CHAPTER LV
DEVELOPMENT OF THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF AIR FIGHTING
The student or observer of the Great European War inevitably must be
impressed with its impersonal character. Everywhere masses and
organizations rule supreme, and men and material are thought of and
used as aggregations rather than as individuals and units for
destruction and defense. The individual, save as he gives himself up
to the great machine, everywhere is inconspicuous, and while no less
courage is demanded than in the days of the short-range weapons and
personal combat, yet the heroic note of personal valor and initiative
in most cases is unheard, and the individual is sunk in the mass. One
is almost tempted to believe that chivalry and individual heroism no
longer bulk large in the profession of arms, and that in the place of
the knightly soldier there is the grim engineer at telescope or
switchboard, touching a key to produce an explosion that will melt
away yards of trenches and carry to eternity not tens but hundreds and
thousands of his fellows; there are barriers charged with deadly
currents; guns hurling tons of metal at a foe invisible to the
gunners, whose position is known only by mathematical deductions from
observers at a distance.
All of this and much more the engineer has brought to
twentieth-century warfare, and the grim fact remains that trained
masses are used, made and destroyed in vain attempts at an object
often unknown to the individual.
Accordingly, when we turn to the work of the aviators we pass back
from the consideration of the mass to the individual. Whatever may be
the airman's convictions as to the ethics of the Great War, always his
duty and his adversary are well defined, and it is his personal
devotion, his skill and daring, his resourcefulness and intrepidity
that are to-day playing no small part on the battle fronts of Europe.
He too is an engineer with scientific and technical knowledge and
training that control the most delicate of machines ever at the mercy
of the elements, and engineer and scientist have supplied him with
instruments and equipments embodying the results of refined research
and investigation. Withal, he is a soldier, yet not one of a mere mass
aggregation, but an individual on whose faithful and intelligent
performance of his duty mid extreme perils the issue of a great cause
may depend. But not entirely a free-lance, for experience in aerial
warfare has shown that in the air, as on the ground, harmony of action
and plan of operation avail and contribute to success. Consequently,
with the development of military aeronautics during the course of the
war, the work of the flying corps, with training and practical
experience, gradually became more systematic and far more efficient.
While many of their achievements were distinctly sensational,
involving extreme personal daring and heroism, yet usually the general
operations were as methodical and prearranged as other forms of
military activity carried on by the different armies on the ground
below. No longer were single aeroplanes used exclusively, but large
numbers of machines were brought to bear, with the pilots drilled not
only in the manipulation of their individual machines, but to work
with others in military formations and groups, while increased
attention was paid to weapons and the protection of vulnerable parts.
The flying craft cooperated constantly with the intelligence
departments of the various staffs, observing the enemy positions, the
distribution and movement of troops, and photographing the territory,
and their observations were not only useful but essential to the
artillery engaged so extensively in indirect fire. As their work
became more practical and understood, it was the more appreciated and
its volume increased. Indeed, by the summer of 1915 the aviation corps
of the various belligerent armies in Europe had settled down to more
or less of a routine of observation, reconnaissance, and patrol,
enlivened by bombing expeditions against the enemy and frequent aerial
combats. What once would have been considered feats of usual
intrepidity and skill on the part of the aviators, long since had
become commonplace, and the standard of operation developed to a
degree that at the beginning of the war would have been considered
phenomenal.
Reconnaissance was actively in progress on all of the battle fronts,
combats in the air were more frequent, bombing expeditions were
conducted across the frontiers, and with a constantly increasing
supply of new and improved machines, and freshly trained aviators, the
work progressed, so that before the end of 1915, on the part of the
Allies at least, there was probably ten times as much flying as at the
beginning of the year. Even when the heavy fogs pervading the battle
fields of western Europe in the early part of 1916 prevented other
operations, reconnaissance was actively carried on, and this, with the
routine work of determining ranges, positions, etc., for the
artillery, in active progress, gave little quiet to the airmen. With
the development of the war there was a constantly increasing demand on
the skill of the aviators.
Many of the places from which it was necessary to begin flights did
not furnish good starting, and often the same condition held as
regards the landing places. Furthermore, flying was attended with much
greater danger, with a corresponding increase in fatalities, on
account of the improvements in the antiaircraft guns and ranging
apparatus and the skill of the gunners. Withal, all official reports
agree in stating that the proportion of casualties was smaller in the
air service than in other branches of the service. There has been an
ever-increasing number of combats in the air. Often when aeroplanes
were observed in reconnaissance the enemy would make an attack upon
them in force and endeavor to destroy the machines. Indeed, this was a
marked tendency of the war, and the record from the first of August
would show not only an increased number of duels between individual
machines, but of skirmishes between air patrols, and contests in which
a number of machines would attack in force opposing aeroplanes.
As the war developed there was an increased tendency toward the
tactical maneuvering of a number of aeroplanes, a greater frequency of
bombing raids, and these attempts naturally led to reprisals as well
as to defensive efforts. Often the aeroplanes designed for dropping
bombs were heavy and powerful machines, not armed primarily for
attack, but depending for protection upon one or more fighting
aeroplanes of greater maneuvering power which accompanied them and
carried machine guns and other weapons. In these bombing raids the
tendency was to use a number of machines. In the raids of October 2,
1915, on the stations of Vosiers and Challeranges, sixty-five machines
were employed. A few days later a fleet of eighty-four French
aeroplanes made a raid on the German lines, starting from an aerodrome
near Nancy. Since then raids by large flocks of aeroplanes have become
common.
One important objective of such attacks was the destruction of the
enemy's communication, and the bombing of railway trains bringing up
supplies or reenforcements, became a most important feature. Often
this involved considerable daring on the part of the pilot and his
companion, as to insure a successful dropping of bombs the aeroplanes
had to descend to comparatively low levels. The British Royal Flying
Corps on several occasions dropped bombs from a height hardly more
than 500 feet, and in the operations at the end of September, 1915,
within five days, nearly six tons of explosives were dropped on moving
trains with considerable damage.
The most striking feature, perhaps in the work of the aeroplanes, was
the increased height of flight which developing conditions made
necessary. At the beginning of the war it was assumed that overhead
reconnaissance could be carried on in safety at a height of from 4,000
to 6,000 feet above the surface of the earth. At such altitude it was
assumed that the aeroplane was safe from terrestrial artillery on
account of offering so small a target, as well as on account of its
speed and the difficulty of determining its range, but this condition
of affairs did not long remain. Both armies, and particularly the
Germans, acquired experience in the use of their antiaircraft guns,
and improved weapons were placed at their disposal, so that it was not
long before the gunners could cause their shrapnel to burst with
deadly effect some three miles in vertical height above the ground,
and up to 10,000 feet their shooting compelled the admiration of the
aviators of the Allies.
Such efficient gunnery practice, of course, contributed to the loss of
life among the aviators and the destruction of machines,
notwithstanding the constantly increased height of flying. In some
cases aeroplanes managed to reach the ground safely with as many as
300 bullet holes, but in other cases a single bullet sufficed to kill
the aviator or to hit a vital part, and this was a compelling reason
for armoring the aeroplanes and protecting their engines and controls.
All of this naturally produced a higher standard of skill in the
European armies than was ever before realized, and the training of new
aviators, especially in the light of war experience, was carried on in
large part by convalescent members of the aviation corps who had seen
actual service in the field, so that the quota of recruits was not
only maintained but supplied, trained to a high degree of efficiency.
The progress of the war marked changes in the tactics of the aerial
services of the various armies. The French and English believed that
in the course of the war the Germans had lost a number of their most
skilled and intrepid aviators, and that the expert pilots were held in
readiness for more serious effort rather than being sacrificed for any
contests of doubtful outcome. The Germans for a time became more
cautious in their fights over the French lines, and in the summer and
autumn of 1915 seldom crossed. This probably was due in large part to
the increased number of aeroplanes at the disposal of the French and
English. Apparently for a number of weeks there was a decrease in the
reckless flights on the part of the Germans and desire to give battle,
and more attention was paid to developing tactical efficiency and
securing military results. Often their aeroplanes operated in
connection with the artillery, and in many cases their object was to
draw the Allies' machines within range of the German antiaircraft
artillery, which was efficiently served.
A complete chronicle of the flights and air battles of the period of
the war under review would contain a record where hardly a day passed
without some flight or contest of greater or less significance. A duel
between two hostile airmen might be of less importance than an
exchange of shots between members of opposing outposts, yet it might
involve heroic fighting and a skillful manipulation of aeroplane and
machine gun, when one or both of the contestants might be thrown
headlong to the ground. So for these pages we may select some of the
more significant of the battles in the air with the understanding that
many of those ignored were not without their vital interest.
CHAPTER LVI
ZEPPELIN RAIDS--ATTACKS ON GERMAN ARMS FACTORIES--GERMAN OVER-SEA
RAIDS
The second year of the war opened with a spirited combat between the
German and French aeroplanes, on August 1, 1915, when six attacking
German machines engaged fifteen French machines over Chateau Salins.
This fight, which at the time was widely discussed, lasted
three-quarters of an hour, and as the French reenforcements came the
Germans retreated to their own lines, though it was reported that
several of the French machines were disabled and forced to land.
Regarding this contest the opinion was expressed that the French were
inadequately armed to fight the Germans, and that the latter were not
driven back until armed scouts had joined the French. Furthermore, it
was believed that the German aeroplanes were more heavily armed than
those previously employed, and represented a new and more powerful
type of machine. If the French suffered in this battle for lack of
armament, the lesson was taken to heart, for the following week a
French squadron of thirty-two units, including bombing machines
convoyed by a flotilla of armed scouts (_avions de chasse_) made an
attack on the station and factories of Saarbruecken.
There was air war over sea as well as over land. On August 3, 1915, a
squadron of Russian seaplanes attacked a German gunboat near Windau
and forced her to run ashore, while the same squadron attacked a
Zeppelin and two German seaplanes, one of which was shot down. The
Russians the following day attacked Constantinople and dropped a
number of bombs on the harbor fortifications. That the advantage was
not entirely with the Allies at this time was shown by the report that
on August 10, 1915, a Turkish seaplane attacked an ally submarine near
Boulair. The Russian seaplanes were again successful on August 10,
1915, when they participated in the repulse of the Germans off the
Gulf of Riga, where they attempted to land troops. The Russians had
merely small sea craft such as torpedo boats and submarines in this
engagement, but their seaplanes proved very effective, and the Germans
retired with a cruiser and two torpedo boats damaged.
After the attack by German Zeppelins on the east coast of England in
June, 1915, there was a lull in the activity of the German airships.
Count Zeppelin had stated early in the spring that in August fifteen
airships of a new type capable of carrying at least two tons of
explosives would be available, and accordingly, when a squadron of
five Zeppelins were sighted off Vlieland, near the entrance of the
Zuyder Zee, pointed for England, it was realized that attempted aerial
invasion was being resumed in earnest. These airships bombed war
vessels in the Thames, the London docks, torpedo boats near Harwich,
and military establishments on the Humber, with the result, slight in
its military importance, of some twenty-eight casualties and a number
of fires due to incendiary bombs. This attack encountered resistance
and counterattacks from the British aerial services, not without
effect, but lacking in positive achievement. One Zeppelin was damaged
by the gunfire of the land defenses, and upon her return an Ally
aeroplane squadron from Dunkirk attacked the disabled airship and
finally blew her up after she had fallen into the sea off Ostend.
It was realized, particularly by the British, that the best way to
meet the Zeppelins was by aeroplane attack, yet on the raid just
described, the great airships entirely escaped the British aviators.
This Zeppelin raid was followed by a second on the night of August
12-13, 1915, which was directed against the military establishment at
Harwich. Six people were killed and seventeen wounded by the bombs,
and the post office was set on fire by an incendiary bomb. Aside from
this, damage was limited. On August 17 and 18, 1915, a squadron of
four Zeppelins again attacked the English east coast, and their bombs
killed ten persons and wounded thirty-six. Once again the airships
were able to escape the British air patrols and made their escape
apparently without damage, though one, the _L-10_, while flying over
Vlieland, Holland, was fired upon by Dutch troops.
An important effect of the Zeppelin raids was to bring the war
directly to the experience of the British public, and the effect on
recruiting as well as in arousing an increased national spirit for
defense was marked. On the other hand, in Germany the Zeppelin raids
produced great elation, and the German populace anticipated that the
aerial invasion of Great Britain would contribute materially toward
the conclusion of the war.
In the early summer of 1915 there had been rather less activity on the
war front in eastern France and Flanders, especially on the part of
the Germans, and as later developments proved, they apparently were
engaged in experiments with new types of machines and engines. There
was also in this time a manifestation of increased skill on the part
of the German air pilots, so that when the new machines were brought
out they were handled with skill and ease, especially when climbing to
the upper air and dodging the shells from antiaircraft guns of the
Allies.
In the meantime, and especially during August, 1915, the French began
to develop bombing attacks against German arms and ammunition
factories, railway junctions, and other military establishments, on a
scale never before attempted in aerial warfare. Toward the middle of
the month as many as eighty-four French aeroplanes were assembled for
a flight over the German lines, and so carefully were these aviators
trained that in less than four minutes the eighty-four aeroplanes were
in the sky, arranged in perfect tactical formation. On this particular
occasion a reconnaissance was made in force, and the various
evolutions and the distributions of the machines were carefully tried.
With such practice, on August 25, 1915, a French aerial squadron,
including sixty-two aviators, flew over the heights of Dilligen in
Rhenish Prussia, thirty miles southeast of Treves, and dropped more
than 150 bombs, thirty of which were of large caliber. This raid,
while successful in many respects, was not without damage, for the
French lost four aeroplanes. One fell to earth on fire near Bolzhen
with the pilot and observer killed. A second was captured by the
Germans, together with its occupants, near Romilly, a third was forced
to land near Arracourt, north of Luneville, and was destroyed by
German artillery, and the fourth landed within range of the German
guns near Moevruns, south of Nomeny, behind the French front. On this
very day a second French squadron bombed the German camps of Pannes
and Baussant, starting fires, and discharged bombs over other German
stations and bivouacs. In Argonne stations were bombarded as well as
the aviation park of Vitry-en-Artois. Allied fleets of French,
British, and Belgian aeroplanes, both of the land and sea services,
comprising some sixty machines in all, bombarded the wood of Houthulst
and set a number of fires.
It must not be inferred that at this time there was any lack of
individual effort or achievement. Often bombs were dropped at
important stations on lines of communication, and on August 26, 1915,
a poisoned gas plant at Dornach was bombed by a French aeroplane and
ten shells dropped.
[Illustration: German aeroplane guns, mounted on turntables. They can
be turned quickly to any direction and to whatever angle of elevation
is required.]
On the other side, during the month of August, 1915, and particularly
toward the end, raiding expeditions were organized by the Germans, and
on August 28, 1915, an attack on Paris was organized, in which six
German aeroplanes were to take part. This furnished a striking test of
the French aerial defenses, for none of the German aeroplanes was able
to get near Paris, and in the attempt one was shot to pieces by a
French gun plane which overtook the German and riddled the machine
with bullets, causing it to fall in flames with the pilot incinerated.
The German aeroplanes were first discovered by the French scouts as
they flew over the French battle front at so great a speed and height
that attack from the ground from the parks near the battle lines was
impossible. The alarm was given by telephone, however, while north of
Paris the French patrol flotilla was found in readiness. The Germans
were forced to retreat, and in addition to the aeroplane shot down, as
already mentioned, another was fired upon after it had dropped five
bombs on Montmorency.
On September 3, 1915, a raid nearly 150 miles from the French base was
made by two French aviators on Donaueschingen and Marbach in Bavaria.
On the same day in retaliation for the German bombardment at Luneville
and Compiegne the French air service sent out a squadron of nineteen
aeroplanes over the town of Treves, which dropped about 100 shells.
The same squadron, after returning to its base, proceeded in the
afternoon to drop fifty-eight shells on the station at Dommary and on
Baroncour.
During September, 1915, the Germans resumed over-sea raids, and naval
airships attacked the city of London, with results considered
generally satisfactory, as German bombs were dropped on the western
part of the city, the factories at Norwich, and the harbor and iron
works near Middlesbrough. In this raid, made by three Zeppelins on the
night of September 8-9, 1915, the British reported as a result 20
killed, 14 seriously wounded, 74 slightly wounded. The Zeppelins flew
over Trafalgar Square, one of the innermost places of London, and were
clearly visible from the streets. They were attacked by antiaircraft
guns, and by aeroplanes, but the latter were unable to locate the
airships, whose bombs, both incendiary and explosive, fell on
buildings and in the streets. Later in the month of September other
Zeppelin raids occurred over various parts of the eastern countries of
England.
On September 22, 1915, French aviators made a spectacular raid and
shelled the royal palace and station at Stuttgart in the kingdom of
Wuerttemburg. This was partly in retaliation for the bombarding by the
Germans of open towns and civilian populations, and in the course of
the attack about 100 shells were dropped on the royal palace and the
station, killing, according to German reports, four persons, and
wounding a number of soldiers and civilians, but without doing
important material damage. Antiaircraft opened fire on the French
raiders and they were forced to retire. In this attack the French
machines were painted with the German distinguishing marks, with the
result that after their attack a German airman arriving at Stuttgart
was fired on by the German troops until he was recognized as one of
their own officers, fortunately landing unhurt near the town.
During the first three weeks in September, 1915, the Royal Flying
Corps, with the British army in the field, was very active, and there
were forty air duels in eighteen days. During the first three weeks
four monoplanes were known to have been destroyed, and at least seven
others sent heavily to earth, and all survivors were, of course,
forced to retire to their own lines.
One notable contest by a British pilot took place one morning when he
beat off the first four German machines that had come to attack him,
one after the other, but by the time of the onslaught of the fifth, he
had exhausted all of his machine-gun and revolver ammunition. The
British airman proceeded to go through the motions of aiming and
firing his revolver, and the German pilot not realizing that the
weapon was useless, after firing a number of shots at him, retired, so
that the British officer was able to finish his reconnoitering and
return to his own lines.
On September 7, 1915, a furious battle in the plain sight of thousands
of soldiers occurred in midair, and resulted in the destruction of a
German aeroplane, which had been particularly active in ranging the
German guns, and had circled and signaled above the British positions,
apparently with considerable effect. A British aeroplane straightway
went out and attacked the German at a height of 9,000 feet above the
latter's lines, and the duel was in clear sight of the armies. Every
form of maneuver known to the expert pilot was indulged in, and in the
meantime, both foes were shooting at each other as rapidly as
possible. Finally the German aeroplane was seen to fall erratically at
an angle, nose downward, that indicated its probable destruction.
On September 13, 1915, two German aeroplanes were brought down by the
British within their lines, one of which fought a most thrilling
battle before it succumbed. It was a large biplane of considerable
speed, armed with two machine guns, one fore and one aft. Flying over
the British lines, it was sighted by the English, and a similar type
aeroplane attacked. A shot hit the German machine in the gasoline
tank, putting the motor out of commission, and, notwithstanding their
rapid fall, the aviators maintained their firing until the end. The
machine crashed to the earth, and both pilot and observer were killed,
but the aeroplane itself was not badly damaged. On the same day,
September 13, 1915, a German aeroplane visited the coast of Kent and
dropped bombs, which resulted in damage to a house and injured four
persons before it was chased off by two British naval aeroplanes.
Regarding the British aviation service, Field Marshal Sir John French,
in a dispatch to the secretary of state for war, said with special
reference to the fighting on September 25, 1915, at Artois, "that the
wing of the Royal Flying Corps attached to the Third Army performed
valuable work, and not only in times of actual battle, but throughout
the summer. They continuously cooperated with the artillery,
photographing the positions of the enemy, bombing their
communications, and reconnoitering far over hostile country." In the
period under review by the field marshal, he stated that there had
been more than 240 combats in the air, and in nearly every case the
British pilots had to seek out the Germans behind the German lines,
where their aeroplanes were aided by the fire of the movable
antiaircraft guns, and that they were successful in bringing down four
German machines behind the British trenches, and at least twelve in
the German lines, as well as putting out of action many others more or
less damaged.
While considerable has been made of the Zeppelins, the French airships
were also active during the war. One of the latter craft of this type,
the _Alsace_, having a capacity of 23,000 cubic meters (30,000 cubic
yards), on the night of September 30 and October 1, 1915, bombarded
the junction of Amagne-Lucquy, and the stations of Attigny and
Vouziers on the trunk-line railroad going through Luxemburg and the
Ardennes, which was the main supply line for the whole German line
from Verdun to the neighborhood of Novon. This airship made its
journey and returned safely. However, three days later, in a cruise in
the Reathel district, it was forced to land, and the crew were
captured by the Germans.
On October 3, 1915, a group of French aeroplanes started out to attack
Luxemburg, where the kaiser on his return from Russia had established
his headquarters. The station was bombarded at the railroad bridge and
also military buildings. The "group" that was used for this work
consisted of three flotillas and a flotilla leader, that is, a total
of nineteen aeroplanes.
CHAPTER LVII
ATTACKS ON LONDON--BOMBARDMENT OF ITALIAN PORTS--AEROPLANE AS COMMERCE
DESTROYER
On the evening of October 13, 1915, one of the most noted of the
Zeppelin raids over Great Britain occurred, with London as the
objective. The airships flew very high to avoid searchlights and
gunfire, thus interfering with the accuracy of the bomb dropping, and
in only one case was damage done to property connected with the
conduct of the war. The darkening of the city and the various
protective measures required high flying, so that the dropping of
bombs was more or less at random. The raid occurred in the early
evening, and while hundreds of thousands of persons heard the bursting
bombs and the guns, there was no panic, and the majority of the
citizens took shelter as they had been warned officially. An
investigation of the damage the next morning showed five distinct
areas where bombs containing high explosives had been dropped, and
the principal damage was where the explosion of the bombs falling into
subways containing gas and water pipes had ignited the former. In one
case a number of bombs were dropped on a suburban area where there
were no aerial defenses or searchlights, but in few cases were houses
actually struck or seriously damaged. Most of the damage was done to
people in the streets, and the effect on buildings, while serious,
possessed no military importance, and fires produced by incendiary
bombs were readily extinguished. The London police officials repeated
the warning to the citizens to remain within doors during any
subsequent air raids and advising them to keep at hand supplies of
water and sand as a safeguard against incendiary bombs.
In the raid of German Zeppelins over the British Isles on the night of
October 13-14, 1915, and the attack on London, forty-five were killed
and 114 wounded. It was reported during November that Great Britain
proposed to construct fifty dirigibles within two years to meet the
Zeppelin menace, and to construct each year a sufficient number to
secure complete mastery of the air for England. The attack produced a
degree of indignation and irritation that was more than proportional
to the damage done, and the Government was criticized for the
inadequacy of the protective measures.
After these air raids on Great Britain there was a lull in such
activities, but it was realized by the English that with the opening
of spring these attacks probably would be carried on with greater
vigor and determination, as there would be an increased number both of
Zeppelins and Schuette-Lanz airships. The atmospheric conditions
pervading the British Isles formed as important a defense against
airship attacks for almost half the year as actual military measures.
Several times fogs and high winds prevented attempts of this kind, and
it was realized by the German air pilots that unless weather
conditions were favorable flights should not be attempted. Therefore,
during the late autumn and winter of 1915-1916, they concerned
themselves with problems of construction and equipment, and the
training of air pilots rather than actual attempts.
In the meantime the Germans suffered by the destruction of several
Zeppelins. One was destroyed with its crew by colliding with a dummy
on October 18, 1915, near Maubeuge, and the _Z-28_ was lost near
Hamburg, and a third, whose number was unknown, at Bitterfeld, Saxony.
On December 5, 1915, the Russians brought down another Zeppelin near
Kalkun on the Libau-Romin railway, locating it with a powerful
searchlight and destroying it by artillery fire. The airship
previously had escaped several attacks after being caught by the
searchlights, but when it appeared for a second time over Kalkun, with
its motors silent, it was hit by gunfire. Another accident at Tondern
resulted in the destruction of the Zeppelin _Z-22_ during the first
week in December, 1915, this being the same station at which the
_Z-19_ was destroyed in the previous month. The _Z-22_ had been in
service only a few weeks, and was of the latest type, with invisible
gondolas, platforms at the top of the envelope, and detachable rafts
for use in case of accident while crossing the sea. Its destruction
was due to the accidental explosion of a bomb while the airship was
leaving the shed, and nearly all the forty members of the crew were
killed or wounded. Still another Zeppelin was reported to have been
destroyed by a storm in Belgium about December 12, 1915.
On November 15, 1915, two Austrian aeroplanes bombarded Brescia,
killing seven persons and wounding ten, all of whom were civilians,
and some of them women. None of the bombs hit any of the arms
factories of the city, which is about fifteen miles west of the
southern part of the Lago di Garda, while Verona, which was attacked
by Austrian aeroplanes on the previous Sunday, is about the same
distance east. The attack on Verona resulted in the death of thirty
persons and injury to about twice that number, and was made possible
in a degree by the fog which allowed the aircraft to approach close to
the city before they were discovered. They flew as low as 4,500 feet,
it is stated, each dropping five or six bombs. On November 18, 1915,
the Austrians' seaplane squadron dropped bombs on the forts at San
Nicole and Alberoni, and also on the arsenal, the aviation station,
gas works, railway station, and several parks at Venice. The Italians
attacked in turn, and there was a heavy fire of antiaircraft guns, but
the Austrian squadron retired in safety. On November 19, 1915,
Austrian aviators threw fifteen bombs on Udine, Italy, killing twelve
persons and wounding twenty-seven.
The activity of the Italian aero service developed in the course of
the war, and there were many combats between them and Austrian
aviators. On December 30, 1915, it was reported that during the naval
engagement off Durazzo an Austrian seaplane was shot down by an
Italian destroyer, while a fortnight later, January 12, 1916, when
four Austrian aeroplanes were attacking Rimini with bombs with little
success, one of them was brought down by fire from the main artillery
and shells from the warships. On January 13, 1916, Italian aeroplanes
dropped bombs on a barracks in the Breguzzo zone in the valley of the
Giudicaria, with success. On January 15, 1916, an Italian air squadron
made an extensive raid in the region of the East Isonzo and bombarded
the enemy aviation camp at Assevizza, the cantonments at Cihapovano
and Boruberg, and the railway stations at Longatica, Pregasina, and
Lubiana. This squadron was under continuous fire by antiaircraft
batteries, but returned in safety.
Reports from Montenegro during January, 1916, reported the activity of
Austrian aeroplanes in bombing operations. On January 7, 1916, an
Austrian aeroplane fell near Dulcigno, and the aviators were taken
prisoners.
On November 28, 1915, the French were successful in three battles in
the air and two raids. A French aeroplane in Belgium pursued a German
squadron and brought down one of the German machines in the sea off
Westende-Bains, between Nieuport and Ostend. On the same day ten
French aeroplanes set fire to the German hangars in Habsheim in
southern Alsace, and also damaged an aeroplane that was on the ground.
Two German machines that attempted a pursuit of the French were
repulsed, one being damaged by machine gunfire, and the other being
capsized. On the same day, near Nancy, French aeroplanes shot down a
German machine and put another to flight.
The Allies continued vigorously their attacks on various munition
plants and aero stations of the Germans. How much damage can be done
by aeroplane attacks was indicated in an item in the annual financial
statement of the Krupps, which was published during the year 1915 in a
German paper. This item reads: "Claims and damages due to the war, ten
million marks ($2,375,000)," and deals with the effect of the raid
over Essen by the airmen of the Allies.
The German aerodrome at Gits, containing fourteen machines, was
attacked, and at La Chapelette the ammunition factory with nineteen
machines was also the object of an attempt by the Allies. Some sixteen
British aeroplanes bombarded a stores depot at Miramont in the Somme
district, and the aerodrome at Hervilly. All of the machines returned
safely, and considerable damage was believed to have been done at the
above points.
The aeroplane as a commerce destroyer had a test on October 30, 1915,
when three German machines attacked the steamship _Avocet_ of the Cork
Steamship Company. One of these, a large battle plane, discharged some
thirty-six bombs, but none hit. With the supply of projectiles
exhausted, the battle plane, handled with great skill, opened gunfire
on the vessel, while the small planes crossed and recrossed, dropping
their bombs, but without effect. The aviators and their observers also
opened rifle fire on the steamer, but in the space of thirty-five
minutes they were unable to do any serious damage, and none of the
crew was injured. It was noted that the failure to fly low so as to
get sufficient accuracy for dropping the bombs was responsible for the
miscarriage of this attack.
The use of seaplanes to attack merchantmen and smaller warcraft became
a feature of the Austrian and German campaign, and in November and
December, 1915, several attacks were reported on steamers of the
Allies. Two German aeroplanes dropped bombs on a British patrol ship
off North Hinder Lightship in the North Sea on November 6, 1915, and
set her on fire. The French steamer _Harmonie_ was attacked in the
Mediterranean by an Austrian aeroplane, but none of the six bombs
which were dropped struck the vessel. Three German seaplanes attacked
a British cargo boat aground off the coast of Belgium, but before they
could succeed in destroying her with bombs, the attempt was reported
by the Allies' aero scouts, and a squadron of aeroplanes went to the
rescue. The Germans were forced to retire, while French torpedo boats
floated the British freighters.
One of the notable events of the year was the first seaplane battle
between the British and German seaplanes near Dunkirk on November 28,
1915. The British were successful, as they were also in an attack on a
large German seaplane by one of their aeroplanes patrolling off the
Belgian coast. The German machine was hit and fell on the sea,
bursting into flames and exploding on striking the water. No trace of
pilot, passengers, or machine could be found. The British aeroplane,
under command of Lieutenant Graham, was also damaged by gunfire and
fell into the sea, but the officers were picked up and safely landed.
The Allies, and particularly the British, employed aeroplanes chiefly
for patrolling their coasts, naval harbors and subsidiary fleet bases,
as well as the principal shipping lanes, in order to keep them clear
of the insidious action of hostile submarines. Of this silent and
steady coast patrol work, which is deprived of any spectacular side,
little has come to light, except where a reconnaissance also involved
an attack upon forces of the enemy.
It was during such patrol flights, along the Belgian coast, that two
German submarines were put out of action by aviators of the Allies.
The first of these engagements occurred on August 26, 1915, when
Squadron Commander A. W. Bigsworth of the Royal Naval Air Service
destroyed a German submarine off Ostend by dropping several bombs on
the but partly submerged vessel. The second German submarine was
destroyed off Middelkerke, Belgium, on November 28, 1915, by a British
seaplane, piloted by Flight Sub-Lieutenant Viney, and carrying a
French officer, Lieutenant Count de Sincay, as an observer. German
submarines having been reported in the vicinity, the aviators were
ordered to patrol the coast with the object of watching for the enemy.
The aviators rose to an altitude of 3,000 meters, and had been up for
half an hour when they sighted, four miles from the shore, two
submarines side by side on the surface. The place was favorable for
attack, the sea being shallow there, and the aviators hoped that the
enemy boats would be unable to escape by diving. The seaplane quickly
dived to about 200 meters above the sea and attacked the submarines,
one of which succeeded in escaping, the other boat, however, was hit
by two bombs, which broke open its hull and caused it to sink in a few
minutes.
Owing to the great range of vision afforded by a seaplane, both
horizontally and vertically, owing also to its considerable speed and
ease of maneuvering, marine aeroplanes have proven formidable foes for
submarines, which they can easily overtake and destroy with bombs.
Especially is this true when a submarine is steaming partly submerged,
with only its periscope visible above the sea, for, whereas, the
submarine's outline is easily detected from great heights, the
periscope has but a limited range of vision horizontally, and none
vertically.
Another instance of how aeroplanes can be used for attacking war
vessels was furnished by the feat of a British aviator who attacked a
Turkish army transport on August 12, 1915, in the Marmora Sea and sank
the vessel with a heavy projectile, which, it is claimed, weighed over
200 pounds.
Although not yet sufficiently developed to fulfill the functions
for which they are ultimately intended, i. e., strategical
reconnaissance and offensive action against vessels of war and
coast fortifications--seaplanes have played a very useful role in
tactical operations, and particularly in convoying troop ships, as
well as in "spotting" for naval guns. Whenever the comparatively
limited range of seaplanes precluded their employment for
long-range reconnaissances or bombardment, airships were called
upon to carry out these duties.
In the matter of airships, Germany was markedly favored by the
possession of the Zeppelin type, whose speed and endurance is still
unequaled by the smaller, nonrigid dirigibles which constitute the
chief bulk of the British, French, Italian, and Russian fleets of
"lighter-than-air" machines.
Obviously, the employment of airships is fraught with even more
danger, on account of the large hull exposed to enemy fire, than that
of aeroplanes. A great number of Zeppelins have been destroyed either
by antiaircraft guns or by storms, although the gallant feat of the
late Flight Lieutenant Warneford, who blew up single-handed a Zeppelin
near Ghent, has not yet been repeated by aviators of the Allies.
An Austrian aviator, however, succeeded on August 5, 1915, in putting
out of action the Italian dirigible _Citta-di-Jesi_, which was
returning from a bombing raid on Pola. Soaring above the airship the
aviator dropped several bombs on the envelope, which was damaged, the
hydrogen being ignited thereby. The airship did not explode, but was
forced to alight on the sea, her crew being captured by the Austrians.
CHAPTER LVIII
AIR FIGHTING ON ALL FRONTS--LOSSES
By December, 1915, and January, 1916, the official reports of the war
in the air contained a continued account of activity. Almost every day
reconnoitering machines were sent out over one city or another, and
attempts were made to interfere with their work or to bring on battle,
and on December 19, 1915, the British War Office reported forty-four
combats in the air, with two enemy aeroplanes brought to the ground
within their own lines, and two brought down in damaged condition. On
this day one of the British machines was missing.
Again, the report on December 29, 1915, from the British War Office
mentioned an unsuccessful attack by the Germans on one of the British
aerodromes by four machines, only two of which reached their
objective, and no damage was done to them, although one of the British
aeroplanes was shot down. On December 29, 1915, sixteen British
aeroplanes attacked the Comines station with bombs, and hit the
station railway and sheds in the vicinity. Ten of the British
aeroplanes attacked the aerodromes and did considerable damage, in
both cases all machines returning safely.
On this day, December 29, 1915, there were twelve encounters with
hostile aeroplanes, and a British aeroplane engaged four belonging to
the Germans, one of which was believed to have been brought down,
while another was damaged, and all four were driven off. The British
aeroplane fell as the result of a struggle with two machines. On
January 5, 1916, a number of British aeroplanes made a bombing raid
against enemy aeroplanes at Douai, while the Germans retaliated by an
aeroplane raid over Boulogne, dropping a few bombs without damage. The
next day the British made another raid with eleven machines on gun and
supply stations at Lesars. On January 10, 1916, enemy aircraft dropped
bombs near Starzelle, Hazebrouck and St. Omer, and one woman and one
child were killed.
That the activities of the British were not always crowned with
success is stated in the report for January 13, 1916, where record is
made of the fact that four of the British aeroplanes sent out on the
previous day had not returned. On January 17, 1916, sixteen British
aeroplanes attacked the German supply depot at Lesars, northeast of
Albert, and did considerable damage. On this day there were nineteen
encounters in the air, and five of the German machines were driven
down, and two British aeroplanes were lost.
The activity of the French did not diminish as the war progressed, and
the activity of the bomb-operating squadron continued. On December 20,
1915, four French aeroplanes designed for bomb-dropping, escorted by
seven machines with rapid-fire guns dropped on the fort and station at
Muelhausen six shells of 155-millimeter caliber, and twenty shells of
ninety-six caliber. In the terse language of the official report,
"they reached their objective." The damage must be imagined as it was
not specified.
During December, 1915, and January, 1916, the French aviators were
active with the eastern army, although many difficulties were
encountered, especially the intense cold in the Balkan Mountains when
reconnoitering around the Bulgarian lines and elsewhere. French
aviators during December, 1915, shelled Uskub, Istip, Strumitza, and
other encampments with great effect, and they made a remarkable
series of photographs and maps, in addition to reporting to
headquarters by wireless. The aviation corps in this section of Europe
furnished daily weather reports to the headquarters staff regarding
the speed of the wind and the height of the clouds from 1,000 meters
altitude, and this work shows the extent of the organization and plan
of campaign. On December 29, 1915, the French aeroplanes bombarded
parks and encampments of the Bulgarians at Petrik, east of Lake
Doiran, and that the activity in this region was not all one-sided was
evident by the fact that on January 27, 1916, hostile aeroplanes
bombarded the cantonments of the Allies in the environs of Saloniki,
doing little damage, but losing one of their aeroplanes, which was
brought to earth by gunfire. On January 14, 1916, the Allies were
again attacked, and bombs were dropped on Janes (Yanesh), northwest of
Kukus (Kilkich), and on Doganizi.
In the operations around Constantinople both sides employed aeroplanes
for various purposes. On the Gallipoli front on December 20, 1915, it
was reported that the Allies had a seaplane shot down and its
occupants made prisoners, while on December 23, 1915, an ally
aeroplane was shot down at Birheba. On December 26, 1915, an ally
aeroplane was brought to earth near Birelsabe, and the French pilot,
Captain Baron de Ceron, and a British lieutenant were killed. On
December 27, 1915, the Turkish forces sent out a seaplane, which made
a reconnoitering flight over Tenedos, the island of Mavro, and the
many positions near Sedd-ul-Bahr, striking a torpedo boat south of
this point with a bomb. On December 28, 1915, three ally aeroplanes
flew over Ari-Burnu, and one of these was hit by artillery fire and
fell into the sea, while a British seaplane successfully dropped some
bombs on a tent camp. On December 28, 1915, Turkish artillery brought
down a biplane flying over Yent Shehr and Kum Kaleh, and on the
previous day a reconnoitering and bombing expedition was undertaken by
a Turkish seaplane, which dropped bombs on the harbor tool house at
Mudros.
On January 1, 1916, a Turkish seaplane attacked and repulsed a hostile
ally aeroplane while reconnoitering, and on the following day a
Turkish seaplane dropped bombs on the enemy's camp at Sedd-ul-Bahr.
Lieutenant Ryck Boddike figured prominently in a number of successful
flights, in one of which he attacked a French aeroplane on January 6,
1916, killing the aviator and bringing down the machine on the
Anatolian coast, near Akbanca. On the following day he shot down, east
of Yalova, a British Farman aeroplane. On January 7, 1916, also there
was bomb dropping by the Turkish aviators over the enemy's positions
at Sedd-ul-Bahr, and their aviation station on the island of Imbros.
January 10, 1916, Lieutenant Ryck Boddike brought down his fourth
enemy aeroplane, which fell into the open sea, and two days later he
shot down his fifth, a British machine of the Farman type, killing one
of the aviators and wounding the other. This aeroplane fell in such
condition that it could be repaired by the Turks. On January 14, 1916,
a Turkish aeroplane attacked a monitor which, with other vessels,
opened fire in the direction of Kilid Bahr. The monitor was forced to
withdraw in flames.
Late in the year 1915 the Germans, after a period of inactivity, made
a raid in force on the French fortress at Belfort. At least three
aeroplanes dropped bombs over the city, and were attacked in turn by
the machine and antiaircraft guns of the garrison, and French aviators
proceeded to the attack, beating off the Germans, who returned again
later in the day discharging another shower of shells over the
fortress.
On December 29, 1915, the Germans reported that they had shot down an
English biplane in an aerial flight near Bruges, and the occupants of
the machine were killed. The English machine had been flying over the
district of Lichtervelde, south of Bruges, and had dropped several
bombs, one of which had hit a munitions depot with disastrous effect.
A German aeroplane intercepted the British machine on its return, and
in the course of the battle both machines were disabled and crashed to
earth. The same day the Germans reported the loss of two aeroplanes by
the British, one of which was forced to descend at a point to the
north of Lens, and the other, a large battle aeroplane, was shot down
in a fight north of Han, on December 27, 1915, and three British
aeroplanes were destroyed by fire west of Lille. The Berlin report on
December 29, 1915, stated that on the whole front artillery and
aeroplanes were active. The enemy's aircraft attacked the towns and
railroad stations of Wervick and Menin, Belgium, without, however,
doing military damage. A British aeroplane was shot down in a fight
northeast of Cambrai, and on January 6, 1916, the Allies made an
aircraft attack upon Douai, which failed, and two British aeroplanes
were shot down by German aviators. One of these was brought down by
Lieutenant Boelke, and was the seventh aeroplane that he had disabled.
January 10, 1916, a German air squadron attacked the warehouses of
Furnes. On this same day an interesting air battle occurred, involving
a series of fights, with casualties on both sides, between the French
and German aeroplanes above the lines of the latter near Dixmude.
Three French avions cannon (Voisin steel biplanes armed with
37-millimeter quick-firing guns at the bow) fought with German
scouting aeroplanes of the Fokker type. The attack was brought on by
the Fokker assailing a French machine which was forced to descend, but
one of its companions straightway attacked the German and brought him
down by machine gunfire at a distance of twenty-five meters. A third
French machine was also successful in attacking another Fokker, which
fell in the forest of Houthulst, southeast of Dixmude.
On January 11, 1916, a French battle aeroplane was attacked by German
rifle fire and forced to land near Noumen, south of Dixmude in
Belgium, and the aeroplane and its occupants, uninjured, became German
prisoners. On this day a British biplane was shot down in an encounter
near Tournai, Belgium. Lieutenant Boelke on January 13, 1916, shot
down a British aeroplane, as did also Lieutenant Immelmann--one
northeast of Tourcoing and the other near Bapaume. Both were decorated
with the Order of Pour-le-Merite by the emperor. A third British
aeroplane was shot down in an aerial fight near Roubaix, and a fourth
was brought down by German defense guns near Ligne, northwest of
Lille. Of the eight British officers on these four aeroplanes six were
killed and two wounded.
On January 15, 1916, Lieutenant Boelke again shot down an enemy
aeroplane, which fell within the British lines and was set on fire by
German artillery. On January 18, 1916, there were aerial battles near
Paschendaele and Dadezelle in Flanders, and three of the four
occupants of one machine were killed. A French aeroplane was shot down
by German airmen near Moyenvic, and the pilot and observer were
captured.
In the course of the war the German aeroplane fleet developed at the
close of the year 1915, and at the beginning of 1916, a renewed
activity and initiative of attack. In the period from December 20,
1915, to January 19, 1916, an analysis of the official reports
indicated that the British airmen had had seventy-five individual
combats with the Germans, in the course of which nine British and
eight German machines were lost. The Germans, on the other hand,
reported in this time that they had destroyed fourteen British and
three French aeroplanes, while the French claimed the destruction of
three German machines, one of which was shot down in the Balkans;
while the Turks, defending the Dardanelles, claimed to have shot down
seven ally aeroplanes. Italian airmen overcame two Austrian machines,
and Austria and Montenegro each overcame one enemy aeroplane. An
analysis of these figures indicates that for this month the advantage
was distinctly with the Germans, as they had destroyed twenty-five
machines as against fourteen aeroplanes brought down by the enemy.
The statements concerning the losses of airships and aeroplanes
published by the various armies and newspapers in most cases were
disputed for their accuracy. The Paris "Temps" on February 5, 1916,
criticising a German statement, stated as the correct figures for the
aeroplane losses of the various combatants on the western front
between October 1, 1915, and January 31, 1916, the following:
"Thirteen English and seventeen French aeroplanes lost on the side of
the Allies--eleven German aeroplanes destroyed on the English front
and twenty on the French front. Of the French machines lost, four were
overcome in aerial combats, one destroyed by artillery fire, three
were forced to descend by motor troubles, and eight disappeared on
land-scouting missions."
During the month of February, 1916, patrol service was actively
maintained on both sides of the frontier; a large number of attempts
at bombing were made, and many individual combats took place, with the
losses, so far as the French and Germans were concerned, about evenly
divided, the French reporting the destruction of nine German
aeroplanes, while the Germans claimed to have destroyed eight French
and four British machines. For this period the official reports of the
British claimed that four German machines were forced to the ground,
but it was not apparent whether they had been actually destroyed or
merely forced to retire. In the French reports, in addition to the
nine German aeroplanes destroyed as noted, it was stated that two
additional were "forced down."
In January and February, 1916, the German air service again began its
activity against the British Isles, and not only Zeppelins but also
seaplanes and aeroplanes crossed the Channel and dropped explosives
and incendiary bombs on English towns and villages, mostly on the east
coast. The Germans claimed that in one instance a Zeppelin had gone as
far as Midlands in an attempt at some of the great manufacturing
centers of England, and this seemed to indicate that the campaign
would be carried on with greater relentlessness than ever and more
attempt at material damage. More and more aeroplanes of the German
service were beginning to cooperate with the Zeppelins, and it was
clear that future attacks would be in forces with aeroplanes to
protect the Zeppelins from attack by quick-flying hostile aeroplanes.
It was evident from the activity of the Germans that in all
departments of its aerial services increases were being made, and
increased activity was to be manifested. At the same time the Allies
were showing corresponding activity in their attempts to destroy the
air cruisers of the enemy.
The German military Zeppelin _L-Z-77_ was brought down by a French
incendiary shell from a 75-millimeter antiaircraft gun of the
motor-gun section of Renigny in the neighborhood of Brabant-le-roi, on
February 21, 1916. This airship was hit by an explosive shell which
ignited the gas bag and caused an explosion of the bombs, so that it
was completely wrecked and fell in flames. The _L-19_, belonging to
the German navy, previously had been destroyed by a storm in the North
Sea on January 31, 1916.
PART XII--THE UNITED STATES AND THE BELLIGERENTS
CHAPTER LIX
SINKING OF THE ARABIC--ANOTHER CRISIS--GERMANY'S DEFENSE AND
CONCESSIONS.
The _Lusitania_ issue, after the dispatch to Germany of the third
American note of July 21, 1915, was withdrawn from the publicity in
which the exchange of diplomatic communications had been made. Note
writing having fulfilled its mission in stating the case, an interlude
followed devoted to private conversations between the American
Ambassador at Berlin and the German Foreign Office and between the
German Ambassador at Washington and the State Department. Apparently a
way out of the impasse was seen in conferences in the privacy of the
chancelleries rather than by negotiations conducted in the light of
day on the theory that absorbed public observation and criticism of
every stage in the exchanges was not helpful to a settlement. But time
did not show that this resort to secrecy smoothed the path of Germany
meeting the American demands.
In fact, the ruthless course of the submarine warfare, which the
sinking of the _Lusitania_ only momentarily checked, relegated that
specific issue to the background, or at least made it only one of a
series of indictments by the United States of the entire submarine
policy pursued by the Teutonic Powers.
Thirty days after the American Government had warned Germany that any
further contravention of American neutral rights at sea would be
regarded as an act "deliberately unfriendly," the White Star Atlantic
liner, the _Arabic_, with twenty-nine Americans among her company, was
sunk without warning off the south of Ireland by a German submarine.
Germany had not responded to the reiterated demands made in the third
American note on the _Lusitania_ and the question was impetuously
asked in the press: Was the sinking of the _Arabic_ Germany's answer?
This view of Germany's second blow at transatlantic liners, made at a
time when the _Lusitania_ crisis had only seemingly abated because
withdrawn from the public gaze, found its best expression from a
pro-German quarter. The "New Yorker Staats-Zeitung" deplored the
absence of a reply from the German Government to the third _Lusitania_
note as "most unfortunate," because the subsequent destruction of the
_Arabic_ could therefore be held to be a "direct challenge,"
particularly as reports showed that the liner had been torpedoed
without warning and the rescuing of the passengers had been left to
"blind chance."
The _Arabic_ was bound from Liverpool to New York, so that the motive
for sinking her could not be that advanced by Germany for destroying
the _Lusitania_--that the vessel was carrying war munitions to her
enemies. The fact that she was headed for the United States inspired
some incensed commentators to make the direct charge that the German
submarine commander deliberately aimed at the lives of Americans on
board. As elsewhere described, the _Arabic_ was sunk on August 19,
1915, without being first warned by the attacking submarine. Abundant
testimony from survivors satisfied the Administration as to this
circumstance, in addition to disproving the belief originating from
German sources that the liner was being convoyed by a warship, whose
presence would deprive her of any right to protection from attack. The
Administration was also assured that the liner, contrary to Germany's
allegation, did not attempt to ram the submarine or escape from it.
Two Americans were among the passengers lost; but this was not the
sole issue.
The days immediately following were charged with dangerous
undercurrents. The President was silent. Had he not said all there was
to be said in the _Lusitania_ notes? But there was no doubt that the
press correctly divined what was passing through his mind, and the
press said that, short of a satisfactory explanation from Germany,
made in a proper spirit, accompanied by a disavowal of the deed, a
break in diplomatic relations was inevitable. But the onus was on
Germany to speak before the Administration took action, which could
not take the form of another protest. The situation had grown beyond
the stage of protests. They had already been made. If Germany could
not show extenuating circumstances that palliated the sinking of the
_Arabic_, the President must act on his _Lusitania_ warning, or remain
silent--must go forward or recede.
This ominous condition of American sentiment was not lost on Germany.
It was true the Berlin press affected an apathetic tone in referring
to the _Arabic_, saw nothing calling for perturbation, and, in casting
doubt on the accounts of the liner's destruction, hinted that a mine
was responsible. But the German Government, wisely informed by Count
von Bernstorff on the state of American feeling, knew better than to
belittle the situation. Pending the receipt of any report from the
submarine commander who sank the _Arabic_, it charged Ambassador von
Bernstorff to ask the American Government to defer judgment.
"The German Government," Count von Bernstorff pleaded, "trusts that
the American Government will not take a definite stand after hearing
the reports of only one side, which in the opinion of the Imperial
Government cannot correspond with the facts, but that a chance be
given Germany to be heard equally. Although the Imperial Government
does not doubt the good faith of the witnesses whose statements are
reported by the newspapers in Europe, it should be borne in mind that
these statements are naturally made under excitement, which might
easily produce wrong impressions. If Americans should actually have
lost their lives, this would naturally be contrary to our intentions.
The German Government would deeply regret the fact and beg to tender
sincerest sympathies to the American Government."
This statement, made five days after the _Arabic's_ destruction, was
viewed as the first ray of hope in the crisis. A disavowal of
unfriendly intent was seen in the regrets expressed for the loss of
American lives. There was a disposition to credit Germany with
cherishing a desire to avert a rupture with the United States and to
go to considerable lengths in that endeavor. This impression eased the
Washington atmosphere, which had been weighed by the President's
determination not to depart from the stand he took in the third
_Lusitania_ note, and also by Germany's apparent indifference to its
warning, as shown by her pursuit of submarine warfare seemingly
regardless of consequences.
What the "facts" were in the sinking of the _Arabic_ to which,
according to the German statement, the reports to hand could not
correspond, exercised official Washington. As the German Government
had not so far heard from the submarine commander of its own
acknowledgment, it could not itself be aware of this version of how
the _Arabic_ sank. Why Germany was so confident that the reports the
Administration accepted were inaccurate was explained on the surmise
that she had revised her orders to submarine commanders governing the
conduct of their operations. For some time before the sinking of the
_Arabic_ the German submarine commanders had been conforming closely
to the rules of search and seizure demanded by the United States. The
sudden divergence from this procedure in the sinking of the _Arabic_,
according to the accepted reports, implied that the submarine
commander had contravened instructions, or could plead justification.
Germany was indisposed to believe that the submarine commander had
disobeyed orders. But if he had done so, the German Government would
give "full satisfaction" to the United States. This assurance came
from the Imperial German Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, the day
after Ambassador von Bernstorff had revealed Germany's conciliatory
spirit.
The United States consented to withhold judgment until Germany had
presented her side of the case. Meantime Count von Bernstorff urged
upon his Government the imperative necessity of making more
substantial concessions to the United States on the submarine issue.
Another catastrophe such as the sinking of the _Lusitania_ or
_Arabic_, he warned Berlin, would aggravate the situation beyond his
control. That Germany recognized the danger was shown by a further
declaration from her Imperial Chancellor on August 26, 1915, wherein
he endeavored to placate American feeling by declaring that the
sinking of the _Arabic_, if caused by a German submarine, was not a
"deliberately unfriendly act," but, if the accepted version of the
disaster proved to be true, was "the arbitrary deed of the submarine
commander, not only not sanctioned but decidedly condemned by the
German Government," and that the latter, being "most anxious to
maintain amicable relations with the United States, would express its
deep regret and make full reparation." This conditional promise was
made in the continued absence of any report from the implicated
submarine commander, whose silence became mysterious. The British
added to the perplexity by making the unqualified statement that the
submarine which sank the _Arabic_ had herself been sunk by a British
patrol boat.
While the United States waited significantly for Germany to make the
_amende honorable_, an internal conflict was proceeding in Berlin over
the submarine policy. The _Arabic_ crisis had been transferred to
Germany by the stand the Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, and the
Foreign Minister, Herr von Jagow, made for modifying the ruthless
conditions under which the German admiralty had pursued the submarine
warfare. Grand Admiral von Tirpitz and the extremists opposed any
relaxation permitting passenger ships to be warned before being
torpedoed or safeguarding the lives of passengers. The chancellor
desired to place Germany on record as an observer of international
law, and the kaiser faced the task of determining which side should
prevail.
Admiral von Tirpitz was generally regarded as the originator of the
policy of sinking merchant shipping without heeding the recognized
laws of visit and search. "What would America say if Germany declares
war on all enemy merchant ships?" he had asked before Germany
initiated the submarine methods which caused the destruction of the
_Lusitania_ and the _Arabic_ and numerous other craft. His view of the
_Lusitania_ issue, as freely expressed in an interview, was that the
maintenance of friendly relations with the United States was of far
less importance than the continuance of the submarine blockade of
British ports, and that the entrance of the United States into the
war among Germany's enemies was preferable to acceding to the American
demands.
Since the _Lusitania_ disaster the imperial chancellor had been the
target of sustained attacks from the Von Tirpitz group, who charged that
he was not radical enough and inclined to abandon the extreme aims of
German policy. The agitation attained such serious proportions that the
National Liberal party issued a statement denying knowledge of any lack
of confidence in the Government. Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg's difficult
position in trying to save Germany from international outlawry, however,
was not sensibly weakened. Events temporarily showed that the kaiser
concurred more in his view than that of the hotspurs. There was a
momentary cessation of submarine activity. The chancellor's policy, the
keynote of which was: "Keep at peace with the United States," gained the
upper hand, and Admiral von Tirpitz grudgingly bowed to the chancellor's
contentions, on the condition that his acquiescence must be deemed
unofficial; but he held out against any formal disavowal by Germany of
the sinking of the _Arabic_. This attitude was comprehensible, for a
disavowal meant a repudiation of his submarine policy. Thus the
surrender of the extremists did not go very far; it merely helped to
relax the friction between the kaiser's councilors.
The outcome of this agreement was a note (September 1, 1915) from
Count von Bernstorff to Secretary Lansing announcing that his
instructions concerning Germany's answer to the last American note on
the _Lusitania_ contained this passage:
"Liners will not be sunk by our submarines without warning and without
safety of the lives of noncombatants, provided the liners do not try
to escape or offer resistance."
The German Ambassador added that this policy had been decided on
before the _Arabic_ was sunk. Secretary Lansing, commenting upon this
abatement of Germany's sea war methods, said: "It appears to be a
recognition of the fundamental principles for which we have
contended." A settlement of the _Lusitania_ case, however, was
deferred until that of the _Arabic_ had been satisfactorily disposed
of.
The atmosphere was clearer. But Germany was still silent regarding the
report of the submarine commander, on whose version of the _Arabic's_
destruction hinged the question whether Germany would disavow his act.
The report that the submarine had been sunk revived in London, but the
British admiralty maintained an impenetrable silence regarding its
truth or falsehood. The circumstantial story was that the submarine
later sighted a cattle boat, and was engaged in shelling it when a
British patrol boat appeared and, opening fire, sank the submarine
with its crew except two or three survivors. Hence London concluded
that in the disappearance of the submarine lay Germany's reason for
her readiness to climb down to the United States on the _Arabic_
controversy.
On September 7, 1915, nineteen days after the _Arabic_ was sunk,
Germany appeared to disprove this story of furnishing a report to the
American Government giving the submarine commander's account of the
sinking. This delay was in contrast to the promptitude with which the
German Government had officially announced the sinking of the
_Lusitania_. The British openly charged that Germany could not have
heard from the submarine commander, for the sufficient reason, they
iterated, that he was drowned with his craft, and that the German
Government, waiting in vain for him to report, had resorted to
"manufacturing" a report to conform with its preconceived theories of
the _Arabic's_ destruction. This, however, remained an unsolved press
controversy in face of the British admiralty's silence. The American
Government gave no indication that it took cognizance of the charge,
or that the British admiralty had privately enlightened it as to
whether it had any real basis. Hence Germany's report officially stood
unquestioned.
The defense of Germany was that before sighting the _Arabic_ the
submarine commander had stopped the British steamer _Dunsley_ and was
about to sink her by gunfire, after the crew had left the vessel, when
the _Arabic_ appeared, headed directly toward the submarine. From the
_Arabic's_ movements the commander became convinced that the liner
intended to attack and ram his submarine; whereupon, to forestall such
an attack, he ordered the submarine to dive, and fired a torpedo at
the _Arabic_. After doing so he had convinced himself that the people
on board were being rescued in fifteen boats.
"According to his instructions," the German report continued, "the
commander was not allowed to attack the _Arabic_ without warning and
without saving the passengers' lives unless the ship attempted to
escape or offered resistance. He was forced, however, to conclude from
the attendant circumstances that the _Arabic_ planned a violent attack
on the submarine.
"The German Government most deeply regrets that lives were lost
through the action of the commander. It particularly expresses this
regret to the Government of the United States on account of the death
of American citizens.
"The German Government is unable, however, to acknowledge any
obligation to grant indemnity in the matter, even if the commander
should have been mistaken as to the aggressive intentions of the
_Arabic_.
"If it should prove to be the case that it is impossible for the
German and American Governments to reach a harmonious opinion on this
point, the German Government would be prepared to submit the
difference of opinion, as being a question of international law, to
The Hague Tribunal for arbitration, pursuant to Article 38 of The
Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.
"In so doing it assumes that, as a matter of course, the arbitral
decision shall not be admitted to have the importance of a general
decision on the permissibility or the converse under international law
of German submarine warfare."
Here Germany affirmed that submarine commanders were forbidden to
attack liners without warning and safeguarding passengers' lives, but
that commanders could justifiably disregard this precaution if they
deemed that a vessel's movements, designedly or otherwise, jeopardized
the safety of the attacking submarine. On this reasoning a submarine
commander could excuse a wanton act on the plea of self-defense, which
Germany appeared eager to accept, whether the need of self-defense was
actual or fancied.
The Washington Government declined to consent to clothing a submarine
commander with the discretionary power of determining whether a vessel
should be sunk on sight because of movements he considered suspicious.
The German Government would absolve him from blame and repudiate any
obligation to grant indemnity, even if the commander was mistaken in
attributing aggressive intentions in a vessel's movements. Germany's
precept, as laid down by Count von Bernstorff in his note of September
1, 1915, and Germany's practice, as illustrated by the foregoing
defense for the sinking of the _Arabic_, were thus widely divergent.
The situation receded to the _Lusitania_ stage. Ambassador von
Bernstorff's assurances as to warning and safety to passengers were
negatived by the new condition that submarine commanders could
disregard instructions, whether right or wrong, in doing so. The
Administration accepted as convincing the abundant evidence before it
that the _Arabic_ made no attempt to ram the submarine. According to
this testimony, no one on board the _Arabic_ even saw the submarine;
only the torpedo was seen coming from the direction of the sinking
_Dunsley_, behind which, it was supposed, the submarine had been
screened when the _Arabic_ came in view, whereupon it submerged.
Moreover, the _Arabic_ was struck astern from a direction which showed
that the submarine was at right angles to her. If the _Arabic_ had
been heading toward the submarine with the intention of ramming it,
the torpedo should have struck her at the bow. But the _Arabic_
testimony was that the submarine was invisible.
Germany's explanation was so unsatisfactory, so discredited by the
overwhelming evidence of the _Arabic_ survivors, as well as being
qualified by an indirect recognition of the possibility that the
submarine commander might have erred, that the question of severing
diplomatic relations again became imminent. A resort to arbitration,
as proposed by Germany, with the nullifying condition that any
decision of a Hague tribunal was not to affect Germany's conduct of
submarine warfare, was not deemed worthy of serious consideration. The
question now was whether, after the pledge given by Count von
Bernstorff, the German Government intended to allow submarine
commanders a broad discretion in deciding the circumstances under
which passenger ships may be torpedoed. The ambassador was informed of
the Administration's conviction that the torpedoing of the _Arabic_
could not have been a mistake, justified or unjustified. Germany's
unreadiness to disavow responsibility for the act of the submarine
commander as "arbitrary" and "unsanctioned," to quote the German
Chancellor, showed that she accepted her submarine commander's
purported report, not the _Arabic_ testimony. In this impasse the
Administration was credited with being almost ready to break off
relations with Germany, but deferred doing so until the German
Government had studied the evidence on which the American Government
had decided that the submarine commander was solely to blame.
In the negotiations which followed, the _Arabic_ issue went the way of
the unsettled _Lusitania_ case by its withdrawal from being threshed
out in public. The exchange of notes was abandoned for pourparlers,
which were resorted to as seeming to afford a more supple means of
arriving at a settlement. Germany was afforded an opportunity of
privately establishing her good faith--which was in serious
question--by reconciling her acts on the seas with her pledge not to
attack passenger vessels without warning. No official disclosure was
made to enlighten a forgetful public as to the extent to which she had
done so in the negotiations which occupied the American and German
Governments throughout September, 1915. But a communication from Count
von Bernstorff to Secretary Lansing, which passed October 2, 1915, was
permitted to be revealed acknowledging that the submarine commander
was mistaken in believing that the _Arabic_ intended to ram his
vessel, and disavowing the act. The Von Bernstorff note contained this
passage: "The order issued by His Majesty the Emperor to the
commanders of the German submarines, of which I notified you on a
similar occasion, has been so stringent that the recurrence of
incidents similar to the _Arabic_ case is considered out of the
question."
The United States had thus brought Germany to an admission that the
sinking of the liner was unjustified. This important point gained,
the issue was removed from the acute stage at which it had dangerously
lingered, and only left undetermined the question of indemnity to be
paid by Germany to the _Arabic_ victims.
It cleared the diplomatic decks sufficiently to enable the deferred
negotiations on the _Lusitania_ dispute to be resumed; but these had
made little headway when both the _Lusitania_ and _Arabic_ issues were
overshadowed by the sinking of the _Ancona_.
CHAPTER LX
ISSUE WITH AUSTRIA-HUNGARY OVER THE ANCONA--SURRENDER TO AMERICAN
DEMANDS
The attention of the United States was abruptly diverted from Germany
to Austria-Hungary. The _Ancona_, an Italian liner en route for New
York, was steaming westward in the Mediterranean, between the coasts
of Sicily and Tunis, on November 9, 1915, when a submarine flying the
Austro-Hungarian flag fired a shot at the steamship. As described by
the American protest sent to Austria-Hungary on December 6, 1915,
based upon the testimony of American and other survivors, the _Ancona_
thereupon "attempted to escape, but being overhauled by the submarine
she stopped; that after a brief period, and before the crew and
passengers were all able to take to the boats, the submarine fired a
number of shells at the vessel and finally torpedoed and sank her
while there were yet many persons on board, and that by gunfire and
floundering of the vessel a large number of persons lost their lives
or were seriously injured, among whom were citizens of the United
States."
A heated protest from the Italian Ambassador to the State Department
thus depicted the same scene: "Without any warning whatever, without
even a blank shot, without observing any of the formalities
accompanying the right of search, the submarine encountered by the
_Ancona_ opened fire upon the unarmed passenger liner, relentlessly
shelling not only the wireless apparatus, side, and decks of the ship
while she was at a stop, but even the lifeboats in which the terrified
passengers were seeking refuge. Many of the passengers were killed
outright or wounded. Some who approached the submarine in the hope of
rescue were driven off with jeers. As a result of this inhumane
procedure more than two hundred men, women and children lost their
lives."
An impenitent explanation came from the Austro-Hungarian admiralty,
who in upholding the submarine commander, saw "no reason to find fault
with his course of action," and while recognizing that a commander in
the heat of battle could act contrary to instructions, "nothing of the
kind has occurred in this case."
"It appears from his report," said the admiralty defense, "that his
ship was in danger; indeed, in double danger; first, that an enemy
boat was approaching on a line that threatened to cut off his retreat,
and the enemy ship and the Ancona could have established his radius of
action and could have set a torpedo boat flotilla on him; and second,
there was danger of the Ancona escaping, which, according to his
instructions, was to be prevented in all circumstances. Hence the
conduct of the commander, much as the loss of innocent lives must be
regretted and deplored, cannot be disapproved. On the contrary, if he
had departed without destroying the Ancona, it would have been failure
to do his duty since the Ancona could have notified other ships of his
whereabouts. The loss of American lives is regrettable, as well as
that Americans used a vessel belonging to a nation at war with
Austria-Hungary."
This statement amplified a previous defense by the Austrian admiralty,
in which the latter admitted that the _Ancona_ was torpedoed after her
engines had been stopped and when passengers were still on board. The
American protest cited the admiralty's admission as substantially
confirming the principal testimony of the survivors. It, moreover,
alluded to the correspondence which had passed between Germany and the
United States on the use and misuse of submarines in attacking vessels
of commerce, and to Germany's acquiescence in the American stand
thereon. Yet despite the "full knowledge" possessed by the
Austro-Hungarian Government of the views of the United States, "as
expressed in no uncertain terms to the ally of Austria-Hungary," the
commander of the submarine which attacked the _Ancona_, the United
States protested, failed to put in a place of safety the crew and
passengers before destroying the vessel.
The United States accused the submarine commander of violating the
principles of international law and humanity, and characterized his
conduct as "wanton slaughter of defenseless noncombatants," as the
vessel was not resisting or attempting to escape, and no other reason
was sufficient to excuse such an attack, not even the possibility of
rescue.
A tone of severity and bluntness, not hitherto used in American
communications with the belligerents, marked this note of protest to
Austria-Hungary. Demands were made for a denunciation of the submarine
commander's act as "illegal and indefensible," for his punishment, and
for reparation by the payment of indemnity for the loss of American
lives. The United States left an avenue open through which
Austria-Hungary could find an acceptable excuse. It preferred to believe
that the submarine commander acted contrary to instructions rather than
accept the alternative assumption that the Austro-Hungarian Government
"failed to issue instructions to the commanders of the submarines in
accordance with the laws of nations and the principles of humanity."
The answer of Austria-Hungary (December 13, 1915) was deftly befogging
by clouding in diplomatic rhodomontade the familiar issues raised by
the United States. Its deliberate evasiveness was so direct as to be
almost an affront. Stripped of its confusing terminology, the Austrian
note declared that the United States had not adequately stated its
cause of complaint, and had wrongly assumed that the Austrian
Government was fully acquainted with all communications passed between
the German and American Governments on the submarine issue. This plea
of ignorance was made in face of the precautionary transmission by the
State Department to the Austrian embassy of copies of all the
American notes sent to Germany. The Austrian note also questioned
whether the testimony made by the _Ancona_ survivors, whom the
American protest had not specifically named, was to be deemed more
trustworthy than the report of the submarine commander. As to
Austria-Hungary's knowledge of the American issues with Germany, that
Government was not of the opinion that "this knowledge could be
sufficient for the present case, which, according to its own
information, is materially different from the case or cause to which
the American Government apparently is referring." The note thus
proceeded:
"Therefore, the Austro-Hungarian Government must leave it to the
Washington Cabinet to draw up the individual legal maxims which the
commander of the submarine is alleged to have violated when sinking
the _Ancona_.
"The American Government also thought it advisable to point out the
attitude which the Berlin Cabinet in the before-mentioned exchange of
correspondence had taken. In the highly esteemed note the
Austro-Hungarian Government finds no support for this course. If the
American Government should have intended thereby to express an opinion
as if a precedent exists for the present case, the Austro-Hungarian
Government, in order to prevent misunderstandings, must declare that
it, of course, must preserve full liberty to urge its own legal
interpretations during the discussion of the _Ancona_ case."
This was a virtual refusal by Austria-Hungary to be bound by or
concerned with the submarine agreement between her ally and the United
States. As viewed through German-American eyes (the "New Yorker
Herold"), the Austrian answer represented "a very sharp censure of a
dilettante diplomacy which desires to negotiate and expects plain
replies before the most essential preliminaries are given. The tenor
of the Vienna note is in substance this: 'We are willing to negotiate,
but first you must furnish us with the necessary material--undebatable
material at that.' It is quite comprehensible that Washington is
peeved at this censure."
Austria's demand for a "bill of particulars" was aptly expressed in
this hostile view of the American note. The United States declined to
accede to the request, which was viewed as a resort to the evasive
methods practiced by Germany, but rested its case on the Austrian
admiralty's self-condemning admission that the _Ancona_ was sunk while
people were still on board her. Nor would the American Government
assent to the Austrian proposal that the two governments "exchange
views" as to the legality of the act as described by the Austrian
admiralty. President Wilson and his advisers saw no loophole for
argument as to the justification or otherwise of a submarine sinking
an unarmed merchantman with passengers on board her when the vessel
was at a standstill.
Hence the second American note sent on December 19, 1915, was confined
to a simple issue. The Government brushed aside the questions Austria
raised as immaterial to the main fact based on the incriminating
report of her own admiralty. The Austrian Government was informed that
the admission that the _Ancona_ was torpedoed after her engines had
been stopped and while passengers remained on her was alone sufficient
to fix the blame on the submarine commander. His culpability was
established.
"The rules of international law," the American note continued, "and
the principles of humanity which were thus willfully violated by the
commander of the submarine have been so long and so universally
recognized and are so manifest from the standpoint of right and
justice that the Government of the United States does not feel called
upon to debate them and does not understand that the Imperial and
Royal Government questions or disputes them.
"The Government of the United States therefore finds no other course
open to it but to hold the Imperial and Royal Government responsible
for the act of its naval commander and to renew the definite but
respectful demands made in its communication of the 6th of December,
1915."
[Illustration: Firing a torpedo from the deck of a German destroyer.
The torpedo has just left the tube. Dropping into the water it will
continue its course, like a small submarine boat, straight to its
mark.]
Austria yielded. A lengthy response from Vienna, disclosed on December
31, 1915, was couched in a spirit which removed all danger of a
cleavage of relations between the two countries on the _Ancona_ issue.
The United States drew from the Dual Monarchy an affirmation that
"the sacred commandments of humanity" must be observed in war, and a
concurrence in the principle that "private ships, in so far as they do
not flee or offer resistance, may not be destroyed without the persons
aboard being brought into safety." Austria-Hungary was thus ranged in
line with Germany in the recognition of, and pledging compliance with,
principles for which the United States stood.
The Vienna Government, however, adhered to its own version of the
sinking of the _Ancona_, and from it sought to show that the
statements made in the first American note were based on incorrect
premises, i. e.:
"Information reaching the United States Government that solid shot was
immediately fired toward the steamer is incorrect; it is incorrect
that the submarine overhauled the steamer during the chase; it is
incorrect that only a brief period was given for getting the people
into the boats. On the contrary an unusually long period was granted
to the _Ancona_ for getting passengers in the boats. Finally it is
incorrect that a number of shells were still fired at the steamer
after it had stopped.
"The facts of the case demonstrate further that the commander of the
submarine granted the steamer a full forty-five minutes' time--that is
more than an adequate period to give the persons aboard an opportunity
to take to the boats. Then, since the people were not all saved, he
carried out the torpedoing in such a manner that the ship would remain
above water the longest possible time, doing this with the purpose of
making possible the abandonment of the vessel on boats still in hand.
"Since the ship remained a further forty-five minutes above water he
would have accomplished his purpose if the crew of the _Ancona_ had
not abandoned the passengers in a manner contrary to duty.
"With full consideration, however, of this conduct of the commander,
aimed at accomplishing the rescue of the crew and passengers, the
Imperial and Royal Marine authorities reached the conclusion that he
had omitted to take adequately into consideration the panic that had
broken out among the passengers, which rendered difficult the taking
to the boats, and the spirit of the regulation that Imperial and
Royal Marine officers shall not fail in giving help to anybody in
need, not even to an enemy.
"Therefore the officer was punished, in accordance with the existing
rules, for exceeding his instructions."
On the question of reparation by indemnity for the loss of American
lives, Austria-Hungary would not admit liability for damages resulting
from the "undoubtedly justified bombarding of the fleeing ship," but
was willing to come to an agreement on the subject.
It will be seen that the note did not denounce the attack on the
_Ancona_ as "illegal and indefensible"; but Austria's acquiescence in
the American demand for the punishment of the submarine commander was
viewed as a virtual admission of the illegality and indefensibility of
the method of attack. Coupled with her expressed disposition to pay
damages and her acceptance of the humane principle of warning and
safety to passengers, Austria regarded her concessions as closing the
_Ancona_ issue, in so far as it affected the friendly relations
between the two Governments. As the complaint of the American
Government had been principally against the method of attack, and had
been met by Austria, the crisis passed.
CHAPTER LXI
THE LUSITANIA DEADLOCK--AGREEMENT BLOCKED BY ARMED MERCHANTMEN
ISSUE--CRISIS IN CONGRESS
The _Lusitania_ negotiations were resumed, only to encounter a deadlock.
The issue had been eased in one important particular--Germany's
undertaking, drawn from her in the _Arabic_ crisis, not to sink unarmed
merchant vessels without warning and regard for the safety of passengers
and crews. But there remained the no less vital questions of indemnity
to relatives of the Americans who lost their lives when the _Lusitania_
sank and a disavowal by Germany of the submarine commander's act. Here
was ground well traversed by the State Department in its communications
with Austria over the _Ancona_; but Germany was much less pliant. The
United States insisted that not only must full indemnity be paid for the
American lives lost, but that the agreement for such payment must be
accompanied by a declaration of disavowal acknowledging that the
submarine commander committed an illegal act in sinking the _Lusitania_.
The stumbling-block lay in Germany's objection to subscribing to such
a principle as was here implicated--that her war-zone decree against
Great Britain, carried out by submarine attacks on merchant vessels,
was illegal. She held that her submarine policy was a just reprisal
for Great Britain's "starvation" blockade of Germany. The United
States held that reprisals in the form of sinking helpless ships
without warning were illegal. Germany would not admit that her
submarine policy as practiced when the _Lusitania_ went down was
illegal. To do so would be an admission that her entire submarine
campaign against Great Britain violated international law, and that
Americans surrendered none of their rights as neutral citizens in
traveling through a war zone on merchant ships of a belligerent power.
But Germany was willing to pay an indemnity for the loss of American
lives, not as an admission of wrongdoing, but as an act of grace.
Despite this deadlock the private conversations between Secretary
Lansing and Count von Bernstorff continued. Germany submitted
proposals in various forms aiming at making concessions to meet the
American demand for disavowal of an illegal act; but in each case
Secretary Lansing discerned an effort to evade acknowledging
wrongdoing.
Matters remained at this stage toward the close of January, 1916,
after negotiations extending over several weeks, apparently fruitless
in opening any acceptable channel toward a settlement. That the status
of the _Lusitania_ case was unsatisfactory was vaguely hinted, and the
alternative to Germany's meeting the American demands--a severance of
diplomatic relations--which remained the menace it was from the
outset, loomed up again. A speech by President Wilson before the
Railway Business Association in New York City on January 27, 1915,
ostensibly on preparedness for war, was interpreted as having a
bearing on the deadlock in the _Lusitania_ negotiations. At least it
was significantly coincidental both in time and subject, and did not
pass without comment in Europe, especially this passage:
"I cannot tell you what the international relations of this country
will be to-morrow. I would not dare keep silent and let the country
suppose that to-morrow was certain to be as bright as to-day. There is
something the American people love better than peace. They love the
principles upon which their political life is founded. They are ready
at any time to fight for the vindication of their character and honor.
I would rather surrender territory than ideals."
Whether this utterance was a warning to Germany or not, the
_Lusitania_ negotiations afterward became more promising. Throughout
them Germany balked at making an outright disavowal; she indicated a
willingness to go part of the way to meet the United States, but
always conditional to an expression being inserted in her apologia
that the attack on the _Lusitania_ was a justifiable reprisal against
Great Britain. A proposal by Germany to submit the question of
disavowal to arbitration was rejected, for the second time, on the
ground that the "vital interests and national honor" of the United
States were involved and were therefore not arbitrable. The right of
Americans to be on board the _Lusitania_, under the protection of
international law accorded to neutrals on the high seas in war time,
was too firmly established to admit of debate. A renewed reminder to
Germany that the private conversations threatened to end in failure,
which meant further consideration of the alternative of a cleavage of
relations between the two countries, brought from Germany a reply on
February 4, 1916, which was described as "one word short" of a
satisfactory surrender. The word needed was a synonym for "disavowal"
which did not convey that Germany had committed an illegal act. So the
proposal again fell short of the demand; it did not contain the exact
form of disavowal insisted upon by the United States. But it came
nearer to meeting the American demands than any of the varied
proposals Germany had previously submitted. The dispute turned on
terminology that did not affront Germany's sensibilities. The aim
sought was the avoidance of the words "illegal" and "disavowal" or
whether to "assume" liability, which seemed to imply a voluntary act
of grace, or "admit" liability, which implied an acknowledgment of an
illegal act, or "recognize" liability, which was President Wilson's
solution. On February 8, 1916, the outcome of these efforts in search
of the acceptable word or words was a reported agreement on a
memorandum which contained "language sufficiently broad to cover
substantially the demands of the United States."
This bright prospect of a speedy settlement was suddenly dimmed by a
communication received from Germany and Austria-Hungary two days later
notifying that, beginning March 1, 1916, their submarines would sink
all armed merchantmen without warning. Germany's revised draft
apparently deciding the _Lusitania_ issue came to hand on February 15,
1916. The following day the Administration intimated that the
submarine controversy over the _Lusitania_ could not be closed until
the United States had fully considered the possible effect of the new
policy of the Teutonic Powers.
Germany later informed the United States that her assurances regarding
the future conduct of submarine warfare, given in the _Lusitania_ and
_Arabic_ cases, were still binding, but that they applied only to
merchantmen of a peaceful character; that the new orders issued to the
submarine commanders, which directed them to sink without warning all
belligerent merchantmen carrying arms, either for defense or offense,
were not in conflict with these assurances; and that Germany and
Austria-Hungary had entered into an agreement regarding the new
submarine orders, which would go into effect by midnight, February 29,
1916.
Germany charged that Great Britain had instructed all her merchantmen
to arm for offensive purposes against submarine attacks, and cited
instances in which submarines were attacked by vessels seemingly of a
peaceful character. This accusation was denied by Lord Robert Cecil,
Great Britain's Minister for War Trade, who told the House of Commons:
"The British view has always been that defensively armed merchantmen
must not fire on submarines or on any other warships, except in
self-defense. The Germans have twisted a passage in a document taken
from a transport which they sank into meaning that merchant vessels
have instructions to take the offensive. This is not so."
The question of armed merchantmen had been simmering during the course
of the _Lusitania_ negotiations. It arose over the unexplained sinking
in the Mediterranean of a Peninsular and Oriental liner, the _Persia_,
on December 29, 1915. The American Consul to Aden, Robert N. McNeely,
was among the passengers who lost their lives. The _Persia_ carried a
4.7 gun. The Administration was believed to be exercised--though
erroneously--over the question whether an armed liner was entitled to
be regarded as any other than an auxiliary cruiser, and hence liable
to be sunk without warning. No new issue, however, was raised by the
United States with the Teutonic Powers, because both Germany and
Austria-Hungary--Turkey also--categorically denied that the liner had
been sunk by any of their submarines. The loss of the _Persia_ thus
remained a mystery, though there were not wanting suspicions in the
American press that the Teutonic Powers, in disclaiming that they had
any hand in the vessel's destruction, might have hit upon a new device
to evade further controversies with the United States.
The _Persia's_ gun, added to the frequent reports rife of other
merchantmen being similarly armed, injected a new element in the
submarine controversy, which could not be wholly removed from the
pending _Lusitania_ negotiations. Germany had excused the sinking of
vessels without warning on the plea that her submarine commanders, if
they appeared on the surface to warn them to haul to for visit and
search, or for those on board to take to the boats, could never be
assured that they would not be fired upon and sunk. Hence she regarded
armed merchantmen as being more than a match for submarines and not
entitled to any consideration. Had evidence been forthcoming that the
_Persia_ was sunk by a German submarine, the presence of a gun on
board her would, in Germany's view, have justified the vessel's
destruction without warning, and the uncertain attitude of the
American Government, at this stage, appeared to lean toward the
acceptance of such a defense. It was even hinted that the
Administration was considering whether the situation did not call for
a proclamation warning all Americans off armed merchantmen. Sweden had
done so in the case of her nationals.
The Administration soon dissipated the impression current that it
contemplated a change of policy in the submarine issue. But, while the
uncertainty lasted, it appeared to have a credible basis in a proposal
Secretary Lansing had made to the Entente Powers, as a _modus vivendi_
of the submarine controversy, for the disarmament of merchant vessels,
to assure the safety of their passengers and crews if attacked. The
success of this course depended wholly upon Germany living up to her
guarantees. The proposal was not well received by the Entente Powers,
who doubted the good faith of Germany's pledges, and only saw in the
Lansing suggestion an assurance of safety to her submarines in their
raids on allied shipping.
The American attitude to the new Teutonic policy of sinking all armed
merchantmen on sight remained to be declared. The Administration had
upheld the right of Americans to travel on the high seas in
merchantmen, and saw a surrender of national principle and an
abridgment of personal liberty if the United States yielded to the
terrorism caused by submarine warfare and warned Americans to stay at
home. The United States also recognized the right of belligerent
merchantmen to arm, but for defensive purposes only. At the beginning
of the war it so notified Germany in a memorandum naming the following
American regulations, among others, governing such vessels:
"A merchant vessel of belligerent nationality may carry an armament
and ammunition for the sole purpose of defense without acquiring the
character of a ship of war.
"The presence of an armament and ammunition on board a merchant ship
creates a presumption that the armament is for offensive purposes, but
the owners or agents may overcome this presumption by showing that the
vessel carries armament solely for defense."
The memorandum was sent to Germany as an answer to Germany's protest
against the refusal of the United States to intern as ships of war
British liners leaving or entering New York with guns mounted. Germany
dissented from the view that any belligerent merchant ship could carry
guns. The United States declined to modify its rulings, but informed
Germany that, recognizing the "desirability of avoiding a ground of
complaint", it had disapproved of British vessels using American ports
if armed, and had made such representations to Great Britain that no
armed merchant vessel, since September, 1914, with the exception of
two, had entered an American port.
The situation disturbed Congress. A resolution came before the Senate
on February 18, 1916, opposing acquiescence by the United States in
the notifications of the Central Powers of the right of their
submarines to sink armed merchantmen. The foreign policy of the
Administration was bitterly assailed by Senators Lodge and Sterling,
especially for its attitude in relation to the pending negotiations
over the new submarine order. For the Administration, Senator Stone,
chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, said the question of
armed merchantmen was at least debatable. The position at this stage
was that the Administration was taking cognizance of Germany's charge
that British merchantmen were armed for offensive purposes, had been
instructed to attack submarines, and that rewards had been offered for
their success in so doing. Germany offered to furnish proofs to show
that the American rules recognizing merchantmen armed for defensive
purposes as peaceful ships could not now apply.
There was a division of sentiment in the Senate as to the stand the
United States should take, and a wider one in the House of
Representatives, where a panic-stricken feeling arose that the country
was slowly but surely heading toward war with Germany. A vociferous
demand was made by a minority of congressmen for strong action warning
Americans off armed merchantmen of belligerents to prevent the United
States raising further critical issues with Germany. The House leaders
informed the President that they could not control their following,
and that on a vote the House would be two to one in favor of such
legislation. They even were tempted to force the passage of such a
resolution on the patriotic ground that in doing so they would merely
be seeking to prevent American citizens from jeopardizing the peace of
the nation. The President suspected that pro-German propaganda was
behind the hysteria in Congress, and objected to any legislative
interference in his handling of the submarine controversy. A
resolution was actually pending in the House forbidding Americans to
travel on armed merchantmen. The President finally stated his position
in a forceful letter to Senator Stone on February 24, 1916, refusing
to assent to any such abridgment of the rights of American citizens.
This letter followed an emphatic rejection by him of a proposal made
by the Democratic leaders in Congress that that body should relieve
him of all responsibility of forcing an issue with Germany.
"The course which the Central European Powers have announced their
intention of following in the near future with regard to undersea
warfare," the President wrote, "seems for the moment to threaten
insuperable obstacles, but its apparent meaning is so manifestly
inconsistent with explicit assurances recently given us by those
powers with regard to their treatment of merchant vessels on the high
seas that I must believe that explanations will presently ensue which
will put a different aspect upon it.... But in any event our duty is
plain. No nation, no group of nations, has the right, while war is in
progress, to alter or disregard the principles which all nations have
agreed upon in mitigation of the horrors or sufferings of war, and if
the clear rights of American citizens should ever unhappily be
abridged or denied by any such action, we should, it seems to me, have
in honor no choice as to what our own course should be.
"For my own part I cannot consent to any abridgment of the rights of
American citizens in any respect. The honor and self-respect of the
nation is involved. We covet peace, and shall preserve it at any cost
but the loss of honor. To forbid our people to exercise their rights
for fear we might be called upon to vindicate them would be a deep
humiliation indeed. It would be an implicit, all but an explicit,
acquiescence in the violation of the rights of mankind everywhere and
of whatever nation or allegiance. It would be a deliberate abdication
of our hitherto proud position as spokesmen even amid the turmoil of
war for the law and the right. It would make everything this
Government has attempted, and everything it has achieved during this
terrible struggle of nations, meaningless and futile.
"It is important to reflect that if in this instance we allowed
expediency to take the place of principle the door would inevitably be
opened to still further concessions. Once accept a single abatement of
right and many other humiliations would certainly follow, and the
whole fine fabric of international law might crumble under our hands
piece by piece. What we are contending for in this matter is of the
very essence of the things that have made America a sovereign nation.
She cannot yield them without conceding her own impotency as a nation
and making virtual surrender of her independent position among the
nations of the world."
The leaders in Congress were so impressed by this uncompromising
declaration of the President that they set about allaying the revolt
against the Administration's policy, which, it was feared, was drawing
the United States into war. Efforts were made to smother in committee
the resolutions pending in both the House and Senate forbidding
Americans to travel on armed merchant ships. But the President later
saw that much harm had already been done. An impression became current
abroad that Congress and the President were at cross purposes
regarding the attitude the United States should take toward the new
submarine policy of the Teutonic Powers. In the belief that the
country was with him in his stand, the President decided that such an
impression ought not to be permitted to prevail, and that the question
should be determined as to whether Congress upheld him also. In almost
irreconcilable contrast to his previous opposition to Congress voting
on the resolutions forbidding Americans to travel on armed
merchantmen, the President suddenly executed an audacious _volte face_
on February 29, 1916, by demanding a test vote upon them. The
congressional leaders were confounded by the request, coming as it did
after they had done their utmost to suppress the resolutions in
deference to the President. But the latter made his reasons for
changing his attitude cogent enough in a letter he addressed to
Representative Pou of the House Rules Committee.
"The report," he wrote, "that there are divided counsels in Congress
in regard to the foreign policy of the Government is being made
industrious use of in foreign capitals. I believe that report to be
false, but so long as it is anywhere credited it cannot fail to do the
greatest harm and expose the country to the most serious risks.
"I therefore feel justified in asking that your committee will permit
me to urge an early vote upon the resolutions with regard to travel on
armed merchantmen, which have recently been so much talked about, in
order that there may be afforded an opportunity for full public
discussion and action upon them, and that all doubts and conjectures
may be swept away and our foreign relations once more cleared of
damaging misunderstandings."
The House resolution, which was proposed by Representative McLemore of
Texas, was thereupon revived for immediate consideration. The
President's demand for a vote upon it came on the eve of the date set
by the Teutonic Powers for inaugurating their submarine war on armed
merchantmen, March 1, 1916. The ensuing events belong to the next
volume of this history.
CHAPTER LXII
DEVELOPMENTS OF PRO-GERMAN PROPAGANDA--MUNITIONS CRUSADE DEFENDED--NEW
ASPECTS OF AMERICAN POLICY
Pro-German propaganda soon developed far beyond its original aim.
Registering protests against the Administration preserving a
neutrality according to its own interpretation of American laws proved
ineffective. Balked in this, the crusade took a form which was plainly
an outgrowth of a countrywide circulation of literature emanating
from German publicity organizations devoted to presenting the Teutonic
cause in the most favorable light to the American people. Opinions
being free, epistolary zeal of this kind violated no laws, and words
broke no bones. In the fact that the crusade failed perceptibly to
swing national sentiment regarding the European war to a recognition
of the German view of American neutrality obviously lay a stimulus and
incitement for resorting to sterner measures, since mild measures were
vain. Events already narrated show the extent to which German zealots
pursued a defiant criminal course in making their "protests," but
there was no certainty--though suspicions and allegations were not
wanting--that their activities had official German inspiration and
sanction. But as the summer of 1915 wore on, the Administration became
satisfied--through an accumulation of evidence--that this was the
case. For reasons of state, in view of the delicate stages of the
_Lusitania_ and _Arabic_ issues with Germany, the Government forbore
to take cognizance of the undoubted participation of German diplomats
and secret-service agents in plots hatched and pursued on American
soil against the country's neutrality, and provoking unrest and
disorder. The Government's tolerance of such a situation did not long
endure.
The first revelation that these activities were organized on an
extended scale came through the columns of the New York "World" in
August, 1915. The country was not unprepared for the disclosure. They
had had forerunners in repeated rumors and accusations that German
Embassy officials were involved in the passport frauds and were using
American territory as a base for an espionage system, whose coils were
wound about this country and Canada, as well as in the charge that
German money had been freely spent in a way inconsistent with
international friendship. The newspaper named unreservedly charged
that "The German propaganda in the United States has became a
political conspiracy against the Government and people of the United
States." To substantiate that sweeping indictment the "World"
reproduced the text of a series of letters it had obtained, addressed
to Dr. Heinrich F. Albert, a German Privy Councilor, who acted as the
fiscal agent of the Kaiser's Government in the United States.
The correspondence, as printed, linked Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, the
German Imperial Chancellor, and Count von Bernstorff, the German
Ambassador, with a vast project for spreading German propaganda. The
disclosures of the correspondence, the authenticity of which was not
contested, were described as showing that the German propaganda had
for its purpose "the involving of the United States in the
complications of the European war," and that the plans "designed to
accomplish this result were carefully and deliberately projected,
efficiently organized, superbly executed, and adequately financed."
These plans embraced an elaborate scheme to control and influence the
press of the United States to establish newspapers and news services,
finance professional lecturers and moving-picture entertainments and
publish books "for the sole purpose of fomenting internal discord
among the American people to the advantage of the German Empire."