remained till the 17th, and then advanced with the whole army into the

open country, to the foot of the Albayda pass, about a league in front

of Alcoy. But this being a lateral movement, made after the enemy had

so far the start as to have passed all that was perilous for him, and

got into a strong country, with his forces collected and restored to

order, was an unimportant demonstration which had no effect; and he

returned after it to his position at Castalla.

Marshal Suchet had not been more successful in machinations of another

kind. Before the battle of Castalla, an Italian regiment in the

Anglo-Sicilian army had been corrupted, and would have betrayed its

post in an attack concerted with that view, if a timely discovery had

not been made. A scheme also had been formed for delivering Alicante

into his hands; but this also was detected, and three of his emissaries

suffered death for it at Alcoy. Frey Assensio Nebot, known as a

Guerrilla chief, by the name of _El Frayle_, the Friar, had more than

any other partizan annoyed the French in Valencia. His party was well

organized, and provided with a regularity which was seldom to be found

in the regular Spanish armies: so rigorous were the measures employed

against him, that women were put to death for supplying him with means

and intelligence; and at length it was affirmed, that three criminals

who had been condemned to capital punishment obtained their lives, and

the promise of a good reward, on condition of presenting themselves

to the Friar as volunteers, and taking an opportunity to assassinate

him. Mr. Tupper, who had been the British consul at Valencia, and whose

zealous services were never wanting to the common cause, obtained

information of this villany, and the Friar was thus put upon his guard.

♦LORD WELLINGTON OPENS THE CAMPAIGN.♦

Lord Wellington was now prepared to open the campaign, and, for the

first time, with such means as enabled him to act in full confidence

of success. If the Anglo-Sicilian army should not achieve any signal

service, he was yet assured that it would give sufficient employment to

Suchet, so that the Intruder could look for no support from that side.

The British force under his command consisted of 48,000 effective men;

the Portugueze of about 28,000; the Galician of 18,000. The enemy were

not inferior in number, and could more surely rely upon the whole of

♦MAY.♦ their troops; but the change in their Emperor’s fortune and in

their own had been such, that they looked only to a defensive campaign,

and trusted to their strong position on the Douro. In the middle of

May Lord Wellington put his troops in motion. The cavalry which had

wintered in the neighbourhood of Coimbra began their movement at the

end of April: they went by the way of Porto to Braga, where they rested

some days, and proceeding to Braganza, reached that place, which was

the point of union for the left of the army, on the 22d of May. The

left of the army under Sir Thomas Graham crossed the Douro in Portugal,

between Lamego and the frontier. The siege of Ciudad Rodrigo in the

preceding year could not have been undertaken unless that river had

been rendered navigable far above the point to which the Portugueze

barks formerly ascended: it had now been opened as high as to the

mouth of the Agueda; and boats had been quietly collected at different

points, without exciting any suspicion that they were ♦THE LEFT OF THE

ARMY CROSSES THE DOURO.♦ designed for the passage of the troops. Five

divisions of infantry and two brigades of cavalry were thus placed upon

the right bank of the Douro, while the enemy supposed that they had

only to guard against an attempt from the left. The difficulties of

the march were indeed very great; most of the roads are so narrow that

carriages could barely pass between the thick walls which bounded them;

and the mountain streams had their course in ravines, from whence the

ascent is so laborious that sixty men could not without great exertion

enable the horses to drag the artillery up. Nevertheless, hope and

ardour overcame all difficulties; and the advantage which the troops

derived from being provided with shelter was sensibly felt: out of a

division of 6000 men, there were but 120 sick after a march of 250

miles, through such a country. When these were far on their way, Lord

Wellington, with two divisions of British infantry, a Portugueze one

under the Conde de Amarante, a Spanish one under Morillo, and some

corps of cavalry, advanced from Ciudad Rodrigo by the direct road to

Salamanca; the remainder of the army under Sir Rowland Hill moved upon

the same point by Alba de Tormes.

The line of their retreat in November was still too evidently marked

by the skeletons of the poor animals who had been worked to death in

that cruel service. A division of infantry under General Villatte had

been left in Salamanca, with some artillery, and three squadrons of

horse. They evacuated the city upon the approach of the allies, but

they lingered too long upon ♦MAY 26. AFFAIR NEAR SALAMANCA.♦ the

high ground in its vicinity. When Lord Wellington was within half a

league of Salamanca, he and his staff got upon a rocky height which

commanded a full view of the city and adjacent country. Below him were

his own videttes, and beyond them those of the enemy, each supported

by piquets. To the right were the Arapiles, a name known only in

topography before, but which had now a place in military history; and

in the same direction, but more behind him, the heads of two columns,

forming Sir Rowland’s division, were seen on two nearly parallel roads.

Through a glass, the enemy were observed drawn up; two battalions and a

squadron to the right of the city, near a ruined convent; two squadrons

on the Tormes, near the bridge; half a squadron guarding the ford,

about a mile above the city, near S. Martha; ... and behind the city a

battalion in reserve. Villatte having barricadoed the bridge and the

principal communications throughout the town, seemed to have thought

himself sure of an easy retreat. The 1st German hussars, favoured by

ground which concealed them from the enemy, inclined toward the ford,

while the 14th light dragoons, keeping beyond the reach of fire, edged

along the left bank of the river. The enemy appeared in some confusion,

but remained stationary, as if waiting for something; and beyond the

city, in the direction of Miranda de Duero and Zamora, their piquets

were withdrawing, and mules and baggage joining them from all sides.

It was now nearly ten in the forenoon, and the day very hot. The head

of Sir Rowland’s right column, which consisted of cavalry, and a troop

of horse artillery, under General Fane, were within two miles of S.

Martha, marching for the ford: the enemy now began to move, first in

the direction of Toro, but presently, as if wavering, bending to their

right, they kept close to the Tormes, in the direction of Arevalo; and

retired rapidly, but in good order, when Fane with his six squadrons

had crossed the river. It was well for them that this cavalry was

already jaded by a long march; but the horse artillery, as soon as,

owing to the ravines and the intricacies of the ground, it could be

brought into use, opened upon them with great effect, every shot going

through their crowded ranks. They retired with extreme rapidity, but

in excellent order, and the artillery pursued as quickly as a very deep

country, occasionally intersected with hollow roads, would allow. When

the enemy came to Aldea Lengua, there was an opportunity of attacking

them with every probability of forcing them to lay down their arms; but

strict orders had been given not to pass a ravine just by that village;

and the moment (never to be regained in war) went by. When orders came

to proceed, it was just too late; the pursuit however was continued,

and some three miles beyond the village a charge was attempted by two

squadrons, but feebly, for the horses were now far spent; the enemy

formed into squares, and repulsed them by a volley, though with little

loss. The pursuit was continued about three miles farther. Some of the

French were taken, being unable to march farther from fatigue; and

many threw away their knapsacks, and sacks full of biscuit, and of

corn, but no troops under such circumstances could have behaved better;

... and some proofs were given of what better deserves to be called

ferocious intrepidity than courage. One of their men who was severely

wounded attempted to destroy himself; and another obstinately refusing

to surrender when it was not possible for him to escape, compelled

those who would fain have saved his life to cut him down. The affair

ended in front of Aldea Rubia; a corps of infantry and cavalry retiring

from Alba, when threatened by Major-General Long and by Morillo’s

division, joined the enemy here; and Lord Wellington, as his infantry

had not come up, recalled the troops from the pursuit. Above fourscore

of the French lay dead on the road, and many fell among the standing

corn: some 200 were made prisoners; and some baggage, ammunition, and

provisions, with Villatte’s coach, were taken.

♦PASSAGE OF THE EZLA.♦

During the two following days, Lord Wellington established the troops

which had marched from the Agueda and Extremadura Alta between the

Tormes and the Lower Douro. On the 29th he left Salamanca, and reached

Miranda de Duero. The enemy had destroyed all the bridges upon the

river except that at Zamora. Opposite Miranda there is a ferry, where

this deep and rapid stream is from 80 to 100 yards wide, and the rocks

on either side from 400 to 500 feet high. When it is so swoln that the

ferry is impracticable, the only way by which travellers can cross is

after the old Peruvian manner, in a sort of hammock or cradle, fastened

to a rope, which is secured upon two projecting points of rock, about

thirty feet above the ordinary level of the ♦FLOREZ ESP. SAGRADA, T.

16, P. 3.♦ water. Here Lord Wellington crossed, and on the following

day joined Sir Thomas Graham’s corps at Carvajales on the Ezla. This

river, which upon good grounds is believed to have been the Astura

of the ancients, and in Leon is called the Rio Grande, descends from

the Puertos de Asturias, passes by Mansilla to Benevente, near which

town it receives the Cea from the east, and the larger river Orbigo

from the west, and enters the Douro below Zamora. At daybreak on

the 31st the troops began to ford: the enemy so little apprehended

danger on that side, that they had only a piquet there, and thus no

opposition was offered to a very difficult and perilous passage. The

ford was intricate; the water nearly chin deep; the bottom rough and

stony; and the stones large and loose. The hussar brigade began the

passage, entering in a body; and as it was supposed that a village on

the opposite hill was occupied by the enemy, and as it was necessary

that some infantry should cross to support the advance of the hussars,

each dragoon had a soldier holding by his stirrup. But this impeded

the horses: alarmed both by, the stream and the unsafe footing, they

became unmanageable and plunged forward: the men, who before could

scarcely keep their feet against the force and weight of the stream,

lost at once their footing and their hold; they were plunged into the

water, their knapsacks overweighed them and kept them on their backs,

and in this manner they struggled at the mercy of the current. There

were, fortunately, three or four small islands just at this part;

and by these most of the officers and men were stopped, but several

valuable lives were lost. The hussars exerted themselves with exemplary

humanity to assist the infantry, and one of their corporals lost his

own life in the performance of this generous duty. In this way the 51st

and the Brunswick Oel’s corps, as well as the cavalry, passed. Their

orders were to ascend the hill and take the village: the enemy’s piquet

were made prisoners. A pontoon bridge was then thrown across, and the

remainder of the corps passed over.

♦JUNE.♦

The French seem now for the first time to have comprehended Lord

Wellington’s plan, and found themselves out-manœuvred by an enemy to

whom they had hitherto allowed no credit for any thing except courage,

and that only because they had been so often beaten by them that it

was no longer for their own credit to deny it. No sooner were they

menaced by the advance of the columns than they destroyed the bridge

at Zamora, and retired from that city and from Toro. Both cities

were entered by the allies; and at daybreak on the first of June the

hussar brigade under Colonel Grant came up near Toro with the enemy’s

rear-guard, who retired rapidly to the village of Morales, in the

direction of Tordesillas. After having been cannonaded by two guns,

which were all that could be brought up in time through the deep sandy

roads, the French formed behind the village. The hussars passed on

both sides of the village, and instantly charged them; upon which they

made off with all speed for a little bridge across a marshy bottom,

faced about there, being supported by some guns belonging to their

infantry, and stood a charge. They were worsted in it, but passed the

bridge; part of the 10th hussars pursued, and Captain Lloyd advancing

with great spirit, but few followers, was taken: they were again

pressed, and retired hastily on the infantry, losing more than 200

prisoners in these affairs, and so many in killed and wounded, that

the 16th regiment of dragoons was almost destroyed. Captain Lloyd was

ill-treated by his captors; they beat him and rifled him, but left

him in their retreat. Though the fighting was almost in the street of

Morales, the Spaniards were now so accustomed to sights of war, that

within ten minutes after the firing had ceased the women were spinning

at their doors, and the little children at play as if nothing had

happened.

♦SIR ROWLAND HILL CROSSES THE DOURO.

JUNE 3.♦

Lord Wellington halted at Toro, that the light division and the troops

under Sir Rowland might cross the Douro by the bridge there, that his

rear-guard might come up, and that the Galician army should unite

itself with his left. The whole of the allied force was now on the

right side of the Douro: leaving then half the reserve-ammunition

near Zamora to spare the horses (which were already suffering), he

proceeded: the French, whose force was distributed between Valladolid,

Tordesillas, and Medina, retiring as he advanced, their rear crossing

at the Puente de Duero, on the same day that the allies accomplished

their first object in the campaign, by uniting on the right side of

that river. The enemy now concentrated their force behind the Pisuerga:

there also there was strong ground for defence; but abandoning that

also when Lord Wellington manœuvred on their right, they withdrew

behind the Carrion. The Intruder quitted Palencia on the 6th, and the

greater part of his troops early on the following morning, after a

night passed in the fear of close pursuit. When Lord Wellington entered

that city, flowers were thrown upon him from the windows, and a shower

of roses from the upper gratings of a nunnery. The enemy had not left a

morsel of bread, nor a drop of wine in that city: and when they hastily

retired from a bivouac near Tordesillas, leaving it to be occupied by a

part of Sir Rowland’s corps, the fuel which the troops found collected

there consisted of doors, window-frames, tables, and drawers, from the

houses in the neighbourhood.

From the Ezla to Palencia the troops had marched through one continued

track of corn, where villages were so thinly scattered, that it

seemed unaccountable where the cultivators were to be found. The land

was generally in wheat, with a fair proportion of barley, and here

and there a crop of vetches and clover. They moved generally by two

roads, and on each side of each at least twenty yards were trampled

down. The horses were fed on green barley nearly the whole march. The

intention of the British Government was to pay the inhabitants for

whatever the army must of necessity take from them; and on the part

of the Government, the full payment was in fact made: but little of

that payment reached the poor people to whom it was due. For want of

specie, the commissaries could pay upon the spot only in bills; to the

peasantry these were worth no more than what the land-sharks who follow

in the wake of an army chose to offer for them; and in this iniquitous

manner large fortunes were amassed, ... a species of roguery which many

of the Portugueze (though as a people the Portugueze are eminent for

probity) were not slow in learning.

♦THE FRENCH ABANDON BURGOS.♦

The army crossed the Carrion on the 7th, following an enemy who seemed

undetermined where to make a stand. On the 12th, Lord Wellington found

it necessary after such rapid movements to halt his left, while the

right under Sir Rowland advanced to reconnoitre the strength of the

French, and the position which they had taken up near Burgos, where

great pains had been taken to strengthen the fortifications of the

castle. They were posted in considerable force on the heights to

the left of the Hormaza, with their right above the village of that

name, and their left in front of Estapar. Part of the allied force

flanked them on their right, another marched against the heights of

Hormaza, the remainder threatened those of Estapar; without waiting

to be attacked they were dislodged, and retreated hastily for Burgos,

suffering considerable loss from the horse artillery, and losing a gun

and some prisoners, but retreating in the best order. More presence of

mind indeed was shown by them hitherto in presence of the enemy, and

in action, than in their counsels. They posted themselves on the left

of the Arlanzon and of the Urbel, which were then greatly swoln with

rains: but in the night they retreated into the city, and hurrying from

it, blew up the castle early in the morning, about an hour after the

Intruder had left it. They seemed to have been aware that there was no

longer any hope of recovering their ascendancy, and to have intended to

bring upon the city a destruction which should prevent the inhabitants

from rejoicing in their deliverance. But the hurry, and fear, and

confusion, with which their preparations were made defeated this

malignant purpose. Several mines failed; some which were primed did not

explode; others were so ill managed that they blew the earth inwards:

and as the explosion took place some hours sooner than was intended,

the destruction which was intended for their enemies fell in part upon

themselves. Many of their men who were lingering to plunder perished as

they were loading their horses with booty in the streets and squares,

and three or four hundred were blown up in the fort. Above 1000 shells

had been placed in the mines: the explosion was distinctly heard at the

distance of fifty miles; and the pavement of the cathedral was covered

with the dust into which its windows had been shivered by the shock.

The town escaped destruction owing to the failure of so many of the

mines, but the castle was totally destroyed, ... gates, beams, masses

of masonry, guns, carriages, and arms lying in one heap of ruins; ...

some of the mines had laid open the breaches, and exposed the remains

of those who had fallen during the siege.

♦THE EBRO.♦

The object of the enemy now was to occupy a position behind the Ebro,

blocking up the great road by placing a garrison in the castle of

Pancorbo, and calling to their assistance the corps from Biscay,

Navarre, and Aragon. But Lord Wellington, repeating the manœuvre which

had before so perfectly succeeded, had already sent his left column to

effect its passage in a quarter from whence they apprehended no danger.

The Ebro rises in the mountains of Santillana, its principal source

being at the northern extremity of Old Castille, towards the Asturian

frontier, near a town which from that cause is called Fontibre. The

Sierra de Oca prevents it from trending westward, like the other

great rivers of Spain; and at Miranda de Ebro, the point at which the

Intruder had instructed the different divisions of his army to make

for with all speed, it appears nearly as large a stream as at Tortosa,

though in the course of the intervening sixty leagues it receives many

and large rivers, one of them the Aragon, of such magnitude, that it

is called the husband (_el varou_) of the Ebro. While the remainder

of the army were pushing the enemy back ♦PASSAGE OF THE EBRO BY THE

ALLIES.♦ upon Burgos, the left column had been detached to effect its

passage above Frias by the bridges of S. Martin and Rocamunde: the

road thither had been deemed impracticable for carriages, and on that

supposed impracticability the enemy relied; but the confidence of the

British General was partaken by his army, and well seconded by them in

all ways; exertions which nothing but zeal and eager hope could have

accomplished were made; and the artillery was lowered down the steep

banks of the river where there were none to offer any resistance. The

French had calculated not without reason on the line of the Ebro, if

they had had foresight or been allowed leisure to occupy it. The road

begins to descend the mountains about three miles from the right bank,

and for more than half that way winds down a continued defile, which

admits only eight or ten men abreast, and being withal tremendously

steep, is so paved that horses can scarcely keep their feet there.

Another such defile, and of greater length, is to be passed on the

opposite side. A few ditches cut across the route, a few trees placed

as barricadoes, a rock blown up to block the pass, a hundred or two

of men to defend it, and to roll stones from the crags and precipices

above, might have stopped any force that attempted the passage. The

left column crossed on the 14th, the remainder of the army on the 15th,

at the same points and by the Puente de Arenas, and on the following

day they moved to the right, in the direction of Vittoria.

♦THE FRENCH FALL BACK UPON VITTORIA.♦

They knew at this time little of the enemy, not even who commanded

their united force, whether Marshal Jourdan or General Gazan, the

Intruder’s command being of course merely nominal; it was thought

that their intention was to have given battle upon the main road,

near Briviesca; but this alone was certain, that their plans had

been disconcerted by Lord Wellington’s movements and sudden advance,

and that they were in that state of irresolution which prepares even

the best soldiers for defeat. On the 16th and 17th they assembled a

considerable force near Espejo, composed of troops which had been

employed against Longa and Mina, and of others detached from the main

body of their army. They had also a division of infantry, with some

cavalry, at Frias, to observe the movements of the allies after the

passage of the Ebro. These detachments, in all about 16,000 men, moved

on the 18th, those from Frias upon S. Millan, and those from Espejo

upon Osma. The light division, under Major-General Alten, drove them

from S. Millan, and cut off the brigade of their rear-guard, of whom

it killed and wounded many, took 300 prisoners, with a considerable

quantity of baggage, and dispersed the rest among the mountains, ...

from thence to be brought in by the peasants and the guerrillas. Sir

Thomas Graham arrived at Osma at the same time with the enemy’s corps;

they were considerably superior in numbers, nevertheless they retired

as soon as an intention was shown of attacking them: presently they

returned briskly, as if to become assailants in their turn, but their

reception was not such as to encourage them, and they once more retired

towards Espejo, and being followed thither, withdrew to the heights.

The enemy’s head-quarters were that day at Pancorvo. During the night

they moved from thence towards Vittoria; and on the following day their

rear-guard was found strongly posted, having its right covered by the

village of Subijana, and its left upon the heights in front of ♦JUNE

19.♦ Pobes. The light division attacked them in flank on the right, Sir

Lowry Cole with the 4th in front, and they were driven back upon their

main force, of which a view was then obtained, but no correct judgment

could be formed of its numbers, because they were in part concealed by

the mountains, and a thick rain was falling during the whole day. On

that night they took up a position in front of Vittoria.

♦VITTORIA.♦

This city, which is now the capital of the province of Alava, and

stands in a valley, bounded on one side by a part of the Pyrenees,

and on the other by a range of bold though inferior mountains, was

founded in 1181 by Sancho VII. of Navarre, a king distinguished by the

appellations of the Wise and the Valiant. There had been a village

called Gasteiz on the site; Sancho thinking it a good situation for a

fortress which might check the incursions of his Castillian neighbours

♦GARCHAY, L. 24, CAP. 13. PP. 187–8.♦ on that side, rebuilt, peopled

and fortified it, and gave his new town the name of Victoria, in

memorial of some now forgotten victory obtained in that vicinity over

them. Juan II. of Castille made it a city. It is now divided into the

old and new towns, the latter being the larger and better part of what

in peaceful times was a populous, industrious, and prosperous place,

containing more than a thousand houses, and twice that number in the

suburbs.

♦POSITION OF THE FRENCH ARMY.♦

In front of this city the enemy had taken their position, under the

nominal command of the Intruder, but actually commanded by Marshal

Jourdan, as the Major-General of the army. Their left rested upon

the heights which terminated at the Puebla de Arlanza; and they had

a reserve in rear of their left, at the village of Gomecha: their

centre extended along a range of strong heights on the left bank of

the Zadorra, its right resting on a circular hill that commands the

valley to which that river gives name; this hill they had covered with

infantry, flanked and defended with several brigades of guns; their

right was in advance of the river, above the village of Abechuco,

to defend the passage. This position, extending about eight miles,

covered the three great roads which from Bilbao, Logroño, and Madrid,

converge upon Vittoria; it crossed also the main road to Bayonne, upon

which immense convoys were seen, moving towards France with the last

harvest and the last gleanings of their plunder. The city was filled

with others awaiting their turn for departure. It is remarkable that,

within sight of this ground, the battle of Najara was fought, in which

Edward the Black Prince, acting as the ally of a bad man, defeated

the best troops of France under their most distinguished leader

Bertram du Guesclin, who was come in support of a worse. It is also

remarkable that the Prince of Brazil, before the battle of Vittoria was

fought, should have conferred the title of Duque da Victoria upon Lord

Wellington.

Lord Wellington halted his columns on the 20th, in order to close them

up, for since reaching the Ebro they had necessarily been extended,

because of the nature of the country: only the 6th division was left

at Medina de Pomal to cover the march of supplies from the rear.

That day he made a close reconnoissance of the enemy’s position in

every part, with the determination of attacking them on the following

morning, if they should continue there. There was little disparity

of numbers between the two armies, each having from 70 to 75,000

men. Lord Wellington instantly perceived that the position, though

in most respects well chosen, was too confined, that it showed an

inconsiderable front, and was liable to be taken in flank.

♦BATTLE OF VITTORIA.♦

At daybreak on the 21st of June the allied army was put in motion. The

right under Sir Rowland, consisting of the second British division, the

Conde de Amarante’s Portugueze division, and Morillo’s Spanish corps,

was to commence the action by attacking the heights of La Puebla,

upon which the enemy’s left rested. Sir Thomas Graham with the left,

composed of the 1st and 5th divisions, Generals Pack and Bradford’s

brigades of infantry, Generals Bock and Anson’s brigades of horse,

and Longa’s Spanish division, was directed to turn their right by a

wide movement, and, crossing the Zadorra, to cut off their retreat

by the road to Bayonne. As soon as either of these corps should be

in a situation to manœuvre on the other side the river, the centre,

consisting of the 3d, 4th, 7th, and light divisions, in two columns,

was to advance, and the whole then push forward on the city, and attack

it simultaneously in front and in flank, ... whereby the French would

be compelled either to abandon it and their precious convoys, or risk

a battle in the hope of preserving them. The Spaniards, under Morillo,

began the action, and attacked the heights with great gallantry; their

leader was wounded, but remained in the field; the enemy stood firm,

and made great efforts to retain their ground, perceiving when too

late, that they had neglected to occupy it in sufficient strength.

Strong reinforcements were sent from their centre to its support, so

that Sir Rowland found it necessary to detach thither, first, the 71st

regiment, and the light infantry battalions of Major-General Walker’s

brigade, and successively other troops; the contest was very severe,

and the loss considerable. Here the Hon. Lieutenant-Colonel Cadogan was

mortally wounded, an officer, in Lord Wellington’s words, “of great

zeal and tried gallantry, who had acquired the respect and regard of

the whole profession, and of whom it might have been expected, that

if he had lived he would have rendered the most important services

to his country.” At length the enemy were driven at the point of the

bayonet from these heights; and under the cover which the possession of

this ground afforded, Sir Rowland crossed the Zadorra at La Puebla,

passed the difficult defile, two miles in length, which is formed by

the heights and the river, and then attacked and won the village of

Sabijana de Alva, which covered the left of the enemy’s lines. They

on their part made repeated attempts to regain this important point,

and with that hope drew from their centre a considerable force; again

and again they endeavoured to recover the village, but their efforts,

though bravely and perseveringly made, were unsuccessful.

The difficult nature of the country delayed the communication between

the different columns, and it was late before Lord Wellington knew that

the 3d and 7th divisions, under the Earl of Dalhousie, had arrived at

their appointed station. The 4th and the light divisions, however,

crossed the Zadorra immediately after Sir Rowland had gained possession

of Sabijana, the former at the bridge of Nanclares, the latter at the

Tres Puentes; almost at the same time the Earl of Dalhousie’s column

arrived at Mendonza, and the 3rd division, under Sir Thomas Picton,

charged and took the bridge higher up, and crossed and was followed by

the 7th. These bridges the enemy ought to have destroyed, but from the

beginning of the campaign a want of foresight had been manifested in

all their operations, though when in action their generals displayed

the habitual promptitude of experienced commanders. The four divisions

which had now crossed, and which formed the centre of the allied army,

were destined to attack the heights on which the right of the enemy’s

centre was placed, while Sir Rowland should move forward from Sabijana

to attack the left. The French had lined those heights with artillery,

which opened on the allies as soon as they attempted to advance from

the river, and with so destructive a fire that it became necessary for

them to halt and bring two brigades of guns to oppose it. Meantime the

contest was maintained at Sabijana with great obstinacy; the enemy

feeding their attacks from a wood, in which their troops were assembled

in great force. But when a brigade which Sir Rowland had detached along

a range of mountains to turn their flank appeared, and at the same time

Sir Thomas Picton approached their front, they gave over their attempts

to recover the village, and began to think rather of retreat than of a

successful resistance. And when Sir Thomas pushed on to take the large

circular hill in flank, while the fourth division moved simultaneously

upon the village in the centre, their whole force prepared to fall back

upon the town, retreating before the allies could close, but keeping

up a hot fire from their artillery. The third division first came in

contact with their columns, and by a gallant attack captured 28 of

their guns which they had not time to draw into the road. The other

divisions pressed them in front. At this moment both the winning and

the losing game were played with equal skill, “the allies advancing

by echellons of battalions, in two or three lines, according ♦COLONEL

JONES’S ACCOUNT, 2. 158.♦ to the nature of the ground; and the French

retiring before them in the most orderly manner, and taking advantage

of every favourable opportunity to make a stand.” And here it happened,

that General Colville’s brigade, which was on the left of the centre,

and most in advance, became, by an accident of the ground, separated

from its support; the enemy, who lost no opportunity in action,

attacked it with a far superior force, but the brigade stood firm,

though out of 1800 men it lost 550.

While the right and the centre, following up their success, were

pushing the enemy back upon Vittoria, the left was advancing upon

that town by the high road from Bilbao. Sir Thomas Graham with that

column had been moved on the preceding evening to Margina, and had

then so considerable a round to make, that it was ten o’clock before

he began to descend into the plain. General Giron with the Spanish

army had been detached to the left under a different view of the

state of affairs; but having been recalled and reached Orduña on

the yesterday, he marched from thence in the morning so as to be

in readiness to support Sir Thomas Graham, if his support should

be required. The enemy had a division of infantry and some cavalry

advanced upon the Bilbao road, resting their right on some strong

heights covering the village of Gamarra Mayor, and both that village

and Abechuco were strongly occupied as _têtes-du-pont_ to the bridges

over the Zadorra at those places. The heights were attacked both in

front and flank by Brigadier-General Pack’s Portugueze brigade, and

Longa’s Spanish division, supported by Major-General Anson’s brigade

of light dragoons, and the 5th division of infantry, all under the

command of Major-General Oswald; and they were carried, both Spaniards

and Portugueze behaving admirably. Longa then with little resistance

got possession of Gamarra Menor, and the larger village of the same

name was stormed and taken by Brigadier-General Robinson’s brigade of

the 5th division, which advanced under a heavy fire of artillery and

musketry without firing a shot: the enemy suffered severely there,

and lost three pieces of cannon. Sir Thomas Graham then proceeded to

attack the village of Abechuco with the 1st division; they formed a

strong battery against it, under cover of which Colonel Halkett’s

brigade advanced to the attack, supported by General Bradford’s

brigade of Portugueze infantry. Three guns and a howitzer were taken

on the bridge here, and the village was carried. While the contest at

Abechuco continued, the enemy seeing their communication with Bayonne

threatened, marched a strong body to their right in the hope of

recovering Gamarra Mayor: they were driven back in confusion; made a

second attempt, and were again repulsed, for Sir Thomas had loop-holed

the houses in front of the bridge, placed artillery to flank the

approach, and stationed several battalions concealed along the walls,

and their fire repelled the enemy upon a third advance. But the French

had two divisions of infantry in reserve upon the heights on the left

of the Zadorra; Sir Thomas, therefore, could not cross the river with

such a corps in front, till the troops which had moved upon the centre

and the left of the French should have driven them through Vittoria.

About six in the evening this was done, and the corps which held him

in check retreated then lest it should be taken in rear. The left then

crossed the Zadorra, took possession of the high road to Bayonne, and

forced the right as well as the left centre of the enemy back into

the Pamplona road; and now they were unable to hold any position long

enough for drawing off their artillery and baggage. In the expressive

language of an officer who bore his part in the victory, “they were

beaten before the town, and in the town, and through the town, and

out of the town, and behind the town, and all round about the town.”

Every where they had been attacked, every where beaten, and now every

where were put to utter rout. They themselves had in many actions

made greater slaughter of a Spanish army, but never in any instance

had they reduced an army, even of raw volunteers, to such a state of

total wreck. Stores, baggage, artillery, every thing was abandoned;

one gun and one howitzer only were they able to carry off, and the

gun was taken before it could reach Pamplona. 151 pieces of brass

ordnance on travelling carriages were taken; more than 400 caissons,

more than 14,000 round of ammunition, and nearly two millions of

musket-ball cartridges. The loss on the part of the allies consisted

of 501 British killed, 2808 wounded: 150 Portugueze and 89 Spaniards

killed, 899 and 466 wounded, ... the total loss not amounting to 5000.

The French acknowledged a loss of 8000, ... unquestionably it was

greater; not more than a thousand prisoners were taken; for so soon

as they found themselves irretrievably defeated, they ran, and never

did brave soldiers when beaten display more alacrity in flight. Having

abandoned all their ammunition waggons, they had not powder to blow up

the bridges; had this been done, the pursuit would have been greatly

impeded; attempts were made to break them up with pick-axes, and in

this they partly succeeded in several places. But the country was too

much intersected with ditches for cavalry to act with effect in a

pursuit; and infantry who moved in military order could not at their

utmost speed keep up with a route of fugitives. Yet, precipitate as

their flight was, they took great pains to bear off their wounded, and

dismounted a regiment of cavalry to carry them on. And they carefully

endeavoured to conceal their dead, stopping occasionally to collect

them and throw them into ditches, where they covered them with bushes.

Many such receptacles were found containing from ten to twenty bodies.

The Intruder, who now appears for the last time upon the stage of

his everlasting infamy, narrowly escaped. The tenth hussars entered

Vittoria at the moment that he was hastening out of it in his carriage.

Captain Wyndham with one squadron pursued, and fired into the carriage,

and Joseph had barely time to throw himself on his horse and gallop off

under the protection of an escort of dragoons. The carriage was taken,

and in it the most splendid of his trinkets, and the most precious

articles of his royal plunder. Marshal Jourdan’s staff was among the

trophies of the field; it was rather more than a foot long, and covered

with blue velvet, on which the imperial eagles were embroidered; and

it had been tipped with gold; but the first finder secured the gold

for himself. The case was of red morocco with silver clasps, and

with eagles on it, and at either end the Marshal’s name imprinted in

gold letters. Lord Wellington sent it to the Prince Regent, and was

gracefully presented in return with the staff of a Field-Marshal of

Great Britain. The spoils resembled those of an Oriental rather than

of an European army; for the Intruder, who in his miserable situation

had abandoned himself to every kind of sensuality, had with him all

his luxuries. His plunder, his wardrobe, his sideboard, his larder,

and his cellar, fell into the conqueror’s hands. The French officers,

who carried the pestilential manners of their nation wherever they

went, followed his example as far as their means allowed, and thus

the finest wines and the choicest delicacies were found in profusion.

The wives and mistresses of the officers had gathered together in one

house, where they were safe, and from whence they were sent in their

own carriages with a flag of truce to Pamplona. Poodles, parrots,

and monkeys, were among the prisoners. Seldom has such a scene of

confusion been witnessed as that which the roads leading from the field

of battle presented; ... broken down waggons stocked with claret and

champagne, others laden with eatables dressed and undressed, casks of

brandy, apparel of every kind, barrels of money, books, papers, sheep,

cattle, horses, and mules, abandoned in the flight. The baggage was

presently rifled, and the followers of the camp attired themselves in

the gala dresses of the flying enemy. Portugueze boys figured about

in the dress coats of French general officers; and they who happened

to draw a woman’s wardrobe in the lottery, converted silks, satins,

and embroidered muslins, into scarfs and sashes for their masquerade

triumph. Some of the more fortunate soldiers got possession of the

army chest, and loaded themselves with money: “Let them,” said Lord

Wellington, when he was informed of it; “they deserve all they can

find, were it ten times more.” The camp of every division was like a

fair; benches were laid from waggon to waggon, and there the soldiers

held an auction through the night, and disposed of such plunder as had

fallen to their share to any who would purchase it. Even dollars became

an article of sale, for they were too heavy to be carried in any great

numbers; eight were offered for a guinea, ... guineas which had been

struck for the payment of the troops in Portugal, and made current

there by a decree of the Regency, being the gold currency. The people

of Vittoria had their share in the spoils, and some of them indemnified

themselves thus for what they had suffered in their property by the

enemy’s exactions.

The city sustained no injury, though the French were driven through

it, and though great part of the battle might be seen from every

window. Nothing could be more mournful than its appearance that night,

... a lantern at every door, and no one in the streets. It was the

first place where the allies had found that the inhabitants were

French in feeling. Two days of heavy rain impeded the pursuit; but

that rain saved many houses from the flames, for the French wreaked

their vengeance upon every thing which they could destroy in their

flight. Every house at which the pursuers arrived had been gutted by

the fugitives, every village set on fire, and the few inhabitants who

had not taken flight in time had met with no mercy; at every step the

allies found havoc, and flames, and misery, the dying and the dead.

Such was the panic among the fugitives, that, finding the gates of

Pamplona closed, they attempted to force their way over the walls, and

did not desist till they were opposed by a serious fire of cannon and

musketry. A council of war was held there, in which it was resolved

to blow up the works and abandon the place; with this intent they

destroyed ammunition and tore down palisades from the outworks. But

the Intruder knew that the possession of so strong a fortress would in

some degree cover his flight; and the last act of his usurped authority

was to order that every article of food and fuel should be taken from

the Spaniards who were within reach. By the rigorous execution of this

order, the quantity in the town was more than doubled; and having left

a garrison there, the flying force continued their way to the Pyrenees.

Their rear was still in sight of Pamplona, when the right and centre of

the allies were checked in their pursuit by a fire from the walls.

♦SIR T. GRAHAM PROCEEDS AGAINST G. FOY.♦

Sir Thomas Graham with the left of the army was ordered to march by

Puerto S. Andrian upon Villa Franca, in the hope of intercepting

General Foy, who occupied Bilbao after the atrocities which he had

committed in Castro. The orders were not received till the 23rd, when

the weather and the ways in consequence were so bad, that only a small

part of the column could pass the mountain that day; and it was not

till the 24th that Sir Thomas, with Major-General Anson’s brigade of

light dragoons, the light battalions of the German legion, and two

Portugueze brigades could march from Segura, the rest of the troops

not having come up. The roads were so slippery with the rain, and in

many places so steep, that horses could scarcely keep their feet, or

the infantry make any progress. This allowed Foy time to withdraw

the troops from some of the military stations there, and with his

collected force he began his retreat into France. The allies came to

the junction of the roads from Bilbao and from Vittoria to Bayonne just

as the enemy’s rear had passed it. The French occupied in force some

strong ♦JUNE 24.♦ ground on the right of the Oria, in front of the

village of Olaverria, about a mile and a half from Villa Franca; they

were dislodged from thence, and allowed the pursuers to take possession

of the town, meaning to make their stand at Tolosa. During the night,

Longa’s corps joined Sir Thomas, and the advance of General Giron’s.

On the following morning the enemy evacuated Celequiz, and took up a

very strong position between that place and Tolosa, covering the road

to Pamplona. Longa was then directed to march by Alzo upon Lizara

in order to flank his left, while General Mendizabel was requested

to dispatch some battalions from Aspeytia to flank his right, which

rested upon a mountain with an inaccessible ravine in front. The French

were driven from the summit of a hill lying between the Pamplona and

Vittoria roads, on the right of the allies, by a very skilful attack of

Lieutenant-Colonel Williams, and the possession of this important point

enabled the assailants to act on the Pamplona road. In the course of

the afternoon the Spaniards arrived at their ♦THE FRENCH DRIVEN FROM

TOLOSA.♦ destination, and between six and seven a general attack was

made, one column advancing upon the Vittoria road, another on the left;

General Bradford driving the enemy in on their front by the Pamplona

road, and Longa still more on the right from the side of the mountains,

turning, and forcing from very strong positions, all their posted

bodies on the right of the town. Still they held the town; and it was

found much more capable of defence than had been represented; this

was generally the case with their fortified posts, so prone were the

Spaniards to report things always according to their hopes; the walls

had been loop-holed, and new towers erected to flank it. The Vittoria

gate was barricadoed and the Pamplona one on the bridge; both were

flanked by convents and other large buildings which the enemy occupied;

the place was nowhere open, and a strong wood block-house had been

constructed in the Plaza, of so much importance had it been deemed. A

nine-pounder was brought up close to the Vittoria gate, under cover

of the light battalions’ fire; the gate was burst open: at the same

time, the walls were attacked and gained under a considerable fire, and

about half an hour after night closed, the enemy forsook the place,

flying from every point, and the troops entered amidst the _vivas_ of

the inhabitants, who had fully expected to have been plundered that

night by the retreating enemy. The British officer who first entered

thought they were in some danger from their deliverers, considering

the mixed composition of the troops, and how likely it was that some

parties away from their regiments might take advantage of the darkness

and the confusion. He advised them therefore to shut their doors,

and, to the credit of the troops, it must be added, that no outrage

or excess was committed. Longa and the German legion passed on, and

formed immediately beyond the town. The loss of the allies on this and

the preceding day amounted to about 400. Sir Thomas Graham was struck

during the attack by a musket-ball; the hurt was not serious, and he

attempted to conceal it, but could not, and was obliged to dismount.

♦JUNE 26.♦

On the morrow one brigade was placed on the Pamplona road, and another

on the Bayonne, each about a league from Tolosa; a third occupied

Alegria, and Sir Thomas then halted two days to ascertain ♦FOY RETREATS

INTO FRANCE.♦ the advance of Lord Wellington on his right. Foy had

retreated to Anduain, where he destroyed the bridge; but he now knew

himself to be no longer safe within the Spanish territory, and lost

no time in making his way into France. A brigade of the Galician army

attacked his rear-guard on the Bidassoa at Irun, and drove them over

the bridge. They still maintained a strong stone block-house there,

which served as a head to the bridge, and some loop-holed houses on

the Spanish side of the river. General Giron sent for some Spanish

artillery to dislodge them; an ♦JUNE 30.♦ English brigade of nine

pounders was sent from Oyarzun to act with it; the French then found

it necessary to abandon their post, and they blew up the block-house

and burnt the bridge. In all these affairs no troops could have

behaved better than the Spanish; and General Giron, with a natural

and becoming feeling, had been very desirous that this last exploit

should fall to their part. The garrison at Passages, 150 in number,

♦PASSAGES IS SURRENDERED.♦ surrendered on the same day to Longa, and

on the following the garrison of Guetaria, being blockaded by land,

evacuated the town and fort, ♦CASTRO ABANDONED BY THE ENEMY.♦ and went

by sea to St. Sebastian. Castro de Urdiales, the scene of General Foy’s

atrocities, had been abandoned the day after the battle of Vittoria,

the British squadron having cut off the garrison from all supplies by

sea, and the Spaniards by land. A British vessel heaving opportunely in

sight, the commandant withdrew precipitately, without destroying his

artillery and powder, or injuring the castle. A few old women were the

only survivors in the town, and their tale of the barbarities which

the French and Italian troops had committed there is too dreadful for

recital; there is, however, a satisfaction in recording that fourteen

of the perpetrators were among the prisoners taken at Bilbao, and were

deservedly put to death. The garrison got by sea to Santona, that and

St. Sebastian being the only points which the enemy now occupied upon

that coast. The French had left 700 men in Pancorbo, a post commanding

a ravine through which the high road ♦PANCORBO TAKEN.♦ from Burgos

to Vittoria passes. The Andalusian army of reserve, under the Conde

de Abisbal, was on its way to join the main force. Lord Wellington

requested him to make himself master of the town and lower works, and

blockade, as closely as he could, the castle, which is situated on a

high rock. Abisbal assaulted and took the town and the fort of Santa

Marta on the 28th; and cutting off the garrison in the castle from the

spring which supplied them with water, compelled them to surrender two

days afterwards, when in all other respects they were well provided for

a regular defence.

♦CLAUSEL RETIRES TO ZARAGOZA.♦

General Clausel’s corps, consisting of part of the army of the north,

and one division of the army of Portugal, 14,000 in all, had been

recalled from its operations against Mina to join the collected force

of the Intruder. Coming in a direction which none of the fugitives had

taken, he approached Vittoria the day after the battle, and finding

that city in possession of Major-General Pakenham’s division, which

had just arrived there, and having no means of communicating with the

routed army, he retired immediately towards Logroño. There he halted,

hoping to obtain information whereby to direct his movements; and

Lord Wellington thinking there was some prospect of intercepting his

retreat, moved three divisions towards Tudela, and the 5th and 6th from

Vittoria and Salvatierra towards Logroño. Clausel, who was at this

time harassed by the indefatigable Mina, and by Don Julian Sanchez

with his regiment of cavalry, left Logroño on the 24th, taking with

him the garrison of that place, and marching on the left bank of the

Ebro, crossed it by the bridge at Lodosa, and reached Calahorra on the

following day. On the next he arrived at Tudela; but the Alcalde of

that city informed him that the allies were on the road to meet him,

upon which he marched toward Zaragoza, taking with him this garrison

also.

♦PREPARATIONS FOR THE SIEGE OF PAMPLONA.♦

Sir Rowland meantime following the main body of the defeated army

on their retreat over the Pyrenees, dislodged them from every point

which they attempted to hold, and obtained possession of the passes

of S. Esteban, Donna Maria, Maya, and Roncesvalles. It was now Lord

Wellington’s intention to besiege Pamplona: with this intent the heavy

guns and stores for the siege were brought from Santander to Deba, a

little town to the westward of S. Sebastian’s: there they were landed,

and cows and bullocks had been collected for transporting them to the

trenches: but the intelligence which Lord Wellington received from the

Anglo-Sicilian army rendered it necessary to give up this intention,

and every thing therefore was reshipped.

History of the Peninsular War, Volume 6 (of 6) · 第 4 / 11 章