FROM THE FOUNDATION OF MESSENE AND MEGALOPOLIS TO THE DEATH OF
PELOPIDAS.
Prodigious was the change operated throughout the Grecian world
during the eighteen months between June 371 B.C. (when the general
peace, including all except Thebes, was sworn at Sparta, twenty days
before the battle of Leuktra), and the spring of 369 B.C., when
the Thebans, after a victorious expedition into Peloponnesus, were
reconducted home by Epaminondas.
How that change worked in Peloponnesus, amounting to a partial
reconstitution of the peninsula, has been sketched in the preceding
chapter. Among most of the cities and districts hitherto dependent
allies of Sparta, the local oligarchies, whereby Spartan influence
had been maintained, were overthrown, not without harsh and violent
reaction. Laconia had been invaded and laid waste, while the Spartans
were obliged to content themselves with guarding their central hearth
and their families from assault. The western and best half of Laconia
had been wrested from them; Messênê had been constituted as a free
city on their frontier; a large proportion of their Periœki and
Helots had been converted into independent Greeks bitterly hostile
to them; moreover the Arcadian population had been emancipated from
their dependence, and organized into self-acting jealous neighbors in
the new city of Megalopolis, as well as in Tegea and Mantinea. The
once philo-Laconian Tegea was now among the chief enemies of Sparta;
and the Skiritæ, so long numbered as the bravest of the auxiliary
troops of the latter, were now identified in sentiment with Arcadians
and Thebans against her.
Out of Peloponnesus, the change wrought had also been considerable;
partly, in the circumstances of Thessaly and Macedonia, partly in the
position and policy of Athens.
At the moment of the battle of Leuktra (July, 371 B.C.) Jason was
tagus of Thessaly, and Amyntas king of Macedonia. Amyntas was
dependent on, if not tributary to, Jason, whose dominion, military
force, and revenue, combined with extraordinary personal energy and
ability, rendered him decidedly the first potentate in Greece, and
whose aspirations were known to be unbounded; so that he inspired
more or less alarm everywhere, especially to weaker neighbors like
the Macedonian prince. Throughout a reign of twenty-three years, full
of trouble and peril, Amyntas had cultivated the friendship both of
Sparta and of Athens,[521] especially the former. It was by Spartan
aid only that he had been enabled to prevail over the Olynthian
confederacy, which would otherwise have proved an overmatch for
him. At the time when Sparta aided him to crush that promising and
liberal confederacy, she was at the maximum of her power (382-379
B.C.), holding even Thebes under garrison among her subject allies.
But the revolution of Thebes, and the war against Thebes and Athens
(from 378 B.C. downward) had sensibly diminished her power on land;
while the newly-organized naval force and maritime confederacy of
the Athenians, had overthrown her empire at sea. Moreover, the
great power of Jason in Thessaly had so grown up (combined with the
resistance of the Thebans) as to cut off the communication of Sparta
with Macedonia, and even to forbid her (in 374 B.C.) from assisting
her faithful ally, the Pharsalian Polydamas, against him.[522]
To Amyntas, accordingly, the friendship of Athens, now again the
greatest maritime potentate in Greece, had become more important than
that of Sparta. We know that he tried to conciliate the powerful
Athenian generals, Iphikrates and Timotheus. He adopted the former as
his son;[523] at what exact period, cannot be discovered; but I have
already stated that Iphikrates had married the daughter of Kotys king
of Thrace, and had acquired a maritime settlement called Drys, on the
Thracian coast. In the years 373-372 B.C., we find Timotheus also in
great favor with Amyntas, testified by a valuable present sent to him
at Athens; a cargo of timber, the best produce of Macedonia.[524]
Amyntas was at this period on the best footing with Athens, sent his
deputies as a confederate to the regular synod there assembled, and
was treated with considerable favor.[525]
[521] Æschines, De Fals. Leg. c. 13, p. 249; Isokrates, Or. v,
(Philipp.) s. 124. Ὁ γὰρ πατήρ σου (Isokrates to Philip) πρὸς
τὰς πόλεις ταύτας (Sparta, Athens, Argos, and Thebes), αἷς σοι
παραινῶ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, πρὸς ἁπάσας οἰκείως εἶχε.
The connection of Amyntas with Thebes could hardly have been
considerable; that with Argos, was based upon a strong legendary
and ancestral sentiment rather than on common political grounds;
with Athens, it was both political and serious; with Sparta, it
was attested by the most essential military aid and coöperation.
[522] Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 17.
[523] Æschines, De Fals. Leg. c. 13, p. 249.
[524] Demosthen. cont. Timotheum. c. 8, p. 1194; Xenoph. Hellen.
vi, 1, 11.
[525] Æschines, De Fals. Leg. c. 13, p. 248. τὴν πατρικὴν
εὔνοιαν, καὶ τὰς εὐεργεσίας ἃς ὑμεῖς ὑπήρξατε Ἀμύντᾳ, τῷ Φιλίππου
πατρὶ, etc.
Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. c. 30, p. 660. τὴν πατρικὴν φιλίαν
ἀνανεοῦθαι (Philip to the Athenians): compare ibid. c. 29, p. 657.
The battle of Leuktra (July 371 B.C.) tended to knit more closely
the connection between Amyntas and the Athenians, who were now the
auxiliaries most likely to sustain him against the ascendency of
Jason. It produced at the same time the more important effect of
stimulating the ambition of Athens in every direction. Not only
her ancient rival, Sparta, beaten in the field and driven from
one humiliation to another, was disabled from opposing her, and
even compelled to solicit her aid,—but new rivals, the Thebans,
were suddenly lifted into an ascendency inspiring her with mingled
jealousy and apprehension. Hence fresh hopes as well as fresh
jealousies conspired to push Athens in a career of aspiration such as
had never appeared open to her since the disasters of 404 B.C. Such
enlargement of her views was manifested conspicuously by the step
taken two or three months after the battle of Leuktra (mentioned in
my preceding chapter),—of causing the peace, which had already been
sworn at Sparta in the preceding month of June, to be resworn under
the presidency and guarantee of Athens, by cities binding themselves
mutually to each other as defensive allies of Athens;[526] thus
silently disenthroning Sparta and taking her place.
On land, however, Athens had never held, and could hardly expect to
hold, anything above the second rank, serving as a bulwark against
Theban aggrandizement. At sea she already occupied the first place,
at the head of an extensive confederacy; and it was to farther
maritime aggrandizement that her present chances, as well as her past
traditions, pointed. Such is the new path upon which we now find
her entering. At the first formation of her new confederacy, in 378
B.C., she had distinctly renounced all idea of resuming the large
amount of possessions, public and private, which had been snatched
from her along with her empire at the close of the Peloponnesian
war; and had formally proclaimed that no Athenian citizen should
for the future possess or cultivate land out of Attica—a guarantee
against renovation of the previous kleruchies or out-possessions.
This prudent self-restraint, which had contributed so much during
the last seven years to raise her again into naval preëminence, is
now gradually thrown aside, under the tempting circumstances of the
moment. Henceforward, the Athenian maritime force becomes employed
for the recovery of lost possessions as well as for protection or
enlargement of the confederacy. The prohibition against kleruchies
out of Attica will soon appear to be forgotten. Offence is given to
the prominent members of the maritime confederacy; so that the force
of Athens, misemployed and broken into fragments, is found twelve or
thirteen years afterwards unable to repel a new aggressor, who starts
up, alike able and unexpected, in the Macedonian prince Philip, son
of Amyntas.
[526] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 2.
Very different was the position of Amyntas himself towards Athens, in
371 B.C. He was an unpretending ally, looking for help in case of
need against Jason, and sending his envoy to the meeting at Athens
about September or October 371 B.C., when the general peace was
resworn under Athenian auspices. It was at this meeting that Athens
seems to have first put forth her new maritime pretensions. While
guaranteeing to every Grecian city, great and small, the enjoyment
of autonomy, she made exception of some cities which she claimed as
belonging to herself. Among these was certainly Amphipolis; probably
also the towns in the Thracian Chersonesus and Potidæa; all which
we find, a few years afterwards, occupied by Athenians.[527] How
much of their lost possessions the Athenians thought it prudent now
to reclaim, we cannot distinctly make out. But we know that their
aspirations grasped much more than Amphipolis;[528] and the moment
was probably thought propitious for making other demands besides.
Amyntas through his envoy, together with the rest of the assembled
envoys, recognized without opposition the right of the Athenians to
Amphipolis.[529]
[527] Demosthen. (Philippic. ii, c. 4, p. 71; De Halonneso, c. 3,
p. 79; De Rebus Chersones. c. 2, p. 91); also Epistol. Philipp.
ap. Demosthen. c. 6, p. 163.
[528] Compare the aspirations of Athens, as stated in 391 B.C.,
when the propositions of peace recommended by Andokides were
under consideration, aspirations, which were then regarded as
beyond all hope of attainment, and imprudent even to talk about
(Andokides, De Pace, s. 15). φέρε, ἀλλὰ Χεῤῥόνησον καὶ τὰς
ἀποικίας καὶ τὰ ἐγκτήματα καὶ τὰ χρέα ἵνα ἀπολάβωμεν; Ἀλλ’ οὔτε
βασιλεὺς, οὔτε οἱ σύμμαχοι, συγχωροῦσιν ἡμῖν, μεθ’ ὧν αὐτὰ δεῖ
πολεμοῦντας κτήσασθαι.
[529] Æschines, De Fals. Leg. c. 14, p. 250.
Συμμαχίας γὰρ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων συνελθούσης,
εἷς ὢν τούτων Ἀμύντας ὁ Φιλίππου πατὴρ, καὶ πέμπων σύνεδρον,
καὶ τῆς καθ’ ἐαυτὸν ψήφου κύριος ὢν, ~ἐψηφίσατο Ἀμφίπολιν τὴν
Ἀθηναίων συνεξαιρεῖν μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων Ἀθηναίοις~. Καὶ τοῦτο
τὸ κοινὸν δόγμα τῶν Ἑλλήνων, καὶ τοὺς ψηφισαμένους, ~ἐκ τῶν
δημοσίων γραμμάτων~ μάρτυρας παρεσχόμην.
The remarkable event to which Æschines here makes allusion, must
have taken place either in the congress held at Sparta, in the
month preceding the battle of Leuktra, where the general peace
was sworn, with universal autonomy guaranteed,—leaving out only
Thebes; or else, at the subsequent congress held three or four
months afterwards at Athens, where a peace, on similar conditions
generally, was again sworn under the auspices of Athens as
president.
My conviction is, that it took place on the latter occasion,—at
Athens. First, the reference of Æschines to the δημόσια γράμματα
leads us to conclude that the affair was transacted in that city;
secondly, I do not think that the Athenians would have been in
any situation to exact such a reserve in their favor, prior to
the battle of Leuktra; thirdly, the congress at Sparta was held,
not for the purpose of συμμαχία or alliance, but for that of
terminating the war and concluding peace; while the subsequent
congress at Athens formed the basis of a defensive alliance, to
which, either then or soon afterwards, Sparta acceded.
Such recognition was not indeed in itself either any loss to
Amyntas, or any gain to Athens; for Amphipolis, though bordering
on his kingdom, had never belonged to him, nor had he any power of
transferring it. Originally an Athenian colony,[530] next taken from
Athens in 424-423 B.C. by Brasidas, through the improvidence of
the Athenian officers Euklês and Thucydides, then recolonized under
Lacedæmonian auspices,—it had ever since remained an independent
city; though Sparta had covenanted to restore it by the peace of
Nikias (421 B.C.), but had never performed her covenant. Its
unparalleled situation, near to both the bridge and mouth of the
Strymon, in the midst of a fertile territory, within reach of the
mining district of Pangæus,—rendered it a tempting prize; and
the right of Athens to it was indisputable; so far as original
colonization before the capture by Brasidas, and formal treaty of
cession by Sparta after the capture, could confer a right. But this
treaty, not fulfilled at the time, was now fifty years old. The
repugnance of the Amphipolitan population, which had originally
prevented its fulfilment, was strengthened by all the sanction of
a long prescription; while the tomb and chapel of Brasidas their
second founder, consecrated in the agora, served as an imperishable
admonition to repel all pretensions on the part of Athens. Such
pretensions, whatever might be the right, were deplorably impolitic
unless Athens was prepared to back them by strenuous efforts of men
and money; from which we shall find her shrinking now as she had
done (under the unwise advice of Nikias) in 421 B.C., and the years
immediately succeeding. In fact, the large renovated pretensions of
Athens both to Amphipolis and to other places on the Macedonian and
Chalkidic coast, combined with her languor and inertness in military
action,—will be found henceforward among the greatest mischiefs
to the general cause of Hellenic independence, and among the most
effective helps to the well-conducted aggressions of Philip of
Macedon.
[530] The pretensions advanced by Philip of Macedon (in
his Epistola ad Athenienses, ap. Demosthen. p. 164), that
Amphipolis or its locality originally belonged to his ancestor
Alexander son of Amyntas, as having expelled the Persians from
it,—are unfounded, and contradicted by Thucydides. At least,
if (which is barely possible) Alexander ever did acquire the
spot, he must have lost it afterwards; for it was occupied by
the Edonian Thracians, both in 465 B.C., when Athens made her
first unsuccessful attempt to plant a colony there,—and in 437
B.C., when she tried again with better success under Agnon, and
established Amphipolis (Thucyd. iv, 102).
The expression of Æschines, that Amyntas in 371 B.C. “gave up or
receded from” Amphipolis (ὧν δ’ Ἀμύντας ἀπέστη—De Fals. Leg. 1
c.) can at most only be construed as referring to rights which he
may have claimed, since he was never in actual possession of it;
though we cannot wonder that the orator should use such language
in addressing Philip son of Amyntas, who was really master of the
town.
Though the claim of Athens to the recovery of a portion of her lost
transmarine possessions was thus advanced and recognized in the
congress of autumn 371 B.C., she does not seem to have been able to
take any immediate steps for prosecuting it. Six months afterwards,
the state of northern Greece was again completely altered by the
death, nearly at the same time, of Jason in Thessaly, and of Amyntas
in Macedonia.[531] The former was cut off (as has been mentioned
in the preceding chapter) by assassination, while in the plenitude
of his vigor; and his great power could not be held together by an
inferior hand. His two brothers, Polyphron and Polydorus, succeeded
him in the post of tagus of Thessaly. Polyphron, having put to death
his brother, enjoyed the dignity for a short time; after which he
too was slain by a third brother, Alexander of Pheræ; but not before
he had committed gross enormities by killing and banishing many of
the most eminent citizens of Larissa and Pharsalus; among them the
estimable Polydamas.[532] The Larissæan exiles, many belonging to
the great family of the Aleuadæ, took refuge in Macedonia, where
Amyntas (having died in 370 B.C.) had been succeeded in the throne
by his youthful son Alexander. The latter, being persuaded to invade
Thessaly for the purpose of restoring them, succeeded in getting
possession of Larissa and Krannon; both which cities he kept under
his own garrisons, in spite of unavailing resistance from Polyphron
and Alexander of Pheræ.[533]
[531] Diodor. xv, 60.
[532] Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 4, 33, 34.
Diodorus (xv, 61) calls Alexander of Pheræ brother of Polydorus;
Plutarch (Pelopid. c. 29) calls him nephew. Xenophon does not
expressly say which; but his narrative seems to countenance the
statement of Diodorus rather than that of Plutarch.
[533] Diodor. xv, 61.
This Alexander, who succeeded to Jason’s despotism in Pheræ, and
to a considerable portion of his military power, was nevertheless
unable to keep together the whole of it, or to retain Thessaly and
its circumjacent tributaries in one united dominion. The Thessalian
cities hostile to him invited assistance, not merely from Alexander
of Macedon, but also from the Thebans; who despatched Pelopidas
into the country, seemingly in 369 B.C., soon after the return of
the army under Epaminondas from its victorious progress in Laconia
and Arcadia. Pelopidas entered Thessaly at the head of an army,
and took Larissa with various other cities into Theban protection;
apparently under the acquiescence of Alexander of Macedon, with whom
he contracted an alliance.[534] A large portion of Thessaly thus came
under the protection of Thebes in hostility to the dynasty of Pheræ,
and to the brutal tyrant Alexander who now ruled in that city.
Alexander of Macedon found that he had difficulty enough in
maintaining his own dominion at home, without holding Thessalian
towns in garrison. He was harassed by intestine dissensions, and
after a reign of scarcely two years, was assassinated (368 B.C.) by
some conspirators of Alôrus and Pydna, two cities (half Macedonian,
half Hellenic) near the western coast of the Thermaic Gulf. Ptolemæus
(or Ptolemy) of Alôrus is mentioned as leader of the enterprise,
and Apollophanês of Pydna as one of the agents.[535] But besides
these conspirators, there was also another enemy, Pausanias,—a
man of the royal lineage and a pretender to the throne;[536] who,
having been hitherto in banishment, was now returning at the head
of a considerable body of Greeks, supported by numerous partisans
in Macedonia,—and was already master of Anthemus, Thermê, Strepsa,
and other places in or near the Thermaic Gulf. He was making war
both against Ptolemy and against the remaining family of Amyntas.
Eurydikê, the widow of that prince, was now left with her two younger
children, Perdikkas, a young man, and Philip, yet a youth. She was in
the same interest with Ptolemy, the successful conspirator against
her son Alexander, and there was even a tale which represented her
as his accomplice in the deed. Ptolemy was regent, administering her
affairs and those of her minor children, against Pausanias.[537]
[534] Diodor. xv, 67.
The transactions of Macedonia and Thessaly at this period are
difficult to make out clearly. What is stated in the text comes
from Diodorus; who affirms, however, farther,—that Pelopidas
marched into Macedonia, and brought back as a hostage to
Thebes the youthful Philip, brother of Alexander. This latter
affirmation is incorrect; we know that Philip was in Macedonia,
and free, _after_ the death of Alexander. And I believe that the
march of Pelopidas into Macedonia, with the bringing back of
Philip as a hostage, took place in the following year 368 B.C.
Justin also states (vii, 5) erroneously, that Alexander of
Macedon gave his brother Philip as a hostage, first to the
Illyrians, next to the Thebans.
[535] Demosthen. De Fals. Leg. c. 58, p. 402; Diodorus, xv, 71.
Diodorus makes the mistake of calling this Ptolemy son of Amyntas
and brother of Perdikkas; though he at the same time describes
him as Πτολεμαῖος Ἀλωρίτης, which description would hardly be
applied to one of the royal brothers. Moreover, the passage of
Æschines, Fals. Leg. c. 14, p. 250, shows that Ptolemy was not
son of Amyntas; and Dexippus (ap. Syncellum, p. 263) confirms the
fact.
See these points discussed in Mr. Fynes Clinton’s Fasti
Hellenici, Appendix, c. 4.
[536] Diodor. xvi, 2.
[537] Æschines, Fals. Legat. c. 13, 14, p. 249, 250; Justin, vii,
6.
Æschines mentions Ptolemy as regent, on behalf of Eurydikê and
her younger sons. Æschines also mentions Alexander as having
recently died, but says nothing about his assassination.
Nevertheless there is no reason to doubt that he was
assassinated, which we know both from Demosthenes and Diodorus;
and assassinated by Ptolemy, which we know from Plutarch (Pelop.
c. 27), Marsyas (ap. Athenæum, xiv. p. 629), and Diodorus.
Justin states that Eurydikê conspired both against her husband
Amyntas, and against her children, in concert with a paramour.
The statements of Æschines rather tend to disprove the charge of
her having been concerned in the death of Amyntas, but to support
that of her having been accomplice with Ptolemy in the murder of
Alexander.
Assassination was a fate which frequently befel the Macedonian
kings. When we come to the history of Olympias, mother of
Alexander the Great, it will be seen that Macedonian queens were
capable of greater crimes than those imputed to Eurydikê.
Deserted by many of their most powerful friends, Eurydikê and Ptolemy
would have been forced to yield the country to Pausanias, had they
not found by accident a foreign auxiliary near at hand. The Athenian
admiral Iphikrates, with a squadron of moderate force, was then on
the coast of Macedonia. He had been sent thither by his countrymen
(369 B.C.) (soon after his partial conflict near Corinth with the
retreating army of Epaminondas, on its way from Peloponnesus to
Bœotia), for the purpose of generally surveying the maritime region
of Macedonia and Thrace, opening negotiations with parties in the
country, and laying his plans for future military operations. At the
period when Alexander was slain, and when Pausanias was carrying on
his invasion, Iphikrates happened to be on the Macedonian coast.
He was there visited by Eurydikê with her two sons Perdikkas and
Philip; the latter seemingly about thirteen or fourteen years of age,
the former somewhat older. She urgently implored him to assist the
family in their present emergency, reminding him that Amyntas had
not only throughout his life been a faithful ally of Athens, but had
also adopted him (Iphikrates) as his son, and had thus constituted
him brother to the two young princes. Placing Perdikkas in his hands,
and causing Philip to embrace his knees, she appealed to his generous
sympathies, and invoked his aid as the only chance of restoration,
or even of personal safety, to the family. Iphikrates, moved by this
affecting supplication, declared in her favor, acted so vigorously
against Pausanias as to expel him from Macedonia, and secured the
sceptre to the family of Amyntas; under Ptolemy of Alôrus as regent
for the time.
This striking incident is described by the orator Æschines[538] in
an oration delivered many years afterwards at Athens. The boy, who
then clasped the knees of Iphikrates, lived afterwards to overthrow
the independence, not of Athens alone, but of Greece generally. The
Athenian general had not been sent to meddle in the disputes of
succession to the Macedonian crown. Nevertheless, looking at the
circumstances of the time, his interference may really have promised
beneficial consequences to Athens; so that we have no right to blame
him for the unforeseen ruin which it was afterwards found to occasion.
[538] Æschines, Fals. Leg. c. 13, 14, p. 249, 250; Cornelius
Nepos, Iphicrates, c. 3.
Though the interference of Iphikrates maintained the family of
Amyntas, and established Ptolemy of Alôrus as regent, it did not
procure to Athens the possession of Amphipolis; which was not in
the power of the Macedonian kings to bestow. Amphipolis was at
that time a free Greek city, inhabited by a population in the
main seemingly Chalkidic, and in confederacy with Olynthus.[539]
Iphikrates prosecuted his naval operations on the coast of Thrace
and Macedonia for a period of three years (368-365 B.C.). We make
out very imperfectly what he achieved. He took into his service a
general named Charidemus, a native of Oreus in Eubœa; one of those
Condottieri (to use an Italian word familiar in the fourteenth
century), who, having a band of mercenaries under his command, hired
himself to the best bidder and to the most promising cause. These
mercenaries served under Iphikrates for three years,[540] until he
was dismissed by the Athenians from his command and superseded by
Timotheus. What successes they enabled him to obtain for Athens,
is not clear; but it is certain that he did not succeed in taking
Amphipolis. He seems to have directed one or two attempts against the
town by other officers, which proved abortive; but he got possession
of some Amphipolitan prisoners or hostages,[541] which opened a
prospect of accomplishing the surrender of the town.
[539] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669, s. 150.
... μισθοῖ πάλιν αὑτὸν (Charidemus) τοῖς Ὀλυνθίοις, τοῖς ὑμετέροις
ἐχθροῖς καὶ τοῖς ἔχουσιν Ἀμφίπολιν κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον.
Demosthenes is here speaking of the time when Timotheus
superseded Iphikrates in the command, that is, about 365-364 B.C.
But we are fairly entitled to presume that the same is true of
369 or 368 B.C.
[540] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669, s. 149, c. 37.
[541] Demosthen. cont. Aristokr. p. 669, s. 149, c. 37.
The passage in which the orator alludes to these _hostages_ of
the Amphipolitans in the hands of Iphikrates, is unfortunately
not fully intelligible without farther information.
(Charidemus) Πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς ~Ἀμφιπολιτῶν ὁμήρους, οὓς παρ’
Ἁρπάλου λαβὼν Ἰφικράτης ἔδωκε φυλάττειν αὐτῷ, ψηφισαμένων ὑμῶν~
ὡς ὑμᾶς κομίσαι, παρέδωκεν Ἀμφιπολίταις· καὶ τοῦ μὴ λαβεῖν
Ἀμφίπολιν, τοῦτ’ ἐμπόδιον κατέστη.
Who Harpalus was,—or what is meant by Iphikrates “obtaining
(or capturing) from him the Amphipolitan hostages”—we cannot
determine. Possibly Harpalus may have been commander of a
body of Macedonians or Thracians acting as auxiliaries to the
Amphipolitans, and in this character exacting hostages from them
as security. Charidemus, as we see afterwards when acting for
Kersobleptes, received hostages from the inhabitants of Sestos
(Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 679. c. 40 s. 177).
It seems evident, however, in spite of our great dearth of
information, that Iphikrates during his command between 369-365
B.C. did not satisfy the expectations of his countrymen. At that
time, those expectations were large, as testified by sending out not
only Iphikrates to Macedonia and Thrace, but also Timotheus (who
had returned from his service with the Persians in 372-371 B.C.)
to Ionia and the Hellespont, in conjunction with Ariobarzanes the
satrap of Phrygia.[542] That satrap was in possession of Sestos, as
well as of various other towns in the Thracian Chersonesus, towards
which Athenian ambition now tended, according to that new turn,
towards more special and separate acquisitions for Athens, which it
had taken since the battle of Leuktra. But before we advert to the
achievements of Timotheus (366-365 B.C.) in these regions, we must
notice the main course of political conflict in Greece Proper, down
to the partial pacification of 366 B.C.
[542] Demosthen. De Rhodior. Libertat. c. 5, p. 193.
Though the Athenians had sent Iphikrates (in the winter of 370-369
B.C.) to rescue Sparta from the grasp of Epaminondas, the terms of
a permanent alliance had not yet been settled between them; envoys
from Sparta and her allies visited Athens shortly afterwards for
that purpose.[543] All pretensions to exclusive headship on the
part of Sparta were now at an end. Amidst abundant discussion in
the public assembly, all the speakers, Lacedæmonian and others as
well as Athenian, unanimously pronounced that the headship must be
vested jointly and equally in Sparta and Athens; and the only point
in debate was, how such an arrangement could be most suitably carried
out. It was at first proposed that the former should command on
land, the latter at sea; a distribution, which, on first hearing,
found favor both as equitable and convenient, until an Athenian
named Kephisodotus reminded his countrymen, that the Lacedæmonians
had few ships of war, and those manned chiefly by Helots; while the
land-force of Athens consisted of her horsemen and hoplites, the
choice citizens of the state. Accordingly, on the distribution now
pointed out, Athenians, in great numbers and of the best quality,
would be placed under Spartan command; while few Lacedæmonians, and
those of little dignity, would go under Athenian command; which would
be, not equality, but the reverse. Kephisodotus proposed that both
on land and at sea, the command should alternate between Athens and
Sparta, in periods of five days; and his amendment was adopted.[544]
[543] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 1.
The words τῷ ὑστέρῳ ἔτει must denote the year beginning in the
spring of 369 B.C. On this point I agree with Dr. Thirlwall
(Hist. Gr. vol. v, ch. 40, p. 145 note); differing from him
however (p. 146 note), as well as from Mr. Clinton, in this,—that
I place the second expedition of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus
(as Sievers places it, p. 278) in 369 B.C.; not in 368 B.C.
The narrative of Xenophon carries to my mind conviction that this
is what he meant to affirm. In the beginning of Book VII, he
says, τῷ δ’ ὑστέρῳ ἔτει Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν συμμάχων πρέσβεις
ἦλθον αὐτοκράτορες Ἀθήναζε, βουλευσόμενοι καθ’ ὅ,τι ἡ συμμαχία
ἔσοιτο Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις.
Now the words τῷ δ’ ὑστέρῳ ἔτει denote the spring of 369 B.C.
Xenophon goes on to describe the assembly and the discussion
at Athens, respecting the terms of alliance. This description
occupies, from vii, 1, 1 to vii, 1, 14, where the final vote and
agreement is announced.
Immediately after this vote, Xenophon goes on to
say,—Στρατευομένων δ’ ἀμφοτέρων αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν συμμάχων
(Lacedæmonians, Athenians, and allies) εἰς Κόρινθον, ἔδοξε κοινῇ
φυλάττειν τὸ Ὄνειον. Καὶ ἐπεὶ ἐπορεύοντο οἱ Θηβαῖοι καὶ οἱ
σύμμαχοι, παραταξάμενοι ἐφύλαττον ἄλλος ἄλλοθεν τοῦ Ὀνείου.
I conceive that the decision of the Athenian assembly,—the
march of the Athenians and Lacedæmonians to guard the lines of
Oneion,—and the march of the Thebans to enter Peloponnesus,—are
here placed by Xenophon as events in immediate sequence, with no
long interval of time between them. I see no ground to admit the
interval of a year between the vote of the assembly and the march
of the Thebans; the more so, as Epaminondas might reasonably
presume that the building of Megalopolis and Messene, recently
begun, would need to be supported by another Theban army in
Peloponnesus during 369 B.C.
It is indeed contended (and admitted even by Sievers) that
Epaminondas could not have been reëlected Bœotarch in 369 B.C.
But in this point I do not concur. It appears to me that the
issue of the trial at Thebes was triumphant for him; thus making
it more probable,—not less probable,—that he and Pelopidas were
reëlected Bœotarchs immediately.
[544] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 10-14.
Though such amendment had the merit of perfect equality between the
two competitors for headship, it was by no means well-calculated for
success in joint operations against a general like Epaminondas. The
allies determined to occupy Corinth as a main station, and to guard
the line of Mount Oneium between that city and Kenchreæ,[545] so as
to prevent the Thebans from again penetrating into Peloponnesus.
It is one mark of the depression in the fortunes of Sparta, that
this very station, now selected for the purpose of keeping a Theban
invader away from her frontier, had been held, during the war from
394-387 B.C., by the Athenians and Thebans against herself, to
prevent her from breaking out of Peloponnesus into Attica and Bœotia.
Never since the invasion of Xerxes had there been any necessity for
defending the Isthmus of Corinth against an extra-Peloponnesian
assailant. But now, even to send a force from Sparta to Corinth,
recourse must have been had to transport by sea, either across the
Argolic Gulf from Prasiæ to Halieis, or round Cape Skyllæum to the
Saronic Gulf and Kenchreæ; for no Spartan troops could march by land
across Arcadia or Argos. This difficulty however was surmounted, and
a large allied force (not less than twenty thousand men according
to Diodorus),—consisting of Athenians with auxiliary mercenaries
under Chabrias, Lacedæmonians, Pellenians, Epidaurians, Megarians,
Corinthians, and all the other allies still adhering to Sparta,—was
established in defensive position along the line of Oneium.
[545] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 15, 16; Diodor. xv, 68.
It was essential for Thebes to reopen communication with her
Peloponnesian allies. Accordingly Epaminondas, at the head of the
Thebans and their northern allies, arrived during the same summer in
front of this position, on his march into Peloponnesus. His numbers
were inferior to those of his assembled enemies, whose position
prevented him from joining his Arcadian, Argeian, and Eleian allies,
already assembled in Peloponnesus. After having vainly challenged
the enemy to come down and fight in the plain, Epaminondas laid
his plan for attacking the position. Moving from his camp a little
before daybreak, so as to reach the enemy just when the night-guards
were retiring, but before the general body had yet risen and got
under arms,[546]—he directed an assault along the whole line. But
his principal effort, at the head of the chosen Theban troops, was
made against the Lacedæmonians and Pellenians, who were posted in
the most assailable part of the line.[547] So skilfully was his
movement conducted, that he completely succeeded in surprising them.
The Lacedæmonian polemarch, taken unprepared, was driven from his
position, and forced to retire to another point of the hilly ground.
He presently sent to solicit a truce for burying his dead; agreeing
to abandon the line of Oneium, which had now become indefensible. The
other parts of the Theban army made no impression by their attack,
nor were they probably intended to do more than occupy attention,
while Epaminondas himself vigorously assailed the weak point of
the position. Yet Xenophon censures the Lacedæmonian polemarch as
faint-hearted, for having evacuated the whole line as soon as his
own position was forced; alleging, that he might easily have found
another good position on one of the neighboring eminences, and might
have summoned reinforcements from his allies,—and that the Thebans,
in spite of their partial success, were so embarrassed how to descend
on the Peloponnesian side of Oneium, that they were half disposed to
retreat. The criticism of Xenophon indicates doubtless an unfavorable
judgment pronounced by many persons in the army; the justice of which
we are not in a condition to appreciate. But whether the Lacedæmonian
commander was to blame or not, Epaminondas, by his skilful and
victorious attack upon this strong position, enhanced his already
high military renown.[548]
[546] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 16; Polyænus, ii, 2, 9.
This was an hour known to be favorable to sudden assailants,
affording a considerable chance that the enemy might be off their
guard. It was at the same hour that the Athenian Thrasybulus
surprised the troops of the Thirty, near Phylê in Attica (Xen.
Hellen. ii, 4, 6).
[547] Xen. Hellen. ib.; Pausanias, ix, 15, 2.
Pausanias describes the battle as having been fought περὶ
Λέχαιον; not very exact, topographically, since it was on the
other side of Corinth, between Corinth and Kenchreæ.
Diodorus (xv, 68) states that the whole space across, from
Kenchreæ on one sea to Lechæum on the other, was trenched and
palisaded by the Athenians and Spartans. But this cannot be true,
because the Long Walls were a sufficient defence between Corinth
and Lechæum; and even between Corinth and Kenchreæ, it is not
probable that any such continuous line of defence was drawn,
though the assailable points were probably thus guarded. Xenophon
does not mention either trench or palisade.
[548] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 14-17; Diodor. xv, 68.
Having joined his Peloponnesian allies, Arcadians, Eleians, and
Argeians, he was more than a match for the Spartan and Athenian
force, which appears now to have confined itself to Corinth, Lechæum,
and Kenchreæ. He ravaged the territories of Epidaurus, Trœzen, and
Phlius; and obtained possession of Sikyon as well as of Pellênê.[549]
At Sikyon, a vote of the people being taken, it was resolved to
desert Sparta, to form alliance with Thebes, and to admit a Theban
harmost and garrison into the acropolis; Euphron, a citizen hitherto
preponderant in the city by means of Sparta and devoted to her
interest, now altered his politics and went along with the stronger
tide.[550] We cannot doubt also that Epaminondas went into Arcadia to
encourage and regulate the progress of his two great enterprises,—the
foundation of Messênê and Megalopolis; nor does the silence of
Xenophon on such a matter amount to any disproof. These new towns
having been commenced less than a year before, cannot have been yet
finished, and may probably have required the reappearance of his
victorious army. The little town of Phlius,—situated south of Sikyon
and west of Corinth,—which was one of the most faithful allies of
Sparta, was also in great hazard of being captured by the Phliasian
exiles. When the Arcadians and Eleians were marching through Nemea to
join Epaminondas at Oneium, these exiles entreated them only to show
themselves near Phlius; with the assurance that such demonstration
would suffice to bring about the capture of the town. The exiles then
stole by night to the foot of the town walls with scaling-ladders,
and there lay hid, until, as day began to break, the scouts from the
neighboring hill Trikaranum announced that the allied enemies were in
sight. While the attention of the citizens within was thus engaged
on the other side, the concealed exiles planted their ladders,
overpowered the few unprepared guards, and got possession of the
acropolis. Instead of contenting themselves with this position until
the allied force came up, they strove also to capture the town; but
in this they were defeated by the citizens, who, by desperate efforts
of bravery, repulsed both the intruders within and the enemy without;
thus preserving their town.[551] The fidelity of the Phliasians to
Sparta entailed upon them severe hardships through the superiority
of their enemies in the field, and through perpetual ravage of their
territory from multiplied hostile neighbors (Argos, Arcadia, and
Sikyon), who had established fortified posts on their borders; for it
was only on the side of Corinth that the Phliasians had a friendly
neighbor to afford them the means of purchasing provisions.[552]
[549] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 18; vii, 2, 11; Diodor. xv, 69.
This march against Sikyon seems alluded to by Pausanias (vi, 3,
1); the Eleian horse were commanded by Stomius, who slew the
enemy’s commander with his own hand.
The stratagem of the Bœotian Pammenes in attacking the harbor
of Sikyon (Polyænus, v, 16, 4) may perhaps belong to this
undertaking.
[550] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 18, 22, 44; vii, 3, 2-8.
[551] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 5-9.
This incident may have happened in 369 B.C., just about the
time when Epaminondas surprised and broke through the defensive
lines of Mount Oneium. In the second chapter of the seventh Book,
Xenophon takes up the history of Phlius, and carries it on from
the winter of 370-369 B.C., when Epaminondas invaded Laconia,
through 369, 368, 367 B.C.
[552] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 17.
Amidst general success, the Thebans experienced partial reverses.
Their march carrying them near to Corinth, a party of them had the
boldness to rush at the gates, and to attempt a surprise of the town.
But the Athenian Chabrias, then commanding within it, disposed his
troops so skilfully, and made so good a resistance, that he defeated
them with loss and reduced them to the necessity of asking for the
ordinary truce to bury their dead, which were lying very near to
the walls.[553] This advantage over the victorious Thebans somewhat
raised the spirits of the Spartan allies; who were still farther
encouraged by the arrival in Lechæum of a squadron from Syracuse,
bringing a body of two thousand mercenary Gauls and Iberians,
with fifty horsemen, as a succor from the despot Dionysius. Such
foreigners had never before been seen in Peloponnesus. Their bravery,
and singular nimbleness of movement, gave them the advantage in
several partial skirmishes, and disconcerted the Thebans. But the
Spartans and Athenians were not bold enough to hazard a general
battle, and the Syracusan detachment returned home after no very long
stay,[554] while the Thebans also went back to Bœotia.
[553] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 19; Diodor. xv, 69.
[554] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 22; Diodor. xv, 70.
Diodorus states that these mercenaries had been furnished with
pay for five months; if this is correct, I presume that we must
understand it as comprehending the time of their voyage from
Sicily and back to Sicily. Nevertheless, the language of Xenophon
would not lead us to suppose that they remained in Peloponnesus
even so long as three months.
I think it certain however that much more must have passed in
this campaign than what Xenophon indicates. Epaminondas would
hardly have forced the passage of the Oneium for such small
objects as we find mentioned in the Hellenica.
An Athenian Inscription, extremely defective, yet partially
restored and published by M. Boeckh (Corp. Inscr. No. 85 a.
Addenda to vol. i, p. 897), records a vote of the Athenian people
and of the synod of Athenian confederates—praising Dionysius of
Syracuse,—and recording him with his two sons as benefactors of
Athens. It was probably passed somewhere near this time; and we
know from Demosthenes that the Athenians granted the freedom
of their city to Dionysius and his descendants (Demosthenes ad
Philipp. Epistol. p. 161, as well as the Epistle of Philip, on
which this is a comment). The Inscription is too defective to
warrant any other inferences.
One proceeding of Epaminondas during this expedition merits especial
notice. It was the general practice of the Thebans to put to death
all the Bœotian exiles who fell into their hands as prisoners, while
they released under ransom all other Greek prisoners. At the capture
of a village named Phœbias in the Sikyonian territory, Epaminondas
took captive a considerable body of Bœotian exiles. With the least
possible delay, he let them depart under ransom, professing to regard
them as belonging to other cities.[555] We find him always trying
to mitigate the rigorous dealing then customary towards political
opponents.
[555] Pausanias, ix, 15, 2.
Throughout this campaign of 369 B.C., all the Peloponnesian allies
had acted against Sparta cheerfully under Epaminondas and the
Thebans. But in the ensuing year the spirit of the Arcadians had
been so raised, by the formation of the new Pan-Arcadian communion,
by the progress of Messênê and Megalopolis, and the conspicuous
depression of Sparta,—that they fancied themselves not only capable
of maintaining their independence by themselves, but also entitled
to divide headship with Thebes, as Athens divided it with Sparta.
Lykomedes the Mantinean, wealthy, energetic, and able, stood forward
as the exponent of this new aspiration, and as the champion of
Arcadian dignity. He reminded the Ten Thousand (the Pan-Arcadian
synod),—that while all other residents in Peloponnesus were
originally immigrants, they alone were the indigenous occupants of
the peninsula; that they were the most numerous section, as well as
the bravest and hardiest men, who bore the Hellenic name,—of which
proof was afforded by the fact, that Arcadian mercenary soldiers were
preferred to all others; that the Lacedæmonians had never ventured to
invade Attica, nor the Thebans to invade Laconia, without Arcadian
auxiliaries. “Let us follow no man’s lead (he concluded), but stand
up for ourselves. In former days, we built up the power of Sparta by
serving in her armies; and now, if we submit quietly to follow the
Thebans, without demanding alternate headship for ourselves, we shall
presently find them to be Spartans under another name.”[556]
[556] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 23.
Such exhortations were heard with enthusiasm by the assembled
Arcadians, to whom political discussion and the sentiment of
collective dignity was a novelty. Impressed with admiration for
Lykomedes, they chose as officers every man whom he recommended
calling upon him to lead them into active service, so as to
justify their new pretensions. He conducted them into the
territory of Epidaurus, now under invasion by the Argeians; who
were however in the greatest danger of being cut off, having
their retreat intercepted by a body of troops from Corinth under
Chabrias,—Athenians and Corinthians. Lykomêdês with his Arcadians,
fighting his way through enemies as well as through a difficult
country, repelled the division of Chabrias, and extricated the
embarrassed Argeians. He next invaded the territory south of the
new city of Messene and west of the Messenian Gulf, part of which
was still held by Spartan garrisons. He penetrated as far as
Asinê, where the Spartan commander, Geranor, drew out his garrison
to resist them, but was defeated with loss, and slain, while the
suburbs of Asinê were destroyed.[557] Probably the Spartan mastery
of the south-western corner of the Peloponnesus was terminated by
this expedition. The indefatigable activity which these Arcadians
now displayed under their new commander, overpowering all enemies,
and defying all hardships and difficulties of marching over the
most rugged mountains, by night as well as by day, throughout the
winter season,—excited everywhere astonishment and alarm; not
without considerable jealousy even on the part of their allies the
Thebans.[558]
[557] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 25.
Στρατευσάμενοι δὲ καὶ εἰς Ἀσίνην τῆς Λακωνικῆς, ἐνίκησάν τε τὴν
τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων φρουρὰν, καὶ τὸν Γεράνορα, τὸν πολέμαρχον
Σπαρτιάτην γεγενημένον, ἀπέκτειναν, καὶ τὸ προάστειον τῶν
Ἀσιναίων ἐπόρθησαν.
Diodorus states that Lykomedes and the Arcadians took Pellênê,
which is in a different situation, and can hardly refer to the
same expedition (xv, 67).
[558] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 26.
While such jealousy tended to loosen the union between the Arcadians
and Thebes, other causes tended at the same time to disunite them
from Elis. The Eleians claimed rights of supremacy over Lepreon and
the other towns of Triphylia, which rights they had been compelled
by the Spartan arms to forego thirty years before.[559] Ever since
that period, these towns had ranked as separate communities, each
for itself as a dependent ally of Sparta. Now that the power of
the latter was broken, the Eleians aimed at resumption of their
lost supremacy. But the formation of the new “commune Arcadum” at
Megalopolis, interposed an obstacle never before thought of. The
Tryphilian towns, affirming themselves to be of Arcadian origin, and
setting forth as their eponymous Hero Triphylus son of Arkas,[560]
solicited to be admitted as fully qualified members of the incipient
Pan-Arcadian communion. They were cordially welcomed by the general
Arcadian body (with a degree of sympathy similar to that recently
shown by the Germans towards Sleswick-Holstein), received as
political brethren, and guaranteed as independent against Elis.[561]
The Eleians, thus finding themselves disappointed of the benefits
which they had anticipated from the humiliation of Sparta, became
greatly alienated from the Arcadians.
[559] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 30, 31.
[560] Polyb. iv, 77.
[561] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 26; vii, 4, 12.
Ariobarzanes, the satrap of Phrygia, with whom the Athenians had
just established a correspondence, now endeavored (perhaps at their
instance) to mediate for peace in Greece, sending over a citizen
of Abydus named Philiskus, furnished with a large sum of money.
Choosing Delphi as a centre, Philiskus convoked thither, in the name
of the Persian king, deputies from all the belligerent parties,
Theban, Lacedæmonian, Athenian, etc., to meet him. These envoys
never consulted the god as to the best means of attaining peace
(says Xenophon), but merely took counsel among themselves; hence,
he observes, little progress was made towards peace; since the
Spartans[562] peremptorily insisted that Messênê should again be
restored to them, while the Thebans were not less firm in resisting
the proposition. It rather seems that the allies of Sparta were
willing to concede the point, and even tried, though in vain, to
overcome her reluctance. The congress accordingly broke up; while
Philiskus, declaring himself in favor of Sparta and Athens, employed
his money in levying mercenaries for the professed purpose of aiding
them in the war.[563] We do not find, however, that he really lent
them any aid. It would appear that his mercenaries were intended for
the service of the satrap himself, who was then organizing his revolt
from Artaxerxes; and that his probable purpose in trying to close
the war was, that he might procure Grecian soldiers more easily and
abundantly. Though the threats of Philiskus produced no immediate
result, however, they so alarmed the Thebans as to determine them to
send an embassy up to the Great King; the rather, as they learnt that
the Lacedæmonian Euthykles had already gone up to the Persian court,
to solicit on behalf of Sparta.[564]
[562] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 27. Ἐκεῖ δὲ ἐλθόντες, τῷ μὲν θεῷ οὐδὲν
ἐκοινώσαντο, ὅπως ἂν ἡ εἰρήνη γένοιτο, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐβουλεύοντο.
[563] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 27; Diodor. xv, 70.
Diodorus states that Philiskus was sent by Artaxerxes; which
seems not exact; he was sent by Ariobarzanes in the name
of Artaxerxes. Diodorus also says that Philiskus left two
thousand mercenaries with pay provided, for the service of the
Lacedæmonians; which troops are never afterwards mentioned.
[564] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 33.
How important had been the move made by Epaminondas in reconstituting
the autonomous Messenians, was shown, among other evidences, by
the recent abortive congress at Delphi. Already this formed the
capital article in Grecian political discussion; an article, too,
on which Sparta stood nearly alone. For not only the Thebans (whom
Xenophon[565] specifies as if there were no others of the same
sentiment), but all the allies of Thebes, felt hearty sympathy and
identity of interest with the newly-enfranchised residents in Mount
Ithômê and in Western Laconia; while the allies even of Sparta were,
at most, only lukewarm against them, if not positively inclined in
their favor.[566] A new phenomenon soon presented itself, which
served as a sort of recognition of the new-born, or newly-revived,
Messenian community, by the public voice of Greece. At the one
hundred and third Olympic festival (Midsummer 368 B.C.),—which
occurred within less than two years after Epaminondas laid the
foundation-stone of Messênê,—a Messenian boy named Damiskus gained
the wreath as victor in the foot-race of boys. Since the first
Messenian war, whereby the nation became subject to Sparta,[567] no
Messenian victor had ever been enrolled; though before that war, in
the earliest half-century of recorded Olympiads, several Messenian
victors are found on the register. No competitor was admitted to
enter the lists, except as a free Greek from a free community;
accordingly so long as these Messenians had been either enslaved,
or in exile, they would never have been allowed to contend for the
prize under that designation. So much the stronger was the impression
produced, when, in 368 B.C., after an interval of more than three
centuries, Damiscus the Messenian was proclaimed victor. No Theôry
(or public legation for sacrifice) could have come to Olympia from
Sparta, since she was then at war both with Eleians and Arcadians;
probably few individual Lacedæmonians were present; so that the
spectators, composed generally of Greeks unfriendly to Sparta,
would hail the proclamation of the new name as being an evidence of
her degradation, as well as from sympathy with the long and severe
oppression of the Messenians.[568] This Olympic festival,—the first
after the great revolution occasioned by the battle of Leuktra,—was
doubtless a scene of earnest anti-Spartan emotion.
[565] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 27.
[566] See this fact indicated in Isokrates, Archidamus (Or. vi,)
s. 2-11.
[567] Pausanias, vi, 2, 5.
Two Messenian victors had been proclaimed during the interval;
but they were inhabitants of Messênê in Sicily. And these two
were ancient citizens of Zanklê, the name which the Sicilian
Messênê bore before Anaxilaus the despot chose to give to it this
last-mentioned name.
[568] See the contrary, or Spartan, feeling,—disgust at the idea
of persons who had just been their slaves, presenting themselves
as spectators and competitors in the plain of Olympia,—set forth
in Isokrates, Or. vi, (Archidamus) s. 111, 112.
During this year 368 B.C., the Thebans undertook no march into
Peloponnesus; the peace-congress at Delphi probably occupied their
attention, while the Arcadians neither desired nor needed their aid.
But Pelopidas conducted in this year a Theban force into Thessaly,
in order to protect Larissa and the other cities against Alexander
of Pheræ, and to counter-work the ambitious projects of that despot,
who was soliciting reinforcement from Athens. In his first object
he succeeded. Alexander was compelled to visit him at Larissa, and
solicit peace. This despot, however, alarmed at the complaints which
came from all sides against his cruelty,—and at the language, first,
admonitory, afterwards, menacing, of Pelopidas—soon ceased to think
himself in safety, and fled home to Pheræ. Pelopidas established a
defensive union against him among the other Thessalian cities, and
then marched onward into Macedonia, where the regent Ptolemy, not
strong enough to resist, entered into alliance with the Thebans;
surrendering to them thirty hostages from the most distinguished
families in Macedonia, as a guarantee for his faithful adherence.
Among the hostages was the youthful Philip, son of Amyntas, who
remained in this character at Thebes for some years, under the
care of Pammenês.[569] It was thus that Ptolemy and the family of
Amyntas, though they had been maintained in Macedonia by the active
intervention of Iphikrates and the Athenians not many months before,
nevertheless now connected themselves by alliance with the Thebans,
the enemies of Athens. Æschines the Athenian orator denounces them
for ingratitude; but possibly the superior force of the Thebans left
them no option. Both the Theban and Macedonian force became thus
enlisted for the protection of the freedom of Amphipolis against
Athens.[570] And Pelopidas returned to Thebes, having extended the
ascendency of Thebes not only over Thessaly, but also over Macedonia,
assured by the acquisition of the thirty hostages.
[569] Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 26.
[570] Æschines, De Fals. Leg. c. 14, p. 249.
... διδάσκων, ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν ὑπὲρ Ἀμφιπόλεως ἀντέπραττε (Ptolemy)
τῇ πόλει (to Athens), καὶ πρὸς Θηβαίους διαφερομένων Ἀθηναίων,
συμμαχίαν ἐποιήσατο, etc.
Neither Plutarch nor Diodorus appear to me precise in specifying
and distinguishing the different expeditions of Pelopidas
into Thessaly. I cannot but think that he made four different
expeditions; two before his embassy to the Persian court (which
embassy took place in 367 B.C.; see Mr. Clinton, Fast. Hellen.
on that year, who rightly places the date of the embassy), and
two after it.
1. The first was, in 369 B.C., after the death of Amyntas, but
during the short reign, less than two years, of his son Alexander
of Macedon.
Diodorus mentions this fact (xv, 67), but he adds, what is
erroneous, that Pelopidas on this occasion brought back Philip as
a hostage.
2. The second was in 368 B.C.; also mentioned by Diodorus (xv,
71) and by Plutarch (Pelop. c. 26).
Diodorus (erroneously, as I think) connects this expedition with
the seizure and detention of Pelopidas by Alexander of Pheræ. But
it was really on this occasion that Pelopidas brought back the
hostages.
3. The third (which was rather a mission than an expedition) was
in 366 B.C., after the return of Pelopidas from the Persian
court, which happened seemingly in the beginning of 366 B.C.
In this third march, Pelopidas was seized and made prisoner
by Alexander of Pheræ, until he was released by Epaminondas.
Plutarch mentions this expedition, clearly distinguishing it
from the second (Pelopidas, c. 27—μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν, etc.);
but with this mistake, in my judgment, that he places it before
the journey of Pelopidas to the Persian court; whereas it really
occurred after and in consequence of that journey, which dates in
367 B.C.
4. The fourth and last, in 364-363 B.C.; wherein he was slain
(Diodor. xv. 80; Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 32).
Such extension of the Theban power, in Northern Greece, disconcerted
the maritime projects of Athens on the coast of Macedonia, at the
same time that it laid the foundation of an alliance between her
and Alexander of Pheræ. While she was thus opposing the Thebans in
Thessaly, a second squadron and reinforcement arrived at Corinth
from Syracuse, under Kissidas, despatched by the despot Dionysius.
Among the synod of allies assembled at Corinth, debate being held
as to the best manner of employing them, the Athenians strenuously
urged that they should be sent to act in Thessaly. But the Spartans
took an opposite view, and prevailed to have them sent round to the
southern coast of Laconia, in order that they might coöperate in
repelling or invading the Arcadians.[571] Reinforced by these Gauls
and other mercenaries, Archidamus led out the Lacedæmonian forces
against Arcadia. He took Karyæ by assault, putting to death every
man whom he captured in the place; and he farther ravaged all the
Arcadian territory, in the district named after the Parrhasii, until
the joint Arcadian and Argeian forces arrived to oppose him; upon
which he retreated to an eminence near Midea.[572] Here Kissidas, the
Syracusan commander, gave notice that he must retire, as the period
to which his orders reached had expired. He accordingly marched back
to Sparta; but midway in the march, in a narrow pass, the Messenian
troops arrested his advance, and so hampered him, that he was forced
to send to Archidamus for aid. The latter soon appeared, while the
main body of Arcadians and Argeians followed also; and Archidamus
resolved to attack them in general battle near Midea. Imploring his
soldiers, in an emphatic appeal, to rescue the great name of Sparta
from the disgrace into which it had fallen, he found them full of
responsive ardor. They rushed with such fierceness to the charge,
that the Arcadians and Argeians were thoroughly daunted, and fled
with scarce any resistance. The pursuit was vehement, especially by
the Gallic mercenaries, and the slaughter frightful. Ten thousand
men (if we are to believe Diodorus) were slain, without the loss
of a single Lacedæmonian. Of this easy and important victory,—or,
as it came to be called, “the tearless battle,”—news was forthwith
transmitted by the herald Demotelês to Sparta. So powerful was the
emotion produced by his tale, that all the Spartans who heard it
burst into tears; Agesilaus, the Senators, and the ephors, setting
the example;[573]—a striking proof how humbled, and disaccustomed
to the idea of victory, their minds had recently become!—a striking
proof also, when we compare it with the inflexible self-control which
marked their reception of the disastrous tidings from Leuktra, how
much more irresistible is unexpected joy than unexpected grief, in
working on these minds of iron temper!
[571] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 28.
[572] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 28. The place here called Midea cannot
be identified. The only place of that name known, is in the
territory of Argos, quite different from what is here mentioned.
O. Müller proposes to substitute Malæa for Midea; a conjecture,
which there are no means of verifying.
[573] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 28-32; Diodor. xv, 72; Plutarch,
Agesil. c. 33.
So offensive had been the insolence of the Arcadians, that the news
of their defeat was not unwelcome even to their allies the Thebans
and Eleians. It made them feel that they were not independent of
Theban aid, and determined Epaminondas again to show himself in
Peloponnesus, with the special view of enrolling the Achæans in his
alliance. The defensive line of Oneium was still under occupation
by the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, who had their head-quarters at
Corinth. Yet having remained unattacked all the preceding year, it
was now so negligently guarded, that Peisias, the general of Argos,
instigated by a private request of Epaminondas, was enabled suddenly
to seize the heights above Kenchreæ, with a force of two thousand
men and seven days’ provision. The Theban commander, hastening his
march, thus found the line of Oneium open near Kenchreæ, and entered
Peloponnesus without resistance; after which he proceeded, joined by
his Peloponnesian allies, against the cities in Achaia.[574] Until
the battle of Leuktra, these cities had been among the dependent
allies of Sparta, governed by local oligarchies in her interest.
Since that event, they had broken off from her, but were still
under oligarchical governments (though doubtless not the same men),
and had remained neutral without placing themselves in connection
either with Arcadians or Thebans.[575] Not being in a condition to
resist so formidable an invading force, they opened negotiations
with Epaminondas, and solicited to be enrolled as allies of Thebes;
engaging to follow her lead whenever summoned, and to do their duty
as members of her synod. They tendered securities which Epaminondas
deemed sufficient for the fulfilment of their promise. Accordingly,
by virtue of his own personal ascendency, he agreed to accept them
as they stood, without requiring either the banishment of the
existing rulers or substitution of democratical forms in place of
the oligarchical.[576] Such a proceeding was not only suitable to
the moderation of dealing so remarkable in Epaminondas, but also
calculated to strengthen the interests of Thebes in Peloponnesus,
in the present jealous and unsatisfactory temper of the Arcadians,
by attaching to her on peculiar grounds Achæans as well as Eleians;
the latter being themselves half-alienated from the Arcadians.
Epaminondas farther liberated Naupaktus and Kalydon,[577] which were
held by Achæan garrisons, and which he enrolled as separate allies of
Thebes; whither he then returned, without any other achievements (so
far as we are informed) in Peloponnesus.
[574] I think that this third expedition of Epaminondas into
Peloponnesus belongs to 367 B.C.; being simultaneous with the
embassy of Pelopidas to the Persian court. Many chronologers
place it in 366 B.C., after the conclusion of that embassy;
because the mention of it occurs in Xenophon after he has brought
the embassy to a close. But I do not conceive that this proves
the fact of subsequent date. For we must recollect that the
embassy lasted several months; moreover the expedition was made
while Epaminondas was Bœotarch; and he ceased to be so during the
year 366 B.C. Besides, if we place the expedition in 366 B.C.,
there will hardly be time left for the whole career of Euphron at
Sikyon, which intervened before the peace of 366 B.C. between
Thebes and Corinth (see Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 44 _seq._).
The relation of cotemporaneousness between the embassy of
Pelopidas to Persia, and the expedition of Epaminondas, seems
indicated when we compare vii, 1, 33 with vii, 1, 48—Συνεχῶς
δὲ βουλευόμενοι οἱ Θηβαῖοι, ὅπως ἂν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν λάβοιεν τῆς
Ἑλλάδος, ἐνόμισαν εἰ πέμψειαν πρὸς τὸν Περσῶν βασιλέα, etc. Then
Xenophon proceeds to recount the whole embassy, together with its
unfavorable reception on returning, which takes up the entire
space until vii, 2, 41, when he says—Αὖθις δ’ Ἐπαμεινώνδας,
βουληθεὶς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς προσυπαγαγέσθαι, ὅπως μᾶλλον σφίσι καὶ
οἱ Ἀρκάδες καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι σύμμαχοι προσέχοιεν τὸν νοῦν, ἔγνωκε
στρατευτέον εἶναι ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀχαΐαν.
This fresh expedition of Epaminondas is one of the modes adopted
by the Thebans of manifesting their general purpose expressed in
the former words,—συνεχῶς βουλευόμενοι, etc.
[575] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 42-44.
The neutrality before observed, is implied in the phrase whereby
Xenophon describes their conduct afterwards; ἐπεὶ δὲ κατελθόντες
~οὐκέτι ἐμέσευον~, etc.
[576] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 42.
His expression marks how completely these terms were granted
by the personal determination of Epaminondas, overruling
opposition,—~ἐνδυναστεύει~ ὁ Ἐπαμεινώνδας, ὥστε μὴ φυγαδεῦσαι
τοὺς κρατίστους, μηδὲ τὰς πολιτείας μεταστῆσαι, etc.
[577] Diodor. xv, 75.
But the generous calculations of this eminent man found little favor
with his countrymen. Both the Arcadians, and the opposition-party
in the Achæan cities, preferred accusations against him, alleging
that he had discouraged and humiliated all the real friends of
Thebes; leaving power in the hands of men who would join Sparta
on the first opportunity. The accusation was farther pressed
by Menekleidas, a Theban speaker of ability, strongly adverse
to Epaminondas, as well as to Pelopidas. So pronounced was the
displeasure of the Thebans,—partly perhaps from reluctance to offend
the Arcadians,—that they not only reversed the policy of Epaminondas
in Achaia, but also refrained from reëlecting him as Bœotarch during
the ensuing year.[578] They sent harmosts of their own to each of
the Achæan cities,—put down the existing oligarchies,—sent the chief
oligarchical members and partisans into exile,—and established
democratical governments in each. Hence a great body of exiles soon
became accumulated; who, watching for a favorable opportunity and
combining their united forces against each city successively, were
strong enough to overthrow the newly-created democracies, and to
expel the Theban harmosts. Thus restored, the Achæan oligarchs took
decided and active part with Sparta;[579] vigorously pressing the
Arcadians on one side, while the Lacedæmonians, encouraged by the
recent Tearless Battle, exerted themselves actively on the other.
[578] Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 1, 43; Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 25.
Diodorus (xv, 72) refers the displeasure of the Thebans against
Epaminondas to the events of the preceding year. They believed
(according to Diodorus) that Epaminondas had improperly spared
the Spartans, and not pushed his victory so far as might have
been done, when he forced the lines of Mount Oneium in 369 B.C.
But it is scarcely credible that the Thebans should have been
displeased on this account; for the forcing of the lines was a
capital exploit, and we may see from Xenophon that Epaminondas
achieved much more than the Spartans and their friends believed
to be possible.
Xenophon tells us that the Thebans were displeased with
Epaminondas, on complaint from the Arcadians and others, for his
conduct in Achaia two years after the action at Oneium; that
is, in 367 B.C. This is much more probable in itself, and much
more consistent with the general series of facts, than the cause
assigned by Diodorus.
[579] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 23.
For a similar case, in which exiles from many different cities,
congregating in a body, became strong enough to carry their
restoration in each city successively, see Thucyd. i, 113.
The town of Sikyon, closely adjoining to Achaia, was at this time in
alliance with Thebes, having a Theban harmost and garrison in its
acropolis. But its government, which had always been oligarchical,
still remained unaltered. The recent counter-revolution in the Achæan
cities, followed closely by their junction with Sparta, alarmed
the Arcadians and Argeians, lest Sikyon also should follow the
example. Of this alarm a leading Sikyonian citizen named Euphron,
took advantage. He warned them that if the oligarchy were left in
power, they would certainly procure aid from the garrison at Corinth,
and embrace the interests of Sparta. To prevent such defection (he
said) it was indispensable that Sikyon should be democratized. He
then offered himself, with their aid, to accomplish the revolution,
seasoning his offer with strong protestations of disgust against the
intolerable arrogance and oppression of Sparta: protestations not
unnecessary, since he had himself, prior to the battle of Leuktra,
carried on the government of his native city as local agent for her
purposes and interest. The Arcadians and Argeians, entering into
the views of Euphron, sent to Sikyon a large force, under whose
presence and countenance he summoned a general assembly in the
market-place, proclaimed the oligarchy to be deposed, and proposed
an equal democracy for the future. His proposition being adopted, he
next invited the people to choose generals; and the persons chosen
were, as might naturally be expected, himself with five partisans.
The prior oligarchy had not been without a previous mercenary force
in their service, under the command of Lysimenês; but these men were
overawed by the new foreign force introduced. Euphron now proceeded
to reorganize them, to place them under the command of his son Adeas
instead of Lysimenês, and to increase their numerical strength.
Selecting from them a special body-guard for his own personal safety,
and being thus master of the city under the ostensible color of chief
of the new democracy, he commenced a career of the most rapacious
and sanguinary tyranny.[580] He caused several of his colleagues to
be assassinated, and banished others. He expelled also by wholesale
the wealthiest and most eminent citizens, on suspicion of Laconism;
confiscating their properties to supply himself with money, pillaging
the public treasure, and even stripping the temples of all their rich
stock of consecrated gold and silver ornaments. He farther procured
for himself adherents by liberating numerous slaves, exalting them
to the citizenship, and probably enrolling them among his paid
force.[581] The power which he thus acquired became very great. The
money seized enabled him not only to keep in regular pay his numerous
mercenaries, but also to bribe the leading Arcadians and Argeians, so
that they connived at his enormities; while he was farther ready and
active in the field to lend them military support. The Theban harmost
still held the acropolis with his garrison, though Euphron was master
of the town and harbor.
[580] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 44-46; Diodor. xv, 70.
[581] Xen. Hellen, vii, 3, 8.
During the height of Euphron’s power at Sikyon, the neighboring city
of Phlius was severely pressed. The Phliasians had remained steadily
attached to Sparta throughout all her misfortunes; notwithstanding
incessant hostilities from Argos, Arcadia, Pellênê, and Sikyon, which
destroyed their crops and inflicted upon them serious hardships. I
have already recounted, that in the year 369 B.C., a little before
the line of Oneium was forced by Epaminondas, the town of Phlius,
having been surprised by its own exiles with the aid of Eleians
and Arcadians, had only been saved by the desperate bravery and
resistance of its citizens.[582] In the ensuing year, 368 B.C.,
the Argeian and Arcadian force again ravaged the Phliasian plain,
doing great damage; yet not without some loss to themselves in their
departure, from the attack of the chosen Phliasian hoplites and of
some Athenian horsemen from Corinth.[583] In the ensuing year 367
B.C., a second invasion of the Phliasian territory was attempted by
Euphron, with his own mercenaries to the number of two thousand,—the
armed force of Sikyon and Pellênê,—and the Theban harmost and
garrison from the acropolis of Sikyon. On arriving near Phlius, the
Sikyonians and Pellenians were posted near the gate of the city which
looked towards Corinth, in order to resist any sally from within;
while the remaining invaders made a circuit round, over an elevated
line of ground called the _Trikaranum_ (which had been fortified
by the Argeians and was held by their garrison), to approach and
ravage the Phliasian plain. But the Phliasian cavalry and hoplites
so bravely resisted them, as to prevent them from spreading over the
plain to do damage, until at the end of the day they retreated to
rejoin the Sikyonians and Pellenians. From these last, however, they
happened to be separated by a ravine which forced them to take a
long circuit; while the Phliasians, passing by a shorter road close
under their own walls, were beforehand in reaching the Sikyonians
and Pellenians, whom they vigorously attacked and defeated with
loss. Euphron with his mercenaries, and the Theban division, arrived
too late to prevent the calamity, which they made no effort to
repair.[584]
[582] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 6-9.
[583] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 10.
[584] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 11-15.
An eminent Pellenian citizen, named Proxenus having been here made
prisoner, the Phliasians, in spite of all their sufferings, released
him without ransom. This act of generosity—coupled with the loss
sustained by the Pellenians in the recent engagement, as well as
with the recent oligarchical counter-revolutions which had disjoined
the other Achæan cities from Thebes—altered the politics of Pellênê,
bringing about a peace between that city and Phlius.[585] Such
an accession afforded sensible relief,—it might almost be said,
salvation,—to the Phliasians, in the midst of cruel impoverishment;
since even their necessary subsistence, except what was obtained by
marauding excursions from the enemy, being derived by purchase from
Corinth, was found difficult to pay for, and still more difficult
to bring home, in the face of an enemy. They were now enabled, by
the aid of the Athenian general Charês and his mercenary troops from
Corinth, to escort their families and their non-military population
to Pellênê, where a kindly shelter was provided by the citizens. The
military Phliasians, while escorting back a stock of supplies to
Phlius, broke through and defeated an ambuscade of the enemy in their
way; and afterwards, in conjunction with Charês, surprised the fort
of Thyamia, which the Sikyonians were fortifying as an aggressive
post on their borders. The fort became not only a defence for Phlius,
but a means of aggression against the enemy, affording also great
facility for the introduction of provisions from Corinth.[586]
[585] This change of politics at Pellênê is not mentioned by
Xenophon, at the time, though it is noticed afterwards (vii,
4, 17) as a fact accomplished; but we must suppose it to have
occurred now, in order to reconcile sections 11-14 with sections
18-20 of vii, 2.
The strong Laconian partialities of Xenophon induce him to allot
not only warm admiration, but a space disproportionate compared
with other parts of his history, to the exploits of the brave
little Phliasian community. Unfortunately, here, as elsewhere,
he is obscure in the description of particular events, and still
more perplexing when we try to draw from him a clear idea of the
general series.
With all the defects and partiality of Xenophon’s narrative,
however, we must recollect that it is a description of real
events by a contemporary author who had reasonable means of
information. This is a precious ingredient, which gives value to
all that he says; inasmuch as we are so constantly obliged to
borrow our knowledge of Grecian history either from authors who
write at second-hand and after the time,—or from orators whose
purposes are usually different from those of the historian. Hence
I have given a short abridgment of these Phliasian events as
described by Xenophon, though they were too slight to exercise
influence on the main course of the war.
[586] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 18-23.
Another cause, both of these successes and of general relief to
the Phliasians, arose out of the distracted state of affairs in
Sikyon. So intolerable had the tyranny of Euphron become, that the
Arcadians, who had helped to raise him up, became disgusted. Æneas of
Stymphalus, general of the collective Arcadian force, marched with a
body of troops to Sikyon, joined the Theban harmost in the Acropolis,
and there summoned the Sikyonian _notables_ to an assembly. Under
his protection, the intense sentiment against Euphron was freely
manifested, and it was resolved to recall the numerous exiles, whom
he had banished without either trial or public sentence. Dreading
the wrath of these numerous and bitter enemies, Euphron thought
it prudent to retire with his mercenaries to the harbor; where he
invited Pasimêlus the Lacedæmonian to come, with a portion of the
garrison of Corinth, and immediately declared himself an open
partisan of Sparta. The harbor, a separate town and fortification at
some little distance from the city (as Lechæum was from Corinth),
was thus held by and for the Spartans; while Sikyon adhered to the
Thebans and Arcadians. In Sikyon itself however, though evacuated
by Euphron, there still remained violent dissensions. The returning
exiles were probably bitter in reactionary measures; the humbler
citizens were fearful of losing their newly-acquired political
privileges; and the liberated slaves, yet more fearful of forfeiting
that freedom, which the recent revolution had conferred upon them.
Hence Euphron still retained so many partisans, that having procured
from Athens a reinforcement of mercenary troops, he was enabled to
return to Sikyon, and again to establish himself as master of the
town in conjunction with the popular party. But as his opponents,
the principal men in the place, found shelter along with the
Theban garrison in the acropolis, which he vainly tried to take
by assault,[587]—his possession even of the town was altogether
precarious, until such formidable neighbors could be removed.
Accordingly he resolved to visit Thebes, in hopes of obtaining from
the authorities an order for expelling his opponents and handing over
Sikyon a second time to his rule. On what grounds, after so recent
a defection to the Spartans, he rested his hopes of success, we do
not know; except that he took with him a large sum of money for the
purpose of bribery.[588] His Sikyonian opponents, alarmed lest he
should really carry his point, followed him to Thebes, where their
alarm was still farther increased by seeing him in familiar converse
with the magistrates. Under the first impulse of terror and despair,
they assassinated Euphron in broad daylight,—on the Kadmeia, and even
before the doors of the Theban Senate-house, wherein both magistrates
and Senate were sitting.
[587] Xen. Hellen. vii, 3, 9.
[588] Xen. Hellen. vii, 3, 4-6.
For an act of violence thus patent, they were of course seized
forthwith, and put upon their trial, before the Senate. The
magistrates invoked upon their heads the extreme penalty of death,
insisting upon the enormity and even impudence of the outrage,
committed almost under the eyes of the authorities,—as well as upon
the sacred duty of vindicating not merely the majesty, but even the
security of the city, by exemplary punishment upon offenders who had
despised its laws. How many in number were the persons implicated,
we do not know. All, except one, denied actual hand-participation;
but that one avowed it frankly, and stood up to justify it before the
Theban Senate. He spoke in substance nearly as follows,—taking up the
language of the accusing magistrates:—
“Despise you I cannot, men of Thebes; for you are masters of my
person and life. It was on other grounds of confidence that I slew
this man: first, I had the conviction of acting justly; next, I
trusted in your righteous judgment. I knew that _you_ did not wait
for trial and sentence to slay Archias and Hypatês,[589] whom you
caught after a career similar to that of Euphron,—but punished them
at the earliest practicable opportunity, under the conviction that
men manifest in sacrilege, treason, and despotism, were already
under sentence by all men. Well! and was not Euphron, too, guilty
of all these crimes? Did not he find the temples full of gold and
silver offerings, and strip them until they were empty? How can
there be a traitor more palpable than the man, who, favored and
upheld by Sparta, first betrayed her to you; and then again, after
having received every mark of confidence from you, betrayed you to
her,—handing over the harbor of Sikyon to your enemies? Was not he
a despot without reserve, the man who exalted slaves, not only into
freemen, but into citizens? the man who despoiled, banished, or slew,
not criminals, but all whom he chose, and most of all, the chief
citizens? And now, after having vainly attempted, in conjunction
with your enemies the Athenians, to expel your harmost by force from
Sikyon, he has collected a great stock of money, and come hither to
turn it to account. Had he assembled arms and soldiers against you,
you would have thanked me for killing him. How then can you punish me
for giving him his due, when he has come with money to corrupt you,
and to purchase from you again the mastery of Sikyon, to your own
disgrace as well as mischief? Had he been my enemy and your friend,
I should undoubtedly have done wrong to kill him in your city; but
as he is a traitor, playing you false, how is he more my enemy
than yours? I shall be told that he came hither of his own accord,
confiding in the laws of the city. Well! you would have thanked me
for killing him anywhere out of Thebes; why not _in_ Thebes also,
when he has come hither only for the purpose of doing you new wrong
in addition to the past? Where among Greeks has impunity ever been
assured to traitors, deserters, or despots? Recollect, that you have
passed a vote that exiles from any one of your allied cities might
be seized as outlaws in any other. Now Euphron is a condemned exile,
who has ventured to come back to Sikyon without any vote of the
general body of allies. How can any one affirm that he has not justly
incurred death? I tell you in conclusion, men of Thebes,—if you put
me to death, you will have made yourselves the avengers of your very
worst enemy,—if you adjudge me to have done right, you will manifest
yourselves publicly as just avengers, both on your own behalf and on
that of your whole body of allies.”[590]
[589] This refers to the secret expedition of Pelopidas and the
six other Theban conspirators from Athens to Thebes, at the time
when the Lacedæmonians were masters of that town and garrisoned
the Kadmeia. The conspirators, through the contrivance of the
secretary Phyllidas, got access in disguise to the oligarchical
leaders of Thebes, who were governing under Lacedæmonian
ascendency, and put them to death. This event is described in a
former chapter, Ch. lxxvii, p. 85 _seq._
[590] Xen. Hellen. vii, 3, 7-11.
To the killing of Euphron, followed by a defence so
characteristic and emphatic on the part of the agent,—Schneider
and others refer, with great probability, the allusion in
the Rhetoric of Aristotle (ii, 24, 2)—καὶ περὶ τοῦ Θήβῃσιν
ἀποθανόντος, περὶ οὗ ἐκέλευε κρῖναι, εἰ δίκαιος ἦν ἀποθανεῖν ὡς
οὐκ ἄδικον ὂν ἀποκτεῖναι τὸν δικαίως ἀποθανόντα.
This impressive discourse induced the Theban Senate to pronounce
that Euphron had met with his due. It probably came from one of the
principal citizens of Sikyon, among whom were most of the enemies
as well as the victims of the deceased despot. It appeals, in a
characteristic manner, to that portion of Grecian morality which bore
upon men, who by their very crimes procured for themselves the means
of impunity; against whom there was no legal force to protect others,
and who were therefore considered as not being entitled to protection
themselves, if the daggers of others could ever be made to reach
them. The tyrannicide appeals to this sentiment with confidence, as
diffused throughout all the free Grecian cities. It found responsive
assent in the Theban Senate, and would probably have found the like
assent, if set forth with equal emphasis, in most Grecian senates or
assemblies elsewhere.
Very different, however, was the sentiment in Sikyon. The body
of Euphron was carried thither, and enjoyed the distinguished
preëminence of being buried in the market-place.[591] There, along
with his tomb, a chapel was erected, in which he was worshipped
as Archêgetês, or Patron-hero and Second Founder, of the city.
He received the same honors as had been paid to Brasidas at
Amphipolis. The humbler citizens and the slaves, upon whom he had
conferred liberty and political franchise,—or at least the name of
a political franchise,—remembered him with grateful admiration as
their benefactor, forgetting or excusing the atrocities which he
had wreaked upon their political opponents. Such is the retributive
Nemesis which always menaces, and sometimes overtakes, an oligarchy
who keep the mass of the citizens excluded from political privileges.
A situation is thus created, enabling some ambitious and energetic
citizen to confer favors and earn popularity among the many, and thus
to acquire power, which, whether employed or not for the benefit
of the many, goes along with their antipathies when it humbles or
crushes the previously monopolizing few.
[591] Xen. Hellen. vii, 3, 12.
We may presume from these statements that the government of Sikyon
became democratical. But the provoking brevity of Xenophon does
not inform us of the subsequent arrangements made with the Theban
harmost in the acropolis,—nor how the intestine dissensions, between
the democracy in the town and the refugees in the citadel, were
composed,—nor what became of those citizens who slew Euphron. We
learn only that not long afterwards, the harbor of Sikyon, which
Euphron had held in conjunction with the Lacedæmonians and Athenians,
was left imperfectly defended by the recall of the latter to Athens;
and that it was accordingly retaken by the forces from the town,
aided by the Arcadians.[592]
[592] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 1.