unfortunately called upon to study, we have found few or no examples
of any considerable town taken by storm. So much the more terrible
was the shock throughout the Grecian world, of the events just
recounted; Selinus and Himera, two Grecian cities of ancient standing
and uninterrupted prosperity,—had both of them been stormed, ruined,
and depopulated, by a barbaric host, within the space of three
months.[909] No event at all parallel had occurred since the sack
of Miletus by the Persians after the Ionic revolt (495 B.C.),[910]
which raised such powerful sympathy and mourning in Athens. The
war now raging in the Ægean, between Athens and Sparta with their
respective allies, doubtless contributed to deaden, throughout
Central Greece, the impression of calamities sustained by Greeks at
the western extremity of Sicily. But within that island, the sympathy
with the sufferers was most acute, and aggravated by terror for the
future. The Carthaginian general had displayed a degree of energy
equal to any Grecian officer throughout the war, with a command of
besieging and battering machinery surpassing even the best equipped
Grecian cities.
The mercenaries whom he had got together were alike terrible from
their bravery and ferocity; encouraging Carthaginian ambition to
follow up its late rapid successes by attacks against the other
cities of the island. No such prospects indeed were at once realized.
Hannibal, having completed his revenge at Himera, and extended the
Carthaginian dominion all across the north-west corner of Sicily
(from Selinus on the southern sea to the site of Himera or Therma
on the northern), dismissed his mercenary troops and returned home.
Most of them were satiated with plunder as well as pay, though the
Campanians, who had been foremost at the capture of Selinus, thought
themselves unfairly stinted, and retired in disgust.[911] Hannibal
carried back a rich spoil, with glorious trophies, to Carthage, where
he was greeted with enthusiastic welcome and admiration.[912]
[909] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 37.
[910] Herodot. vi, 28.
[911] Diodor. xiii, 62-80.
[912] Diodor. xiii, 62.
Never was there a time when the Greek cities in Sicily,—and Syracuse
especially, upon whom the others would greatly rest in the event of
a second Carthaginian invasion,—had stronger motives for keeping
themselves in a condition of efficacious defence. Unfortunately,
it was just at this moment that a new cause of intestine discord
burst upon Syracuse; fatally impairing her strength, and proving in
its consequences destructive to her liberty. The banished Syracusan
general Hermokrates had recently arrived at Messênê in Sicily;
where he appears to have been, at the time when the fugitives
came from Himera. It has already been mentioned that he, with two
colleagues, had commanded the Syracusan contingent serving with the
Peloponnesians under Mindarus in Asia. After the disastrous defeat
of Kyzikus, in which Mindarus was slain and every ship in the fleet
taken or destroyed, sentence of banishment was passed at Syracuse
against the three admirals. Hermokrates was exceedingly popular
among the trierarchs and the officers; he had stood conspicuous for
incorruptibility, and had conducted himself (so far as we have means
of judging) with energy and ability in his command. The sentence,
unmerited by his behavior, was dictated by acute vexation for the
loss of the fleet, and for the disappointment of those expectations
which Hermokrates had held out; combined with the fact that Diokles
and the opposite party were now in the ascendant at Syracuse. When
the banished general, in making it known to the armament, complained
of its injustice and illegality, he obtained warm sympathy, and even
exhortations still to retain the command, in spite of orders from
home. He forbade them earnestly to think of raising sedition against
their common city and country;[913] upon which the trierarchs, when
they took their last and affectionate leave of him, bound themselves
by oath, as soon as they should return to Syracuse, to leave no means
untried for procuring his restoration.
[913] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 28. Οἱ δ’ οὐκ ἔφασαν δεῖν στασιάζειν
πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτῶν πόλιν, etc.
The admonitory words addressed by Hermokrates to the forwardness
of the trierarchs, would have been honorable to his patriotism,
had not his own conduct at the same time been worthy of the worst
enemies of his country. For immediately on being superseded by the
new admirals, he went to the satrap Pharnabazus, in whose favor he
stood high; and obtained from him a considerable present of money,
which he employed in collecting mercenary troops and building ships,
to levy war against his opponents in Syracuse and procure his own
restoration.[914] Thus strengthened, he returned from Asia to Sicily,
and reached the Sicilian Messênê rather before the capture of Himera
by the Carthaginians. At Messênê he caused five fresh triremes to
be built, besides taking into his pay one thousand of the expelled
Himeræans. At the head of these troops, he attempted to force his
way into Syracuse, under concert with his friends in the city,
who engaged to assist his admission by arms. Possibly some of the
trierarchs of his armament, who had before sworn to lend him their
aid, had now returned and were among this body of interior partisans.
[914] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 31; Diodor. xiii, 63.
The moment was well chosen for such an enterprise. As the disaster
at Kyzikus had exasperated the Syracusans against Hermokrates, so
we cannot doubt that there must have been a strong reaction against
Diokles and his partisans, in consequence of the fall of Selinus
unaided, and the subsequent abandonment of Himera. What degree of
blame may fairly attach to Diokles for these misfortunes, we are not
in a condition to judge. But such reverses in themselves were sure
to discredit him more or less, and to lend increased strength and
stimulus to the partisans of the banished Hermokrates. Nevertheless
that leader, though he came to the gates of Syracuse, failed in
his attempt to obtain admission, and was compelled to retire; upon
which he marched his little army across the interior of the island,
and took possession of the dismantled Selinus. Here he established
himself as the chief of a new settlement, got together as many as
he could of the expelled inhabitants (among whom probably some had
already come back along with Empedion), and invited many fresh
colonists from other quarters. Reëstablishing a portion of the
demolished fortifications, he found himself gradually strengthened
by so many new-comers, as to place at his command a body of six
thousand chosen hoplites,—probably independent of other soldiers of
inferior merit. With these troops he began to invade the Carthaginian
settlements in the neighborhood, Motyê and Panormus.[915] Having
defeated the forces of both in the field, he carried his ravages
successfully over their territories, with large acquisitions of
plunder. The Carthaginians had now no army remaining in Sicily;
for their immense host of the preceding year had consisted only of
mercenaries levied for the occasion, and then disbanded.
[915] Diodor. xiii, 63.
These events excited strong sensation throughout Sicily. The valor of
Hermokrates, who had restored Selinus and conquered the Carthaginians
on the very ground where they had stood so recently in terrific
force, was contrasted with the inglorious proceeding of Diokles at
Himera. In the public assemblies of Syracuse, this topic, coupled
with the unjust sentence whereby Hermokrates had been banished, was
emphatically set forth by his partisans; producing some reaction
in his favor, and a still greater effect in disgracing his rival
Diokles. Apprised that the tide of Syracusan opinion was turning
towards him, Hermokrates made renewed preparations for his return,
and resorted to a new stratagem for the purpose of smoothing the
difficulty. He marched from Selinus to the ruined site of Himera,
informed himself of the spot where the Syracusan troops had undergone
their murderous defeat, and collected together the bones of his slain
fellow-citizens; which (or rather the unburied bodies) must have
lain upon the field unheeded for about two years. Having placed
these bones on cars richly decorated, he marched with his forces and
conveyed them across the island from Himera to the Syracusan border.
Here as an exile he halted; thinking it suitable now to display
respect for the law,—though in his previous attempt he had gone up
to the very gates of the city, without any similar scruples. But he
sent forward some friends with the cars and the bones, tendering
them to the citizens for the purpose of being honored with due
funeral solemnities. Their arrival was the signal for a violent
party discussion, and for an outburst of aggravated displeasure
against Diokles, who had left the bodies unburied on the field of
battle. “It was to Hermokrates (so his partisans urged) and to his
valiant efforts against the Carthaginians, that the recovery of
these remnants of the slain, and the opportunity of administering
to them the funeral solemnities, was now owing. Let the Syracusans,
after duly performing such obsequies, testify their gratitude to
Hermokrates by a vote of restoration, and their displeasure against
Diokles by a sentence of banishment.”[916] Diokles with his partisans
was thus placed at great disadvantage. In opposing the restoration of
Hermokrates, he thought it necessary also to oppose the proposition
for welcoming and burying the bones of the slain citizens. Here the
feelings of the people went vehemently against him; the bones were
received and interred, amidst the respectful attendance of all; and
so strong was the reactionary sentiment generally, that the partisans
of Hermokrates carried their proposition for sentencing Diokles to
banishment. But on the other hand, they could not so far prevail as
to obtain the restoration of Hermokrates himself. The purposes of the
latter had been so palpably manifested, in trying a few months before
to force his way into the city by surprise, and in now presenting
himself at the frontier with an armed force under his command,—that
his readmission would have been nothing less than a deliberate
surrender of the freedom of the city to a despot.[917]
[916] Diodor. xiii, 63, 75.
[917] Diodor. xiii, 75. Καὶ ὁ μὲν Διοκλῆς ἐφυγαδεύθη, τὸν δὲ
Ἑρμοκράτην οὐδ’ ὡς προσεδέξαντο· ὑπώπτευον γὰρ τὴν τἀνδρὸς
τόλμαν, μή ποτε τυχὼν ἡγεμονίας, ἀναδείξῃ ἑαυτὸν τύραννον.
Having failed in this well-laid stratagem for obtaining a vote
of consent, Hermokrates saw that his return could not at that
moment be consummated by open force. He therefore retired from the
Syracusan frontier; yet only postponing his purposes of armed attack
until his friends in the city could provide for him a convenient
opportunity. We see plainly that his own party within had been much
strengthened, and his opponents enfeebled, by the recent manœuvre.
Of this a proof is to be found in the banishment of Diokles, who
probably was not succeeded by any other leader of equal influence.
After a certain interval, the partisans of Hermokrates contrived a
plan which they thought practicable, for admitting him into the city
by night. Forewarned by them, he marched from Selinus at the head
of three thousand soldiers, crossed the territory of Gela,[918] and
reached the concerted spot near the gate of Achradina during the
night. From the rapidity of his advance, he had only a few troops
along with him; the main body not having been able to keep up. With
these few, however, he hastened to the gate, which he found already
in possession of his friends, who had probably (like Pasimêlus at
Corinth[919]) awaited a night on which they were posted to act as
sentinels. Master of the gate, Hermokrates, though joined by his
partisans within in arms, thought it prudent to postpone decisive
attack until his own main force came up. But during this interval,
the Syracusan authorities in the city, apprised of what had happened,
mustered their full military strength in the agora, and lost no time
in falling upon the band of aggressors. After a sharply contested
combat, these aggressors were completely worsted, and Hermokrates
himself slain with a considerable proportion of his followers. The
remainder having fled, sentence of banishment was passed upon them.
Several among the wounded, however, were reported by their relatives
as slain, in order that they might escape being comprised in such a
condemnation.[920]
[918] Diodor. xiii, 75. Ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἑρμοκράτης τότε τὸν καιρὸν οὐχ
ὁρῶν εὔθετον εἰς τὸ βιάσασθαι, πάλιν ἀνεχώρησεν εἰς Σελινοῦντα.
Μετὰ δέ τινα χρόνον, τῶν φίλων αὐτὸν μεταπεμπομένων, ὥρμησε μετὰ
τρισχιλίων στρατιωτῶν, καὶ πορευθεὶς διὰ τῆς Γελώας, ἧκε νυκτὸς
ἐπὶ τὸν συντεταγμένον τόπον.
[919] Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 4, 8.
[920] Diodor. xiii, 75.
Xenophon (Hellen. i, 3, 13) states that Hermokrates, ἤδη φεύγων
ἐκ Συρακουσῶν, was among those who accompanied Pharnabazus along
with the envoys intended to go to Susa, but who only went as far
as Gordium in Phrygia, and were detained by Pharnabazus (on the
requisition of Cyrus) for three years. This must have been in the
year 407 B.C. Now I cannot reconcile this with the proceedings
of Hermokrates as described by Diodorus; his coming to the
Sicilian Messênê,—his exploits near Selinus,—his various attempts
to procure restoration to Syracuse:—all of which must have
occurred in 408-407 B.C., ending with the death of Hermokrates.
It seems to me impossible that the person mentioned by Xenophon
as accompanying Pharnabazus into the interior can have been the
eminent Hermokrates. Whether it was another person of the same
name,—or whether Xenophon was altogether misinformed,—I will not
take upon me to determine. There were really two contemporary
Syracusans bearing that name, for the father of Dionysius the
despot was named Hermokrates.
Polybius (xii, 25) states that Hermokrates fought with the
Lacedæmonians at Ægospotami. He means the eminent general so
called; who however cannot have been at Ægospotami in the summer
or autumn of 405 B.C. There is some mistake in the assertion of
Polybius, but I do not know how to explain it.
Thus perished one of the most energetic of the Syracusan citizens; a
man not less effective as a defender of his country against foreign
enemies, than himself dangerous as a formidable enemy to her internal
liberties. It would seem, as far as we can make out, that his attempt
to make himself master of his country was powerfully seconded, and
might well have succeeded. But it lacked that adventitious support
arising from present embarrassment and danger in the foreign
relations of the city, which we shall find so efficacious two years
afterwards in promoting the ambitious projects of Dionysius.
Dionysius,—for the next coming generation the most formidable name
in the Grecian world,—now appears for the first time in history. He
was a young Syracusan of no consideration from family or position,
described as even of low birth and low occupation; as a scribe or
secretary, which was looked upon as a subordinate, though essential,
function.[921] He was the son of Hermokrates,—not that eminent person
whose death has been just described, but another person of the same
name, whether related or not, we do not know.[922] It is highly
probable that he was a man of literary ability and instruction, since
we read of him in after-days as a composer of odes and tragedies;
and it is certain that he stood distinguished in all the talents
for military action,—bravery, force of will, and quickness of
discernment. On the present occasion, he espoused strenuously the
party of Hermokrates, and was one of those who took arms in the
city on his behalf. Having distinguished himself in the battle,
and received several wounds, he was among those given out for dead
by his relations.[923] In this manner he escaped the sentence of
banishment passed against the survivors. And when, in the course of
a certain time, after recovering from his wounds, he was produced
as unexpectedly living,—we may presume that his opponents and the
leading men in the city left him unmolested, not thinking it worth
while to reopen political inquisition in reference to matters already
passed and finished. He thus remained in the city, marked out by his
daring and address to the Hermokratæan party, as the person most fit
to take up the mantle, and resume the anti-popular designs, of their
late leader. It will presently be seen how the chiefs of this party
lent their aid to exalt him.
[921] Diodor. xiii, 96; xiv, 66.
Isokrates, Or. v, Philipp. s. 73—Dionysius, πολλοστὸς ὢν
Συρακοσίων καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῇ δόξῃ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν, etc.
Demosthenes, adv. Leptinem, p. 506, s. 178. γραμματέως, ὥς φασι,
etc. Polybius (xv, 35), ἐκ δημοτικῆς καὶ ταπεινῆς ὑποθέσεως
ὁρμηθεὶς, etc. Compare Polyænus, v, 2, 2.
[922] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 24. Διονύσιος ὁ Ἑρμοκράτους. Diodor.
xiii, 91.
[923] Diodor. xiii, 75.
Meanwhile the internal condition of Syracuse was greatly enfeebled by
this division. Though the three several attempts of Hermokrates to
penetrate by force or fraud into the city had all failed, yet they
had left a formidable body of malcontents behind; while the opponents
also, the popular government and its leaders, had been materially
reduced in power and consideration by the banishment of Diokles. This
magistrate was succeeded by Daphnæus and others, of whom we know
nothing, except that they are spoken of as rich men and representing
the sentiments of the rich,—and that they seem to have manifested but
little ability. Nothing could be more unfortunate than the weakness
of Syracuse at this particular juncture: for the Carthaginians, elate
with their successes at Selinus and Himera, and doubtless also piqued
by the subsequent retaliation of Hermokrates upon their dependencies
at Motyê and Panormus, were just now meditating a second invasion of
Sicily on a still larger scale. Not uninformed of their projects,
the Syracusan leaders sent envoys to Carthage to remonstrate against
them, and to make propositions for peace. But no satisfactory answer
could be obtained, nor were the preparations discontinued.[924]
[924] Diodor. xiii, 79.
In the ensuing spring, the storm gathering from Africa burst with
destructive violence upon this fated island. A mercenary force had
been got together during the winter, greater than that which had
sacked Selinus and Himera; three hundred thousand men, according to
Ephorus,—one hundred and twenty thousand, according to Xenophon and
Timæus. Hannibal was again placed in command; but his predominant
impulses of family and religion having been satiated by the great
sacrifice of Himera, he excused himself on the score of old age,
and was only induced to accept the duty by having his relative
Imilkon named as colleague. By their joint efforts, the immense
host of Iberians, Mediterranean islanders, Campanians, Libyans, and
Numidians, was united at Carthage, and made ready to be conveyed
across, in a fleet of one hundred and twenty triremes, with no less
than one thousand five hundred transports.[925] To protect the
landing, forty Carthaginian triremes were previously sent over to
the Bay of Motyê. The Syracusan leaders, with commendable energy and
watchfulness, immediately despatched the like number of triremes
to attack them, in hopes of thereby checking the farther arrival
of the grand armament. They were victorious, destroying fifteen of
the Carthaginian triremes, and driving the rest back to Africa; yet
their object was not attained; for Hannibal himself, coming forth
immediately with fifty fresh triremes, constrained the Syracusans
to retire. Presently afterwards the grand armament appeared,
disembarking its motley crowd of barbaric warriors near the western
cape of Sicily.
[925] Diodor. xiii, 80; Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 21.
Great was the alarm caused throughout Sicily by their arrival. All
the Greek cities either now began to prepare for war, or pushed with
a more vigorous hand equipments previously begun, since they seem
to have had some previous knowledge of the purpose of the enemy.
The Syracusans sent to entreat assistance both from the Italian
Greeks and from Sparta. From the latter city, however, little was
to be expected, since her whole efforts were now devoted to the
prosecution of the war against Athens; this being the year wherein
Kallikratidas commanded, and when the battle of Arginusæ was fought.
Of all Sicilian Greeks, the Agrigentines were both the most
frightened and the most busily employed. Conterminous as they were
with Selinus on their western frontier, and foreseeing that the first
shock of the invasion would fall upon them, they immediately began
to carry in their outlying property within the walls, as well as
to accumulate a stock of provisions for enduring blockade. Sending
for Dexippus, a Lacedæmonian then in Gela as commander of a body of
mercenaries for the defence of that town, they engaged him in their
service, with one thousand five hundred hoplites; reinforced by eight
hundred of those Campanians who had served with Hannibal at Himera,
but had quitted him in disgust.[926]
[926] Diodor. xiii, 81-84.
Agrigentum was at this time in the highest state of prosperity and
magnificence; a tempting prize for any invader. Its population
was very great; comprising, according to one account, twenty
thousand citizens among an aggregate total of two hundred thousand
males,—citizens, metics, and slaves; according to another account, an
aggregate total of no less than eight hundred thousand persons;[927]
numbers unauthenticated, and not to be trusted farther than as
indicating a very populous city. Situated a little more than two
miles from the sea, and possessing a spacious territory highly
cultivated, especially with vines and olives, Agrigentum carried on a
lucrative trade with the opposite coast of Africa, where at that time
no such plantations flourished. Its temples and porticos, especially
the spacious temple of Zeus Olympius,—its statues and pictures,—its
abundance of chariots and horses,—its fortifications,—its sewers,—its
artificial lake of near a mile in circumference, abundantly stocked
with fish,—all these placed it on a par with the most splendid
cities of the Hellenic world.[928] Of the numerous prisoners taken
at the defeat of the Carthaginians near Himera seventy years before,
a very large proportion had fallen to the lot of the Agrigentines,
and had been employed by them in public works contributing to the
advantage or ornament of the city.[929] The hospitality of the
wealthy citizens,—Gellias, Antisthenes, and others,—was carried
even to profusion. The surrounding territory was celebrated for its
breed of horses,[930] which the rich Agrigentines vied with each
other in training and equipping for the chariot-race. At the last
Olympic games immediately preceding this fatal Carthaginian invasion
(that is at the 93rd Olympiad,—408 B.C.), the Agrigentine Exænetus
gained the prize in a chariot-race. On returning to Sicily after his
victory, he was welcomed by many of his friends, who escorted him
home in procession with three hundred chariots, each drawn by a pair
of white horses, and all belonging to native Agrigentines. Of the
festival by which the wealthy Antisthenes celebrated the nuptials of
his daughter, we read an account almost fabulous. Amidst all this
wealth and luxury, it is not surprising to hear that the rough duties
of military exercise were imperfectly kept up, and that indulgences,
not very consistent with soldier-like efficiency, were allowed to the
citizens on guard.
[927] Diogen. Laert. viii, 63.
[928] Diodor. xiii, 81-84; Polyb. ix, 7.
[929] Diodor. xi, 25.
[930] Virgil, Æneid. iii, 704.
Such was Agrigentum in May 406 B.C., when Hannibal and Imilkon
approached it with their powerful army. Their first propositions,
however, were not of a hostile character. They invited the
Agrigentines to enter into alliance with Carthage; or if this were
not acceptable, at any rate to remain neutral and at peace. Both
propositions were declined.[931]
[931] Diodor. xiii, 85.
Besides having taken engagements with Gela and Syracuse, the
Agrigentines also felt a confidence, not unreasonable, in the
strength of their own walls and situation. Agrigentum with its
citadel was placed on an aggregate of limestone hills, immediately
above the confluence of two rivers, both flowing from the north; the
river Akragas on the eastern and southern sides of the city, and the
Hypsas on its western side. Of this aggregate of hills, separated
from each other by clefts and valleys, the northern half is the
loftiest, being about eleven hundred feet above the level of the
sea—the southern half is less lofty. But on all sides, except on the
south-west, it rises by a precipitous ascent; on the side towards
the sea, it springs immediately out of the plain, thus presenting a
fine prospect to ships passing along the coast. The whole of this
aggregate of hills was encompassed by a continuous wall, built round
the declivity, and in some parts hewn out of the solid rock. The
town of Agrigentum was situated in the southern half of the walled
enclosure. The citadel, separated from it by a ravine, and accessible
only by one narrow ascent, stood on the north-eastern hill; it was
the most conspicuous feature in the place, called the Athenæum,
and decorated by temples of Athênê and of Zeus Atabyrius. In the
plain under the southern wall of the city stood the Agrigentine
sepulchres.[932]—Reinforced by eight hundred Campanian mercenaries,
with the fifteen hundred other mercenaries brought by Dexippus from
Gela,—the Agrigentines awaited confidently the attack upon their
walls, which were not only in far better condition than those of
Selinus, but also unapproachable by battering-machines or movable
towers, except on one part of the south-western side. It was here
that Hannibal, after reconnoitering the town all round, began his
attack. But after hard fighting without success for one day, he was
forced to retire at nightfall; and even lost his battering train,
which was burnt during the night by a sally of the besieged.[933]
Desisting from farther attempts on that point, Hannibal now ordered
his troops to pull down the tombs; which were numerous on the lower
or southern side of the city, and many of which, especially that of
the despot Theron, were of conspicuous grandeur. By this measure he
calculated on providing materials adequate to the erection of immense
mounds, equal in height to the southern wall, and sufficiently
close to it for the purpose of assault. His numerous host had made
considerable progress in demolishing these tombs, and were engaged
in breaking down the monument of Theron, when their progress was
arrested by a thunderbolt falling upon it. This event was followed
by religious terrors, suddenly overspreading the camp. The prophets
declared that the violation of the tombs was an act of criminal
sacrilege. Every night the spectres of those whose tombs had been
profaned manifested themselves, to the affright of the soldiers on
guard; while the judgment of the gods was manifested in a violent
pestilential distemper. Numbers of the army perished, Hannibal
himself among them; and even of those who escaped death, many were
disabled from active duty by distress and suffering. Imilkon was
compelled to appease the gods, and to calm the agony of the troops,
by a solemn supplication according to the Carthaginian rites. He
sacrificed a child, considered as the most propitiatory of all
offerings, to Kronus; and cast into the sea a number of animal
victims as offerings to Poseidon.[934]
[932] See about the Topography of Agrigentum,—Seyfert, Akragas,
p. 21, 23, 40 (Hamburg, 1845).
The modern town of Girgenti stands on one of the hills of this
vast aggregate, which is overspread with masses of ruins, and
around which the traces of the old walls may be distinctly made
out, with considerable remains of them in some particular parts.
Compare Polybius, i, 18; ix, 27.
Pindar calls the town ποταμίᾳ τ’ Ἀκράγαντι—Pyth. vi, 6: ἱερὸν
οἴκημα ποταμοῦ—Olymp. ii, 10.
[933] Diodor. xiii, 85.
We read of a stratagem in Polyænus (v, 10, 4), whereby Imilkon is
said to have enticed the Agrigentines, in one of their sallies,
into incautious pursuit, by a simulated flight; and thus to have
inflicted upon them a serious defeat.
[934] Diodor. xiii, 86.
These religious rites calmed the terrors of the army, and mitigated,
or were supposed to have mitigated, the distemper; so that Imilkon,
while desisting from all farther meddling with the tombs, was enabled
to resume his batteries and assaults against the walls, though
without any considerable success. He also dammed up the western river
Hypsas, so as to turn the stream against the wall; but this manœuvre
produced no effect. His operations were presently interrupted by
the arrival of a powerful army which marched from Syracuse, under
Daphnæus, to the relief of Agrigentum. Reinforced in its road by
the military strength of Kamarina and Gela, it amounted to thirty
thousand foot and five thousand horse, on reaching the river Himera,
the eastern frontier of the Agrigentine territory; while a fleet
of thirty Syracusan triremes sailed along the coast to second its
efforts. As these troops neared the town, Imilkon despatched against
them a body of Iberians and Campanians;[935] who however, after a
strenuous combat, were completely defeated, and driven back to the
Carthaginian camp near the city, where they found themselves under
the protection of the main army. Daphnæus, having secured the victory
and inflicted severe loss upon the enemy, was careful to prevent his
troops from disordering their ranks in the ardor of pursuit, in the
apprehension that Imilkon with the main body might take advantage
of that disorder to turn the fortune of the day,—as had happened in
the terrible defeat before Himera, three years before. The routed
Iberians were thus allowed to get back to the camp. At the same time
the Agrigentines, witnessing from the walls, with joyous excitement,
the flight of their enemies, vehemently urged their generals to lead
them forth for an immediate sally, in order that the destruction
of the fugitives might thus be consummated. But the generals were
inflexible in resisting such demand; conceiving that the city itself
would thus be stripped of its defenders, and that Imilkon might seize
the occasion for assaulting it with his main body, when there was not
sufficient force to repel them. The defeated Iberians thus escaped
to the main camp; neither pursued by the Syracusans, nor impeded, as
they passed near the Agrigentine walls, by the population within.
[935] Diodor. xiii, 87.
It appears that an eminence a little way eastward from Agrigentum
still bears the name of _Il Campo Cartaginese_, raising some
presumption that it was once occupied by the Carthaginians.
Evidently, the troops sent out by Imilkon to meet and repel
Daphnæus, must have taken post to the eastward of Agrigentum,
from which side the Syracusan army of relief was approaching.
Seyfert (Akragas, p. 41) contests this point, and supposes that
they must have been on the western side; misled by the analogy
of the Roman siege in 262 B.C., when the Carthaginian relieving
army under Hanno were coming from the westward,—from Heraklei
(Polyb. i, 19).
Presently Daphnæus with his victorious army reached Agrigentum,
and joined the citizens; who flocked in crowds, along with the
Lacedæmonian Dexippus, to meet and welcome them. But the joy of
meeting, and the reciprocal congratulations on the recent victory,
were fatally poisoned by general indignation for the unmolested
escape of the defeated Iberians; occasioned by nothing less than
remissness, cowardice, or corruption, (so it was contended), on the
part of the generals,—first the Syracusan generals, and next the
Agrigentine. Against the former, little was now said, though much
was held in reserve, as we shall soon hear. But against the latter,
the discontent of the Agrigentine population burst forth instantly
and impetuously. A public assembly being held on the spot, the
Agrigentine generals, five in number, were put under accusation.
Among many speakers who denounced them as guilty of treason, the most
violent of all was the Kamarinæan Menês,—himself one of the leaders,
seemingly of the Kamarinæan contingent in the army of Daphnæus. The
concurrence of Menês, carrying to the Agrigentines a full sanction of
their sentiments, wrought them up to such a pitch of fury, that the
generals, when they came to defend themselves, found neither sympathy
nor even common fairness of hearing. Four out of the five were stoned
and put to death on the spot; the fifth, Argeius, was spared only
on the ground of his youth; and even the Lacedæmonian Dexippus was
severely censured.[936]
[936] Diodor. xiii, 87.
The youth of Argeius, combined with the fact of his being in high
command, makes us rather imagine that he was of noble birth:
compare Thucydid. vi, 38,—the speech of Athenagoras.
How far, in regard to these proceedings, the generals were really
guilty, or how far their defence, had it been fairly heard, would
have been valid,—is a point which our scanty information does not
enable us to determine. But it is certain that the arrival of the
victorious Syracusans at Agrigentum completely altered the relative
position of affairs. Instead of farther assaulting the walls, Imilkon
was attacked in his camp by Daphnæus. The camp, however, was so
fortified as to repel all attempts, and the siege from this time
forward became only a blockade; a contest of patience and privation
between the city and the besiegers, lasting seven or eight months
from the commencement of the siege. At first Daphnæus, with his own
force united to the Agrigentines, was strong enough to harass the
Carthaginians and intercept their supplies, so that the greatest
distress began to prevail among their army. The Campanian mercenaries
even broke out into mutiny, crowding, with clamorous demands for
provision and with menace of deserting, around the tent of Imilkon;
who barely pacified them by pledging to them the gold and silver
drinking-cups of the chief Carthaginians around him,[937] coupled
with entreaties that they would wait yet a few days. During that
short interval, he meditated and executed a bold stroke of relief.
The Syracusans and Agrigentines were mainly supplied by sea from
Syracuse; from whence a large transport of provision-ships was now
expected, under convoy of some Syracusan triremes. Apprised of
their approach, Imilkon silently brought out forty Carthaginian
triremes from Motyê and Panormus, with which he suddenly attacked the
Syracusan convoy, no way expecting such a surprise. Eight Syracusan
triremes were destroyed; the remainder were driven ashore, and the
whole fleet of transports fell into the hands of Imilkon. Abundance
and satisfaction now reigned in the camp of the Carthaginians,
while the distress, and with it the discontent, was transferred to
Agrigentum. The Campanian mercenaries in the service of Dexippus
began the mutiny, complaining to him of their condition. Perhaps he
had been alarmed and disgusted at the violent manifestation of the
Agrigentines against their generals, extending partly to himself
also. At any rate, he manifested no zeal in the defence, and was even
suspected of having received a bribe of fifteen talents from the
Carthaginians. He told the Campanians that Agrigentum was no longer
tenable, for want of supplies; upon which they immediately retired,
and marched away to Messênê, affirming that the time stipulated
for their stay had expired. Such a secession struck every one with
discouragement. The Agrigentine generals immediately instituted an
examination, to ascertain the quantity of provision still remaining
in the city. Having made the painful discovery that there remained
but very little, they took the resolution of causing the city to be
evacuated by its population during the coming night.[938]
[937] Mention is again made, sixty-five years afterwards, in the
description of the war of Timoleon against the Carthaginians,—of
the abundance of gold and silver drinking cups, and rich personal
ornaments, carried by the native Carthaginians on military
service (Diodor. xvi, 81; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 28, 29).
There was a select body of Carthaginians,—a Sacred
Band,—mentioned in these later times, consisting of two thousand
five hundred men of distinguished bravery as well as of
conspicuous position in the city (Diodor. xvi, 80; xx, 10).
[938] Diodor. xiii, 88.
A night followed, even more replete with woe and desolation than
that which had witnessed the flight of Diokles with the inhabitants
of Himera from their native city. Few scenes can be imagined more
deplorable than the vast population of Agrigentum obliged to hurry
out of their gates during a December night, as their only chance of
escape from famine or the sword of a merciless enemy. The road to
Gela was beset by a distracted crowd, of both sexes and of every age
and condition, confounded in one indiscriminate lot of suffering.
No thought could be bestowed on the preservation of property
or cherished possessions. Happy were they who could save their
lives; for not a few, through personal weakness or the immobility
of despair, were left behind. Perhaps here and there a citizen,
combining the personal strength with the filial piety of Æneas, might
carry away his aged father with the household gods on his shoulders;
but for the most part, the old, the sick, and the impotent, all
whose years were either too tender or too decrepit to keep up with a
hurried flight, were of necessity abandoned. Some remained and slew
themselves, refusing even to survive the loss of their homes and
the destruction of their city; others, among whom was the wealthy
Gellias, consigned themselves to the protection of the temples, but
with little hope that it would procure them safety. The morning’s
dawn exhibited to Imilkon unguarded walls, a deserted city, and a
miserable population of exiles huddled together in disorderly flight
on the road to Gela.
For these fugitives, however, the Syracusan and Agrigentine soldiers
formed a rear-guard sufficient to keep off the aggravated torture of
a pursuit. But the Carthaginian army found enough to occupy them in
the undefended prey which was before their eyes. They rushed upon
the town with the fury of men who had been struggling and suffering
before it for eight months. They ransacked the houses, slew every
living person that was left, and found plunder enough to satiate
even a ravenous appetite. Temples as well as private dwellings were
alike stripped, so that those who had taken sanctuary in them became
victims like the rest: a fate which Gellius only avoided by setting
fire to the temple in which he stood and perishing in its ruins.
The great public ornaments and trophies of the city,—the bull of
Phalaris, together with the most precious statues and pictures,—were
preserved by Imilkon and sent home as decorations to Carthage.[939]
While he gave up the houses of Agrigentum to be thus gutted, he still
kept them standing, and caused them to serve as winter-quarters for
the repose of his soldiers, after the hardships of an eight months’
siege. The unhappy Agrigentine fugitives first found shelter and kind
hospitality at Gela; from whence they were afterwards, by permission
of the Syracusans, transferred to Leontini.
[939] Diodor. xiii, 89, 90.
I have described, as far as the narrative of Diodorus permits us to
know, this momentous and tragical portion of Sicilian history; a
suitable preface to the long despotism of Dionysius. It is evident
that the seven or eight months (the former of these numbers is
authenticated by Xenophon, while the latter is given by Diodorus)
of the siege or blockade must have contained matters of the
greatest importance which are not mentioned, and that even of the
main circumstances which brought about the capture, we are most
imperfectly informed. But though we cannot fully comprehend its
causes, its effects are easy to understand. They were terror-striking
and harrowing in the extreme. When the storm which had beaten down
Selinus and Himera was now perceived to have extended its desolation
to a city so much more conspicuous, among the wealthiest and most
populous in the Grecian world,—when the surviving Agrigentine
population, including women and children, and the great proprietors
of chariots whose names stood recorded as victors at Olympia, were
seen all confounded in one common fate of homeless flight and
nakedness—when the victorious host and its commanders took up their
quarters in the deserted houses, ready to spread their conquests
farther after a winter of repose,—there was hardly a Greek in Sicily
who did not tremble for his life and property.[940] Several of them
sought shelter at Syracuse, while others even quitted the island
altogether, emigrating to Italy.
[940] Diodor. xiii, 91.
Amidst so much anguish, humiliation, and terror, there were loud
complaints against the conduct of the Syracusan generals under whose
command the disaster had occurred. The censure which had been cast
upon them before, for not having vigorously pursued the defeated
Iberians, was now revived, and aggravated tenfold by the subsequent
misfortune. To their inefficiency the capture of Agrigentum was
ascribed, and apparently not without substantial cause; for the town
was so strongly placed as to defy assault, and could only be taken
by blockade; now we discern no impediments adequate to hinder the
Syracusan generals from procuring supplies of provisions; and it
seems clear that the surprise of the Syracusan store-ships might
have been prevented by proper precautions; upon which surprise the
whole question turned, between famine in the Carthaginian camp and
famine in Agrigentum.[941] The efficiency of Dexippus and the other
generals, in defending Agrigentum (as depicted by Diodorus), stands
sadly inferior to the vigor and ability displayed by Gylippus before
Syracuse, as described by Thucydides: and we can hardly wonder that
by men in the depth of misery, like the Agrigentines,—or in extreme
alarm, like the other Sicilian Greeks—these generals, incompetent or
treasonable, should be regarded as the cause of the ruin.
[941] Diodor. xiii, 88.
Xenophon confirms the statement of Diodorus, that Agrigentum was
taken by famine (Hellen. i, 5, 21; ii, 2, 24).
Such a state of sentiment, under ordinary circumstances, would have
led to the condemnation of the generals and to the nomination of
others, with little farther result. But it became of far graver
import, when combined with the actual situation of parties in
Syracuse. The Hermokratean opposition party,—repelled during the
preceding year with the loss of its leader, yet nowise crushed,—now
re-appeared more formidable than ever, under a new leader more
aggressive even than Hermokrates himself. Throughout ancient as
well as modern history, defeat and embarrassment in the foreign
relations have proved fruitful causes of change in the internal
government. Such auxiliaries had been wanting to the success of
Hermokrates in the preceding year; but alarms of every kind now
overhung the city in terrific magnitude, and when the first Syracusan
assembly was convoked on returning from Agrigentum, a mournful
silence reigned;[942] as in the memorable description given by
Demosthenes of the Athenian assembly held immediately after the
taking of Elateia.[943] The generals had lost the confidence of their
fellow-citizens; yet no one else was forward, at a juncture so full
of peril, to assume their duty, by proffering fit counsel for the
future conduct of the war. Now was the time for the Hermokratean
party to lay their train for putting down the government. Dionysius,
though both young and of mean family, was adopted as leader in
consequence of that audacity and bravery which even already he
had displayed, both in the fight along with Hermokrates and in the
battles against the Carthaginians. Hipparinus, a Syracusan of rich
family, who had ruined himself by dissolute expenses, was eager to
renovate his fortunes by seconding the elevation of Dionysius to the
despotism;[944] Philistus (the subsequent historian of Syracuse),
rich, young, and able, threw himself ardently into the same cause;
and doubtless other leading persons, ancient Hermokrateans and
others, stood forward as partisans in the conspiracy. But it either
was, from the beginning, or speedily became, a movement organized
for the purpose of putting the sceptre into the hands of Dionysius,
to whom all the rest, though several among them were of far greater
wealth and importance, served but as satellites and auxiliaries.
[942] Diodor. xiii, 91.
[943] Demosthenes de Coronâ, p. 286, s. 220.
This comparison is made by M. Brunet de Presle, in his valuable
historical work (Recherches sur les Establissemens des Grecs en
Sicile, Part ii, s. 39, p. 219).
[944] Aristotel. Politic. v, 5, 6. Γίνονται δὲ μεταβολαὶ τῆς
ὀλιγαρχίας, καὶ ὅταν ἀναλώσωσι τὰ ἴδια, ζῶντες ἀσελγῶς· καὶ γὰρ
οἱ τοιοῦτοι καινοτομεῖν ζητοῦσι, καὶ ἢ τυραννίδι ἐπιτίθενται
αὐτοὶ, ἢ κατασκευάζουσιν ἕτερον· ὥσπερ Ἱππαρῖνος Διονύσιον ἐν
Συρακούσαις.
Hipparinus was the father of Dion, respecting whom more hereafter.
Plato, in his warm sympathy for Dion, assigns to Hipparinus more
of an equality of rank and importance with the elder Dionysius,
than the subsequent facts justify (Plato, Epistol. viii. p. 353
A.; p. 355 F.).
Amidst the silence and disquietude which reigned in the Syracusan
assembly, Dionysius was the first who rose to address them. He
enlarged upon a topic suitable alike to the temper of his auditors
and to his own views. He vehemently denounced the generals as having
betrayed the security of Syracuse to the Carthaginians,—and as the
persons to whom the ruin of Agrigentum, together with the impending
peril of every man around, was owing. He set forth their misdeeds,
real or alleged, not merely with fulness and acrimony, but with a
ferocious violence outstripping all the limits of admissible debate,
and intended to bring upon them a lawless murder, like the death of
the generals recently at Agrigentum. “There they sit, the traitors!
Do not wait for legal trial or verdict; but lay hands upon them at
once, and inflict upon them summary justice.”[945] Such a brutal
exhortation, not unlike that of the Athenian Kritias, when he
caused the execution of Theramenes in the oligarchical senate, was
an offence against law as well as against parliamentary order. The
presiding magistrates reproved Dionysius as a disturber of order,
and fined him, as they were empowered by law.[946] But his partisans
were loud in his support. Philistus not only paid down the fine for
him on the spot, but publicly proclaimed that he would go on for
the whole day paying all similar fines which might be imposed,—and
incited Dionysius to persist in such language as he thought proper.
That which had begun as illegality, was now aggravated into open
defiance of the law. Yet so enfeebled was the authority of the
magistrates, and so vehement the cry against them, in the actual
position of the city, that they were unable either to punish or
to repress the speaker. Dionysius pursued his harangue in a tone
yet more inflammatory, not only accusing the generals of having
corruptly betrayed Agrigentum, but also denouncing the conspicuous
and wealthy citizens generally, as oligarchs who held tyrannical
sway,—who treated the many with scorn, and made their own profit out
of the misfortunes of the city. Syracuse (he contended) could never
be saved, unless men of a totally different character were invested
with authority; men, not chosen from wealth and station, but of
humble birth, belonging to the people by position, and kind in their
deportment from consciousness of their own weakness.[947] His bitter
invective against generals already discredited, together with the
impetuous warmth of his apparent sympathy for the people against
the rich, were both alike favorably received. Plato states that the
assembly became so furiously exasperated, as to follow literally
the lawless and blood-thirsty inspirations of Dionysius, and to
stone all these generals, ten in number, on the spot, without any
form of trial. But Diodorus simply tells us, that a vote was passed
to cashier the generals, and to name in their places Dionysius,
Hipparinus, and others.[948] This latter statement is, in my opinion,
the more probable.
[945] Diodor. xiii, 91. Ἀπορουμένων δὲ πάντων παρελθών Διονύσιος
ὁ Ἑρμοκράτους, τῶν μὲν στρατηγῶν κατηγόρησεν, ὡς προδιδόντων τὰ
πράγματα τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις· τὰ δὲ πλήθη παρώξυνε πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν
τιμωρίαν, παρακαλῶν μὴ περιμεῖναι τὸν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους κλῆρον,
ἀλλ’ ἐκ χειρὸς εὐθέως ἐπιθεῖναι τὴν δίκην.
[946] Diodor. xiii, 91. Τῶν δ’ ἀρχόντων ζημιούντων τὸν Διονύσιον
κατὰ τοὺς νόμους, ὡς θορυβοῦντα, Φίλιστος, ὁ τὰς ἱστορίας ὕστερον
συγγράψας, οὐσίαν ἔχων μεγάλην, etc.
In the description given by Thucydides (vi, 32-39) of the debate
in the Syracusan assembly (prior to the arrival of the Athenian
expedition) in which Hermokrates and Athenagoras speak, we find
the magistrates interfering to prevent the continuance of a
debate which had become very personal and acrimonious; though
there was nothing in it at all brutal, nor any exhortation to
personal violence or infringement of the law.
[947] Diodor. xiii, 91.
[948] Plato, Epistol. viii, p. 354. Οἱ γὰρ πρὸ Διονυσίου καὶ
Ἱππαρίνου ἀρξάντων Σικελιῶται τότε ὡς ᾤοντο εὐδαιμόνως ἔζων,
τρυφῶντές τε καὶ ἅμα ἀρχόντων ἄρχοντες· οἱ καὶ τοῦς δέκα
στρατηγοὺς κατέλευσαν βάλλοντες τοὺς πρὸ Διονυσίου, κατὰ νόμον
οὐδένα κρίναντες, ἵνα δὴ δουλεύοιεν μηδένι μήτε σὺν δίκῃ μήτε
νόμῳ δεσπότῃ, ἐλεύθεροι δ’ εἶεν πάντῃ πάντως· ὅθεν αἱ τυραννίδες
ἐγένοντο αὐτοῖς.
Diodor. xiii, 92. παραυτίκα τοὺς μὲν ἔλυσε τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἑτέρους δὲ
εἵλετο στρατηγοὺς, ἐν οἷς καὶ τὸν Διονύσιον. Some little time
afterwards, Diodorus farther mentions that Dionysius accused
before the public assembly, and caused to be put to death,
Daphnæus and Demarchus (xiii, 96); now Daphnæus was one of the
generals (xiii, 86-88).
If we assume the fact to have occurred as Plato affirms it,
we cannot easily explain how something so impressive and
terror-striking came to be transformed into the more commonplace
statement of Diodorus, by Ephorus, Theopompus, Hermeias, Timæus,
or Philistus, from one of whom probably his narrative is borrowed.
But if we assume Diodorus to be correct, we can easily account
for the erroneous belief in the mind of Plato. A very short
time before this scene at Syracuse, an analogous circumstance
had really occurred at Agrigentum. The assembled Agrigentines,
being inflamed against their generals for what they believed
to be slackness or treachery in the recent fight with the
Carthaginians, had stoned four of them on the spot, and only
spared the fifth on the score of his youth (Diodor. xiii, 87).
I cannot but think that Plato confounded in his memory the scene
and proceedings at Syracuse with the other events, so recently
antecedent, at Agrigentum. His letter (from which the above
citation is made) was written in his old age,—fifty years after
the event.
This is one inaccuracy as to matter-of-fact, which might be
produced in support of the views of those who reject the
letters of Plato as spurious, though Ast does not notice it,
while going through the letters _seriatim_, and condemning
them not only as un-Platonic but as despicable compositions.
After attentively studying both the letters themselves, and his
reasoning, I dissent entirely from Ast’s conclusion. The first
letter, that which purports to come not from Plato, but from
Dion, is the only one against which he seems to me to have made
out a good case (see Ast, Ueber Platon’s Leben und Schriften,
p. 504-530). Against the others, I cannot think that he has
shown any sufficient ground for pronouncing them to be spurious
and I therefore continue to treat them as genuine, following
the opinion of Cicero and Plutarch. It is admitted by Ast that
their authenticity was not suspected in antiquity, as far as our
knowledge extends. Without considering the presumption hence
arising as conclusive, I think it requires to be countervailed by
stronger substantive grounds than those which Ast has urged.
Among the total number of thirteen letters, those relating
to Dion and Dionysius (always setting aside the first
letter)—that is the second, third, fourth, seventh, eighth, and
thirteenth,—are the most full of allusions to fact and details.
Some of them go very much into detail. Now had they been the
work of a forger, it is fair to contend that he could hardly
avoid laying himself more open to contradiction than he has done,
on the score of inaccuracy and inconsistency with the supposed
situation. I have already mentioned one inaccuracy which I take
to be a _fault_ of memory, both conceivable and pardonable. Ast
mentions another, to disprove the authenticity of the eighth
letter, respecting the son of Dion. Plato, in this eighth
letter, speaking in the name of the deceased Dion, recommends
the Syracusans to name Dion’s son as one of the members of a
tripartite kingship, along with Hipparinus (son of the elder
Dionysius) and the younger Dionysius. This (contends Ast, p. 523)
cannot be correct, because Dion’s son died before his father. To
make the argument of Ast complete, we ought to be sure that Dion
had only _one_ son; for which there is doubtless the evidence
of Plutarch, who after having stated that the son of Dion, a
youth nearly grown up, threw himself from the roof of the house
and was killed, goes on to say that Kallippus, the political
enemy of Dion, founded upon this misfortune a false rumor which
he circulated,—ὡς ὁ Δίων ~ἄπαις γεγονὼς~ ἔγνωκε τὸν Διονυσίου
καλεῖν Ἀπολλοκράτην καὶ ποιεῖσθαι διάδοχον (Plutarch, Dion. c.
55, 56: compare also c. 21,—τοῦ παιδίου). But since the rumor was
altogether false, we may surely imagine that Kallippus, taking
advantage of a notorious accident which had just proved fatal to
the eldest son of Dion, may have fabricated a false statement
about the family of Dion, though there might be a younger boy at
home. It is not certain that the number of Dion’s children was
familiarly known among the population of Syracuse; nor was Dion
himself in the situation of an assured king, able to transfer
his succession at once to a boy not yet adult. And when we find
in another chapter of Plutarch’s Life of Dion (c. 31), that the
son of Dion was called by Timæus, _Aretæus_,—and by Timonides,
_Hipparinus_,—this surely affords some presumption that there
were _two_ sons, and not one son called by two different names.
I cannot therefore admit that Ast has proved the eighth Platonic
letter to be inaccurate in respect to matter of fact. I will add
that the letter does not mention the _name_ of Dion’s son (though
Ast says that it calls him _Hipparinus_); and that it does
specify the _three_ partners in the tripartite kingship suggested
(though Ast says that it only mentioned _two_).
Most of Ast’s arguments against the authenticity of the letters,
however, are founded, not upon alleged inaccuracies of fact,
but upon what he maintains to be impropriety and meanness of
thought, childish intrusion of philosophy, unseasonable mysticism
and pedantry, etc. In some of his criticisms I coincide, though
by no means in all. But I cannot accept them as evidence to
prove the point for which he contends,—the spuriousness of the
letters. The proper conclusion from his premises appears to me
to be, that Plato wrote letters which, when tried by our canons
about letter-writing, seem awkward, pedantic, and in bad taste.
Dionysius of Halikarnassus (De adm. vi dicend. in Demosth.
p. 1025-1044), while emphatically extolling the admirable
composition of Plato’s dialogues, does not scruple to pass an
unfavorable criticism upon him as a speech-writer; referring to
the speeches in the Symposion as well as to the funeral harangue
in the Menexenus. Still less need we be afraid to admit, that
Plato was not a graceful letter-writer.
That Plato would feel intensely interested, and even personally
involved, in the quarrel between Dionysius II. and Dion, cannot
be doubted. That he would write letters to Dionysius on the
subject,—that he would anxiously seek to maintain influence over
him, on all grounds,—that he would manifest a lofty opinion
of himself and his own philosophy,—is perfectly natural and
credible. And when we consider both the character and the station
of Dionysius, it is difficult to lay down beforehand any assured
canon as to the epistolary tone which Plato would think most
suitable to address him.
Such was the first stage of what we may term the despot’s progress,
successfully consummated. The pseudo-demagogue Dionysius outdoes,
in fierce professions of antipathy against the rich, anything that
we read as coming from the real demagogues, Athenagoras at Syracuse,
or Kleon at Athens. Behold him now sitting as a member of the new
Board of generals, at a moment when the most assiduous care and
energy, combined with the greatest unanimity, were required to put
the Syracusan military force into an adequate state of efficiency. It
suited the policy of Dionysius not only to bestow no care or energy
himself, but to nullify all that was bestowed by his colleagues, and
to frustrate deliberately all chance of unanimity. He immediately
began a systematic opposition and warfare against his colleagues. He
refused to attend at their Board, or to hold any communication with
them. At the frequent assemblies held during this agitated state of
the public mind, he openly denounced them as engaged in treasonable
correspondence with the enemy. It is obvious that his colleagues, men
newly chosen in the same spirit with himself, could not as yet have
committed any such treason in favor of the Carthaginians. But among
them was his accomplice Hipparinus;[949] while probably the rest
also, nominated by a party devoted to him personally, were selected
in a spirit of collusion, as either thorough-going partisans, or
worthless and incompetent men, easy for him to set aside. At any
rate, his calumnies, though received with great repugnance by the
leading and more intelligent citizens, found favor with the bulk of
the assembly, predisposed at that moment from the terrors of the
situation to suspect every one. The new Board of generals being thus
discredited, Dionysius alone was listened to as an adviser. His
first and most strenuous recommendation was, that a vote should be
passed for restoring the exiles; men (he affirmed) attached to their
country, and burning to serve her, having already refused the offers
of her enemies; men who had been thrown into banishment by previous
political dispute, but who, if now generously recalled, would
manifest their gratitude by devoted patriotism, and serve Syracuse
far more warmly than the allies invoked from Italy and Peloponnesus.
His discredited colleagues either could not, or would not, oppose the
proposition; which, being warmly pressed by Dionysius and all his
party, was at length adopted by the assembly. The exiles accordingly
returned, comprising all the most violent men who had been in arms
with Hermokrates when he was slain. They returned glowing with
party-antipathy and revenge, prepared to retaliate upon others the
confiscation under which themselves had suffered, and looking to the
despotism of Dionysius as their only means of success.[950]
[949] Plutarch, Dion. c. 3.
[950] Diodor. xiii, 93.
The second step of the despot’s progress was now accomplished.
Dionysius had filled up the ranks of the Hermokratean party, and
obtained an energetic band of satellites, whose hopes and interests
were thoroughly identified with his own. Meanwhile letters arrived
from Gela, entreating reinforcements, as Imilkon was understood to be
about to march thither. Dionysius being empowered to march thither
a body of two thousand hoplites, with four hundred horsemen, turned
the occasion to profitable account. A regiment of mercenaries,
under the Lacedæmonian Dexippus, was in garrison at Gela; while the
government of the town is said to have been oligarchical, in the
hands of the rich, though with a strong and discontented popular
opposition. On reaching Gela, Dionysius immediately took part with
the latter; originating the most violent propositions against the
governing rich, as he had done at Syracuse. Accusing them of treason
in the public assembly, he obtained a condemnatory vote under
which they were put to death and their properties confiscated. With
the funds so acquired, he paid the arrears due to the soldiers of
Dexippus, and doubled the pay of his own Syracusan division. These
measures procured for him immense popularity, not merely with all the
soldiers, but also with the Geloan Demos, whom he had relieved from
the dominion of their wealthy oligarchy. Accordingly, after passing a
public vote testifying their gratitude, and bestowing upon him large
rewards, they despatched envoys to carry the formal expression of
their sentiments to Syracuse. Dionysius resolved to go back thither
at the same time, with his Syracusan soldiers; and tried to prevail
on Dexippus to accompany him with his own division. This being
refused, he went thither with his Syracusans alone. To the Geloans,
who earnestly entreated that they might not be forsaken when the
enemy was daily expected, he contented himself with replying that he
would presently return with a larger force.[951]
[951] Diodor. xiii, 93.
A third step was thus obtained. Dionysius was going back to Syracuse
with a testimonial of admiration and gratitude from Gela,—with
increased attachment on the part of his own soldiers, on account of
the double pay,—and with the means of coining and circulating a new
delusion. It was on the day of a solemn festival that he reached
the town, just as the citizens were coming in crowds out of the
theatre. Amidst the bustle of such a scene as well as of the return
of the soldiers, many citizens flocked around him to inquire, What
news about the Carthaginians? “Do not ask about your foreign enemies
(was the reply of Dionysius); you have much worse enemies within
among you. Your magistrates,—these very men upon whose watch you
rely during the indulgence of the festival,—they are the traitors
who are pillaging the public money, leaving the soldiers unpaid, and
neglecting all necessary preparation, at a moment when the enemy
with an immense host is on the point of assailing you. I knew their
treachery long ago, but I have now positive proof of it. For Imilkon
sent to me an envoy, under pretence of treating about the prisoners,
but in reality to purchase my silence and connivance; he tendered to
me a larger bribe than he had given to them, if I would consent to
refrain from hindering them, since I could not be induced to take
part in their intrigues. This is too much. I am come home now to
throw up my command. While my colleagues are corruptly bartering away
their country, I am willing to take my share as a citizen in the
common risk, but I cannot endure to incur shame as an accomplice in
their treachery.”
Such bold allegations, scattered by Dionysius among the crowd
pressing round him,—renewed at length, with emphatic formality in
the regular assembly held the next day,—and concluding with actual
resignation,—struck deep terror into the Syracusan mind. He spoke
with authority, not merely as one fresh from the frontier exposed,
but also as bearing the grateful testimonial of the Geloans, echoed
by the soldiers whose pay he had recently doubled. His assertion of
the special message from Imilkon, probably an impudent falsehood,
was confidently accepted and backed by all these men, as well as
by his other partisans, the Hermokratean party, and most of all by
the restored exiles. What defence the accused generals made, or
tried to make, we are not told. It was not likely to prevail, nor
did it prevail, against the positive deposition of a witness so
powerfully seconded. The people, persuaded of their treason, were
incensed against them, and trembled at the thought of being left, by
the resignation of Dionysius, to the protection of such treacherous
guardians against the impending invasion. Now was the time for his
partisans to come forward with their main proposition: “Why not get
rid of these traitors, and keep Dionysius alone? Leave them to be
tried and punished at a more convenient season; but elect him at
once general with full powers, to make head against the pressing
emergency from without. Do not wait until the enemy is actually
assaulting our walls. Dionysius is the man for our purpose, the only
one with whom we have a chance of safety. Recollect that our glorious
victory over the three hundred thousand Carthaginians at Himera was
achieved by Gelon acting as general with full powers.” Such rhetoric
was irresistible in the present temper of the assembly,—when the
partisans of Dionysius were full of audacity and acclamation,—when
his opponents were discomfited, suspicious of each other, and without
any positive scheme to propose,—and when the storm, which had already
overwhelmed Selinus, Himera, and Agrigentum, was about to burst on
Gela and Syracuse. A vote of the assembly was passed, appointing
Dionysius general of the city, alone, and with full powers;[952] by
what majority we do not know.
[952] Diodor. xiii, 94.
The first use which the new general-plenipotentiary made of his
dignity was to propose, in the same assembly, that the pay of the
soldiers should be doubled. Such liberality (he said) would be the
best means of stimulating their zeal; while in regard to expense,
there need be no hesitation; the money might easily be provided.
Thus was consummated the fourth, and most important, act of the
despot’s progress. A vote of the assembly had been obtained, passed
in constitutional forms, vesting in Dionysius a single-handed power
unknown to and above the laws,—unlimited and unresponsible. But he
was well aware that the majority of those who thus voted had no
intention of permanently abnegating their freedom,—that they meant
only to create a temporary dictatorship, under the pressing danger
of the moment, for the express purpose of preserving that freedom
against a foreign enemy,—and that even thus much had been obtained
by impudent delusion and calumny, which subsequent reflection would
speedily dissipate. No sooner had the vote passed, than symptoms of
regret and alarm became manifest among the people. What one assembly
had conferred, a second repentant assembly might revoke.[953] It
therefore now remained for Dionysius to ensure the perpetuity of his
power by some organized means; so as to prevent the repentance, of
which he already discerned the commencement, from realizing itself
in any actual revocation. For this purpose he required a military
force extra-popular and anti-popular; bound to himself and not to
the city. He had indeed acquired popularity with the Syracusan as
well as with the mercenary soldiers, by doubling and ensuring their
pay. He had energetic adherents, prepared to go all lengths on his
behalf, especially among the restored exiles. This was an important
basis, but not sufficient for his objects without the presence of a
special body of guards, constantly and immediately available, chosen
as well as controlled by himself, yet acting in such vocation under
the express mandate and sanction of the people. He required a farther
vote of the people, legalizing for his use such a body of guards.
[953] Diodor. xiii, 95. Διαλυθείσης δὲ τῆς ἐκκλησίας, οὐκ ὀλίγοι
τῶν Συρακουσίων κατηγόρουν τῶν πραχθέντων, ὥσπερ οὐκ αὐτοὶ
ταῦτα κεκυρωκότες· τοῖς γὰρ λογισμοῖς εἰς ἑαυτοὺς ἐρχόμενοι,
τὴν ἐσομένην δυναστείαν ἀνεθεώρουν. Οὗτοι μὲν οὖν βεβαιῶσαι
βουλόμενοι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, ἔλαθον ἑαυτοὺς δεσπότην τῆς πατρίδος
καθεστακότες. Ὁ δὲ Διονύσιος, ~τὴν μετάνοιαν τῶν ὄχλων φθάσαι
βουλόμενος~, ἐπεζήτει δι’ οὗ τρόπου δύναιτο φύλακας αἰτήσασθαι
τοῦ σώματος· τούτου γὰρ συγχωρηθέντος, ῥᾳδίως ἤμελλε κυριεύσειν
τῆς τυραννίδος.
But with all his powers of delusion, and all the zeal of his
partisans, he despaired of getting any such vote from an assembly
held at Syracuse. Accordingly, he resorted to a manœuvre, proclaiming
that he had resolved on a march to Leontini, and summoning the full
military force of Syracuse (up to the age of forty) to march along
with him, with orders for each man to bring with him thirty days’
provision. Leontini had been, a few years before, an independent
city; but was now an outlying fortified post, belonging to the
Syracusans; wherein various foreign settlers, and exiles from the
captured Sicilian cities, had obtained permission to reside. Such
men, thrown out of their position and expectations as citizens, were
likely to lend either their votes or their swords willingly to the
purposes of Dionysius. While he thus found many new adherents there,
besides those whom he brought with him, he foresaw that the general
body of the Syracusans, and especially those most disaffected to him,
would not be disposed to obey his summons or accompany him.[954]
For nothing could be more preposterous, in a public point of view,
than an out-march of the whole Syracusan force for thirty days to
Leontini, where there was neither danger to be averted nor profit to
be reaped; at a moment too when the danger on the side of Gela was
most serious, from the formidable Carthaginian host at Agrigentum.
[954] Diodor. xiii, 95. Αὐτὴ δ’ ἡ πόλις (Leontini) τότε φρούριον
ἦν τοῖς Συρακουσίοις, πλῆρες ὕπαρχον φυγάδων καὶ ξένων ἀνθρώπων.
Ἤλπιζε γὰρ τούτους συναγωνιστὰς ἕξειν, ἀνθρώπους δεομένους
μεταβολῆς· τῶν δὲ Συρακουσίων τοὺς πλείστους οὐδ’ ἥξειν εἰς
Λεοντίνους.
Many of the expelled Agrigentines settled at Leontini, by
permission of the Syracusans (Diodor. xiii, 89).
Dionysius accordingly set out with a force which purported,
ostensibly and according to summons, to be the full military
manifestation of Syracuse; but which, in reality, comprised mainly
his own adherents. On encamping for the night near to Leontini, he
caused a factitious clamor and disturbance to be raised during the
darkness, around his own tent,—ordered fires to be kindled,—summoned
on a sudden his most intimate friends,—and affected to retire under
their escort to the citadel. On the morrow an assembly was convened,
of the Syracusans and residents present, purporting to be a Syracusan
assembly; Syracuse in military guise, or as it were in Comitia
Centuriata,—to employ an ancient phrase belonging to the Roman
republic. Before this assembly Dionysius appeared, and threw himself
upon their protection; affirming that his life had been assailed
during the preceding night,—calling upon them emphatically to stand
by him against the incessant snares of his enemies,—and demanding
for that purpose a permanent body of guards. His appeal, plausibly
and pathetically turned, and doubtless warmly seconded by zealous
partisans, met with complete success. The assembly,—Syracusan or
quasi-Syracusan, though held at Leontini,—passed a formal decree,
granting to Dionysius a body-guard of six hundred men, selected
by himself and responsible to him alone.[955] One speaker indeed
proposed to limit the guards to such a number as should be sufficient
to protect him against any small number of personal enemies, but not
to render him independent of, or formidable to, the many.[956] But
such precautionary refinement was not likely to be much considered,
when the assembly was dishonest or misguided enough to pass the
destructive vote here solicited; and even if embodied in the words
of the resolution, there were no means of securing its observance
in practice. The regiment of guards being once formally sanctioned,
Dionysius heeded little the limit of number prescribed to him. He
immediately enrolled more than one thousand men, selected as well
for their bravery as from their poverty and desperate position. He
provided them with the choicest arms, and promised to them the most
munificent pay. To this basis of a certain, permanent, legalized,
regiment of household troops, he added farther a sort of standing
army, composed of mercenaries hardly less at his devotion than the
guards properly so called. In addition to the mercenaries already
around him, he invited others from all quarters, by tempting offers;
choosing by preference outlaws and profligates, and liberating
slaves for the purpose.[957] Next, summoning from Gela Dexippus the
Lacedæmonian, with the troops under his command, he sent this officer
away to Peloponnesus,—as a man not trustworthy for his purpose and
likely to stand forward on behalf of the freedom of Syracuse. He then
consolidated all the mercenaries under one organization, officering
them anew with men devoted to himself.
[955] Diodor. xiii, 95.
[956] Aristotel. Politic. iii, 10, 10. Καὶ Διονυσίῳ τις, ὅτ’ ᾔτει
τοὺς φύλακας, συνεβούλευε τοῖς Συρακουσίοις διδόναι τοσούτους
τοὺς φύλακας—i. e. τοσαύτην τὴν ἴσχυν, ὥσθ’ ἑκάστου μὲν καὶ ἑνὸς
καὶ συμπλειόνων κρείττω, τοῦ δὲ πλήθους ἥττω, εἶναι.
[957] Diodor. xiv, 7. τοὺς ἠλευθερωμένους δούλους, etc.
This fresh military levy and organization was chiefly accomplished
during his stay at Leontini, without the opposition which would
probably have arisen if it had been done at Syracuse; to which latter
place Dionysius marched back, in an attitude far more imposing than
when he left it. He now entered the gates at the head not only of his
chosen body-guard, but also of a regular army of mercenaries, hired
by and dependent upon himself. He marched them at once into the islet
of Ortygia (the interior and strongest part of the city, commanding
the harbor), established his camp in that acropolis of Syracuse, and
stood forth as despot conspicuously in the eyes of all. Though the
general sentiment among the people was one of strong repugnance, yet
his powerful military force and strong position rendered all hope
of open resistance desperate. And the popular assembly,—convoked
under the pressure of this force, and probably composed of none but
his partisans,—was found so subservient, as to condemn and execute,
upon his requisition, Daphnæus and Demarchus. These two men, both
wealthy and powerful in Syracuse, had been his chief opponents,
and were seemingly among the very generals whom he had incited the
people to massacre on the spot without any form of trial, in one
of the previous public assemblies.[958] One step alone remained to
decorate the ignoble origin of Dionysius, and to mark the triumph of
the Hermokratean party by whom its elevation had been mainly brought
about. He immediately married the daughter of Hermokrates; giving his
own sister in marriage to Polyxenus, the brother of that deceased
chief.[959]
[958] Diodor. xiii, 96.
[959] Diodor. 1, c.; Plutarch, Dion. c. 3.
Thus was consummated the fifth or closing act of the despot’s
progress, rendering Dionysius master of the lives and fortunes of
his fellow-countrymen. The successive stages of his rise I have
detailed from Diodorus, who (excepting a hint or two from Aristotle)
is our only informant. His authority is on this occasion better than
usual, since he had before him not merely Ephorus and Timæus, but
also Philistus. He is, moreover, throughout this whole narrative at
least clear and consistent with himself. We understand enough of the
political strategy pursued by Dionysius, to pronounce that it was
adapted to his end with a degree of skill that would have greatly
struck a critical eye like Machiavel; whose analytical appreciation
of means, when he is canvassing men like Dionysius, has been often
unfairly construed as if it implied sympathy with and approbation
of their end. We see that Dionysius, in putting himself forward as
the chief and representative of the Hermokratean party, acquired
the means of employing a greater measure of fraud and delusion than
an exile like Hermokrates, in prosecution of the same ambitious
purposes. Favored by the dangers of the state and the agony of the
public mind, he was enabled to simulate an ultra-democratical ardor
both in defence of the people against the rich, and in denunciation
of the unsuccessful or incompetent generals, as if they were corrupt
traitors. Though it would seem that the government of Syracuse, in
406 B.C., must have been strongly democratical, yet Dionysius in his
ardor for popular rights, treats it as an anti-popular oligarchy;
and tries to acquire the favor of the people by placing himself in
the most open quarrel and antipathy to the rich. Nine years before,
in the debate between Hermokrates and Athenagoras in the Syracusan
assembly, the former stood forth, or at least was considered to
stand forth, as champion of the rich; while the latter spoke as a
conservative democrat, complaining of conspiracies on the part of
the rich. In 406 B.C., the leader of the Hermokratean party has
reversed this policy, assuming a pretended democratical fervor much
more violent than that of Athenagoras. Dionysius, who took up the
trade of what is called a demagogue on this one occasion, simply
for the purpose of procuring one single vote in his own favor, and
then shutting the door by force against all future voting and all
correction,—might resort to grosser falsehood than Athenagoras; who,
as an habitual speaker, was always before the people, and even if
successful by fraud at one meeting, was nevertheless open to exposure
at a second.
In order that the voting of any public assembly shall be really
available as a protection to the people, its votes must not only be
preceded by full and free discussion, but must also be open from
time to time to rediscussion and correction. That error will from
time to time be committed, as well by the collective people as by
particular fractions of the people, is certain; opportunity for
amendment is essential. A vote which is understood to be final, and
never afterwards to be corrigible, is one which can hardly turn to
the benefit of the people themselves, though it may often, as in the
case of Dionysius, promote the sinister purposes of some designing
protector.