CHAPTER LXXXII.

SICILY DURING THE DESPOTISM OF THE ELDER DIONYSIUS AT SYRACUSE.

The proceedings, recounted at the close of my last chapter, whereby

Dionysius erected his despotism, can hardly have occupied less

than three months; coinciding nearly with the first months of 405

B.C., inasmuch as Agrigentum was taken about the winter solstice

of 406 B.C.[960] He was not molested during this period by the

Carthaginians, who were kept inactive in quarters at Agrigentum, to

repose after the hardships of the blockade; employed in despoiling

the city of its movable ornaments, for transmission to Carthage, and

in burning or defacing, with barbarous antipathy, such as could not

be carried away.[961] In the spring Imilkon moved forward towards

Gela, having provided himself with fresh siege-machines, and ensured

his supplies from the Carthaginian territory in his rear. Finding

no army to oppose him, he spread his troops over the territory both

of Gela and of Kamarina, where much plunder was collected and much

property ruined. He then returned to attack Gela, and established

a fortified camp by clearing some plantation-ground near the river

of the same name, between the city and the sea. On this spot stood,

without the walls, a colossal statue of Apollo, which Imilkon caused

to be carried off and sent as a present to Tyre.

[960] Xen. Hellen. ii, 2, 24. Ὁ ἐνιαυτὸς ἔληγεν, ἐν ᾧ μεσοῦντι

Διονύσιος ἐτυράννησε, etc.

The year meant here is an Olympic year, from Midsummer to

Midsummer; so that the middle months of it would fall in the

first quarter of the Julian year.

If we compare however Xen. Hellen. i, 5, 21 with ii, 2, 24, we

shall see that the indications of time cannot both be correct;

for the acquisition of the despotism by Dionysius followed

immediately, and as a consequence directly brought about, upon

the capture of Agrigentum by the Carthaginians.

It seems to me that the mark of time is not quite accurate in

either one passage or the other. The capture of Agrigentum took

place at the close of B.C. 406; the acquisition of the despotism

by Dionysius, in the early months of 405 B.C., as Diodorus places

them. Both events are in the same Olympic year, between Midsummer

406 B.C. and Midsummer 405 B.C. But this year is exactly the

year which falls between the two passages above referred to in

Xenophon; not coinciding exactly with either one or the other.

Compare Dodwell, Chronolog. Xenoph. ad ann. 407 B.C.

[961] Diodor. xiii, 82, 96, 108. τὰς γλυφὰς καὶ τὰ περιττοτέρως

εἰργασμένα κατέσκαψεν, etc.

Gela was at this moment defended only by its own citizens, for

Dionysius had called away Dexippus with the mercenary troops. Alarmed

at the approach of the formidable enemy who had already mastered

Agrigentum, Himera, and Selinus,—the Geloans despatched pressing

entreaties to Dionysius for aid; at the same time resolving to

send away their women and children for safety to Syracuse. But the

women, to whom the idea of separation was intolerable, supplicated

so earnestly to be allowed to stay and share the fortunes of their

fathers and husbands, that this resolution was abandoned. In

expectation of speedy relief from Dionysius, the defence was brave

and energetic. While parties of the Geloans, well-acquainted with the

country, sallied out and acted with great partial success against

the Carthaginian plunderers,—the mass of the citizens repelled the

assaults of Imilkon against the walls. His battering-machines and

storming-parties were brought to bear on several places at once; the

walls themselves,—being neither in so good a condition, nor placed

upon so unassailable an eminence, as those of Agrigentum,—gave

way on more than one point. Yet still the besieged, with obstinate

valor, frustrated every attempt to penetrate within; reëstablishing

during the night the breaches which had been made during the day.

The feebler part of their population aided, by every means in

their power, the warriors on the battlements; so the defence was

thus made good until Dionysius appeared with the long-expected

reinforcement. It comprised his newly-levied mercenaries, with the

Syracusan citizens, and succors from the Italian as well as from the

Sicilian Greeks; amounting in all to fifty thousand men, according to

Ephorus,—to thirty thousand foot, and one thousand horse, as Timæus

represented. A fleet of fifty ships of war sailed round Cape Pachynus

to coöperate with them off Gela.[962]

[962] Diodor. xiii, 109.

Dionysius fixed his position between Gela and the sea, opposite to

that of the Carthaginians, and in immediate communication with his

fleet. His presence having suspended the assaults upon the town, he

became in his turn the aggressor; employing both his cavalry and his

fleet to harass the Carthaginians and intercept their supplies. The

contest now assumed a character nearly the same as had taken place

before Agrigentum, and which had ended so unfavorably to the Greeks.

At length, after twenty days of such desultory warfare, Dionysius,

finding that he had accomplished little, laid his plan for a direct

attack upon the Carthaginian camp. On the side towards the sea, as no

danger had been expected, that camp was unfortified; it was there,

accordingly, that Dionysius resolved to make his principal attack

with his left division, consisting principally of Italiot Greeks,

sustained by the Syracusan ships, who were to attack simultaneously

from seaward. He designed at the same time also to strike blows from

two other points. His right division, consisting of Sicilian allies,

was ordered to march on the right or western side of the town of

Gela, and thus fall upon the left of the Carthaginian camp; while he

himself, with the mercenary troops which he kept specially around

him, intended to advance through the town itself, and assail the

advanced or central portion of their position near the walls, where

their battering-machinery was posted. His cavalry were directed to

hold themselves in reserve for pursuit, in case the attack proved

successful; or for protection to the retreating infantry, in case it

failed.[963]

[963] Diodor. xiii, 109.

Of this combined scheme, the attack upon the left or seaward side

of the Carthaginian camp, by the Italiot division and the fleet

in concert, was effectively executed, and promised at first to be

successful. The assailants overthrew the bulwarks, forced their way

into the camp, and were only driven out by extraordinary efforts

on the part of the defenders; chiefly Iberians and Campanians, but

reinforced from the other portions of the army, which were as yet

unmolested. But of the two other divisions of Dionysius, the right

did not attack until long after the moment intended, and the centre

never attacked at all. The right had to make a circuitous march, over

the Geloan plain round the city, which occupied longer time than had

been calculated; while Dionysius with the mercenaries around him,

intending to march through the city, found themselves so obstructed

and embarrassed that they made very slow progress, and were yet

longer before they could emerge on the Carthaginian side. Probably

the streets, as in so many other ancient towns, were crooked, narrow,

and irregular; perhaps also, farther blocked up by precautions

recently taken for defence. And thus the Sicilians on the right,

not coming up to the attack until the Italians on the left had been

already repulsed, were compelled to retreat, after a brave struggle,

by the concurrent force of the main Carthaginian army. Dionysius and

his mercenaries, coming up later still, found that the moment for

attack had passed altogether, and returned back into the city without

fighting at all.

Whether the plan or the execution was here at fault,—or both the

one and the other,—we are unable certainly to determine. There will

appear reasons for suspecting, that Dionysius was not displeased at a

repulse which should discourage his army, and furnish an excuse for

abandoning Gela. After retiring again within the walls, he called

together his principal friends to consult what was best to be done.

All were of opinion that it was imprudent to incur farther hazard for

the preservation of the town. Dionysius now found himself in the same

position as Diokles after the defeat near Himera, and as Daphnæus

and the other Syracusan generals before Agrigentum, after the capture

of their provision-fleet by the Carthaginians. He felt constrained

to abandon Gela, taking the best means in his power for protecting

the escape of the inhabitants. Accordingly, to keep the intention of

flight secret, he sent a herald to Imilkon to solicit a burial-truce

for the ensuing day; he also set apart a body of two thousand light

troops, with orders to make noises in front of the enemy throughout

the whole night, and to keep the lights and fires burning, so as to

prevent any suspicion on the part of the Carthaginians.[964] Under

cover of these precautions, he caused the Geloan population to

evacuate their city in mass at the commencement of night, while he

himself with his main army followed at midnight to protect them. All

hurried forward on their march to Syracuse, turning to best account

the hours of darkness. On their way thither lay Kamarina,—Kamarina

the immovable,[965] as it was pronounced by an ancient oracle or

legend, yet on that fatal night seeming to falsify the epithet. Not

thinking himself competent to defend this city, Dionysius forced

all the Kamarinæan population to become partners in the flight of

the Geloans. The same heart-rending scene, which has already been

recounted at Agrigentum and Himera, was now seen repeated on the road

from Gela to Syracuse: a fugitive multitude, of all ages and of both

sexes, free as well as slave, destitute and terror-stricken, hurrying

they knew not whither, to get beyond the reach of a merciless enemy.

The flight to Syracuse, however, was fortunately not molested by any

pursuit. At daybreak the Carthaginians, discovering the abandonment

of the city, immediately rushed in and took possession of it. As very

little of the valuable property within it had been removed, a rich

plunder fell into the hands of the conquering host, whose barbarous

hands massacred indiscriminately the miserable remnant left behind:

old men, sick, and children, unable to accompany a flight so sudden

and so rapid. Some of the conquerors farther satiated their ferocious

instincts by crucifying or mutilating these unhappy prisoners.[966]

[964] Diodor. xiii, 111.

[965] Μὴ κινεῖ Καμάριναν, ἀκίνητόν περ ἐοῦσαν—

“fatis nunquam concessa moveri

Apparet Camarina procul.”—Virgil. Æneid, iii, 701.

[966] Diodor. xiii. 111. Οὐδεμία γὰρ ἦν παρ’ αὐτοῖς φειδὼ τῶν

ἁλισκομένων, ἀλλ’ ἀσυμπαθῶς τῶν ἠτυχηκότων οὓς μὲν ἀνεσταύρουν,

οἷς δ’ ἀφορήτους ἐπῆγον ὕβρεις.

Amidst the sufferings of this distressed multitude, however, and

the compassion of the protecting army, other feelings also were

powerfully aroused. Dionysius, who had been so unmeasured and so

effective in calumniating unsuccessful generals before, was now

himself exposed to the same arrows. Fierce were the bursts of wrath

and hatred against him, both among the fugitives and among the army.

He was accused of having betrayed to the Carthaginians, not only

the army, but also Gela and Kamarina, in order that the Syracusans,

intimidated by these formidable neighbors so close to their borders,

might remain in patient servitude under his dominion. It was remarked

that his achievements for the relief of Gela had been unworthy of

the large force which he brought with him; that the loss sustained

in the recent battle had been nowise sufficient to compel, or even

to excuse, a disgraceful flight; that the mercenaries, especially,

the force upon which he most relied, had not only sustained no loss,

but had never been brought into action; that while his measures

taken against the enemy had thus been partial and inefficient, they

on their side had manifested no disposition to pursue him in his

flight,—thus affording a strong presumption of connivance between

them. Dionysius was denounced as a traitor by all,—except his own

mercenaries, whom he always kept near him for security. The Italiot

allies, who had made the attack and sustained the main loss during

the recent battle, were so incensed against him for having left them

thus unsupported, that they retired in a body, and marched across the

centre of the island home to Italy.

But the Syracusans in the army, especially the horsemen, the

principal persons in the city, had a double ground of anger against

Dionysius; partly from his misconduct or supposed treachery in

this recent enterprise, but still more from the despotism which he

had just erected over his fellow-citizens. This despotism, having

been commenced in gross fraud and consummated by violence, was now

deprived of the only plausible color which it had ever worn, since

Dionysius had been just as disgracefully unsuccessful against the

Carthaginians as those other generals whom he had denounced and

superseded. Determined to rid themselves of one whom they hated at

once as a despot and as a traitor, the Syracusan horsemen watched

for an opportunity of setting upon Dionysius during the retreat, and

killing him. But finding him too carefully guarded by the mercenaries

who always surrounded his person, they went off in a body, and

rode at their best speed to Syracuse, with the full purpose of

reëstablishing the freedom of the city, and keeping out Dionysius. As

they arrived before any tidings had been received of the defeat and

flight at Gela, they obtained admission without impediment into the

islet of Ortygia; the primitive interior city, commanding the docks

and harbor, set apart by the despot for his own residence and power.

They immediately assaulted and plundered the house of Dionysius,

which they found richly stocked with gold, silver, and valuables

of every kind. He had been despot but a few weeks; so that he must

have begun betimes to despoil others, since it seems ascertained

that his own private property was by no means large. The assailants

not only plundered his house with all its interior wealth, but also

maltreated his wife so brutally that she afterwards died of the

outrage.[967] Against this unfortunate woman they probably cherished

a double antipathy, not only as the wife of Dionysius, but also as

the daughter of Hermokrates. They at the same time spread abroad the

news that Dionysius had fled never to return; for they fully confided

in the disruption which they had witnessed among the retiring army,

and in the fierce wrath which they had heard universally expressed

against him.[968] After having betrayed his army, together with Gela

and Kamarina, to the Carthaginians, by a flight without any real

ground of necessity (they asserted),—he had been exposed, disgraced,

and forced to flee in reality, before the just displeasure of his own

awakened fellow-citizens. Syracuse was now free; and might, on the

morrow, reconstitute formally her popular government.

[967] Diodor. xiii, 112; xiv, 44. Plutarch, Dion. c. 3.

[968] Diodor. xiii, 112.

Had these Syracusans taken any reasonable precautions against adverse

possibilities, their assurances would probably have proved correct.

The career of Dionysius would here have ended. But while they

abandoned themselves to the plunder of his house and brutal outrage

against his wife, they were so rashly confident in his supposed

irretrievable ruin, and in their own mastery of the insular portion

of the city, that they neglected to guard the gate of Achradina

(the outer city) against his reëntry. The energy and promptitude

of Dionysius proved too much for them. Informed of their secession

from the army, and well knowing their sentiments, he immediately

divined their projects, and saw that he could only defeat them by

audacity and suddenness of attack. Accordingly, putting himself

at the head of his best and most devoted soldiers,—one hundred

horsemen and six hundred foot,—he left his army and proceeded by a

forced march to Syracuse; a distance of about four hundred stadia,

or about forty-five English miles. He arrived there about midnight,

and presented himself, not at the gate of Ortygia, which he had

probably ascertained to be in possession of his enemies, but at that

of Achradina; which latter (as has been already mentioned) formed

a separate fortification from Ortygia, with the Nekropolis between

them.[969] Though the gate was shut, he presently discovered it to be

unguarded, and was enabled to apply to it some reeds gathered in the

marshes on his road, so as to set it on fire and burn it. So eager

had he been for celerity of progress, that at the moment when he

reached the gate, a part only of his division were with him. But as

the rest arrived while the flames were doing their work, he entered,

with the whole body, into Achradina or the outer city. Marching

rapidly through the streets, he became master, without resistance,

of all this portion of the city, and of the agora, or market-place,

which formed its chief open space. His principal enemies, astounded

by this alarming news, hastened out of Ortygia into Achradina, and

tried to occupy the agora. But they found it already in possession

of Dionysius; and being themselves very few in number, having taken

no time to get together any considerable armed body, they were

overpowered and slain by his mercenaries. Dionysius was thus strong

enough to vanquish all his enemies, who entered Achradina in small

and successive parties, without any order, as they came out of

Ortygia. He then proceeded to attack the houses of those whom he knew

to be unfriendly to his dominion, slew such as he could find within,

and forced the rest to seek shelter in exile. The great body of the

Syracusan horsemen,—who but the evening before were masters of the

city, and might with common prudence have maintained themselves in

it, were thus either destroyed or driven into banishment. As exiles

they established themselves in the town of Ætna.[970]

[969] Diodor. xiii, 113. παρῆν περὶ μέσας νύκτας πρὸς τὴν πύλην

τῆς Ἀχραδινῆς ... εἰσήλαυνε διὰ τῆς Ἀχραδινῆς, etc.

[970] Diodor. xiii, 113. Compare Xenoph. Hellen. i, 3, 5.

Thus master of the city, Dionysius was joined on the ensuing day by

the main body of his mercenaries, and also by the Sicilian allies,

who had now completed their march. The miserable sufferers from

Gela and Kamarina, who looked upon him with indignation as their

betrayer,—went to reside at Leontini; seemingly as companions of the

original Leontine citizens, who had been for some time domiciliated

at Syracuse, but who no longer chose to remain there under Dionysius.

Leontini thus became again an independent city.[971]

[971] Xenophon (Hellen. ii, 3, 5) states that “the Leontines,

co-residents at Syracuse, revolted to their own city from

Dionysius and the Syracusans.”

This migration to Leontini seems a part of the same transaction

as what Diodorus notices (xiii, 113). Leontini, recognized as

independent by the peace which speedily followed, is mentioned

again shortly afterwards as independent (xiv, 14). It had been

annexed to Syracuse before the Athenian siege.

Though the disasters at Gela had threatened to ruin Dionysius, yet

he was now, through his recent victory, more master of Syracuse

than ever; and had more completely trodden down his opponents. The

horsemen, whom he had just destroyed and chased away, were for the

most part the rich and powerful citizens of Syracuse. To have put

down such formidable enemies, almost indispensable as leaders to

any party which sought to rise against him, was the strongest of

all negative securities for the prolongation of his reign. There

was no public assembly any longer at Syracuse, to which he had to

render account of his proceedings at Gela and Kamarina, and before

which he was liable to be arraigned,—as he himself had arraigned

his predecessors who had commanded at Himera and Agrigentum. All

such popular securities he had already overridden or subverted. The

superiority of force, and intimidation of opponents, upon which his

rule rested, were now more manifest and more decisive than ever.

Notwithstanding such confirmed position, however, Dionysius might

still have found defence difficult, if Imilkon had marched on with

his victorious army, fresh from the plunder of Gela and Kamarina, and

had laid energetic siege to Syracuse. From all hazard and alarm of

this sort he was speedily relieved, by propositions for peace, which

came spontaneously tendered by the Carthaginian general. Peace was

concluded between them, on the following terms:—

1. The Carthaginians shall retain all their previous possessions,

and all their Sikanian dependencies, in Sicily. They shall keep,

besides, Selinus, Himera, Agrigentum. The towns of Gela and Kamarina

may be reoccupied by their present fugitive inhabitants; but on

condition of paying tribute to Carthage, and destroying their walls

and fortifications.

2. The inhabitants of Leontini and Messênê, as well as all the Sikel

inhabitants, shall be independent and autonomous.

3. The Syracusans shall be subject to Dionysius.[972]

[972] Diodor. xiii, 114. καὶ Συρακουσίους μὲν ὑπὸ Διονύσιον

τετάχθαι, etc.

4. All the captives, and all the ships, taken on both sides, shall be

mutually restored.

Such were the conditions upon which peace was now concluded. Though

they were extremely advantageous to Carthage, assigning to her,

either as subject or as tributary, the whole of the southern shore

of Sicily,—yet as Syracuse was, after all, the great prize to be

obtained, the conquest of which was essential to the security of

all the remainder, we are astonished that Imilkon did not push

forward to attack it, at a moment so obviously promising. It

appears that immediately after the conquest of Gela and Kamarina,

the Carthaginian army was visited by a pestilential distemper,

which is said to have destroyed nearly the half of it, and to

have forbidden future operations. The announcement of this event

however, though doubtless substantially exact, comes to us in a way

somewhat confused.[973] And when we read, as one of the articles in

the treaty, the express and formal provision that “The Syracusans

shall be subject to Dionysius,”—we discern plainly, that there was

also an additional cause for this timely overture, so suitable to

his interests. There was real ground for those bitter complaints

against Dionysius, which charged him with having betrayed Gela and

Kamarina to the Carthaginians in order to assure his own dominion

at Syracuse. The Carthaginians, in renouncing all pretensions to

Syracuse and recognizing its autonomy, could have no interest in

dictating its internal government. If they determined to recognize by

formal treaty the sovereignty as vested in Dionysius, we may fairly

conclude that he had purchased the favor from them by some underhand

service previously rendered. In like manner both Hiketas and

Agathoklês,—the latter being the successor, and in so many points the

parallel of Dionysius, ninety years afterwards,—availed themselves

of Carthaginian support as one stepping-stone to the despotism of

Syracuse.[974]

[973] Diodor. xiii, 114.

Diodorus begins this chapter with the words,—~Διόπερ ὑπὸ τῶν

πραγμάτων ἀναγκαζόμενος~ Ἰμίλκων, ἔπεμψεν εἰς Συρακούσας κήρυκα,

παρακαλῶν τοὺς ἡττημένους διαλύσασθαι. Ἀσμένως δ’ ὑπακούσαντος

τοῦ Διονυσίου, τὴν εἰρήνην ἐπὶ τοῖσδε ἔθεντο, etc.

Now there is not the smallest matter of fact either mentioned

or indicated before, to which the word διόπερ can have

reference. Nothing is mentioned but success on the part of the

Carthaginians, and disaster on the part of the Greeks; the

repulse of the attack made by Dionysius upon the Carthaginian

camp,—his retreat and evacuation of Gela and Kamarina,—the

occupation of Gela by the Carthaginians,—the disorder, mutiny,

and partial dispersion of the army of Dionysius in its

retreat,—the struggle within the walls of Syracuse. There is

nothing in all this to which διόπερ can refer. But a few lines

farther on, after the conditions of peace have been specified,

Diodorus alludes to _the_ terrible disease (ὑπὸ τῆς νόσου) which

laid waste the Carthaginian army, as if he had mentioned it

before.

I find in Niebuhr (Vorträge über alte Geschichte, vol. iii, p.

212, 213) the opinion expressed, that here is a gap in Diodorus

“intentionally disguised in the MSS., and not yet noticed by any

editor.” Some such conclusion seems to me unavoidable. Niebuhr

thinks, that in the lost portion of the text, it was stated that

Imilkon marched on to Syracuse, formed the siege of the place,

and was there visited with the terrific pestilence to which

allusion is made in the remaining portion of the text. This also

is nowise improbable; yet I do not venture to assert it,—since

the pestilence may possibly have broken out while Imilkon was

still at Gela.

Niebuhr farther considers, that Dionysius lost the battle of

Gela through miserable generalship,—that he lost it by design,

as suitable to his political projects,—and that by the terms of

the subsequent treaty, he held the territory around Syracuse only

under Carthaginian supremacy.

[974] Justin, xxii, 2; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 2, 7, 9.

The pestilence, however, among the Carthaginian army is said to have

been so terrible as to destroy nearly the half of their numbers.

The remaining half, on returning to Africa, either found it already

there, or carried it with them; for the mortality at and around

Carthage was not less deplorable than in Sicily.[975]

[975] Diodor. xiii, 114.

It was in the summer of 405 B.C., that this treaty was concluded,

which consigned all the Hellenic ground on the south of Sicily to

the Carthaginian dominion, and Syracuse with its population to

that of Dionysius. It was in September or October of the same year

that Lysander effected his capture of the entire Athenian fleet at

Ægospotami, destroyed the maritime ascendency and power of Athens,

and gave commencement to the Lacedæmonian empire, completed by the

actual surrender of Athens during the ensuing year. The dekarchies

and harmosts, planted by Lysander in so many cities of the central

Hellenic world, commenced their disastrous working nearly at the same

time as the despotism of Dionysius in Syracuse. This is a point to be

borne in mind, in reference to the coming period. The new position

and policy wherein Sparta now became involved, imparted to her a

sympathy with Dionysius such as in earlier times she probably would

not have felt; and which contributed materially, in a secondary way,

to the durability of his dominion, as well by positive intrigues

of Lacedæmonian agents, as by depriving the oppressed Syracusans

of effective aid or countenance from Corinth or other parts of

Greece.[976]

[976] Diodor. xiv, 10.

The valuable support lent to Dionysius by the Spartans is

emphatically denounced by Isokrates, Orat. iv, (Panegyric.) s.

145; Orat. viii, (De Pace) s. 122.

The period immediately succeeding this peace was one of distress,

depression, and alarm, throughout all the south of Sicily. According

to the terms of the treaty, Gela and Kamarina might be reoccupied by

their fugitive population; yet with demolished walls,—with all traces

of previous opulence and comfort effaced by the plunderers,—and

under the necessity of paying tribute to Carthage. The condition

of Agrigentum, Selinus, and Himera, now actually portions of

Carthaginian territory, was worse; especially Agrigentum, hurled

at one blow from the loftiest pinnacle of prosperous independence.

No free Hellenic territory was any longer to be found between Cape

Pachynus and Cape Lilybæum, beyond the Syracusan frontier.

Amidst the profound discouragement of the Syracusan mind, the

withdrawal from Sicily of the terror-striking Carthaginian

army would be felt as a relief, and would procure credit for

Dionysius.[977] It had been brought about under him, though not

as a consequence of his exploits; for his military operations

against Imilkon at Gela had been completely unsuccessful (and even

worse); and the Carthaginians had suffered no harm except from the

pestilence. While his partisans had thus a plea for extolling him

as the savior of the city, he also gathered strength in other ways

out of the recent events. He had obtained a formal recognition of

his government from the Carthaginians; he had destroyed or banished

the chief Syracusan citizens opposed to his dominion, and struck

terror into the rest; he had brought back all his mercenary troops

and guards, without loss or dissatisfaction. He now availed himself

of his temporary strength to provide precautions for perpetuity,

before the Syracusans should recover spirit, or obtain a favorable

opportunity, to resist.

[977] Plato, while he speaks of Dionysius and Hipparinus on

this occasion as the saviors of Syracuse, does not insist upon

extraordinary valor and ability on their parts, but assigns

the result mainly to fortune and the favor of the gods (Plato,

Epistol. viii, p. 353 B.; p. 355 F.).

His letter is written with a view of recommending a compromise at

Syracuse, between the party of freedom, and the descendants of

Dionysius and Hipparinus; he thus tries to set up as good a case

as he can, in favor of the title of both the two latter to the

gratitude of the Syracusans.

He reluctantly admits how much Dionysius the elder afterwards

abused the confidence placed in him by the Syracusans (p. 353 C.).

His first measure was to increase the fortifications of the islet

called Ortygia, strengthening it as a position to be held separately

from Achradina and the remaining city. He constructed a new wall,

provided with lofty turrets and elaborate defences of every kind,

immediately outside of the mole which connected this islet with

Sicily. On the outside of this new wall, he provided convenient

places for transacting business, porticos spacious enough to shelter

a considerable multitude, and seemingly a distinct strong fort,

destined for a public magazine of corn.[978] It suited his purpose

that the trade of the town should be carried on, and the persons

of the traders congregated, under or near the outer walls of his

peculiar fortress. As a farther means of security, he also erected

a distinct citadel or acropolis within the islet and behind the new

wall. The citadel was close to the Lesser Harbor or Portus Lakkius.

Its walls were so extended as to embrace the whole of this harbor,

closing it up in such a way as to admit only one ship at a time,

though there was room for sixty ships within. He was thus provided

with an almost impregnable stronghold, not only securing him against

attack from the more numerous population in the outer city, but

enabling him to attack them whenever he chose,—and making him master,

at the same time, of the grand means of war and defence against

foreign enemies.

[978] That this was the situation of the fortified _horrea

publica_ at Syracuse, we see from Livy, xxiv, 21. I think we may

presume that they were begun at this time by Dionysius, as they

form a natural part of his scheme.

To provide a fortress in the islet of Ortygia, was one step towards

perpetual dominion at Syracuse; to fill it with devoted adherents,

was another. For Dionysius, the instruments of dominion were his

mercenary troops and body-guards; men chosen by himself from

their aptitude to his views, identified with him in interest, and

consisting in large proportion not merely of foreigners, but even of

liberated slaves. To these men he now proceeded to assign a permanent

support and residence. He distributed among them the houses in the

islet or inferior stronghold, expelling the previous proprietors, and

permitting no one to reside there except his own intimate partisans

and soldiers. Their quarters were in the islet, while he dwelt in

the citadel,—a fortress within a fortress, sheltering his own person

against the very garrison or standing army, by means of which he kept

Syracuse in subjection.[979] Having provided houses for his soldiers,

by extruding the residents in Ortygia,—he proceeded to assign to them

a comfortable maintenance, by the like wholesale dispossession of

proprietors, and reappropriation of lands, without. He distributed

anew the entire Syracusan territory; reserving the best lands, and

the best shares, for his own friends and for the officers in command

of his mercenaries,—and apportioning the remaining territory in equal

shares to all the inhabitants, citizens as well as non-citizens. By

this distribution the latter became henceforward citizens as well as

the former; so far at least, as any man could be properly called a

citizen under his despotism. Even the recently enfranchised slaves

became new citizens and proprietors as well as the rest.[980]

[979] Diodor. xiv, 7.

The residence of Dionysius in the acropolis, and the quarters

of his mercenaries without the acropolis, but still within

Ortygia,—are noticed in Plato’s account of his visit to the

younger Dionysius (Plato, Epistol. vii, p. 350; Epist. iii, p.

315).

[980] Diodor. xiv, 7. Τῆς δὲ χώρας τὴν μὲν ἀρίστην ἐξελόμενος

ἐδωρήσατο τοῖς τε φίλοις καὶ τοῖς ἐφ’ ἡγεμονίας τεταγμένοις·

~τὴν δ’ ἄλλην ἐμέρισεν ἐπίσης ξένῳ τε καὶ πολίτῃ~, συμπεριλαβὼν

τῷ τῶν πολιτῶν ὀνόματι τοὺς ἠλευθερωμένους δούλους, οὓς ἐκάλει

νεοπολίτας. Διέδωκε δὲ καὶ τὰς οἰκίας τοῖς ὄχλοις, πλὴν τῶν ἐν τῇ

Νήσῳ· ταύτας δὲ τοῖς φίλοις καὶ τοῖς μισθοφόροις ἐδωρήσατο. Ἐπεὶ

δὲ τὰ κατὰ τὴν τυραννίδα καλῶς ἐδόκει διῳκηκέναι, etc.

Respecting this sweeping change of property, it is mortifying to

have no farther information than is contained in two or three brief

sentences of Diodorus. As a basis for entire redivision of lands,

Dionysius would find himself already possessed of the property

of those Syracusan Horsemen or Knights whom he had recently put

down or banished. As a matter of course, their property would be

confiscated, and would fall into his possession for reassignment. It

would doubtless be considerable, inasmuch as these Horsemen were for

the most part wealthy men. From this basis, Dionysius enlarged his

scheme to the more comprehensive idea of a general spoliation and

reappropriation, for the benefit of his partisans and his mercenary

soldiers. The number of these last we do not know; but on an occasion

not very long afterwards, the mercenaries under him are mentioned as

amounting to about ten thousand.[981] To ensure landed properties

to each of these men, together with the monopoly of residence in

Ortygia, nothing less than a sweeping confiscation would suffice.

How far the equality of share, set forth in principle, was or could

be adhered to in practice, we cannot say. The maxim of allowing

residence in Ortygia to none but friends and partisans, passed from

Dionysius into a traditional observance for future anti-popular

governments of Syracuse. The Roman consul Marcellus, when he subdued

the city near two centuries afterwards, prescribed the rule of

admitting into the islet none but Romans, and of excluding all native

Syracusan residents.[982]

[981] Diodor. xiv, 78.

So also, after the death of the elder Dionysius, Plutarch speaks

of his military force as having been βαρβάρων μυρíανδρον φυλακήν

(Plutarch, Dion. c. 10). These expressions however have little

pretence to numerical accuracy.

[982] Cicero in Verrem, v. 32, 84; 38, 98.

Such mighty works of fortification, combined with so extensive

a revolution both in property and in domicile, cannot have been

accomplished in less than a considerable time, nor without provoking

considerable resistance in detail. Nor is it to be forgotten that

the pecuniary cost of such fortifications must have been very

heavy. How Dionysius contrived to levy the money, we do not know.

Aristotle informs us that the contributions which he exacted from the

Syracusans were so exorbitant, that within the space of five years,

the citizens had paid into his hands their entire property; that is,

twenty per cent. per annum upon their whole property.[983] To what

years this statement refers, we do not know; nor what was the amount

of contribution exacted on the special occasion now before us. But

we may justly infer from it that Dionysius would not scruple to lay

his hand heavily upon the Syracusans for the purpose of defraying

the cost of his fortifications; and that the simultaneous burthen

of large contributions would thus come to aggravate the painful

spoliation and transfers of property, and the still more intolerable

mischiefs of a numerous standing army domiciled as masters in the

heart of the city. Under such circumstances, we are not surprised

to learn that the discontent among the Syracusans was extreme, and

that numbers of them were greatly mortified at having let slip the

favorable opportunity of excluding Dionysius, when the Horsemen were

actually for a moment masters of Syracuse, before he suddenly came

back from Gela.[984]

[983] Aristotel. Politic. v, 9, 4. Καὶ ἡ εἰσφορὰ τῶν τελῶν

(τυραννικόν ἐστι) ἐν πέντε γὰρ ἔτεσιν ἐπὶ Διονυσίου τὴν οὐσίαν

ἅπασαν εἰσενηνοχέναι συνέβαινε.

[984] Diodorus, xiv, 7.

Whatever might be the extent of indignation actually felt, there

could be no concert or manifestation in Syracuse, under a watchful

despot with the overwhelming force assembled in Ortygia. But a

suitable moment speedily occurred. Having completed his fortress and

new appropriation for the assured maintenance of the mercenaries,

Dionysius resolved to attempt a conquest of the autonomous Sikel

tribes in the interior of the island, some of whom had sided with

Carthage in the recent war. He accordingly marched out with a

military force, consisting partly of his mercenary troops, partly

of armed Syracusan citizens under a commander named Dorikus.

While he was laying siege to the town of Erbessus, the Syracusan

troops, finding themselves assembled in arms and animated with one

common sentiment, began to concert measures for open resistance

to Dionysius. The commander Dorikus, in striving to repress these

manifestations, lifted up his hand to chastise one of the most

mutinous speakers;[985] upon which the soldiers rushed forward in

a body to defend him. They slew Dorikus, and proclaimed themselves

again, with loud shouts, free Syracusan citizens; calling upon all

their comrades in the camp to unite against the despot. They also

sent a message forthwith to the town of Ætna, inviting the immediate

junction of the Syracusan Horsemen, who had sought shelter there in

their exile from Dionysius. Their appeal found the warmest sympathy

among the Syracusan soldiers in the camp, all of whom declared

themselves decisively against the despot, and prepared for every

effort to recover their liberty.

[985] Diodor. xiv, 7. Compare an occurrence very similar, at

Mendê in Thrace (Thucyd. iv, 130).

So rapidly did this sentiment break out into vehement and unanimous

action, that Dionysius was too much intimidated to attempt to put

it down at once by means of his mercenaries. Profiting by the

lesson which he had received, after the return march from Gela, he

raised the siege of Erbessus forthwith, and returned to Syracuse to

make sure of his position in Ortygia, before his Syracusan enemies

could arrive there. Meanwhile the latter, thus left full of joy and

confidence, as well as masters of the camp, chose for their leaders

those soldiers who had slain Dorikus, and found themselves speedily

reinforced by the Horsemen, or returning exiles from Ætna. Resolved

to spare no effort for liberating Syracuse, they sent envoys to

Messênê and Rhegium, as well as to Corinth, for aid; while they at

the same time marched with all their force to Syracuse, and encamped

on the heights of Epipolæ. It is not clear whether they remained in

this position, or whether they were enabled, through the sympathy

of the population, to possess themselves farther of the outer city

Achradina, and with its appendages Tycha and Neapolis. Dionysius

was certainly cut off from all communication with the country; but

he maintained himself in his impregnable position in Ortygia, now

exclusively occupied by his chosen partisans and mercenaries. If he

even continued master of Achradina, he must have been prevented from

easy communication with it. The assailants extended themselves under

the walls of Ortygia, from Epipolæ to the Greater as well as the

Lesser Harbor.[986] A considerable naval force was sent to their aid

from Messênê and Rhegium, giving to them the means of blocking him

up on the seaside; while the Corinthians, though they could grant no

farther assistance, testified their sympathy by sending Nikoteles as

adviser.[987] The leaders of the movement proclaimed Syracuse again

a free city, offered large rewards for the head of Dionysius, and

promised equal citizenship to all the mercenaries who should desert

him.

[986] Diodor. xiv, 8.

[987] Diodor. xiv, 10.

Several of the mercenaries, attracted by such offers, as well

as intimidated by that appearance of irresistible force which

characterizes the first burst of a popular movement, actually came

over and were well received. Everything seemed to promise success to

the insurgents, who, not content with the slow process of blockade,

brought up battering-machines, and vehemently assaulted the walls

of Ortygia. Nothing now saved Dionysius except those elaborate

fortifications which he had so recently erected, defying all attack.

And even though sheltered by them, his position appeared to be so

desperate, that desertion from Ortygia every day increased. He

himself began to abandon the hope of maintaining his dominion;

discussing with his intimate friends the alternative, between death

under a valiant but hopeless resistance, and safety purchased by

a dishonorable flight. There remained but one means of rescue: to

purchase the immediate aid of a body of twelve hundred mercenary

Campanian cavalry, now in the Carthaginian service, and stationed

probably at Gela or Agrigentum. His brother-in-law Polyxenus

advised him to mount his swiftest horse, to visit in person the

Campanians, and bring them to the relief of Ortygia. But this

counsel was strenuously resisted by two intimate friends,—Helôris

and Megaklês,—who both impressed upon him, that the royal robe was

the only honorable funeral garment, and that, instead of quitting

his post at full speed, he ought to cling to it until he was dragged

away by the leg.[988] Accordingly, Dionysius determined to hold out,

without quitting Ortygia; sending private envoys to the Campanians,

with promises of large pay if they would march immediately to his

defence. The Carthaginians were probably under obligation not to

oppose this, having ensured to Dionysius by special article of treaty

the possession of Syracuse.

[988] Diodor. xiv, 8; xx, 78. Isokrates, Or. vi, (Archidamus)

sect. 49.

It appears that Timæus the historian ascribed this last

observation to Philistus; and Diodorus copies Timæus in one of

the passages above referred to, though not in the other. But

Philistus himself in his history asserted that the observation

had been made by another person (Plutarch, Dion. c. 35).

The saying seems to have been remembered and cited long

afterwards in Syracuse; but cited as having been delivered by

Dionysius himself, not as addressed to him (Livy, xxiv, 22).

Isokrates, while recording the saying, represents it as having

been delivered when the Carthaginians were pressing Syracuse

hardly by siege; having in mind doubtless the siege or blockade

undertaken by Imilkon seven years afterwards. But I apprehend

this to be a misconception. The story seems to suit better to the

earlier occasion named by Diodorus.

To gain time for their arrival, by deluding and disarming the

assailants, Dionysius affected to abandon all hope of prolonged

defence, and sent to request permission to quit the city, along with

his private friends and effects. Permission was readily granted

to him to depart with five triremes. But as soon as this evidence

of success had been acquired, the assailants without abandoned

themselves to extravagant joy and confidence, considering Dionysius

as already subdued, and the siege as concluded. Not merely was all

farther attack suspended, but the forces were in a great measure

broken up. The Horsemen were disbanded, by a proceeding alike unjust

and ungrateful, to be sent back to Ætna; while the hoplites dispersed

about the country to their various lands and properties. The same

difficulty of keeping a popular force long together for any military

operation requiring time, which had been felt when the Athenians

besieged their usurpers Kylon and Peisistratus in the acropolis,[989]

was now experienced in regard to the siege of Ortygia. Tired with

the length of the siege, the Syracusans blindly abandoned themselves

to the delusive assurance held out by Dionysius; without taking

heed to maintain their force and efficiency undiminished, until

his promised departure should be converted into a reality. In this

unprepared and disorderly condition, they were surprised by the

sudden arrival of the Campanians,[990] who, attacking and defeating

them with considerable loss, forced their way through to join

Dionysius in Ortygia. At the same time, a reinforcement of three

hundred fresh mercenaries reached him by sea. The face of affairs

was now completely changed. The recent defeat produced among the

assailants not only discouragement, but also mutual recrimination

and quarrel. Some insisted upon still prosecuting the siege of

Ortygia, while others, probably the friends of the recently dismissed

Horsemen, declared in favor of throwing it up altogether and joining

the Horsemen at Ætna; a resolution, which they seem at once to

have executed. Observing his opponents thus enfeebled and torn by

dissension, Dionysius sallied out and attacked them, near the suburb

called Neapolis or Newtown, on the south-west of Achradina. He was

victorious, and forced them to disperse. But he took great pains to

prevent slaughter of the fugitives, riding up himself to restrain his

own troops; and he subsequently buried the slain with due solemnity.

He was anxious by these proceedings to conciliate the remainder;

for the most warlike portion of his opponents had retired to Ætna,

where no less than seven thousand hoplites were now assembled along

with the Horsemen. Dionysius sent thither envoys to invite them to

return to Syracuse, promising the largest amnesty for the past. But

it was in vain that his envoys expatiated upon his recent forbearance

towards the fugitives and decent interment of the slain. Few could

be induced to come back, except such as had left their wives and

families at Syracuse in his power. The larger proportion, refusing

all trust in his word and all submission to his command, remained

in exile at Ætna. Such as did return were well treated, in hopes of

inducing the rest gradually to follow their example.[991]

[989] Herodotus, v, 71; Thucydides, i, 112.

[990] It is said that the Campanians, on their way to Syracuse,

passed by Agyrium, and deposited their baggage in the care of

Agyris the despot of that town (Diodor. xiv, 9). But if we

look at the position of Agyrium on the map, it seems difficult

to understand how mercenaries coming from the Carthaginian

territory, and in great haste to reach Syracuse, can have passed

anywhere near to it.

[991] Diodor. xiv, 9.

Thus was Dionysius rescued from a situation apparently desperate, and

reëstablished in his dominion; chiefly through the rash presumption

(as on the former occasion after the retreat from Gela), the want of

persevering union, and the absence of any commanding leader, on the

part of his antagonists. His first proceeding was to dismiss the

newly-arrived Campanians. For though he had to thank them mainly for

his restoration, he was well aware that they were utterly faithless,

and that on the first temptation they were likely to turn against

him.[992] But he adopted more efficient means for strengthening

his dominion in Syracuse, and for guarding against a repetition of

that danger from which he had so recently escaped. He was assisted

in his proceedings by a Lacedæmonian envoy named Aristus, recently

despatched by the Spartans for the ostensible purpose of bringing

about an amicable adjustment of parties at Syracuse. While Nikoteles,

who had been sent from Corinth, espoused the cause of the Syracusan

people, and put himself at their head to obtain for them more or

less of free government,—Aristus, on the contrary, lent himself to

the schemes of Dionysius. He seduced the people away from Nikoteles,

whom he impeached and caused to be slain. Next, pretending himself

to act along with the people, and to employ the great ascendency of

Sparta in defence of their freedom,[993] he gained their confidence

and then betrayed them. The despot was thus enabled to strengthen

himself more decisively than before, and probably to take off the

effective popular leaders thus made known to him; while the mass of

the citizens were profoundly discouraged by finding Sparta enlisted

in the conspiracy against their liberties.

[992] Diodor. xiv, 9. The subsequent proceedings of the

Campanians justified his wisdom in dismissing them. They went

to Entella (a town among the dependencies of Carthage, in the

south-western portion of Sicily,—Diod. xiv, 48), where they were

welcomed and hospitably treated by the inhabitants. In the night,

they set upon the Entellan citizens by surprise, put them all to

death, married their widows and daughters, and kept possession of

the town for themselves.

[993] Diodor. xiv, 10. Ἀπέστειλαν (οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι) Ἄριστον,

ἄνδρα τῶν ἐπιφανῶν, εἰς Συρακούσας, τῷ μὲν λόγῳ προσποιούμενοι

καταλιπεῖν τὴν δυναστείαν, τῇ δ’ ἀληθείᾳ σπεύδοντες αὐξῆσαι τὴν

τυραννίδα· ἤλπιζον γὰρ συγκατασκευάζοντες τὴν ἀρχὴν, ὑπήκοον

ἕξειν τὸν Διονύσιον διὰ τὰς εὐεργεσίας. Ὁ δ’ Ἄριστος καταπλεύσας

εἰς Συρακούσας, καὶ τῷ τυράννῳ λάθρα περὶ τούτων διαλεχθεὶς, τούς

τε Συρακοσίους ἀνασείων, Νικοτέλην τὸν Κορίνθιον ἀνεῖλεν,

ἀφηγούμενον τῶν Συρακοσίων· τοὺς δὲ πιστεύσαντας προδοὺς, τὸν μὲν

τύραννον ἰσχυρὸν κατέστησε, διὰ δὲ τῆς πράξεως ταύτης ἀσχημονεῖν

ἐποίησεν αὑτὸν ἅμα καὶ τὴν πατρίδα. Compare xiv, 70.

Of this renovated tide of success Dionysius took advantage, to

strike another important blow. During the season of harvest, while

the citizens were busy in the fields, he caused the houses to be

searched, and seized all the arms found therein. Not satisfied

with thus robbing his opponents of the means of attack, he farther

proceeded to construct additional fortifications around the islet of

Ortygia, to augment his standing army of mercenaries, and to build

fresh ships. Feeling more than ever that his dominion was repugnant

to the Syracusans, and rested only on naked force, he thus surrounded

himself with precautions probably stronger than any other Grecian

despot had ever accumulated. He was yet farther strengthened by the

pronounced and active support of Sparta, now at the maximum of her

imperial ascendency;[994] and by the presence of the mighty Lysander

at Syracuse as her ambassador to countenance and exalt him.[995]

The Spartan alliance, however, did not prevent him from enrolling

among his mercenaries a considerable fraction of the Messenians, the

bitter enemies of Sparta; who were now driven out of Naupaktus and

Kephallenia, with no other possession left except their arms[996]—and

whose restoration to Peloponnesus by Epaminondas, about thirty years

afterwards, has been described in a preceding chapter.

[994] Diodor. xiv, 10. Καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ παρεσκευάζετο πρὸς τὴν

ἀσφάλειαν τῆς τυραννίδος, ὡς ἂν ἔργοις ἤδη πεῖραν εἰληφὼς, ὅτι

πᾶν ὑπομένουσιν οἱ Συρακούσιοι χάριν τοῦ μὴ δουλεύειν.

[995] Plutarch, Lysander, c. 2.

[996] Diodor. xiv, 34.

So large a mercenary force, while the people in Syracuse were

prostrate and in no condition for resistance, naturally tempted

Dionysius to seek conquest as well as plunder beyond the border. Not

choosing as yet to provoke a war with Carthage, he turned his arms

to the north and north-west of the Syracusan territory; the Grecian

(Chalkidic or Ionic) cities, Naxus, Katana, and Leontini—and the

Sikels, towards the centre of Sicily. The three Chalkidic cities

were the old enemies of Syracuse, but Leontini had been conquered by

the Syracusans even before the Athenian expedition, and remained as

a Syracusan possession until the last peace with the Carthaginians,

when it had been declared independent. Naxus and Katana had contrived

to retain their independence against Syracuse, even after the ruin

of the Athenian armament under Nikias. At the head of a powerful

force, Dionysius marched out from Syracuse first against the town of

Ætna, occupied by a considerable body of Syracusan exiles hostile

to his dominion. Though the place was strong by situation,[997]

yet these men, too feeble to resist, were obliged to evacuate it;

upon which he proceeded to attack Leontini. But on summoning the

inhabitants to surrender, he found his propositions rejected, and

every preparation made for a strenuous defence; so that he could do

nothing more than plunder the territory around, and then advanced

onward into the interior Sikel territory, towards Enna and Erbita.

But his march in this direction was little more than a feint, for the

purpose of masking his real views upon Naxus and Katana, with both

which cities he had already opened intrigues. Arkesilaus, general

of Katana, and Prokles, general of Naxus, were both carrying on

corrupt negotiations for the purpose of selling to him the liberty

of their native cities. Until the negotiations were completed,

Dionysius wished to appear as if turning his arms elsewhere, and

therefore marched against Enna. Here he entered into conspiracy with

an Ennæan citizen named Aeimnestus, whom he instigated to seize the

sceptre of his native town,—by promises of assistance, on condition

of being himself admitted afterwards. Aeimnestus made the attempt

and succeeded, but did not fulfil his engagement to Dionysius; who

resented this proceeding so vehemently, that he assisted the Ennæans

in putting down Aeimnestus, delivered him as prisoner into their

hands, and then retired, satisfied with such revenge, without farther

meddling. He next marched against Erbita, before which he passed his

time with little or no result, until the bribes promised at Naxus

and Katana had taken effect. At length the terms were fully settled.

Dionysius was admitted at night by Arkesilaus into Katana, seized

the city, disarmed the inhabitants, and planted there a powerful

garrison. Naxus was next put into his hands, by the like corruption

on the part of Prokles; who was rewarded with a large bribe, and with

the privilege of preserving his kinsmen. Both cities were given up

to be plundered by his soldiers; after which the walls as well as

the houses were demolished, and the inhabitants sold as slaves. The

dismantled site of Katana was then assigned to a body of Campanian

mercenaries in the service of Dionysius, who however retained in his

possession hostages for their fidelity;[998] the site of Naxus to the

indigenous Sikels in the neighborhood. These captures struck so much

terror into the Leontines, that when Dionysius renewed his attack

upon them, they no longer felt competent to resist. He required them

to surrender their city, to remove to Syracuse, and there to reside

for the future as citizens; which term meant, at the actual time, as

subjects of his despotism. The Leontines obeyed the requisition, and

their city thus again became an appendage of Syracuse.[999]

[997] Diodor. xiv, 58.

[998] Diodor. xiv, 61.

[999] Diodor. xiv, 15.

These conquests of Dionysius, achieved mainly by corrupting the

generals of Naxos and Katana, were of serious moment, and spread so

much alarm among the Sikels of the interior, that Archonides, the

Sikel prince of Erbita, thought it prudent to renounce his town and

soil; withdrawing to a new site beyond the Nebrode mountains, on the

northern coast of the island, more out of the reach of Syracusan

attack. Here, with his mercenary soldiers and with a large portion of

his people who voluntarily accompanied him, he founded the town of

Alæsa.[1000]

[1000] Diodor. xiv, 16. This Archonides may probably have been

son of the Sikel prince Archonides, who, having taken active part

as an ally of Nikias and the Athenian invaders against Syracuse,

died just before Gylippus reached Sicily (Thucyd. vii, 1).

Strengthened at home by these successes abroad, the sanguine despot

of Syracuse was stimulated to still greater enterprises. He resolved

to commence aggressive war with the Carthaginians. But against such

formidable enemies, large preparations were indispensable, defensive

as well as offensive, before his design could be proclaimed. First,

he took measures to ensure the defensibility of Syracuse against all

contingencies. Five Grecian cities on the south of the island, one

of them the second in Sicily, had already undergone the deplorable

fate of being sacked by a Carthaginian host; a calamity, which might

possibly be in reserve for Syracuse also, especially if she herself

provoked a war, unless the most elaborate precautions were taken to

render a successful blockade impossible.

Now the Athenian blockade under Nikias had impressed valuable lessons

on the mind of every Syracusan. The city had then been well-nigh

blocked up by a wall of circumvallation carried from sea to sea;

which was actually more than half completed, and would have been

entirely completed, had the original commander been Demosthenes

instead of Nikias. The prodigious importance of the slope of

Epipolæ to the safety of the city had been demonstrated by the most

unequivocal evidence. In my seventh volume, I have already described

the site of Syracuse and the relation of this slope to the outer city

called Achradina. Epipolæ was a gentle ascent west of Achradina.

It was bordered, along both the north side and the south side, by

lines of descending cliff, cut down precipitously, about twenty feet

deep in their lowest part. These lines of cliff nearly converged at

the summit of the slope, called Euryalus; leaving a narrow pass or

road between elevated banks, which communicated with the country

both north and west of Syracuse. Epipolæ thus formed a triangle upon

an inclined plane, sloping upward from its base, the outer wall of

Achradina, to its apex at Euryalus; and having its two sides formed,

the one by the northern, the other by the southern, line of cliffs.

This apex formed a post of the highest importance, commanding the

narrow road which approached Epipolæ from its western extremity or

summit, and through which alone it was easy for an army to get on

the declivity of Epipolæ, since the cliffs on each side were steep,

though less steep on the northern side than on the southern.[1001]

Unless an enemy acquired possession of this slope, Syracuse could

never be blocked up from the northern sea at Trogilus to the Great

Harbor; an enterprise, which Nikias and the Athenians were near

accomplishing, because they first surprised from the northward the

position of Euryalus, and from thence poured down upon the slope

of Epipolæ. I have already described, in my seventh volume, how

the arrival of Gylippus deprived them of superiority in the field,

at a time when their line of circumvallation was already half

finished,—having been carried from the centre of Epipolæ southward

down to Great Harbor, and being partially completed from the same

point across the northern half of Epipolæ to the sea at Trogilus; how

he next intercepted their farther progress, by carrying out, from the

outer wall of Achradina, a cross wall traversing their intended line

of circumvallation and ending at the northern cliff; how he finally

erected a fort or guard-post on the summit of Euryalus, which he

connected with the cross-wall just mentioned by a single wall of

junction carried down the slope of Epipolæ.[1002]

[1001] See the Dissertation of Saverio Cavallari,—Zur Topographie

von Syrakus (Göttingen, 1845), p. 22.

[1002] See, for a farther exposition of these points, my account

of the siege of Syracuse by the Athenians, Vol. VII, ch. lix, lx.

Both the danger which Syracuse had then incurred, and the means

whereby it had been obviated, were fresh in the recollection of

Dionysius. Since the Athenian siege, the Syracusans may perhaps

have preserved the fort erected by Gylippus near Euryalus; but

they had pulled down the wall of junction, the cross-wall, and the

outer wall of protection constructed between the arrival of Nikias

in Sicily and his commencement of the siege, enclosing the sacred

precinct of Apollo Temenites. The outer city of Syracuse was thus

left with nothing but the wall of Achradina, with its two suburbs or

excrescences, Tychê and Neapolis. Dionysius now resolved to provide

for Syracuse a protection substantially similar to that contrived

by Gylippus, yet more comprehensive, elaborate, and permanent.

He carried out an outer line of defence, starting from the sea

near the port called Trogilus, enclosing the suburb called Tychê

(which adjoined Achradina to the north-west), and then ascending

westward, along the brink of the northern cliff of Epipolæ, to the

summit of that slope at Euryalus. The two extremities thus became

connected together,—not as in the time of Gylippus,[1003] by a single

cross-wall carried out from the city-wall to the northern cliff, and

then joined at an angle by another single wall descending the slope

of Epipolæ from Euryalus, but,—by one continuous new line bordering

the northern cliff down to the sea. And the new line, instead of

being a mere single wall, was now built under the advice of the best

engineers, with lofty and frequent towers interspersed throughout its

length, to serve both as means of defence and as permanent quarters

for soldiers. Its length was thirty stadia (about three and a half

English miles); it was constructed of large stones carefully hewn,

some of them four feet in length.[1004] The quarries at hand supplied

abundant materials, and for the labor necessary, Dionysius brought

together all the population of the city and its neighborhood, out of

whom he selected sixty thousand of the most effective hands, to work

on the wall. Others were ordered to cut the stones in the quarry,

while six thousand teams of oxen were put in harness to draw them to

the spot. The work was set out by furlongs and by smaller spaces of

one hundred feet each, to regiments of suitable number, each under

the direction of an overseer.[1005]

[1003] Thucyd. vi, 75.

[1004] Diodor. xiv, 18. λίθων τετραπόδων. The stones may have

been cubes of four feet; but this does not certainly appear.

[1005] Diodor. xiv, 18.

As yet, we have heard little about Dionysius except acts of fraud,

violence, and spoliation, for the purpose of establishing his own

dominion over Syracuse, and aggrandizing himself by new conquests

on the borders. But this new fortification was a work of different

import. Instead of being, like his forts and walls in Ortygia,

a guardhouse both of defence and aggression merely for himself

against the people of Syracuse,—it was a valuable protection to the

people, and to himself along with them, against foreign besiegers.

It tended much to guarantee Syracuse from those disasters which had

so recently befallen Agrigentum and the other cities. Accordingly,

it was exceeding popular among the Syracusans, and produced between

them and Dionysius a sentiment of friendship and harmony such as had

not before been seen. Every man labored at the work not merely with

good will, but with enthusiasm; while the despot himself displayed

unwearied zeal, passing whole days on the spot, and taking part in

all the hardship and difficulty. He showed himself everywhere amidst

the mass, as an unguarded citizen, without suspicion or reserve, in

marked contrast with the harshness of his previous demeanor,[1006]

proclaiming rewards for the best and most rapid workmen; he also

provided attendance or relief for those whose strength gave way.

Such was the emulation thus inspired, that the numbers assembled,

often toiling by night as well as by day, completed the whole wall

in the space of twenty days. The fort at Euryalus, which formed the

termination of this newly-constructed line of wall, is probably not

to be understood as comprised within so short a period of execution;

at least in its complete consummation. For the defences provided

at this fort (either now or at a later period) were prodigious

in extent as well as elaborate in workmanship; and the remains of

them exhibit, even to modern observers, the most complete specimen

preserved to us of ancient fortification.[1007] To bring them into

such a condition must have occupied a longer time than twenty days.

Even as to the wall, perhaps, twenty days is rather to be understood

as indicating the time required for the essential continuity of its

line, leaving towers, gates, etc., to be added afterwards.

[1006] Diodor. xiv, 18. Καθόλου δὲ ἀποθέμενος τὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς βάρος,

ἰδιώτην αὑτὸν ἀπεδείκνυε, etc.

Compare cap. 45 and cap. 47—μισοῦντες τὸ βάρος τῆς τῶν Φοινίκων

ἐπικρατείας, etc.

[1007] According to the testimony of Saverio Cavallari, the

architect under whose directions the excavations were made in

1839, whereby these remains were first fully disclosed (Zur

Topographie von Syrakus, p. 21).

To provide defence for Syracuse against a besieging army, however,

was only a small part of the extensive schemes of Dionysius. What he

meditated was aggressive war against the Carthaginians; for which

purpose, he not only began to accumulate preparations of every kind

on the most extensive scale, but also modified his policy both

towards the Syracusans and towards the other Sicilian Greeks.

Towards the Syracusans his conduct underwent a material change.

The cruelty and oppression which had hitherto marked his dominion

was discontinued; he no longer put men to death, or sent them into

banishment, with the same merciless hand as before. In place of such

tyranny, he now substituted comparative mildness, forbearance, and

conciliation.[1008] Where the system had before been so fraught with

positive maltreatment to many and alarm to all, the mitigation of

it must have been sensibly as well as immediately felt. And when we

make present to our minds the relative position of Dionysius and

the Syracusans, we shall see that the evil inflicted by his express

order by no means represented the whole amount of evil which they

suffered. He occupied the impregnable fortress of Ortygia, with the

entire harbor, docks, and maritime means of the city. The numerous

garrison in his pay, and devoted to him, consisted in great part of

barbaric or non-Hellenic soldiers and of liberated slaves, probably

also non-Hellenic. The Syracusans resident in the outer city and

around were not only destitute of the means of defensive concert

and organization, but were also disarmed. For these mercenaries

either pay was to be provided from the contributions of the citizens,

or lands from their properties; for them, and for other partisans

also, Dionysius had enforced spoliations and transfers of land and

house-property by wholesale.[1009] Now, while the despot himself

was inflicting tyrannical sentences for his own purposes, we may be

sure that these men, the indispensable instruments of his tyranny,

would neither of themselves be disposed to respect the tranquillity

of the other citizens, nor be easily constrained to do so. It was

not, therefore, merely from the systematic misrule of the chief that

the Syracusans had to suffer, but also from the insolence and unruly

appetites of the subordinates. And accordingly they would be doubly

gainers, when Dionysius, from anxiety to attack the Carthaginians,

thought it prudent to soften the rigor of his own proceedings; since

his example, and in case of need his interference, would restrict the

license of his own partisans. The desire for foreign conquest made

it now his interest to conciliate some measure of goodwill from the

Syracusans; or at least to silence antipathies which might become

embarrassing if they broke out in the midst of a war. And he had in

this case the advantage of resting on another antipathy, powerful

and genuine in their minds. Hating as well as fearing Carthage,

the Syracusans cordially sympathized in the aggressive schemes of

Dionysius against her; which held out a prospect of relief from the

tyranny under which they groaned, and some chance of procuring a

restoration of the arms snatched from them.[1010]

[1008] Diodor. xiv, 45. Ἀπετίθετο γὰρ ἤδη τὸ πικρὸν τῆς

τυραννίδος, καὶ μεταβαλλόμενος εἰς ἐπιείκειαν, φιλανθρωπότερον

ἦρχε τῶν ὑποτεταγμένων, οὔτε φονεύων, οὔτε φυγάδας ποιῶν,

~καθάπερ εἰώθει~.

[1009] Diodor. xiv, 7.

[1010] Diodor. xiv, 45.

Towards the Sicilian Greeks, also, the conduct of Dionysius was

mainly influenced by his anti-Carthaginian projects, which made him

eager to put aside, or at least to defer, all possibilities of war

in other quarters. The inhabitants of Rhegium, on the Italian side

of the Strait of Messina, had recently manifested a disposition to

attack him. They were of common Chalkidic origin with Naxos and

Katana, the two cities which Dionysius had recently conquered and

enslaved. Sixteen years before, when the powerful Athenian armament

visited Sicily with the ostensible view of protecting the Chalkidic

cities against Syracuse, the Rhegines in spite of their fellowship of

race, had refused the invitation of Nikias[1011] to lend assistance,

being then afraid of Athens. But subsequent painful experience had

taught them, that to residents in or near Sicily, Syracuse was the

more formidable enemy of the two. The ruin of Naxus and Katana, with

the great extension of Syracusan dominion northward, had filled

them with apprehension from Dionysius, similar to the fears of

Carthage, inspired to the Syracusans themselves by the disasters

of Agrigentum and Gela. Anxious to revenge their enslaved kinsmen,

the Rhegines projected an attack upon Dionysius before his power

should become yet more formidable; a resolution, in which they were

greatly confirmed by the instigations of the Syracusan exiles (now

driven from Ætna and the other neighboring cities to Rhegium),

confident in their assurances that insurrection would break out

against Dionysius at Syracuse, so soon as any foreign succor should

be announced as approaching. Envoys were sent across the strait to

Messênê, soliciting coöperation against Dionysius, upon the urgent

plea that the ruin of Naxus and Katana could not be passed over,

either in generosity or in prudence, by neighbors on either side of

the strait. These representations made so much impression on the

generals of Messênê, that without consulting the public assembly,

they forthwith summoned the military force of the city, and marched

along with the Rhegines towards the Syracusan frontier,—six thousand

Rhegine and four thousand Messenian hoplites,—six hundred Rhegine and

four hundred Messenian horsemen,—with fifty Rhegine triremes. But

when they reached the frontiers of the Messenian territory, a large

portion of the soldiers refused to follow their generals farther. A

citizen named Laomedon headed the opposition, contending that the

generals had no authority to declare war without a public vote of

the city, and that it was imprudent to attack Dionysius unprovoked.

Such was the effect of these remonstrances, that the Messenian

soldiers returned back to their city; while the Rhegines, believing

themselves to be inadequate to the enterprise single handed, went

home also.[1012]

[1011] Thucyd. vi, 46.

[1012] Diodor. xiv, 40.

Apprised of the attack meditated, Dionysius had already led his

troops to defend the Syracusan frontier. But he now reconducted them

back to Syracuse, and listened favorably to propositions for peace

which speedily reached him, from Rhegium and Messênê.[1013] He was

anxious to conciliate them for the present, at all price, in order

that the Carthaginians, when he came to execute his plans, might

find no Grecian allies to coöperate with them in Sicily. He acquired

an influence in Messênê, by making to the city large concessions of

conterminous territory; on which side of the border, or how acquired,

we do not know. He farther endeavored to open an intimate connection

with Rhegium by marrying a Rhegine wife; with which view he sent a

formal message to the citizens, asking permission to contract such an

alliance, accompanied with a promise to confer upon them important

benefits, both in territorial aggrandizement and in other ways.

After a public debate, the Rhegines declined his proposition. The

feeling in their city was decidedly hostile to Dionysius, as the

recent destroyer of Naxus and Katana; and it appears that some of the

speakers expressed themselves with contemptuous asperity, remarking

that the daughter of the public executioner was the only fit wife for

him.[1014] Taken by itself, the refusal would be sufficiently galling

to Dionysius. But when coupled with such insulting remarks (probably

made in public debate in the presence of his own envoys, for it seems

not credible that the words should have been embodied in the formal

reply or resolution of the assembly[1015]), it left the bitterest

animosity; a feeling, which we shall hereafter find in full operation.

[1013] Diodor. xiv, 40.

[1014] Diodor. xiv, 44, 106, 107.

[1015] Diodorus, when he first mentions the answer, does not give

this remark as comprised in it; though he afterwards alludes to

it as having been _said_ to be (φασὶ) so comprised (xix, 44-107).

Refused at Rhegium, Dionysius sent to prefer a similar request,

with similar offers, at the neighboring city of Lokri; where it was

favorably entertained. It is remarkable that Aristotle comments upon

this acquiescence of the Lokrians as an act of grave imprudence, and

as dictated only by the anxiety of the principal citizens, in an

oligarchical government, to seek for aggrandizement to themselves

out of such an alliance. The request would not have been granted

(Aristotle observes) either in a democracy or in a well-regulated

aristocracy. The marital connection now contracted by Dionysius with

a Lokrian female, Doris, the daughter of a citizen of distinction

named Xenetus, produced as an ultimate consequence the overthrow

of the oligarchy of Lokri.[1016] And even among the Lokrians,

the request was not granted without opposition. A citizen named

Aristeides (one of the companions of Plato), whose daughter Dionysius

had solicited in marriage, returned for answer that he would

rather see her dead than united to a despot. In revenge for this

bitter reply, Dionysius caused the sons of Aristeides to be put to

death.[1017]

[1016] Aristot. Politic. v, 6, 7. Ἔτι διὰ τὸ πάσας τὰς

ἀριστοκρατικὰς πολιτείας ὀλιγαρχικὰς εἶναι, μᾶλλον πλεονεκτοῦσιν

οἱ γνώριμοι· οἷον καὶ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι εἰς ὀλίγους αἱ οὐσίαι

ἔρχονται, καὶ ἔξεστι ποιεῖν ὅτι ἂν θέλωσι τοῖς γνωρίμοις μᾶλλον,

καὶ κηδεύειν ὅτῳ θέλουσι. Διὸ καὶ ἡ Λοκρῶν πολιτεία ἀπώλετο ἐκ

τῆς πρὸς Διονύσιον κηδείας· ὃ ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ οὐκ ἂν ἐγένετο, οὐδ’

ἂν ἐν ἀριστοκρατίᾳ εὖ μεμιγμένῃ.

[1017] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 6.

But the amicable relations which Dionysius was at so much pains to

establish with the Greek cities near the Strait of Messênê, were

destined chiefly to leave him free for preparations against Carthage;

which preparations he now commenced on a gigantic scale. Efforts so

great and varied, combined not merely with forecast but with all

the scientific appliances then available, have not hitherto come

before us throughout this history. The terrible effect with which

Hannibal had recently employed his battering-machines against Selinus

and Himera, stimulated Dionysius to provide himself with the like

implements in greater abundance than any Greek general had ever

before possessed. He collected at Syracuse, partly by constraint,

partly by allurement, all the best engineers, mechanists, armorers,

artisans, etc., whom Sicily or Italy could furnish. He set them

upon the construction of machines and other muniments of war, and

upon the manufacture of arms offensive as well as defensive, with

the greatest possible assiduity. The arms provided were of great

variety; not merely such as were suitable for Grecian soldiers, heavy

or light, but also such as were in use among the different barbaric

tribes around the Mediterranean, Gauls, Iberians, Tyrrhenians, etc.,

from whom Dionysius intended to hire mercenaries; so that every

different soldier would be furnished, on arriving, with the sort

of weapon which had become habitual to him. All Syracuse became a

bustling military workshop,—not only the market-places, porticos,

palæstræ, and large private houses, but also the fore-chambers and

back-chambers of the various temples. Dionysius distributed the

busy multitude into convenient divisions, each with some eminent

citizen as superintendent. Visiting them in person frequently, and

reviewing their progress, he recompensed largely, and invited to his

table, those who produced the greatest amount of finished work. As

he farther offered premiums for inventive skill, the competition of

ingenious mechanists originated several valuable warlike novelties;

especially the great projectile engine for stones and darts, called

Catapulta, which was now for the first time devised. We are told that

the shields fabricated during this season of assiduous preparation

were not less than one hundred and forty thousand in number, and

the breast-plates fourteen thousand, many of them unrivalled in

workmanship, destined for the body-guard and the officers. Helmets,

spears, daggers, etc., with other arms and weapons in indefinite

variety, were multiplied in corresponding proportion.[1018] The

magazines of arms, missiles, machines, and muniments of war in every

variety, accumulated in Ortygia, continued stupendous in amount

through the whole life of Dionysius, and even down to the downfall of

his son.[1019]

[1018] Diodor. xiv, 42, 43.

The historian Philistus had described with much minuteness these

warlike preparations of Dionysius. Diodorus has probably abridged

from him (Philisti Fragment. xxxiv, ed. Marx and ed. Didot.)

[1019] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 13.

If the preparations for land-warfare were thus stupendous, those

for sea-warfare were fully equal, if not superior. The docks of

Syracuse were filled with the best ship-builders, carpenters, and

artisans; numerous wood-cutters were sent to cut ship-timber on

the well-clothed slopes of Ætna and the Calabrian Apennines; teams

of oxen were then provided to drag it to the coast, from whence it

was towed in rafts to Syracuse. The existing naval establishment

of Syracuse comprised one hundred and ten triremes; the existing

docks contained one hundred and fifty ship-houses, or covered slips

for the purpose either of building or housing a trireme. But this

was very inadequate to the conceptions of Dionysius, who forthwith

undertook the construction of one hundred and sixty new ship-houses,

each competent to hold two vessels,—and then commenced the building

of new ships of war to the number of two hundred; while he at the

same time put all the existing vessels and docks into the best

state of repair. Here too, as in the case of the catapulta, the

ingenuity of his architects enabled him to stand forth as a maritime

inventor. As yet, the largest ship of war which had ever moved on

the Grecian or Mediterranean waters, was the trireme, which was

rowed by three banks or tiers of oars. It was now three centuries

since the first trireme had been constructed at Corinth and Samos by

the inventive skill of the Corinthian Ameinokles:[1020] it was not

until the period succeeding the Persian invasion that even triremes

had become extensively employed; nor had any larger vessels ever

been thought of. The Athenians, who during the interval between the

Persian invasion and their great disaster at Syracuse had stood

preëminent and set the fashion in all nautical matters, were under no

inducement to build above the size of the trireme. As their style of

manœuvring consisted of rapid evolutions and changes in the ship’s

direction, for the purpose of striking the weak parts of an enemy’s

ship with the beak of their own,—so, if the size of their ship had

been increased, her capacity for such nimble turns and movements

would have been diminished. But the Syracusans had made no attempt to

copy the rapid evolutions of the Athenian navy. On the contrary, when

fighting against the latter in the confined harbor of Syracuse,[1021]

they had found every advantage in their massive build of ships, and

straightforward impact of bow driven against bow. For them, the

larger ships were the more suitable and efficient; so that Dionysius

or his naval architects, full of ambitious aspirations, now struck

out the plan of building ships of war with four or five banks of oars

instead of three; that is, quadriremes, or quinqueremes, instead of

triremes.[1022] Not only did the Syracusan despot thus equip a naval

force equal in number of ships to Athens in her best days; but he

also exhibited ships larger than Athens had ever possessed, or than

Greece had ever conceived.

[1020] Thucyd. i, 13.

[1021] Thucyd. vii, 36-62.