OPERATIONS OF THE ANGLO-SICILIAN ARMY. RECOVERY OF ZARAGOZA. SIEGE OF
ST. SEBASTIAN. BATTLES OF THE PYRENEES.
♦1813.♦
♦EXPEDITION FROM ALICANTE.♦
It was part of Lord Wellington’s plan that Marshal Suchet should be
engaged on the eastern coast by the Anglo-Sicilian army, and thus
prevented from sending assistance to the French in Aragon and on the
upper Ebro. His position upon the line of the Xucar was too strong to
be attacked in front by the force under Sir John Murray’s command,
or acting in concert with him; and a movement by Requeña and Utiel
upon their right flank, and by Tortosa and Lerida towards the rear,
seemed as hazardous as it would have been circuitous and difficult.
A naval expedition remained for consideration; and if a vigorous
attack were made either upon Tarragona or Rosas, Suchet’s attention
must necessarily be drawn thither, so that he could give no aid to
the armies in the north, and must leave the open part of the kingdom
of Valencia to the Spaniards. Tarragona was preferred as the point
of attack, and Sir ♦APRIL 14.♦ John was instructed to embark with
that view. If he should succeed in his attempt against that place, an
establishment would be secured on the coast north of the Ebro, so as
to open a communication with the Spanish army in Catalonia: but this
was a question of time and means, and if Suchet should be strong enough
in Catalonia to frustrate the attempt, Sir John was directed in that
case to return immediately, and land as far north in the kingdom of
Valencia as he could, ♦JUNE.♦ and there join with the right of the
Spanish armies, to assist them in profiting by the opportunity which
Suchet’s absence and the withdrawal of a considerable part of his force
from the Xucar might be expected to afford.
The expedition was to have been kept secret; but the preparations which
were made at Alicante for the embarkation of a considerable corps could
not be concealed, and Suchet was speedily informed of them. Already he
had apprehended, by a movement of the Spaniards from La Mancha upon
Cuenca, and of Villacampa from the frontiers of Aragon upon the upper
Guadalaviar, that it was intended by a combined operation to compel him
to evacuate Valencia; but as at that time Clausel’s activity relieved
him from any inquietude with regard to Mina, he was enabled to withdraw
a division from Aragon, and to place Pannetier’s brigade between
Tortosa and Valencia, that he might direct it upon whatever point
should be threatened, without leaving the line of the Xucar exposed.
♦COL DE BALAGUER TAKEN BY THE ANGLO-SICILIAN ARMY.♦
By the end of May the expedition, consisting of 700 cavalry, and 14,600
infantry, including Whittingham’s division of 5000, and above 4000
Italians, had embarked, and on the last day of that month the fleet,
commanded by Rear-Admiral Hallowell, sailed from Alicante. It was seen
from Valencia; and the French troops from the side of Tortosa were
instructed to be ready for moving whithersoever the debarkation might
call them. After a very favourable passage, the fleet anchored on the
evening of the 2nd in the port of Salon, within sight of Tarragona.
The soldiers who had been ordered to hold themselves in readiness to
land were put into the boats, but the surf ran so high that Admiral
Hallowell pronounced the attempt too dangerous, and therefore they
returned to the ships. But before the fleet came to anchor a brigade,
under Lieutenant-Colonel Prevost, was judiciously detached to get
possession of the fort at Col de Balaguer, that point commanding
the only road by which artillery could be brought to the relief of
Tarragona. General Copons, who had been apprized of the expedition,
occupied Reus at that time, and sent two battalions, at first, to
co-operate in the attack upon this fort, and afterwards two more in
consequence of some movements from Tortosa. The attack was vigorously
pressed. On the 5th the place was battered in breach; on the 7th a
magazine exploded; the garrison, consisting of 80 men, were intimidated
by this, and the commandant capitulated. On this side, therefore, no
succours could now reach Tarragona, which is about six leagues from Col
de Balaguer, except by a circuitous march of three days, through a very
difficult country: there was a pass indeed by which the place might be
approached, but it was not practicable for artillery.
♦THE EXPEDITION LANDS NEAR TARRAGONA.♦
Meantime the debarkation had been effected on the 3rd, in broad day,
and with an order, a precision, and a rapidity, peculiar to the English
in their naval operations. Having reconnoitred the fortress, Sir John
Murray determined upon ♦M. SUCHET’S MEM. 2, 311.♦ attacking it on the
western side, which was the weakest, and that on which stores might
most conveniently be brought up to the batteries. General Bertoletti,
who commanded in Tarragona, did not confine himself within the
walls; he occupied the Fuerte Real, and the ruins of the bastion of
St. Carlos, which, though, like all the external works, it had been
demolished, presented still an imposing appearance; and great exertions
were made for repairing it. These works were between 350 and 400 yards
from the body of the place, to the southward, and nearer the sea, the
approach being exceedingly difficult, and covered by the fire of the
town. But they were thought to be the key of the place, and that if
the besiegers could establish themselves there, Tarragona must fall
in three days. Accordingly two batteries were begun on the evening of
the 4th, and on the morning of the 6th they opened their fire with
good effect; another was erected during the night, and on the morning
of the 8th the commanding engineer reported that a practicable breach
in the Fuerte Real had been made; but he requested that it might not
be stormed, because its immediate possession could be turned to no
account, and to retain it would cost the lives of many men. The fire
therefore was continued only to prevent its re-establishment. Meantime,
when the weather would permit, the artillery and engineer horses, and
the cavalry and artillery stores, were landed, and the operations
of the engineers were so far advanced that two heavy batteries were
constructed to enfilade the place. The city was then summoned to
surrender; but as none of the batteries were as yet within 500 yards
of the place, and the fire of the besieged had been very superior to
that of the besiegers, General Bertoletti would not listen to the
summons. On the 11th, the commanding officer of engineers reported that
he was perfectly prepared to push the siege with vigour; and according
to Sir John Murray’s order, Major-General Sir William Clinton, who
had that day been left in temporary command of the siege, resolved to
storm the Fuerte Real at nine that night. Accordingly a disposition
for the assault was made, and arrangements for distracting the enemy’s
attention by a simultaneous show of attack along the whole of his
front, aided from the side of the sea by the bomb-vessels and gun-boats.
Marshal Suchet meantime, leaving General Harispe with the command
on the Xucar, had made for ♦SUCHET’S MOVEMENT FOR THE RELIEF OF
TARRAGONA.♦ Tortosa by forced marches with one division, his reserve,
and a brigade of cavalry: and before his arrival he had dispatched
orders for the garrison of that place to secure the Col de Balaguer;
but the fort there was taken before any attempt to succour it was made,
and he could therefore bring with him no artillery in his attempt to
raise the siege of Tarragona. He had directed also Generals Decaen and
Maurice Mathieu to march for the relief of the place. On the side of
Tortosa all due precautions had been taken, by getting possession of
the fort which absolutely commanded that singular pass. On the other
side, Sir John Murray had ordered General Whittingham to see if the
road could by any means be broken up or impeded, ... but in an open
country this was found impracticable in any part, except at a point
near the sea, and within two miles of Tarragona. When Whittingham was
at Torre de Embarra upon this investigation, Manso, who had 2000 men at
Vendrell, came there to inform him that Decaen, from Hostalric and the
country beyond it, would arrive that night at Barcelona, where there
would then be a force of 12,000 foot and 400 horse, disposable for the
relief of Tarragona. This information General Whittingham communicated
to Sir John Murray on the 9th, observing that the enemy might advance
to succour that place, in two columns, one by the road along the
coast, the other by the heights, upon the left of the besieging army;
the Spanish division, which formed the left, would thus be exposed in
flank to a superior force, and in a position that was commanded by the
heights, and had the fortified city in its rear: and he suggested to
Sir John that he should leave General Copons with the Catalan army to
cover the siege, while he, with the British troops and the Majorcan
division, marched immediately upon Villa Franca to attack Decaen; that
General would have advanced beyond Villa Franca; victory, considering
the number and the quality of the allied troops, would not be doubtful,
and it would decide the contest in Catalonia; and after driving him
from Molins de Rey, and destroying the stone bridge over the Llobregat,
by which bridge alone artillery could be brought across that river,
there would be time to return and encounter Marshal Suchet.
♦SIR JOHN MURRAY RAISES THE SIEGE.♦
To this suggestion Sir John paid no regard; but late in the evening
of the 11th, when every thing was ready for an immediate assault upon
the Fuerte Real, he received intelligence that Suchet was advancing
with 12,000 men from the side of Tortosa, and Decaen with 8000 from
Barcelona; upon which he determined immediately to raise the siege, and
with such haste as to abandon all the heavy artillery, ammunition, and
stores that had been landed. He thought it would have been an useless
waste of the lives of British soldiers to assault a work which, if
carried, must, in his opinion, have been abandoned the next day: he
placed no reliance upon the Spaniards under Copons, who had not more
than 8500 disposable men, and those without pay, discipline, artillery,
or means of subsisting, and whom he considered totally incapable of
acting in the field. He distrusted his own foreign troops, who worked
slowly at the siege, with great unwillingness, and with so little
steadiness, that it had required an additional party of 200 British
soldiers to carry to the batteries the ammunition which one of their
parties threw away when they came under fire. The French too, he
thought, had all advantages; they had fortresses in every direction to
furnish them supplies, to retire upon if they wished to avoid an action
till they could bring together more troops, or to cover them if they
were defeated; whereas he was in the open field, without any point
of support, or of retreat, except to the ships: and how serious an
operation would it be to embark an army in an open bay, and on a beach
where he had learned by experience that it was impossible to disembark
in any but the lightest boats! Three days at least would be required to
complete this re-embarkation. He decided, therefore, upon beginning it
without delay.
Admiral Hallowell strongly remonstrated against abandoning the
artillery, and engaged to bring off every thing, if Sir John would
only give him the night from the 12th to the 13th; but that commander
gave ear to less hopeful counsels, most unfortunately for himself. For
public opinion loudly condemned his conduct; it became the subject of
a court-martial; and though the sentence acquitted him upon all other
charges, it pronounced that he had committed an error of judgment in
abandoning his artillery, when it might have been brought off. The
embarkation was commenced at daybreak. At first some of the valuable
stores were sent off, but orders were given to abandon them. Great part
of the infantry were put on board during the day in full view of the
besieged, who crowded on the ramparts to behold what they were unable
to understand. Sir John himself embarked early in the evening; but it
was not till near midnight that the 1st division, under Sir William
Clinton, who was left in command of the troops on shore, moved to the
beach; and so completely were the enemy deceived as to its movements,
by the piquets of this division having been kept at their advanced
stations till darkness had closed, that not a man ventured without
the walls, and not a shot was fired during the night, except from the
ramparts, nor did any enemy show himself to molest the embarkation.
The cavalry of the Majorcan division were embarked on the morning of
the 13th, by means of a mole constructed for the purpose, about two
leagues from the town; but the other cavalry and a great part of the
field artillery were ordered by land to the Col de Balaguer, whither
Sir John Murray repaired in the Bristol early on the 13th, and where
the whole armament was directed to assemble.
♦SUCHET APPROACHES COL DE BALAGUER, AND RETIRES AGAIN.♦
While the allies were thus re-embarking with discreditable
precipitance, two other armies thought it necessary in consequence of
this movement to retreat also, in equal haste, ... General Copons from
the vicinity of Reus to the mountains, lest he should be exposed to a
combined attack from Decaen and the garrison of Tarragona; and Decaen
himself to Barcelona, apprehending that the allies had raised the siege
for the purpose of bringing him to action. On the evening of the 13th
an enemy’s detachment was seen advancing by the piquets in front of the
fort at Col de Balaguer, and judging that this might be the advance of
Suchet’s force, Sir John ordered part of the infantry to be re-landed
as it arrived from Tarragona, in order to cover the embarkation of
the cavalry and field-artillery, which had reached that point in the
course of the day. He was not mistaken in this judgment, ... Marshal
Suchet having found the way by the mountains impracticable, thought to
force his way by the Col, expecting to reduce the fort with as little
difficulty as the allies had done; and on the 14th he presented himself
there on the road from Tortosa with the main body of his army. He found
a battalion in position covering the fort; but, to his astonishment,
he also discovered the British fleet at anchor between the Col and
Hospitalet. His light troops and skirmishers extended themselves along
the hills, and approached within cannon-shot of the fort. But he found
it impossible to advance, so completely was the road on that side
commanded by the fort and by the judicious station taken by the ships
of war, which could anchor there close to the shore; and it was equally
impossible for an army to remain there many hours, there being no water
within many miles. He found it necessary, therefore, to retire the
same evening to the village of Perillo, not knowing what had occurred
at Tarragona, alarmed as well as surprised at what he had seen, and
holding himself prepared to follow the movements of the fleet.
♦JUNE 15. SIR JOHN RE-LANDS THE TROOPS.♦
On the following morning he made a second movement on Valdellos, as
if intending to attempt the mountain road. As soon as Sir John Murray
was informed of this he apprehended that it was Suchet’s intention to
turn the position which the allies occupied, and enter the plain of
Tarragona in their rear; upon which the farther embarkation of the
cavalry was suspended, and nearly the whole of the infantry were put
on shore. He also sent a strong division, and all the cavalry, under
Major-General Mackenzie, to observe the enemy’s motions, and attack
them if they should attempt to press farther forward. They remained
on the 16th nearly in the same position; but intelligence came that
a column was in march from the side of Tarragona, and as this would
have rendered General Mackenzie’s situation extremely critical, he was
ordered to retire to Hospitalet, and accordingly retreated thither in
the course of the night. Sir John now determined to take up a position
in the plain, between the high ground of the Col and the sea, and this
was done on the 17th. The left rested on the hills, which are almost
inaccessible on that side; the ground in front, though level, was
impracticable for cavalry, because it is intersected from the hills to
the sea with gullies and deep ravines caused by the winter rains. The
right extended to the shore, and was greatly protected by the gun-boats
and the fire of the shipping. In this strong position he had resolved
to wait the enemy’s attack, but in the forenoon it was ascertained
that they had retired on both sides, Suchet toward Tortosa, and Decaen
toward Barcelona, after throwing supplies into Tarragona. Sir John then
assembled a council of war, in which it was concluded that as nothing
farther in the way of offensive operations could be attempted by the
army in its then state, and as no advantage could be expected from
remaining where they were, and acting defensively, the most advisable
measure was to re-embark and return to Alicante, there to re-equip the
army.
♦LORD W. BENTINCK TAKES THE COMMAND.♦
In the afternoon of this busy day Lord William Bentinck, who had
long been looked for, arrived from Sicily to take the command. The
Mediterranean fleet, under Sir Edward Pellew, came with him, having
quitted its station off Toulon in the hope of assisting the operations
against Tarragona, either by its presence there, or by making a show of
landing at and attacking Rosas. Lord William on assuming the command
confirmed the opinion of the council of war, and ordered the troops to
be immediately re-embarked. The weather being such as to raise a high
surf, rendered this very difficult; nevertheless by great exertions on
the part of the navy, every thing was got on board by ♦FORT AT COL DE
BALAGUER DEMOLISHED.♦ the midnight of the 19th. At the same time the
fort at Col de Balaguer, having been dismantled and ruined, was blown
up; and on the ensuing day, Admiral Hallowell and the Anglo-Sicilian
army made sail for Alicante from their bootless expedition, and Sir
Edward Pellew returned with the Mediterranean fleet to his wonted
station.
The explosion of the fort announced to the French that the English had
abandoned all thought of any further operations in lower Catalonia, ...
much to Marshal Suchet’s relief, who while they remained there deemed
it necessary to observe their movements, and yet felt ♦UNSUCCESSFUL
MOVEMENTS OF THE SPANIARDS IN VALENCIA.♦ that he was wanted upon
the Xucar. General Elio’s army, joined by that which Ballasteros
had formerly commanded, but was now under the Duque del Parque, had
endeavoured to take advantage of his absence with so large a part of
his force. On the 11th they had attacked General Harispe’s rear-guard,
under General Mesclop, when on the road from S. Philippe to its
position on the Xucar, but were repulsed at the village of Rogla with
some loss, and Elio himself was for a little while in the enemy’s
hands, but he had the good fortune to escape without being recognized.
The French then pursued their march without farther molestation to the
bridge over the Xucar. On the 13th the Spaniards presented themselves
in force there, and while a cannonade was kept up on that side, the
Duque del Parque attacked Alcira by the two roads of Carcagente and of
Gandia. General Habert let their principal column approach the suburb,
then charged it at the moment when it began to deploy, threw it into
confusion, routed it with the loss of 400 killed and more than 600
prisoners; and this in time for repairing to support his left on the
Gandia road, and there also to defeat the assailants. Notwithstanding
this success, General Harispe was far from feeling secure in his
position. He informed Marshal Suchet that there were in his front not
less than 28,000 of the least bad Spanish infantry, and from 2000 to
3000 cavalry in a good state; this, he said, the prisoners agreed in
affirming, and the intelligence was not of a kind to make them feel
more secure than they ought to be. The departure of the expedition
from Balaguer Roads after the total failure of its object enabled
the Marshal to hasten back towards the Xucar, and he did this with
the more speed, because there was a report that its intention was to
intercept him on his way to Valencia, by landing either at Puerto
de los Alfaques, ♦THE FLEET SUFFERS ON ITS RETURN TO ALICANTE.♦ or
at Castellon de la Plana. But the fleet had no other object in view
than that of returning to Alicante, and in this it suffered much from
storms. Eighteen transports were driven on the Alfaques; the troops
were taken out, and fifteen of the vessels were got off, but the others
were lost.
♦SUCHET’S MEASURES AFTER THE BATTLE OF VITTORIA.♦
On landing at Alicante, Lord William received intelligence of the
battle of Vittoria. Suchet had apprehended no such tidings. Buonaparte
seems to have entertained till the last a blind persuasion that his
schemes of ambition in Spain and every where else must finally be
successful, and the instructions which he had sent to the Marshal
were that he should endeavour to gain time, and lose no ground, till
the affairs of the north should be finished, when, if it were then
necessary, dispositions would be made in favour of the armies in Spain.
The Marshal, however, knew that he must lose no time in retiring
from Valencia; that province therefore was delivered by the battle
of Vittoria, as Andalusia had been by the battle of Salamanca. He
thought to retain upon it a hold which would enable him at any time
to return by leaving a garrison of 1200 men in Murviedro, stored for
twelve months, the place having been materially strengthened during the
eighteen months which had elapsed since the French obtained possession
of it: 500 men were also left in Peñiscola, 120 in Denia, and as many
in Morella, that little fort commanding a mountain-road, by which a
corps of infantry without cannon could at any time re-enter Valencia
from Aragon. Looking forward therefore to the probable resumption of
their conquests, with the hopefulness which characterizes the French
character, and with the confidence which he might justly feel in his
own ability of improving all circumstances to the best advantage,
he commenced his retreat with the less reluctance because Clausel
apprized him that he had arrived at Zaragoza with 14,000 men, and would
establish himself ♦SUCHET’S MÉMOIRES, 2, 310–324.♦ upon the Gallego,
in readiness either to co-operate with the army of Aragon, or with the
Intruder, if the army on that side should resume the offensive.
♦LORD WELLINGTON UNDERTAKES THE SIEGE OF ST. SEBASTIAN.♦
A junction between Clausel and Suchet was what Lord Wellington
apprehended as soon as he heard that the expedition against Tarragona
had failed, and that consideration made him at once give up his
intention of laying siege to Pamplona. Unwelcome as the tidings
were, this change of purpose may have compensated for the failure,
... Pamplona ♦JULY.♦ being so much stronger than it was at that time
supposed to be by the allies, and the British army still so defective
in its engineer’s department, that the siege might probably have proved
unsuccessful. Resorting therefore to the surer method of blockading a
city, which there was reason to believe was not provided for a long
siege, he intrusted that service to the Spaniards, and ordered works
to be thrown up on every side, to prevent the escape of the garrison,
and to cut them off from all supplies; and he determined to besiege St.
Sebastian’s, where farther means of attack could be obtained by sea.
The service was intrusted to Sir Thomas Graham, with 10,000 men.
♦CLAUSEL RETREATS INTO FRANCE BY WAY OF JACA.♦
But the failure in Catalonia was soon compensated by the events which
took place in Aragon. Clausel, not waiting for Marshal Suchet’s
movements, nor to consult with him, left his artillery at Zaragoza, and
made for France by way of Jaca. The Spaniards supposed that his chief
motive was the desire of securing the riches which he had amassed.
Mina was marching upon the same point with a far inferior force, in
the hope of intercepting some of this booty, when he ♦DURAN INVITES
MINA TO ACT WITH HIM FOR THE DELIVERANCE OF ZARAGOZA.♦ received orders
which suspended his progress. Duran at the same time, as commandant in
Lower Aragon, was instructed to take such opportunity as might offer
for acting against the enemy in Zaragoza. This veteran, who was then at
Ricla, sent Colonel Tabuenca to inform Mina of Clausel’s retreat, and
to confer with him upon a plan of speedy operations for the recovery
of that capital, where there were no other troops remaining than a
not numerous garrison, and against which he should immediately move.
Tabuenca was then with his regiment at Borja; Mina was supposed to be
at Gallud: not finding him there, Tabuenca hastened to Pedrola; but
there he found D. Julian Sanchez, who directed him to look for Mina at
Alagon; and from Alagon Cruchaga directed him to Las Casetas, and there
at one in the morning Tabuenca arrived and found him. Upon delivering
his dispatches, he stated that General Duran had selected him to be the
bearer, because, being a native of Zaragoza, and having been present
during both sieges, he could give him the fullest local information,
upon which their combined operations might be concerted. Mina replied,
that their forces were not sufficient for such an enterprise. He had
approached the city, he said, upon an assurance that the enemy had
evacuated it; but an intercepted letter had just been brought him, in
which the governor, General Paris, ordered the garrisons on the left of
the Ebro to maintain their posts, because succours were on the way to
them from Marshal Suchet.
Tabuenca had not expected such a reply. He represented that the united
force of the two divisions amounted to from 10,000 to 12,000 infantry,
and 1500 horse; that the garrison did not at the utmost exceed 5000,
including invalids; that when with that number so wide a circuit was
to be covered, various false attacks might distract their attention,
and an entrance be effected where they least apprehended it: and that
when once the Spaniards should have set foot upon the walls, they might
count upon as many brave soldiers as there were men of Zaragoza. The
reinforcements which the governor looked for were, he said, far off,
and could not, if time were made good use of, arrive till they would be
useless. There was more reason to fear that Clausel might march back;
but even in that case they could maintain themselves in Zaragoza. Paris
could not defend the city, if he were vigorously assailed: and though
he might bring off the garrison by the bridge over the Ebro, the French
could not carry off their booty. Mina replied, that he had only three
regiments of infantry on the right of the Ebro, and cavalry was of
little use; but in the morning he expected information from the place,
and would then determine whether to remain or to retire. Tabuenca
observed, that the regiments on the left bank would not be useless if
they were made to approach, and that the cavalry might be dismounted;
and he requested him at least to bring down the regiments which he had
at Alagon and Pedrola, that the enemy’s attention might thus be drawn
toward Las Casetas, when Duran came with his division, as he would do,
to Maria or Cadrete. To this Mina consented.
♦JULY 8.♦
Early in the morning, Tabuenca’s regiment, which had followed him,
arrived at the Puente de la ♦AFFAIR BEFORE ZARAGOZA.♦ Claveria, where
he joined it, and proceeded on the right of the canal of Tauste toward
the Puente de la Muela, meaning to give the men some rest there, while
he went in search of Duran. They had scarcely been an hour upon the
way, when a fire of musketry was heard on the left toward Las Casetas,
and an orderly of Mina’s came in all haste to recall them, because the
enemy had attacked him. Tabuenca, confiding in his own knowledge of the
ground, represented to Mina, that instead of obeying this order, it
would be better that he should occupy the Puente de la Muela, whereby
he should divert the enemy’s attention, if, as might be expected,
more troops should issue out, and at the same time secure that point
in case Duran should make for it. Mina approved of this suggestion.
The alarm had been occasioned by a body of horse, some 150 in number,
who had been sent on an exploring party; they were charged by Mina’s
cavalry, and compelled to retreat with all speed; but other bodies
presently sallied to their support, and one of about 1000 foot and
100 horse made for the Puente de la Muela. Tabuenca, who had with him
about 1400 men, quickened his pace and anticipated them; and seeing
this they halted, hesitated, and then fell back. Their main force
advanced against Mina upon the road to Las Casetas; troops also came
to his support, and his men behaved with their wonted gallantry. The
enemy were superior both in horse and foot, and when the body which
had been disappointed in their intention of occupying the bridge of
La Muela joined them, the Navarrese could with difficulty keep their
ground; but Tabuenca hastening with part of his men, approached the
enemy on their left flank, under cover of some olive yards, and opened
upon them a fire as opportune as it was unexpected; taking advantage
of the movement which this occasioned among them, Mina charged with
such effect, that they retreated hastily till they were under the fire
of their works. Mina then encamped his troops between the Casetas and
the heights of La Bernardona, ... he had now with him 4000 foot and
1500 horse; and Tabuenca regarding this affair as a preliminary to the
recovery of Zaragoza, ordered his regiment to march immediately upon
the Casa Blanca and the Torrero, while he took the same course with
the detachment which had been engaged. These posts, which had been so
obstinately disputed in the former sieges, were abandoned by the French
at their approach; and the Spaniards entered them, rejoicing in their
success, and in being enabled to rest, after a march of four-and-twenty
hours, during which they had had no other refreshment than a hasty meal
at Grisen.
♦SECOND SALLY OF THE FRENCH.♦
Between four and five in the afternoon the French sallied a second
time and in greater force. They attacked Mina’s division, which was
supported by D. Julian Sanchez with his Castilian lancers; but while
thus engaged, Tabuenca, leaving just troops enough in the works which
he had taken to cover his retreat should that be necessary, attacked
the enemy on their left and in their rear, and the result was that they
were driven into the city, leaving some two hundred killed. Mina’s loss
in killed and wounded amounted in ♦DURAN ARRIVES BEFORE THE CITY.♦ the
course of the day to 115; Tabuenca’s to 28. Duran arrived after the
affair, just as evening was closing; that morning, as he was about to
march from Muel for Cadrete, he was informed that a French detachment
had gone from Zaragoza to bring off the garrison of Almunia which a
party of his troops were blockading; and he was preparing to intercept
them when a dispatch from Tabuenca made him hasten with all speed to
the more important scene of action. Early on the morrow, Mina and
Julian Sanchez came to confer with him in the Casa Blanca, and Duran
proposed that they should assault the city on the following night:
the wall, he said, might be escaladed at many points; the enemy’s
attention might be distracted by false attacks, and they were sure
of assistance from within. This veteran had frequently distinguished
himself by assaulting towns that were imperfectly fortified; Mina was
less accustomed to such service, and more disposed to watch for and
profit by any opportunity that might be offered him in the field: he
was of opinion that they ought to remain before the city and collect
thither the remainder of their forces; and in that opinion he persisted
when Duran on the following evening renewed the proposal: for he judged
rightly, that by a little delay success would be rendered more certain,
and obtained at less cost of life.
♦THE FRENCH WITHDRAW FROM ZARAGOZA.♦
D. Julian Sanchez removed with his lancers that evening to the
Casa Blanca. The enemy allowed no one to go out of the gates: they
had suffered too much in the two sallies of the preceding day to
venture upon a third; and their vigilance was such that eager as the
inhabitants were to communicate with those through whom they expected
now to obtain the deliverance for which they so long offered up their
prayers, they could convey no intelligence: neither, indeed, was it
easy for them to determine what were the intentions of the French; for
though they had their plunder packed up for removal and the carriages
laden with it, and though they mined the stone bridge over the Ebro,
they made at the same time other demonstrations, which were intended
to show that it was not their purpose to abandon the city. A little
before eight in the evening two guns were fired, which were the signal
for a general movement, ... coaches, carts, and sumpter beasts were
collected about the Puerta del Angel, and the troops began to file over
the stone bridge. This movement was succeeded by stillness, and just
before midnight the bridge was blown up. Duran was presently informed
by his outposts where the explosion had been, and that the French had
abandoned the city; immediately he sent D. Julian Sanchez and Tabuenca
to ascertain what damage had been done to the bridge, and whether
it were possible to pursue the enemy: he charged them also to give
immediate directions for rendering it passable, and not to enter the
city unless it should be absolutely necessary, nor suffer any soldier
to enter it, that there might be no opportunity for any of those
excesses which on such occasions were so likely to be committed; for
the same purpose he posted guards at all the gates. The _Ayuntamiento_
however deemed it best, that Sanchez should enter with his lancers, and
with a patrol of the citizens maintain order: the principal streets
were presently illuminated, the people waiting for no orders or
concert, but acting with one common feeling; and the Coso was crowded
to see the entrance of the deliverers.
Duran had lost no time in apprizing Mina of what had occurred, and
requesting to see him that they might arrange their joint entrance.
The _Ayuntamiento_, between one and two in the morning, came to the
Casa Blanca, bringing the keys to Duran, and informing him that the
enemy had left about 700 men in the Aljaferia, whose presence, they
added, could not prevent him from entering Zaragoza and giving the
inhabitants a day of jubilee. Duran replied, that he waited for General
Mina to enter with him; but Mina neither appeared, nor any messenger
from him, till about seven in the morning, when, passing by the Casa
Blanca, without alighting, or turning aside to the building in which
the _Ayuntamiento_ and Duran were awaiting him, he sent a chaplain
to inform the old general that he was going on to the Torrero. Not
a little surprised at this, they all went out in hope of speaking
with him, but it was too late; and when one of the _Ayuntamiento_ was
deputed to seek him at the Torrero, and let him know that they were
waiting for him, he was not found there. The forenoon was far advanced
before he, with some of his chief officers, approached the Puerta
Quemada, where Duran with his division and the _Ayuntamiento_ were
expecting them; his cavalry was at that time fording the Ebro; and
merely saying to Duran that he was about to pursue the enemy with them,
he rode away. Even noble minds are not always free from infirmity, and
this conduct was ascribed to a jealous desire of engrossing to himself
the glory of having delivered Zaragoza; for which reason he did not
choose to enter with Duran, who was an older camp marshal, and as such,
and also as commandant-general of Lower Aragon, must have entered at
the head of the troops. But if this unworthy feeling existed, there
were fairer motives that mingled with it; he thought it better that
his infantry should remain encamped than that they should be quartered
in the city; and the pursuit of General Paris was certainly an object
of no trifling importance. Two of Mina’s regiments thinking that they
were following Paris toward Leciñena, fell in with him unexpectedly,
and were attacked by him in the rear, and found it necessary to take
up a position, first upon a height near that place, and then near
the Ermita de Magallon. The French, whose business should then have
been rather to secure themselves by a rapid retreat, than to seek for
trivial advantages, lost some time in vainly endeavouring to dislodge
them. Giving up the attempt, at last they took the road to Alcubierre;
the Spaniards then pursued, harassed their rear, and compelled them to
abandon, at the foot of the mountain there, the greater part of the
coaches, _calesas_, and carts, laden with spoil which they had brought
from Zaragoza. Paris meantime accelerated his retreat, and effected
it, but not without losing the greater part of his convoy, all his
artillery, and considerable numbers in killed and wounded, and some
fifty prisoners, of whom about twenty were Spanish traitors. Mina
arrived with his cavalry after the spoil had been taken, and when it
was too late to continue the pursuit.
♦SUCHET DRAWS OFF THE REMAINING GARRISONS IN ARAGON.♦
Paris’s orders had been to make for Mequinenza if he were compelled to
leave Zaragoza; this he found impossible, and was glad to effect his
escape by Huesca and Jaca. Marshal Suchet, after leaving a garrison
of 4500 men in Tortosa, under Baron Robert, moved toward the frontier
of Aragon, with the double view of saving Paris, and of enabling a
detachment to rejoin him which he had sent to destroy the castles at
Teruel and Alcañiz, and bring off the garrisons. The detachment having
arrived at Caspe, Suchet pushed his columns to Fabera, and had now
his army on the right bank of the Ebro ... having its right at Caspe,
its centre at Gandessa, and its left at Tortosa. Here he received
intelligence that Paris was driven upon Jaca; that Clausel, who had
moved down from Jaca with a view of securing Zaragoza, finding it
too late, had again retreated, and retiring still further, had taken
a position with his corps upon the frontier of France, and that the
whole of Aragon was lost. Nothing remained for him but to draw off
the garrisons of Zuera, Gurrea, Anzanigo, Ayerbe, Huesca, Belchite,
Fuentes, Pina, Bujaraloz and Caspe, and to think only of combining his
operations with General Decaen for maintaining Catalonia. He crossed
the Ebro therefore at Mequinenza, Mora, and ♦JULY 15. SUCHET’S
MÉMOIRES, 2, 329–331.♦ Tortosa; and in passing between Hospitalet and
Cambrils, was cannonaded by the English fleet. To maintain the line of
the lower Ebro after the deliverance of Aragon was impossible; it was
equally so to feed his army in the sterile environs of Tortosa, where
he was also in danger of having the defiles in his rear occupied by the
enemy, who might come by sea, and interpose between him and the strong
places in Catalonia; he determined therefore upon moving on Reus,
Valls, and Tarragona.
♦DURAN ENTERS ZARAGOZA.
JULY 10.♦
Meantime Duran, manifesting no displeasure at the discourtesy which
had been shown towards him, made his entrance into Zaragoza. His first
business was to march through the rejoicing streets to the church of
Our Lady of the Pillar, and here offer up thanksgiving; his second
was to lay siege to the castle. The heavy artillery of his division
was sent for, and approaches regularly made; and the Zaragozans,
after having so often seen the Spaniards who had been made prisoners
in Aragon or Valencia, marched through their streets, had now the
satisfaction of seeing a French garrison brought prisoners thither in
their turn from La Almunia, where they had surrendered to a detachment
of the Sorian division. During the first days of the siege, Mina,
finding it in vain to pursue General Paris, returned, and took up his
quarters with his troops in the suburb; and this was supposed to be a
farther indication of jealousy towards Duran, because by remaining on
that side of the Ebro which appertained to his own district of Upper
Aragon, he was not under his command; it was deemed more strange that
he took no part whatever at this time in the operations of the siege,
but left it wholly to be carried on by the Sorian division; in fact,
he was daily expecting to be appointed to the command of the whole
province. Before that appointment arrived, intelligence came that
Suchet had advanced to Fabara and Caspe; upon which he crossed the
bridge, began his retreat to Las Casetas and to Alagon, and sent orders
to Tabuenca to follow him with his regiment: Tabuenca replied that he
was under General Duran’s command, and could not leave Zaragoza without
his orders. And Duran, as soon as he was informed of this, sent to
Mina, saying he could not allow the regiment of Rioja to accompany
him in his retreat (a retreat of which he was no otherwise informed
than by the orders which had been sent to its colonel), because being
determined to defend the city, he required its presence, and indeed
he requested the support of some of his troops also; for if the enemy
should advance to Zaragoza, which he did not expect, the retreat of the
Spanish troops would have a most prejudicial effect upon the public
mind; the two divisions were strong enough to meet the French and give
them battle, and this they ought to do; but for himself, with his
single division, he could defend the city. This indeed Duran at that
juncture could well have done; but if the alternative had been to meet
Suchet in the field, or to retreat, the course which Mina followed, in
pursuance of his usual system, would have been unquestionably the most
judicious.
♦MINA TAKES THE COMMAND.♦
It was soon ascertained that Suchet had retreated, upon which Mina
returned to Zaragoza; he then took up his quarters in the city, and the
siege of the Aljaferia was carried on jointly by the two divisions;
and on the fourth day after his return, the commission which he had
looked for arrived, appointing him Commandant-General of all Aragon.
The same day brought orders for Duran to join the army of Catalonia,
leaving, however, such regiments as Mina might think proper to detain.
Mina took two out of four regiments, and one of three squadrons of
cavalry; with the remainder Duran departed for Catalonia, leaving to
Mina the reputation of effecting the deliverance of Zaragoza, which
certainly was not due to him, and was not needed for one who had
rendered more signal services to his country, when its fortunes were
at the lowest ebb, than any other individual. Duran was remarkable
among all the partizans who distinguished themselves in this war for
the ♦RECONQUISTA DE ZARAGOZA, PP. 23–84.♦ discipline which, as an
old officer, he introduced among his troops, and which he maintained
by means that made him equally respected and beloved. Father, or
grandfather, were the appellations by which they called him, and which
he deserved by the care which he manifested on all occasions for them.
On ♦THE ALJAFERIA SURRENDERED.♦ the second day after his departure a
redoubt was blown up, in which the commanding officer of the artillery,
and 28 men who were in garrison there, perished. This was said to have
been his own act; and it was said also that another artillery officer
intended to set fire to the powder-magazine, but was prevented by the
soldiers, who with their besiegers must otherwise have been destroyed,
and with them no small part of the city. The motive assigned for this
insane desperation was resentment against the commandant of the place
for determining to capitulate, though the works had sustained little
injury, and were abundantly provided for a long defence. Immediately
after this the garrison surrendered.
♦CONDUCT OF THE ZARAGOZANS DURING THEIR CAPTIVITY.♦
Thus, after four years of captivity, Zaragoza was delivered from its
detested enemies. During the greater part of that time no tidings
but those of ill fortune had reached the Zaragozans, ... the defeat
of their armies, the capture of one strong hold after another, some
having yielded through famine, others to the strength and skill of the
besiegers, and more having been basely or traitorously given up. And
though they well knew that the journals of the Intrusive Government,
like those in France, were conducted upon a system of falsehood,
suppressing every thing which could not be made appear favourable
to Buonaparte’s views, they could not doubt the substance of these
tidings, nor, in some of the worst cases, the extent of the national
loss. The prisoners who were taken in Blake’s defeat before Murviedro,
and the still greater number who surrendered with him at Valencia,
had been marched through the streets of Zaragoza, in the depth of
winter, and in a condition which would have moved any soldiers to
compassion except those of Buonaparte and of the generals whom he
employed in Spain: without shoes and stockings, foot-sore, half naked,
half famished, they were driven and outraged and insulted by an enemy
who seemed, together with the observances of civilized war, to have
renounced the feelings of humanity. At such times the Zaragozans,
without distinction of rank or sex, crowded about their unfortunate
countrymen to administer what consolation they could, to weep over
them, and to share with them their own scanty supplies of clothing
and of food. On such occasions, too, all the respectable families, as
if by one consent, kept days of mourning and humiliation[1], each in
their houses: and more earnest prayers were never offered up than they
breathed in bitterness of soul for the deliverance of their injured
country, and for vengeance upon their merciless and insolent oppressors.
At the time of the deliverance, and long after, the city and its
environs bore miserable vestiges of the two sieges. Ruined houses were
to be seen far and near on every side, and the broken walls of what
once had been fertile inclosures. Some streets were merely ruins;
in others, the walls of the houses were literally covered with the
marks of musket-balls, and in some places large holes had been made
in them by the numbers which had struck there. Most of the churches
and convents were nothing but heaps of ruins; the Capuchin’s convent
had been so totally demolished, that only a solitary cross remained to
mark the spot where it had stood. Nothing had been repaired except the
Aljaferia and such of the fortifications as the French re-fortified for
their own security. Much of this material destruction was reparable;
but precious monuments of antiquity had been destroyed, ... precious
libraries and precious manuscripts, which never could be replaced; and
upon most of the inhabitants irreparable ruin had been brought. The
loss of life which had been sustained there may be summed up: broken
fortunes and broken hearts are not taken into the account; but the
sufferers had the proud and righteous satisfaction of knowing that they
had not suffered in vain. The two sieges of Zaragoza, that in which
it was overcome, not less than that which it successfully resisted,
contributed more than any other event to keep up the national spirit
of the Spaniards, to exalt the character of the nation, and to excite
the sympathy and the admiration of other countries. And the good will
not pass away with the generation upon whom the evil fell. There is no
more illustrious example of public virtue in ancient or modern history
than this of Zaragoza. Such examples are not lost upon posterity;
and such virtue, as it affords full proof that the Spanish character
retains its primitive strength, affords also the best ground for hope,
not only that Spain may resume its rank in Christendom as a great and
powerful kingdom, but also that the Spaniards may become, religiously
and politically, a free and enlightened nation; not by the remote
consequences of a sudden and violent revolution, which always brings
with it more evils than it sweeps away, but by the progress of wisdom
and truth, working their sure though slow effect in God’s good time,
among a patient, thoughtful, and devout people.
♦ST. SEBASTIAN’S.♦
Aragon having now been wholly delivered from the enemy, no attempt
could be made from that side to relieve Pamplona; the blockade of that
city was safely intrusted to the Spaniards, who were now becoming
an efficient part of the allied armies; and meantime the siege of
St. Sebastian’s was made Lord Wellington’s immediate object. St.
Sebastian’s, which is the most important town in Guipuzcoa, stands
at the mouth of the little river Urumea, on a peninsula between two
arms of the sea, and at the foot of a high hill. A bay forms its port,
which has been widened and deepened, but is still small and shallow,
and so insecure in certain winds, that ships have been driven from
their anchors there; yet to this port the town owes its origin, and
its fortifications, which were first erected to protect the shipping.
Close at hand, on the side towards France, is the capacious harbour
of Passages, surrounded by mountains, with an entrance between the
rocks so strait, that only a single ship can pass, and that only
by towing; formerly it served for ships of the line, but under the
mal-administration of later years it had been neglected, and was now so
far filled up, that none but small craft and vessels of 200 or 300 tons
came in: for this reason, probably, the Caraccas Company, whose port it
had been, removed to St. Sebastian’s. There also the entrance is very
narrow, being confined between two moles. The town contains from 600 to
700 houses, in twenty streets, all which are paved with large smooth
stones, and several of them long, broad, and straight: the suburbs were
more extensive, and the whole population was estimated at 13,000.
Few places present a more formidable appearance; the only land approach
is over a low sandy isthmus, occupied by one front of fortification,
and this narrow road is commanded by the castle; but on the left flank
there are considerable sand-hills some 600 or 700 yards distant, which
completely enfilade and take in reverse the front defences. Those
which cross the isthmus are a double line of works, with the usual
counterscarp, covered way, and glacis; but those which run lengthways
consist only of a single line, and trusting to the waters in their
front to render them inaccessible, are built without any cover. The
northern line is from top to bottom quite exposed to the sand-hills;
the Urumea, which washes the town on that side, is fordable for some
hours before and after low water, and the tide recedes so much that
during that time there is a considerable space left dry by which
troops can march to the foot of the wall. Yet the wall had been left
uncovered, though Marshal Berwick had availed himself of this defect
when he attacked the place in 1719, and by effecting a breach there had
made the garrison retire into the castle. In the revolutionary war, St.
Sebastian’s was taken by the French without resistance; for though the
troops would have done their duty in defending it, the inhabitants,
rather than endure the horrors of a siege, allowed the magistrates,
some of whom were timid and others traitorous, to surrender.
♦DISTRIBUTION OF THE ALLIED ARMY.♦
After the battle of Vittoria, Jourdan had thrown a garrison of
between 3000 and 4000 men into the place. The conduct of the siege
was intrusted to Sir Thomas Graham, and the fifth division, under
Major-General Oswald, consisting of Major-Generals Hay and Robinson’s
British brigades, and Major-General Spry’s Portugueze, were employed
in carrying it on. The first division, under Major-General Howard,
consisting of the 1st and 2nd brigades of guards under Colonel Maitland
and Major-General Stopford, with the brigades of the German legion,
and Lord Aylmer’s, were in position covering the great road between
Irun and Oyarzun, and supporting Don Manuel Freyre’s Spanish corps
which crowned the heights of S. Marzial and guarded the line of the
Bidassoa from the Crown Mountain to the sea. Giron and Longa kept up
the communication with the left of the centre at Vera: this consisted
of the 7th and light divisions, under the Earl of Dalhousie and Baron
Alten ... the former posted in the pass of Etchalar, the latter on
the mountain of S. Barbara, and in the town of Vera. The right of the
centre, commanded by Sir Rowland, occupied the valley of Bastan, and
with Major-Generals Pringle and Walker’s brigades of the 2d division,
under Lieutenant-General the Hon. Sir William Stewart, guarded the
passes of Maya. The Conde de Amarante, with Colonel Ashworth and
Brigadier-General Da Costa’s Portugueze brigades, held the minor passes
of Col d’Ariette and Col d’Espegas on the right, leading also into
the valley of Bastan. Another Portugueze brigade of this division,
under Brigadier-General Campbell, occupied a strong position between
the valleys of Aldudes and Hayra, keeping communication on its left
through the Port de Berdaritz with the valley of Bastan, and through
the Port d’Alalosti on its right, with the right wing of the army, in
the pass of Roncesvalles. The 6th division, under Major-General Pack,
occupied S. Estevan, and formed the reserve of the centre, ready to
support the troops at Maya or at Etchalar. The right wing covered the
direct approaches to Pamplona from St. Jean de Pied-de-Port: in its
front Major-General Byng’s brigade of the 2d division guarded the
passes of Roncesvalles and Orbaicete; Morillo, with a division of
Spanish infantry supporting the latter post; Sir Lowry Cole, with the
4th division, was in second line, at Biscarret, in rear of the pass
of Roncesvalles. The 3rd division formed the reserve under Sir Thomas
Picton, and was stationed at Olaque. This was the distribution of the
allied army, guarding the passes of the Western Pyrenees, and covering
the blockade of Pamplona and the siege of S. Sebastian’s. As the best
means of saving time and labour in that siege, it was determined to
follow Marshal Berwick’s mode of attack, breach the exposed wall from
the sand-hills, and storm it as soon as the breach should be made
practicable, trusting by quick movement to pass through the fire of the
front line of works.
♦SIEGE OF S. SEBASTIAN’S.♦
When the troops appointed for the siege arrived in sight of the place,
the whole of the works and of the castellated hill appeared to be in
motion, so busily were the enemy every where employed in strengthening
their defences. The Spaniards, who were previously blockading the
place, could offer little interruption to them, because they had no
artillery; but serious operations were now to commence, and the French,
though they neither distrusted their own skill, nor that every possible
exertion would be made for their relief, knew that all that skill and
all those exertions would be called for. As a preliminary measure, it
was necessary for the besiegers to drive the garrison from a post which
they occupied, about 700 or 800 yards in advance of the town, formed by
the convent of S. Bartolomé, and an unfinished redoubt, adjoining it,
on the extremity of the steep hill towards the river, and from a small
circular work which they made with casks on the causeway. Approaches
were made, and batteries erected in the course of the night, between
the 13th and 14th of July, with a celerity that surprised the French;
and in the morning the guns opened upon the side of the convent. It was
soon beaten down, ... the chapel, with its organ and costly adornments,
was laid open, and demolished, and the roof fell in; but the French
were not driven from the ruins. A false attack was made to ascertain
whether they intended to maintain an obstinate resistance there; the
troops carried it farther than their orders directed, and were fain
to return with some loss. It was then attempted to drive the garrison
out by means of red-hot shot; the Portugueze were less expert at
this service than they had shown themselves in the field, they fired
shot which had not been half heated, and frequently missed the whole
building. Beams and whatever else was combustible from the neighbouring
houses were used for heating the furnace; and at length the convent
was set on fire in several places, but the garrison succeeded in
extinguishing the flames as often as they broke out. The enemy,
meantime, kept up from the town an incessant fire of shot and shells
upon the batteries. After 2500 eighteen-pound shot and 450 ♦CONVENT OF
S. BARTOLOMÉ TAKEN.♦ shells had been fired at the convent, it was found
that the French were not to be dislodged by any other means than by the
bayonet. Accordingly two columns were formed, one under the direction
of Major-General Hay, on the right, to cross the ravine near the river,
and attack the redoubt; the left, under Major-General Bradford, to
attack the convent. Major-General ♦JULY 17.♦ Oswald commanded. The
attack was begun about ten in the forenoon: the enemy in the convent
were not aware of it till it was made; but the movement was perceived
from the town and castle; troops were sent to reinforce the garrison,
and a heavy fire was opened upon the assailants; ... it was soon
discontinued, because they came to close quarters, and it must then
have proved equally destructive to both parties. The reinforcement was
not of more advantage, for thinking to take one body of the assailants
in the rear, they were encountered and charged by another, and driven
upon the convent, where the garrison had already been overpowered,
and those who escaped were driven with the fugitives from the works
down the hill, through the village of S. Martin’s, immediately below,
which the enemy had burnt. The impetuosity of the pursuers could not be
restrained; their directions not to pass the village were disregarded;
they followed the French to the foot of the glacis, and suffered on
their return. The garrison behaved gallantly, and lost 250 men; the
loss of the allies amounted to 70. A fire from the town was kept up
upon this post for twenty-four hours; and most of the dead with which
the ground between it and the town was strewn, remained unburied
there during the remainder of the siege, so great was the danger in
collecting them, each party being jealous of the approach of an enemy
to their works, even upon such an office.
Two batteries were thrown up during the night in a situation to
enfilade and take in reverse the defences of the town. This in the
loose sand was a most difficult work, and the fire of the enemy was
directed with great precision to interrupt it; four sentinels were
killed in succession through one loop-hole. The only eminence from
whence artillery could be brought to bear directly on the town, though
still about a hundred feet below it, was above the convent, and almost
adjoining its walls. Here a battery was erected; the covered way to
it passed through the convent, and the battery itself was constructed
in a thickly-peopled burial-ground. A more ghastly circumstance can
seldom have occurred in war; ... for coffins and corpses in all stages
of decay were exposed when the soil was thrown up to form a defence
against the fire from the town, and were used indeed in the defences;
and when a shell burst there, it brought down the living and the dead
together. An officer was giving his orders, when a shot struck the
edge of the trenches above him; two coffins slipped down upon him with
the sand, the coffins broke in their fall, the bodies rolled with him
for some distance, and when he recovered he saw that they had been
women of some rank, for they were richly attired in black velvet, and
their long hair hung about their shoulders and their livid faces. The
soldiers, in the scarcity of firewood, being nothing nice, broke up
coffins for fuel with which to dress their food, leaving the bodies
exposed; and till the hot sun had dried up these poor insulted remains
of humanity, the stench was as dreadful as the sight.
The village of S. Martin, or rather its ruins, were now occupied, and
approaches were struck out there ♦THE BATTERIES OPEN.♦ to the right
and left. On the 20th the batteries opened, and early in the evening
the enemy abandoned the circular redoubt. The next day a flag of truce
was sent with a summons to the governor, but not received. Meantime
a parallel across the isthmus had been begun; in cutting it, the men
came upon a channel level with the ground, in which a pipe was laid for
conveying water into the town. The aqueduct was four feet high, and
three feet wide. Lieutenant Reid of the engineers ventured to explore
it, and at the end of 230 yards, he found it closed by a door in the
counterscarp, opposite to the face of the right demi-bastion of the
horn-work. It was thought that if a mine were formed at this point,
the explosion would throw up earth enough against the escarp, which
was only twenty-four feet high, to form a way over it; and accordingly
sand-bags and barrels of powder were lodged there.
The service of the breaching battery was severe; the enemy of course
directed every disposable gun against it, and their shells repeatedly
blew up every platform there, and dismounted the guns. The seamen
who assisted them did their duty nobly, as they always did; but with
characteristic hardihood disregarded all injunctions tending to their
own preservation, till many of them had suffered. Three of their
officers and sixteen of their men were killed and wounded there in the
course of three ♦UNSUCCESSFUL ASSAULT.♦ days. By mid-day of the 22nd, a
breach had been made about 600 feet long, and, as it seemed, perfectly
practicable, the wall being entirely levelled. It was strongly advised
that this should be stormed on the following morning, as early as the
light and the tide would admit; instead of this, orders were given to
make another breach to the left in a more oblique part of the wall;
one sure disadvantage of delay being that the time employed in making
the second breach would be well used by the enemy in intrenching the
first. After battering this second point for some hours, information
was received from a civil engineer who was well acquainted with the
place, that the wall to the right of the breach ♦JULY 24.♦ was a toise
thinner than elsewhere; thither therefore the guns were directed, and
before the night of the 23rd, a practicable breach was made there
also. Great part of the town had already been ruined by the fire; it
was at this time in flames, and the frequent crashing of houses was
heard amid the roaring of the artillery. Before daybreak the trenches
were filled with troops for storming and for supporting the assault,
which was ordered for four o’clock; the batteries were to continue
their fire upon the second breach till the moment of attack, and then
all available guns were to be directed so as to restrain the enemy’s
flanking fire from two towers, ... which, though much injured, were
still occupied, ... or otherwise to assist as occasion might be
perceived. All was in readiness, when about an hour after daybreak the
order was countermanded, upon a misconception that because the houses
at the back of the breach were on fire, the troops would not be able
to advance after they should have gained the summit. The remainder of
the day was spent in widening the second breach; time at this juncture
was of such value that it was hoped the delay might only be for twelve
hours, and the assault made at four in the evening; but it was thought
a more important consideration that there would then be but few hours
of daylight, and therefore the following morning was appointed.