[1022] Diodor. xiv, 42.

In all these offensive preparations against Carthage, as in the

previous defences on Epipolæ, the spontaneous impulse of the

Syracusans generally went hand in hand with Dionysius.[1023] Their

sympathy and concurrence greatly promoted the success of his efforts,

for this immense equipment against the common enemy. Even with all

this sympathy, indeed, we are at a loss to understand, nor are we at

all informed, how he found money to meet so prodigious an outlay.

[1023] Diodor. xiv, 41. Συμπροθυμουμένων δὲ τῶν Συρακουσίων

τῇ τοῦ Διονυσίου προαιρέσει, πολλὴν συνέβαινε γενέσθαι τὴν

φιλοτιμίαν περὶ τὴν τῶν ὅπλων κατασκευήν.

After the material means for war had thus been completed,—an

operation which can hardly have occupied less than two or three

years,—it remained to levy men. On this point, the ideas of Dionysius

were not less aspiring. Besides his own numerous standing force,

he enlisted all the most effective among the Syracusan citizens,

as well as from the cities in his dependency. He sent friendly

addresses, and tried to acquire popularity, among the general body

of Greeks throughout the island. Of his large fleet, one-half was

manned with Syracusan rowers, marines, and officers; the other half

with seamen enlisted from abroad. He farther sent envoys both to

Italy and to Peloponnesus to obtain auxiliaries, with offers of the

most liberal pay. From Sparta, now at the height of her power, and

courting his alliance as a means of perpetuity to her own empire,

he received such warm encouragement, that he was enabled to enlist

no inconsiderable numbers in Peloponnesus; while many barbaric or

non-Hellenic soldiers from the western regions near the Mediterranean

were hired also.[1024] He at length succeeded, to his satisfaction,

in collecting an aggregate army, formidable not less from numbers and

bravery, than from elaborate and diversified equipment. His large and

well-stocked armory (already noticed) enabled him to furnish each

newly-arrived soldier, from all the different nations, with native

and appropriate weapons.[1025]

[1024] Diodor. xiv, 43, 44, 45.

[1025] Diodor. xiv, 41.

When all his preparations were thus complete, his last step was

to celebrate his nuptials, a few days previous to the active

commencement of the war. He married, at one and the same time, two

wives,—the Lokrian Doris (already mentioned), and a Syracusan woman

named Aristomachê, daughter of his partisan Hipparinus (and sister

of Dion, respecting whom much will occur hereafter). The first use

made of one among his newly-invented quinquereme vessels, was to sail

to Lokri, decked out in the richest ornaments of gold and silver,

for the purpose of conveying Doris in state to Ortygia. Aristomachê

was also brought to his house in a splendid chariot with four white

horses.[1026] He celebrated his nuptials with both of them in his

house on the same day; no one knew which bedchamber he visited first;

and both of them continued constantly to live with him at the same

table, with equal dignity, for many years. He had three children by

Doris, the eldest of whom was Dionysius the Younger; and four by

Aristomachê; but the latter was for a considerable time childless;

which greatly chagrined Dionysius. Ascribing her barrenness to

magical incantations, he put to death the mother of his other wife

Doris, as the alleged worker of these mischievous influences.[1027]

It was the rumor at Syracuse that Aristomachê was the most beloved

of the two. But Dionysius treated both of them well, and both of

them equally; moreover his son by Doris succeeded him, though he had

two sons by the other. His nuptials were celebrated with banquets

and festive recreations, wherein all the Syracusan citizens as well

as the soldiers partook. The scene was probably the more grateful

to Dionysius, as he seems at this moment, when every man’s mind was

full of vindictive impulse and expected victory against Carthage, to

have enjoyed a real short-lived popularity, and to have been able

to move freely among the people; without that fear of assassination

which habitually tormented his life even in his inmost privacy and

bedchamber—and that extremity of suspicion which did not except

either his wives or his daughters.[1028]

[1026] Diodor. xiv, 44; xvi, 6.

[1027] Plutarch, Dion. c. 3.

[1028] Cicero, Tusc. Disp. v, 20, 57-63; Valer. Maxim. ix, 13;

Diodor. xiv, 2.

After a few days devoted to such fellowship and festivity, Dionysius

convoked a public assembly, for the purpose of formally announcing

the intended war. He reminded the Syracusans that the Carthaginians

were common enemies to Greeks in general, but most of all to the

Sicilian Greeks—as recent events but too plainly testified. He

appealed to their generous sympathies on behalf of the five Hellenic

cities, in the southern part of the island, which had lately

undergone the miseries of capture by the generals of Carthage, and

were still groaning under her yoke. Nothing prevented Carthage

(he added) from attempting to extend her dominion over the rest

of the island, except the pestilence under which she had herself

been suffering in Africa. To the Syracusans this ought to be an

imperative stimulus for attacking her at once, and rescuing their

Hellenic brethren, before she had time to recover.[1029]

[1029] Diodor. xiv, 45.

These motives were really popular and impressive. There was besides

another inducement, which weighed with Dionysius to hasten the war,

though he probably did not dwell upon it in his public address to the

Syracusans. He perceived that various Sicilian Greeks were migrating

voluntarily with their properties into the territory of Carthage;

whose dominion, though hateful and oppressive, was, at least while

untried, regarded by many with less terror than his dominion when

actually suffered. By commencing hostilities at once, he expected

not only to arrest such emigration, but to induce such Greeks as

were actually subjects of Carthage to throw off her yoke and join

him.[1030]

[1030] Diodor. xiv, 41.

Loud acclamations from the Syracusan assembly hailed the proposition

for war with Carthage; a proposition, which only converted into

reality what had been long the familiar expectation of every man.

And the war was rendered still more popular by the permission,

which Dionysius granted forthwith, to plunder all the Carthaginian

residents and mercantile property either in Syracuse or in any of

his dependent cities. We are told that there were not only several

domiciliated Carthaginians at Syracuse, but also many loaded vessels

belonging to Carthage in the harbor, so that the plunder was

lucrative.[1031] But though such may have been the case in ordinary

times, it seems hardly credible, that under the actual circumstances,

any Carthaginian (person or property) can have been at Syracuse

except by accident; for war with Carthage had been long announced,

not merely in current talk, but in the more unequivocal language

of overwhelming preparation. Nor is it easy to understand how the

prudent Carthaginian Senate (who probably were not less provided with

spies at Syracuse than Dionysius was at Carthage)[1032] can have

been so uninformed as to be taken by surprise at the last moment,

when Dionysius sent thither a herald formally declaring war; which

herald was not sent until after the license for private plunder had

been previously granted. He peremptorily required the Carthaginians

to relinquish their dominion over the Greek cities in Sicily,[1033]

as the only means of avoiding war. To such a proposition no answer

was returned, nor probably expected. But the Carthaginians were

now so much prostrated (like Athens in the second or third years

of the Peloponnesian war) by depopulation, suffering, terrors, and

despondency, arising out of the pestilence which beset them in

Africa, that they felt incompetent to any serious effort, and heard

with alarm the letter read from Dionysius. There was, however,

no alternative, so that they forthwith despatched some of their

ablest citizens to levy troops for the defence of their Sicilian

possessions.[1034]

[1031] Diodor. xiv, 46.

There were also Greeks, and seemingly Greeks of some

consideration, who resided at Carthage, and seemed to have

continued resident there throughout the war between the

Carthaginians and Dionysius (Diodor. xiv, 77). We should infer,

from their continuing to reside there, that the Carthaginians did

not retaliate upon them the plunder now authorized by Dionysius

against their countrymen resident at Syracuse; and farther, it

affords additional probability that the number of Carthaginians

actually plundered at Syracuse was not considerable.

For instances of intermarriage, and inter-residence, between

Carthage and Syracuse, see Herodot. vii, 166; Livy, xxiv, 6.

Phœnician coins have been found in Ortygia, bearing a Phœnician

inscription signifying _The Island_,—which was the usual

denomination of Ortygia (Movers, Die Phönizier, ii, 2, p. 327).

[1032] Diodor. xiv, 55. Τοῦτο δ’ ἐμηχανήσατο (Ἰμίλκων) πρὸς τὸ

μηδένα τῶν κατασκόπων ἀπαγγεῖλαι τὸν κατάπλουν τῷ Διονυσίῳ, etc.

[1033] Diodor. xiv, 46, 47.

[1034] Diodor. xiv, 47.

The first news that reached them was indeed appalling. Dionysius had

marched forth with his full power, Syracusan as well as foreign,

accumulated by so long a preparation. It was a power, the like of

which had never been beheld in Greece; greater even than that wielded

by his predecessor Gelon eighty years before. If the contemporaries

of Gelon had been struck with awe[1035] at the superiority of his

force to anything that Hellas could show elsewhere, as much or more

would the same sentiment be felt by those who surrounded Dionysius.

More intimately still was a similar comparison, with the mighty

victor of Himera, present to Dionysius himself. He exulted in setting

out with an army yet more imposing, against the same enemy, and for

the same purpose of liberating the maritime cities of Sicily subject

to Carthage;[1036] cities, whose number and importance had since

fearfully augmented.

[1035] Herodot. vii, 145. Τὰ δὲ Γέλωνος πρήγματα μεγάλα ἐλέγετο

εἶναι, οὐδαμῶν Ἑλληνικῶν τῶν οὐ πολλὸν μέζω. Compare c. 160-162.

[1036] Herodot. vii, 158. Gelon’s speech to the Lacedæmonians who

come to solicit his aid against Xerxes.

Αὐτοὶ δὲ, ἐμεῦ πρότερον δεηθέντος βαρβαρικοῦ στρατοῦ

συνεπάψασθαι, ὅτε μοι πρὸς Καρχηδονίους νεῖκος συνῆπτο ...

~ὑποτείνοντός τε τὰ ἐμπόρια συνελευθεροῦν~, etc.

These subject-cities, from Kamarina on one side of the island to

Selinus and Himera on the other, though there were a certain number

of Carthaginian residents established there, had no effective

standing force to occupy or defend them on the part of Carthage;

whose habit it was to levy large mercenary hosts for the special

occasion and then to disband them afterwards. Accordingly, as soon

as Dionysius with his powerful army passed the Syracusan border,

and entered upon his march westward along the southern coast of

the island, proclaiming himself as liberator—the most intense

anti-Carthaginian manifestations burst forth at once, at Kamarina,

Gela, Agrigentum, Selinus, and Himera. These Greeks did not merely

copy the Syracusans in plundering the property of all Carthaginians

found among them, but also seized their persons, and put them to

death with every species of indignity and torture. A frightful

retaliation now took place for the cruelties recently committed by

the Carthaginian armies, in the sacking of Selinus, Agrigentum, and

the other conquered cities.[1037] The Hellenic war-practice, in

itself sufficiently rigorous, was aggravated into a merciless and

studied barbarity, analogous to that which had disfigured the late

proceedings of Carthage and her western mercenaries. These “Sicilian

vespers,” which burst out throughout all the south of Sicily against

the Carthaginian residents, surpassed even the memorable massacre

known under that name in the thirteenth century, wherein the Angevine

knights and soldiers were indeed assassinated, but not tortured.

Diodorus tells us that the Carthaginians learnt from the retaliation

thus suffered, a lesson of forbearance. It will not appear however,

from their future conduct, that the lesson was much laid to heart;

while it is unhappily certain, that such interchange of cruelties

with less humanized neighbors, contributed to lower in the Sicilian

Greeks that measure of comparative forbearance which characterized

the Hellenic race in its own home.

[1037] Diodor. xiv, 46. Οὐ μόνον γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰς οὐσίας διήρπασαν,

ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτοὺς συλλαμβάνοντες, πᾶσαν αἰκίαν καὶ ὕβριν εἰς

τὰ σώματα αὐτῶν ἀπετίθεντο, μνημονεύοντες ὧν αὐτοὶ κατὰ τὴν

αἰχμαλωσίαν ἔπαθον. Ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον δὲ τῆς κατὰ τῶν Φοινίκων

τιμωρίας προέβησαν, καὶ τότε καὶ κατὰ τὸν ὕστερον χρόνον,

ὥστε τοὺς Καρχηδονίους διδαχθῆναι μηκέτι παρανομεῖν εἰς τοὺς

ὑποπεσόντας.

Elate with this fury of revenge, the citizens of Kamarina, Gela,

Agrigentum, and Selinus joined Dionysius on his march along the

coast. He was enabled, from his abundant stock of recently fabricated

arms, to furnish them with panoplies and weapons; for it is probable

that as subjects of Carthage they had been disarmed. Strengthened

by all these reinforcements, he mustered a force of eighty thousand

men, besides more than three thousand cavalry; while the ships of war

which accompanied him along the coast were nearly two hundred, and

the transports, with stores and battering machines, not less than

five hundred. With this prodigious army, the most powerful hitherto

assembled under Grecian command, he appeared before the Carthaginian

settlement of Motyê, a fortified seaport in a little bay immediately

north of Cape Lilybæum.[1038]

[1038] Diodor. xiv, 47.

Of the three principal establishments of Carthage in Sicily,—Motyê,

Panormus (Palermo), and Soloeis,—Motyê was at once the nearest to the

mother-city,[1039] the most important, and the most devoted. It was

situated (like the original Syracuse in Ortygia) upon a little islet,

separated from Sicily by a narrow strait about two-thirds of a mile

in breadth, which its citizens had bridged over by means of a mole,

so as to form a regular, though narrow, footpath. It was populous,

wealthy, flourishing, and distinguished for the excellence both of

its private houses and its fortifications. Perceiving the approach of

Dionysius, and not intimidated by the surrender of their neighbors

and allies, the Elymi at Eryx, who did not dare to resist so powerful

a force,—the Motyênes put themselves in the best condition of

defence. They broke up their mole, and again insulated themselves

from Sicily, in the hope of holding out until relief should be

sent from Carthage. Resolved to avenge upon Motyê the sufferings

of Agrigentum and Selinus, Dionysius took a survey of the place in

conjunction with his principal engineers. It deserves notice, that

this is among the earliest sieges recorded in Grecian history wherein

we read of a professed engineer as being directly and deliberately

called on to advise the best mode of proceeding.[1040]

[1039] Thucyd. vi, 2; Pausan. v, 25, 3.

[1040] Diodor. xiv, 48. Διονύσιος δὲ μετὰ τῶν ἀρχιτεκτόνων

κατασκεψάμενος τοὺς τόπους, etc.

Artemon the engineer was consulted by Perikles at the siege of

Samos (Plutarch, Perikles, c. 27).

Having formed his plans, he left his admiral Leptines with a portion

of the army to begin the necessary works, while he himself with

the remainder laid waste the neighboring territory dependent on or

allied with Carthage. The Sikani and others submitted to him; but

Ankyræ, Soloeis, Panormus, Egesta, and Entella, all held out, though

the citizens were confined to their walls, and obliged to witness,

without being able to prevent, the destruction of their lands.[1041]

Returning from this march, Dionysius pressed the siege of Motyê with

the utmost ardor, and with all the appliances which his engineers

could devise. Having moored his transports along the beach, and

hauled his ships of war ashore in the harbor, he undertook the

laborious task of filling up the strait (probably of no great depth)

which divided Motyê from the main island;[1042]—or at least as much

of the length of the strait as was sufficient to march across both

with soldiers and with battering engines, and to bring them up close

against the walls of the city. The numbers under his command enabled

him to achieve this enterprise, though not without a long period

of effort, during which the Carthaginians tried more than once to

interrupt his proceedings. Not having a fleet capable of contending

in pitched battle against the besiegers, the Carthaginian general

Imilkon tried two successive manœuvres. He first sent a squadron of

ten ships of war to sail suddenly into the harbor of Syracuse, in

hopes that the diversion thus operated would constrain Dionysius to

detach a portion of his fleet from Motyê. Though the attack, however,

was so far successful as to destroy many merchantmen in the harbor,

yet the assailants were beaten off without making any more serious

impression, or creating the diversion intended.[1043] Imilkon next

made an attempt to surprise the armed ships of Dionysius, as they

lay hauled ashore in the harbor near Motyê. Crossing over from

Carthage by night, with one hundred ships of war, to the Selinuntine

coast, he sailed round Cape Lilybæum, and appeared at daybreak off

Motyê. His appearance took every man by surprise. He destroyed or put

to flight the ships on guard, and sailed into the harbor prepared

for attack while as yet only a few of the Syracusan ships had been

got afloat. As the harbor was too confined to enable Dionysius to

profit by his great superiority in number and size of ships, a great

portion of his fleet would have been now destroyed, had it not been

saved by his numerous land force and artillery on the beach. Showers

of missiles, from this assembled crowd as well as from the decks of

the Syracusan ships, prevented Imilkon from advancing far enough to

attack with effect. The newly-invented engine called the catapulta,

of which the Carthaginians had as yet had no experience, was

especially effective; projecting large masses to a great distance,

it filled them with astonishment and dismay. While their progress

was thus arrested, Dionysius employed a new expedient to rescue his

fleet from the dilemma in which it had been caught. His numerous

soldiers were directed to haul the ships, not down to the harbor,

but landward, across a level tongue of land, more than two miles in

breadth, which separated the harbor of Motyê from the outer sea.

Wooden planks were laid so as to form a pathway for the ships; and

in spite of the great size of the newly-constructed quadriremes and

quinqueremes, the strength and ardor of the army sufficed for this

toilsome effort of transporting eighty ships across in one day. The

entire fleet, double in number to that of the Carthaginians, being at

length got afloat, Imilkon did not venture on a pitched battle, but

returned at once back to Africa.[1044]

[1041] Diodor. xiv, 48, 49.

[1042] Diodor. xiv, 49. ἐχώννυε τὸν μεταξὺ πόρον, καὶ τὰς μηχανὰς

ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ λόγον ἅμα τῇ τοῦ χώματος αὐξήσει προσήγαγε τοῖς

τείχεσι.

[1043] Diodor. xiv, 50.

[1044] Diodor. xiv, 50; Polyænus, v, 2, 6.

Though the citizens of Motyê saw from the walls the mournful

spectacle of their friends retiring, their courage was nowise

abated. They knew well that they had no mercy to expect; that the

general ferocity of the Carthaginians in their hour of victory,

and especially the cruel treatment of Greek captives even in Motyê

itself, would now be retaliated; and that their only chance lay in

a brave despair. The road across the strait having been at length

completed, Dionysius brought up his engines and began his assault.

While the catapulta with its missiles prevented defenders from

showing themselves on the battlements, battering-rams were driven

up to shake or overthrow the walls. At the same time large towers

on wheels were rolled up, with six different stories in them one

above the other, and in height equal to the houses. Against these

means of attack the besieged on their side elevated lofty masts

above the walls, with yards projecting outwards. Upon these yards

stood men protected from the missiles by a sort of breastwork,

and holding burning torches, pitch, and other combustibles, which

they cast down upon the machines of the assailants. Many machines

took fire in the woodwork, and it was not without difficulty that

the conflagration was extinguished. After a long and obstinate

resistance, however, the walls were at length overthrown or carried

by assault, and the besiegers rushed in, imagining the town to be in

their power. But the indefatigable energy of the besieged had already

put the houses behind into a state of defence, and barricaded the

streets, so that a fresh assault, more difficult than the first,

remained to be undertaken. The towers on wheels were rolled near,

but probably could not be pushed into immediate contact with the

houses in consequence of the ruins of the overthrown wall which

impeded their approach. Accordingly the assailants were compelled

to throw out wooden platforms or bridges from the towers to the

houses, and to march along these to the attack. But here they were

at great disadvantage, and suffered severe loss. The Motyenes,

resisting desperately, prevented them from setting firm foot on the

houses, slew many of them in hand-combat, and precipitated whole

companies to the ground, by severing or oversetting the platform.

For several days this desperate combat was renewed. Not a step was

gained by the besiegers, yet the unfortunate Motyenes became each

day more exhausted, while portions of the foremost houses were

also overthrown. Every evening Dionysius recalled his troops to

their night’s repose, renewing the assault next morning. Having

thus brought the enemy into an expectation that the night would be

undisturbed, he on one fatal night took them by surprise, sending the

Thurian Archylus with a chosen body of troops to attack the foremost

defences. This detachment, planting ladders and climbing up by means

of the half-demolished houses, established themselves firmly in a

position within the town before resistance could be organized. In

vain did the Motyenes, discovering the stratagem too late, endeavor

to dislodge them. The main force of Dionysius was speedily brought

up across the artificial earth-way to confirm their success, and the

town was thus carried, in spite of the most gallant resistance, which

continued even after it had become hopeless.[1045]

[1045] Diodor. xiv, 51, 52, 53.

The victorious host who now poured into Motyê, incensed not merely

by the length and obstinacy of the defence, but also by antecedent

Carthaginian atrocities at Agrigentum and elsewhere, gave full

loose to the sanguinary impulses of retaliation. They butchered

indiscriminately men and women, the aged and the children, without

mercy to any one. The streets were thus strewed with the slain,

in spite of all efforts on the part of Dionysius, who desired

to preserve the captives that they might be sold as slaves, and

thus bring in a profitable return. But his orders to abstain from

slaughter were not obeyed, nor could he do anything more than invite

the sufferers by proclamation to take refuge in the temples; a step,

which most of them would probably resort to uninvited. Restrained

from farther slaughter by the sanctuary of the temples, the victors

now turned to pillage. Abundance of gold, silver, precious vestments,

and other marks of opulence, the accumulations of a long period of

active prosperity, fell into their hands; and Dionysius allowed to

them the full plunder of the town, as a recompense for the toils

of the siege. He farther distributed special recompenses to those

who had distinguished themselves; one hundred minæ being given to

Archylus, the leader of the successful night-surprise. All the

surviving Motyenes he sold into slavery; but he reserved for a more

cruel fate Daimenês and various other Greeks who had been taken among

them. These Greeks he caused to be crucified;[1046] a specimen of

the Phœnician penalties transferred by example to their Hellenic

neighbors and enemies.

[1046] Diodor. xiv, 53.

The siege of Motyê having occupied nearly all the summer, Dionysius

now reconducted his army homeward. He left at the place a Sikel

garrison under the command of the Syracusan Biton, as well as a

large portion of his fleet, one hundred and twenty ships, under the

command of his brother Leptines; who was instructed to watch for

the arrival of any force from Carthage, and to employ himself in

besieging the neighboring towns of Egesta and Entella. The operations

against these two towns however had little success. The inhabitants

defended themselves bravely, and the Egestæans were even successful,

through a well-planned nocturnal sally, in burning the enemy’s camp,

with many horses, and stores of all kinds in the tents. Neither of

the two towns was yet reduced, when, in the ensuing spring, Dionysius

himself returned with his main force from Syracuse. He reduced the

inhabitants of Halikyæ to submission, but effected no other permanent

conquest, nor anything more than devastation of the neighboring

territory dependent upon Carthage.[1047]

[1047] Diodor. xiv, 54.

Leptines was brother of Dionysius (xiv, 102; xv, 7), though he

afterwards married the daughter of Dionysius,—a marriage not

condemned by Grecian sentiment.

Presently the face of the war was changed by the arrival of Imilkon

from Carthage. Having been elevated to the chief magistracy of the

city, he now brought with him an overwhelming force, collected as

well from the subjects in Africa as from Iberia and the Western

Mediterranean. It amounted, even in the low estimate of Timæus,

to one hundred thousand men, reinforced afterwards in Sicily

by thirty thousand more,—and in the more ample computations of

Ephorus, to three hundred thousand foot, four thousand horse, four

hundred chariots of war, four hundred ships of war, and six hundred

transports carrying stores and engines. Dionysius had his spies at

Carthage,[1048] even among men of rank and politicians, to apprise

him of all movements or public orders. But Imilkon, to obviate

knowledge of the precise point in Sicily where he intended to land,

gave to the pilots sealed instructions, to be opened only when

they were out at sea, indicating Panormus (Palermo) as the place

of rendezvous.[1049] The transports made directly for that port,

without nearing the land elsewhere; while Imilkon with the ships of

war approached the harbor of Motyê and sailed from thence along the

coast to Panormus. He probably entertained the hope of intercepting

some portion of the Syracusan fleet. But nothing of the kind was

found practicable; while Leptines on his side was even fortunate

enough to be able to attack, with thirty triremes, the foremost

vessels of the large transport-fleet on their voyage to Panormus. He

destroyed no less than fifty of them, with five thousand men, and

two hundred chariots of war; but the remaining fleet reached the

port in safety, and were there joined by Imilkon with the ships of

war. The land force being disembarked, the Carthaginian general led

them to Motyê, ordering his ships of war to accompany him along the

coast. In his way he regained Eryx, which was at heart Carthaginian,

having only been intimidated into submission to Dionysius during the

preceding year. He then attacked Motyê, which he retook, seemingly

after very little resistance. It had held out obstinately against

the Syracusans a few months before, while in the hands of its

own Carthaginian inhabitants, with their families and properties

around them; but the Sikel garrison had far less motive for stout

defence.[1050]

[1048] Justin, xx, 5. One of these Carthaginians of rank, who,

from political enmity to Hanno, wrote letters in Greek to

communicate information to Dionysius, was detected and punished

as a traitor. On this occasion, the Carthaginian senate is

said to have enacted a law, forbidding all citizens to learn

Greek,—either to write it or to speak it.

[1049] Diodor. xiv, 54; Polyænus, v, 10, 1.

[1050] Diodor. xiv, 55.

Thus was Dionysius deprived of the conquest which had cost him so

much blood and toil during the preceding summer. We are surprised

to learn that he made no effort to prevent its recapture, though he

was then not far off, besieging Egesta,—and though his soldiers,

elate with the successes of the preceding year were eager for a

general battle. But Dionysius, deeming this measure too adventurous,

resolved to retreat to Syracuse. His provisions were failing, and

he was at a great distance from allies, so that defeat would have

been ruinous. He therefore returned to Syracuse, carrying with him

some of the Sikanians, whom he persuaded to evacuate their abode in

the Carthaginian neighborhood, promising to provide them with better

homes elsewhere. Most of them, however, declined his offers; some

(among them, the Halikyæans) preferring to resume their alliance

with Carthage. Of the recent acquisitions nothing now remained to

Dionysius beyond the Selinuntine boundary; but Gela, Kamarina,

Agrigentum, and Selinus had been emancipated from Carthage, and

were still in a state of dependent alliance with him; a result

of moment,—yet seemingly very inadequate to the immense warlike

preparations whereby it had been attained. Whether he exercised a

wise discretion in declining to fight the Carthaginians, we have not

sufficient information to determine. But his army appear to have been

dissatisfied with it, and it was among the causes of the outbreak

against him shortly afterwards at Syracuse.[1051]

[1051] Diodor. xiv, 55.

Thus left master of the country, Imilkon, instead of trying to

reconquer Selinus and Himera, which had probably been impoverished

by recent misfortunes,—resolved to turn his arms against Messênê in

the north-east of the island; a city as yet fresh and untouched,—so

little prepared for attack that its walls were not in good

repair,—and moreover at the present moment yet farther enfeebled

by the absence of its horsemen in the army of Dionysius.[1052]

Accordingly, he marched along the northern coast of Sicily, with his

fleet coasting in the same direction to coöperate with him. He made

terms with Kephalœdium and Therma, captured the island of Lipara, and

at length reached Cape Pelôrus, a few miles from Messênê. His rapid

march and unexpected arrival struck the Messenians with dismay. Many

of them, conceiving defence to be impossible against so numerous a

host, sent away their families and their valuable property to Rhegium

or elsewhere. On the whole, however, a spirit of greater confidence

prevailed, arising in part from an ancient prophecy preserved among

the traditions of the town, purporting that the Carthaginians should

one day carry water in Messênê. The interpreters affirmed that “to

carry water” meant, of course, “to be a slave,”—and the Messenians,

persuading themselves that this portended defeat to Imilkon, sent out

their chosen military force to meet him at Pelôrus, and oppose his

disembarkation. The Carthaginian commander, seeing these troops on

their march, ordered his fleet to sail forward into the harbor of the

city, and attack it from seaward during the absence of the defenders.

A north wind so favored the advance of the ships, that they entered

the harbor full sail, and found the city on that side almost

unguarded. The troops who had marched out towards Pelôrus hastened

back, but were too late;[1053] while Imilkon himself also, pushing

forward by land, forced his way into the town over the neglected

parts of the wall. Messênê was taken; and its unhappy population

fled in all directions for their lives. Some found refuge in the

neighboring cities; others ran to the hill-forts of the Messenian

territory, planted as a protection against the indigenous Sikels;

while about two hundred of them near the harbor, cast themselves into

the sea, and undertook the arduous task of swimming across to the

Italian coast, in which fifty of them succeeded.[1054]

[1052] Diodor. xiv, 56, 57. τῶν ἰδίων ἱππέων ἐν Συρακούσαις

ὄντων, etc. διὰ τῶν πεπτωκότων τειχῶν εἰσβιασάμενοι, etc. τὰ

τείχη καταπεπτωκότα, etc.

Compare another example of inattention to the state of their

walls, on the part of the Messenians (xix, 65).

[1053] Kleon and the Athenians took Torônê by a similar manœuvre

(Thucyd. v, 2).

[1054] Diodor. xiv, 57.

Though Imilkon tried in vain to carry by assault some of the

Messenian hill-forts, which were both strongly placed and gallantly

defended,—yet his capture of Messênê itself was an event both

imposing and profitable. It deprived Dionysius of an important ally,

and lessened his facilities for obtaining succor from Italy. But

most of all, it gratified the anti-Hellenic sentiment of the Punic

general and his army, counterbalancing the capture of Motyê in the

preceding year. Having taken scarce any captives, Imilkon had nothing

but unconscious stone and wood upon which to vent his antipathy. He

ordered the town, the walls, and all the buildings, to be utterly

burnt and demolished; a task which his numerous host are said to

have executed so effectually, that there remained hardly anything

but ruins, without a trace of human residence.[1055] He received

adhesion and reinforcements from most of the Sikels[1056] of the

interior, who had been forced to submit to Dionysius a year or two

before, but detested his dominion. To some of these Sikels, the

Syracusan despot had assigned the territory of the conquered Naxians,

with their city probably unwalled. But anxious as they were to escape

from him, many had migrated to a point somewhat north of Naxus,—to

the hill of Taurus, immediately over the sea, unfavorably celebrated

among the Sikel population as being the spot where the first Greek

colonists had touched on arriving in the island. Their migration was

encouraged, multiplied, and organized, under the auspices of Imilkon,

who prevailed upon them to construct, upon the strong eminence of

Taurus, a fortified post, which formed the beginning of the city

afterwards known as Tauromenium.[1057] Magon was sent with the

Carthaginian fleet to assist in the enterprise.

[1055] Diodor. xiv, 58. Ἰμίλκων δὲ τῆς Μεσσήνης τὰ τείχη

κατασκάψας, προσέταξε τοῖς στρατιώταις καταβαλεῖν τὰς οἰκίας

εἰς ἔδαφος, καὶ μήτε κέραμον, μήθ’ ὕλην, μήτ’ ἄλλο μηδὲν

ὑπολιπεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν κατακαῦσαι, τὰ δὲ συντρίψαι. Ταχὺ δὲ τῇ

τῶν στρατιωτῶν πολυχειρίᾳ λαβόντων τῶν ἔργων συντέλειαν, ἡ πόλις

ἄγνωστος ἦν, ὅπου πρότερον αὐτὴν οἰκεῖσθαι συνέβαινεν. Ὁρῶν γὰρ

τὸν τόπον πόῤῥω μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν συμμαχίδων πόλεων κεχωρισμένον,

εὐκαιρότατον δὲ τῶν περὶ Σικελίαν ὄντα, προῄρητο δυοῖν θάτερον, ἢ

τελέως ἀοίκητον διατηρεῖν, ἢ δυσχερῆ καὶ πολυχρόνιον τὴν κτίσιν

αὐτῆς γίνεσθαι.

Ἐναποδειξάμενος οὖν τὸ πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας μῖσος ἐν τῇ τῶν

Μεσσηνίων ἀτυχίᾳ, etc.

It would appear, however, that the demolition of Messênê can

hardly have been carried so far in fact as Imilkon intended;

since the city reappears shortly afterwards in renewed dignity.

[1056] Diodor. xiv, 59-76.

[1057] Diodor. xiv, 59.

Meanwhile Dionysius, greatly disquieted at the capture of Messênê,

exerted himself to put Syracuse in an effective position of defence

on her northern frontier. Naxus and Katana being both unfortified, he

was forced to abandon them, and he induced the Campanians whom he had

planted in Katana to change their quarters to the strong town called

Ætna, on the skirt of the mountain so named. He made Leontini his

chief position; strengthening as much as possible the fortifications

of the city as well as those of the neighboring country forts,

wherein he accumulated magazines of provisions from the fertile

plains around. He had still a force of thirty thousand foot and more

than three thousand horse; he had also a fleet of one hundred and

eighty ships of war,—triremes and others. During the year preceding,

he had brought out both a land force and a naval force much superior

to this, even for purposes of aggression; how it happened that he

could now command no more, even for defence and at home,—or what had

become of the difference,—we are not told. Of the one hundred and

eighty ships of war, sixty only were manned by the extraordinary

proceeding of liberating slaves. Such sudden and serious changes

in the amount of military force from year to year, are perceptible

among Carthaginians as well as Greeks,—indeed throughout most part

of Grecian history;—the armies being got together chiefly for

special occasions, and then dismissed. Dionysius farther despatched

envoys to Sparta, soliciting a reinforcement of a thousand mercenary

auxiliaries. Having thus provided the best defence that he could

through the territory, he advanced forward with his main land-force

to Katana, having his fleet also moving in coöperation, immediately

off shore.

Towards this same point of Katana the Carthaginians were now moving,

in their march against Syracuse. Magon was directed to coast along

with the fleet from Taurus (Tauromenium) to Katana, while Imilkon

intended himself to march with the land force on shore, keeping

constantly near the fleet for the purpose of mutual support. But

his scheme was defeated by a remarkable accident. A sudden eruption

took place from Ætna; so that the stream of lava from the mountain

to the sea forbade all possibility of marching along the shore to

Katana, and constrained him to make a considerable circuit with

his army on the land-side of the mountain. Though he accelerated

his march as much as possible, yet for two days or more he was

unavoidably cut off from the fleet; which under the command of Magon

was sailing southward towards Katana. Dionysius availed himself of

this circumstance to advance beyond Katana along the beach stretching

northward, to meet Magon in his approach, and attack him separately.

The Carthaginian fleet was much superior in number, consisting of

five hundred sail in all; a portion of which, however, were not

strictly ships of war, but armed merchantmen,—that is, furnished

with brazen bows for impact against an enemy, and rowed with oars.

But on the other hand, Dionysius had a land-force close at hand

to coöperate with his fleet; an advantage which in ancient naval

warfare counted for much, serving in case of defeat as a refuge to

the ships, and in case of victory as intercepting or abridging the

enemy’s means of escape. Magon, alarmed when he came in sight of

the Grecian land-force mustered on the beach, and the Grecian fleet

rowing up to attack him,—was nevertheless constrained unwillingly

to accept the battle. Leptines, the Syracusan admiral,—though

ordered by Dionysius to concentrate his ships as much as possible,

in consequence of his inferior numbers,—attacked with boldness, and

even with temerity; advancing himself with thirty ships greatly

before the rest, and being apparently farther out to sea than the

enemy. His bravery at first appeared successful, destroying or

damaging the headmost ships of the enemy. But their superior numbers

presently closed around him, and after a desperate combat, fought

in the closest manner, ship to ship and hand to hand, he was forced

to sheer off, and to seek escape seaward. His main fleet, coming

up in disorder, and witnessing his defeat, were beaten also, after

a strenuous contest. All of them fled, either landward or seaward

as they could, under vigorous pursuit by the Carthaginian vessels;

and in the end, no less than a hundred of the Syracusan ships, with

twenty thousand men, were numbered as taken, or destroyed. Many of

the crews, swimming or floating in the water on spars, strove to get

to land to the protection of their comrades. But the Carthaginian

small craft, sailing very near to the shore, slew or drowned these

unfortunate men, even under the eyes of friends ashore who could

render no assistance. The neighboring water became strewed, both

with dead bodies and with fragments of broken ships. As victors, the

Carthaginians were enabled to save many of their own seamen, either

on board of damaged ships, or swimming for their lives. Yet their own

loss too was severe; and their victory, complete as it proved, was

dearly purchased.

Though the land-force of Dionysius had not been at all engaged,

yet the awful defeat of his fleet induced him to give immediate

orders for retreating, first to Katana and afterwards yet farther to

Syracuse. As soon as the Syracusan army had evacuated the adjoining

shore, Magon towed all his prizes to land, and there hauled them up

on the beach; partly for repair, wherever practicable,—partly as

visible proofs of the magnitude of the triumph, for encouragement to

his own armament. Stormy weather just then supervening, he was forced

to haul his own ships ashore also for safety, and remained there for

several days refreshing the crews. To keep the sea under such weather

would have been scarcely practicable; so that if Dionysius, instead

of retreating, had continued to occupy the shore with his unimpaired

land-force, it appears that the Carthaginian ships would have been

in the greatest danger; constrained either to face the storm, to run

back a considerable distance northward, or to make good their landing

against a formidable enemy, without being able to wait for the

arrival of Imilkon.[1058] The latter, after no very long interval,

came up, so that the land-force and the navy of the Carthaginians

were now again in coöperation. While allowing his troops some

days of repose and enjoyment of the victory, he sent envoys to the

town of Ætna, inviting the Campanian mercenary soldiers to break

with Dionysius and join him. Reminding them that their countrymen

at Entella were living in satisfaction as a dependency of Carthage

(which they had recently testified by resisting the Syracusan

invasion), he promised to them an accession of territory, and a share

in the spoils of the war, to be wrested from Greeks who were enemies

of Campanians not less than of Carthaginians.[1059] The Campanians of

Ætna would gladly have complied with his invitation, and were only

restrained from joining him by the circumstance that they had given

hostages to the despot of Syracuse, in whose army also their best

soldiers were now serving.

[1058] Diodor. xiv, 60, 61. Compare the speech of Theodôrus at

Syracuse afterwards (c. 68), from which we gather a more complete

idea of what passed after the battle.

[1059] Diodor. xiv, 61. Καὶ καθόλου δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων γένος

ἀπεδείκνυε πολέμιον ὕπαρχον τῶν ἄλλων ἐθνῶν.

These manifestations of anti-Hellenic sentiment, among the

various neighbors of the Sicilian Greeks, are important to

notice, though they are not often brought before us.

Meanwhile Dionysius, in marching back to Syracuse, found his army

grievously discontented. Withdrawn from the scene of action without

even using their arms, they looked forward to nothing better than a

blockade at Syracuse, full of hardship and privation. Accordingly

many of them protested against retreat, conjuring him to lead them

again to the scene of action, that they might either assail the

Carthaginian fleet in the confusion of landing, or join battle

with the advancing land-force under Imilkon. At first, Dionysius

consented to such change of scheme. But he was presently reminded

that unless he hastened back to Syracuse, Magon with the victorious

fleet might sail thither, enter the harbor, and possess himself of

the city; in the same manner as Imilkon had recently succeeded at

Messênê. Under these apprehensions he renewed his original order for

retreat, in spite of the vehement protest of his Sicilian allies;

who were indeed so incensed that most of them quitted him at once.

Which of the two was the wiser plan, we have no sufficient means

to determine. But the circumstances seem not to have been the same

as those preceding the capture of Messênê; for Magon was not in a

condition to move forward at once with the fleet, partly from his

loss in the recent action, partly from the stormy weather; and

might perhaps have been intercepted in the very act of landing,

if Dionysius had moved rapidly back to the shore. As far as we can

judge, it would appear that the complaints of the army against the

hasty retreat of Dionysius rested on highly plausible grounds. He

nevertheless persisted, and reached Syracuse with his army not only

much discouraged, but greatly diminished by the desertion of allies.

He lost no time in sending forth envoys to the Italian Greeks and

to Peloponnesus, with ample funds for engaging soldiers, and urgent

supplications to Sparta as well as to Corinth.[1060] Polyxenus, his

brother-in-law, employed on this mission, discharged his duty with

such diligence, that he came back in a comparatively short space

of time, with thirty-two ships of war under the command of the

Lacedæmonian Pharakidas.[1061]

[1060] Diodor. xiv, 61.

[1061] Diodor. xiv, 63.

Polyænus (v, 8, 2) recounts a manœuvre of _Leptines_, practised

in bringing back a Lacedæmonian reinforcement from Sparta to

Sicily on his voyage along the Tarentine coast. Perhaps this may

be the Lacedæmonian division intended.

Meanwhile Imilkon, having sufficiently refreshed his troops after

the naval victory off Katana, moved forward towards Syracuse both

with the fleet and the land-force. The entry of his fleet into the

Great Harbor was ostentatious and imposing; far above even that of

the second Athenian armament, when Demosthenes first exhibited its

brilliant but short-lived force.[1062] Two hundred and eight ships

of war first rowed in, marshalled in the best order, and adorned

with the spoils of the captured Syracusan ships. These were followed

by transports, five hundred of them carrying soldiers, and one

thousand others either empty or bringing stores and machines. The

total number of vessels, we are told, reached almost two thousand,

covering a large portion of the Great Harbor.[1063] The numerous

land-force marched up about the same time; Imilkon establishing his

head quarters in the temple of Zeus Olympius, nearly one English mile

and a half from the city. He presently drew up his forces in order

of battle, and advanced nearly to the city walls; while his ships of

war also, being divided into two fleets of one hundred ships each,

showed themselves in face of the two interior harbors or docks (on

each side of the connecting strait between Ortygia and the main land)

wherein the Syracusan ships were safely lodged. He thus challenged

the Syracusans to combat on both elements; but neither challenge was

accepted.

[1062] Thucyd. vii, 42; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 21; Diodor. xiii, 11.

[1063] Diodor. xiv, 62.

The text of Diodorus is here so perplexed as to require

conjectural alteration, which Rhodomannus has supplied; yet not

so as to remove all that is obscure. The word εἰσθεόμεναι still

remains to be explained or corrected.

Having by such defiance farther raised the confidence of his own

troops, he first spread them over the Syracusan territory, and

allowed them for thirty days to enrich themselves by unlimited

plunder. Next, he proceeded to establish fortified posts, as

essential to the prosecution of a blockade which he foresaw would

be tedious. Besides fortifying the temple of the Olympian Zeus, he

constructed two other forts; one at Cape Plemmyrium (on the southern

entrance of the harbor, immediately opposite to Ortygia, where

Nikias had erected a post also), the other on the Great Harbor,

midway between Plemmyrium and the temple of the Olympian Zeus, at

the little bay called Daskon. He farther encircled his whole camp,

near the last-mentioned temple, with a wall; the materials of which

were derived in part from the demolition of the numerous tombs

around; especially one tomb, spacious and magnificent, commemorating

Gelon and his wife Damaretê. In these various fortified posts he was

able to store up the bread, wine, and other provisions which his

transports were employed in procuring from Africa and Sardinia, for

the continuous subsistence of so mighty an host.

It would appear as if Imilkon had first hoped to take the city by

assault; for he pushed up his army as far as the very walls of

Achradina (the outer city). He even occupied the open suburb of that

city, afterwards separately fortified under the name of Neapolis,

wherein were situated the temples of Demeter and Persephonê, which he

stripped of their rich treasures.[1064] But if such was his plan,

he soon abandoned it, and confined himself to the slower process

of reducing the city by famine. His progress in this enterprise,

however, was by no means encouraging. We must recollect that he was

not, like Nikias, master of the centre of Epipolæ; able from thence

to stretch his right arm southward to the Great Harbor, and his left

arm northward to the sea at Trogilus. As far as we are able to make

out, he never ascended the southern cliff, nor got upon the slope of

Epipolæ; though it seems that at this time there was no line of wall

along the southern cliff, as Dionysius had recently built along the

northern. The position of Imilkon was confined to the Great Harbor

and to the low lands adjoining, southward of the cliff of Epipolæ;

so that the communications of Syracuse with the country around

remained partially open on two sides,—westward, through the Euryalus

at the upper extremity of Epipolæ,—and northward towards Thapsus

and Megara, through the Hexapylon, or the principal gate in the new

fortification constructed by Dionysius along the northern cliff of

Epipolæ. The full value was now felt of that recent fortification,

which, protecting Syracuse both to the north and west, and guarding

the precious position of Euryalus, materially impeded the operations

of Imilkon. The city was thus open, partially at least, on two

sides, to receive supplies by land. And even by sea means were

found to introduce provisions. Though Imilkon had a fleet so much

stronger that the Syracusans did not dare to offer pitched battle,

yet he found it difficult to keep such constant watch as to exclude

their store-ships, and ensure the arrival of his own. Dionysius and

Leptines went forth themselves from the harbor with armed squadrons

to accelerate and protect the approach of their supplies; while

several desultory encounters took place, both of land-force and of

shipping, which proved advantageous to the Syracusans, and greatly

raised their spirits.

[1064] Diodor. xiv, 63. Κατελάβετο δὲ καὶ τὸ τῆς Ἀχραδινῆς

προάστειον, καὶ τοὺς νέως τῆς τε Δήμητρος καὶ Κόρης ἐσύλησεν.

Cicero (in Verrem, iv, 52, 53) distinctly mentions the temples

of Demeter and Persephonê, and the statue of Apollo Temenites,

among the characteristic features of Neapolis; which proves the

identity of Neapolis with what Diodorus calls the suburb of

Achradina. This identity, recognized by Serra di Falco, Colonel

Leake, and other authors, is disputed by Saverio Cavallari, on

grounds which do not appear to me sufficient.

See Colonel Leake, notes on Syracuse, pp. 7-10; Cavallari, Zur

Topographie von Syrakus, p. 20.

One naval conflict especially, which occurred while Dionysius was

absent on his cruise, was of serious moment. A corn-ship belonging to

Imilkon’s fleet being seen entering the Great Harbor, the Syracusans

suddenly manned five ships of war, mastered it, and hauled it into

their own dock. To prevent such capture, the Carthaginians from

their station sent out forty ships of war; upon which the Syracusans

equipped their whole naval force, bore down upon the forty with

numbers decidedly superior, and completely defeated them. They

captured the admiral’s ship, damaged twenty-four others, and pursued

the rest to the naval station; in front of which they paraded,

challenging the enemy to battle. As the challenge was not accepted,

they returned to their own dock, towing in their prizes in triumph.

This naval victory indicated, and contributed much to occasion, that

turn in the fortune of the siege which each future day still farther

accelerated. Its immediate effect was to fill the Syracusan public

with unbounded exultation. “Without Dionysius we conquer our enemies;

under his command we are beaten; why submit to slavery under him any

longer?” Such was the burst of indignant sentiment which largely

pervaded the groups and circles in the city; strengthened by the

consciousness that they were now all armed and competent to extort

freedom,—since Dionysius, when the besieging enemy actually appeared

before the city, had been obliged, as the less of two hazards, to

produce and redistribute the arms which he had previously taken from

them. In the midst of this discontent, Dionysius himself returned

from his cruise. To soothe the prevalent temper, he was forced to

convene a public assembly; wherein he warmly extolled the recent

exploit of the Syracusans, and exhorted them to strenuous confidence,

promising that he would speedily bring the war to a close.

It is possible that Dionysius, throughout his despotism, may have

occasionally permitted what were called public assemblies; but we

may be very sure, that, if ever convened, they were mere matters of

form, and that no free discussion or opposition to his will was ever

tolerated. On the present occasion, he anticipated the like passive

acquiescence; and after having delivered a speech, doubtless much

applauded by his own partisans, he was about to dismiss the assembly,

when a citizen named Theodôrus unexpectedly rose. He was a Horseman

or Knight,—a person of wealth and station in the city, of high

character and established reputation for courage. Gathering boldness

from the time and circumstances, he now stood forward to proclaim

publicly that hatred of Dionysius, and anxiety for freedom, which so

many of his fellow-citizens around had been heard to utter privately

and were well known to feel.[1065]

[1065] Diodor. xiv, 64. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τοιούτων λόγων γινομένων,

Διονύσιος κατέπλευσε, καὶ συναγαγὼν ἐκκλησίαν, ἐπῄνει τοὺς

Συρακοσίους, καὶ παρεκάλει θαῤῥεῖν, ἐπαγγελλόμενος ταχέως

καταλύσειν τὸν πόλεμον. Ἤδη δ’ αὐτοῦ μέλλοντος διαλύειν τὴν

ἐκκλησίαν, ἀναστὰς Θεόδωρος ὁ Συρακούσιος, ἐν τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν

εὐδοκιμῶν καὶ δοκῶν εἶναι πρακτικὸς, ἀπετόλμησε περὶ τῆς

ἐλευθερίας τοιούτοις χρήσασθαι λόγοις.

Diodorus in his history gives us a long harangue (whether composed

by himself, or copied from others, we cannot tell) as pronounced by

Theodôrus. The main topics of it are such as we should naturally

expect, and are probably, on the whole, genuine. It is a full review,

and an emphatic denunciation, of the past conduct of Dionysius,

concluding with an appeal to the Syracusans to emancipate themselves

from his dominion. “Dionysius (the speaker contends, in substance) is

a worse enemy than the Carthaginians: who, if victorious, would be

satisfied with a regular tribute, leaving us to enjoy our properties

and our paternal polity. Dionysius has robbed us of both. He has

pillaged our temples of their sacred deposits. He has slain or

banished our wealthy citizens, and then seized their properties by

wholesale, to be transferred to his own satellites. He has given

the wives of these exiles in marriage to his barbarian soldiers. He

has liberated our slaves, and taken them into his pay, in order to

keep their masters in slavery. He has garrisoned our own citadel

against us, by means of these slaves, together with a host of other

mercenaries. He has put to death every citizen who ventured to raise

his voice in defence of the laws and constitution. He has abused

our confidence,—once, unfortunately, carried so far as to nominate

him general,—by employing his powers to subvert our freedom, and

rule us according to his own selfish rapacity in place of justice.

He has farther stripped us of our arms; these, recent necessity has

compelled him to restore,—and these, if we are men, we shall now

employ for the recovery of our own freedom.”[1066]

[1066] Diodor. xiv, 65. Οὗτος δὲ, τὰ μὲν ἱερὰ συλήσας, τοὺς δὲ

τῶν ἰδιωτῶν πλούτους ἅμα ταῖς τῶν κεκτημένων ψυχαῖς ἀφελόμενος,

τοὺς οἰκέτας μισθοδοτεῖ ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν δεσποτῶν δουλείας....

c. 66. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρόπολις, δούλων ὅπλοις τηρουμένη, κατὰ τῆς

πόλεως ἐπιτετείχισται· τὸ δὲ τῶν μισθοφόρων πλῆθος ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ

τῶν Συρακοσίων ἤθροισται. Καὶ κρατεῖ τῆς πόλεως οὐκ ἐπίσης

βραβεύων τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλὰ μόναρχος πλεονεξίᾳ κρίνων πράττειν

πάντα. Καὶ νῦν μὲν οἱ πολέμιοι βραχὺ μέρος ἔχουσι τῆς χώρας·

Διονύσιος δὲ, πᾶσαν ποιήσας ἀνάστατον, τοῖς τὴν τυραννίδα

συναύξουσιν ἐδωρήσατο....

... Καὶ πρὸς μὲν Καρχηδονίους δύο μάχας ἐνστησάμενος ἐν ἑκατέραις

ἥττηται· παρὰ δὲ τοῖς πολίταις πιστευθεὶς ἅπαξ στρατηγίαν, εὐθέως

ἀφείλετο τὴν ἐλευθερίαν· φονεύων μὲν τοὺς παῤῥησίαν ἄγοντας ὑπὲρ

τῶν νόμων, φυγαδεύων δὲ τοὺς ταῖς οὐσίαις προέχοντας· καὶ τὰς μὲν

τῶν φυγάδων γυναῖκας οἰκέταις καὶ μιγάσιν ἀνθρώποις συνοικίζων,

τῶν δὲ πολιτικῶν ὅπλων βαρβάρους καὶ ξένους ποιῶν κυρίους....

c. 67. Οὐκ αἰσχυνόμεθα τὸν πολέμιον ἔχοντες ἡγεμόνα, τὸν τὰ κατὰ

τὴν πόλιν ἱερὰ σεσυληκότα;

c. 69. Διόπερ ἕτερον ἡγεμόνα ζητητέον, ὅπως μὴ τὸν σεσυληκότα

τοὺς τῶν θεῶν ναοὺς στρατηγὸν ἔχοντες ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ θεομαχῶμεν....

“If the conduct of Dionysius towards Syracuse has been thus infamous,

it has been no better towards the Sicilian Greeks generally.

He betrayed Gela and Kamarina, for his own purposes, to the

Carthaginians. He suffered Messênê to fall into their hands without

the least help. He reduced to slavery, by gross treachery, our

Grecian brethren and neighbors of Naxus and Katana; transferring the

latter to the non-Hellenic Campanians, and destroying the former.

He might have attacked the Carthaginians immediately after their

landing from Africa at Panormus, before they had recovered from the

fatigue of the voyage. He might have fought the recent naval combat

near the port of Katana, instead of near the beach north of that

town; so as to ensure to our fleet, if worsted, an easy and sure

retreat. Had he chosen to keep his land-force on the spot, he might

have prevented the victorious Carthaginian fleet from approaching

land, when the storm came on shortly after the battle; or he might

have attacked them, if they tried to land, at the greatest advantage.

He has conducted the war, altogether, with disgraceful incompetence;

not wishing sincerely, indeed, to get rid of them as enemies, but

preserving the terrors of Carthage, as an indirect engine to keep

Syracuse in subjection to himself. As long as we fought with him,

we have been constantly unsuccessful; now that we have come to

fight without him, recent experience tells us that we can beat the

Carthaginians, even with inferior numbers.

“Let us look out for another leader (concluded Theodôrus), in place

of a sacrilegious temple-robber whom the gods have now abandoned. If

Dionysius will consent to relinquish his dominion, let him retire

from the city with his property unmolested; if he will not, we are

here all assembled, we are possessed of our arms, and we have both

Italian and Peloponnesian allies by our side. The assembly will

determine whether it will choose leaders from our own citizens,—or

from our metropolis Corinth,—or from the Spartans, the presidents of

all Greece.”

Such are the main points of the long harangue ascribed to Theodôrus;

the first occasion, for many years, on which the voice of free speech

had been heard publicly in Syracuse. Among the charges advanced

against Dionysius, which go to impeach his manner of carrying on

the war against the Carthaginians, there are several which we can

neither admit nor reject, from our insufficient knowledge of the

facts. But the enormities ascribed to him in his dealing with the

Syracusans,—the fraud, violence, spoliation, and bloodshed, whereby

he had first acquired, and afterwards upheld, his dominion over

them,—these are assertions of matters of fact, which coincide in the

main with the previous narrative of Diodorus, and which we have no

ground for contesting.

Hailed by the assembly with great sympathy and acclamation, this

harangue seriously alarmed Dionysius. In his concluding words,

Theodôrus had invoked the protection of Corinth as well as of Sparta,

against the despot, whom with such signal courage he had thus

ventured publicly to arraign. Corinthians as well as Spartans were

now lending aid in the defence, under the command of Pharakidas.

That Spartan officer came forward to speak next after Theodôrus.

Among various other sentiments of traditional respect towards

Sparta, there still prevailed a remnant of the belief that she was

adverse to despots; as she really had once been, at an earlier

period of her history.[1067] Hence the Syracusans hoped, and even

expected, that Pharakidas would second the protest of Theodôrus, and

stand forward as champion of freedom to the first Grecian city in

Sicily.[1068] Bitterly indeed were they disappointed. Dionysius had

established with Pharakidas relations as friendly as those of the

Thirty tyrants at Athens with Kallibius the Lacedæmonian harmost in

the acropolis.[1069] Accordingly Pharakidas in his speech not only

discountenanced the proposition just made, but declared himself

emphatically in favor of the despot; intimating that he had been sent

to aid the Syracusans and Dionysius against the Carthaginians,—not

to put down the dominion of Dionysius. To the Syracusans this

declaration was a denial of all hope. They saw plainly that in

any attempt to emancipate themselves, they would have against

them not merely the mercenaries of Dionysius, but also the whole

force of Sparta, then imperial and omnipotent; represented on the

present occasion by Pharakidas, as it had been in a previous year

by Aristus. They were condemned to bear their chains in silence,

not without unavailing curses against Sparta. Meanwhile Dionysius,

thus powerfully sustained, was enabled to ride over the perilous

and critical juncture. His mercenaries crowded in haste around his

person,—having probably been sent for, as soon as the voice of a

free spokesman was heard.[1070] And he was thus enabled to dismiss

an assembly, which had seemed for one short instant to threaten the

perpetuity of his dominion, and to promise emancipation for Syracuse.

[1067] Thucyd. i, 18; Herodot. v, 92.

[1068] Diodor. xiv, 70. Τοιούτοις τοῦ Θεοδώρου χρησαμένου λόγοις,

οἱ μὲν Συρακούσιοι μετέωροι ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐγένοντο, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς

συμμάχους ἀπέβλεπον. Φαρακίδου δὲ τοῦ Λακεδαιμονίου ναυαρχοῦντος

τῶν συμμάχων, καὶ παρελθόντος ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα, πάντες προσεδόκων

ἀρχηγὸν ἔσεσθαι τῆς ἐλευθερίας.

[1069] Diodor. xiv, 70. Ὁ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὸν τύραννον ἔχων οἰκείως,

etc.; compare Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 14.

[1070] Diodor. xiv, 70. Παρὰ δὲ τὴν προσδοκίαν γενομένης τῆς

ἀποφάσεως, οἱ μὲν μισθόφοροι συνέδραμον πρὸς τὸν Διονύσιον,

οἱ δὲ Συρακούσιοι καταπλαγέντες τὴν ἡσυχίαν, εἶχον, πολλὰ

τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις καταρώμενοι. Καὶ γὰρ τὸ πρότερον Ἀρέτης ὁ

Λακεδαιμόνιος (he is called previously _Aristus_, xiv, 10),

ἀντιλαμβανομένων αὐτῶν τῆς ἐλευθερίας, ἐγένετο προδότης· καὶ τότε

Φαρακίδας ἐνέστη ταῖς ὁρμαῖς τῶν Συρακουσίων.

During this interesting and momentous scene, the fate of Syracuse

had hung upon the decision of Pharakidas: for Theodôrus, well aware

that with a besieging enemy before the gates, the city could not be

left without a supreme authority, had conjured the Spartan commander,

with his Lacedæmonian and Corinthian allies, to take into his own

hands the control and organization of the popular force. There can

be little doubt that Pharakidas could have done this, if he had been

so disposed, so as at once to make head against the Carthaginians

without, and to restrain, if not to put down, the despotism within.

Instead of undertaking the tutelary intervention solicited by the

people, he threw himself into the opposite scale, and strengthened

Dionysius more than ever, at the moment of his greatest peril.

The proceeding of Pharakidas was doubtless conformable to his

instructions from home, as well as to the oppressive and crushing

policy which Sparta, in these days of her unresisted empire (between

the victory of Ægospotami and the defeat of Knidus), pursued

throughout the Grecian world.

Dionysius was fully sensible of the danger which he had thus been

assisted to escape. Under the first impressions of alarm, he strove

to gain something like popularity; by a conciliatory language and

demeanor, by presents adroitly distributed, and by invitations to

his table. Whatever may have been the success of such artifices, the

lucky turn, which the siege was now taking, was the most powerful of

all aids for building up his full power anew.

It was not the arms of the Syracusans, but the wrath of Demeter and

Persephonê, whose temple (in the suburb of Achradina) Imilkon had

pillaged, that ruined the besieging army before Syracuse. So the

piety of the citizens interpreted that terrific pestilence which

now began to rage among the multitude of their enemies without. The

divine wrath was indeed seconded (as the historian informs us[1071])

by physical causes of no ordinary severity. The vast numbers of

the host were closely packed together; it was now the beginning

of autumn, the most unhealthy period of the year; moreover this

summer had been preternaturally hot, and the low marshy ground

near the Great Harbor, under the chill of morning contrasted with

the burning sun of noon, was the constant source of fever and

pestilence. These unseen and irresistible enemies fell with appalling

force upon the troops of Imilkon; especially upon the Libyans, or

native Africans, who were found the most susceptible. The intense

and varied bodily sufferings of this distemper,—the rapidity with

which it spread from man to man,—and the countless victims which it

speedily accumulated,—appear to have equalled, if not surpassed,

the worst days of the pestilence of Athens in 429 B.C. Care and

attendance upon the sick, or even interment of the dead, became

impracticable; so that the whole camp presented a scene of deplorable

agony, aggravated by the horrors and stench of one hundred and

fifty thousand unburied bodies.[1072] The military strength of the

Carthaginians was completely prostrated by such a visitation. Far

from being able to make progress in the siege, they were not even

able to defend themselves against moderate energy on the part of the

Syracusans; who (like the Peloponnesians during the great plague of

Athens) were themselves untouched by the distemper.[1073]

[1071] Diodor. xiv, 70. Συνεπελάβετο δὲ καὶ τῇ τοῦ δαιμονίου

συμφορᾷ τὸ μυριάδας εἰς ταὐτὸ συναθροισθῆναι, καὶ τὸ τῆς ὥρας

εἶναι πρὸς τὰς νόσους ἐνεργότατον, etc.

[1072] Diodor. xiv, 71-76. πεντεκαίδεκα μυριάδας ἐπεῖδον ἀτάφους

διὰ τὸν λοιμὸν σεσωρευμένους.

I give the figure as I find it, without pretending to trust it as

anything more than an indication of a great number.

[1073] Thucyd. ii, 54.

When the Roman general Marcellus was besieging Syracuse in 212

B.C., a terrific pestilence, generated by causes similar to

that of this year, broke out. All parties, Romans, Syracusans,

and Carthaginians, suffered from it considerably; but the

Carthaginians worst of all; they are said to have all perished

(Livy, xxv, 26).

Such was the wretched spectacle of the Carthaginian army, clearly

visible from the walls of Syracuse. To overthrow it by a vigorous

attack, was an enterprise not difficult; indeed, so sure, in the

opinion of Dionysius, that in organizing his plan of operation, he

made it the means of deliberately getting rid of some troops in the

city who had become inconvenient to him. Concerting measures for a

simultaneous assault upon the Carthaginian station both by sea and

land, he entrusted eighty ships of war to Pharakidas and Leptines,

with orders to move at daybreak; while he himself conducted a body

of troops out of the city, during the darkness of night; issuing

forth by Epipolæ and Euryalus (as Gylippus had formerly done when he

surprised Plemmyrium[1074]), and making a circuit until he came, on

the other side of the Anapus, to the temple of Kyanê; thus getting on

the land-side or south-west of the Carthaginian position. He first

despatched his horsemen, together with a regiment of one thousand

mercenary foot-soldiers, to commence the attack. These latter troops

had become peculiarly obnoxious to him, having several times engaged

in revolt and disturbance. Accordingly, while he now ordered them

up to the assault in conjunction with the horse, he at the same

time gave secret directions to the horse, to desert their comrades

and take flight. Both his orders were obeyed. The onset having been

made jointly, in the heat of combat the horsemen fled, leaving their

comrades all to be cut to pieces by the Carthaginians.[1075] We have

as yet heard nothing about difficulties arising to Dionysius from

his mercenary troops, on whose arms his dominion rested; and what we

are here told is enough merely to raise curiosity without satisfying

it. These men are said to have been mutinous and disaffected; a

fact, which explains, if it does not extenuate, the gross perfidy of

deliberately inveigling them to destruction, while he still professed

to keep them under his command.

[1074] Thucyd. vii, 22, 23.

[1075] Diodor. xiv, 72. Οὗτοι δ’ ἦσαν οἱ μισθόφοροι τῷ Διονυσίῳ

παρὰ πάντας ἀλλοτριώτατοι, καὶ πλεονάκις ἀποστάσεις καὶ ταραχὰς

ποιοῦντες. Διόπερ ὁ μὲν Διονύσιος τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν ἦν παρηγγελκὼς,

ὅταν ἐξάπτωνται τῶν πολεμίων, φεύγειν, καὶ τοὺς μισθοφόρους

ἐγκαταλιπεῖν· ὧν ποιησάντων τὸ προσταχθὲν, οὗτοι μὲν ἅπαντες

κατεκόπησαν.

In the actual state of the Carthaginian army, Dionysius could afford

to make them a present of this obnoxious division. His own attack,

first upon the fort of Polichnê, next upon that near the naval

station at Daskon, was conducted with spirit and success. While the

defenders, thinned and enfeebled by the pestilence, were striving

to repel him on the land-side, the Syracusan fleet came forth from

its docks in excellent spirits and order to attack the ships at the

station. These Carthaginian ships, though afloat and moored, were

very imperfectly manned. Before the crews could get aboard to put

them on their defence, the Syracusan triremes and quinqueremes,

ably rowed and with their brazen beaks well directed, drove against

them on the quarter or midships, and broke through the line of

their timbers. The crash of such impact was heard afar off, and the

best ships were thus speedily disabled.[1076] Following up their

success, the Syracusans jumped aboard, overpowered the crews, or

forced them to seek safety as they could in flight. The distracted

Carthaginians being thus pressed at the same time by sea and by land,

the soldiers of Dionysius from the land-side forced their way through

the entrenchment to the shore, where forty pentekonters were hauled

up, while immediately near them were moored both merchantmen and

triremes. The assailants set fire to the pentekonters; upon which the

flames, rapidly spreading under a strong wind, communicated presently

to all the merchantmen and triremes adjacent. Unable to arrest this

terrific conflagration, the crews were obliged to leap overboard;

while the vessels, severed from their moorings by the burning of the

cables, drifted against each other under the wind, until the naval

station at Daskon became one scene of ruin.

[1076] Diodor. xiv, 72. Πάντη δὲ τῶν ἐξοχωτάτων νεῶν θραυομένων,

αἱ μὲν ἐκ τῶν ἐμβόλων ἀναῤῥηττόμεναι λακίδες ἐξαίσιον ἐποιοῦντο

ψόφον, etc.

Such a volume of flame, though destroying the naval resources of the

Carthaginians, must at the same time have driven off the assailing

Syracusan ships of war, and probably also the assailants by land.

But to those who contemplated it from the city of Syracuse, across

the breadth of the Great Harbor, it presented a spectacle grand and

stimulating in the highest degree; especially when the fire was seen

towering aloft amidst the masts, yards, and sails of the merchantmen.

The walls of the city were crowded with spectators, women, children,

and aged men, testifying their exultation by loud shouts, and

stretching their hands to heaven,—as on the memorable day, near

twenty years before, when they gained their final victory in the

same harbor, over the Athenian fleet. Many lads and elders, too much

excited to remain stationary, rushed into such small craft as they

could find, and rowed across the harbor to the scene of action, where

they rendered much service by preserving part of the cargoes, and

towing away some of the enemy’s vessels deserted but not yet on fire.

The evening of this memorable day left Dionysius and the Syracusans

victorious by land as well as by sea; encamped near the temple of

Olympian Zeus which had so recently been occupied by Imilkon. Though

they had succeeded in forcing the defences of the latter both at

Polichnê and at Daskon, and in inflicting upon him a destructive

defeat, yet they would not aim at occupying his camp, in its infected

and deplorable condition.

On two former occasions during the last few years, we have seen the

Carthaginian armies decimated by pestilence,—near Agrigentum and near

Gela,—previous to this last and worst calamity. Imilkon, copying the

weakness of Nikias rather than the resolute prudence of Demosthenes,

had clung to his insalubrious camp near the Great Harbor, long

after all hope of reducing Syracuse had ceased, and while suffering

and death to the most awful extent were daily accumulating around

him. But the recent defeat satisfied even him that his position

was no longer tenable. Retreat was indispensable; yet nowise

impracticable,—with the brave men, Iberians and others, in his army,

and with the Sikels of the interior on his side,—had he possessed the

good qualities as well as the defects of Nikias, or been capable of

anything like that unconquerable energy which ennobled the closing

days of the latter. Instead of taking the best measures available for

a retiring march, Imilkon despatched a secret envoy to Dionysius,

unknown to the Syracusans generally; tendering to him the sum of

three hundred talents which yet remained in the camp, on condition

of the fleet and army being allowed to sail to Africa unmolested.

Dionysius would not consent, nor would the Syracusans have confirmed

any such consent, to let them all escape; but he engaged to permit

the departure of Imilkon himself with the native Carthaginians. The

sum of three hundred talents was accordingly sent across by night to

Ortygia; and the fourth night ensuing was fixed for the departure of

Imilkon and his Carthaginians, without opposition from Dionysius.

During that night forty of their ships, filled with Carthaginians,

put to sea and sailed in silence out of the harbor. Their stealthy

flight, however, did not altogether escape the notice of the

Corinthian seamen in Syracuse; who not only apprised Dionysius, but

also manned some of their own ships and started in pursuit. They

overtook and destroyed one or two of the slowest sailers; but all the

rest with Imilkon himself, accomplished their flight to Carthage.

Dionysius,—while he affected to obey the warning of the Corinthians,

with movements intentionally tardy and unavailing,—applied himself

with earnest activity to act against the forsaken army remaining.

During the same night he led out his troops from the city to the

vicinity of their camp. The flight of Imilkon speedily promulgated,

had filled the whole army with astonishment and consternation. No

command,—no common cause,—no bond of union,—now remained among this

miscellaneous host, already prostrated by previous misfortune. The

Sikels in the army, being near to their own territory and knowing the

roads, retired at once, before daybreak, and reached their homes.

Scarcely had they passed, when the Syracusan soldiers occupied the

roads, and barred the like escape to others. Amidst the general

dispersion of the abandoned soldiers, some perished in vain attempts

to force the passes, others threw down their arms and solicited

mercy. The Iberians alone, maintaining their arms and order with

unshaken resolution, sent to Dionysius propositions to transfer to

him their service; which he thought proper to accept, enrolling them

among his mercenaries. All the remaining host, principally Libyans,

being stripped and plundered by his soldiers, became his captives,

and were probably sold as slaves.[1077]

[1077] Diodor. xiv, 75.

The heroic efforts of Nikias, to open for his army a retreat in

the face of desperate obstacles, had ended in a speedy death as

prisoner at Syracuse,—yet without anything worse than the usual fate

of prisoners of war. But the base treason of Imilkon, though he

insured a safe retreat home by betraying the larger portion of his

army, earned for him only a short prolongation of life amidst the

extreme of ignominy and remorse. When he landed at Carthage with the

fraction of his army preserved, the city was in the deepest distress.

Countless family losses, inflicted by the pestilence, added a keener

sting to the unexampled public loss and humiliation now fully made

known. Universal mourning prevailed; all public and private business

was suspended, all the temples were shut, while the authorities and

the citizens met Imilkon in sad procession on the shore. The defeated

commander strove to disarm their wrath, by every demonstration of

a broken and prostrate spirit. Clothed in the sordid garment of a

slave, he acknowledged himself as the cause of all the ruin, by his

impiety towards the gods; for it was they, and not the Syracusans,

who had been his real enemies and conquerors. He visited all the

temples, with words of atonement and supplication,—replied to all the

inquiries about relatives who had perished under the distemper,—and

then retiring, blocked up the doors of his house, where he starved

himself to death.

But the season of misfortune to Carthage was not closed by his

decease. Her dominion over her Libyan subjects was always harsh

and unpopular, rendering them disposed to rise against her at any

moment of calamity. Her recent disaster in Sicily would have been

in itself perhaps sufficient to stimulate them into insurrection;

but its effect was aggravated by their resentment for the deliberate

betrayal of their troops serving under Imilkon, not one of whom lived

to come back. All the various Libyan subject towns had on this matter

one common feeling of indignation; all came together in congress,

agreed to unite their forces, and formed an army which is said to

have reached one hundred and twenty thousand men. They established

their head-quarters at Tunês (Tunis), a town within a short distance

of Carthage itself, and were for a certain time so much stronger in

the field, that the Carthaginians were obliged to remain within their

walls. For a moment it seemed as if the star of this great commercial

city was about to set for ever. The Carthaginians themselves were

in the depth of despondency, believing themselves to be under the

wrath of the goddesses Demeter and her daughter Persephonê; who, not

content with the terrible revenge already taken in Sicily, for the

sacrilege committed by Imilkon, were still pursuing them into Africa.

Under the extreme religious terror which beset the city, every means

were tried to appease the offended goddesses. Had it been supposed

that the Carthaginian gods had been insulted, expiation would have

been offered by the sacrifice of human victims,—and those too the

most precious, such as beautiful captives, or children of conspicuous

citizens. But on this occasion, the insult had been offered to

Grecian gods, and atonement was to be made according to the milder

ceremonies of Greece. The Carthaginians had never yet instituted in

their city any worship of Demeter or Persephonê; they now established

temples in honor of these goddesses, appointed several of their most

eminent citizens to be priests, and consulted the Greeks resident

among them, as to the form of worship most suitable to be offered.

After having done this, and cleared their own consciences, they

devoted themselves to the preparation of ships and men for the

purpose of carrying on the war. It was soon found that Demeter and

Persephonê were not implacable, and that the fortune of Carthage was

returning. The insurgents, though at first irresistible, presently

fell into discord among themselves about the command. Having no

fleet, they became straitened for want of provisions, while Carthage

was well supplied by sea from Sardinia. From these and similar

causes, their numerous host gradually melted away, and rescued the

Carthaginians from alarm at the point where they were always weakest.

The relations of command and submission, between Carthage and her

Libyan subjects, were established as they had previously stood,

leaving her to recover slowly from her disastrous reverses.[1078]

[1078] Diodor. xiv, 77.

But though the power of Carthage in Africa was thus restored, in

Sicily it was reduced to the lowest ebb. It was long before she

could again make head with effect against Dionysius, who was left

at liberty to push his conquests in another direction, against the

Italiot Greeks. The remaining operations of his reign,—successful

against the Italiots, unsuccessful against Carthage,—will come to be

recounted in my next succeeding chapter and volume.