in S. Maria de las Huelgas, a nunnery founded by Alfonso V. and
his English Queen Leonor, within sight of the city. Its church was
preferred by the Castilian kings for the performance of any remarkable
ceremony, the place for which was not prescribed; three kings therefore
in succession were crowned there, and it was long a place of interment
for the royal family. Except that at Fulda, no other nunnery ever
possessed such privileges, or was so largely endowed. The cathedral,
than which there is no more elaborate or more magnificent specimen of
what may be called monastic architecture, was founded in 1221, by King
St. Ferdinand and the Bishop Maurice, (who is said to have been an
Englishman, either by birth or blood,) about 150 years after the see
of Oca had been removed thither: among the relics which were shown,
there was a handkerchief of the prophet Elijah, and a lock of Abraham’s
hair, and one of St. Apollonia’s innumerable teeth. Two short leagues
from the city is the monastery of St. Pedro de Cardeña, a far older
foundation than the cathedral; where, from the time that two hundred
of its monks were massacred by the Moors the pavement used on the
anniversary of their martyrdom to sweat blood, till that blood, which
through so many centuries had cried for vengeance, was appeased by
the final subjugation of the misbelievers. There the Cid lies and his
wife Ximena: some of the French officers at the commencement of this
treacherous invasion used to visit the church and spout passages from
Corneille’s tragedy over their tomb. There too lie his daughters, D.
Elvira and D. Sol; and his father Diego Laynez; and his kinsman Alvar
Fañez Minaya, and his nephew Martin Antolinez, and Martin Pelaez, the
Asturian, names which will be held in remembrance as long as chivalrous
history shall be preserved. And before the gate of the monastery the
Cid’s good horse Bavieca lies buried, and Gil Diaz his trusty servant,
by the side of that good horse, which he had loved so well.
But of objects of antiquity or veneration, that on which the people of
Burgos prided themselves most was a miraculous crucifix in the convent
of St. Augustine, which a merchant of that city, on his homeward
voyage from Flanders, found at sea, floating in a chest shaped like
a coffin. The learned have concluded, upon a comparison of dates and
circumstances, that it is the identical image which was carved by
Nicodemus, and carried from Jerusalem to Berytus; where, being again
nailed and pierced by unbelieving Jews in the 8th century, blood issued
from its wounds, and miraculously healed both Jews and Christians of
their diseases. When Berytus fell under the yoke of the Saracens, the
Christians, to save it from farther profanation, coffined it thus
carefully and committed it in faith to the waves. Strong, however, as
the circumstantial evidence for this identity was admitted to be, many
persons piously preferred believing that it was no work of human hands,
but had been sent from heaven, in order that there should be on earth
one perfect resemblance of our crucified Saviour. They supported this
opinion by the alleged and admitted fact, that no one has ever been
able to ascertain of what material the image is made: the flesh, they
say, is so elastic that it yields like that of a living body to the
touch, and resumes its natural rotundity when the pressure is removed;
the head moves to whatever side it may be inclined, and the arms, if
they are unfastened, fall like those of a corpse; and the hair, and
beard, and nails, seem not as if they were carved, or fixed there, but
as if they grew. Volumes have been published filled with authenticated
accounts of the miracles which this crucifix has performed. Kings,
nobles, and prelates, have vied with each other in enriching the
chapel wherein it is placed. So many lamps have been presented, that
they are said literally to have hid the vault of the chapel, covering
its whole extent; and of these the meanest were of massive silver.
On each side of the altar stood thirty silver candlesticks, each
taller than the tallest man, and heavier than many men could lift. The
candlesticks upon the altar were of massive gold; between them were
gold and silver crosses, set with precious stones; and crowns rich with
pearls and sparkling with diamonds were suspended over the altar. Above
the altar the miraculous crucifix is placed, behind three curtains
embroidered with jewellery and pearls. It was shown only to persons
of great distinction, and not to them till after many ceremonies, and
till they had heard two masses: bells were then rung to give notice
that all who were present must fall upon their knees, while the sacred
curtains were undrawn. The great captain Gonsalvo de Cordoba, when he
would have ascended to inspect it closely, was overcome with sudden
awe, and withdrew, saying he would not tempt the Lord. And Isabella,
the Catholic Queen, for whom one of the nails which fastened the
image to the cross was taken out, that she might enshrine it among
her relics, fainted when she saw the arm drop; and when she came to
herself, repenting of her intention, as though such piety had partaken
of the sin of sacrilege, ordered the nail to be reverently replaced....
It is a relief for those whose thoughts have been long employed upon
the wickedness and the sufferings of their fellow-creatures, if their
attention can sometimes be drawn away by such examples of their
weakness and their credulity.
♦THE ALLIES ENTER BURGOS.♦
When the enemy withdrew from Burgos they were joined by 9000 infantry
of the army of the north under General Souham, who took the command,
and retiring to Briviesca halted there in a strong position. On the
morning of the 18th the allies took possession of the heights to
the north-west of the castle, and entered the city, where they were
received with the usual acclamations. But this was no day of joy to the
inhabitants: the garrison, who from their fort completely commanded
both the city and the suburbs, opened a fire of musketry and grape into
the principal streets, and burned the houses which were nearest them;
and on the other hand the Guerrillas began to plunder, as if it were
an enemy’s town of which they had taken forcible possession. Alava,
by threats, by blows, and by unremitting exertions, restored order at
last; and his efforts were not a little assisted by a rumour which
he caused to be spread among them, that the French were returning in
great force: these marauders then took to their heels, and a Spanish
battalion was posted in the city, and a battalion of _caçadores_ in the
suburbs.
♦CASTLE OF BURGOS.♦
On the following day the castle was invested. One division remained
on the left of the Arlanzon; part of the army forded it, and marched
round the heights of St. Miguel; their advance drove the enemy from
three detached flêches which they were constructing, to see into the
hollows on the side of the hill, and took possession of such parts as
were under cover. The remainder of the army was advanced on the high
road in front of Monasterio to cover the attack. Upon reconnoitring
the castle it was found much stronger than had been expected: it was
a lofty building, built with the solidity of old times, flanked with
small round towers, and its roof sufficiently strong to bear guns of
large calibre which the French had placed upon it. The keep had been
converted into a casemated battery; the lower part of the hill had
been surrounded by an uncovered scarp wall of difficult access, and
between these defences two lines of field-works had been constructed,
thickly planted with cannon, and encircling the hill. The garrison
under General Du Breton consisted of nearly 3000 men, well provided
with stores of all kinds. It was apparent that approaches against them
must be carried on regularly: the most sanguine entertained no hope
of succeeding in less than seven or eight days; nor would that hope
have been entertained if the deficiency of means had been considered,
unless an undue reliance had been placed upon military courage in
circumstances where skill and science are of far more avail. The
siege establishments of the army had been deficient in all the former
sieges, in all which, therefore, success had been dearly purchased;
but here there was not even the skeleton of an establishment. There
were five officers of engineers, but not a sapper or miner; and only
eight men of the royal military artificers, to whom 81 artificers of
the line were added. The artillery consisted of three 18-pounders,
and five 24-pounder iron howitzers, with 300 rounds of ammunition for
each, and 15 barrels of powder. The engineers’ stores were scanty in
proportion; but in a store which the enemy had left in the town a
considerable number of entrenching tools were found. Lord Wellington
had no other means within his reach when he moved from Madrid. He had
no means of transporting more guns and ammunition from Madrid, or from
Ciudad Rodrigo, to Burgos. The Intruder and the French armies had swept
Castille of all the mules and horses upon which they could lay hands;
and if some might still have been purchased at high prices, there was
no money to pay for them in the military chest.
♦THE HORN WORK ON S. MIGUEL’S TAKEN.♦
On the side toward the country the castle was commanded by the heights
of S. Miguel, which are separated from it by a deep ravine. The summit
is about the same level as the upper works of the castle, at a
distance of 300 yards. On this height the enemy had nearly completed
a large horn work: the branches were not perfect: the rear, on the
advance of the allies, had been closed by an exceedingly strong
palisade; and in front they had begun to throw up three flêches, from
which they had now been driven. As a preliminary to any attack, it was
necessary to win the horn work. The arrangements for this were, that
two parties should march that night, one upon each salient angle of the
demi-bastions, enter the ditch, the counterscarp being unfinished, and
escalade them, under protection of 150 men, who were to march direct
on the front of the work, halt at the edge of the ditch, and keep up a
continued fire on those who defended the parapet.... A third storming
party under the Honourable Major Cocks was to march round the rear of
the work, and endeavour to force in at the gorge. This plan was better
arranged than executed. The covering party began to fire as soon as
they were put in motion, and continued firing as they advanced, till
they reached the ditch where they ought to have begun their fire:
by that time so many of their men had been killed and wounded that
the rest dispersed. The attack on both semi-bastions was not more
fortunately conducted: the ladders were not long enough for the face
of the work; ... and the troops, remembering the murderous character
of the former sieges which they had witnessed rather than their
eventual success, hung back. Major Cocks lost in advancing nearly half
his party by the fire of the castle, but he found that the garrison
of the horn work neglected the gorge, being fully occupied with the
attack in front. He therefore with little opposition got over the
palisades and entered the body of the work with about 140 men: these he
divided, posting one-half on the ramparts to ensure the entry of the
co-operating force in front, and with the other he formed opposite the
gateway, in the hope of making the garrison prisoners: they were about
500 in number, under a _chef de bataillon_, and had his support been
brought up in time there was every probability of his capturing them;
but the French running from their works, mere weight of numbers did
for them as much as determined courage could have done; they literally
ran over this little party and escaped into the ♦COL. JONES’S ACCOUNT
OF THE SIEGES, P. 191.♦ castle. Their loss did not exceed 70 men, that
of the assailants amounted to 420, including six officers killed and
fifteen wounded.
Such a beginning, though successful, was not likely to give the troops
confidence. And it was now found, ... which could not be understood
by a ground-plan of the works, nor indeed be exactly ascertained till
they were in possession of St. Miguel’s hill, ... that although this
hill commanded from its narrow side that on which the enemy’s works
were erected, it was itself commanded by the terrace of the castle. The
breadth of St. Miguel’s is parallel to the length of the castle-hill,
and consequently St. Miguel’s is outflanked by the castle-hill; and as
the surrounding ground is so low as to be completely overlooked, and
commanded by that hill, it was impossible to erect batteries on any
spot except the narrow ridge, which was not only out-flanked by the
opposite height, ♦FAILURE IN ASSAULTING THE FIRST LINE.♦ but commanded
by it. Trenches however were now opened to secure a communication
with the horn work, and afford cover for the men; batteries were
erected; and in order to save the troops from unnecessary fatigue, Lord
Wellington resolved to assault the outer line, on the night of the
22nd, without waiting to form a breach in it. A party of Portugueze
were to advance from some houses in the suburb close to the wall,
cut down the palisades, and take the line in flank and rear, while a
British party were to advance under a ridge of ground, and escalade
the wall in front. The houses afforded cover to the one party, the
ridge to the other, until the moment of attack. But no serious attack
was made; the Portugueze were checked by a fire from a guard-house on
the line, and could not be induced to enter the ditch: the British
planted their ladders, and the officers mounted, but very few men
followed them. Major Lawrie of the 79th, who commanded this party, was
killed. Captain Frazer Mackenzie was struck down by a blow on the head;
he recovered himself, mounted a second time, and was shot through the
knee. The enemy, whose attention was not diverted by any other attack,
mounted the parapet, and fired down upon the assailants, who stood
crowded in the ditch unable now to advance, and still unwilling to
retire. Lord Wellington was watching the attack from the hill of St.
Miguel, under a fire of musketry, grape-shot, and shells; and when he
saw that the Portugueze did nothing, and that the party in front made
no progress, he ordered the attempt to be relinquished, after the loss
of about three hundred and thirty men. The wounded were brought in in
the morning during an hour’s truce.
♦A SECOND ASSAULT FAILS.♦
The original plan was now resumed of working up to the wall, and mining
under it. The enemy placed two or three guns behind a projecting
palisade, which was so close as perfectly to secure them, and from
whence they did great execution. As there were neither sappers, miners,
nor pioneers, the engineer officers were obliged not only to direct
every operation, but to stand by and instruct the working parties; and
while thus employed, Captain Williams was killed. It seemed miraculous
that any of these valuable officers escaped. The enemy could not now
but have discovered that the besiegers were miserably provided with
artillery, and that they had no ammunition to spare; nevertheless they
began to prepare their second line for an obstinate defence. On the
evening of the 29th the miners hit upon the foundation of the wall,
mined it, and charged the mine with twelve barrels of powder. At
midnight it was sprung, and threw down the wall. Three hundred men were
in readiness for storming: a serjeant and four men, the advance of a
party of twenty who were to lead the way, mounted without opposition,
for the enemy were panic-stricken: they remained some minutes on the
top of the breach before the French, perceiving that they were not
supported, took courage and drove them down. The officer in command of
the first advance did not discover the breach, ... he returned into
the parallel, reporting that the mine had failed, and the storming
party, in consequence of this error, was withdrawn. After this, Lord
Wellington determined to have no more night attacks.
♦A THIRD BY DAYLIGHT PROVES SUCCESSFUL.
OCT. 4.♦
A supply of gunpowder having been obtained from Sir Home Popham’s
squadron, a second mine was completed: the first breach was rendered
practicable, and the explosion which made the second was the signal for
assaulting both. Immediately before the explosion, and while in the
act of communicating that all was ready, Lieutenant-Colonel Jones of
the engineers was severely wounded, an officer whose Journals of the
Sieges, and whose general Account of the War have been the most useful
as well as the most trust-worthy of the printed authorities from which
the present history has been composed. About an hundred feet of the
wall were thrown down by the explosion: the storming party, instead
of being composed of detachments from different regiments, consisted
of the 24th regiment, supported by the working and covering parties
in the trenches, a reserve of 500 men having also been formed in the
parallel. This assault was made in the face of day. The officer who led
the left party was at the foot of the old breach before the smoke had
cleared away, and he was the first man on the top of it; and the dust
had scarcely subsided before the troops had gained the summit of both
breaches, and driven the enemy into their covered way, and behind their
new palisades. During the night the besiegers established themselves
in both breaches, and along the wall to the left of them, and began
an approach towards the second line of works. But the rains now began
to set in heavily; and on the following afternoon 300 of the garrison
made a sortie from their covered way, gained possession of the first
breach, and retained it long enough to ruin the lodgment and carry off
the tools. They did not get possession of the second breach, nor of the
parallel along the parapet: but the advantage which they had gained
was sufficient to encourage them, and to lessen the confidence of the
besiegers, who could not but perceive that they were struggling against
all advantages of situation, and with means the most inadequate. The
enemy could not depress their guns so as to bear upon the new works,
but they kept up a constant fire of musketry upon them, and from time
to time rolled large shells down the steep glacis, and these either
carried away the gabion where the men were breaking ground in the
night, or lodging against it and bursting, blew it to pieces. The rain
was now so heavy that much time was daily expended in draining and
keeping the communications up the steep banks and breaches practicable.
The garrison meantime were never idle: they had now disabled two of the
three 18-pounders; and making another sortie at two in the morning of
the 8th, from the covered way with 400 men, they surprised the advanced
covering party, drove the remainder from the parallel of the outer
line, and once more levelled the work and ♦MAJOR COCKS KILLED.♦ carried
off the tools. Major Cocks was killed in a charge to regain it: he was
shot through the body when ascending the breach, by a French infantry
man close to him: the ball entered on the right side between the fourth
and the fifth rib, passed through the great artery immediately above
the heart, and so out at the left side, breaking the left arm. Major
Cocks was a young officer of the highest promise. He was the eldest
son of Lord Somers, and by the demise of his maternal grandfather,
in possession of a large landed estate; but preferring the military
profession to the peaceful enjoyment of good fortune, and to the
pursuits whereto his station in society invited him, he devoted himself
to the study of that profession with an ardour, of which an ordinary
observer would not, from his mild manners and habitual composure, have
supposed him capable. Entering early into the service, and leaving
his regiment in England, he joined the army at Lisbon in the spring
of 1809, for the purpose of acquiring the Portugueze and Spanish
languages. He was in the south of Spain when the French attempted
to surprise Cadiz, and he it was who gave Alburquerque the first
information of their movements, by which timely advice that magnanimous
Spaniard was enabled to prevent their design and throw himself into
the place. He read much, and let no opportunity pass unimproved of
perfecting by practice the knowledge which he acquired from books:
and thus he had distinguished himself on so many occasions, that the
promotion which his rank and fortune might have commanded was not more
rapid than his conspicuous merit had deserved. When the dispatches
relating the capture of the horn work on S. Michael’s reached home, his
commission as Lieutenant-Colonel was immediately sent out; but before
these dispatches arrived in Spain, his career was closed. On the day
preceding his death he was field-officer of the trenches: the day was
very wet, and he went round to every sentry to see that the orders were
clearly understood, ... a duty generally left to the serjeant who posts
them, and not often attended to by a subaltern having only a picket
of twenty men; but Major Cocks never spared himself, and never left
anything which depended upon him undone. The death of such a man (for
such men are rare) was justly regarded in the army as a national loss.
He was buried in the camp ground of his regiment near Bellema, Lord
Wellington, Sir Stapleton Cotton, Generals Anson and Pack, with the
whole of their staffs, attending his funeral, and the officers of the
79th (his own regiment) and of the 16th light dragoons.
After this second successful sortie, no further attempt was made to
push the works between the outer and second line: a third breach was
effected with the view of making a flank attack at the moment of
assaulting the second line in front; but when it was made, it could not
be stormed for want of musket ammunition. The enemy attempted to repair
it during the night, but were several times driven in. A small supply
of powder having now been received from Santander, the howitzers were
put in battery; but the 24-pound shot were nearly expended, and for the
18-pounders the 16-pound shot fired by the enemy were collected and
made to serve: when the embrazures were opened, the guns could not be
run in on account of the weather, and one of the batteries was silenced
in half an hour by the enemy’s fire. By the 18th, a sufficient opening
had been made in an exposed part of the second line; and the church of
St. Roman, which was near the second line, had been mined. The ♦THE
SECOND LINE ASSAULTED WITH ILL SUCCESS.♦ assault was made by daylight;
the works were immediately carried with very little loss, and some of
the German legion escaladed the third line; but they were few, and were
presently driven back, for the course of the siege had taken confidence
from the besiegers and given it to the besieged; and when the guards
gained the parapet, the garrison rallied on the _terre plein_ of the
work, and assembled in force, then advanced, and drove the assailants
back completely from the line. The mine under the church did little
injury to it; but it so alarmed the enemy, that they exploded their own
mines, which destroyed the greater part: the troops lodged themselves
in the ruins, and a communication was carried to this point during the
night. A convoy of heavy artillery and ammunition was now on its way
from Santander, and the castle might then have been reduced in a few
days, without further loss; but it was now too late, and after that
failure all circumstances induced Lord Wellington to think only of
retreat.
♦MOVEMENTS OF THE FRENCH IN THE NORTH.♦
On the day of that failure, the enemy were joined at Breviesca by
the army of observation from Alava, and the remainder of the army
of the north. This force considerably outnumbered that which Lord
Wellington could bring against them, and in cavalry they were greatly
superior. They made a show of coming on in front; and in consequence,
the covering army moved up near Quintana-palla, and was joined by
most of the besieging corps. On the 20th they advanced in force,
drove in the pickets, and obtained possession of Quintana-palla; but
Sir Edward Paget drove them back, and recovered the place, and they
then desisted from their offensive movements. Intelligence which Lord
Wellington had reason to expect arrived on the following day, that the
united forces of the enemy in the south were in motion. Ballasteros,
who had hitherto, if with little success and no great ♦BALLASTEROS
REFUSES TO ACT UNDER THE BRITISH COMMANDER.♦ skill, displayed the most
indefatigable activity, had in a mood of sullen resentment at the
appointment of Lord Wellington to the chief command, ceased to molest
the enemy. He had hung upon the flanks of Soult’s army, and harassed
it as far as Granada, with more effect than in any of his former
enterprises, because the enemy were dispirited and on their retreat;
but upon receiving instructions to obey Lord Wellington’s orders, he
took no farther measures for annoying the French, refused to act in
concert with Sir Rowland Hill, according to the plan which the British
Commander had laid down, and remained obstinately inactive at the most
critical time. At length he published a letter to the minister at war,
saying, that from the time when the French treacherously seized the
four fortresses, he had spared no efforts for raising the nation, and
that no person had contributed more to the event of the second of May
than himself, without which events, Spain would not have been in its
present state. From that time he had never laid aside his arms, and
had resisted all solicitations which the foreigners had made him to
the prejudice of his country, ... inexorable in being a Spaniard and
nothing but a Spaniard, and that his countrymen should be so, like
him: this having been his principle, without any regard to his own
fortune, he had always found the nation ready to support it in every
sense. “And now he was surprised,” he said, “to see that the English
General, Lord Wellington, was by a resolution of the Cortes appointed
Commander-in-Chief of the Spanish armies; those armies, thousands
upon thousands of whose companions in arms were in the grave, having
fallen in defending the reputation of their country, were observing
what would be his conduct on this occasion; and he should not consider
himself worthy of being an Aragonese, if he did not represent to the
government, that he could not condescend to a determination which
disparaged the Spanish name.” He spoke of the English as a nation to
whom the Spaniards were bound by true friendship and fair dealing, but
of whose fair promises and bad faith no one could give more information
than the then president of the Regency, the Duque del Infantado. “Was
Spain,” he asked, “like the petty kingdom of Portugal, that the command
of its armies should be intrusted to a foreigner? Had its revolution
begun like that of Portugal? Had it not still resources of its own?
Had it not generals, officers, and soldiers, who still supported the
honour which they had inherited from their forefathers; and who in
the present war had made both English and French know that they were
nothing inferior to them in discipline or in courage, and that they
had chiefs of their own who knew how to lead them to victory? Finally,
he required that the opinion of the soldiers and of the people should
be taken upon this matter; if they condescended to the appointment,
he should renounce his employments, and retire to his own house, thus
manifesting, that he had only the honour and the welfare of his country
in view, not any ambitious or interested end.”
♦HE IS EXILED TO CEUTA.♦
Ballasteros was a rude, intrepid, enterprising, and persevering
soldier of fortune, handsome in person, strong in body, and of a
hale constitution; very useful as a partizan at the head of 4000 or
5000 men, but incapable of conducting any extensive operations with
a regular army. Before the appointment of Lord Wellington took place
he was in no good humour with the Government, and the Government on
its part as little pleased with him. With some better parts of the
national character, he partook in no slight degree of its boastfulness,
and entertaining a most exaggerated notion of his own merits, made no
scruple of saying that Ballasteros had done more for Spain than all
her other chiefs put together, and that in spite of the Government,
Ballasteros, unassisted and discouraged, would continue to do more than
the favourites of the Regency, whose pockets were filled with doubloons
by the English. But though he had a large party among the lower orders
in Cadiz, and some of his regiments were much attached to him, he
overrated his own importance as greatly as his own deserts; he was
unpopular in the provinces and disliked by his officers: and when the
Government put him under arrest for thus defying its authority, marched
him under an escort to Malaga, and sent him from thence to Ceuta as an
exile, not a hand, and scarcely a voice was raised in his defence. Some
seditious writings indeed were published in his favour at Cadiz, but
they produced no effect. The loss of an active partizan was regretted,
and the error of an honest, though obstinate and wrong-headed man; but
the army and the nation concurred in condemning him, and in approving
the promptitude and decision with which the Government had acted.
Meantime, in consequence of this inactivity, in dereliction of
all duty, on Ballasteros’s part, and of the inefficiency of the
Anglo-Sicilian army, Marshal Soult and Suchet were enabled, without
any impediment, to concert their operations with the Intruder, and
carry them ♦GEN. MAITLAND GIVES UP THE COMMAND OF THE ANGLO-SICILIAN
ARMY.♦ into effect. General Maitland’s health gave way under the
anxieties of his situation, so that it became necessary for him to
return to Sicily. Major-General William Clinton was sent from thence
to take the command in his stead, and till his arrival, it devolved
upon Major-General John Mackenzie. That general made an attempt to
seize the castle of Denia by a _coup-de-main_: from its strength and
its position on commanding ground close to the sea it might have
easily been maintained against the enemy, and would have afforded
great opportunity for annoying ♦UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT UPON DENIA.♦
him. Major-General Donkin, Quarter-Master-General of this army, was
intrusted with the enterprise; it failed, but the men and guns which
had been landed were re-embarked with ♦THE FRENCH PREPARE TO MARCH FROM
THE SOUTH AGAINST LORD WELLINGTON.♦ little loss. Knowing that nothing
was to be apprehended from this army in its present state, Marshals
Jourdan, Soult, and Suchet, held a counsel in presence of the Intruder,
at Fuente la Higuera. They had feared at one time that it might have
been necessary to abandon Valencia: that apprehension was removed, and
they now believed that, as the long and brave resistance which had been
made by the garrison at Burgos had given the army of Portugal time to
recover strength and to unite with the troops in the north, nothing
more was required for restoring their affairs, than that the armies
of the south and the centre should co-operate with it, for the double
purpose of beating Lord Wellington, and re-establishing the Intrusive
government at Madrid. It was not deemed necessary to take any part of
Suchet’s forces for this service; the state of Aragon and Catalonia on
the one hand, and the presence of the Anglo-Sicilian expedition on the
other, made it dangerous to weaken him.
At the point where the roads from Alicante and Valencia ♦CASTLE OF
CHINCHILLA TAKEN BY THE FRENCH.♦ to Madrid join, stands the little
castle of Chinchilla; it was in possession of the Spaniards, and
while the Intruder was reconnoitring it one day with a telescope,
a shot from an eight-pounder passed close by him. This place the
French besieged; it was ably defended by the Governor D. Juan Antonio
Cearra, who was a lieutenant-colonel of engineers: but the enemy were
not scrupulous as to any means which could accelerate their success;
and during a night’s truce they erected a battery of eight guns, in
the most advantageous situation; by this battery the works were much
injured, and the garrison considerably reduced in number; and of twenty
artillerymen, ♦OCT. 9.♦ there only remained eight to work the guns,
when some of these men were struck dead by lightning, many more, and
among them the governor, wounded by it, and the works so shaken, that
it became necessary to surrender. The enemy’s preparations ♦THEY BEGIN
THEIR MARCH.♦ were complete soon after this obstacle was removed; and
on the 16th of October, the Intruder set out from Valencia towards the
Tagus, with Marshals Jourdan and Soult at the head of 70,000 troops,
10,000 being cavalry. Lord Wellington received intelligence of this
from Sir Rowland Hill on the 21st, and the same advices informed him
that the Tagus was already fordable by individuals in many places, and
was likely soon to be so for an army. As long as the Tagus remained
unfordable, Sir Rowland’s position was tolerably secure; but when the
river fell, it became too hazardous for him to maintain an advanced
position near Madrid in front of an enemy so greatly superior. It
was necessary that Lord Wellington should move towards him, lest the
corps under his own command should be insulated in consequence of the
movements which Sir Rowland might find himself compelled to make. He
determined therefore to fall back upon the Douro, so as to afford Sir
Rowland a point upon which to return, and by uniting their forces, to
secure a retreat into Portugal.
♦LORD WELLINGTON RAISES THE SIEGE OF BURGOS.♦
This resolution was executed as promptly as it was formed. He instantly
raised the siege, and filed his whole army in the night of the 21st
under the walls of the castle and over the bridge, which was closely
enfiladed by its artillery; a bold and unprecedented manœuvre, which
military men adduce as a proof that the march of troops cannot be
stopped by the fire of artillery in the night. The allies moved in
silence and good order; but a party of Guerrillas, regardless of
discipline, then, as at all times, put their horses to their speed,
and the clatter which they made alarmed the garrison. A fire was
consequently opened from the guns which were directed on the bridge,
and the first discharge was most destructive; but the gunners then
lost the range and direction, and their farther fire served only to
quicken the speed of the carriages. Every thing was brought away in
this retreat except the three disabled guns, and the eight pieces
of the enemy which had been taken in the horn-work. The loss of the
allies during the siege amounted to 24 officers and 485 men killed;
68 officers and 1487 men wounded ♦RETREAT FROM BURGOS.♦ and missing.
The enemy did not begin to follow till late on the ensuing day; 10,000
of their troops encamped that day on the south of Burgos, and on the
morrow at noon they came up in force with the retreating army. Sir
Stapleton Cotton detained them for above three hours at the passage
of the Hormaza, in front of Celada del Camino; they were twice
charged there by Major-General Anson’s brigade with great success,
and the rear-guard continued to fall back in the best order, till the
Guerrillas on their left were driven in and came flying upon them, four
or five of the enemy’s squadrons being mixed with them in pursuit. In
the confusion which ensued, the French were mistaken for Spaniards,
and, favoured by that mistake, they fell upon the flank and rear of
the allies. Some loss was sustained, and Lieutenant-Colonel Pell, of
the 16th dragoons, was taken prisoner, having had his horse shot. A
very superior body of cavalry, in which the enemy were strong, now
came up, and the allied cavalry fell back hastily, lest they should
be surrounded; but having crossed a wide and deep ditch by a narrow
bridge, the brigades of Major-Generals Bock and Anson charged their
pursuers when only part had filed over: in this they were repulsed,
hardly pressed, and forced upon the infantry rear-guard of German light
troops under Colonel Halkett; that officer formed his troops in four
squares, and the men behaving, as that legion ever did, admirably,
repulsed the enemy in several charges, and checked the ♦THE ALLIES
CROSS THE PISUERGA.♦ pursuit. The right of the army crossed the
Pisuerga that afternoon at Torquemada, and the left at Cordovilla,
where head-quarters were established that night.
The army continued its march on the 24th towards ♦DISORDERS DURING
THE RETREAT.♦ the Carrion. Throughout the north of Castille, which is
a great wine country, the wine is stowed either in caves dug in the
hill sides, or excavated in the earth, the soil from the excavation
being formed into a mound over them, and the entrance appearing like
the chimney of a subterraneous dwelling. These cellars were now filled
with new wine; the soldiers broke into them during the night, and it
was not without the greatest exertions that the officers in the morning
could put their battalions in march. The enemy, however, after their
yesterday’s repulse were less pressing; and the whole army having that
day marched twenty miles, took up its ground behind the Carrion with
its right at Dueñas and its left at Villa Muriel; and here the brigade
of guards which had disembarked at Coruña joined them. The retreating
army did not exceed 20,000 men; the French displayed above thirty;
they were confident also in the superiority of their cavalry, in that
country the most efficient force; and as it is their national character
to be easily elated, they might well be elated now at having baffled
Lord Wellington before so poor a fortress as the castle at Burgos,
and compelled him who had driven Massena out of Portugal, and routed
Marmont at Salamanca, to retreat before them. English soldiers are
neither lightly elated, nor soon cast down; they keep their courage
on a retreat, for that never gives way; but they become disdainful
of control when they have no opportunity of wreaking their wrathful
feelings upon the enemy who is in pursuit, and insubordination is
then the sin which most easily besets them. This was already felt,
though as yet they had suffered little, and though the retreat was so
deliberately made, and with so firm a face toward the enemy, that the
men lost none of their confidence in their Commander.
The army halted on the 25th, and measures were taken for impeding the
pursuit. A battalion of the royals was posted at Palencia, to cover
the operations for destroying the bridges over the Carrion at that old
city; but the French assembled there in such force that the commanding
officer being attacked and overpowered, found it necessary to retire
upon Villa Muriel, and the bridges were left uninjured for the pursuers
to pass. Two other bridges over the same river at Villa Muriel and at
Dueñas were mined, that they might be exploded on the enemy’s approach,
and one in like manner over the Pisuerga at Tariago. The two former
were successfully exploded, that at Villa Muriel under a fire of
grape-shot from the enemy; but they discovered a ford there, and passed
over a considerable body both of horse and foot. A false report that
the enemy had already crossed at Tariago, delayed the commencement of
the work there; the French came up before it was completed; it was
exploded prematurely, and consequently to no effect; their cavalry
galloped over and made the party prisoners. This enabled them to push
a corps on the right into contact with the posts on the Carrion; their
passing at Palencia made it necessary for Lord Wellington to change the
front of his army, and this second success rendered his farther retreat
difficult, and even precarious. Major-Generals Pringle and Barnes
were therefore ordered to attack those who had crossed the Pisuerga;
the Spanish troops co-operated in this, and the enemy were driven
across the river with considerable loss. Neither could they maintain
themselves upon the Carrion after having forded at Villa Muriel; the
Spaniards who were employed to dislodge them, faltered in the charge,
and Alava, while leading them on and in the act of encouraging them,
fell badly wounded: the fall of this gallant leader did not inspire
them with more courage, but the Brunswickers were then ordered to
advance; those brave men ran into the village without firing a shot;
the Spaniards took heart and followed them, and the French withdrew;
and the fifth division under General Oswald advancing against their
main body, compelled it to recross.
♦OCT. 26. THE ALLIES HALT.♦
The next day the allies retreated sixteen miles without molestation,
and crossed the Pisuerga at Cabezon del Campo; the bridge there was
barricadoed and mined, and the army halted in its rear. The ruined
bridges at Dueñas and Villa Muriel had impeded Souham’s movements,
so that he did not approach till evening; he then halted his whole
army ♦OCT. 27.♦ on the right bank of the Pisuerga. The morning of the
27th was foggy, but when the mist cleared, their whole force was seen
encamped at about three miles’ distance. They brought up two brigades
of artillery and cannonaded the town, with little other harm than that
of severely wounding Lieutenant-Colonel Robe of the artillery. Being
opposed to a superior fire, they made no farther attempt in front, but
made considerable detachments to their right, through Cigales, with
a view of getting possession of the bridge at Valladolid, and thus
interposing in the rear of the retreating army. Lord Wellington had an
opportunity of seeing their whole force from a high ground, and saw
that they were in very great strength. On the 28th they extended their
right still farther, and endeavoured in the morning to force the bridge
over the Douro at Simancas, which was defended by Colonel Halkett, with
his brigade of the 7th division, while the Earl of Dalhousie, with the
remainder of the division, defended the bridge at Valladolid. Halkett
being hard pressed blew up the bridge, and disappointed them of their
passage there; at the same time he sent the Brunswick Oels regiment
to Tordesillas, whither the enemy detached troops in the evening,
and where also the bridge over the Douro was destroyed in time. Lord
Wellington sent orders to the Brunswickers to take post on its ruins,
in such manner as to prevent them from repairing it; and breaking up
from the Pisuerga, he crossed the Douro on the 29th, by the bridges of
Puente Douro, and Tudela, both which, and that at Quintanilla also,
were blown up, and subsequently those at Toro and Zamora. The pursuers
that evening displayed more enterprise than they had hitherto shown;
they passed a body of men in the night of the 29th, by swimming the
Douro near Tordesillas, and these gallant fellows falling upon the
guard who had been left in a tower on the south end of the bridge,
and looked for no attack on that side, surprised and overpowered
them, and immediately fell to work to restore the communication. Lord
Wellington was apprised of this in time, or it would have frustrated
all his former precautions; he marched his army early on the morrow,
and posted them on the heights, between Rueda and Tordesillas,
immediately opposite and near the bridge: the bridge by this time had
been nearly repaired, but the French had made no attempt to pass; and
in that position, which he strengthened with batteries, Lord Wellington
remained from the 30th till the 6th of November, the enemy meantime
extending along the river from Toro to Valladolid. He thus obtained the
double object of resting the troops, and gaining time for Sir Rowland
Hill’s movements; for, ... though his first view had been in falling
back upon the Douro to afford Sir Rowland a point upon which to retire
when he should no longer be able to maintain an advanced position in
front of Madrid, against the very superior force which would be brought
against him, ... having seen the strength of Souham’s army, it had
become necessary to order Sir Rowland to break up from the Xarama, for
the purpose of securing his own retreat.
♦SIR ROWLAND HILL RETREATS FROM THE XARAMA.♦
Sir Rowland was an officer upon whom Lord Wellington might always
rely with the most perfect confidence. He expected such orders,
and receiving them on the 29th, intended to begin his march on the
following morning; but the mine which should have destroyed the Puente
Larga, on the Xarama, failed; and the enemy, who had collected a large
body between that bridge and Aranjuez, immediately made an attack
upon the allied post there. They were repulsed by Colonel Skerrett
with considerable loss on their part, and that of some forty men on
ours: this affair delayed the march of Sir Rowland’s right till the
evening, the enemy however made no subsequent attempt to molest him,
farther than by picking up such stragglers as fell behind for the sake
of plundering and drinking; and these were numerous. The army marched
all night and reached Madrid on the following morning. That capital
presented ♦STATE OF MADRID.♦ a melancholy scene: it was known that
these allies could make no attempt to defend it, and that their retreat
would be followed by the entrance of the enemy; and two days before,
when the Military and Provisional Government were about to transfer
their authority to the _Ayuntamiento_, that body dissolved itself,
regardless of its duty. Upon this, the Regidor D. Pedro Baranda,
who had been on the point of resigning his office, came bravely and
honourably forward to take himself the charge from which they had
shrunk, and summoning persons to his aid who had been in authority
when the French withdrew, began to take measures for averting the
evils which there was so much cause to apprehend. The letters in the
post-office were sent off to Avila, lest they should be seized by the
enemy, and many persons brought into danger by their contents. And to
prevent the excesses which must be expected, if on the entrance of the
enemy the prisons should be thrown open, the alcaydes were called upon
to deliver in ♦NOVEMBER.♦ a list of those persons who were imprisoned
for disloyalty to the national cause, and they were set at liberty
while there yet existed an authority which could restrain them from
acts of immediate vengeance.
♦THE ALLIES WITHDRAW FROM MADRID.♦
There were large depôts of provisions in the Retiro and in the convent
of Monserrate, which the allied army had no means of carrying with them
in their retreat, and orders were therefore given that they should be
burnt. The municipality requested that they might rather be disposed of
either by sale, or as a loan, for the inhabitants and the hospitals;
it was not at the commissary’s discretion to accede to this proposal;
but instead of destroying the stores, the people in the immediate
vicinity were invited to help themselves there. It seemed, indeed,
in this retreat, that in the economy of an army the English had yet
every thing to learn: the troops were at this time scantily provided
with food, their line of supply had been along the valley of the Tagus,
the arrangements for changing its direction failed, and before the
men effected their junction with Lord Wellington’s army, the sweet
acorns which they found in the wood formed no slight part of their
subsistence. The works at the Retiro were destroyed before the troops
withdrew from Madrid, and the artillery there was rendered useless:
their departure resembled that of the French in this respect, that
they were accompanied by a considerable number of Spaniards, for whom
it would have been dangerous to place themselves at the mercy of the
Intrusive Government; but such persons were objects of commiseration
and respect to their countrymen, not of contempt and execration.
While the allies retired leisurely towards the pass of ♦THE FRENCH
ENTER.♦ the Guadarrama, a French officer presented himself on the
afternoon of November 1, at the bridge of Toledo, announcing on the
part of General Drouet, that King Joseph would enter on the morrow with
his army, and requiring that a deputation should go out to meet and
welcome him. On the morrow, accordingly, the _Ayuntamiento_ went forth
accompanied by some of the parish priests, of the titular nobility,
and of those who held office under the Intruder. Baranda briefly
represented the peaceable conduct of the inhabitants, and expressed to
Joseph’s minister of the Interior, that his only wish was to retire to
his own house, where he might consult his own health, and look after
his own affairs. This permission was easily obtained, as the French
presently re-established the former functionaries; but on the 6th, the
municipality were informed that circumstances rendered it necessary
for the troops to leave the capital for some days; and that, in the
meantime, they must take upon themselves the charge of preserving
tranquillity. Baranda was then summoned from his short retirement, and
required again to act as President of the _Ayuntamiento_. At two on the
afternoon of the 7th, the troops departed to reinforce Marshal Soult,
who had followed Sir Rowland’s movements; and in less than two hours
after their departure, Lieutenant-Colonel Mondedeu, the commandant of a
Guerrilla party, entered; on the morrow, the Medico arrived with part
of his band, the Empecinado’s division on the following day, and on
the 11th, the Camp Marshal Bassecourt with some of his troops. Fewer
disorders were committed than might have been expected under such
circumstances, and those chiefly by peasants and deserters, who thought
to take advantage of the sort of interregnum in which the capital was
left; but the officers caused these offenders to be arrested, and
exerted themselves to prevent excesses. But the inhabitants were told
that, as the human means of effecting with God’s blessing their own
deliverance, they must contribute towards the support of the soldiers
as much as their necessities could spare; and it may be supposed that
this contribution was exacted with less compunction on the one part,
and submitted to with less unwillingness on the other, because both
well knew that when the French returned, the locust would devour what
the palmer-worm had left.
On the 6th Sir Rowland reached Arevalo, which is ♦JUNCTION OF THE
RETREATING ARMIES.♦ about 80 miles from Madrid; the troops had suffered
much from the weather, more from the gross ill management on the
part of the commissariat and the staff, and not a little from their
own irregularities, moral discipline having long been disregarded
in modern armies. He was now in communication with Lord Wellington,
and was instructed to continue his march by Fonteveros upon Alba de
Tormes. By this time Lord Wellington’s army had been recruited by
rest, and the enemy had rendered the bridges passable at Toro and at
Tordesillas: he broke up therefore from his position in front of the
latter city before daylight, leaving the fires burning: that day he
fell back to Torrecilla de la Orden, continued his march the following
day, and on the 8th took up the position which he had twice before
occupied in front of Salamanca. Sir Rowland crossed the Tormes the
same day at Alba, occupied that town and castle with Major-General
Howard’s brigade, and stationed a Portugueze division on the left of
the Tormes, under Major-General Hamilton, to support them. They were
not followed during their retreat from the Douro; the enemy halted to
collect provisions ♦JUNCTION OF THE FRENCH ARMIES.♦ and bring up their
detachments, and the armies of Portugal and the north then formed
their junction with those of the south, and of the centre under Soult
and the Intruder: their united force amounted to not less than 80,000
foot and 12,000 horse, being the whole of their disposable force in
Spain, and it was believed that they had with them not fewer than 200
pieces of cannon. The allies had 48,000 foot and 5000 horse. On the
9th the enemy drove in the piquets in front of Alba, and Major-General
Long was obliged to withdraw his brigade through that town on the
following morning. The enemy then, who were directing their main
efforts against the right of the allies, approached their position on
the Tormes, and prepared to force a passage. They attacked the troops
in Alba with twenty pieces of cannon, and bringing up 15 squadrons and
a considerable force of infantry threatened an assault, their light
troops advancing close to the walls which had been hastily thrown up.
They continued their fire from two o’clock till darkness had closed;
but they made no impression on the brave troops who were opposed to
them, and therefore they did not repeat the attempt. The intermediate
time till the 14th they employed in reconnoitring the fords, and the
position which Lord Wellington occupied in front of Salamanca; and on
the 14th they commenced the passage at three fords, about two leagues
above Alba, near Lucinas.
♦LORD WELLINGTON RETREATS FROM SALAMANCA.♦
Lord Wellington immediately broke up from St. Christoval, ordered the
troops to move towards Arapiles, and as soon as he had ascertained the
direction of the enemy’s march from the fords, moved with a division
of infantry and all the cavalry he could collect to attack them; but
they had already crossed in too great force. The wind at this time blew
strong, and a thick rain rendered all objects indistinct at little
distance; Lord Wellington, nevertheless, under cover of a cannonade,
reconnoitred their position, and saw that they were too strongly posted
at Mozarbes to be attacked. In the evening therefore he withdrew the
troops from the neighbourhood of Alba, having destroyed the bridges,
and leaving only a Spanish garrison of 300 men in the castle, into
which the remains of an old palace had been converted. During the
night, and in the course of the ensuing morning, he moved the greater
part of the troops through Salamanca, and placed Sir Edward Paget, with
the first division of infantry on the right, at Aldea Tejada, to secure
the passage there over the little river Zunguen, in case the movements
of the French on his right flank should compel him to make choice
either of giving up his communications with Ciudad Rodrigo or with
Salamanca. The inhabitants of that city were some preparing for the
worst, and others helplessly expecting it, yet with a lingering hope
that another battle upon that ground which had proved so destructive to
Marmont’s army might once more deliver them. Lord Wellington himself
had this possibility in mind, and did not order the commissariat
and hospital stores to be removed from Salamanca till the movements
of the French rendered it certain that, notwithstanding their great
superiority in numbers, they would not venture to bring on a general
action. They fortified their position at Mozarbes, and sent out bodies
of horse and foot towards their left, to act upon the communications
of the allies with Ciudad Rodrigo. This was a sure game; they were
too strong and too strongly posted for Lord Wellington to think of
attacking them; nothing therefore remained for him but to retreat upon
his resources; and this was the more necessary because the men were
nearly exhausted with the fatigues of so long and arduous a campaign;
there was little regard to discipline among them, except when in the
immediate presence of an enemy, and the horses were dying of exhaustion
and for want of forage.
♦RETREAT TO THE AGUEDA.♦
On the 15th the army was put in motion to retire, in three columns,
observing, as well as the country would allow, parallel distances. Sir
Rowland commanded the first, Sir Edward Paget the centre, the third
consisted of the Spanish army. They crossed the Zunguen, passed the
left flank of the enemy’s position, and encamped that night in the
olive-grounds, on the Vamusa, one of the smaller rivers which find
their way into the Tormes. The weather was most unfavourable, and the
way sometimes over stony and ploughed grounds, sometimes over swampy
or inundated low lands. The ♦SUFFERINGS OF THE ARMY.♦ troops arrived
at their halting places greatly fatigued. They were without shelter of
any sort; it was impossible to kindle fires because of the heavy and
incessant rain; and they were still farther dispirited by finding that
the supplies had been forwarded to Ciudad Rodrigo. Bread for three days
in advance had been issued to them as usual, but English soldiers are
seldom provident, and when such demands were made upon their strength,
the natural means of supporting and recruiting it could never be more
needful. There was no provender for the horses, the bark of trees and
sprigs of wild briar were the only and miserable substitutes that could
be found. The French never displayed less vigour than at this time;
the overweening contempt which they had once affected for the British
troops had been so thoroughly corrected, that they made no attempt to
overwhelm an enemy greatly inferior in number, and retreating under
circumstances of great difficulty and distress. They only sent a
body of cavalry with light artillery in pursuit; and these contented
themselves with picking up stragglers and such baggage as fell behind.
The army bivouacked on the 16th in a wood about two leagues from
Tamames; the ground in many places was covered with water, but the rain
ceased, and some biscuit was issued. The day’s march had been most
painful, over such heavy ground that at every step the horses sunk
to the fetlock, and the men to their ancles; but while the men were
filling their havresacks with sweet acorns, which they rejoiced to meet
with, in the want of other food, the horses now and then picked up a
little grass.
The 17th was another wet and misty day; the army left its bivouack
at six; an extensive wood lay before them: the enemy now followed
close upon their rear, and the light companies were ordered to extend
themselves through the wood for the purpose of protecting the flanks
and the baggage. This service was not easily to be performed against
so great a force of cavalry as was now harassing the movements of a
disorderly army. Wherever the way was through the woods, the officers
as well as men carried on a successful warfare against the herds
of swine which at that season are turned there to feed upon the
acorns; the Spaniards, it is said, began; the wretched state of their
commissariat was their excuse, and the allies had the same excuse
for following the example; and so eagerly was it followed, that the
continued firing of musquetry on all sides, often occasioned an
apprehension that the piquets were warmly engaged, and even that the
army was surrounded. This occurred so often that it produced incaution
at last, and the enemy’s fire was mistaken for pig-shooting. Owing
to the badness of the roads, and the swollen state of the rivulets,
there was an interval of about a mile between ♦SIR EDWARD PAGET MADE
PRISONER.♦ two of the infantry divisions. Sir Edward Paget, who
commanded the centre column, rode to the rear, alone, for the purpose
of discovering the cause of this interval: a body of the enemy’s
cavalry meantime had entered between these divisions; they had pursued
a troop of Portugueze horse from the left flank: the firing had been
ascribed to the pig-shooters, and Sir Edward falling in with the French
was made prisoner, being without support: they might have done much
hurt had they been more enterprising or more aware of their advantage.
At this time the troops were descending upon the little village of
S. Muñoz, in a valley between two hills; the Huebra which runs into
the Douro has its course along this valley, a deep and rapid stream;
both hills are covered with oaks, and the declivity on both sides is
difficult and steep. The troops when they had forded were formed in
open columns on the heights, and halted. A fog came on early in the
afternoon, under cover of which the enemy got possession of a hill upon
the right of the British line; they brought up some mountain guns,
and commenced a fire upon the rear-guard, consisting of the light
division, under Major-General Alten, while it was fording the river.
Some loss was sustained by them. The guns of Major Macdonald’s troops
of horse-artillery returned their fire successfully, but during the
cannonade he was severely wounded. The enemy’s cavalry followed as soon
as the division had crossed, and began to hem them in; and though the
troops formed in squares, they succeeded in charging them in the low
ground.
♦LORD WELLINGTON REACHES CIUDAD RODRIGO.♦
There was now some appearance that an action might be brought on; the
men were sufficiently eager for this, they longed to revenge themselves
upon the French for the privations and sufferings of their retreat;
they made no doubt of beating them, and they anticipated with hungry
eagerness the pleasure of taking their supplies. As Lord Wellington
came to pass the column in review, the word, “here he comes,” passed
along, and carried with it sure confidence to every heart, ... that
confidence which before the works at Burgos could not be felt, being
given in the field as fully as it was deserved. But the French also
knew that the British commander and his troops might justly rely upon
each other, and they would not hazard a battle. The cannonade was
continued on both sides till evening closed. The men bivouacked as
usual on the wet ground, their cloaks and blankets soaked with rain;
but the rain had ceased, it was a moonlight night, and they had the
satisfaction of knowing that another day’s march would bring them to
Ciudad Rodrigo, beyond which the enemy could not follow them, and where
their privations would be at an end. Between three and four in the
morning they moved from their bivouack; the enemy followed them that
day only with their cavalry. Lord Wellington’s head-quarters were in
Ciudad Rodrigo that night, and on the 19th and 20th the army entered
the Portugueze frontier, crossing the Agueda. The loss during this
retreat of about 240 miles amounted to 196 killed, 663 wounded, 421
missing, and 280 horses; many of the men who had been returned as
missing afterwards came in; but others, among whom were some valuable
officers, died in consequence of the fatigues and hardships which they
had endured.
♦THE FRENCH RETIRE TO THE TORMES.♦
The enemy retired as soon as the allies had reached Ciudad Rodrigo,
and they withdrew from the Tormes also as soon as the castle of Alba
was surrendered. The Spanish Governor Don José de Miranda held out
there with great gallantry, and made more than a hundred prisoners in
some well-directed ♦CASTLE OF ALBA DE TORMES EVACUATED.♦ sallies. Some
characteristic correspondence passed between him and the French; they
required him to surrender and rely upon their generosity, otherwise he
must expect to be treated with the utmost rigour; he in reply spoke of
his duties as a soldier, and boasted of his brilliant garrison. The
French allowed him an hour for returning a second answer, and bade him
tremble if it were a refusal; in his reply he bade them do their duty
as he should perform his, and told them that if the fortune of war
should be in their favour, his numerous prisoners, who had been treated
in the best manner, would be the victims. In this strain, but in
letters which increased in length, and became more and more courteous,
the correspondence was continued from the 14th of November till the
24th, on the night of which Miranda left the fortress in the hands
of Lieutenant D. Nicolas Soler, with 20 men, the prisoners and the
sick; and informing the French commander, in his last communication,
that this officer was instructed to deliver up the place, he with the
remainder of the garrison effected their escape, making their way
through many dangers, but with little loss, to the Puerto del Pico.
As soon as it was ascertained that the enemy had withdrawn from the
Tormes, Lord Wellington distributed the troops in winter cantonments,
the left being retired to Lamego, and the right thrown forward as ♦LORD
WELLINGTON’S CIRCULAR LETTER TO THE COMMANDING OFFICERS.♦ far as Baños
and Bejar, to hold the passes. He then addressed a circular letter
to the commanding officers of battalions, for the purpose of drawing
their attention in a very particular manner to the state of discipline
of the troops. “The discipline of every army,” he said, “after a long
and active campaign, becomes in some degree relaxed, and requires the
utmost attention on the part of the generals and other officers to
bring it back to the state in which it ought to be for service; but I
am concerned to have to observe, that the army under my command has
fallen off in this respect in the last campaign in a greater degree
than any army with which I have ever served, or of which I have ever
read. Yet this army has met with no disaster; it has suffered no
privations which but trifling attention on the part of the officers
could have prevented, and for which there existed no reason whatever
in the nature of the service; nor has it suffered any hardships
excepting those resulting from the inclemencies of the weather at a
time when they were most severe. It must be obvious, however, to every
officer that from the time the troops commenced their retreat from the
neighbourhood of Burgos on one hand, and from Madrid on the other, the
officers lost all command over their men. Irregularities and outrages
of all descriptions were committed with impunity, and losses have been
sustained which ought never to have occurred. Yet, the necessity for
retreat existing, none was ever made in which the troops made such
short marches; none on which they made such long and repeated halts;
and none on which the retreating armies were so little pressed in the
rear by the enemy. We must look therefore to some cause besides those
resulting from the operations in which we have been engaged. I have
no hesitation in attributing these evils to the habitual inattention
of the officers of the regiments to their duty as prescribed by the
standing regulations of the service, and by the orders of this army.
“I am far from questioning the zeal, still less the gallantry and
spirit of the officers; and I am quite certain that as their minds
can be convinced of the necessity of minute and constant attention,
to understand, recollect, and carry into execution the orders which
have been issued for the performance of their duty, and that the
strict performance of their duty is necessary to enable the army to
serve the country as it ought to be served, they will in future fix
their attention to these points. Unfortunately the inexperience of the
officers has induced many to conceive that the period during which
an army is on service is one of relaxation from all rule, instead of
being, as it is, the period during which, of all others, every rule
for the regulation and control of the conduct of the soldier, for the
inspection and care of his arms, ammunition, accoutrements, necessaries
and field equipments, and his horse and horse appointments, for the
receipt and issue, and care of his provisions, and the regulation of
all that belongs to his food and the forage for his horse, must be most
strictly attended to by the officer of his company or troop, if it is
intended that an army, a British army in particular, shall be brought
into the field of battle in a state of efficiency to meet the enemy on
the day of trial.
“These are the points then to which I most earnestly entreat you to
turn your attention, and the attention of the officers under your
command, Portugueze as well as English, during the period in which
it may be in my power to leave the troops in their cantonments. The
commanding officers of regiments must enforce the orders of the army
regarding the constant inspection and superintendence of the officers
over the conduct of the men of their companies in their cantonments;
and they must endeavour to inspire the non-commissioned officers with
a sense of their situation and authority; and the non-commissioned
officers must be forced to do their duty, by being constantly under the
view and superintendence of the officers. By these means the frequent
and discreditable recourse to the authority of the provost, and to
punishments by the sentence of courts-martial will be prevented, and
the soldiers will not dare to commit the offences and outrages of which
there are too many complaints, when they know that their officers,
and their non-commissioned officers, have their eyes and attention
turned towards them. The commanding officers of regiments must likewise
enforce the orders of the army regarding the constant, real inspection
of the soldiers’ arms, ammunition, accoutrements and necessaries, in
order to prevent at all times the shameful waste of ammunition, and the
sale of that article, and of the soldiers’ necessaries. With this view
both should be inspected daily.”
He proceeded to say that he had frequently observed during the late
campaign with how much more ease and celerity the French soldiers
cooked their food than the British. This disadvantage on our part,
he said, must be ascribed to the same cause as the other evils which
he lamented, “the want of attention in the officers to the orders of
the army and to the conduct of their men, and the consequent want of
authority over their conduct. Certain men of each company should be
appointed to cut and bring in wood, others to fetch water, and others
to get the meat, &c. to be cooked: and it would soon be found if this
practice were duly enforced, and a particular hour for serving the
dinners, and for the men dining, named, as it ought to be, equally as
for the parade, that cooking would no longer require the inconvenient
length of time which it had lately been found to take, and that the
soldiers would not be exposed to the privation of their food at the
moment when the army may be engaged in operations with the enemy.” He
concluded by repeating that the great object of the general and field
officers must be to get the captains and subalterns of the regiments
to understand, and to perform the duties required from them, as the
only mode by which the discipline and efficiency of the army could be
restored and maintained during the next campaign.
This letter excited no little surprise in the nation, mortifying and
disgraceful as the faults were which were thus openly and manfully
exposed. But it was not more severe than the occasion called for.
No retreat had ever been conducted with greater military skill; and
nothing but that skill, and the reputation which the British troops
had established for themselves under its direction, could have saved
the army from the consequences of the ignorance or neglect of duty in
many of the officers, and the insubordination of the men, which was a
consequence of such neglect or ignorance. The circumstances of that
retreat justified the whole severity of Lord Wellington’s remarks,
and would more evidently have done so, if the sufferings of the army
had been more broadly stated; for though the marches had indeed been
short, and the halts long and frequent, no army which was not flying
from an enemy, but retreating before it, in strength, ever suffered so
much from exposure, and hunger, and exhaustion. Nothing could be more
judicious than his orders during the whole retreat, and nothing more
irregular than the way in which they were carried into effect; and
this, though in part owing to casual and unavoidable obstructions on
the way, arose in a far greater degree from negligence and incapacity.
Sometimes divisions were moved too soon, more frequently too late,
and kept standing on wet ground, in the rain, for two hours, perishing
with cold, waiting the order to move. Their clothes were seldom dry
for six hours together, and during the latter part of the retreat
continually wet; sometimes they were bivouacked in a swamp, when better
ground was near: they lay down upon the wet ground, fell asleep from
mere exhaustion, were roused to receive their meat, and had then no
means of dressing it, ... the camp-kettles had been sent on, or by some
error were some miles in the rear, or the mules which carried them had
foundered on the way; and no fire could be kindled on wet ground, with
wet materials, and under a heavy rain. The subalterns threw the blame
upon their superiors, and these again upon theirs, all complaining
of incompetence in some of the general officers, and carelessness or
supercilious neglect in some of the staff. But the intended effect
was produced. That something was deficient in the equipments of the
army was perceived, and in part remedied. Alas! no one observed that
there was an utter want of that discipline by virtue of which Cromwell
conquered, which rendered the Swedes invincible under their great
Gustavus, and to which the Prince of Parma owed little less than to his
own military genius, admirable as that was.