During September, 1915, General Cadorna was able to report progress

all along the front occupied, and especially on the Trentino frontier,

where Italian troops moved along the three main routes which converge

on the Adige Valley from the Italian plain. The route taken was

through the Val Giudicaria on the western face of the Trentino

salient, up the Adige on the south side, and along the Val Sugano on

the eastern front. The Val Giudicaria is the highway into the Tyrol

from Brescia, and on either side of it are fortified positions nearly

the whole way to Trent. During the first week of the war the Italians,

taking the Austrians by surprise, seized Condino by a coup de main,

and compelled the Austrian garrison to fall back on the second line of

defense higher up the valley. Then the Italian troops began to secure

the position gained by constructing defensive works covering the road

approaches to Brescia, and linking these up with other defensive

positions extending along the entire front from the Stelvio pass to

Lake Garda. Simultaneously with the occupation of Condino, an Italian

force, based on Verona, moved up both banks of the Adige, crossed the

Austrian frontier near Borghetto, and seized Ala with hardly any

opposition. Continuing their offensive the Italians then seized Monte

Altissimo and its northern spurs, which command the railroad between

Riva and Rovereto, and at the same time occupied the important

position of Gori Zugra, which is four miles north of Ala, and flanks

the Rovereto road. From there on advance was subsequently made to

Pozzachio, an unfinished fort eight miles from Rovereto, which was

abandoned by the Austrians as soon as the Italian offensive began to

develop. Another force then moved up the Val Astico from Asiero, and

succeeded in storming the Austrian positions on Monte Maronia, whence

the Italians threatened the main defenses of Rovereto on the

Lavaone-Folgaria Plateau. Rovereto is at the junction of three

mountain roads leading into Italy in this locality, and has a

strategical importance second only to that of Trent. Its occupation

was recognized from the start as a necessary preliminary to advanced

operations up the Adige. The third Italian column, directed against

Trent, moved up the Brenta along the Val Sugana, and in September,

1915, its advanced guards, operating right and left of the valley,

reached Monte Salubion on the north and Monte Armenderia on the south

of Borgo. These heights command the town of Borgo, but as the

inhabitants are all Italians, the place was not occupied lest this

should lead to its bombardment by the Austrian artillery. The Austrian

commander, however, did not spare the town, which had been repeatedly

bombarded by the guns north of Ronegno. Borgo is only eighteen miles

from Trent and its investment by Italian troops brought them almost

within striking distance of the great Tyrol fortress.

During November and December, 1915, a series of most desperate

attempts were made by the troops under General Cadorna to storm the

bridgehead of Gorizia and establish a firm footing on the Doberdo

Plateau. This plateau, which acts as the citadel for the more extended

position of the Carso, rises from 350 to 650 feet above the level of

the valley, and dominates all the approaches to Gorizia. Monte San

Michele, which is a ridge on the north side of the plateau, and rises

in one place to 900 feet above sea level, is the key to the whole

position; and round it there was a continuous sanguinary hand-to-hand

fight, the Italians sometimes gaining the advantage, and at other

times the Austrians. Against this position General Cadorna

concentrated 1,500 guns, some of them 14-and 15-inch howitzers, and

naval guns. A tremendous artillery duel, interspersed with infantry

attacks, thus set in, and for a long time the fate of Gorizia trembled

in the balance. But the advantage of position and the systematic

preparation of long years told heavily on the side of the Austrians,

who had defended the town with a determination and courage equal to

that of their adversaries. General Boroevich had all along had general

charge of the Isonzo defenses, while the Archduke Joseph, who held the

Dukla Pass for so many weeks against the Russian attacks, succeeded to

the command of the corps holding the Doberdo Plateau. Meanwhile the

Italian troops were achieving successes elsewhere. They occupied

during the month of November, 1915, Bezzecea in the Ledro Valley, and

took possession of Col di Lava (8,085 feet) in the Dolomite district.

This was roughly the position from the military point of view on the

various Austro-Italian fronts toward the close of the year, when the

obstacles facing the Italian forces began to be appreciated by the

outside world. It was by that time generally recognized that, though

the Italians outnumbered the Austro-Hungarian troops, and but few

reserves were available to reenforce General Boroevich, the Austrian

defenses were enormously strong, and could only be captured after a

heavy sacrifice of life and an unlimited expenditure of artillery

ammunition. No mere study of the map can convey any true idea of the

difficulties to be overcome before the Austrian positions in the

Dolomites and Carnic Alps could be captured. For such a survey could

give no indication of the huge guns mounted on the very summit of

snow-clad peaks, or the lines of armored trenches stretching

uninterruptedly from the Stelvio to the Isonzo. In the mountain

warfare that had to be undertaken amidst the terrific heights,

progress by either side could all but be reckoned by yards. The

convoys had to plod up and down precipitous mountain sides. Instead of

the fighting taking place in valleys and passes, as many thought, the

positions and even the trenches were revealed as frequently on the

very summits of almost inaccessible peaks and crags, often above the

snow line. At high altitudes the few observers admitted on either side

saw artillery of a caliber usually associated with defensive works at

sea level. The intrepidity required in operations over such a terrain

is illustrated by the Italian capture of Monte Vero, when a battalion

of Alpini ascended barefooted the precipitous face of the mountain in

the middle of the night and stormed the Austrian position on the

summit. In such enterprises youth and enthusiasm were found the best

assets. The Alpine troops of Italy are recruited from mountain

populations, whose hearts and lungs, accustomed to high altitudes, can

well bear the strain of mountain fighting.

On the lower Isonzo front the character of the operations has somewhat

recalled the aspect of the fighting area and the troop movements in

France. Here low foothills and undulating plains predominate. There

was on the Isonzo front, however, an absence of the horrors of war in

the shape of devastated towns, villages, and countryside, with which

the world has become familiar in illustrations from Belgium and

northern France.

Over no field of operations was the veil of official secrecy more

securely held than over the events proceeding on the Austro-Italian

front. Newspaper men were rigorously excluded from the area over which

martial law prevailed and the official communiques seldom erred on the

side of perspicuity. This procedure gave rise to a widespread

impression that the Italian forces had been largely marking time. The

brilliant dash into the Isonzo Valley and the capture of Austrian

positions in the Trentino which were chronicled during the months of

June and July, 1915, marked an advance which was not equaled by any

achievements in the months that followed. Nevertheless, a detailed

study of the changes in position during that time show that the

Italians were drilling their path forward with unflagging

determination.

CHAPTER XLVII

ITALY'S RELATIONS TO THE OTHER WARRING NATIONS

Meanwhile, events of a most startling character were taking place

close to the Italian frontier, every one of them big with consequence

to Italy's vital interests. The conquest of Serbia by the forces of

Germany and Austria-Hungary under General von Mackensen was begun and

completed in two months. On October 14, 1915, Bulgaria declared war

against the Allies and immediately attacked Serbia from the south,

cooperating with the Austro-German forces with whom direct

communication was established toward the end of November, 1915. A

belated French-British expedition landed at Saloniki for the purpose

of lending aid to harassed Serbia, but the forces, which were united

under the command of the French General, Sarrail, were capable of

achieving little. After coming into contact with the Bulgarians they

began on November 27, 1915, to retire to their base at Saloniki, with

Irish troops covering their retreat. The conquest of Montenegro

followed that of Serbia. The much-coveted strategic position of Mount

Lovcen, commanding the Bocca di Cattaro, was captured by the Austrians

on January 10, 1916, while the capital, Cettinje, was likewise

occupied three days later. Farther east, the ill-starred Dardanelles

venture was coming to a disastrous end. Evacuation of the Gallipoli

Peninsula by the forces of Britain and France began in December, 1915,

the last soldiers of these two powers leaving Sedd-el-Bahr on January

7, 1916.

It was expected that Italy would take a prominent part in the series

of events which had taken place on these various fields. More than

once the message was sent round the world that a well-equipped Italian

expedition had left for the Dardanelles. It was considered certain

that Italy would lend her assistance to the forces landed at Saloniki,

and thus aid in preventing the overrunning of Montenegro, which could

not but constitute a direct menace to herself. Apart from the landing

of a number of troops at Avlona in Albania, Italy kept aloof. This

rigid abstinence, coupled with the appearance of deadlock on Italy's

two main frontiers, set in motion an undercurrent of criticism among

the friends of the Allies. A further source of uncertainty was found

in the relations still maintained between Italy and Germany. "Why did

not Italy declare war against Germany as well as against Austria?" was

a query that was continually put. In the face of this attitude of

doubt the Italian Government still continued what it considered its

sound and well-matured policy of concentrating its forces for the

protection of its own frontiers against Austria, and looking on every

other enemy as secondary.

As regards the Balkans, it has to be recalled that it was Italy who

first suggested that Serbia receive the assistance of the Allies

against the superior Austrian forces. This suggestion was at that

early time taken into but slight consideration by France and Great

Britain. A battery or two was lent to Serbia by Great Britain, but

little more was done until the spectacle of invasion became imminent.

While Italy recognized that her interests were of a paramount

character in the Balkans, she was convinced that the war would be

decided in the main theatre, and not on any of the side theatres that

Germany might decide to choose. Nor was Italy under any

misapprehension as to what would be her fate were the Austrians to

succeed in breaking through the lines of defense on her northern

frontier. These considerations decided her against participating in

any over-sea adventure unless she was absolutely compelled to do so.

Italy's interest in the problem as to who was to dominate

Constantinople and the Dardanelles was less than that of either

England or Russia. The apologists of her policy of abstention

maintained, indeed, that jealousy of Russia was Great Britain's main

motive in deciding on the expedition to Gallipoli. Italy had a more

important work to do than to lend her aid in playing off one ally

against another. Any aid given to that expedition had, necessarily, to

be of a comprehensive character if success was to be achieved. This

would have meant a serious depletion of the Italian forces and might

have opened up a way that would have enabled the enemy to strike at

the very heart of Italy.

When the possibility of Bulgaria taking the side of the Central Powers

loomed into the domain of actuality, Italy with her nearer intuition

in Balkan affairs called attention to the impending denouement. In

this she was seconded by Serbia, who asked the aid of the Allies in

striking a blow which would have prevented what proved from the allied

point of view to be a calamity. Italy's suggestion was that Sofia be

at once occupied before Bulgarian mobilization could be got under way.

The policy of hoping against hope took the place of energetic action.

Then action on the part of the Allies followed when the blow had

fallen. Yet Italy knew that Serbia was doomed the moment Bulgaria

declared war.

Bitter as the admission might be to Italy, it was convinced that

Montenegro was in the like case with Serbia. Montenegro had as little

hope of coping with the combined forces of Germany, Austria, and

Bulgaria as Serbia. A mere consideration of the alternative plans of

rendering aid to her small neighbors revealed the most promising of

them as entailing a useless sacrifice. It would have meant the taking

over-sea of some hundreds of thousands of men and large guns during

the worst period of the year. The passage to the Montenegrin port of

Antivari would have required the protection of the entire Italian

navy, thus leaving the coasts of Italy exposed to the attacks of the

enemy. And what would have been the main purpose of the expedition? To

save the celebrated Mount Lovcen, which indeed dominates the Bocca di

Cattaro, but does not dominate the Bocca di Teodo, where at the time

of the combined attacks of Montenegrins and French from Mount Lovcen

months before, and of the French and English from the sea, the

Austrian navy was safely sheltered. What Italy could wisely do she did

so. She succored the retreating Serbian and Montenegrin soldiers, gave

them food, clothing, and shelter, and brought them in safety to the

different places to which they had been assigned.

Even before hostilities commenced between Italy and Austria the

Italian Government accomplished a _tour de force_. Against the tacit

opposition of Austria she transported a considerable body of troops to

the port of Avlona, which, with Brindisi, commands the entrance to the

Adriatic. A glance at the map will immediately reveal the vital

importance of this strategic position as a base for expeditionary

forces in Albania and the Balkans, while its naval possibilities make

it inferior to no port on the Adriatic. The fly in the ointment was

in the Austrian hold on the Bocca di Cattaro. Thence Austrian

submarines could menace Italian shipping, even though no Austrian

surface craft dare approach the Strait of Otranto. To this has to be

added the further peril arising from the strong current that is

supposed to descend from the head of the Adriatic. While transporting

troops from Brindisi to Avlona, more than one Italian vessel fell

victim to floating mines borne down by this current.

Such in general outline was Italy's position at the end of the year

1915, and such the tenor of those who sought to vindicate her policy

in the Balkans and elsewhere. It was maintained by Italian publicists

that the Italian fleet had fought with the fleets of France and

England on several occasions against the Turks. It was pointed out

that that fleet was on continual patrol duty in the Mediterranean with

those of the Allies. Italian troops had also been landed with French

troops on the island of Corfu, and, according to report, had

cooperated to some extent with British troops in Egypt and North

Africa. Nevertheless, political and military reasons all combined to

make the Austro-Italian frontier the one battle ground where Italy

could hope for an enduring victory and fight for it with all her

strength.

In regard to the absence of a declaration of war between Germany and

Italy, the attitude of the Government of King Victor Emmanuel was thus

explained: First of all, the treaty of the Triple Alliance did not

consist of a single document, but of three separate agreements: one

between Germany and Austria, another between Germany and Italy, and

another between Austria and Italy. When Austria declared war on

Serbia, Italy registered her protest against the policy of Austria in

which she claimed to recognize a violation of that country's treaty

with herself. The pourparlers thus gradually turned for subject matter

to the time-honored grievances which Italy cherished against her

present ally, but old oppressor. In these negotiations Germany

rendered continued aid to Italy, who sought by peaceful means to

secure the return of the provinces to which she had an immemorial

claim. These negotiations failed, and Italy, denouncing her treaty

with Austria-Hungary, declared war against her. But except in so far

as she was the ally of Austria-Hungary, Italy had no grievance against

Germany. She broke off diplomatic relations with both empires, and she

expected that Germany would declare war against her. Germany did not

do so, and there the matter remained.

Italy had undoubted historic grounds for this procedure, which was

likewise in full agreement with the national feeling. For well over a

century feeling in Italy against Austria has been deep and widespread.

Toward Germany, on the other hand, the feeling is largely neutral,

tinged with a certain awe of German efficiency. German investments in

Italy are also said to total something like $3,000,000,000, and the

economic domination which that vast sum denotes was bound to be felt

through every channel of the national life. But neither the respect

felt for German ability nor the secret influence of German finance has

hampered Italy in the conduct of the war. Besides breaking off

diplomatic relations with the kaiser, she treated the Germans within

her gates exactly as she treated the citizens and subjects of other

enemy countries. She formed a commercial alliance with France, Great

Britain, and Russia, an alliance the chief aim of which was the

removal of German economic domination in Italy. She, moreover,

requisitioned German merchant ships that had taken shelter in Italian

ports; and finally she broke off commercial relations with Germany,

and took measures to prevent Germany from obtaining through

Switzerland any goods necessary for the welfare of the population or

the prosecution of the war. Germany allowed the serious measures taken

by Italy to pass unchallenged, and so Italy was content to let the

relations between the two countries continue on that basis.

But beneath all these surface movements ran a deeper current of

influence that was partly hidden from all except those who were

active participants in affairs of southeastern Europe. There was, for

example, the rivalry between Italy and Greece, a factor that may yet

be discovered to have had a deciding influence in the war. For it was

the entrance of Italy into the war, with the assumed pledge of

territorial profits in the Balkans and in Asia Minor, that forced

Greece into maintaining her neutrality at a time when the alignment of

forces in the Balkans was still in complete doubt. A well-informed and

well-conducted diplomacy, steering skillfully amid the eddies of

Balkan affairs, might have brought the combined strength of Italy,

Bulgaria, and Greece to the side of the Allies. But Greek jealousy of

Italy was allowed to smolder and even to be fanned into flame by the

awakened pretensions of the Italian press, whose ambitions in the East

became inflated at the prospect of a victorious war, out of which

Italy was mirrored as issuing as an imperial state holding a hegemony

over the lesser lands on her extended border. While hesitation and

doubt held sway in the councils of the Allies, Bulgaria struck, and at

one stroke brought disaster on Serbia and Montenegro, and stiffened

Greece into an attitude of unshakable neutrality.

CHAPTER XLVIII

PROBLEMS OF STRATEGY

Meanwhile, with more than half a year's fighting behind them, the

Italian commanders had come to certain well-defined military

conclusions. The plans of General Cadorna had involved three separate

campaigns--one in the Trentino, the other in the Carso, and a

subsidiary campaign in the Carnic Alps to the north, along the main

watershed of the mountains. A general offensive in the Trentino had

been tested and found well-nigh impossible. Trentino is indeed a

military paradox--a sharp salient jutting into Italy, which is strong

by reason of its being a salient. This is because it is inclosed on

eight sides by great walls, the batteries of the main Alpine chain. A

salient is weak as a strategical situation in proportion to the

possibility of crushing in its sides and threatening the lines of

retreat of the forces occupying the point. Where the sides cannot be

successfully attacked, it becomes a position of strength and remains a

constant threat. This was the situation in the Trentino. The main

Alpine chain is not impassable. It is indeed conceivable, under

exceedingly favorable circumstances, that one or more of the passes on

the east or west side might be taken and an advance down the valleys

to the Adige turn the positions of the defenders. But ordinary

foresight on the part of the defense would make this impossible. The

valley of the Adige is the only avenue through the Trentino, and this

avenue, which is at best only a narrow road, was heavily guarded by

the strong fortress of Trent. Moreover, there could be but little

result accruing to Italy if the Trentino were forced. The Adige leads

only to the main chain of the Alps, and farther on, across the

mountains by the easiest of Alpine highways, is the Brenner Pass.

Modern defensive power is so great that its development to the point

where this highway would be impregnable, except against overwhelmingly

superior numbers, would be a matter of great simplicity. Along the

northern frontier, in the Carnic Alps, the situation is similar. There

is only one pass across these mountains, and this the Austrians could

block with the same facility and certainty with which they could block

the Brenner Pass.

On the other hand the presumption that the Isonzo sector had a degree

of vulnerability was found correct, and along the Isonzo line the real

Italian offensive from the beginning continued to be directed. The

Isonzo is roughly about three miles into Austria, beyond the political

boundary. But it is the true military boundary between Italy and

Austria, and it was always regarded by the Austrians as their first

line of defense. For almost its entire length, as far south as

Salcaro, about four miles north of Gorizia, the Isonzo River runs

through a deep gorge and is easily defended. From Salcaro to the sea

it issues from the gorge into a more level country--the plateaus of

Gorizia and of Carso--although even the southern part of the line is

dominated by a series of elevations in supporting distance of each

other. Until the line of the Isonzo was forced, Trieste and the entire

Istrian Peninsula might be regarded as safe.

Although the line of the Isonzo was, as has been shown, the only

feasible line on which Italy could advance, no serious offensive could

be attempted until the outlets from the Trentino were thoroughly and

effectively stopped up. For Italy to have advanced in the Carso, with

her rear open to attack by the Austrians coming through the Tyrolean

passes, would have been foolhardy. Italy's first step, therefore, was

to start a simultaneous forward movement through every pass from

Stelvio on the west to the pass near Pontebba on the north. These

movements naturally were of an offensive nature, although they were

really for a defensive purpose. No attempt was made to advance any

distance through the western passes. The Italians were content to take

the fortifications guarding the entrance and to seize heights

commanding the approaches.

On the south and east of the Trentino, however, the operations took on

a more extended and, for the Austrians, a more serious aspect. On the

south the principal efforts were directed against Riva and Rovereto.

The operations against Riva, which is situated at the head of Lake

Garda, were directed along the valley of the Ledro and thence along

the Tonale River, a small stream connecting Lake Ledro and Lake Garda.

At the same time the Italians pushed with energy down the Val Sugana,

which leads directly to Trent. The advance was pushed to a point where

there was no possibility of the Austrians coming through, and there

the Italian forces rested.

Well up, toward the north, in the Dolomites there followed

considerable fighting, in the Cordevole Valley particularly, for the

Col di Lona, the loftiest of the mountain tops in that region. The

Cordevole unites with the Val Forsa some twenty miles east of the

Adige Valley, the Val Forsa connecting with the Adige at the town of

Lavio, six miles north of Trent. To cut in behind the Austrians south

of Trent would, of course, have created havoc with the entire Austrian

forces in the Trentino, but, as stated, the defensive possibilities of

the situation are so formidable that success would appear almost

beyond the realms of actuality.

On the Isonzo front the fighting all along continued on a large scale.

An idea of the immensity of the struggle is suggested by the Austrian

estimate in January, 1916, that Italian casualties had passed the

million mark. Exaggerated as this number was regarded in allied

circles, it showed Austria-Hungary's opinion of the severity of the

fighting in what was considered a subsidiary theatre of the Great War.

The railroad situation on the Isonzo front is, as in practically all

modern military situations, of primary strategic importance. The

Istrian Peninsula is served by three lines, each of which runs to

Austrian bases of supply. One runs up the valley of the Isonzo,

through Gorizia and Tolmino and through the Hochein Tunnel to Vienna.

At Gorizia a branch leaves this line, running southeast, and connects

Gorizia with Trieste across the Carso Plateau. The second line comes

from the east from Laibach through San Pietro, where a branch runs

south to Fiume, and the third comes north from the Austrian naval base

at Pola. Gorizia is served by the northern road from Vienna, from

Trieste by the main line, and by the branch just described. Supplies

from Vienna would be stopped by cutting the road anywhere north of

Gorizia. But to shut off Trieste as a source, both of the southern

rail communications must be cut. Early in June, 1915, the Italians

forced a passage of the Isonzo at Plava and at Monfalcone, and cut the

railroad at these two points. Gorizia then continued to be supplied

only by the Trieste branch. Nor was Trieste itself cut off, as the

road from Laibach through San Pietro continued open. The only way to

isolate Istria was to take the San Pietro junction, and this was the

ultimate aim of the operations at that region.

The Italian objective in Istria was, of course, Trieste. In order to

advance on Trieste the Italians must be secured from a flank attack,

and Gorizia, which is a strongly fortified bridgehead, would be

directly on their flank. Therefore, it must be either captured or

masked before an advance to the south could be started. Gorizia, too,

was important for another reason. It was the point which the

Austrians had chosen to be the center of their first main line of

defense. If it fell, not only was the way open for an advance on

Trieste, but the entire Austrian line to the north and south was

jeopardized through the fact that, with the center pierced, both wings

were exposed to flank attacks, and would have to retreat or be rolled

up and defeated in detail. In other words, the fall of Gorizia would

uncover Austria's entire Isonzo line, and, although there might be

some subsequent resistance in the mountains to the north, the giving

way of the line would be inevitable.

Gorizia, however, as has been shown, stands in the front rank of

strong natural defensive positions. The foothills of the Julian Alps

descend sharply to a plain near where the Isonzo issued from the gorge

which it has cut through the mountains. The line between the plain and

the mountains is sharp and clearly marked. There is no gentle tapering

off of one into the other. This line between the hills and plain is

somewhat irregular in shape and incloses a pocket in which Gorizia is

situated. It is not unlike a huge elliptical stadium. At the north

end, level with the ground, is Gorizia, with the Julian Alps mounting

on all sides. The southern bank is constituted by the plateau of the

Carso, in which is situated the town of Doberdo. Thus the plain of

Gorizia is surrounded on three sides by elevations which serve as

admirable watchmen for the city beneath. Just across the Isonzo from

Gorizia are the town and spur of Podgora, which absolutely command the

city and prevent an Italian attack from that side. With Podgora

completely in Italian hands, it is difficult to see how Gorizia could

hold out. From Podgora the depots, barracks, and supply houses of

Gorizia are within artillery range of guns of all calibers, and the

environs of Podgora have changed hands several times.

To the north of Podgora, at a distance of between two and three

miles, is a second series of heights--the heights of Oslavia, which

also dominate the bridgehead. These the Italians rushed in December,

1915, so the heights northwest of Gorizia continued in Italian

hands. To the south, on the Carso Plateau, the Italians also pushed

forward. The heights on the edge of the plateau--San Michele and

San Martine di Carso--came into Italian hands. The fortifications of

Gorizia--temporary field fortifications--are not at all like the

more modern fortifications of Europe, which, previous to the

shelling of Liege and Namur, were considered almost impregnable.

They are more nearly like the little town of Ossowetz on the Bobr

River, which held out against the German 42-centimeter guns for over

six months, and was then evacuated only because its defenders were

flanked out. There was very little concrete in the Gorizia defenses,

which were mostly earthworks formed into terraces on which the guns

were mounted. Many of these gun positions have been destroyed, but

Gorizia has continued to hold out despite the desperate attacks of

the besiegers.

Because of the natural defensive strength of the line less men have

been used by Austria on this front than in any other theatre of the

war. When war between Italy and Austria broke out the Austrians had

already commenced the vast operations which flung Russia from the

Carpathians and behind Lemberg. The men were therefore not available

in sufficient numbers to defend the line of the Isonzo, otherwise it

is likely it would have remained intact from the outset, and the

Italian forces would never have been able to force their way through

Flava and Monfalcone. That Austria harbored little anxiety regarding

her Italian frontier likewise appears from her relinquishment of the

Russian offensive to begin operations in the Balkans. Whether a real

Italian offensive at any time was among her military plans will remain

doubtful till events make the situation clear. Austria would appear to

have little to gain from a conquest of Italian provinces in which her

former rule brought her the deep and ordained resentment of the

Italian people.

During the month of January, 1916, the southern theatre of war was

comparatively quiet. The forces under General Cadorna maintained their

offensive on the Isonzo without any decisive revolt taking place.

There was considerable bombardment of the bridgeheads at Tolmino and

Gorizia. In the Gorizia sector the Austrians attacked the Italian

positions at Oslavia, capturing 900 men and inflicting severe losses

in killed and wounded. Determined attacks by the Italian troops

followed, and the positions were again transferred to Italian hands.

At the end of this month an official resume covering Italy's entrance

into the war and the operations of the Italian army in the intervening

months was issued at Rome. In this official communique it was

estimated that 30,000 Austrian prisoners, 5 guns, 65 machine guns, and

a large quantity of war material had so far been captured by the

Italians from the Austrian forces. Twenty-five Austrian divisions,

totaling about 425,000 men, were said to have been massed along the

Italian frontier at the beginning of the war.

CHAPTER XLIX

MOVE AGAINST GERMANY

A royal decree was issued at Rome on February 11, 1916, prohibiting

the importation into Italy or transit through Italy of all German and

Austrian merchandise, as well as the exportation of all merchandise of

German or Austrian origin through Italian ports. This was the formal

recognition of a policy that had been followed out with increasing

strictness since hostilities commenced, but which had never been

officially declared. The declaration of war by Italy against Austria

carried with it the prohibition of trading with Austro-Hungarian

subjects, and announcement had been made in the Italian press of

prosecution of persons on the charge of trading with the nation's

enemy. The coupling of the German Empire with Austria-Hungary in this

royal decree was the first formal act on the part of Italy in the way

of making it clear that all commercial relations with Germany were

suspended. This was in accordance with the general policy of

cooperation among the Allies, whose disjointed action had hitherto

seriously hampered the conduct of the war.

It was also decided by the Italian Government on February 16, 1916,

that warmer commercial relations with the allied nations should be

cultivated. In pursuance of this policy a program was mapped out

covering the following five years, during which period machinery, raw

materials, and manufactured articles destined for the development of

existing industries or the creation of new ones could be imported free

of any duty if their origin was in allied or friendly countries. In

this way it was aimed to disintegrate the commercial domination of

Germany which had been built up by the efforts of a generation. It was

felt that by this method efforts on the part of Germany and

Austria-Hungary to recapture lost Italian import trade would be

rendered futile. During this same month announcement was made

regarding the third Italian war loan. This was declared to have

reached on February 6, 1916, 3,000,000,000 lire, which, together with

former loans, showed that altogether 5,000,000,000 lire had been

contributed. Considerable satisfaction was expressed at this result.

It was conceded that in the realm of finance, in which Italy had been

considered weakest, the country had done remarkably well. Considering

that Italy not long ago was considered one of the poorest nations of

Europe, bearing taxes out of all proportion to her wealth, and that

even now she had been enjoying but half a century of national

independence, the showing was full of promise for the future. In

general, it was held that Italy had revealed herself in a character

different from that which had been made traditional by the criticisms

of foreigners.

Not only on the declaration of war had the traditional "Latin

temperament" shown itself to be surprisingly calm and self-possessed,

but various other traits were revealed that militated against the

conventional view. When hostilities began on the Austro-Italian

frontier the stroke of the fateful hour found Italy prepared to the

last button and the last man. An organization that was the fruit of

years of toil had been built up, ready for action on any frontier.

That such action would be first needed on the frontier of a former

ally could not have been foreseen. But within a very short time Italy

was mobilized, and her prompt efficiency made it possible at once to

carry the war on to Austrian territory, where it has since been waged.

On the last day of the month of February, 1916, Italy took still

another step which showed her prepared to burn all her boats as far as

Germany was concerned. On that date the Italian Government

requisitioned thirty-four large German steamers interned in Italian

harbors. A total of fifty-seven German and Austrian vessels were in

Italian ports at the beginning of the war. The Austrian ships were

seized by Italy when war was declared on the Dual Monarchy. No action

had, however, been taken in regard to German vessels. Their status in

the ports of Italy had been regarded as parallel to that of German

vessels which remained in American ports after war began. This led to

a certain amount of heartburning among the friends of the Allies, who

pointed out that it was in line with the Italian policy of maintaining

commercial relations with Germany as far as they could be maintained.

Rumors had also been rife regarding alleged secret agreements that had

been made with the German Government.

These rumors were gradually dissipated by the successive measures

taken by the Italian Government and the requisitioning of the German

interned vessels revealed her as in full cooperation with the Allies.

There were also other considerations that weighed with Italy. The

submarine had revealed itself as a powerful destructive weapon, and

the toll taken by it of allied ships was a heavy one. It was seen that

the transfer of German vessels to the flag of Italy and their use by

the Allies would do much toward relieving the congestion of goods at

American docks which were awaiting shipment to the allied countries.

The loot of German vessels then in Italian ports and their tonnage

formed a formidable total. They were as follows: At Ancona, _Lemnos_,

24,873 tons; at Bari, _Waltraute_, 3,818; at Cagliari, _Spitzfels_,

5,809; at Catania, _Lipari_, 1,539; at Genoa, _Hermesburg_, 2,824,

_Koenig Albert_, 10,484, _Moltke_, 12,325, _Prinz-Regent Luitpold_,

6,595; at Girgenti, _Imbros_, 2,380; at Leghorn, _Amalfi_, 1,756,

_Termini_, 1,523; at Licata, _Portfino_, 1,745; at Naples, _Bayern_,

8,000, _Marsala_, 1,753, _Herania_, 6,455; at Palermo, _Algier_,

3,127, _Catania_, 3,000, _Tunis_, 1,833; at Savona, _Bastia_, 1,527;

at Syracuse, _Albany_, 5,882, _Ambria_, 5,143, _Barcelona_, 5,465,

_Katterturm_, 6,018, _Mudros_, 3,137, _Sigmaringen_, 5,710, _Italia_,

3,498; at Venice, _Samo_, 1,922, _Volos_, 1,903; at Massowah,

_Aspemfell_, 4,361, _Borkum_, 5,645, _Choising_, 1,657, _Christian X_,

4,956, _Ostmark_, 4,400, _Persepolis_, 5,446, _Segovia_, 4,945, and

_Sturmfels_, 5,660. All these were at the end of February, 1916, put

into the service of the Allies, compensating in some degree for the

losses suffered by each of these nations from mines and the deadly

submarine.

CHAPTER L

RENEWED ATTACKS--ITALY'S SITUATION AT THE BEGINNING OF MARCH, 1916

During the month of February, 1916, the war on the Italian front

continued with bitterness but without decisive result. Early in the

month the Austrians attacked the heights of Oslavia northwest of

Gorizia, capturing 1,200 men and several trenches. Several days later

the Italians achieved some results after weeks of hammering in the

Sugana Valley. They captured the mountainous region of Collo and also

occupied the towns of Roncegno and Romchi. By this new acquisition of

territory the Italians came almost within striking distance of one of

their chief objectives in the war--the city of Trent--which lies,

protected on the northeast and north by a line of forts, fifteen miles

west of the conquered terrain. Meanwhile several aerial attacks, which

had been fitfully chronicled since the beginning of the war, brought

anxiety to the coast towns of Italy. Venice with its arsenal was

visited more than once. In February, 1916, hostile aeroplanes

bombarded the town of Setio, fifteen miles from Vicenza, killing six

persons, wounding many others, and doing considerable material damage.

The aerial attack on Setio was the third reported in one week on

Italian cities, following raids on the districts of Ravenna and Milan.

Setio is in northeastern Italy, fifteen miles south of the Austrian

border, and fifty miles northwest of Venice. On February 14, 1916,

Austrian aeroplanes dropped bombs on Rimini, but were chased to the

east by the fire of antiaircraft batteries.

In the last week of February, 1916, a report that Durazzo, an Albanian

port on the Adriatic Sea, had been evacuated by the Italian troops was

confirmed. The Italian brigade stationed there had been withdrawn, it

was officially declared. The Italian troops were drawn back in company

with Serbians, Montenegrins, and Albanians. Men and horses were

gathered together, revictualed, and transported with light losses in

the midst of grave difficulties, by the combined action of Italian and

allied warships and Italian troops along the Albanian coast. When the

evacuation was completed by the departure of the Albanian Government

from Durazzo, the Italian brigade assigned to the city began a

retreat, which was accomplished according to plan despite serious

attacks from the Austrian forces, which advanced as far as the

isthmuses to the east and north of Durazzo. The fall of the city of

Durazzo resulted from the defeat of the Italian and the Albanian

forces under Essad Pasha, the provisional president. A strong line of

outer defenses for the city had been constructed and the indications

were that a spirited resistance would be offered. The Austrian and

German forces attacked at daybreak. The defenders were soon ejected

from their positions at Bazar Sjak. Soon afterward the Italians on the

southern bank of the lower Arzen were forced to abandon their

positions. The Austrians crossed the river and proceeded southward. At

noon a decisive action east of Bazar Sjak drove the Italians from

strong positions. The same fate was suffered by the defenders of Sassa

Bianeo, six miles east of Durazzo. By the evening of February 23,

1916, the entire outer girdle of defenses was taken. The attackers,

advancing to the inner line positions, established the fact that the

Italians were embarking their troops hurriedly. The final result was

that the only position held by Italian troops in the Balkans was

Avlona in Albania. The situation was viewed with much concern in

Italy, where the ambition was to make the Adriatic an Italian sea. It

was an unsatisfactory result of a series of operations in which

Italian interests were vital, but in which Italians had taken but a

negligible part. The conquest of most of the territory north of

Greece had left the Austro-Germans with a large army released for work

elsewhere. French and British were intrenching strongly at Saloniki,

backed by a powerful fleet. The Italians still held Avlona. Greece

remained neutral, but was filled with resentment against the Allies,

who were repeatedly violating her territory. Bulgaria, flushed with

victory, now held her strong army in leash. Serbia and Montenegro had

gone down before the invader. Rumania was resisting every effort

whether by threat or force or cajolement to lead her into war. The

situation called for the most serious consideration from Italy and her

allies.

During February, 1916, M. Briand, the French Premier, was the guest of

the Italian Government in Rome, where he had gone with the object--the

words are M. Briand's--"of establishing a closer and more fruitful

cooperation between the Italians and their allies." Political

cooperation was complete, he declared, but military cooperation on

their part had been admittedly less so, and that was the supreme want

of the moment. Italy rightly hesitated to embark on adventure, but in

order to secure her political aims her primary object was identical

with that of her allies, namely, to break down the military strength

of the Central Powers. For this purpose it was necessary to strike

together, and strike at the enemy's heart. The world knew what

Italians wanted, and meant to get--the Italian Trentino and Trieste;

but frontal attacks were costly, as General Cadorna had discovered,

and the Italian strategist had not yet said his last word.

The fate of Trieste might perhaps be more quickly decided on the

Danube than on the Isonzo. There was a general agreement that an error

had been committed by the Allies in letting the Central Powers cross

the Danube into Serbia. Except along the 250-mile gap between the

Adriatic and the Serbo-Rumanian frontier, the Central Powers were

blockaded either by ships and soldiers or by neutral territory.

Opinions differed as to where the Allies should strike to reach the

heart of Germany, but there were many who thought that the first

offensive should be to close the gateway into the Balkans by

reconquering Serbia and cutting the communications between the

Central Powers and their allies. Time would show what the allied

Governments meant to do, but if this intention was to get back to the

Danube half a million men would be required at Saloniki with an equal

force in reserve.

It was generally admitted that the territorial ambitions of Italy had

been seriously checked by the development of Austrian strength. The

war as originally planned on the Austro-Italian frontier was to be one

of swift movement in the direction of Trieste and Dalmatia; with the

gradual cooperation of the Balkan nations and a general invasion into

the interior of Austria. Until, therefore, decided headway could be

made on the Isonzo front and Gorizia had fallen, a feeling-out

movement would appear the best to be followed. The Italian people were

learning to accept the delay with philosophic resignation. The axiom

of Napoleon was recalled that it was always the unsuspected that

happened in war, and events in the other fighting areas enabled them

to grasp the difficulties of the situation on their own border.

Already in February, 1916, the conquest of Montenegro and the capture

of Mount Lovchen, long the nightmare of Italian statesmen, by the

Austrians, began to be less a subject of anxiety. Serious blow as it

was to Italian prestige, it did not appear irreparable. Even before,

Austria had already a magnificent series of natural harbors in the

Adriatic. But it was argued that Austria had not a sufficiently strong

fleet to take advantage of the new wonderful natural harbor now

entirely in her possession. The chief perils lay in the formidable

obstacle to naval activity formed by Mount Lovchen, with 305-mm. guns

mounted on its summit and in the facile use of the Bocca di Cattaro as

a submarine base from which to harass the Italian fleet. Italy, it was

recognized, was contending with geographical disadvantages everywhere,

but in the Adriatic more than elsewhere, owing to the peculiarly tame

configuration of her coast line. As compared with that on the eastern

side of the Adriatic the contrast was great.

Nature had, indeed, been lavish in her gifts to Austria in this

direction. Deep water inlets forming natural harbors, which at the

present time are invaluable as harbors for warships or as submarine

bases, are to be found all along the Dalmatian coast.

Tajer, Zara, Lesina, Lissa, Curzola, Maleda, Sabbioncello, Grayosa,

and Sebenico are almost in themselves sufficient to counterbalance any

numerical disparity between the Austrian and Italian fleets. Several

of these natural harbors have of late years been transformed, at

enormous expense, into naval ports and strongly fortified. Millions

have been spent on Sebenico, and it has been so fortified as to be

absolutely impregnable from the sea, even the rocks facing the harbor

having been cased in ferroconcrete and turned into forts. The claim of

Venice to be mistress of the Adriatic belongs to a remote age; it has

long since been ousted by Pola, which has gradually been developed

into one of the strongest naval arsenals and ports in the world.

Similarly the whole coast line of Dalmatia is fronted by a chain of

islands, round which submarines can receive supplies and lurk in

absolute security. In the rear of these islands is a succession of

navigable channels through which a war fleet can pass under cover from

Pola to Cattaro. The Italian coast line is the very antithesis of the

Austrian. Between Venice and Brindisi, the whole length of the

Adriatic, there is not a single natural harbor. But, said the

Italians:

"What is the good of a fine stable without horses?" Italy had the

ships, Austria the harbors: it remained to be seen which would win

out.

The bearing of all this on the question of Italy's cooperation with

the Allies in the Balkans is apparent. It had been frequently remarked

that the Dalmatian coast line was likely one day to bring on a

European war, for its possession is of vital interest to Italy.

Austria, with twelve naval bases and all the natural advantages of

coast line in her favor, is in a far stronger position than Italy. How

can Italy hope to occupy the Dalmatian coast? There was and is a

considerable diversity of opinion in Italy as to the wisdom of an

over-sea expedition in addition to the occupation of Avlona in

Albania. At one moment it was suggested that in view of the

preponderating call on the military resources of the country in the

areas of operations on the Isonzo, in Carnia, Cadore, and the

Trentino, it would be wiser to withdraw for the time being from

Avlona. But it would seem as though Italy is bound to see the thing

through. The place has been put into a state of comparative

impregnability. Italy is well aware that her line of communication

must remain more or less at the mercy of the Austrian fleet operating

from Pola and the naval bases along the coast. She would need very

material assistance from the allied fleets, and her part in the Balkan

operations would appear therefore to depend on cohesive action among

the allied admirals. The loss of Avlona would inflict a blow on the

prestige of the Allies paralleling that of the Gallipoli debacle. Yet

at the end of February, 1916, the Austrians, advancing along the coast

in conjunction with Bulgarians coming from Monastir, would appear to

be making Avlona their objective. Austrian success would make the

Adriatic a _mere clausum_ to the allied fleets and cripple Italy in

one of her chief arms of defense and offense.

PART X--CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA

CHAPTER LI

OPERATIONS AGAINST BAGDAD AND AROUND THE TIGRIS

The British campaign in Mesopotamia during the first year of the war

had been generally successful. After the capture of Basra in November,

1914, the Delta country was cleared of the enemy and the safety of the

oil fields assured. A period of quiet followed, broken only when the

Turks took the offensive, which failed, in April, 1915. Late in May

the British won a decisive victory over the Turkish troops at Kurna.

In July, 1915, the ill-fated expedition against the enemy forces

guarding Bagdad was planned. Later, after the failure in the

Dardanelles, it was necessary to attempt something spectacular that

would restore British prestige in the Orient, and this could be

accomplished by the capture of Bagdad.

The British position in regard to Persia had become difficult. It was

known that the German Ambassador at Teheran, Prince Henry XXXI of

Reuss, was scheming with Persian tribes and Persian statesmen and

politicians, and also trying to win over the armed police and their

Swedish officers. Russia and Great Britain had established this police

system to protect the highways from brigands, and Swedish officers had

been chosen to command them because they might be counted on not to

favor Russian or British interests.

[Illustration: The Bagdad Railroad.]

The mountain tribes on the Turko-Persian border were in a state of

unrest and seemed to be only waiting an opportunity to show their

hostility toward the foes of Germany and Turkey. The Swedish-led

gendarmerie were also more than suspected by the British of having

been won over by German agents. The Russian army in the Caucasus

meanwhile was accomplishing little or nothing, while the Turkish

forces in part were extending toward the Persian highlands, with the

purpose, it was suspected, of joining with the Swedish-led rebels and

mountain tribes. The Turks and intriguers in Persia evidently thought

the time ripe for a quick conquest of Persia, as the main Russian

armies in Poland were not in a position to interfere. It seemed to the

Turks and their German advisers that the hour was propitious to send

forward an army that would drive the British-Indian Expeditionary

Force out of Mesopotamia.

Sir John Nixon had no adequate forces at his command for the proposed

task of capturing Bagdad, having only at his disposal one division of

Indian and British troops, and a brigade or so in reserve with which

to attack the Turkish army that was daily increasing in numbers.

The most implacable foe that the British troops had to contend against

was the climate. It was found impossible to march more than eight

miles a day and after sundown. The heat in the tents at times varied

between 128 and 130 degrees Fahrenheit. With burning sand underfeet,

and scorching rays of the sun from above, blood dried up in the body,

the brain became inflamed, followed by delirium, coma, death. It was

impossible for the white soldiers to perspire unless they were near

marshes where they might quench their intolerable thirst in the

brackish waters. Owing to the lack of fresh vegetables and improper

food, the rations of bully beef and hard-tack, and the assaults of

blood-sucking insects, many deaths occurred. Even the Northwest Indian

troops, accustomed to the desert and life in a hot climate, suffered

intensely in Mesopotamia. It is necessary to consider the climatic

conditions the British forces had to contend with in this country to

understand why their progress was necessarily slow, and why so many

men fell by the way.

The attempt to capture Bagdad was much criticized when projected, and

since, as being foolhardy, and likely to fail, and in any case not

worth the great loss of men it must entail. But the British-Indian

Expeditionary Force was in a position where it must take a gambler's

chance and stand to win or lose. To capture the city of the Caliphs

would in the first place greatly impress the Mohammedan population and

restore British prestige, which had sadly suffered through the

Dardanelles failure. And it was necessary that the British troops

should act promptly and without counting the possible cost, for every

hour's delay permitted the Turks and their allies to grow in strength.

To the British, Bagdad was of importance. It was needed as a base at

the head of navigation. It would enable them to prevent Turkish troops

from traveling over Persian highways, and, most important of all, it

would afford the British opportunities to check Mohammedan

organization and subdue attempted risings.

General Townshend, who commanded the division that was sent forward to

attempt the capture of Bagdad, had all the odds against him. His small

force, consisting of two-thirds Indian and one-third British troops,

was hopelessly inadequate for the projected campaign. It was known

that the Turks were well equipped with guns of superior power, and

that they were directed by German officers, assisted by German

engineers; that the very able German officer Marshal von der Goltz was

in charge of operations. When it is considered that the Turkish force

was three times as strong in numbers as General Townshend's, the

British general's advance on Bagdad seemed foredoomed to failure. His

only hope lay in delivering a swift defeat to the Turks before their

reenforcements could arrive from the Caucasian front, a movement which

began about the middle of September, 1915.

Before an advance could be made on Bagdad it was necessary for the

British to defeat a large Turkish force at Nasiriyeh and at

Kut-el-Amara, where the British captured fourteen guns and about 1,000

prisoners, losing in killed and wounded 500 officers and men. The

Turkish trenches were destroyed and within a small area about 900

Turkish dead were counted.

The British troops, having fought in an atmosphere of 130 degrees,

were thoroughly exhausted when they encamped in Nasiriyeh. Like most

Arab towns, the place was in such a filthy condition that it required

weeks to clean it up and make it habitable for Europeans. Meanwhile

the British troops lived in tents and enjoyed a much needed rest. It

was stated that fully 95 per cent of the men were in such a state of

exhaustion as to be quite unfit for active service. If the Turkish

commander in chief had known of this, the reenforcements he had

dispatched from his base at Kut-el-Amara might easily have compelled

the British force to retire. Fortunately for the British, the Turkish

reenforcements encountered on the way the routed Turkish army of the

Euphrates and evidently heard such tales of the fighting powers of the

British and Indian soldiers that they joined the fugitives in their

retreat.

At the close of August, 1915, Nasiriyeh had been made habitable by the

British engineers and a large part of the force departed for Amara on

steamers and barges, most of the soldiers wearing only a waist-clout

and still suffering from the intense heat, as they crouched under the

grass-mat shelters that had been provided. The garrison left in the

town to keep the Arabs in order suffered from swarms of flies, heat,

fever, and dysentery, and would have welcomed a Turkish attack if only

that it might afford some variety to their monotonous life.

During this time General Townshend, from his base at Amara on the

Tigris, was moving his heterogeneous collection of vessels up the

river and had begun friendly negotiations with the powerful tribes of

the Beni Lam Arabs, who held most of the land between the Tigris and

the northern mountains, and much territory on the southern side of the

river. Here stretched out a desert waste between Amara and

Kut-el-Amara, occupied by powerful confederations of fighting

Bedouins, the Abu Mohammed tribes, known by their black tents, who

moved about the British base on the river; the Makusis tribes, who

fought as light cavalry on the side of the Turks, and the Abu Dir

Diraye Arabs, who were ready to fight on any side that promised the

most booty. For religious reasons their priests urged the Arabs to

fight against the infidels, but the Britons had enjoyed considerable

prestige in Mesopotamia; thousands of Arabs calling themselves English

subjects and claiming the help of the British Consul in Bagdad when

they were in difficulties.

A fighting league with the great federation of Beni Lam was greatly to

be desired by the British, for it would enable them to use freely a

considerable stretch of the Tigris, and secure safety from attack from

both banks. The Beni Lam by siding with the English, whose recent

victories had not failed to impress them, hoped to gain new grazing

territory from their rivals who fought with the Turks, so an alliance

was formed and ratified by the Sheiks of the confederation, and Sir

John Nixon, Commander in Chief; Sir Percy Cox, British Resident in the

Persian Gulf, and General Townshend commanding the troops at Amara.

The British were under no illusions regarding the Arab character,

having learned from some bitter experiences just how much the wily

nomads were to be trusted. As long as the British were victorious they

might count on the Arabs' allegiance, but in case of defeat he was

more than likely to turn about and fight with the enemy. The alliance

between the British and the Beni Lam Arabs was of problematic value,

but it was worth while under the circumstances. It was better to

secure their friendship even temporarily, for the Arabs had been a

constant source of trouble from the time the British Expeditionary

Force entered Mesopotamia. Fighting to them was a pastime rather than

a serious business, and whenever the struggle became deadly they would

very likely disappear. A veritable nuisance to the British force were

the Arabs who hung around the skirts of the expeditionary force and

amused themselves by reckless sniping.

Conflicts with mounted bands offered no difficulties, for having no

artillery they would disappear among the dunes to be located later by

British aeroplanes, and could then be hunted down by columns of

infantry. When aeroplanes were not available, it was impossible to

follow their movements. Having perfect mounts they could afford to

laugh at a cavalry charge.

"They would simply melt away into thin air," wrote an officer at the

front, who had led a charge against these sons of the desert. "They

are a quaint mixture," he adds: "some of them being distinctly gallant

fellows, but the greater part are curs and jackals and will never take

you on unless they are at least three, or four, to your one.

Incidentally, they have the pleasant habit of turning on the Turks

(for whom they are nominally fighting) and looting and harassing them

as soon as they (the Turks) take the knock from us, and as a

consequence the Turk does not much care about having a real scrap with

us."

Sometimes the Arabs led the British into desert wastes where they

could get water from hidden springs known only to themselves, and

where the British soldier, who literally traveled on his water bottle,

suffered tortures from thirst under a heat that dried up the blood in

his veins. In some of these attempts to round up Bedouin marauders the

British lost a number of men because the water supply gave out. These

conditions will explain why in so many dispatches sent by General

Townshend from the front, it was stated that he had to fall back on

the Tigris because his troops lacked water. In such parts of the

country where it was possible to employ armed motor cars and even the

best Arabian steed could be run down, the Bedouins found their old

tactics of little account and were inspired with a wholesome fear of

the British soldier. Portable wireless apparatus used by airmen and

troops, and scouting aeroplanes, made difficulties for the elusive

Bedouins whose methods of desert warfare had not changed in centuries.

So it happened that in proportion as British fighting methods and

British resources became known and feared by the Arab in Mesopotamia

he grew more and more wary of running into danger, unless the odds

were altogether in his favor. What the German and Turkish officers

endured from their Arab allies will probably never be known, but on

more than one occasion when the British won a victory and the Turks

were in retreat, the Arabs were active in despoiling the fugitives and

then made off with their loot, and with the new rifles and equipment

they had been supplied with by the Turks or Germans.

Being accomplished robbers, the Arabs were constantly making raids on

British stores under cover of the night and were generally successful.

On one occasion a party of eight got by the pickets and crawled into

the regimental slaughterhouse. But they had not counted on modern

science. There were mines planted outside the door and every Arab who

was a robber was killed.

CHAPTER LII

ADVANCE TOWARD BAGDAD--BATTLE OF KUT-EL-AMARA

The advance toward Bagdad was begun in the middle of September, 1915,

but owing to the constantly changing conditions in the bed of the

Tigris, which hindered the progress of vessels, and the necessity for

constant reconnaissances of the river region, it was not until the

last of the month that the British force, consisting of only four

brigades, reached the vicinity of Kut-el-Amara.

Nuredin Pasha's troops occupied a strong position near the Kut, with

carefully constructed intrenchments protected by large areas of

barbed-wire entanglements and supported by considerable heavy

artillery. The British camp was about ten miles away from the Turkish

position. They were weaker in men and in guns than the enemy. The heat

was overpowering. The British lost some men on the way to this camp

and others continued to drop out from heat exhaustion.

On September 23, 1915, two British brigades advanced to within sight

of the Turkish tents, while their principal camp was pitched on the

south bank of the Tigris. The British steamers took up a position

between the two armies in readiness to shatter a surprise attack. It

was discovered when the two brigades made a demonstration against the

enemy on September 25, 1915, that the Turks had thoroughly mined all

the southern bank of the river, which caused the British commander to

alter his plans of attack.

On the night of September 27, 1915, the two brigades, leaving their

tents standing to deceive the Turks, crossed the Tigris by a flying

bridge. It is said that this dummy camp which a Turkish division was

facing was the direct cause that enabled the British to win a victory.

If the Turks had concentrated all their forces on the north bank of

the river the British attack would undoubtedly have failed. It was the

absence of the division facing the empty tents from the real battle

field that caused them to lose the day.

In order to understand the magnitude of the British victory it is

necessary to describe the seemingly impregnable character of the

Turkish defenses. There were twelve miles of defenses across the river

at right angles to its general direction at this point--six miles to

the right and six miles to the left. The works on the right bank had

been strengthened by the existence of an old water cut. The banks at

this point were from ten to twenty feet high and afforded excellent

facilities for viewing the deployment of troops advancing to attack. A

strong redoubt on the extreme right opposed any flank movement that

might be attempted in that direction. On the left bank the line of

defenses was separated by a heavy marsh about two miles wide, so that

from the left bank of the river there were, first, two miles of

trenches, then two miles of marsh, and then two miles of defenses. It

was evident that much labor had been expended in preparing these

defenses, showing the skilled hand of German engineers. Each section

of the successive lines of trenches was connected by an intricate

network of communication trenches. Along these complete lines of water

pipes had been laid.

It was known that the Turkish army holding this strong position had

been largely reenforced by the arrival of fresh troops from Nasiriyeh,

and the Turkish commander in chief, Nuredin Pasha, may well have

believed that victory would crown his arms that day and that the

British expeditionary force would be annihilated. There was no lack of

confidence in the British camp either, though it was known that the

Turks were vastly superior in numbers to their own army. For, despite

some hard lessons learned from the enemy, the British soldier

considers himself a superior fighter to the Turk, and is always eager

for an opportunity to prove it.

If the Turks had made their position almost impregnable on land, they

had neglected nothing to prevent the British from gaining any

advantage on the Tigris. The river was blocked at different points by

lines of sunken dhows, while across the water, and a little above it,

was stretched a great wire cable. Special care had been taken to

protect the Turkish guns from being destroyed. Each one of them was

placed in such position that nothing less than a direct hit by a

howitzer shell could damage it.

On September 26, 27, and 28, 1915, a column under General Fry, by

ceaseless effort day and night, had managed to work its way up to

within four hundred yards of the Turkish barbed-wire entanglements,

round what was known from its shape as the Horseshoe Marsh. The troops

went forward slowly under continual shell fire and hail of rifle

bullets, digging themselves in as they advanced. The British guns in

the open could not check the Turkish artillery, which increased in

intensity as the British troops continued to advance. The nature of

the ground was decidedly to the advantage of the attackers, for at

intervals there were deep, firm-bottomed trenches that afforded

excellent cover. If the Turks had been provided with good ammunition

the British would have lost vastly more men than they did. It is said

that the Turkish shrapnel was of such poor quality that the British

troops passed unscathed through it, only being wounded when they were

hit by cases and fuses. All told, the British suffered ninety

casualties in this attack on the enemy round the Horseshoe Marsh. The

main object of this operation was to hold the Turkish attention at a

point where they hoped to be attacked while more important work was

going forward elsewhere.

A second column under General Delamain, which had crossed the Tigris

from the south side, marched all night of September 27, 1915, and

reached their new attacking position on a neck of dry land between two

marshes where the Turks were intrenched at five o'clock in the morning

of September 28, 1915. Advancing cautiously for a mile between the two

marshes, Delamain's column came in sight of the enemy's intrenchments.

Before the fight opened General Townshend directed General Houghton to

lead a detachment of Delamain's force around the marsh to the north

and make a flank attack on the Turkish intrenchments. That Nuredin

Pasha should have left his northern flank exposed to a turning

movement appeared to some of the British officers at the time as a

piece of incredible stupidity; but it developed afterward that the

Turkish commander knew perfectly well what he was about. The open road

around the marsh was a skillfully prepared trap. A carefully concealed

Turkish brigade that had escaped the observations of the British

airmen lay behind the ridges near the most northern marsh. But the

Turkish surprise did not come off as they expected, for General

Houghton's column moved forward so swiftly through the dark around the

marsh that, at 8.20 a. m., he was ready to send a wireless message to

his superior officer announcing that he had reached the left rear of

the Turkish lines. Everything now being ready for a general attack,

General Townshend proceeded to give battle. Since sunrise on September

27, 1915, the fleet on the river, consisting of armed steamers,

tugboats, launches, etc., had been firing on the main Turkish

position. Attempts made by H. M. S. _Comet_, leading a flotilla to get

in near to the shore at the bend of the river and bombard the Turks at

close range, were a failure. For the enemy quickly noted this movement

and dropped shells so fast on the British vessels that they were

compelled to retire. Some boats had been struck by Turkish shells, but

the damages were not serious. Later some armed launches were able to

creep near to the Turkish field batteries, and about noon their guns

were silenced and the gunners killed or dispersed. The British shore

batteries did some effective work, but the Turks succeeded in getting

in one shot that killed two gunners and wounded a number of others. It

was the only shot, and the last, that caused any British loss of life.

During most of the long hot day General Fry's brigade occupied a

position in front of the Horseshoe Marsh, subjected to a constant

shower of shells from quick-firing guns. It was evident that the enemy

artillery was manned by Germans, for the firing showed speed and

accuracy. It was an advantage to the British that the enemy had no

airmen to scout and spot for them, and consequently there were few

casualties as the result of the almost continuous deluge of shells

poured forth by the Turkish guns. Early in the morning the Turks

discovered that the British camp was a dummy, and a division crossing

the Tigris by means of a flying bridge dashed into the fight. A

counterattack was made against General Delamain by the greater part

of this fresh division.

The British column which was operating between what were known as the

Suwada Marsh and Circular Marsh started its assault between eight and

nine o'clock in the morning. The British had concentrated all their

available artillery between the marshes, and under the protection of

the guns and the supporting fire of Maxims and musketry a double

company of the 117th Mahrattas made a headlong charge on the Turkish

trenches. The daring Indians suffered great losses, not more than half

the number who had set out reaching the Turkish trenches, into which

they dashed intrepidly and bayoneted their way along them, causing

heavy losses to the enemy. A double company of Second Dorsets was now

sent against the Turkish trenches, and after meeting with desperate

resistance they succeeded in entering the enemy's deeply dug line. The

rest of the battalion followed a little later, joining their comrades

in the captured position.

General Houghton's leading troops now came into action around the rear

of the Circular Marsh. The Turks' northern flank had been stormed, but

they still held desperately to their southern flank, from which they

poured a devastating stream of shells against the British troops that

caused many casualties.

General Houghton's troops had had little rest since the previous day,

but they were cheered by the prospect of success, and with the Oxfords

leading they entered the fight, and after four hours of continuous

struggle surrounded and destroyed or captured the enemy force. The

Turkish troops, concealed in deep ditches protected from the scorching

rays of the sun by grass matting, fought on with dogged determination

and were with difficulty dislodged. The British troops exposed to the

pitiless heat, and exhausted from lack of sleep and from having had no

water since the previous day, suffered terribly and could not possibly

have held out much longer if the Turkish resistance had not collapsed.

General Delamain, commanding the victorious columns, had made a night

march from the dummy camp on the Tigris, and his soldiers and horses

also suffered from thirst, having been forced into action before it

was possible to renew the water supply.

In the afternoon of the same day, September 28, 1915, General

Houghton's exhausted troops were furiously attacked by the Turkish

division that had crossed the Tigris at nine o'clock in the morning,

while a force of Turkish cavalry at the same time attempted an

outflanking charge.

The British troops beat off the Turkish horsemen and infantry and

endeavored to reach the river, which was over a mile to the rear of

the Turkish intrenched forces at Horseshoe Marsh. Exhausted with

weariness, consumed by a feverish thirst, the gallant troops were

swept by showers of shrapnel from heavy Turkish batteries stationed

near the Kut just when they were nearing the longed-for river that

promised relief for their sufferings. It was impossible for them to

continue in that unprotected position, and reluctantly the troops

turned back from the inviting waterway and struggled back to the

Suwada Marsh, where General Delamain's force was concentrated. The

filthy marsh water was undrinkable, but it could be used to cool the

superheated jackets of the guns and thus keep them in a condition for

action. After nearly fourteen hours of continuous fighting and

marching the troops at last had an opportunity to take a short and

much-needed rest.

At 5 p. m. a wireless message was received from General Townshend

ordering a combined attack on the Turkish lines around Horseshoe

Marsh. General Delamain's column was ordered to move forward to the

rear of the enemy's position, while General Fry's column, which had

been moving toward the Turkish center, was directed to hold back until

Delamain had reached the appointed place.

Behind Nuredin Pasha's main position the two brigades under General

Delamain and General Houghton, skirting the Suwada Marsh, struggled

once more to gain the river. Suddenly, out of the dust clouds that

obscured the view for any distance, appeared a Turkish column about a

mile to the west marching almost parallel with the British force, but

a little behind it. It is related by one who was present that this

sudden appearance of the enemy so close at hand, and marching in the

open, had such a stimulating and heartening effect on the exhausted

and thirst-stricken British troops that they forgot for a time all

about the river toward which they were eagerly pressing, and, dashing

forward, charged the Turks with the bayonet and routed them before

they had time to recover from their surprise or could fire more than a

few wild shots. The British captured all the enemy guns and pursued

the enemy fleeing toward the river, shooting them down as they

scattered, and only ceasing their destructive work when darkness fell

and the few living Turks had escaped over their bridge of boats on the

river.

The combat here had not lasted more than an hour, and the British

brigades, now that the excitement was over, were too exhausted to

proceed any farther and bivouacked on the ground near the scene of

their victory.

It was hopeless now to attempt to continue the encircling movement,

which was started at five o'clock, owing to the darkness and the

condition of the men. Some time during the night Nuredin Pasha, having

evacuated his fortified position, moved his troops across the Tigris

to the southern bank and, by forced marches, reached Shat-el-Hai. From

there he proceeded to Azizie, where, for the defense of Bagdad,

extensive fortifications had been constructed. It was evident from the

rapidity of his movements that the Turkish commander was afraid of

being overtaken by the British forces, for in two days he had marched

his men sixty-five miles toward Bagdad.

The Turkish forces made good their retreat, and so General Townshend,

who had accomplished some remarkable successes at the beginning of the

battle, was deprived of a decisive victory. He had evidently planned

the battle on the impulse of the moment and when it was impossible to

secure an adequate water supply. His men fought with courage and

determination, but tormented by thirst and worn out from loss of sleep

it was physically impossible for them to accomplish more than they

did. It was a bitter blow to General Townshend that the Turks had been

able to retreat in good order. The importance of such a victory could

not be overestimated. It meant the conquering of entire Mesopotamia as

far as Bagdad, and the moral effect of such a success on the Arabs and

tribesmen would have greatly raised British prestige in that region.

An attempt was made to give chase to the fleeing Turks on the river

during the night, when Lieutenant Commander Cookson, the senior naval

officer, with his ship, the destroyer _Comet_, and several other

smaller vessels set out after them. The Turks fired on the boats from

the shore, and the _Comet_, which had steamed in close to the bank,

was assailed with hand grenades by the enemy. A strong, thick wire had

been stretched across the river, attached to sunken dhows, and it

became necessary to remove these obstructions before an advance could

be made. A vivid description of the heroic death of Lieutenant

Commander Edgar Christopher Cookson, D. S. O., R. N., who won the

Victoria Cross for his bravery at this time, is given in a letter home

by one of his crew of the destroyer _Comet_: "Just as it was getting

dark our seaplane dropped on the water alongside of us and told

Lieutenant Commander Cookson that the Turks were on the run, but that

a little farther up the river they had placed obstructions across, so

that we could not pass without clearing it away. This turned out to be

the liveliest time that I have had since we began fighting. It was

very dark when we started off, the _Comet_ leading, and the _Shaitan_

and _Sumana_ following. When we got around the head of land the Turks

opened fire with rifles, but we steamed up steadily to the

obstruction. The Turks were then close enough to us to throw hand

bombs, but luckily none reached the deck of our ship.

"During all this time we weren't asleep. We fired at them with guns

and rifles, and the _Shaitan_ and _Sumana_ were also blazing away. Our

troops ashore said it was a lively sight to see all our guns working.

"We found that the obstruction was a big wire across the river, with

boats made fast to it. An attempt to sink the center dhow of the

obstruction by gunfire having failed, Lieutenant Commander Cookson

ordered the _Comet_ to be placed alongside and himself jumped on to

the dhow with an ax and tried to cut the wire hawsers connecting it

with two other craft forming the obstruction. He was shot in seven

places and when we dragged him over his last words were: 'I am done;

it is a failure. Return at full speed!' He never spoke afterward. We

had six wounded, but none seriously."

The adventure which had cost the British the loss of a brave officer

was not a failure, as this writer concludes: "We must have frightened

the Turks, because on going up the river again about daybreak (after

we had buried our commander) we found the Turks had cleared out and

retired farther up the river. So we steamed up after them and when we

reached Kut-el-Amara we found the army there." The friendly but keen

rivalry that existed between the two services is amusingly shown in

the sea-man's final comment, "This is the first place that the army

has got ahead of the navy."

A little later the gunboats were ordered to pursue the fleeing Turks.

The _Shaitan_ and the _Sumana_ grounded on uncharted mud banks and

were unable to proceed, but the _Comet_ continued on its way and

forced the Turks to leave several dhows behind them laden with

military stores, provisions, and ammunition.

Kut-el-Amara, the Arab town which General Townshend was to make famous

in history, was occupied by the British troops on September 11, 1915.

It is situated on a bend of the Tigris and is 120 miles from Bagdad by

road, and 220 miles by water. The retreating Turkish army made a stand

a little to the west of Azizi, which is forty miles to Bagdad by road

and about four times that distance by water. The object of the Turks

in taking up a position at this place, it was discovered later, was to

enable their engineers to prepare near Bagdad the most elaborate and

scientifically arranged system of fortifications that had so far been

constructed in Mesopotamia.

When the British Expeditionary Force began to threaten the "City of

the Caliphs," it was evident that the Turks had found it possible to

extend the Bagdad railway line, by means of which Nuredin Pasha

received fresh troops to reenforce his army, brought hurriedly down

out of Syria. For when the British force reached Azizi on October 13,

1915, it was known that the Turkish commander had recently received

some thousands of fresh troops. Their presence in that part of

Mesopotamia, at that time, could only be explained on the ground that

with the aid of German engineers the Turks had been enabled to

complete railway communications, an important fact that seems to have

been unsuspected by the British military authorities, and which might

lead to serious consequences for the already outnumbered British

force. Until the beginning of November General Townshend's division

remained here, part of the Turkish force being intrenched about four

miles up the river. While it was expected that at any hour the Turks

would attack, they did not attempt the offensive with any strong

force, but skirmishes between the opposing troops were of frequent and

almost daily occurrence. The British infantry were busy many days

digging intrenchments, and every preparation was made by the British

general to make his position impregnable. With shore batteries and a

number of armed steamers and armored boats on the river, it was hoped

that the Turks would make a grand attack. Why they did not when they

had four times the number of men as the British was inexplainable.

Some such move was necessary if they hoped to restore the confidence

of their Arab allies, which was said to be wavering. The recent

British victory had, perhaps, made the Turkish commander doubtful of

his troops, for no serious offensive against the British position was

attempted.

About the middle of October, 1915, General Townshend received some

reenforcements who had fought their way along the river, constantly

harassed by Bedouins and hostile tribesmen, reaching the British

position in a thoroughly exhausted condition. Even with the arrival of

the reenforcements General Townshend's force numbered little more than

a complete division, and a small reserve. During the stay at Azizi it

was rumored that a large contingent of troops was on its way from

India to strengthen the force at this place.

As time passed and nothing more was heard of these promised

reenforcements the small British army settled down with grim

determination to make the best of their situation, but there was a

general feeling among them that the Government had not acted fairly

by them in not sending help. It was evident that the Indian and

British Governments were imperfectly informed as to the strength of

the enemy's forces and of the means whereby they could fill up the

ranks when depleted by battle. This is the only explanation or excuse

that could be made. At no time did General Townshend's force number

more than four brigades, which, under the circumstances, was wholly

inadequate to accomplish the conquest of Bagdad.

General Townshend being thrown on his own resources proceeded to act

with extreme caution, for the whole fate of the British Expeditionary

Force hung in the balance. It was not a time to take venturesome

risks, for he could not spare a man. The Turks, fortunately, showed no

disposition to attack in force, but they resorted to methods of

guerrilla warfare.

The Turks had only left one brigade to hold their advanced position,

the remainder joining the forces established in the new fortifications

near Bagdad.

The rear guard remaining near Azizi did not allow the British to

forget their presence. They were well equipped with guns and at

frequent intervals sent shells into the British camp without, however,

doing much damage. Along the river they were strong enough to hold

back the British gunboats. For a time General Townshend pursued the

policy of watchful waiting, but one dark night toward the close of

October, 1915, the opportunity arrived for an operation which promised

success. Two brigades were sent out to make a long detour, with the

object of getting behind the Turkish position. This, it was expected,

would take most of the night. At sunrise it was proposed that another

brigade should make a frontal attack on the enemy. The Turks, however,

were not to be caught napping. Their outposts, far flung into the

desert, soon gave warning of the attempted British enveloping

movement, and they were in full retreat with most of their stores and

guns before the British force could reach their main position. The

Turkish retreat in the face of superior numbers was the logical thing

to do under the circumstances, and from the manner in which the

movement was conducted it was evident that it had been prepared for in

advance. The brigades of British and Indian troops that had been sent

forward to make a frontal attack on the Turkish position now embarked

on the miscellaneous flotilla of boats on the river to pursue the

retreating foe. The attempt was not successful, for, owing to the

condition of the river which abounded in mud banks not down on the

chart, the British boats were constantly sticking fast in the mud or

grounding on shoals. Such slow progress was made that the pursuit, if

such it could be called, was abandoned.

British seaplanes and aeroplanes meanwhile had been scouting around

Bagdad and keeping a watchful eye on the Turkish lines of

communication that extended up the river toward the Caucasus heights,

and across the desert in the direction of Syria. The difficult task

set before the small British force was to break its way through to

Bagdad, where it was hoped it would be joined by the advanced columns

of the Russian army in the Caucasus. Early in November, 1915, General

Townshend knew that a Russian advanced column was rapidly forcing its

way down the border of Persia by Lake Urumiah. In a more southerly

direction a second column was on the march to the city of Hamadan, 250

miles from Bagdad. It was hoped that the small British force would

smash the Turks at Bagdad and the Germano-Persian Gendarmes Corps be

vanquished at Hamadan, after which it would be no difficult task for

the troops of Sir John Nixon to link up with the army of the Grand

Duke Nicholas. These far too sanguine hopes were not destined to be

fulfilled.

CHAPTER LIII

BATTLE OF CTESIPHON

General Townshend having captured the village of Jeur on November 19,

1915, marched against Nuredin Pasha's main defenses which had been

constructed near the ruins of Ctesiphon, eighteen miles from Bagdad.

Ctesiphon at the present time is a large village on the Tigris, once a

suburb of ancient Seleucia, and the winter capital of the Parthian

kings. The vicinity is of great historic interest. About thirteen

centuries ago Chosroes, the great Persian emperor, erected a vast and

splendid palace, said to be the greatest on earth in that period, and

of which the ruins are still standing near the marshy edge of the

river. Neither the ravages of time, nor the devastations of the

destructive Mongols who swept the country in ages past could

obliterate this palatial memorial to the genius of Persian architects.

The ruins of the palace at Ctesiphon contain the greatest vaulted room

in the world, and its battered walls, grand in decay, stand to-day an

enduring monument to the invincible power of Islam in the days of

Mohammed. For one of the first of the well-known achievements of the

army of the Arabian prophet was the capture of Ctesiphon and the

burning and despoiling of the palace of the Persian kings.

[Illustration: The Russian Advance through Persia.]

Nuredin Pasha was well aware when he selected his defensive position

near the ruins of this memorial to the valor of Islam in ancient days,

that every Turk, Arab, and tribesman of his troops was familiar with

the story, and he doubtless hoped that its memory might inspire the

descendants of the Prophet's army to fresh deeds of valor for the

honor of Islam.

Around this ruin the Turks had constructed their position, on the

right bank of the river and on the left. For miles around the country

was perfectly flat and devoid of cover of any description. A network

of deep and narrow trenches stretched back to within a short distance

of the River Dialah, six miles to the rear, which flows into the

Tigris at this point. The earth from the trenches had been carried to

the rear, and there were no embankments or parapets of any kind. Along

the entire front a thick barbed-wire fence had been set up.

The hard-fought action at Ctesiphon must rank as one of the greatest

battles in which the Indo-British army has ever been engaged. The

troops were in an emaciated condition through constant fighting, first

in excessively hot weather, and afterward suffering intensely from the

cold, which made the nights unendurable at this time of the year in

Mesopotamia. In such a physically weakened condition did the

Indo-British troops engage the vastly stronger forces of Nuredin

Pasha at Ctesiphon. An officer who participated in the battle

describes in a letter home some of the striking incidents of that

important action.

"Morning of the 22d of November, 1915, found the troops in readiness

to attack, stretched out on the wide plain facing the Ctesiphon

position, the troops detailed for the frontal attack nearest the

river. As soon as dawn broke the advance commenced. The left of the

columns marching against the enemy's flank were faintly visible on the

horizon. The gunboats opened fire against the enemy's trenches close

to the left bank. The field artillery drew in and pounded the ground

where they imagined the trenches must be, but there was no reply, nor

any sound of movement at Ctesiphon until the lines of advancing

infantry got within 2,000 yards of the wire entanglements. Then, as by

signal, the whole of the Turkish line broke into a roar of fire, and

we knew that the struggle had commenced.

"Under the heavy artillery fire the attack pushed in toward the enemy

with a steadiness which could not have been beaten on parade until

effective rifle range was reached, where a pause was made to build up

the strength. The fight for the trenches from now on until the British

succeeded in reaching the first line of trenches baffles description.

The gallant advance across the open ground, the building up of the

firing line, the long pause under murderous rifle fire, while devoted

bodies of men went forward to cut the wire, the final rush and the

hand-to-hand fighting in the trenches, are stories which have been

told before. No description could do justice to the gallantry of the

men who carried it out.

"Meanwhile, the flank attack had crushed the enemy's left and driven

it back on its second line a mile or so to the rear. Courage and

determination carried the day, and by the afternoon the whole of the

front Turkish position, and part of the second line was in the hands

of the British. The intensity of the fighting, however, did not abate.

The Turks pressed in counterattacks at several points from their

second position on which they had fallen back. Twelve Turkish guns

were captured, taken again by the enemy, recaptured by the British,

and retaken finally by the Turks, and so the fighting went on until a

merciful darkness fell, and, as if by mutual agreement, the fire of

both sides, too weary for more, died away."

Nuredin Pasha's forces were numerically far superior to the British.

General Townshend had only four brigades, while the Turkish commander

had four divisions, and was much stronger in artillery.

The Turkish commander, who was well informed as to the strength or

weakness of the British force, may well have looked forward to an easy

victory. But the many successes gained by British arms during the

campaign in Mesopotamia had not failed to impress the Turkish troops

and the tribesmen, their allies, with a wholesome respect for British

valor. If General Townshend had been reenforced by another division

that might easily have been spared to him from the army that had been

in training in India for ten months previous, he could have smashed

the Turks at Ctesiphon and conquered Mesopotamia. As it was, the

British victory was all but complete. An entire Turkish division was

destroyed. They took 1,600 prisoners and large quantities of arms and

ammunition. But these successes had been dearly won. Some of the

British battalions lost half their men. According to the best

authorities the British casualties totaled 4,567, of whom 643 were

killed, 3,330 wounded, and 594 men not accounted for. According to the

Turkish accounts of the Battle of Ctesiphon, which emanated from

Constantinople, the British had 170,000 men in action, and their

losses exceeded 5,000. This estimate of General Townshend's strength

was far from the truth. At no time did the British commander's troops

number more than 25,000, and 16,000 men would be a liberal estimate of

his striking force.

A graphic description of what followed the battle is furnished by a

letter home, written by an officer who participated in the struggle.

"The cold of the night, want of water, the collecting of the wounded,

gave little rest to the men, though many snatched a few hours' sleep

in the trenches among the dead. Dawn of November 23, 1915, broke with

a tearing wind and a dust storm which obscured the landscape for some

hours, and then the air, becoming clearer, allowed us to take in the

scene of the fight. Whatever losses we suffered the Turks must have

suffered even more severely. They had fought desperately to the end,

knowing that to attempt to escape over the open ground was to court

instant death. The trenches were full of their dead, and here and

there a little pile of men showed where a lucky shell had fallen.

Ctesiphon loomed through the dust before us, still intact for all the

stream of shell which had passed it, for our gunners had been asked

not to hit the ancient monument.

"The early part of the morning was occupied in clearing to the rear

the transport which had come up to the first line during the night. At

about ten o'clock the air cleared and the enemy's artillery began to

boom fitfully. Their guns from across the river began to throw heavy

shells over us, and as the light grew better it developed into an

artillery duel which lasted throughout the day. General Townshend

during the afternoon parked his transport two miles to the rear, and

while holding the front line of the Turkish position swung his right

back to cover his park. In the late afternoon the artillery fire

briskened, and long lines of Turkish infantry could be seen in the

half light advancing against the British. The first attack was

delivered against our left just after dark with a heavy burst of fire,

and from then until four o'clock the next morning the Turkish force,

strengthened by fresh troops that had arrived from Bagdad, flung

themselves against us and attempted to break the line. On three

separate occasions during the night were infantry columns thrown right

up against the position at different points, and each effort was

heralded by wild storms of artillery and infantry fire. The line held,

and before dawn had broken the Turks had withdrawn, subsequently to

re-form on their third position on the banks of the Dialah River."

By November 24, 1915, the casualties had been evacuated to the ships

eight miles to the rear. The British force remained on the position

which they had won for another day and then withdrew toward

Kut-el-Amara.

General Townshend's force reached the Kut on or about December 5,

1915, having fought some rear-guard actions on the way, and lost

several hundred men. The news had been skillfully spread about the

country that the Turks had won a great victory at Ctesiphon, in proof

of which it was known that the British were retreating, and that the

Turkish forces were in pursuit. These facts had the usual effect on

the Arabs, who had been friendly to the British, and who now deserted

them to join forces with the Turks. For the wily nomads are ever ready

to go over to the side which seems to be winning, for then there is

promise of much loot. There is no profit in aiding lost causes or the

weaker side.

An officer describing General Townshend's retreat on Kut-el-Amara

through a country swarming with hostile Arabs has this to say: "It

speaks well for the spirit of the troops under his command that, in

the face of overwhelming numbers the retirement was carried out with

cheerfulness and steadiness beyond all praise, and not even the

prisoners, of whom 1,600 had been captured at Ctesiphon, were allowed

to fall into the hands of the enemy. The country around is perfectly

flat, covered with short grass or shrub, though here and there old

irrigation channels make it difficult for carts or motor cars to

negotiate. The operations above the Kut were carried out by land,

though ships bore an important part in bringing up supplies and the

thousand and one things required by an army in the field. An enemy

report was published to the effect that the Turks had captured one of

our armored trains. It will not be giving away a military secret when

I say that no railway of any sort exists south of Bagdad."

How closely General Townshend was pressed by the enemy in his retreat

to Kut-el-Amara is evident from an officer's letter: "We found the

Turks in camps sitting all around us. We had to fight a rear-guard

action all day and marched twenty-seven miles before we halted. After

lying down for two or three hours, we marched on fifteen miles more to

within four miles of the Kut. Here we had to stop for a time because

the infantry were too tired to move."

CHAPTER LIV

STAND AT KUT-EL-AMARA--ATTEMPTS AT RELIEF

Kut-el-Amara, where General Townshend and his troops were so long

besieged, stands on the left bank of the Tigris, almost at the water's

level, with sloping sand hills rising to the north. The desert beyond

the river is broken here and there by deep nullahs which, when they

are filled with water after a rainfall, are valuable defensive

features of the country. Five miles from the town, and surrounding it

on all sides but the waterside, is a series of field forts of no great

value against heavy artillery. Had the Turks been equipped with large

guns such as the Germans employed in Europe these fortifications would

have been shattered to pieces in a few hours. But the forts proved

useful.

The spaces between them were filled with strong barbed-wire

entanglements and carefully prepared intrenchments. To the southeast

the position was further strengthened by a wide marshy district that

lies just outside the fortified line. General Townshend was holding a

position that was about fifteen miles in circumference, to adequately

protect which it would have been necessary for him to have twice as

many men as were at his disposal. For one of the lessons that has been

learned in the Great War is that 5,000 men, including reserves, are

required to the mile to properly defend a position. General

Townshend's occupation of the Kut was therefore precarious, and he

could only hope to hold out until the arrival of reenforcements which

had been held back by the Turks when they were within sight of the

British general's position.

The Turkish success in checking the British advance and in bottling up

General Townshend's troops in Kut-el-Amara had inspired them with hope

and courage and the town was subjected to almost constant bombardment.

Confident of the outcome the Turks fought with considerable bravery.

It was known to the Turks that reenforcements had been sent to the

relief of the British commander, and they hoped to capture the Kut

before these arrived. On December 8, 1915, they shelled the British

position all day; the bombardment was continued on the 9th and they

made some desultory attacks on all sides. From the British point of

view the attitude of the Arabs at this time was satisfactory. General

Townshend received encouraging news that a relieving force was pushing

its way rapidly to his aid.

On December 10, 1915, the Kut was again heavily bombarded by the Turks

and an attack was developed against the northern front of the

position, which however was not pressed. On the day following the

bombardment was continued. Two attacks made on the northern front of

the British position were repulsed, the enemy losing many men.

December 11, 1915, the bombardment was renewed. The Turks reported the

capture of Sheik Saad on the line of retreat, twenty-five miles east

of the Kut. They also gave out a statement that the British had lost

700 men in this fight.

Heavy musketry fire marked the Turkish offensive on December 12, 1915.

They attacked on the same day a river village on the right bank of the

Tigris, but were repulsed with heavy casualties. It was estimated by

the British commander that the Turks lost at least 1,000 men during

this abortive attack.

British losses at the Kut since their return totaled 1,127, including

200 deaths, 49 from disease. Reenforcements were constantly joining

the Turkish besieging army, and it was estimated that in the first

weeks of December, 1915, they had been strengthened by 20,000 men.

Every day the enemy's ring of steel became stronger, while the British

were in such a position that if the Kut became untenable they could

not retreat with any hope of success. If forced out into the open,

there would be nothing left for them to do but surrender.

A sortie of British and Indian troops was made on December 17, 1915,

who surprised the enemy in the advanced trenches, killed 30, and took

11 prisoners and returned without suffering any casualties.

On or about this date, on the Sinai Peninsula, a British

reconnoitering party routed a hostile band of Arabs near Matruh,

losing 15 men killed and 15 wounded, 3 of whom were officers. The

Arabs had 35 killed and 17 taken prisoners.

On December 24, 1915, the Turks having made a breach in the north

bastion of one of the Kut forts succeeded in forcing their way in, but

were repulsed, leaving 200 dead. On Christmas Day there was fierce

fighting again at this point, when the Turks once more entered through

the breach and were driven out with heavy losses.

The garrison consisting of the Oxford Light Infantry and the 103d,

being reenforced by the Norfolk Regiment and 104th Pioneers, drove the

Turks back over their second line of trenches and reoccupied the

bastion. The total British losses in the fighting on Christmas Day

were 71 killed, of whom three were officers, one missing, and 309

wounded. It was estimated that the enemy lost about 700.

The Turks continued to bombard the Kut almost hourly, but the only

serious damage effected by their fire was when on December 30, 1915,

shells burst through the roof of the British hospital and wounded a

few men.

General Aylmer's leading troops under General Younghusband of the

British force sent to relieve the besieged army at the Kut left Ali

Gherbi on January 4, 1916. Following up both banks of the Tigris,

British cavalry came in contact with the enemy on the following day.

These advanced Turkish troops were on the right bank of the river and

few in number, but farther on at Sheik Saad, the enemy in considerable

strength occupied both sides of the river. On January 6, 1916, the

British infantry attacked and then dug itself in in front of the

Turkish position on the right bank. In the morning of the following

day by adroit maneuvering, the British cavalry succeeded in getting

around to the rear of the enemy's trenches on the right bank and

destroyed nearly a whole battalion, taking over 550 prisoners.

Among the number of captives were sixteen officers. Several mountain

guns were also taken. The British casualties were heavy, especially

among the infantry.

The remainder of General Aylmer's force having advanced from Ali

Gherbi, January 6, 1916, fought a simultaneous action on the left bank

of the river while the action on the right bank just described was in

progress.

Early in the afternoon of this day the British forces were subjected

to heavy rifle and Maxim fire from the Turkish trenches 1,200 yards

away. The hazy, dusty atmosphere made it difficult to see with any

accuracy the enemy's defenses. Their numerous trenches were most

carefully concealed. Toward evening the Turkish cavalry attempted an

enveloping move against the British right, but coming under the fire

of the British artillery, that move failed. Finding the resistance of

the Turkish infantry too strong, the British troops abandoned any

further offensive and intrenched in the positions they had won. Later

in the evening the Turks suddenly evacuated their defenses and

retired. A heavy rainfall hindered the British commander from

pursuing, and a stop was made at Sheik Saad to enable him to get his

wounded away. The Turks finding that General Aylmer did not pursue,

fell back on Es Sinn, from which they had been ousted by General

Townshend in September of the previous year. The Turkish version of

the Battle of Sheik Saad estimated the British losses at 3,000.

On January 12, 1916, the Turks advanced from Es Sinn to the Wadi, a

stream that flows into the Tigris about twenty-four miles from

Kut-el-Amara. Here the British relieving force came in touch with the

enemy on January 13, 1916, and a hotly contested struggle ensued that

lasted all day long. The British force consisted of three divisions.

One of these, occupying a position on the south bank of the Tigris,

was being opposed by a column under General Kemball. On the northern

bank General Aylmer's troops engaged two divisions in the neighborhood

of the Wadi.

On January 14, 1916, the Turkish army began a general retreat and

General Aylmer moved his headquarters and transport forward to the

mouth of the Wadi. On the day following the whole of the Wadi position

was captured by the British relieving force, and the Turkish rear

guard again took up a position at Es Sinn. It was reported that German

officers were with the Turkish force.

Further military operations against the Turks were delayed by storms

of great violence that continued for about ten days. General Aylmer

found it impossible to move his troops through the heavy mire, and not

until January 21, 1916, could he advance and attack the Turks who

after their retreat occupied a position near Felahie, about

twenty-three miles from Kut-el-Amara. Here a brisk engagement was

fought in the midst of torrents of rain that greatly hindered

operations. The struggle was indecisive. Owing to the floods, General

Aylmer could not attack on the following day, but took up a position

about 1,300 yards from the enemy's trenches.

Mr. Edmund Candler, the well-known English writer, who was with the

British troops operating on the Tigris, furnishes some striking

details of the engagement. His picturesque description of what took

place at this point in General Aylmer's advance to relieve the

besieged army at the Kut, shows the desperate character of the Turkish

resistance:

"The Turks were holding a strong position between the left bank of the

Tigris and the Suweki Marsh, four miles out of our camp. It was a

bottle-neck position, with a mile and a half of front: there was no

getting around them, and the only way was to push through.

"We intrenched in front of them. On January 20, 1916, we bombarded

them with all our guns and again on the morning of the 21st

preparatory to a frontal attack.

"At dawn the rifle fire began, and the tap-tap-tap of the Maxims,

steady and continuous, with vibrations like two men wrestling in an

alternate grip, tightening and relaxing." It was not light enough for

the gunners to see the registering marks, but at a quarter before

eight in the morning the bombardment began. "The thunderous orchestra

of the guns shook the earth and rent the skies. Columns of earth rose

over the Turkish lines, and pillars of smoke, green and white and

brown and yellow, and columns of water, where a stray shell--Turkish

no doubt--plunged into the Tigris.

"The enemy lines must have been poor cover, and I was glad we had the

bulk of the guns on our side. All this shell fire should have been a

covering roof to our advance, but the Turk it appears was not skulking

as he ought.

"The B's came by in support and occupied an empty trench. They were

laughing and joking, but it was a husky kind of fun, and there was no

gladness in it, for everyone knew that we were in for a bloody day.

One of them tripped upon a telegraph wire. 'Not wounded yet!' a pal

cried. Just then another stumbled to an invisible stroke and did not

rise. A man ahead was singing nervously, 'That's not the girl I saw

you with at Brighton.'

"I went on to the next trench where a sergeant showed me his

bandolier. A sharp-nosed bullet had gone through three rounds of

ammunition and stuck in the fourth, during the last rush forward.

"I could conceive of the impulse that carried one over those last two

hundred yards--but as an impulse of a lifetime; to most of my friends

this kind of thing was becoming their daily bread. The men I was with

were mostly a new draft. I could see they were afraid, but they were

brave. Word was passed along to advance to the next bit of cover.

"The bombardment had ceased. The rifle and Maxim fire ahead was

continuous, like hail on a corrugated roof of iron. The B's would soon

be in it. I listened eagerly for some intermission, but it did not

relax or recede, and I knew that the Turks must be holding on. The

bullets became thicker--an ironic whistle, a sucking noise, a gluck

like a snipe leaving mud, the squeal and rattle of shrapnel.

"I found the brigade headquarters. We had got into the Turkish

trenches, the general told me, but by that time we were sadly thin,

and we had been bombed out. At noon the rain came down, putting the

crown upon depression. All day and all night it poured, and one

thought of the wounded, shivering in the cold and mud, waiting for

help. At night they were brought in on slow, jolting transport carts."

The writer met a boy, the only officer of his regiment who had come

out of the trenches alive and unwounded, and who had a bullet through

his pocket and another through his helmet. He was in a dazed state of

wonder at finding himself still alive.

"It was a miracle that anyone had lived through that fire in the

attack and retreat, but the boy had been in the Turkish trenches and

held them for an hour and a quarter. Oddments of other regiments had

got through, two British and two Indian. I saw their dead being

carried out during the truce of the next day."

The boy officer's regiment had been the first to penetrate the enemy's

trenches. As he dropped into the trench a comrade next to him was

struck in the back of the head and dropped forward on his shoulder. "I

saw eight bayonets and rifles all pointing to me," said the boy

officer describing his experiences. "I saw the men's faces, and I was

desperately scared. I expected to go down in the next two yards. I

felt the lead in my stomach. I thought I was done for. I don't know

why they didn't fire. They must have been frightened by my sudden

appearance. I let off my revolver at them and it kicked up an awful

lot of dust."

The British troops that had charged the Turkish trenches were not

supplied with bombs, but the enemy were well equipped with them.

Consequently the British were gradually driven down the trench from

traverse to traverse, in the direction of the river, where they

encountered another bombing party that was coming up a trench at right

angles. The British were placed in a desperate position, being jammed

in densely between these attacks, and literally squeezed over the

parapet. In evacuating the trench they were subjected to a deadly fire

in which they lost more men than in the attack.

[Illustration: The British Campaign in Mesopotamia.]

The uniform flatness of the terrain in this region and entire absence

of cover for the attacker, whether the movement be frontal or

enveloping, was responsible for the heavy losses the British incurred

in this engagement. Here there were no protecting villages, hedges, or

banks. A swift, headlong rush that could be measured in seconds was

impossible under the circumstances. At 2000 yards the British infantry

came under rifle fire, and had no communication trenches to curtail

the zone of fire. An armistice was concluded on January 21, 1916, for

a few hours, to allow for the removal of the wounded and the burial of

the dead. In forty-eight hours the Tigris had risen as high as seven

feet in some places and the country around was under water, which

effectually prevented all movements of troops by land.

General Townshend meanwhile, besieged at Kut-el-Amara, continued

cheerfully to repel attacks and to await the arrival of the relieving

force. He was well supplied with stores, and there was no fear of a

famine. He described his troops at this time as being in the best of

spirits. Evidently he was not in a position to be of any assistance to

the relieving force, whose advance had been delayed by the storms. At

the close of January, 1916, he reported that the enemy had evacuated

their trenches on the land side of the Kut defenses, and had retired

to a position about a mile away from the British intrenchments.

The floods of January, 1916, were a distinct benefit to General

Townshend, for the Turks, intrenched in a loop of the Tigris, were

driven out by the deluge and compelled to seek higher ground.

In the first days of February, 1916, Sir Percy Lake, who had succeeded

Sir John Nixon to the chief command of the British forces in

Mesopotamia, dispatched General Brooking from Nasariyeh with a column

up the River Shatt-el-Har, a branch of the Tigris, to make a

reconnaissance. On February 7, 1916, on his way back, General Brooking

was attacked by hostile Arabs near Butaniyeh. He was also attacked by

tribesmen who had been considered friendly to the British and who

issued from villages along the route. There was some sharp fighting in

which the losses were heavy on both sides. The British had 373 men

killed or wounded, while the Arab dead numbered 636. On the 9th a

small punitive expedition was sent against the treacherous tribesmen,

and four Arab villages were destroyed. The incident offered another

striking proof that no dependence could be placed on the faith of the

Arabs.

General Aylmer finding, after his failure at Felahie, that his force

was too weakened physically to attempt to break through to relieve the

beleaguered division at the Kut, decided to intrench in the position

then occupied by his troops and to await the reenforcements which were

on the way.

On February 17-19, 1916, hostile aeroplanes dropped bombs on the Kut,

without doing any damage, General Townshend reported. For two and a

half months the British army had been bottled up in this river town,

and the Turks had tried every means to dislodge them.

On February 22, 1916, British columns under General Aylmer advanced up

the river on the right bank to Um-el-Arak, occupying a position which

commanded the Turkish camp behind their trenches at El Henna, a marsh

on the left bank. At daybreak the British guns opened a heavy

bombardment on the enemy's camp across the Tigris, which at this point

makes a sharp bend to the north. The Turks were evidently taken by

surprise, for a lively stampede followed.

On March 6, 1916, General Aylmer marched up the Tigris to the Turkish

position at Es Sinn, which is only seven miles from Kut-el-Amara. This

is a Turkish stronghold and was carried by General Townshend on his

way to the Kut. The position had been greatly strengthened since that

time, that General Aylmer could hardly have hoped to succeed in

driving the enemy out. But the effort had to be made, and resulted in

a failure. The enemy lost heavily according to the British accounts,

while their own casualties were unimportant. The Turkish version of

the struggle was as follows:

"On the morning of March 8, 1916, the enemy attacked from the right

bank of the Tigris with his main force. The fighting lasted until

sunset. Assisted by reenforcements hastily brought to his wing by his

river fleet, he succeeded in occupying a portion of our trenches, but

the latter were completely recaptured by a heroic counterattack by our

reserves, the enemy being then driven back to his old positions."

Owing to the lack of water, General Aylmer was forced to fall back on

the Tigris. On March 10, 1916, information reached the Tigris corps

that the Turks had occupied an advanced position on the river. The

following day a British column was sent to turn the enemy out. The

British infantry daringly assaulted the position and bayoneted a

considerable number of the Turks, after which the column withdrew.