CHAPTER XL

CONDITIONS IN SERBIA, GREECE, AND RUMANIA

During this time the Bulgarians and Germans were establishing a

semicivil government in Serbia. Many conflicting reports were

circulated, some of them to the effect that there was much friction

between the German and Bulgarian officers. Whether Germany and

Bulgaria really intended to make an attack on Saloniki has until now

been a question, but in those districts near the Greek frontier

considerable forces of Germans remained, garrisoning the large towns,

notably Monastir. The forces along the frontier itself were

Bulgarians at first, but toward the end of February, 1916, detachments

of Germans began taking their places along the front. The Allies in

Saloniki reported that up to this time there were heavy desertions

from the Bulgarian forces, the deserters coming in to Saloniki,

complaining that they were starved and did not wish to fight the

French and British. When the Germans appeared on the front, these

desertions suddenly ceased.

In the middle of January Emperor William of Germany paid Serbia a

visit and inspected the captured towns and cities of most prominence.

On the 18th he arrived in Nish, where he was met by King Ferdinand and

Prince Boris of Bulgaria. The two sovereigns then attended Mass in the

cathedral together, after which they reviewed the troops.

At a dinner which followed the emperor announced to King Ferdinand his

nomination to the rank of a Prussian field marshal and presented him

with the baton. King Ferdinand in turn bestowed the order for bravery

on the emperor and General von Mackensen. In a speech which he made,

King Ferdinand addressed the emperor with "Ave Imperator, Caesar et

Rex." ("Hail Emperor, Caesar and King.")

During the first two months of the year the Allies had continued to

reenforce their forces in Saloniki, and toward the end of February

there were reports to the effect that General Sarrail would assume an

offensive up into Macedonia and Bulgaria. On January 20, 1916, the

ships of the Allies again bombarded Dedeagatch vigorously, then

proceeded to Port Lagos and swept that seaport with a heavy shell

fire. A few days later a feat, which in some respects established a

new record in the annals of French aviation, was performed by an

attacking squadron of forty French aeroplanes.

The French squadron left Saloniki at seven in the morning and divided

into two parts, one of which proceeded to Monastir, about sixty miles

distant, and the other going to Ghevgli. Some of the aeroplanes were

armed with guns.

Altogether over two hundred projectiles were discharged at the enemy's

camp, on the building occupied by the Bulgarian headquarters in

Monastir, and on other military establishments. The airmen were

vigorously bombarded in return, but sustained no casualties. One

notable feature of the raid was that the squadron had to contend with

a forty-mile gale from abeam during the whole trip and they had also

to fly over mountains 6,000 feet in height. By noon both sections of

the squadron had returned to Saloniki.

On the part of Greece there was no change; she still continued her

attitude of sullen acquiescence to the presence of the Allies' troops

in Saloniki. In the last week of January General Sarrail sent a

detachment to occupy Cape and Fort Kara Burun, about twelve miles from

Saloniki and commanding the harbor. This action, it was stated, was

due to the fact that a British transport had been torpedoed by a

German submarine under the very guns of the fort. As usual, Greece

protested, and, again as usual, no notice was taken of her protest.

At about this same time King Constantine sent for the American

correspondent of the Associated Press in Athens and asked him to make

public certain statements he wished to make, whereupon he gave the

journalist an interview so remarkable that when it was published it

attracted world-wide attention.

"It is the merest cant," he said, "for Great Britain and France to

talk about the violation of the neutrality of Belgium after what they

themselves have done and are doing.... The only forum of public

opinion open to me is the United States. The situation is far too

vital for me to care a snap about royal dignity in the matter of

interviews when the very life of Greece as an independent country is

at stake. I shall appeal to America again and again, if necessary, for

that fair hearing which has been denied me by the press of the Allies.

"Just look at the list of Greek territories already occupied by the

allied troops--Lemnos, Imbros, Mytilene, Castelloriza, Corfu,

Saloniki, including the Chalcidice Peninsula, and a large part of

Macedonia. In proportion to all Greece it is as if that part of the

United States which was won from Mexico after the Mexican War were

occupied by foreign troops, and not so much as by your leave.... Where

is the necessity for the occupation of Corfu? If Greece is an ally of

Serbia, so also is Italy, and transportation of the Serbs to Italy

would be simpler than to Corfu. Is it because the Italians are

refusing to accept the Serbs, fearing the spread of cholera, and the

Allies are thinking that the Greeks want to be endangered by cholera

any more than the Italians?... The history of the Balkan politics of

the Allies is the record of one crass mistake after another, and now,

through pique over the failure of their every Balkan calculation, they

try to unload on Greece the results of their own stupidity. We warned

them that the Gallipoli expedition would be fruitless and that the

Austro-Germans would surely crush Serbia.... At the beginning of the

war eighty per cent of the Greeks were favorable to the Allies; to-day

not forty, no, not twenty per cent would turn their hands to aid the

Allies."

As for Venizelos, his voice was no longer heard. So disliked was he by

the Government that when certain soldiers joined in a celebration of

his name-day, fifty of them were sentenced to a month's confinement as

a punishment for so expressing their sympathy. In the middle of

February, 1916, this enmity was especially acute. Venizelos himself

told a journalist that he was holding himself so aloof from politics

that he did not even read the reports of the proceedings of the

Chamber of Deputies.

But on March 1, 1916, there was a report from Athens that King

Constantine had suddenly summoned Venizelos. Several interviews

followed, and it was then announced that the king and Venizelos were

reconciled. Whether that meant any change in Greece's policy was not

mentioned. The general impression prevailed at this time, however,

that the great success of the Russians in Asiatic Turkey was having

its effect on the King of Greece and his Government.

Of Rumania little was heard during the entire winter, no startling

changes having taken place in her attitude. In January the British

Government contracted with Rumania for the purchase of 800,000 tons of

wheat, to the value of about fifty million dollars, to be delivered by

the middle of April.

On February 14, 1916, the Rumanian Government announced that its

mobilization had been completed by the calling up of a fresh class

and that the General Staff was completing the defenses of the

Carpathians and the fortifications along the banks of the Danube in

the new Dobrudja territory, which had been taken from Bulgaria during

the Balkan Wars. Take Jonescu, the well-known Rumanian statesman, in

an interview with a French journalist on the same date said:

"As regards Rumanian policy; we made a great mistake in not

intervening when Bulgaria entered the war. I hope that we shall not

make the same mistake again and that we shall not quail before

Germany's threats, if she makes them.... The country is unanimous on

this point."

PART VII--THE DARDANELLES AND RUSSO-TURKISH CAMPAIGN

CHAPTER XLI

CONDITIONS IN GALLIPOLI--ATTACK AT SUVLA BAY

We left the allied troops at the end of July, 1915, firmly established

at two points on the Gallipoli Peninsula. But though they had won

these secure bases by terrible losses and much heroism, yet they had

progressed but slightly toward their ultimate objects--the capture of

the three key points to the peninsula defenses and the opening of the

Dardanelles to the fleets of England, France, and Russia.

Indeed, it had become apparent, not only to those in command on the

spot, but to the authorities in London and in Paris, that the allied

forces had reached a condition of stalemate on the two fronts. In

other words, the Turks by their stubborn, intelligent, and brave

defense had eliminated the possibility of the element of surprise,

without which it was almost hopeless to expect success under the

modern conditions of trench warfare.

Much as the world appreciated the virtues of the Turk as a fighting

man, it must be confessed that he furnished the allied troops with an

unpleasant surprise. He displayed, first of all, a quite remarkable

degree of bravery, hurling himself against the intrenched troops of

France and England with an abandon and a disregard of personal safety

that excited the admiration of his enemies. The whole Gallipoli

campaign is replete with examples of Turkish valor.

Furthermore, the Turks were well led, not only by their German

officers, but by the Turkish commanders as well. Frequently they

surprised and confounded the allied command in this respect,

successfully foiling vital movements by daring and original maneuvers.

This was all the more remarkable because it demanded cool thinking at

critical moments, not the excited religious fanaticism for which the

Turk had been noted. The Turk is an adept in the construction of

trenches and their use.

Thus it became apparent to all that if any real success was to be

obtained in the Dardanelles campaign the element of surprise must be

reintroduced. Sir Ian Hamilton refused to throw away his troops in

hopeless frontal attacks against practically impregnable defenses. He

called upon Lord Kitchener for reenforcements, at the same time

issuing an encouraging bulletin to his troops, telling them that help

was coming.

These new troops, which began to arrive at Mudros about the first week

of August, 1915, were not to be used for strengthening the two fronts,

but were to be employed in an entirely fresh attempt to surprise the

Turks at a new point, push inland before the defenders had time to

bring up troops, and seize commanding positions in the first great

rush. In fact it was a repetition of the attempts made at Achi Baba

and Krithia at the original landings, applying the lessons learned at

such tremendous cost on those occasions.

Besides the military considerations which made such an attempt

desirable, the political situation in the Balkans made an allied

success in the Dardanelles highly imperative. The success of the great

German drive against the Russians in Poland and Galicia had had a

disturbing effect upon at least one of the Balkan neutrals. Bulgaria,

it soon became apparent, was preparing to enter the struggle on the

side of the Central Powers and Entente diplomats reported to their

Governments that nothing short of a smashing victory at the Strait

would change the purpose of King Ferdinand. Furthermore, the Entente

Powers were disturbed over the attitude of Greece and Rumania. It had

been confidently expected that the latter country would enter the

struggle on the side of the Entente Powers at the same time that

Italy actively entered the struggle. Indeed, the Bank of England had

made an advance to Rumania of $25,000,000, although it was expressly

understood that the loan was purely a business transaction and had no

political import. It was believed that Rumanian sympathy, as a whole,

was with the Entente Powers, but it was known that financial,

commercial, and dynastic ties with Germany and Austria were important

and might at any moment, in favorable circumstances, turn the scales

in favor of the Central Powers.

It had become apparent, too, that even Greece had been impressed by

the success of the Germans. It was known that King Constantine, with

his strong German sympathies, and especially his oft-expressed

admiration for the power of the German military machine, was

determined at all costs to keep his little kingdom out of the great

struggle. Inasmuch as these two countries, Greece and Rumania, had

been confidently regarded as belligerents on the side of the Entente

Powers, even their neutrality was regarded as a blow to the Allies.

This, then, was the situation that made a dashing stroke in Gallipoli

necessary. Sir Ian Hamilton prepared for it with great skill. A point

called Suvla Bay, north of the base established by the Australian and

New Zealand troops at Anzac Cove, was selected for the point of

landing, aiming to cooperate with the force already ashore and

assisted by a strong diversion aimed against the Bulair lines.

For this supreme attack, upon which so much was dependent, fresh

troops were brought from England--men who had seen nothing of the

fighting on any front. Indeed, it is a question for future experts and

historians to argue pro and con whether or not the outcome of the

attack was not due almost entirely to this use of green troops. How

they were depended upon in a crucial operation, how they wavered, and

the consequences to the allied operations will be told in the

narrative.

Suvla Bay lies between five and six miles from Anzac Cove. It is a

wide, shallow indentation forming an almost perfect half circle.

Although the landing facilities were not as good as at some other

points on the coast of the peninsula, it had the advantage of

providing plenty of more or less open country for maneuvering, once

the troops were well ashore. This was an element lacking in the case

of all the other landings, and one that Sir Ian Hamilton found of

vital importance. The nature of the Gallipoli country as a whole made

flank attacks almost impossible, but he hoped in the case of the fresh

landing to be able to avoid a direct frontal assault.

The new troops, once ashore at Suvla Bay, were to push rapidly across

country, skirt Salt Lake, and carry the crest of the Anafarta Hills, a

range running to something like 600 feet in height and dominating two

important roads and the adjacent country, excepting the all-important

peak of Sari Bair.

At the same time the Australian and New Zealand troops were to make a

sudden and supreme attack upon Sari Bair itself. It speaks volumes for

the confidence which Sir Ian Hamilton had in the fighting qualities of

these colonial troops that he set them such a tremendous task. Since

the landing at Anzac Cove, the Turks, under the supervision of their

German mentors, had fortified every yard of the thousand feet of

heights known as Sari Bair. An unprecedented number of machine guns

had been brought up and placed in concealed positions from which it

was possible to sweep every line of advance, thus powerfully

increasing the volume of the infantry and artillery fire. It did not

seem possible that an attack, however resolutely and bravely made,

could succeed in the face of such a fierce defense.

The third element in this new attack was to be a demonstration against

Karachali, on the European mainland of Turkey, menacing the Bulair

lines as well as the railway running to Sofia, Bulgaria. For this

purpose a number of troopships and warships carrying what was known as

the Greek Legion and made up of Cretan volunteers, were to be used. It

was hoped that this diversion would attract most of the available

reserves in and about the Gallipoli Peninsula and make impossible the

reenforcement of the troops stationed near Anafarta Hills and Sari

Bair.

The fourth and last element was to consist of a determined attack upon

the Turkish defenses about Krithia, pinning to that spot all the

troops possible. Curiously enough the plans of the Turkish command,

dominated by Enver Pasha, favored the allied troops in that the Turks

had planned an attack upon the enemy on the Krithia lines about this

time and had concentrated most of their available reserves near the

tip of the peninsula.

This intention on the part of the Turks was undoubtedly due to the

information they had received of the arrival of fresh British troops.

But quickly as they pushed forward their preparations, the Allies were

too lively for them. On August 6, 1915, the French and British troops

advanced against the Turks and there followed some of the most

determined and desperate fighting of the whole Dardanelles campaign.

In the fighting the East Lancashire Division, a territorial force, did

heroic work and bore the brunt of the fighting. There were many

individual feats of daring and bravery, yet one stands out

conspicuously. A youthful Manchester schoolmaster, Lieutenant W. T.

Forshaw, held his trench against attacks for forty-five hours. For

forty-one of those hours he was continuously throwing bombs and only

desisted when his arm became temporarily paralyzed. When, finally, the

Turks swarmed into his trench, revolver in hand he led his wearied

troops and drove them out. He richly deserved the coveted Victoria

Cross which was conferred upon him.

At dawn on the following day, the Australians began the attack at Sari

Bair. The force at Anzac Cove had been reenforced with Indian troops

and two divisions of the new troops from England. As planned, the

operations at Sari Bair were to consist of an attack, first on the

right, to serve as a feint, and then a main attack on the left which

was to link up and support the attack from Suvla Bay, moving around in

back of Salt Lake.

The attack on the right, upon what was called Lone Pine Plateau, was a

dispiriting failure on the opening day. The dismounted troops of the

Third Australian Light Horse, a magnificent body of men, were sent

forward to storm the elaborate trenches of the enemy. The attack was

made in three lines. The first was mowed down to a man; of the second

only a few survivors reached the Turkish trenches to be either

captured or killed; the third was stopped by a change of orders just

as it was about to follow the other two into the valley of sure death.

On the following day, the 8th, the main Australian infantry forces

were sent forward against the same trenches and, after some bloody

fighting, succeeded in capturing and holding them against repeated

counterattacks.

While this holding operation was in progress the main attack was being

made on the left. New Zealand and Australian troops, supported by a

picked force of Indian hillmen, used to night warfare and campaigning

in difficult mountain country, starting in the evening of August 6,

1915, made a rapid march along the coast as far as Fisherman's Hut.

There large quantities of stores had been gradually accumulated in

preparation for this very movement.

At Fisherman's Hut the force, numbering 6,000 men, under the command

of Major General Sir A. J. Godley, turned sharply inland and just

before dawn, almost without the knowledge of the Turkish defenders,

had arrived within half a mile of one of the dominating hills on the

right flank of the vitally important Sari Bair.

At this point Godley's force was split into three columns. One

composed of Australian troops, was based on Asma Dere, almost within

touch of Suvla Bay. The Indian troops were within striking distance of

Chunuk Bair, close to the towering peak of Koja Chemen, rising sharply

to almost 1,000 feet, while the New Zealanders were within striking

distance of Rhododendron Ridge.

With the dawn of August 7, 1915, the Turks awoke to the seriousness of

the new menace. So difficult was the country in which the British

troops were operating that the Ottoman commander had dismissed all

idea of a serious attack from that point and had merely posted patrols

in the hills guarding the flank of Sari Bair. Now, however, reserves

were hurried to the scene, and so rapidly and in such large numbers

did they arrive that the troops from Anzac were soon compelled to dig

themselves in in an attempt to hold what they had won by their

surprise march.

Early on the morning of August 8, 1915, the Australians moved out from

Asma Dere. They had as an objective a near-by hill from which it was

proposed to storm the height known as Koja Chemen. Unfortunately for

their plan, the Turks by this time had brought up such forces that the

Australians were outnumbered. They had not proceeded far before they

discovered that they were being rapidly encircled. A retreat was

immediately decided upon and so closely were they followed by the

Turks that the British troops had difficulty even in holding their

original position at Asma Dere.

Meanwhile the New Zealanders were having more success. Carrying full

kit, food, and water, these splendid colonials clambered up the steep

sides of Rhododendron Ridge, swept the Turks from the crest and

charged up the southwestern slope of the main peak of Sari Bair. There

they dug in and fought desperately to hold their advantage against

successive waves of Turkish infantry that came charging down upon

them.

At the same time the Indian troops gained some fresh ground in the

neighborhood of Hill Q.

During the night of August 8, 1915, and the early morning of the

following day, the officers of the British forces who had survived the

fighting reorganized the scattered remnants and prepared for a fresh

advance. About midnight reenforcements arrived at all three bases and

were hurried forward to relieve as much as possible the exhausted men

in the firing line.

Just as dawn was breaking on August 9, 1915, word was passed along the

lines that a supreme effort was to be made to carry the heights that

barred the allied troops from a great victory. British and French

warships posted close inshore and in wireless touch with the troops

opened an intense bombardment of the Chunuk Bair, Hill Q, and Koja

Chemen. Then the whistles blew, the infantry leaped out of its shallow

trenches and, with a yell that echoed and reechoed through the

Gallipoli hills, charged up the precipitous slopes.

Of the three columns, the greatest success was gained by the Indians.

Led by the hardy Gurkhas, they actually reached the crest of Hill Q

and looked down on the much-to-be-desired Strait, bathed in the hot

August sunshine.

The Turkish command full well realized the importance of this

position, and immediately guns from every angle were turned on the

Indian troops and the New Zealanders who were supporting them on the

left. A hurricane of shells was poured on the troops before they had

time to dig themselves in. A few seconds later a counterattack was

launched in such force against the New Zealanders that they and the

Indians were swept down the slopes of Sari Bair.

By nightfall of August 8, 1915, the few Turkish patrols in the

district had been driven off and considerable forces of the British

troops had made their way inland. Splitting into two columns, one

moved north and seized Karakol Bagh; the other and larger force

marched across the low country until it had arrived in position facing

the Anafarta Ridge, its objective.

Lying between the line of advance from Suvla Bay to the Anafarta Ridge

and Asma Dere, the base of the Australian troops operating against

Sari Bair, were a number of hills, two of which played supremely

important parts in the fighting of the next few days. They have been

called Chocolate Hill and Burnt Hill.

It was in an action against Chocolate Hill that the battle opened.

Moving in a night attack on August 8, 1915, Irish troops stormed

Chocolate Hill and came within measurable distance of connecting up

with the Australian division. Then preparations were made for an

attack upon the Anafarta Ridge.

On August 11, 1915, the right wing of the forces landed at Suvla Bay

succeeded in working along the coast and linking up with the

Australians at Asma Dere. They brought with them to the hard-hitting

Colonials the first word of the progress of the Anafarta operation,

and it was a bitter disappointment to the latter to learn that their

heroic efforts against Sari Bair had been largely made in vain because

of the failure of the Suvla Bay force to accomplish its task.

Both sides then busied themselves preparing for the new warfare in

this region. The British consolidated their positions, and on August

15, 1915, sent forward the same Irish division that had captured

Chocolate Hill in an attempt to rush Dublin Hill. After a hand-to-hand

fight with the Turkish troops, who swarmed out of their trenches to

meet the charging Irishmen, the hill was won.

The Turks, meanwhile, were strongly fortifying not only the Anafarta

Ridge proper but some of the hills commanding its left flank. Here

Hill 70 and Hill 112 were the major positions, and on August 21, 1915,

the British troops moved out in an effort to capture them.

A portion of the British troops succeeded in reaching the top of Hill

70. There, however, they were greeted by a terrible fire from a

battery concealed on Hill 112 and forced to fall back, first to the

lower slopes of the hill and then, when the fire slackened, to their

original intrenched positions.

Even less success was enjoyed by the troops making the assault upon

Hill 112. The Turkish artillery poured a curtain of fire among the

shrubs at the foot of the hill which effectively prevented the

proposed advance. Farther to the south at the same time the

Australians were attacking Hill 60 of the Sari Bair group and

succeeded in driving the Turkish defenders from its crest.

PART VIII--AGGRESSIVE TURKISH CAMPAIGN AT DARDANELLES

CHAPTER XLII

SARI BAIR--PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALLIES

Thus practically ended the Suvla Bay operation and its supporting

movements. Much had been expected of it and, by the barest margin, in

the opinion of many competent military men, great results had been

missed. Just what ultimate effect its success in this operation would

have had on the Gallipoli campaign, on the position of Turkey in the

war and, finally, upon the course of the war as a whole, it is

obviously impossible to say. There are those who claim that the

capture of Constantinople would have brought the struggle to a quick

and disastrous end from the viewpoint of the Central Powers. There are

others, equally entitled by experience and knowledge to speak, who

claim that it would have had no appreciable influence on the final

result. And there is a third body of critics of opinion that the

capture of Constantinople would have been a disaster for the Allies,

inasmuch as it would have opened up vast questions of age-long

standing that would have led to wide dissension between England,

Russia, and France.

There is another and no less interesting phase of the Suvla Bay

operation that will one day be studied with care. In this crucial

attack a reliance was placed upon raw troops who had seen little or no

actual fighting. It was, in a way, an attempt to prove that patriotic

youths, rallying to the colors at their country's need, although

without previous training, could in a few months be made more than a

match for the obligatory military service troops of the Continental

system.

Some extremely interesting details of the preparation for the landing

at Suvla Bay have been given by a correspondent who was permitted to

be present, but who, like all except a few officers of General Ian

Hamilton's immediate staff, was kept in absolute ignorance of the

exact location of the spot selected.

"It has long been obvious that some new landing on a vast scale was

about to be attempted," he wrote, "and surmise has therefore been rife

as to the exact point on which the blow would fall. It was hoped to

take the Turk completely by surprise, and to obtain a firm foothold on

the shore before he could bring up his reenforcements. In this it

would seem as if we have been successful, for two divisions were

yesterday (August 7, 1915) put ashore almost without opposition. The

enemy probably had accurate knowledge of the arrival of large

reenforcements, for it is almost impossible to keep movements of

troops unknown in the Near East, and his airmen have frequently flown

over our camps. He knew, therefore, we were preparing to strike, but

on the vital point as to where the blow would fall he seems to have

been entirely ignorant.

"No one who has not seen a landing of a large army on a hostile shore

can have any idea of the enormous amount of preparation work and

rehearsal which must precede any such movement. For three weeks this

has been going on incessantly.

"For many days past a division has been practicing embarking and

disembarking until every officer and every man knew the exact role he

had to play.

"On the morning of August 6, 1915, I was told to hold myself in

readiness to embark that evening for an unknown destination, which

would not be disclosed to me until after I got on board the transport.

There was general rejoicing among the troops when it became known that

the period of preparation was at length passed and that the hour for

action had at last arrived.

"Throughout the whole of August 6, 1915, the work of embarking

proceeded without a stop. Dense masses of fully equipped infantry,

each carrying two days' rations, and tin dishes strapped on their

knapsacks, moved down to the quay and were there embarked. The troops

seemed in excellent spirits and full of fight. They were cracking

jokes and singing many familiar songs, the favorite of which seemed to

be a blending of 'Tipperary' with 'Are We Downhearted?' Which query

was answered by a deafening roar of 'No!'"

In writing of the country around Suvla Bay the same correspondent

said:

"The country is in fact terrible; the hills are an awful jumble, with

no regular formation, but broken up into valleys, dongas, ravines, and

partly bare sandstone, and partly covered with dense shrub. In places

there are sheer precipices over which it is impossible to climb and

down which a false step may send you sliding several hundreds of

feet."

Finally, deeply illuminating is the official communique published in

England on August 26, 1915, regarding the operations in early August.

The most striking paragraphs follow:

"Very severe and continuous fighting, with heavy losses to both sides,

has resulted. Our forces have not yet gained the objectives at which

they were aiming in sphere eight, though they have made a decided

advance toward them and have greatly increased the area in our

possession.

"The attack from Anzac after a series of desperately contested

actions, was carried to the summit of Sari Bair and Chunuk Bair Ridge,

which are the dominating positions on this area, but, owing to the

fact that the attack from Suvla Bay did not make the progress which

was counted upon, the troops from Anzac were not able to maintain

their position in the actual crest, and after repeating

counterattacks, were compelled to withdraw to positions close below

it."

And the communique ends up with the significant sentence:

"But these facts must not lead the public to suppose that the true

objective has been gained or that further serious and costly efforts

will not be required before a decisive victory is won."

Picturesque accounts of the fighting by the Australian troops for Sari

Bair on August 6, 7, and 8, 1915, have been written by an eyewitness

of the fighting. Speaking of the few moments before the fighting, he

said:

"Meanwhile the combined Australians and New Zealanders braced for the

desperate night attack that had been decided upon. The men had long

been waiting for this hour to arrive.

"Strict orders were given that not a shot was to be fired; the bayonet

alone was to be used. Exactly at ten o'clock on Friday night a brigade

clambered over their trenches and furiously charged the Turkish line

amid loud cheers, bayoneting all the enemy found therein. The Turks,

taken apparently quite unawares, fired wildly and were unable to check

the advance.

"Thus in a few minutes all the enemy nearest the sea were in our hands

and the way was thus cleared for the main advance. The New Zealanders

stopped only to take breath and then pursued their victorious career,

rushing in succession the old No. 3 outpost, 'Bauchop's Hill,' and

other Turkish positions. The native Maoris entered into the charge

with great dash, making the darkness of the night hideous with their

wild war cries, and striking terror into the hearts of the Turks with

the awful vigor with which they used their bayonets and the butt end

of their rifles.

"The darkness of the night, the broken nature of the ground, and the

shell fire with which the enemy had smothered every available bit of

ground, with his deadly snipers, delayed the main advance somewhat

after these preliminary positions had been successfully rushed, for

every hill and spur had to be picketed to keep down the fire from

lurking marksmen left in the rear of our advancing columns. The

fighting throughout the night was continuous, for amid these gloomy

ravines the Turks offered courageous and despairing resistance to the

Australians, the New Zealanders and Maoris, and many bloody

encounters, the details of which will never be known, were fought in

the dark hours which preceded a still more eventful dawn."

CHAPTER XLIII

AGGRESSIVE TURKISH MOVEMENTS--OPINION IN ENGLAND--CHANGE IN COMMAND

With the withdrawal of the allied troops from Anzac Cove and Suvla

Bay, the Turks were free to concentrate all their forces in the

Gallipoli Peninsula in the south against the British and French forces

that were still intrenched on a line running roughly from Y Beach on

the Aegean Sea to Kereves Dere on the Dardanelles, skirting the slopes

that led up to the town of Krithia and the heights of Achi Baba.

Immediately the Turks began to transfer the guns and men that had been

used against the northern position. Obviously such a transfer in

difficult country with few roads and a restricted front took

considerable time. In the meantime the British and French in front of

Krithia were not inactive. They countered constantly against the

ever-increasing pressure of the enemy. Although few infantry attacks

were engaged in, bomb and mine warfare for the improvement of the

allied positions and the prevention of fresh inroads by the Turks was

an almost constant affair.

Fortunately for the safety and subsequent plans of the Allies, the

Gallipoli Peninsula at that time of the year was rendered most

difficult for offensive fighting. Heavy rains and consequent floods

make the country almost impassable for the movement of big guns or

large bodies of troops in the face of a determined defense.

But while the position of the allied troops in the hills away from the

fringe of coast was becoming desperate, at or near the beaches they

could enjoy practical immunity except from a few long-range Turkish

batteries. The powerful guns of the allied warships so far outranged

and outweighed anything the Turks could bring into the field about

Krithia and Achi Baba that the allied troops could lie sheltered under

their protection.

This fact undoubtedly contributed largely to the astonishing success

of the reembarkation operations here, as it had at the two northern

bases. The chief danger to the allied troops about Krithia was in the

retreat over the few miles that separated them from the embarkation

beaches.

Finally, however, the pressure of the Turks became so heavy that there

was very real apprehension for the safety of the allied troops still

left on the peninsula. Whether or not it was ever intended to maintain

the positions won in the south it is impossible to say at this time.

Some observers were of the opinion that it was England's desire to

construct on the territory in her possession at the entrance to the

Dardanelles a second Gibraltar, commanding at least one end of the

important waterway. German opinion held that it had been agreed

between the Entente Powers in the event of the forcing of the

Dardanelles that the land commanding the waterway was to be divided

among the three countries, each dominating a stretch--probably Russia

in Constantinople, England at the Narrows, and France in between.

However that may be, any intention of hanging on to the territory

captured in the south was soon to be impracticable. By the first of

the year, 1916, the Turks were hotly pressing the allied troops to the

left of Krithia and it became imperative to shorten the line.

Favored by the floods and the fact that, despite the knowledge of the

Turks that a reembarkation had been decided upon, they did not know

exactly when it was to be carried out, the retirement was effected

with small loss. On the nights of January 8-9, 1916, the men were

embarked from the beaches at the north of Sedd-el-Bahr under the guns

of the British and French fleet.

At the last moment it was found impossible to get eleven British guns

away. Reluctantly it was decided to destroy them and they were

rendered useless by the last troops leaving the peninsula. Similarly

the French were compelled to abandon six heavy pieces. Immense stores

were burned and all the buildings, piers, etc., erected by the allied

troops blown up.

While the Allies' offensive was beginning to wane at Gallipoli, an

interesting incident developed at Constantinople which gives some idea

of the high tension existing there at the time. The story is best told

in the original words of Mr. Henry Wood, an American newspaper

correspondent, who in a dispatch dated August 17, 1915, first gave the

news to the New York "World." He wrote:

"The following is the story of the manner in which Mr. Morgenthau, the

American Ambassador, intervened in favor of 2,000 English and French

civilians whom Enver Pasha had decided to expose to the bombardment of

the allied fleet at Gallipoli:

"The decision had not only been taken, but every detail had been

covertly prepared for its carrying out on a Monday morning, when on

the previous evening Mr. Morgenthau learned of it. He at once

telephoned to Enver Pasha and secured from him a promise that women

and children should be spared. A second request, that the execution of

the order be delayed until the following Thursday, was only granted

after the ambassador had assured Enver that it would be the greatest

mistake Turkey had ever made to carry it out without first advising

the powers interested.

"Mr. Morgenthau at once telegraphed to France and England by way of

Washington, and no reply having arrived by Wednesday morning, again

telephoned to the War Minister, insisting on being received in

personal audience.

"'I have not a single moment left vacant until four o'clock, at which

time I must attend a Council of the Ministers,' was the reply.

"'But unless you have received me by four o'clock,' Mr. Morgenthau

replied, 'I will come out and enter the Council of Ministers myself,

when I shall insist upon talking to you.'

"An appointment was therefore granted for three o'clock, and after a

long argument Enver Pasha was persuaded to agree to send only

twenty-five French and twenty-five English to Gallipoli 'as a

demonstration,' the War Minister arguing that any farther retraction

would weaken discipline. It was also agreed to send only the youngest

men, and Bedri Bey, the Constantinople chief of police, was at once

sent for in order that he might be acquainted with the new limitation

of the decision. But he at once protested. 'I don't want to send a lot

of boys down there. I want to send down notables. You have tricked

me,' he declared, turning to the ambassador.

"Next morning the ambassador attended personally to the going aboard

of the twenty-five French and twenty-five English who had been finally

selected. For all that, they knew the original orders to expose them

to the fire of the fleet were to be carried out to the letter, and the

farewell to their friends and relatives at the Golden Horn pier was

one of the most affecting ever enacted at Constantinople. At the last

minute one of the British ministers, who still remained at

Constantinople, volunteered to go along in order that he might offer

spiritual consolation should they eventually face death, and a young

Englishman was released in his place. Mr. Morgenthau insisted that the

party be accompanied by Mr. Hoffman Phillip, First Secretary of the

American Embassy.

"On their arrival at Gallipoli they were imprisoned in two empty

houses and informed that the allied fleet was expected any moment to

resume its bombardment. The city had been under fire for several days,

and was almost completely deserted. No provision had been made for

their subsistence. During the days which followed the fifty men

suffered considerable hardships, but at last orders came from

Constantinople for all fifty to be returned and released."

Meanwhile a curious hardening of public opinion regarding the

Dardanelles was taking place in England, which in the course of time

was destined to have an all-important influence on the operations in

that part of the world. Before the Suvla Bay landing there had been

considerable but mild criticism of the manner in which the whole

affair had been undertaken and carried out. Close upon the early

successes of the naval bombardment there had been an unjustified

public optimism. Then came weeks of pessimism following that black day

when three battleships were sent to the bottom almost at one blow.

Subsequent events and the false color given to them by the official,

but especially the unofficial, accounts served to hearten the British

public for a time. Then came Winston Churchill's famous speech in

which he spoke of Sir Ian Hamilton's forces being "only a few miles

from a great victory," such as would have a determining effect upon

the outcome of the war. This was followed by many absurd but

circumstantial reports that the Dardanelles had actually been forced

but, for some unexplained reasons, the news was being withheld by the

Government.

A little later there came news of the arrival of German submarines off

Gallipoli and of the sinking of two more battleships. This was

followed by unofficial intimation that the major fleet had had to be

withdrawn from the waters about the peninsula and that the forces on

land were in a measure cut off and dependent upon smaller vessels for

naval support and supply.

At this point criticism of the Dardanelles campaign became more

pronounced and daring in many quarters in England. The public was ripe

for it and many openly expressed their regret that it had ever been

entered upon. Then came the Suvla Bay landing, and affairs rapidly

moved to a climax.

The Suvla Bay attempt, like all of the other operations at Gallipoli,

was conceived in a spirit of excessive optimism. It was intended to be

a surprise and the public in England were kept absolutely ignorant of

the preparations, so far as it was possible to prevent a leakage with

thousands of troops being sent out of the country. Even after the

landing and the fighting were well over, little or no news was allowed

to get into the papers. Finally there came a long dispatch from the

United States, which, curiously enough, the British censor passed,

telling of the utter defeat of the Turk, the complete success of the

Suvla Bay maneuver, and intimating that the forcing of the Dardanelles

was now but a question of a few days.

This amazing dispatch, in which there was of course no truth, was

printed in the leading English papers, and a large part of the

unthinking public and even a portion of the more intelligent classes

swallowed it whole. The news came just at the time of the blackest

week of the war up to that time, from the British point of view, when

the Germans were racing to the end of their remarkable drive against

the Russians and the czar's great fortresses were falling like packs

of cards before the furious onslaughts of the Teuton forces.

But with the arrival and publication in England of Sir Ian Hamilton's

account, and the declaration by him that the ends aimed at had not

been achieved, it soon was realized that even this great attempt, upon

which so much had been builded, had failed. Depression became

universal, and there were for the first time responsible demands that

the whole expedition be abandoned.

This question of the total abandonment of the attempt to force the

Dardanelles was a tremendous problem for England. Involved in it was

the great question of her prestige, not only among her millions of

Mohammedan subjects, but also in the Balkans, then rapidly moving to a

decision. Turkey was the only Mohammedan power still boasting

independence, and for Great Britain to acknowledge herself bested in

an attempt to defeat her was likely to have far-reaching and serious

results throughout India and Egypt, where Great Britain's ability to

hold what she had won was dependent in a large measure upon the very

prestige now in danger.

One of the reasons for urging the abandonment of the Dardanelles

campaign was the urgent need for troops elsewhere. It was declared

that it was absurd folly to be wasting troops at Gallipoli when the

western front was being starved for men. Furthermore there were

rapidly accumulating evidences that the Entente Powers were soon to be

compelled to fight on a new and important front.

About this time Germany began her preparations for a final attack upon

Serbia. Try as the Allies might, they had not been able to force an

agreement between Serbia and Bulgaria on the question of the ownership

of those parts of Macedonia won from the Turk in the First Balkan War,

and taken from the Bulgar by the Serbians in the second. Germany,

taking advantage of these irreconcilable differences, was about to

launch a heavy attack from the north upon the kingdom of aged Peter.

In these circumstances there came before the British Government, in

common with the French Government, the question of just how great an

obligation rested on the shoulders of the two great powers. Serbia

certainly looked to them to assist her with all their strength, and at

the height of the agitation Sir Edward Grey made a public declaration

that in every circumstance Serbia could look to England for unlimited

support.

It was when those who knew began to discuss the question of where

Great Britain was to find the military force to make good Grey's

pledge to Serbia that the Dardanelles campaign came in for hot

criticism. It was known that few, if any, fully trained troops were

available in England for a fresh campaign. Indeed, as matters

ultimately worked out, it was France who found the bulk of the force

that was hurried to Saloniki when Bulgaria declared war on Serbia and

joined in the Austro-German attack upon the Balkan kingdom. Later,

under French pressure, England withdrew 40,000 of her troops from the

western front and rushed them off to Saloniki, but much too late to

succor Serbia.

Finally, so powerful became the influences calling upon the Government

to retire from the Dardanelles with as much grace as possible that the

opinion of Sir Ian Hamilton was asked. Probably the inside truth of

the affair will not be known for some years, but it later developed

that there was considerable friction between Sir Ian Hamilton and the

British War Office at the time. Sir Ian, it is known, laid a large

part of blame for the failure at the Strait to the fact that Earl

Kitchener did not send him large reenforcements that were expressly

promised. At any rate he was against a withdrawal from Gallipoli in

the circumstances and in favor of a swift and overwhelming assault

with all the troops and forces that could be gathered. He was still

firmly convinced that the forcing of the Dardanelles was possible and

probable.

Just what were the relations between France and England, and

especially how they each regarded the Dardanelles campaign in the

winter of 1915, it is impossible to say with any degree of assurance.

It is known, however, that there were serious differences of opinion,

not only among the more influential men in both Paris and London, but

between the two Governments.

Obviously, the British were the more reluctant to abandon the project,

which had been entered upon with so much confidence and enthusiasm. It

was distinctly a British operation, although the French Government had

given its unqualified approval at the start and had loyally

contributed all the troops it could spare. But the plans had been

drawn up in London and had been worked out by British commanders; and

the acknowledgment of failure was a confession of British, not French,

incompetency. It was a blow at British prestige such as had not been

dealt since the early disasters of the Boer War.

While the whole question of the Gallipoli campaign was being

reconsidered there occurred something that had a profound effect upon

subsequent events in that part of the war area and elsewhere. The

defeat of the Russians while the French and British troops were

unable, through lack of preparation and foresight, to carry on an

energetic offensive that might have drawn the Germans from their Slav

prey, convinced all the allied Governments that the time had arrived

for a thorough revision of their system of cooperation. In short, if

the war was to be won and each of the Entente Powers was to escape a

separate defeat while the others were doomed to a forced inactivity,

it was necessary that their military, economic, and financial affairs

should be so coordinated and administered that they should be directed

with one object only in view--the winning of the war.

For this purpose representatives of the allied powers met in Paris and

discussed plans. One of the first results of these discussions was to

be seen in the military field. The armies of France and England in the

field became, for all practical purposes, one. The supreme command of

the allied forces in France was placed in the hands of the commander

in chief of the French army.

General French, who had been only nominally under the orders of the

French commander in chief, retired from command of the British army in

France and one of his subordinates, Sir Douglas Haig, took his place.

Similarly, in the southwestern theatre of the war, where Sir Ian

Hamilton was in supreme command, the leadership passed to France,

Hamilton resigning and his place being taken by Sir Charles Monro.

When the British and French troops from Gallipoli were ultimately

landed at Saloniki the supreme command of the allied forces in that

theatre of war was given to General Sarrail of the French army.

Undoubtedly, too, the influence of France, and of Joffre individually,

was thrown into the scales at these Paris meetings against a

continuance of the Dardanelles operations. French public opinion was

strongly in favor of sending immediate succor to the Serbians. So

strong, in fact, was this public opinion that, when the expected help

failed to arrive, it forced the immediate downfall of Delcasse and the

ultimate resignation of the French Cabinet.

Soon after Kitchener returned to London from these Paris conferences a

sensation was caused by the announcement that he was leaving the War

Office temporarily and would undertake an important mission in the

Near East. Ultimately it developed that this important mission was

nothing more nor less than a first-hand examination of the problems

confronting the British commander in withdrawing his force from

Gallipoli and a study of the field into which it was proposed to

transfer, not only these troops, but hundreds of thousands of others.

Probably no high officer of the British army was more fitted for the

mission. Whatever one may think of Kitchener's administration of the

British War Office during a period of unprecedented difficulty, no one

can deny his success in India and Egypt. With those commands had

necessarily gone an exhaustive study of military operations that might

conceivably have to be undertaken for the protection of British

prestige and power in the Mohammedan world.

Thus he was thoroughly at home in the Near East and he brought back to

London an encouraging report. Even high military opinion in England

had been of the opinion that the withdrawal of the allied troops from

Gallipoli could not be effected without terrible losses. Some even

held that it would be better and less costly in human lives to leave

the troops there on the defensive until the end of the war than to

attempt to get them out of the death hole into which they had been

dumped.

This, however, was not Lord Kitchener's idea. He reported that they

could be withdrawn, not, it was true, without heavy losses, but at a

cost much smaller than the general estimate. This conclusion he came

to after an examination on the spot, and subsequent events, as we

shall see, more than justified his judgment in the matter.

Once having made up its mind to risk the loss of prestige involved and

withdraw the army from the Gallipoli Peninsula, the British Government

acted with speed and intelligence. It turned the difficult task over

to General Sir Charles Monro, whose subsequent accomplishment of the

operations earned him the admiration of every military man throughout

the world.

General Sir Charles Monro's job was difficult and dangerous enough for

any man. In the face of an enemy numbering something like 80,000 men,

along a line of 20,000 yards, he had to withdraw an almost equal

number of men with their stores, trucks, ammunition, guns, etc. Only

by the greatest of good fortune could he have the inestimable

advantage of surprise.

Moreover, the enemy had been tremendously encouraged and emboldened by

the successful defense which they had offered to all the allied

assaults of the previous year. Their Mohammedan fanaticism had been

stirred by the Turkish, Austrian, and German press, and their pride

quickened by the thick crop of rumors that the Allies were finally

about to acknowledge defeat.

In many places the French and British trenches were separated by less

than fifty yards from the Turkish defenders. In few cases were they

more than 500 yards distant. Furthermore, the Turkish positions

overlooked the allied troops, being in almost every case on higher

ground. And finally the Suvla Bay and Anzac regions, the points from

which the troops would have to be embarked, were all within artillery

range and often within rifle range of the enemy.

Every effort was made by General Monro and his subordinate officers to

conduct the preparations for the embarkation of the troops in secret.

That is to say the exact day decided upon was kept a secret from all

except the highest officers. For it was not possible to keep from the

Turks entirely the knowledge of a complete withdrawal from the

Gallipoli Peninsula of the allied troops. Too much publicity had been

given to the whole discussion in France and England for that.

Eventually, Monday, December 19, 1915, was decided upon for the

critical operation. With all possible secrecy a great fleet of

transports was gathered at Mudros Bay and, under the protection of

this fleet of warships--the strongest that had approached the

Gallipoli Peninsula since the arrival of the German submarines in the

neighborhood--sailed for Suvla Bay and Anzac Cove.

It had been decided to remove the allied troops from these two bases

before attempting the perhaps more difficult task of getting the force

away from the Krithia region. Indeed, after the troops had been safely

extricated from the northern bases it was officially announced in

London that the Allies would continue to hold the base won in the

south. This proved, however, to be merely in the nature of a literary

demonstration to divert the attention of the none too credulous Turk

from the real purpose of the allied command.

While the fleet of transports and warships was approaching the two

bases under cover of the night, the Australian and New Zealand troops

at Anzac and the British troops at Suvla were hastily preparing for

leaving. Among the colonial troops there was the keenest regret in

thus relinquishing what had been so hardly won at the price of so many

precious lives. To the Australians the operations at Anzac will always

remain one of the greatest, if not the very greatest military feat in

their history. To be sure they fought in numbers and with conspicuous

bravery throughout the Boer War; but Anzac was an operation all their

own, on a scale never before attempted by them as a distinct military

organization. They had won undying fame and unstinted praise from the

highest military authorities, and the success of the operation in that

part of the Gallipoli Peninsula had become a matter affecting their

pride.

[Illustration: Operations at the Dardanelles.]

CHAPTER XLIV

ABANDONMENT OF DARDANELLES--ARMENIAN ATROCITIES

Finally, by midnight of Sunday, all was ready. Just after that hour

the allied troops on shore at Anzac and Suvla Bay could see the dark

forms of the warships and the transports as they dropped anchor close

inshore. If they had listened attentively they might have heard the

soft splash of the hundreds of muffled oars as they slowly propelled

the ships' boats toward the beaches.

On shore preparations were being made to repel a hurricane attack by

the Turks. For it was felt that as soon as the enemy got knowledge of

the contemplated withdrawal they would attack with unprecedented fury.

But, though the British troops waited, the expected attack never came.

Finally, just after three o'clock in the morning, the Australians

exploded a large mine at Russell's Top, between the two systems of

trenches, and made a strong demonstration as if about to initiate a

big offensive. About eight o'clock the last of them were taken off.

Before these last men left they set fire to the stores that it had

been impossible to carry away.

It was only then, apparently, that the Turks awoke to the real

progress of events. Immediately from every Turkish battery a hurricane

of shells was poured into the deserted Allies' base. Those within

range turned their fire upon the allied fleet, now swiftly

disappearing from sight in the thin haze.

Highly significant, as showing the serious state of public opinion in

England during the closing days of the Dardanelles campaign, were the

published statements of E. Ashmead-Bartlett. Ashmead-Bartlett was in

the nature of an official eyewitness of the major part of the

operations at the Strait, although the British War Office took no

responsibility for his opinions or statements. It was at first

intended by the British authorities that there should be no newspaper

correspondents on the spot, but finally, as a concession to the

demands of the united press of Great Britain, it was agreed that one

man should be allowed on the scene and that his dispatches should be

syndicated among the papers sharing the expense of his work.

Ashmead-Bartlett was the man selected for the unique task.

His dispatches from the Dardanelles were censored on the spot and

again in London, so they did not possess much information of direct

value. It was when he returned to London and was in a degree free from

restraint that he wrote frankly. His remarks are quoted in part

because they are the best, perhaps the only, unprejudiced opinion on

the operations from a British point of view.

Writing in the middle of October, 1915, he strongly advised the

abandonment of the campaign, "which," he says, "if it ever had any

hope of success, now is completely robbed of it." In his opinion,

giving up the campaign would not hurt the Allies' prestige in the

Balkans, for the simple reason that their prestige had "been reduced

to nil" by the Foreign Office, loquacious politicians, and faulty

diplomacy.

Speaking of the military operations at the Dardanelles, after paying

the highest tribute to the ability and the courage of the Turks, and

berating the British politicians who interfered with the General

Staff, he said:

"Apart from the question that the conception is of doubtful paternity,

we committed every conceivable blunder in our methods of carrying out

the plan. Few minds were engaged that had any knowledge of the

character of the Turks' fighting qualities and the geography of the

country. Never before in this war has the situation been more serious.

"Our boasted financial stamina in outlasting our opponents is going

fast to ruin in excessive expenditures in enterprises which, if they

ever had any hope of success, now have been finally robbed of all such

hope.

"A good gambler, when he loses much, can afford to stop. He waits for

a turn in his luck and a fresh pack of cards, and clears off for

another table. The mad and headstrong gambler loses everything trying

to recoup, and has nothing left to make a fresh start elsewhere.

Which is England to be, the former or the latter?"

It is natural that the Turkish people should have been jubilant over

the turn of events in Gallipoli and elsewhere. After the series of

defeats during the Balkan War the successes of the Great War against

such redoubtable opponents as France and England were all the more

inspiring. The final success in the Dardanelles had been predicted

some weeks before in the Turkish Parliament, and therefore was not

unexpected. In the last week in October, Halil Bey, president of the

Turkish Chamber of Deputies, declared:

"At the time when the most serious engagements were taking place in

the Dardanelles and in Gallipoli, I was in Berlin. I was there able to

realize personally the feelings of high and sincere admiration

entertained by our allies for the extraordinary bravery with which

terrible attacks were repulsed by our armies. The German nation

publicly congratulated their Government, which, at a time when we were

despised by the smallest nations, was proud to sign an alliance with

us. That alliance carries with it obligations for the distant future,

and unites in a sincere and unshakable friendship three great armies

and three great nations.

"The cannon which thundered on the Danube will soon be heard again in

greater force and will create in the Balkans an important sector in

connection with the war. After the reestablishment of communications,

which will take place within a brief space of time, our army will be

in a better position to fulfill its mission on all the fronts, and in

irresistible fashion. The hopes of the enemy are forever destroyed as

regards Constantinople and its straits, and can never be renewed."

Extremely significant is one of the concluding paragraphs of his

speech in which he foreshadows economic developments after the war. In

view of the Allies' expressed intention of making an effort to boycott

German trade even after the signing of peace terms, the following

words of Halil Bey are illuminating and important:

"The most important result of this war is that from the North Sea to

the Indian Ocean a powerful group will have been created that will be

ever in opposition to English egotism, which has been the cause of the

loss of millions of human lives and of thousands of millions in money,

and will act as a check on Russian pride, French _revanche_, and

Italian treachery. In order to secure this happy result the Turkish

nation will be proud to submit to every sort of sacrifice." The

president concluded his speech by eulogizing the memory of those who

had fallen in the war.

Halil Bey's prediction of the reestablishment of communications with

the Central Powers was not long in being fulfilled. Within two weeks

the Germano-Austrian drive from the Danube had penetrated to Bulgarian

territory opposite the Rumanian frontier, and within another fortnight

it had linked up with the Bulgarian columns in the south operating

against Nish. For all practical purposes Serbia was in their hands,

and the powerful economic group heralded by Halil Bey was in the

process of completion.

There is no doubt that the forging of this strong link with Berlin was

one of the main considerations in inducing the Allies to abandon the

Dardanelles campaign. There were two immensely important reasons why

this should have radically changed conditions in the Gallipoli

Peninsula.

In the first place, there was the question of supplies. There are

three ways in which modern wars on a big scale can be won: by direct

military pressure, by financial pressure, or by economic stress. In

the case of the Allies' offensive against Turkey, after the first

disappointment of the naval military operations, it was confidently

predicted that economic stress would accomplish what military pressure

had failed to do. It was known that Turkey had but meager means of

making good the enormous expenditure of heavy-gun ammunition necessary

in modern battles. Indeed, as early as the big naval attempt to force

the Dardanelles, rumors were heard of a shortage of ammunition in the

Turkish forts, and in this connection it is interesting to print a

report that gained currency at the time of the abandonment of the

Anzac and Suvla Bay bases.

Had the allied fleet returned to its attack upon the Dardanelles

batteries on the day following the great bombardment of March 19,

1915, the waterway to Constantinople would surely have been forced, in

the opinion of several artillery officers of the defense works near

Tchanak-Kalessi expressed to the Associated Press correspondent, who

had just reached Vienna.

One of the principal batteries, it appeared, had for three of its

large caliber guns just four armor-piercing shells each when night

ended the tremendous efforts of the British and French fleet.

For the fourth gun five shells were left, making for the entire

battery a total of seventeen projectiles of the sort which the

aggressors had to fear. What this meant is best understood when it is

considered that the battery in question was the one which had to be

given the widest berth by the allied fleet.

During the evening of March 18, 1915, the correspondent talked with

several artillery officers from this battery.

"Better pack up and be ready to quit at daybreak," said one of them.

"Why?" he asked.

"Oh, they are sure to get in to-morrow!"

Then the officer stated his reasons. He was so certain that the

British and French would return in the morning to finish their task

that there was no question in his mind as to the propriety of

discussing the ammunition matter.

"We'll hold out well enough to make them think that there is no end to

our supply of ammunition," he said, "but it can't be done if they go

about their work in real earnest. With our heavy pieces useless they

can reduce the batteries on the other shore without trouble. The case

looks hopeless. You had better take my advice."

Following the advice thus given, the correspondent rose early next

morning and packed his few belongings, keeping, meanwhile, a watchful

eye on the tower of Kale-Sultanie, where the flag, showing that the

allied fleet was near, was usually hoisted. But the morning passed and

still the danger signal did not appear. Evidently the allied fleet was

not inclined to risk more such losses as those of the previous day,

when the _Bouvet_, _Irresistible_, and _Ocean_ went down and five

other ships were badly damaged. Yet even with the eleven remaining

ships, it appears from the Turkish admissions, the Dardanelles could

have been forced on March 19, 1915.

The correspondent visited several of the batteries during the day. The

damage done the day before was slight indeed, consisting mostly of

large earth displacements from the parapets and traverses. Four guns

were temporarily out of commission, but the general shortage of

ammunition made these pieces negligible quantities anyway.

Although the British information system in this field of operations

was efficient, it must have failed in this instance, for it seems

certain that with seventeen shells the battery in question would have

been easily disposed of, a channel could have been made through the

mine field, and the way to Constantinople would have been open.

All this was realized in the Turkish capital. The court made

arrangements to transfer to Akhissar Anatolia, and the German and

Austro-Hungarian Embassies were ready to leave for this ancient seat

of the Ottoman Government. The families of many German officers in the

Turkish service left Constantinople. In short, everybody understood

that a calamity was pending. What its exact nature was but a few knew.

Whatever truth there may have been in this particular story, there

seems to be little doubt that the Turks were woefully short of

ammunition. During the Balkan War it was reported on good authority

that much of their ammunition was defective. When countries like

France, England, and Russia hopelessly miscalculated the need of

ammunition for modern warfare, it is not asking too much of us to

believe that the Turks suffered in a worse degree.

Without direct or indirect communication with Germany, it is easy to

imagine this condition of affairs getting steadily worse. At the

beginning of the war, there seems to be good evidence, large

quantities of all kinds of munitions and war supplies were rushed from

Germany to Constantinople by way of Rumania and Bulgaria, but it was

not long before the Rumanian Government, either of its own volition or

in the face of threats by the allied powers, refused to permit these

supplies to pass through her territory.

It became evident to the Allies that sooner or later the Germans would

have to make an attempt to link up with the Turks. Thus, from one

point of view, the operations at the Dardanelles became a race against

Germany, with a common objective, Constantinople. Those who laid their

money on the allied horse were confident of winning, figuring that

long before the Germans were free of the French menace on the west and

south and the Russian menace on the east, and so in a position to

undertake an offensive against Serbia, the allied troops would have

forced the Dardanelles, vanquished the Ottoman troops before the gates

of Constantinople, and opened the Strait of the Dardanelles and the

Bosporus.

So it was that when events did not transpire as expected, and the

allied troops were still hanging desperately to their bases on

Gallipoli Peninsula, when the Germans had subdued Serbia, and arrived

in triumph in the capital of the Ottoman Empire via the Berlin to

Constantinople Express, there was no longer any hope of starving the

Turkish guns nor, having even forced the Dardanelles, any certainty of

the capture of Constantinople. In other words, conditions had

radically changed, and, even with better chances of success than were

believed to exist, the game was no longer worth the candle.

The second reason was that, with a neutral Bulgaria, the benefits to

the Allies of a successful offensive in the Dardanelles were obvious.

The forcing of the Strait, a combined naval and land attack upon

Constantinople, the driving of the Turk from Europe, and the insertion

of a firm defensive wedge between the empire of the Sultan and any

possible German offensive from the north, were objectives important

enough to justify almost any expenditure of money, men, and effort the

Allies might have made.

But with the Turkish army linked up with a friendly Bulgaria, and

backed by a strong Austro-German force led by General Mackensen, the

conditions were changed to a state of hopelessness. An allied army

operating on the European side against Constantinople would be

dangerously flanked by the Bulgarian and Austro-Germans and hopelessly

outnumbered if limited to the force the Allies had been able to send

to the southeastern war area.

Just how many men it was possible for Bulgaria and Turkey to put in

the field it is not possible to state definitely. It would be

reasonable to figure that they could by a great effort, after many

months of war, put at least twice their reputed war strength into the

ranks. The larger countries far exceeded such figures. Enver Pasha, at

the end of October, 1915, stated that Turkey had raised a total of

2,000,000 soldiers. Bulgaria, in a case of necessity, might possibly

have added another million, while Germany and Austria, at the time of

the operations against Serbia, demonstrated their ability to supply,

in action and in reserve, another 500,000 for this front.

These are huge figures. There were many reasons why all these troops

could not be used against an allied offensive. It is not meant to

imply, for instance, that an allied offensive on a large scale, based

on Saloniki, is doomed to failure. The figures are quoted simply to

show the military conditions that made an offensive from the

Dardanelles hopeless in the circumstances that obtained at the end of

1915 and that weighed with the military authorities in London and

Paris in deciding upon a withdrawal from the Gallipoli Peninsula.

Probably it will be a long time before the world has any accurate,

adequate idea of the terrible disaster that overtook British prestige

and allied troops in their year's attempt to force the Strait.

Official figures announced by Premier Asquith speak of more than

100,000 troops killed, wounded, or missing, but these total figures

took account of the sick, who reached an extraordinary high total.

Lack of drinking water, the difficulty of keeping the troops supplied

with food, the intense heat, and the fact that the men engaged were

unused to the climatic conditions, combined to lay low thousands upon

thousands of men not mentioned in the restricted casualty lists. An

estimate of another hundred thousand put out of action, temporarily

or permanently, by sickness is not unreasonable.

Thus 200,000 men, six battleships and smaller war vessels, enormous

stores and millions of dollars' worth of ammunitions were the price

Britain paid to discover that the Dardanelles were impregnable even to

British battleships and British endurance. And who shall estimate the

loss of vital prestige, the waste of fine efforts at a time when it

was so much needed elsewhere? Some future historian, with all the

facts in his possession, with the saving perspective that only time

can give, will have a fascinating subject for discussion in this

Dardanelles campaign, destined to go down into history as one of the

most spectacular and daring in the annals of warfare.

It was not until some weeks later that the outside world began to hear

rumors of the dire predicament of the Armenians under Turkish rule. In

their case, as in that of the French and British who were to be sent

to the Dardanelles, Mr. Morgenthau finally intervened with effect.

It had always been recognized that the elements of serious trouble

existed in the districts of Asiatic Turkey populated by the Armenians.

In the days of Sultan Abdul Hamid there had been frequent massacres by

the Turks, following outbreaks of racial and religious strife. The

Armenians had not been easy people to govern, and a constant and deep

hatred existed between them and their rulers.

With the coming of the Young Turks the lot of the unhappy Armenians

had apparently bettered. Indeed, at the time of the outbreak of war,

one of two special European inspectors, specially appointed to watch

over the administration of the six provinces of Asiatic Turkey in

which the Armenians lived, was actually on his way to his post.

Of course the war changed the entire situation and made the position

of the Armenian population a precarious one. All hope of reform for

the moment was banished and the old hatred, of which it was hoped the

world had heard the last, was revived and intensified by the passions

aroused by the entrance of Turkey into the struggle.

Nor were the Armenians content to await their fate. In several

important instances they took matters into their own hands. It was,

perhaps quite natural that many of them, especially those who lived

near the Russian frontier, should sympathize with Russia.

Early in April of 1915, a considerable force of Armenians in the city

of Van collected and resisted the attempts of Turkish gendarmes to

apply the terms of an order banishing certain of their number

suspected of Russian or anti-Turk sympathies. In such force were they

that they actually, with the help of Russian troops, captured the

city.

With the Van revolt Talaat Bey, the powerful Turkish Minister of the

Interior, determined upon a ruthless policy of repression, and it was

largely due to efforts to put that policy in force that there resulted

the subsequent massacre of Armenians that shocked the world. It is

difficult for anyone not in possessions of the actual facts to

apportion an exact measure of blame for these bloody reprisals; and in

the following account, it must be remembered, we are compelled at this

juncture to rely almost entirely upon English and Russian, and

therefore biased, information.

The district covered by the massacre, in which it has been said

1,000,000 Armenians (probably a gross exaggeration) were killed, were

Eastern Anatolia, Cilicia, and the Anti-Taurus regions. It is said

that at Marsovan, where there is an American college, the Armenians

early in June were ordered to meet outside the town. They were

surrounded and 1,200 of their number killed by an infuriated mob.

Thousands of the rest were hurled into northern Mesopotamia.

At Bitlis and Mush, in the Lake Van district, it is reported that

12,000 were killed and several Armenian villages entirely wiped out.

As has been pointed out, the Armenians of some districts did not sit

still and wait to be massacred. At Shaben Karahissar in northeastern

Anatolia, within a hundred miles of Trebizond, the Armenian population

held the town for a short time against Turkish troops. Finally they

were overcome and 4,000 are said to have been killed. At Kharput, a

hundred and twenty-five miles southwest of Erzerum, the Armenians held

the town for a whole week, but were finally overcome by troops and

artillery. In many of the districts the able-bodied men of the

Armenian population have been drafted into the labor battalions for

military work at the front and at the bases. The men too old for this

class of work, and yet suspected of agitating against Turkish rule,

were exiled into districts where their powers for harm would be nil.

It must not be assumed because of these accounts that the Turkish

Government gave its unqualified approval of these massacres.

Undoubtedly Talaat Bey adopted a deliberately ruthless policy in

dealing with all cases of actual or suspected revolt. But it is a far

cry from a systematic, intelligent policy of frightfulness to an

indiscriminate massacre.

Protests against these massacres were not confined to the outside

world. Many influential personages in Turkey openly protested, and in

some notable cases conscientious and brave officials actually refused

to obey the demands of the Constantinople authorities and hand over

Armenian subjects or assist in their exile.

Again in this case, as in that of the proposal of Enver Pasha to send

a large number of allied citizens to the bombardment area of Gallipoli

as a reprisal, it was Mr. Morgenthau, the American Ambassador at

Constantinople, who followed up his protest by real action. He threw

himself heart and soul into the work of softening the lot of the

unfortunate Armenians. Of course he had to move warily in order not to

offend the pride of the Turkish authorities, but working through the

American Consular officials stationed throughout Turkey and through

the American missionaries and teachers working among the Armenian and

Turkish people he undoubtedly saved the lives of thousands of men,

women, and children, while other thousands undoubtedly owe to his zeal

their escape from exile or starvation.

It was due largely to the publicity given to these deplorable

happenings in the American press that the attention of the world was

drawn to Asiatic Turkey and the conditions there, resulting in action

by the Turkish Government that effectively put a stop, for the moment

at least, to the persecution of an unhappy people.

CHAPTER XLV

CAMPAIGN IN CAUCASUS--FALL OF ERZERUM

The fall of 1915 and the early winter of 1915 were periods of feverish

activity behind the lines in the Caucasus. A severe winter held up any

active operations of consequence on the part of either belligerents,

but both knew that with the coming of better conditions their

defensive and offensive organizations would be put to severe tests.

On the part of the Russians the Caucasus front became at the time one

of prime importance. Not excepting even the Balkan frontier, to Russia

the Turkish line was of more importance than any other on which her

army was aligned. In the first place, of all her frontier that running

through the Caucasus promised the best return for the least

expenditure of effort, time, money, and men. Against both Germany, in

the north, and Germany-stiffened Austria in Galicia and the

Carpathians, Russia had had severe reverses. The czar's staff, through

grim experience, realized the tremendous difficulties that confronted

them on these two fronts. Turkey, ill prepared, lacking superlative

military leaders, without organization, and barely recovered from the

terrible effects of the Balkan wars, appeared to be an easy opponent,

comparatively speaking, despite the frightful difficulties of large

military operations in the roadless and railless mountain passes of

the Trans-caucasus.

[Illustration: The Turkish Empire.]

Furthermore, the military pressure was becoming steadily easier on

Russia. The great German drive was drawing to its close. With its

front established in a straight line from just south of Riga on the

north, to the Rumanian frontier on the south, the Austro-German army

decided to abandon the offensive for the time being and be content

with holding that front; and devote its energies to the Serbian and

French theatres of war. This promised to provide a very welcome

breathing spell for Russia, permitting her to reorganize her military

forces, remedy her deplorable shortage of munitions and incidentally

to turn her attentions to the Turks.

Finally, once in the war, the whole of Russian official opinion tended

toward a settlement, once and for all, of her age-long dream of

Constantinople. The consolidation of the Balkans on a Slav,

pro-Russian basis, important as it appeared to be and furnishing the

ostensible causes of the war, was but incidental to the Russian

dominion over and control of Constantinople, the gate to the warm

waters of the Mediterranean.

From the viewpoint of the Entente Powers as a whole there were cogent

reasons why a Russian offensive against the Turkish Caucasus front

would be highly desirable. It would, for instance, relieve the

pressure, not only on the Gallipoli front, but as well on the British

forces in Mesopotamia. In the latter field, of course, Great Britain,

with a miniature army of not more than 40,000, was attempting to reach

Bagdad, but was being hard pressed by the Ottoman forces. Furthermore,

an eventual junction of the Russian columns from the Caucasus and the

British troops from the Persian Gulf, and the establishment of an

impregnable line, would provide against any future drive of a

German-Austro-Turkish army toward India.

These, then, were the considerations that influenced the preparations

for a resumption of the Russian offensive against Erzerum and beyond,

which had been more or less quiescent since the smashing defeat of the

Turkish army on the frontier in December, 1914.

Undoubtedly this state of affairs had much to do with the transfer of

the Grand Duke Nicholas to the Caucasus command when it became

apparent that the German offensive in the north was nearing its

finish. With masterly skill the Russian commander in chief had

withdrawn his huge army in the face of a victorious and highly

efficient enemy, not, to be sure, without serious losses, but

certainly without permitting his long front to be really broken or his

forces utterly defeated. It was felt in Russia that he, of all men

developed by the war, was the one to organize and initiate the

proposed operations in the Caucasus.

It was early in the month of September, 1915, September 5 to be

precise, that the czar issued his famous order relieving the Grand

Duke Nicholas of his command in the north and transferring him to the

Caucasus. Taking with him a number of the higher officers who had been

with him through the trying months on the Warsaw front, the Grand Duke

Nicholas immediately journeyed south and took over the command of the

Russian forces in that theatre of war.

It was not long before there were to be seen many evidences of the

arrival of a commander with energy and determination. Despite the

lamentable shortage of munitions known to exist in Russia, guns,

shells, rifles, provisions, and stores of all kinds were rapidly

accumulated at the main Caucasus base and from there distributed to

the points along the line of advance into Turkey. Many of these

supplies of all kinds, provisions as well as munitions of war, came

from the United States by way of the Siberian port of Vladivostok and

even by way of Archangel, although that port was, in most cases,

reserved for British shipments. From Vladivostok the American

shipments were carried over the 6,000 miles of the great

Trans-Siberian railway to Petrograd and from there continued on their

long and slow journey to the Caucasus front.

Among the endless stream of supplies were many special and ingenious

conveyances for transporting guns, provisions, and soldiers over the

otherwise impassable snows of this terrible region. It was necessary,

to insure success, that by some means hitherto unknown to military

transportation guns weighing tons should be moved about the trackless,

roadless country almost like playthings. Only thus could a commander

hope to secure that preponderance of heavy gunfire without which the

modern offensive is doomed to defeat or stalemate.

By the beginning of February, 1916, all was ready for the Russian

advance upon Erzerum. To begin with, the Turks were known to be

busily occupied in other fields. The British forces in Mesopotamia,

although held up at Kut-el-Amara, and known to be in sore straits,

were in daily expectation of strong reenforcements. The campaign

against Bagdad, which had been originally undertaken by the Indian

army, had proved too big a task for that relatively small

organization, and the conduct of that campaign was taken over by the

imperial military authorities in Great Britain, who have larger

militant forces at their disposal than those possessed by the Indian

Government.

Aside from this fear of strong reenforcements, the Turkish commanders

were straining every effort to capture the British force shut up in

Kut-el-Amara, and thus secure a great victory that could not fail to

have far-reaching military and political effects both in Turkey and

throughout the whole warring world. For this reason every unit of

troops that could be possibly spared from other fields was rushed to

Bagdad and thrown into the field against General Townshend's sorely

pressed command awaiting relief at Kut-el-Amara.

Furthermore, although the pressure on the Gallipoli front had been

relaxed through the practical abandonment by the allied troops of the

attempt to force the Dardanelles, with the entrance of the Bulgarians

into the war and the prosecution of the offensive against Serbia a new

need had been found for Turkish troops. For the Bulgarian and Serbian

development had brought the Allies in ever-increasing strength to

Saloniki. The Allies at the Greek port were a constant potential

menace to Turkey, as well as to Bulgaria, and through the Entente

press were running constant rumors of a coming offensive directed at

Constantinople "through the back door," as it was called.

To be sure the allied forces at Saloniki, beyond a half-hearted

effort, with but a fraction of their numbers to assist the escape of

the Serbian army from the menace of the Austro-German-Bulgarian

pincers that threatened it on three sides, had made no move to carry

the war to the Bulgarian or Turkish enemy. Yet Turkey found it

necessary to keep constantly at Constantinople, or in the country

immediately to the north and in close touch with the Bulgarian forces,

an army estimated at at least 200,000 men.

In other words, the Turkish General Staff could withdraw few if any of

the men concentrated about Constantinople at the beginning of the war

to fill the enormous gaps made in her line on other fronts. Indeed,

she had need to add to them to offset the extraordinary number of men

who were constantly being poured into Saloniki by France and England

until, in the early spring, their total was variously estimated at

from 250,000 to 350,000 men of all services.

It was in these circumstances, then, that the Grand Duke Nicholas

ordered the advance upon Erzerum. They go far to explain the events of

the subsequent few weeks in and about the great Turkish Caucasian

fortress town.

Russian forces had, during the three months immediately preceding the

big offensive, prepared the way by the capture of points from which

the grand attack was to be launched. In command of the czar's troops

was General Judenich, although the Grand Duke Nicholas was officially

responsible for operations on this front. General Judenich had devoted

years of his life to a study of the special problems attending an

offensive in the Kars-Erzerum regions and carried through his task

with a skill and an expedition that have hardly their equal in the

history of the war.

The advance of the Russian forces upon Erzerum was made from three

points. It is well for the reader to keep this constantly in mind. It

was an application of the principle of the pincers, combined with a

great frontal attack, used so often and so successfully by the Germans

in their Russian drive. It adds tremendously to the difficulties of a

commander battling to defend a big position. Nowadays, under the new

conditions of warfare, fortresses or other positions are not defended

to the end. They are held just as long as it is safe for the army

within to hold out. But a commander must on no account endanger his

force. Discretion is more than ever the better part of valor, and "he

who fights and runs away, lives to fight another day," is the guiding

principle of the general of modern times.

Now this triple menace, striking not only on the front but on both

sides and menacing the roads by which a defeated army must retreat,

seriously weakens the defense which an army within a fortress can

make. It was just such an operation or series of operations that

carried the tremendously strong fortress of Antwerp in record time,

that accounted for the surprising fall of Namur in two days, and that

explains the rapidity with which a score of almost impregnable Russian

fortresses in Poland fell before the rush of the German avalanche.

The triple Russian thrust at Erzerum was made from Olty, which had

been captured as far back as August 3, 1915, along the Kars-Erzerum

road by way of Sarikamish, the scene of the great Turkish defeat of

the early days of the war, and from Melazghert and Khynysskala.

Erzerum was undoubtedly one of the strongest positions in the Turkish

Empire, although the experience of the war had tended to detract from

previous confidence in the strength of old-style concrete forts when

attacked by concentrated big-gun bombardment. Opinions differ on the

question of whether or not the Erzerum armament had been maintained up

to a modern standard. But as regards the number of its guns, and the

size and number of its individual forts, there are no two opinions.

Its eighteen separate positions encircling the city in two rings,

defended by concrete forts, would, under ordinary conditions, have

made it virtually impregnable. One count mentions as many as 467 big

guns in the outer forts, 374 in the inner forts, and 200 more or less

mobile fieldpieces scattered about the country intervening. Although

this was an early Russian report, issued in the delirium of national

joy that followed the capture of the fortress, and should be

considerably discounted, nevertheless, Erzerum boasted a plentiful

supply of big guns, few if any of which were taken away by the fleeing

Turkish army, although the majority of them were probably rendered

useless at the last moment. According to Entente information, among

these guns were 300 of the very latest pattern Krupp pieces, but on

the other hand, according to German information, the fortress boasted

no guns less than twenty years old. Arguing from the known shortage of

big guns in Turkey and the fact that of late years other fronts have

been of prime importance and have undoubtedly received what fresh

ordnance the army was able to purchase and secure, it does not seem

likely that much modern equipment was found in the Caucasus fortress

by the Russian victors.

Quickly the three Russian forces converged upon Erzerum. Finally,

driving outlying Turkish forces before them, in the second week of

February, 1916, they were in touch with the outer defenses of the

great fortress. It was rumored at this time that both Von der Goltz

and Liman von Sanders, the two high German commanders, lent by the

kaiser to Turkey, were in Erzerum superintending the defense and,

furthermore, that huge Turkish reenforcements were covering the 200

miles from the nearest railway head by forced marches in an effort to

arrive at the fortress and prevent its encircling and isolation by the

Russians. Both of these reports, however, ultimately were proved to be

figments of the active imaginations of local correspondents.

The Turkish plan of campaign for the defense of Erzerum, according to

official Russian sources, was as follows: The Third Army Corps, which

had been ordered up to replace the losses in the Caucasus front of the

previous nine months, was moved out of Erzerum and took up a position

between that town and the Russian front. The Ninth and Tenth Corps

moved out toward Olty to form an offensive ring, while the Eleventh

Corps was to hold the Russian offensive on the Kars-Erzerum road. In

case the Russians in the last named region were too strong for the

Eleventh Corps to hold, it was to fall back slowly on the fortress of

Erzerum, drawing the army of the Grand Duke Nicholas with it. When

this movement had progressed sufficiently, the Ninth and Tenth Corps

were to attack energetically on the flank.

Unfortunately for the success of this plan, although the Eleventh

Corps performed its function and drew the Russian army with it in its

retreat toward Erzerum, the Ninth and Tenth Corps suffered a reverse

and were compelled to fall back also. Similarly, the Third Corps was

compelled to yield before superior numbers and barely escaped

envelopment.

Naturally, there is considerable difference of opinion as to the

question of numbers involved in these operations. It seems to be

fairly well established, however, that the Russians used, roughly,

eight army corps, or slightly more than 300,000 men. Eight corps are

known to have been at the disposal of the grand duke, but a small

portion of his force was at the same time engaged in an expedition

into northern Persia, so that the round figures given would seem to be

conservative.

Although but four Turkish corps are mentioned, it is known that the

Ottoman command had at its disposal considerable numbers of Kurds,

Persians, Arabs, and other irregular troops, as well as several units

not specifically mentioned in the official accounts. Thus the estimate

of 180,000 to 200,000 men would not seem to be out of the way.

While the thrusts from the northeast and southeast were fighting their

way toward the flanks of Erzerum, the Russian troops advancing along

the Kars-Erzerum road, driving the Eleventh Corps before them, made a

fierce frontal assault upon the outer forts of the town.

In this connection it would be well to examine more minutely the

conditions that confronted the Russian commander. Erzerum is situated

on a plateau some 6,000 feet above sea level, and the key forts had

been placed on high ground commanding the surrounding country. However

well the Russian transport department had done its work, the Russian

supply of heavy artillery could not have been overwhelming in the

sense that heavy guns were overwhelming on other fronts. There could,

therefore, have been no condition of affairs where the infantry was

called upon simply to occupy positions previously shattered by

gunfire. Indeed, the best opinions agree that little or no real damage

was done by the artillery to the Erzerum forts and that the infantry

had to advance against practically intact defenses. Yet, after five

days of fierce assault, the hardy Siberian troops of General

Judenich's army carried nine of the outlying forts and forced the

evacuation of the entire fortress.

There can be but one explanation of this astonishing result. It is

hardly possible for any troops to take a position like Erzerum by

direct assault. The fortress successfully resisted all Russian

attempts to capture it in the Russo-Turkish War, although then far

less strong than in 1916. Some foreign military critics have tried to

explain the puzzling facts by claiming that the well-known bravery

and tenacity of the Turk on defense, shown all through his history and

never more evident than in the Gallipoli campaign, was, for some

unknown reason, totally lacking at Erzerum. Such claims, however, do

not hold water.

Erzerum was evacuated simply because of a menace to the Turkish lines

of communication and the danger of isolation. However well provisioned

the fortress might have been--and its stores were vast, for it was the

chief supply and provisioning center for the whole Turkish military

organization in Asia Minor--it could not hope to withstand an

indefinite siege. The Turkish high command would not view with

equanimity the bottling up of close upon 200,000 of its first-line

troops. With the example of Przemysl, and Metz in 1870 in its mind, it

decided upon a, perhaps, temporary abandonment of the position

immediately it became apparent that the Russian advance from the

northeast and southeast could not be successfully opposed by the

troops available.

Furthermore, the defense of the fortress was weakened by the condition

of the country over which the Turkish army had to retreat in any

retirement from Erzerum. It is no simple matter to transport a

defeated army, with its supplies, enormous guns, ammunition, and other

impedimenta, even with an efficient railway organization at its back.

It is comparatively easy, then, to imagine some of the difficulties

that confronted the Turkish command. From Erzerum to the nearest

railhead is something like 200 miles. A blinding snowstorm was raging

and the temperature was hovering around 25 degrees below zero. Few

roads, and those almost impassable at that season of the year, must

supply all the needs of scores of thousands of men and thousands of

animals, carts, trucks, guns, carriages, etc.

[Illustration: The Russian Advance on Turkey in Armenia.]

The retreat of the Turkish forces from Erzerum, resembling a rout in

its inevitable haste and confusion, had to be made in the face of a

victorious enemy and, menaced by superior forces on both flanks, under

terrific weather conditions and through roadless and highly broken

country. After a preliminary artillery bombardment of the Turkish

forts on the southeast front of the city, the Russian infantry began

to assault Fort Kara Gubek. Finally this was carried and then fell

in quick succession Forts Tafta and Chobandede, six miles south on the

commanding and important Deyer Boyum Heights. By February 15, 1916,

the Russians were masters of the city and fortress.

At first it was supposed in the allied countries that the Turkish army

had been trapped in the fortress and more or less authoritative

accounts spoke of the surrender of 180,000 Turkish troops. These

accounts were circumstantial enough. Several days before the news of

the fall of Erzerum came through there appeared stories of the

envelopment of the city. It soon became known, however, that less than

17,000 troops had been taken with the abandoned forts--merely a rear

guard left behind to delay the onward sweep of the Russians and give

the retreating Turkish army a chance to put a few miles between it and

its pursuers.

If the country to the west of Erzerum was rugged and difficult for the

retiring Turk, it also followed that it was not only difficult for the

pursuing Russians, but also offered many opportunities for a stern

resistance. Thus it was not astonishing to learn that the Russians had

little chance of following up their success at Erzerum. The Turkish

army, largely intact, made good its escape across Armenia, followed by

the troops of the Grand Duke Nicholas, much to the chagrin of allied

public opinion, which had hoped for a smashing victory such as the

fall of Przemysl, or Metz in 1870, or Plevna in 1877.

The grand duke decided to advance with the right of his army on

Trebizond, the Turkish supply base on the Black Sea. Turkey was known

to be hurrying reenforcements to this town in the hope of preventing

its capture by the Russians. It became a race across difficult country

and, although Petrograd and London reports confidently predicted the

success of the Russians, in the end the Turks were able to bring up

strong enough forces to prevent its capture, for the time being at

least.

It is difficult to measure with any accuracy the political results of

the success of the Russians at Erzerum, for the political results far

outweighed the military. In a general way it can be said that it had

little or no effect upon the Balkans, and upon Mohammedan opinion

throughout the East, merely serving to offset in a small measure the

effects of the allied withdrawal from the Dardanelles. On the other

hand, it had a tremendously important effect upon the situation in

Persia. In that kingdom, just prior to the Russian offensive, there

were many evidences that affairs were ripe for a rising of the local

tribes against the Russians in occupation of the northern zone of

influence. Indeed, at the very time the grand duke gave his orders for

the advance upon Erzerum he was compelled to detach troops for

operations in Persia. This force advanced against a body numbering

about 2,000, made up of Turks, Persians, and some Germans, and

finally, after some small fighting, occupied the Persian towns of

Hamadan, Kurn, and Kermanshah.

Even with these successes there was great difficulty in controlling

the Persians, who had gained courage through the defeat of the British

in Mesopotamia and in Gallipoli. However, the capture of Erzerum and

the rout of the Turks had a quieting effect, for the time being at

least.

PART IX--ITALY IN THE WAR

CHAPTER XLVI

REVIEW OF PRECEDING OPERATIONS--ITALIAN MOVEMENTS

A retrospect of the Austro-Italian struggle, taken from the vantage

point afforded by nine months of fighting, revealed what was intended

to be a campaign of invasion as developing all the characteristics of

trench warfare. Following shortly on the declaration of war by Italy,

General Cadorna deployed the whole of the Italian Third Army on the

right bank of the Isonzo between Tolmino and Monfalcone, and carried

out a vigorous offensive in order to gain a secure footing on the left

bank--an antecedent condition to further operations eastward. Italian

troops crossed the river at five different points, Caporetto, Plava,

Castelnuovo, Gradisca, and Monfalcone. Considering the immense

strength of the Austrian defenses this was considered a good start.

Along the thirty-mile front from Tolmino to the sea there is a

continuous wall of defensive works, flanked on the north by the

fortified position of Tolmino, and on the south by the formidable

Carso Plateau, while Gorizia constitutes the central Austrian _point

d'appui_, having been converted into a modern fortress with a girdle

of exterior forts supplemented by advanced batteries provided by

armored cars on which the latest types of howitzers are mounted. All

that military science could do to render this iron barrier impregnable

had been done, and the Italians from the first had a hard struggle in

their attacks on it.

While regular siege operations were being carried on against Tolmino

and Gorizia, the Italians were putting forth great efforts to secure

possession of the Carso Plateau, which dominates the rail and carriage

road between Monfalcone and Trieste, as well as the Isonzo Valley up

to Gorizia. The plateau had to be completely occupied before any

advance could be made along the coast road into Istria and before

Gorizia could be attacked from the south. Two months after the

declaration of war the Italians, who by that time were in possession

of the bridgehead at Sagrada, stormed with great gallantry several

lines of trenches on the summit of the western face of the plateau,

and captured two thousand prisoners with a large quantity of war

material. They followed up this success by an infantry attack,

supported by a large number of heavy and field guns. Farther north

another army operated against Tarvis along two routes, one of which

goes over the Pontafel Pass and is traversed by the railroad running

between Vienna and Venice, while the other is a coach road leading

from Plezzo over the Predil Pass to the Save Valley. The progress of

the Italian columns was checked at Malborgeth, where the Austrians had

constructed a chain of permanent forts, while along the coach road an

equally strong group of forts covering the Predil Pass blocked the

way. A further offensive was directed across the Carnic Alps by way of

the Kreuzberg Pass down the Seoten Valley to Innichen and Toblach on

the Pusterthal railway. Formidable works had been constructed at

Seoten and Lambeo, covering the approaches to the railroad, and on

these the Italians opened a furious bombardment for the purpose of

clearing a way into the Drave Valley. The object aimed at here was

very clear to the Austrians, for when the railroad was reached

communication along the Pusterthal between the Adige and Isonzo would

be cut, and the Austrian position on the Trentino turned. This was the

position in August, 1915, when the Italians were exerting pressure on

the Austrians for the further purpose of diverting troops from the

Russian frontier, where was being carried on the greatest offensive

known to history.

During August, 1915, a continuous night and day battle was waged on

the Isonzo frontier for the possession of the Carso Plateau. Gorizia,

with its circle of outlying forts, proved itself practically

unavailable from either the north or west, for two fortified heights,

Monte Sabatino, on the right bank, and Monte Gabrielle on the left

bank, of the Isonzo River, stood sentry over the town on the north,

while the plateau of Podgora, which is a perfect labyrinth of deep,

intercommunicating trenches, barred the approach to the town from the

west. A determined and carefully prepared attack was made by a large

Italian force on Podgora, but though ten regiments were sent against

the position they failed to get through. In another movement the

troops of General Cadorna were successful in obtaining a firm footing

on the western face of the Carso Plateau, occupying Sdraissima,

Polazzo, Vermegbano, and Monte Sei Bussi, which overlooks Monfalcone.

Finding, however, that the Austrians had been strongly reenforced,

General Cadorna abandoned his storming tactics, and began advancing

along the plateau by the slower methods of siege operations. From the

beginning, both Italians and Austrians recognized the Carso Plateau as

the key to Gorizia, and around it have been waged some of the

bitterest conflicts of the war.