It appears that these proceedings of Euphron (from his first

proclamation of the democracy at Sikyon and real acquisition of

despotism to himself, down to his death and the recovery of the

harbor) took place throughout the year 367 B.C. and the earlier half

of 366 B.C. No such enemy, probably, would have arisen to embarrass

Thebes, unless the policy recommended by Epaminondas in Achaia had

been reversed, and unless he himself had fallen under the displeasure

of his countrymen. His influence too was probably impaired, and the

policy of Thebes affected for the worse, by the accidental absence

of his friend Pelopidas, who was then on his mission to the Persian

court at Susa. Such a journey and return, with the transaction of the

business in hand, must have occupied the greater part of the year 367

B.C., being terminated probably by the return of the envoys in the

beginning of 366 B.C.

The leading Thebans had been alarmed by the language of

Philiskus,—who had come over a few months before as envoy from the

satrap Ariobarzanes and had threatened to employ Asiatic money in

the interest of Athens and Sparta against Thebes, though his threats

seem never to have been realized, as well as by the presence of the

Lacedæmonian Euthyklês (after the failure of Antalkidas[593]) at the

Persian court, soliciting aid. Moreover Thebes had now pretensions to

the headship of Greece, at least as good as either of her two rivals;

while since the fatal example set by Sparta at the peace called by

the name of Antalkidas in 387 B.C., and copied by Athens after the

battle of Leuktra in 371 B.C.,—it had become a sort of recognized

fashion that the leading Grecian state should sue out its title

from the terror-striking rescript of the Great King, and proclaim

itself as enforcing terms which he had dictated. On this ground of

borrowed elevation Thebes now sought to place herself. There was in

her case a peculiar reason which might partly excuse the value set

upon it by her leaders. It had been almost the capital act of her

policy to establish the two new cities, Megalopolis and Messênê. The

vitality and chance for duration, of both,—especially that of the

latter, which had the inextinguishable hostility of Sparta to contend

with,—would be materially improved, in the existing state of the

Greek mind, if they were recognized as autonomous under a Persian

rescript. To attain this object,[594] Pelopidas and Ismenias now

proceeded as envoys to Susa; doubtless under a formal vote of the

allied synod, since the Arcadian Antiochus, a celebrated pankratiast,

the Eleian Archidamus, and a citizen from Argos, accompanied them.

Informed of the proceeding, the Athenians also sent Timagoras and

Leon to Susa; and we read with some surprise that these hostile

envoys all went up thither in the same company.[595]

[593] Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 22.

[594] It is plain that Messênê was the great purpose with

Pelopidas in his mission to the Persian court; we see this not

only from Cornelius Nepos (Pelop. c. 4) and Diodorus (xv, 81),

but also even from Xenophon, Hellen. vii, 1, 36.

[595] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 33-38; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 30;

Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 22.

The words of Xenophon ἠκολούθει δὲ καὶ Ἀργεῖος must allude to

some Argeian envoy; though the name is not mentioned, and must

probably have dropped out,—or perhaps the word τις, as Xenophon

may not have heard the name.

It would appear that in the mission which Pharnabazus conducted

up to the Persian court (or at least undertook to conduct) in 408

B.C., envoys from hostile Greek cities were included in the same

company (Xen. Hellen. i, 3, 13), as on the present occasion.

Pelopidas, though he declined to perform the usual ceremony of

prostration,[596] was favorably received by the Persian court.

Xenophon,—who recounts the whole proceeding in a manner unfairly

invidious towards the Thebans, forgetting that they were now only

copying the example of Sparta in courting Persian aid,—affirms that

his application was greatly furthered by the recollection of the

ancient alliance of Thebes with Xerxes, against Athens and Sparta,

at the time of the battle of Platæa; and by the fact that Thebes had

not only refused to second, but had actually discountenanced, the

expedition of Agesilaus against Asia. We may perhaps doubt, whether

this plea counted for much; or the straightforward eloquence of

Pelopidas, so much extolled by Plutarch,[597] which could only reach

Persian ears through an interpreter. But the main fact for the Great

King to know was, that the Thebans had been victorious at Leuktra;

that they had subsequently trodden down still farther the glory

of Sparta, by carrying their arms over Laconia, and emancipating

the conquered half of the country; that when they were no longer

in Peloponnesus, their allies the Arcadians and Argeians had been

shamefully defeated by the Lacedæmonians (in the Tearless Battle).

Such boasts on the part of Pelopidas,—confirmed as matters of fact

even by the Athenian Timagoras,—would convince the Persian ministers

that it was their interest to exercise ascendency over Greece through

Thebes in preference to Sparta. Accordingly Pelopidas being asked

by the Great King what sort of rescript he wished, obtained his own

terms. Messênê was declared autonomous and independent of Sparta:

Amphipolis also was pronounced to be a free and autonomous city: the

Athenians were directed to order home and lay up their ships of war

now in active service, on pain of Persian intervention against them,

in case of disobedience. Moreover Thebes was declared the head city

of Greece, and any city refusing to follow her headship was menaced

with instant compulsion by Persian force.[598] In reference to the

points in dispute between Elis and Arcadia (the former claiming

sovereignty over Triphylia, which professed itself Arcadian and had

been admitted into the Arcadian communion), the rescript pronounced

in favor of the Eleians;[599] probably at the instance of Pelopidas,

since there now subsisted much coldness between the Thebans and

Arcadians.

[596] Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 22.

His colleague Ismenias, however, is said to have dropped his

ring, and then to have stooped to pick it up, immediately before

the king; thus going through the prostration.

[597] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 30.

[598] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 36. Ἐκ δὲ τούτου ἐρωτώμενος ὑπὸ

βασιλέως ὁ Πελοπίδας τί βούλοιτο ἑαυτῷ γραφῆναι, εἶπεν ὅτι

Μεσσήνην τε αὐτόνομον εἶναι ἀπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων, καὶ Ἀθηναίους

ἀνέλκειν τὰς ναῦς: εἰ δὲ ταῦτα μὴ πείθοιντο, στρατεύειν ἐπ’

αὐτούς· ~εἴ τις δὲ πόλις μὴ ἐθέλοι ἀκολουθεῖν~, ἐπὶ ταύτην πρῶτον

ἰέναι.

It is clear that these are not the exact words of the rescript of

367 B.C., though in the former case of the peace of Antalkidas

(387 B.C.) Xenophon seems to have given the rescript in its

exact words (v, 1, 31).

What he states afterwards (vii, 1, 38) about Elis and Arcadia

proves that other matters were included. Accordingly I do not

hesitate to believe that Amphipolis also was recognized as

autonomous. This we read in Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 383,

c. 42. Καὶ γάρ τοι πρῶτον μὲν Ἀμφίπολιν πόλιν ἡμετέραν δούλην

κατέστησεν (the king of Persia), ~ἣν τότε σύμμαχον αὐτῷ καὶ

φίλην~ ἔγραψεν. Demosthenes is here alluding to the effect

produced on the mind of the Great King, and to the alteration in

his proceedings, when he learnt that Timagoras had been put to

death on returning to Athens; the adverb of time τότε alludes to

the rescript given when Timagoras was present.

In the words of Xenophon,—εἴ τις δὲ πόλις μὴ ἐθέλοι

~ἀκολουθεῖν~,—the headship of Thebes is declared or implied.

Compare the convention imposed by Sparta upon Olynthus, after the

latter was subdued (v, 3, 26.)

[599] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 38. Τῶν δὲ ἄλλων πρέσβεων ὁ μὲν Ἠλεῖος

Ἀρχίδαμος, ὅτι ~προὐτίμησε τὴν Ἦλιν πρὸ τῶν Ἀρκάδων~, ἐπήνει τὰ

τοῦ βασιλέως· ὁ δ’ Ἀντίοχος, ὅτι ~ἠλαττοῦτο τὸ Ἀρκαδικὸν~, οὔτε

τὰ δῶρα ἐδέξατο, etc.

Leon the Athenian protested against the Persian rescript, observing

aloud when he heard it read,—“By Zeus, Athenians, I think it is time

for you to look out for some other friend than the Great King.”

This remark, made in the King’s hearing and interpreted to him,

produced the following addition to the rescript: “If the Athenians

have anything juster to propose, let them come to the King and

inform him.” So vague a modification, however, did little to appease

the murmurs of the Athenians. On the return of their two envoys to

Athens, Leon accused his colleague Timagoras of having not only

declined to associate with him during the journey, but also of having

lent himself to the purposes of Pelopidas, of being implicated in

treasonable promises, and of receiving large bribes from the Persian

King. On these charges Timagoras was condemned and executed.[600]

The Arcadian envoy Antiochus was equally indignant at the rescript;

refusing even to receive such presents of formal courtesy as were

tendered to all, and accepted by Pelopidas himself, who however

strictly declined everything beyond. The conduct of this eminent

Theban thus exhibited a strong contrast with the large acquisitions

of the Athenian Timagoras.[601] Antiochus, on returning to Arcadia,

made report of his mission to the Pan-Arcadian synod, called the Ten

Thousand, at Megalopolis. He spoke in the most contemptuous terms

of all that he had seen at the Persian court. There were (he said)

plenty of bakers, cooks, wine-pourers, porters, etc., but as for men

competent to fight against Greeks, though he looked out for them with

care, he could see none; and even the vaunted golden plane-tree was

not large enough to furnish shade for a grasshopper.[602]

[600] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. c. 42, p. 383.

In another passage of the same oration (c. 57, p. 400),

Demosthenes says that Leon had been joint envoy with Timagoras

_for four years_. Certainly this mission of Pelopidas to the

Persian court cannot have lasted four years; and Xenophon states

that the Athenians sent the two envoys when they heard that

Pelopidas was going thither. I imagine that Leon and Timagoras

may have been sent up to the Persian court shortly after the

battle of Leuktra, at the time when the Athenians caused the

former rescript of the Persian king to be resworn, putting Athens

as head into the place of Sparta (Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 1, 2).

This was exactly four years before (371-367 B.C.). Leon and

Timagoras having jointly undertaken and perhaps recently returned

from their first embassy, were now sent _jointly_ on a second.

Demosthenes has summed up the time of the two as if it were one.

[601] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 30.

Demosthenes speaks of the amount received, in money, by Timagoras

from the Persian king as having been forty talents, ὡς λέγεται

(Fals. Leg. p. 383), besides other presents and conveniences.

Compare also Plutarch, Artaxerxes, c. 22.

[602] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 38.

On the other hand, the Eleian envoy returned with feelings of

satisfaction, and the Thebans with triumph. Deputies from each of

their allied cities were invited to Thebes, to hear the Persian

rescript. It was produced by a native Persian, their official

companion from Susa,—the first Persian probably ever seen in Thebes

since the times immediately preceding the battle of Platæa,—who,

after exhibiting publicly the regal seal, read the document aloud;

as the satrap Tiribazus had done on the occasion of the peace of

Antalkidas.[603]

[603] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 30.

But though the Theban leaders thus closely copied the conduct of

Sparta both as to means and as to end, they by no means found the

like ready acquiescence, when they called on the deputies present

to take an oath to the rescript, to the Great King, and to Thebes.

All replied that they had come with instructions, authorizing them

to hear and report, but no more; and that acceptance or rejection

must be decided in their respective cities. Nor was this the worst.

Lykomedes and the other deputies from Arcadia, already jealous of

Thebes, and doubtless farther alienated by the angry report of their

envoy Antiochus, went yet farther, and entered a general protest

against the headship of Thebes; affirming that the synod ought not

to be held constantly in that city, but in the seat of war, wherever

that might be. Incensed at such language, the Thebans accused

Lykomedes of violating the cardinal principle of the confederacy;

upon which he and his Arcadian comrades forthwith retired and went

home, declaring that they would no longer sit in the synod. The other

deputies appear to have followed his example. Indeed, as they had

refused to take the oath submitted to them, the special purpose of

the synod was defeated.

Having thus failed in carrying their point with the allies

collectively, the Thebans resolved to try the efficacy of

applications individually. They accordingly despatched envoys, with

the Persian rescript in hand, to visit the cities successively,

calling upon each for acceptance with an oath of adhesion. Each

city separately (they thought) would be afraid to refuse, under

peril of united hostility from the Great King and from Thebes. So

confident were they in the terrors of the king’s name and seal, that

they addressed this appeal not merely to the cities in alliance

with them, but even to several among their enemies. Their envoys

first set forth the proposition at Corinth; a city, not only at

variance with them, but even serving as a centre of operation for

the Athenian and Lacedæmonian forces to guard the line of Oneium,

and prevent the entrance of a Theban army into Peloponnesus. But the

Corinthians rejected the proposition altogether, declining formally

to bind themselves by any common oaths towards the Persian king.

The like refusal was experienced by the envoys as they passed on to

Peloponnesus, if not from all the cities visited, at least from so

large a proportion, that the mission was completely frustrated. And

thus the rescript, which Thebes had been at such pains to procure,

was found practically inoperative in confirming or enforcing her

headship;[604] though doubtless the mere fact, that it comprised and

recognized Messênê, contributed to strengthen the vitality, and exalt

the dignity, of that new-born city.

[604] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 40. Καὶ αὐτὴ μὲν ἡ Πελοπίδου καὶ τῶν

Θηβαίων τῆς ἀρχῆς περιβολὴ οὕτω διελύθη.

In their efforts to make the Persian rescript available towards

the recognition of their headship throughout Greece, the Thebans

would naturally visit Thessaly and the northern districts as well

as Peloponnesus. It appears that Pelopidas and Ismenias themselves

undertook this mission; and that in the execution of it they were

seized and detained as prisoners by Alexander of Pheræ. That despot

seems to have come to meet them, under pacific appearances, at

Pharsalus. They indulged hopes of prevailing on him as well as the

other Thessalians to accept the Persian rescript; for we see by the

example of Corinth, that they had tried their powers of persuasion

on enemies as well as friends. But the Corinthians, while refusing

the application, had nevertheless respected the public morality held

sacred even between enemies in Greece, and had dismissed the envoys

(whether Pelopidas was among them, we cannot assert) inviolate. Not

so the tyrant of Pheræ. Perceiving that Pelopidas and Ismenias were

unaccompanied by any military force, he seized their persons, and

carried them off to Pheræ as prisoners.

Treacherous as this proceeding was, it proved highly profitable

to Alexander. Such was the personal importance of Pelopidas, that

his imprisonment struck terror among the partisans of Thebes in

Thessaly, and induced several of them to submit to the despot of

Pheræ; who moreover sent to apprise the Athenians of his capture,

and to solicit their aid against the impending vengeance of Thebes.

Greatly impressed with the news, the Athenians looked upon Alexander

as a second Jason, likely to arrest the menacing ascendency of their

neighbor and rival.[605] They immediately despatched to his aid

thirty triremes and one thousand hoplites under Autoklês; who, unable

to get through the Euripus, when Bœotia and Eubœa were both hostile

to Athens, were forced to circumnavigate the latter island. He

reached Pheræ just in time; for the Thebans, incensed beyond measure

at the seizure of Pelopidas, had despatched without delay eight

thousand hoplites and six hundred cavalry to recover or avenge him.

Unfortunately for them, Epaminondas had not been rechosen commander

since his last year’s proceedings in Achaia. He was now serving as an

hoplite in the ranks, while Kleomenes with other Bœotarchs had the

command. On entering Thessaly, they were joined by various allies

in the country. But the army of Alexander, aided by the Athenians,

and placed under the command of Autoklês, was found exceedingly

formidable, especially in cavalry. The Thessalian allies of Thebes,

acting with their habitual treachery, deserted in the hour of danger;

and the enterprise, thus difficult and perilous, was rendered

impracticable by the incompetence of the Bœotarchs. Unable to make

head against Alexander and the Athenians, they were forced to retreat

homeward. But their generalship was so unskilful, and the enemy’s

cavalry so active, that the whole army was in imminent danger of

being starved or destroyed. Nothing saved them now, but the presence

of Epaminondas as a common soldier in the ranks. Indignant as well

as dismayed, the whole army united to depose their generals, and

with one voice called upon him to extricate them from their perils.

Epaminondas accepted the duty,—marshalled the retreat in consummate

order,—took for himself the command of the rear-guard, beating off

all the attacks of the enemy,—and conducted the army safely back to

Thebes.[606]

[605] The strong expressions of Demosthenes show what a

remarkable effect was produced by the news at Athens (cont.

Aristokrat. p. 660, s. 142).

Τί δ’; Ἀλέξανδρον ἐκεῖνον τὸν Θετταλὸν, ἡνίκ’ εἶχε μὲν αἰχμάλωτον

δήσας Πελοπίδαν, ἐχθρὸς δ’ ὡς οὐδεὶς ἦν Θηβαίοις, ὑμῖν δ’ οἰκείως

διέκειτο, οὕτως ὥστε παρ’ ὑμῶν στρατηγὸν αἰτεῖν, ἐβοηθεῖτε δ’

αὐτῷ καὶ πάντ’ ἦν Ἀλέξανδρος, etc.

Alexander is said to have promised to the Athenians so ample a

supply of cattle as should keep the price of meat very low at

Athens (Plutarch, Apophtheg. Reg. p. 193 E.)

[606] Diodor. xv, 71; Plutarch, Pelop. c. 28; Pausanias ix, 15, 1.

This memorable exploit, while it disgraced the unsuccessful

Bœotarchs, who were condemned to fine and deposition from their

office, raised higher than ever the reputation of Epaminondas among

his countrymen. But the failure of the expedition was for the time a

fatal blow to the influence of Thebes in Thessaly; where Alexander

now reigned victorious and irresistible, with Pelopidas still in

his dungeon. The cruelties and oppressions, at all times habitual

to the despot of Pheræ, were pushed to an excess beyond all former

parallel. Besides other brutal deeds of which we read with horror, he

is said to have surrounded by his military force the unarmed citizens

of Melibœa and Skotussa, and slaughtered them all in mass. In such

hands, the life of Pelopidas hung by a thread; yet he himself, with

that personal courage which never forsook him, held the language of

unsubdued defiance and provocation against the tyrant. Great sympathy

was manifested by many Thessalians, and even by Thêbê the wife of

Alexander, for so illustrious a prisoner; and Alexander, fearful

of incurring the implacable enmity of Thebes, was induced to spare

his life, though retaining him as a prisoner. His confinement, too,

appears to have lasted some time before the Thebans, discouraged

by their late ill-success, were prepared to undertake a second

expedition.

At length they sent a force for the purpose; which was placed, on

this occasion, under the command of Epaminondas. The renown of his

name rallied many adherents in the country; and his prudence, no less

than his military skill, was conspicuously exhibited, in defeating

and intimidating Alexander, yet without reducing him to such despair

as might prove fatal to the prisoner. The despot was at length

compelled to send an embassy excusing his recent violence, offering

to restore Pelopidas, and soliciting to be admitted to peace and

alliance with Thebes. But Epaminondas would grant nothing more than

a temporary truce,[607] coupled with the engagement of evacuating

Thessaly; while he required in exchange the release of Pelopidas

and Ismenias. His terms were acceded to, so that he had the delight

of conveying his liberated friend in safety to Thebes. Though this

primary object was thus effected, however, it is plain that he did

not restore Thebes to the same influence in Thessaly which she had

enjoyed prior to the seizure of Pelopidas.[608] That event with

its consequences still remained a blow to Thebes and a profit to

Alexander; who again became master of all or most part of Thessaly,

together with the Magnêtes, the Phthiot Achæans, and other tributary

nations dependent on Thessaly—maintaining unimpaired his influence

and connection at Athens.[609]

[607] Plutarch (Pelopidas, c. 29) says, a truce for thirty days;

but it is difficult to believe that Alexander would have been

satisfied with a term so very short.

[608] The account of the seizure of Pelopidas by Alexander,

with its consequences, is contained chiefly in Diodorus, xv,

71-75; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 27-29; Cornel. Nep. Pelop. c. 5;

Pausanias, ix, 15, 1. Xenophon does not mention it.

I have placed the seizure in the year 366 B.C., after the return

of Pelopidas from his embassy in Persia; which embassy I agree

with Mr. Fynes Clinton in referring to the year 367 B.C. Plutarch

places the seizure before the embassy; Diodorus places it in the

year between Midsummer 368 and Midsummer 367 B.C.; but he does

not mention the embassy at all, in its regular chronological

order; he only alludes to it in summing up the exploits at the

close of the career of Pelopidas.

Assuming the embassy to the Persian court to have occurred in 367

B.C., the seizure cannot well have happened before that time.

The year 368 B.C. seems to have been that wherein Pelopidas

made his second expedition into Thessaly, from which he returned

victorious, bringing back the hostages. See above, p. 264, note.

The seizure of Pelopidas was accomplished at a time when

Epaminondas was not Bœotarch, nor in command of the Theban army.

Now it seems to have been not until the close of 367 B.C., after

the accusations arising out of his proceedings in Achaia, that

Epaminondas missed being rechosen as general.

Xenophon, in describing the embassy of Pelopidas to Persia,

mentions his grounds for expecting a favorable reception, and

the matters which he had to boast of (Hell. vii, 1, 35). Now if

Pelopidas, immediately before, had been seized and detained for

some months in prison by Alexander of Pheræ, surely Xenophon

would have alluded to it as an item on the other side. I know

that this inference from the silence of Xenophon is not always to

be trusted. But in this case, we must recollect that he dislikes

both the Theban leaders; and we may fairly conclude, that where

he is enumerating the trophies of Pelopidas, he would hardly

have failed to mention a signal disgrace, if there had been one,

immediately preceding.

Pelopidas was taken prisoner by Alexander, not in battle, but

when in pacific mission, and under circumstances in which

no man less infamous than Alexander would have seized him

(παρασπονδηθεὶς—Plutarch, Apoph. p. 194 D.; Pausan. ix, 15, 1;

“legationis jure satis tectum se arbitraretur” Corn. Nep.). His

imprudence in trusting himself under any circumstances to such

a man as Alexander, is blamed by Polybius (viii, 1) and others.

But we must suppose such imprudence to be partly justified or

explained by some plausible circumstances; and the proclamation

of the Persian rescript appears to me to present the most

reasonable explanation of his proceeding.

On these grounds, which, in my judgment, outweigh any

probabilities on the contrary side, I have placed the seizure of

Pelopidas in 366 B.C., after the embassy to Persia; not without

feeling, however, that the chronology of this period cannot be

rendered absolutely certain.

[609] Plutarch. Pelopid c. 31-35.

While the Theban arms were thus losing ground in Thessaly, an

important point was gained in their favor on the other side of

Bœotia. Orôpus, on the north-eastern frontier of Attica adjoining

Bœotia, was captured and wrested from Athens by a party of exiles

who crossed over from Eretria in Eubœa, with the aid of Themison,

despot of the last-mentioned town. It had been more than once

lost and regained between Athens and Thebes; being seemingly in

its origin Bœotian, and never incorporated as a Deme or equal

constituent member of the Athenian commonwealth, but only recognized

as a dependency of Athens; though, as it was close on the frontier,

many of its inhabitants were also citizens of Athens, demots of

the neighboring Deme Græa.[610] So recently before as the period

immediately preceding the battle of Leuktra, angry remonstrances had

been exchanged between Athens and Thebes respecting a portion of

the Oropian territory. At that time, it appears, the Thebans were

forced to yield, and their partisans in Oropus were banished.[611]

It was these partisans who, through the aid of Themison and the

Eretrians, now effected their return, so as to repossess themselves

of Oropus, and doubtless to banish the principal citizens friendly to

Athens.[612] So great was the sensation produced among the Athenians,

that they not only marched with all their force to recover the place,

but also recalled their general, Chares, with that mercenary force

which he commanded in the territories of Corinth and Phlius. They

farther requested aid from the Corinthians and their other allies in

Peloponnesus. These allies did not obey the summons; but the Athenian

force alone would have sufficed to retake Oropus, had not the Thebans

occupied it so as to place it beyond their attack. Athens was obliged

to acquiesce in their occupation of it; though under protest, and

with the understanding that the disputed right should be referred to

impartial arbitration.[613]

[610] See the instructive Inscription and comments published by

Professor Ross, in which the Deme Γραῆς, near Oropus, was first

distinctly made known (Ross, Die Demen von Attika, p. 6, 7—Halle,

1846).

[611] Isokrates, Orat. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 22-40.

[612] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 1; Diodor. xv, 76.

The previous capture of Oropus, when Athens lost it in 411 B.C.,

was accomplished under circumstances very analogous (Thucyd.

viii, 60).

[613] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 1; Diodor. xv, 76.

Compare Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 259, s. 123; Æschines cont.

Ktesiphont. p. 397, s. 85.

It would seem that we are to refer to this loss of Oropus the

trial of Chabrias and Kallistratus in Athens, together with

the memorable harangue of the latter which Demosthenes heard

as a youth with such strong admiration. But our information is

so vague and scanty, that we can make out nothing certainly on

the point. Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, et Timothei, p.

109-114) brings together all the scattered testimonies in an

instructive chapter.

This seizure of Oropus produced more than one material consequence.

Owing to the recall of Chares from Corinth, the harbor of Sikyon

could no longer be maintained against the Sikyonians in the town;

who, with the aid of the Arcadians, recaptured it, so that both

town and harbor again came into the league of Thebans and Arcadians.

Moreover, Athens became discontented with her Peloponnesian allies,

for having neglected her summons on the emergency at Oropus,

although Athenian troops had been constantly in service for the

protection of Peloponnesus against the Thebans. The growth of such

dispositions at Athens became known to the Mantinean Lykomedes;

the ablest and most ambitious leader in Arcadia, who was not only

jealous of the predominance of the Thebans, but had come to a formal

rupture with them at the synod held for the reception of the Persian

rescript.[614] Anxious to disengage the Arcadians from Thebes as well

as from Sparta, Lykomedes now took advantage of the discontent of

Athens to open negotiations with that city; persuading the majority

of the Arcadian Ten Thousand to send him thither as ambassador. There

was difficulty among the Athenians in entertaining his proposition,

from the alliance subsisting between them and Sparta. But they were

reminded, that to disengage the Arcadians from Thebes, was no less

in the interest of Sparta than of Athens; and a favorable answer was

then given to Lykomedes. The latter took ship at Peiræus for his

return, but never reached Arcadia; for he happened to land at the

spot where the Arcadian exiles of the opposite party were assembled,

and these men put him to death at once.[615] In spite of his death,

however, the alliance between Arcadia and Athens was still brought to

pass, though not without opposition.

[614] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 39; vii, 4, 2.

[615] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 3.

Xenophon notices the singularity of the accident. There were

plenty of vessels in Peiræus; Lykomedes had only to make his

choice, and to determine where he would disembark. He fixed upon

the exact spot where the exiles were assembled, not knowing that

they were there—δαιμονιώτατα ἀποθνήσκει.

Thebes was during this year engaged in her unsuccessful campaign in

Thessaly (alluded to already) for the rescue of Pelopidas, which

disabled her from effective efforts in Peloponnesus. But as soon as

that rescue had been accomplished, Epaminondas, her greatest man, and

her only conspicuous orator, was despatched into Arcadia to offer,

in conjunction with an envoy from Argos, diplomatic obstruction to

the proposed Athenian alliance. He had to speak against Kallistratus,

the most distinguished orator at Athens, who had been sent by his

countrymen to plead their cause amidst the Arcadian Ten Thousand, and

who, among other arguments, denounced the enormities which darkened

the heroic legends both of Thebes and Argos. “Were not Orestes and

Alkmæon, both murderers of their mothers (asked Kallistratus),

natives of Argos? Was not Œdipus, who slew his father and married his

mother, a native of Thebes?”—“Yes (said Epaminondas, in his reply)

they were. But Kallistratus has forgotten to tell you, that these

persons, while they lived at home were innocent, or reputed to be so.

As soon as their crimes became known, Argos and Thebes banished them;

and then it was that Athens received them, stained with confessed

guilt.”[616] This clever retort told much to the credit of the

rhetorical skill of Epaminondas; but his speech as a whole, was not

successful. The Arcadians concluded alliance with Athens; yet without

formally renouncing friendship with Thebes.

[616] Cornelius Nepos, Epaminond. c. 6: Plutarch, Repub. Ger.

Præc. p. 810 F.; Plutarch, Apophtheg. Reg. p. 193 D.

Compare a similar reference, on the part of others, to the crimes

embodied in Theban legend (Justin, ix, 3).

Perhaps it may have been during this embassy into Peloponnesus,

that Kallistratus addressed the discourse to the public assembly

at Mêssenê, to which Aristotle makes allusion (Rhetoric, iii, 17,

3); possibly enough, against Epaminondas also.

As soon as such new alliance had been ratified, it became important

to Athens to secure a free and assured entrance into Peloponnesus;

while at the same time the recent slackness of the Corinthians, in

regard to the summons to Oropus, rendered her mistrustful of their

fidelity. Accordingly it was resolved in the Athenian assembly, on

the motion of a citizen named Demotion, to seize and occupy Corinth;

there being already some scattered Athenian garrisons, on various

points of the Corinthian territory, ready to be concentrated and

rendered useful for such a purpose. A fleet and land-force under

Chares was made ready and despatched. But on reaching the Corinthian

port of Kenchreæ, Chares found himself shut out even from admittance.

The proposition of Demotion, and the resolution of the Athenians

had become known to the Corinthians; who forthwith stood upon their

guard, sent soldiers of their own to relieve the various Athenian

outposts on their territory, and called upon these latter to give

in any complaints for which they might have ground, as their

services were no longer needed. Chares pretended to have learnt that

Corinth was in danger. But both he and the remaining Athenians were

dismissed, though with every expression of thanks and politeness.[617]

[617] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 4-6.

The public debates of the Athenian assembly were not favorable to

the success of a scheme, like that proposed by Demotion, to which

secrecy was indispensable. Compare another scheme, divulged in

like manner, in Thucydides, iii, 3.

The treacherous purpose of Athens was thus baffled, and the

Corinthians were for the moment safe. Yet their position was

precarious and uncomfortable; for their enemies, Thebes and Argos,

were already their masters by land, and Athens had now been converted

from an ally into an enemy. Hence they resolved to assemble a

sufficient mercenary force in their own pay;[618] but while thus

providing for military security, they sent envoys to Thebes to open

negotiations for peace. Permission was granted to them by the Thebans

to go and consult their allies, and to treat for peace in conjunction

with as many as could be brought to share their views. Accordingly

the Corinthians went to Sparta and laid their case before the full

synod of allies, convoked for the occasion. “We are on the point

of ruin (said the Corinthian envoy), and must make peace. We shall

rejoice to make it in conjunction with you, if you will consent; but

if you think proper to persevere in the war, be not displeased if we

make peace without you.” The Epidaurians and Phliasians, reduced to

the like distress, held the same language of weariness and impatience

for peace.[619]

[618] It seems probable that these were the mercenaries placed by

the Corinthians under the command of Timophanes, and employed by

him afterwards as instruments for establishing a despotism.

Plutarch (Timoleon, c. 3, 4) alludes briefly to mercenaries

equipped about this time (as far as we can verify his chronology)

and to the Corinthian mercenaries now assembled, in connection

with Timoleon and Timophanes, of whom I shall have to say much in

a future chapter.

[619] Compare Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 8, 9 with Isokrates, Or. vi,

(Archidamus), s. 106.

It had been ascertained at Thebes, that no propositions for peace

could be entertained, which did not contain a formal recognition of

the independence of Messênê. To this the Corinthians and other allies

of Sparta had no difficulty in agreeing. But they vainly endeavored

to prevail upon Sparta herself to submit to the same concession.

The Spartans resolutely refused to relinquish a territory inherited

from victorious forefathers, and held under so long a prescription.

They repudiated yet more indignantly the idea of recognizing as

free Greeks and equal neighbors, those who had so long been their

slaves; and they proclaimed their determination of continuing the

war, even single-handed and with all its hazards, to regain what they

had lost;[620] and although they could not directly prohibit the

Corinthians and other allies, whose sickness of the war had become

intolerable, from negotiating a separate peace for themselves,—yet

they gave only a reluctant consent. Archidamus son of Agesilaus even

reproached the allies with timorous selfishness, partly in deserting

their benefactress Sparta at her hour of need, partly in recommending

her to submit to a sacrifice ruinous to her honor.[621] The Spartan

prince conjured his countrymen, in the name of all their ancient

dignity, to spurn the mandates of Thebes; to shrink neither from

effort nor from peril for the reconquest of Messênê, even if they

had to fight alone against all Greece; and to convert their military

population into a permanent camp, sending away their women and

children to an asylum in friendly foreign cities.

[620] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 9.

[621] This sentiment of dissatisfaction against the allies is

strongly and repeatedly set forth in the oration of Isokrates

called Archidamus, composed as if to be spoken in this

synod,—and good evidence (whether actually spoken or not) of

the feelings animating the prince and a large party at Sparta.

Archidamus treats those allies who recommended the Spartans to

surrender Messênê, as worse enemies even than those who had

broken off altogether. He specifies Corinthians, Phliasians,

and Epidaurians, sect. 11-13,—εἰς τοῦτο δ’ ἥκουσι πλεονεξίας,

καὶ τοσαύτην ἡμῶν κατεγνώκασιν ἀνανδρίαν, ὥστε πολλάκις ἡμᾶς

ἀξιώσαντες ὑπὲρ τῆς αὑτῶν πολεμεῖν, ὑπὲρ Μεσσήνης οὐκ οἴονται

δεῖν κινδυνεύειν· ἀλλ’ ἵν’ αὐτοὶ τὴν σφετέραν αὐτῶν ἀσφαλῶς

καρπῶνται, πειρῶνται διδάσκειν ἡμᾶς ὡς χρὴ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς τῆς

ἡμετέρας παραχωρῆσαι, καὶ πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπαπειλοῦσιν, ὡς, εἰ

μὴ ταῦτα συγχωρήσομεν, ποιησόμενοι τὴν εἰρήνην κατὰ σφᾶς αὐτούς.

Compare sect. 67, 87, 99, 105, 106, 123.

We may infer from this discourse of Isokrates, that the

displeasure of the Spartans against their allies, because the

latter advised them to relinquish Messênê,—was much greater than

the narrative of Xenophon (Hellen. vii, 4, 8-11) would lead us to

believe.

In the argument prefixed to the discourse, it is asserted (among

various other inaccuracies), that the Spartans had sent to Thebes

to ask for peace, and that the Thebans had said in reply,—peace

would be granted, εἰ Μεσσήνην ἀνοικίσωσι καὶ αὐτόνομον ἐάσωσι.

Now the Spartans had never sent to Thebes for this purpose; the

Corinthians went to Thebes, and there learnt the peremptory

condition requiring that Messênê should be recognized. Next, the

Thebans would never require Sparta to recolonize or reconstitute

(ἀνοικίσαι) Messênê; that had been already done by the Thebans

themselves.

Though the Spartans were not inclined to adopt the desperate

suggestions of Archidamus, yet this important congress ended

by a scission between them and their allies. The Corinthians,

Phliasians, Epidaurians, and others, went to Thebes, and concluded

peace; recognizing the independence of Messênê, and affirming the

independence of each separate city within its own territory, without

either obligatory alliance, or headship on the part of any city. Yet

when the Thebans invited them to contract an alliance, they declined,

saying that this would be only embarking in war on the other side;

whereas that which they sighed for was peace. Peace was accordingly

sworn, upon the terms indicated in the Persian rescript, so far as

regarded the general autonomy of each separate town, and specially

that of Messênê; but not including any sanction, direct or indirect,

of Theban headship.[622]

[622] Diodorus (xv, 76) states that the Persian king sent envoys

to Greece who caused this peace to be concluded. But there seems

no ground for believing that any Persian envoys had visited

Greece since the return of Pelopidas, whose return with the

rescript did in fact constitute a Persian intervention. The peace

now concluded was upon the general basis of that rescript; so

far, but no farther (as I conceive), the assertion of Diodorus

about Persian intervention is exact.

This treaty removed out of the war, and placed in a position of

neutrality, a considerable number of Grecian states; chiefly those

near the Isthmus,—Corinth, Phlius, Epidaurus; probably Trœzen and

Hermionê, since we do not find them again mentioned among the

contending parties. But it left the more powerful states, Thebes and

Argos,—Sparta and Athens,[623]—still at war; as well as Arcadia,

Achaia, and Elis. The relations between these states, however, were

now somewhat complicated; for Thebes was at war with Sparta, and in

alliance, though not altogether hearty alliance, with the Arcadians;

while Athens was at war with Thebes, yet in alliance with Sparta

as well as with Arcadia. The Argeians were in alliance with Thebes

and Arcadia, and at war with Sparta; the Eleians were on unfriendly

terms, though not yet at actual war, with Arcadia—yet still (it

would appear) in alliance with Thebes. Lastly, the Arcadians

themselves were losing their internal coöperation and harmony one

with another, which had only so recently begun. Two parties were

forming among them, under the old conflicting auspices of Mantinea

and Tegea. Tegea, occupied by a Theban harmost and garrison, held

strenuously with Megalopolis and Messênê as well as with Thebes, thus

constituting a strong and united frontier against Sparta.

[623] Diodorus (xv, 76) is farther inaccurate in stating the

peace as universally accepted, and as being a conclusion of the

Bœotian and Lacedæmonian war, which had begun with the battle of

Leuktra.

As the Spartans complained of their Peloponnesian allies, for urging

the recognition of Messênê as an independent state,—so they were

no less indignant with the Persian king; who, though still calling

himself their ally, had inserted the same recognition in the rescript

granted to Pelopidas.[624] The Athenians also were dissatisfied with

this rescript. They had (as has been already stated) condemned to

death Timagoras, one of their envoys who had accompanied Pelopidas,

for having received bribes. They now availed themselves of the

opening left for them in the very words of the rescript, to send a

fresh embassy up to the Persian court, and solicit more favorable

terms. Their new envoys, communicating the fact that Timagoras had

betrayed his trust and had been punished for it, obtained from the

Great King a fresh rescript, pronouncing Amphipolis to be an Athenian

possession instead of a free city.[625] Whether that other article

also in the former rescript, which commanded Athens to call in

all her armed ships, was now revoked, we cannot say; but it seems

probable.

[624] Xenophon, Enc. Agesil. ii, 30. ἐνόμιζε—τῷ Πέρσῃ δίκην

ἐπιθήσειν καὶ τῶν πρόσθεν, καὶ ὅτι νῦν, σύμμαχος εἶναι φάσκων,

ἐπέταττε Μεσσήνην ἀφιέναι.

[625] This second mission of the Athenians to the Persian court

(pursuant to the invitation contained in the rescript given to

Pelopidas, Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 37), appears to me implied in

Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 384, s. 150, p. 420, s. 283; Or. De

Halonneso, p. 84, s. 30.

If the king of Persia was informed that Timagoras had been put

to death by his countrymen on returning to Athens,—and if he

sent down (κατέπεμψεν) a fresh rescript about Amphipolis,—this

information can only have been communicated, and the new rescript

only obtained, by a second embassy sent to him from Athens.

Perhaps the Lacedæmonian Kallias may have accompanied this second

Athenian mission to Susa; we hear of him as having come back with

a friendly letter from the Persian king to Agesilaus (Xenophon,

Enc. Ages. viii, 3; Plutarch, Apophth. Lacon. p. 1213 E.),

brought by a Persian messenger. But the statement is too vague to

enable us to verify this as the actual occasion.

At the same time that the Athenians sent this second embassy, they

also despatched an armament under Timotheus to the coast of Asia

Minor, yet with express instructions not to violate the peace with

the Persian king. Agesilaus, king of Sparta, went to the same

scene, though without any public force; availing himself only of

his long-established military reputation to promote the interests

of his country as negotiator. Both Spartan and Athenian attention

was now turned, directly and specially, towards Ariobarzanes the

satrap of Phrygia; who (as has been already related) had sent over to

Greece, two years before, Philiskus of Abydus, with the view either

of obtaining from the Thebans peace on terms favorable to Sparta,

or of aiding the latter against them.[626] Ariobarzanes was then

preparing, and apparently had since openly consummated, his revolt

from the Persian king, which Agesilaus employed all his influence in

fomenting. The Athenians, however, still wishing to avoid a distinct

breach with Persia, instructed Timotheus to assist Ariobarzanes,—yet

with a formal proviso, that he should not break truce with the Great

King. They also conferred both upon Ariobarzanes (with his three

sons), and upon Philiskus, the gift of Athenian citizenship.[627]

That satrap seems now to have had a large mercenary force, and to

have been in possession of both sides of the Hellespont, as well as

of Perinthus on the Propontis; while Philiskus, as his chief officer,

exercised extensive ascendency, disgraced by much tyranny and

brutality, over the Grecian cities in that region.

[626] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 27.

[627] Demosthen. De Rhodior. Libert. p. 193, s. 10, cont.

Aristokrat. p. 666, s. 165; p. 687, s. 242.

Precluded by his instructions from openly aiding the revolted

Ariobarzanes, Timotheus turned his force against the island of Samos;

which was now held by Kyprothemis, a Grecian chief with a military

force in the service of Tigranes, Persian satrap on the opposite

mainland. How or when Tigranes had acquired it we do not know; but

the Persians, when once left by the peace of Antalkidas in quiet

possession of the continental Asiatic Greeks, naturally tended to

push their dominion over the neighboring islands. After carrying on

his military operations in Samos, with eight thousand peltasts and

thirty triremes, for ten or eleven months, Timotheus became master

of it. His success was the more gratifying, as he had found means

to pay and maintain his troops during the whole time at the cost

of enemies; without either drawing upon the Athenian treasury, or

extorting contributions from allies.[628] An important possession

was thus acquired for Athens, while a considerable number of Samians

of the opposite party went into banishment, with the loss of their

properties. Since Samos was not among the legitimate possessions

of the king of Persia, this conquest was not understood to import

war between him and Athens. Indeed it appears that the revolt of

Ariobarzanes, and the uncertain fidelity of various neighboring

satraps, shook for some time the king’s authority, and absorbed his

revenues in these regions. Autophradates, the satrap of Lydia,—and

Mausôlus, native prince of Karia under Persian supremacy,—attacked

Ariobarzanes, with the view, real or pretended, of quelling his

revolt; and laid siege to Assus and Adramyttium. But they are

said to have been induced to desist by the personal influence

of Agesilaus.[629] As the latter had no army, nor any means of

allurement (except perhaps some money derived from Ariobarzanes),

we may fairly presume that the two besiegers were not very earnest

in the cause. Moreover, we shall find both of them, a few years

afterwards, in joint revolt with Ariobarzanes himself against the

Persian king.[630] Agesilaus obtained, from all three, pecuniary aid

for Sparta.[631]

[628] Demosth. _ut sup._; Isokrates, Or. xv, (De Permut.) s. 118;

Cornel. Nepos, Timoth. c. 1.

The stratagems whereby Timotheus procured money for his troops

at Samos, are touched upon in the Pseudo-Aristoteles, Œconomic.

ii, 23; and in Polyæn. iii, 10, 9; so far as we can understand

them, they appear to be only contributions, levied under a thin

disguise, upon the inhabitants.

Since Ariobarzanes gave money to Agesilaus, he may perhaps have

given some to Timotheus during this siege.

[629] Xenoph. Enc. Ages. ii, 26; Polyænus, vii, 26.

I do not know whether it is to this period that we are to refer

the siege of Atarneus by Autophradates, which he was induced to

relinquish by an ingenious proposition of Eubulus, who held the

place (Aristot. Politic. ii, 4, 10).

[630] It is with the greatest difficulty that we make out

anything like a thread of events at this period; so miserably

scanty and indistinct are our authorities.

Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, et Timothei, chap. v, p.

118-130) is an instructive auxiliary in putting together the

scraps of information; compare also Weissenborn, Hellen. p.

192-194 (Jena, 1844).

[631] Xen. Enc. Ages. ii, 26, 27.

The acquisition of Samos, while it exalted the reputation of

Timotheus, materially enlarged the maritime dominion of Athens.

It seems also to have weakened the hold of the Great King on Asia

Minor,—to have disposed the residents, both satraps and Grecian

cities, to revolt,—and thus to have helped Ariobarzanes, who rewarded

both Agesilaus and Timotheus. Agesilaus was enabled to carry home

a sum of money to his embarrassed countrymen; but Timotheus,

declining pecuniary aid, obtained for Athens the more valuable boon

of readmission to the Thracian Chersonese. Ariobarzanes made over

to him Sestus and Krithôtê in that peninsula; possessions doubly

precious, as they secured to the Athenians a partial mastery of the

passage of the Hellespont; with a large circumjacent territory for

occupation.[632]

[632] Isokrates, Or. xv, (De Permut.) s. 115-119; Cornelius

Nepos, Timotheus, c. 1.

Isokrates particularly dwells upon the fact that the conquests

of Timotheus secured to Athens a large circumjacent territory—ὧν

ληφθεισῶν ἅπας ὁ τόπος περιέχων οἰκεῖος ἠναγκάσθη τῇ πόλει

γενέσθαι, etc. (s. 114).

From the value of the Hellespont to Athens as ensuring a regular

supply of corn imported from the Euxine, Sestus was sometimes

called “the flour-board of the Peiræus”—ἡ τηλία τοῦ Πειραιῶς

(Aristot. Rhetor. iii, 10, 3).

Samos and the Chersonese were not simply new tributary confederates

aggregated to the Athenian synod. They were, in large proportion,

new territories acquired to Athens, open to be occupied by Athenian

citizens as out-settlers or kleruchs. Much of the Chersonese had

been possessed by Athenian citizens, even from the time of the first

Miltiades and afterwards down to the destruction of the Athenian

empire in 405 B.C. Though all these proprietors had been then driven

home and expropriated, they had never lost the hope of a favorable

turn of fortune and eventual reëntry.[633] That moment had now

arrived. The formal renunciation of all private appropriations of

land out of Attica, which Athens had proclaimed at the formation

of her second confederacy in 378 B.C., as a means of conciliating

maritime allies—was forgotten, now that she stood no longer in

fear of Sparta. The same system of kleruchies, which had so much

discredited her former empire, was again partially commenced. Many

kleruchs, or lot-holders, were sent out to occupy lands both at Samos

and in the Chersonese. These men were Athenian citizens, who still

remained citizens of Athens even in their foreign domicile, and

whose properties formed part of the taxable schedule of Athens. The

particulars of this important measure are unknown to us. At Samos

the emigrants must have been new men; for there had never been any

kleruchs there before.[634] But in the Chersonese, the old Athenian

proprietors, who had been expropriated forty years before (or their

descendants), doubtless now went back, and tried, with more or less

of success, to regain their previous lands; reinforced by bands of

new emigrants. And Timotheus, having once got footing at Sestus and

Krithôtê, soon extended his acquisitions to Elæus and other places;

whereby Athens was emboldened publicly to claim the whole Chersonese,

or at least most part of it, as her own ancient possession,—from its

extreme northern boundary at a line drawn across the isthmus north of

Kardia, down to Elæus at its southern extremity.[635]

[633] See Andokides de Pace, s. 15.

[634] That the Athenian occupation of Samos (doubtless only in

part) by kleruchs, _began_ in 366 or 365 B.C.,—is established

by Diodorus, xviii, 8-18, when he mentions the restoration of

the Samians forty-three years afterwards by the Macedonian

Perdikkas. This is not inconsistent with the fact that additional

detachments of kleruchs were sent out in 361 and in 352 B.C.,

as mentioned by the Scholiast on Æschines cont. Timarch. p. 31

c. 12; and by Philochorus, Fr. 131, ed. Didot. See the note of

Wesseling, who questions the accuracy of the date in Diodorus. I

dissent from his criticism, though he is supported both by Boeckh

(Public Econ. of Athens, b. iii, p. 428) and by Mr. Clinton (F.

H. ad ann. 352). I think it highly improbable that so long an

interval should have elapsed between the capture of the island

and the sending of the kleruchs, or that this latter measure,

offensive as it was in the eyes of Greece, should have been

_first_ resorted to by Athens in 352 B.C., when she had been

so much weakened both by the Social War, and by the Progress of

Philip. Strabo mentions two thousand kleruchs as having been

sent to Samos. But whether he means the first batch alone, or

altogether, we cannot say (Strabo xiv, p. 638). The father of the

philosopher Epikurus was among these kleruchs; compare Diogen.

Laert. x, 1.

Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ et Timothei, p. 127) seems to

me to take a just view of the very difficult chronology of this

period.

Demosthenes mentions the property of the kleruchs, in his general

review of the ways and means of Athens; in a speech delivered in

Olym. 106, before 352 B.C. (De Symmoriis, p. 182, s. 19).

[635] See Demosthenes, De Halonneso, p. 86, s. 40-42; Æschines, De

Fals. Legat. 264, s. 74.

This transfer of lands in Samos to Athenian proprietors, combined

with the resumption of the Chersonese, appears to have excited

a strong sensation throughout Greece, as a revival of ambitious

tendencies on the part of Athens, and a manifest departure from

those disinterested professions which she had set forth in 378

B.C. Even in the Athenian assembly, a citizen named Kydias

pronounced an emphatic protest against the emigration of the

kleruchs to Samos.[636] However, obnoxious as the measure was to

criticism, yet having been preceded by a conquering siege and the

expulsion of many native proprietors, it does not seem to have

involved Athens in so much real difficulty as the resumption of

her old rights in the Chersonese. Not only did she here come into

conflict with independent towns, like Kardia,[637] which resisted

her pretensions,—and with resident proprietors whom she was to

aid her citizens in dispossessing,—but also with a new enemy,

Kotys, king of Thrace. That prince, claiming the Chersonese as

Thracian territory, was himself on the point of seizing Sestus,

when Agesilaus or Ariobarzanes drove him away,[638] to make room

for Timotheus and the Athenians.

[636] Aristotel. Rhetoric. ii, 8, 4.

[637] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 677, s. 201; p. 679, s. 209.

[638] Xenophon, Enc. Agesil. ii, 26.

It has been already mentioned, that Kotys,[639]—the new Thracian

enemy, but previously the friend and adopted citizen, of Athens,—was

father-in-law of the Athenian general Iphikrates, whom he had enabled

to establish and people the town and settlement called Drys, on

the coast of Thrace. Iphikrates had been employed by the Athenians

for the last three or four years on the coasts of Macedonia and

Chalkidikê, and especially against Amphipolis; but he had neither

taken the latter place, nor obtained (so far as we know) any other

success; though he had incurred the expense for three years of

a mercenary general named Charidemus with a body of troops. How

so unprofitable a result, on the part of an energetic man like

Iphikrates, is to be explained,—we cannot tell. But it naturally

placed him before the eyes of his countrymen in disadvantageous

contrast with Timotheus, who had just acquired Samos and the

Chersonese. An additional reason for mistrusting Iphikrates, too,

was presented by the fact, that Athens was now at war with his

father-in-law Kotys. Hence it was now resolved by the Athenians to

recall him, and appoint Timotheus[640] to an extensive command,

including Thrace and Macedonia as well as the Chersonese. Perhaps

party enmities between the two Athenian chiefs, with their respective

friends, may have contributed to the change. As Iphikrates had been

the accuser of Timotheus a few years before, so the latter may have

seized this opportunity of retaliating.[641] At all events the

dismissed general conducted himself in such a manner as to justify

the mistrust of his countrymen; taking part with his father-in-law

Kotys in the war, and actually fighting against Athens.[642] He had

got into his possession some hostages of Amphipolis, surrendered to

him by Harpalus; which gave great hopes of extorting the surrender

of the town. These hostages he had consigned to the custody of the

mercenary general Charidemus, though a vote had been passed in the

Athenian assembly that they should be sent to Athens.[643] As soon

as the appointment of Iphikrates was cancelled, Charidemus forthwith

surrendered the hostages to the Amphipolitans themselves, thus

depriving Athens of a material advantage. And this was not all.

Though Charidemus had been three years with his band in the service

of Athens under Iphikrates, yet when the new general Timotheus

wished to reëngage him, he declined the proposition; conveying

away his troops in Athenian transports, to enter into the pay of a

decided enemy of Athens—Kotys; and in conjunction with Iphikrates

himself.[644] He was subsequently coming by sea from Kardia to take

service under her other enemies, Olynthus and Amphipolis, when he was

captured by the Athenian fleet. Under these circumstances, he was

again prevailed on to serve Athens.

[639] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 660, s. 141.

[640] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669, s. 174. Ἐπειδὴ τὸν μὲν

Ἰφικράτην ἀποστράτηγον ἐποιήσατε, Τιμόθεον δ’ ἐπ’ Ἀμφίπολιν καὶ

Χεῤῥόνησον ἐξεπέμψατε στρατηγὸν, etc.

[641] See Demosthen. cont. Timoth. p. 1187, 1188, s. 10-15.

Timotheus swore and pledged himself publicly in the Athenian

assembly, on one occasion, to prefer against Iphikrates a γραφὴν

ξενίας; but he never realized this engagement, and he even

afterwards became so far reconciled with Iphikrates, as to give

his daughter in marriage to the son of the latter (ibid. p. 1204,

s. 78).

To what precise date, or circumstance, this sworn engagement is

to be referred, we cannot determine. Possibly the γραφὴ ξενίας

may refer to the connection of Iphikrates with Kotys, which

might entail in some manner the forfeiture of his right of

citizenship; for it is difficult to understand how γραφὴ ξενίας,

in its usual sense (implying the negation of any original right

of citizenship), could ever be preferred as a charge against

Iphikrates; who not only performed all the active duties of a

citizen, but served in the highest post, and received from the

people distinguished honors.

[642] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 664, s. 153. ἐτόλμησεν ὑπὲρ

τῶν Κότυος πραγμάτων ἐναντία τοῖς ὑμετέροις στρατηγοῖς ναυμαχεῖν.

[643] Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669. s. 174-177. Respecting

these hostages, I can do nothing more than repeat the brief

and obscure notice of Demosthenes. Of the various conjectures

proposed to illustrate it, none appear to me at all satisfactory.

Who Harpalus was, I cannot presume to say.

[644] Demosthen. cont. Aristocrat. p. 669. s. 175.

The orator refers to letters written by Iphikrates and Timotheus

to the Athenian people, in support of these allegations.

Unfortunately these letters are not cited in substance.

It was against these two cities, and to the general coast of

Macedonia and the Chalkidic Thrace, that Timotheus devoted his first

attention, postponing for the moment Kotys and the Chersonese. In

this enterprise he found means to obtain the alliance of Macedonia,

which had been hostile to his predecessor Iphikrates. Ptolemy of

Alôrus, regent of that country, who had assassinated the preceding

king, Alexander son of Amyntas, was himself assassinated (365 B.C.)

by Perdikkas, brother of Alexander.[645] Perdikkas, during the first

year or two of his reign, seems to have been friendly and not hostile

to Athens. He lent aid to Timotheus, who turned his force against

Olynthus and other towns both in the Chalkidic Thrace and on the

coast of Macedonia.[646] Probably the Olynthian confederacy may have

been again acquiring strength during the years of recent Spartan

humiliation; so that Perdikkas now found his account in assisting

Athens to subdue or enfeeble it, just as his father Amyntas had

invoked Sparta for the like purpose. Timotheus, with the assistance

of Perdikkas, was very successful in these parts; making himself

master of Torônê, Potidæa, Pydna, Methônê, and various other places.

As he mastered many of the Chalkidic towns allied with Olynthus,

the means and adherents still retained by that city became so much

diminished, that Timotheus is spoken of loosely as having conquered

it.[647] Here, as at Samos, he obtained his successes not only

without cost to Athens, but also (as we are told) without severities

upon the allies, simply from the regular contributions of the

Thracian confederates of Athens, assisted by the employment of a

temporary coinage of base metal.[648] Yet though Timotheus was thus

victorious in and near the Thermaic Gulf, he was not more fortunate

than his predecessor in his attempt to achieve that which Athens had

most at heart,—the capture of Amphipolis; although, by the accidental

capture of Charidemus at sea, he was enabled again to enlist that

chief with his band, whose services seem to have been gratefully

appreciated at Athens.[649] Timotheus first despatched Alkimachus,

who was repulsed,—then landed himself and attacked the city. But the

Amphipolitans, aided by the neighboring Thracians, in large numbers

(and perhaps by the Thracian Kotys), made so strenuous a resistance,

that he was forced to retire with loss; and even to burn some

triremes, which, having been carried across to assail the city from

the wide part of the river Strymon above, could not be brought off

in the face of the enemy.[650]

[645] Diodorus, xv, 77; Æschines de Fals. Leg. p. 250. c. 14.

[646] Demosthenes (Olynth. 1, p. 21. s. 14) mentions the

assistance of the Macedonians to Timotheus against Olynthus.

Compare also his oration ad Philippi Epistolam (p. 154. s. 9).

This can hardly allude to anything else than the war carried on

by Timotheus on those coasts in 364 B.C. See also Polyæn. iii,

10, 14.

[647] Diodor. xv, 81; Cornelius Nepos, Timoth. 1; Isokrates, Or.

xv, (De Permut.) s. 115-119; Deinarchus cont. Demosth. s. 14.

cont. Philokl. s. 19.

I give in the text what I apprehend to be the real truth

contained in the large assertion of Isokrates,—Χαλκιδεῖς ἅπαντας

κατεπολέμησεν (s. 119). The orator states that Timotheus acquired

twenty-four cities in all; but this total probably comprises

his conquests in other times as well as in other places. The

expression of Nepos—“Olynthios bello subegit” is vague.

[648] Isokrates, _l. c._; Aristotel. Œconomic. ii, 22: Polyæn.

iii, 10, 14.

[649] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669. s. 177.

[650] Polyænus (iii, 10, 8) mentions this fact, which is

explained by comparing (in Thucydides, vii, 9) the description of

the attack made by the Athenian Euetion upon Amphipolis in 414

B.C.

These ill-successes of Timotheus stand enumerated, as I conceive,

in that catalogue of _nine_ defeats, which the Scholiast on

Æschines (De Fals. Leg. p. 755, Reiske) specifies as having been

undergone by Athens at the territory called _Nine Ways_ (Ἐννέα

Ὁδοὶ), the previous name of the spot where Amphipolis was built.

They form the eighth and ninth items of the catalogue.

The third item, is the capture of Amphipolis by Brasidas. The

fourth is, the defeat of Kleon by Brasidas. Then come,—

5. οἱ ἐνοικοῦντες ἐπ’ Ἠϊόνα Ἀθηναῖοι ἐξελάθησαν. The only way

in which I can make historical fact out of these words, is,

by supposing that they allude to the driving in of all the

out-resident Athenians to Athens, after the defeat of Ægospotami.

We know from Thucydides that when Amphipolis was taken by

Brasidas, many of the Athenians who were there settled retired

to Eion; where they probably remained until the close of the

Peloponnesian war, and were then forced back to Athens. We should

then have to construe οἱ ἐνοικοῦντες ἐπ’ Ἠϊόνα Ἀθηναῖοι—“the

Athenians residing at Eion;” which, though not a usual sense

of the preposition ἐπὶ with an accusative case, seems the only

definite meaning which can be made out here.

6. οἱ μετὰ Σιμμίχου στρατηγοῦντος διεφθάρησαν.

7. ὅτε Πρωτόμαχος ἀπέτυχεν (Ἀμφιπολιτῶν αὐτοὺς παραδόντων τοῖς

ὁμόροις Θρᾳξί, these last words are inserted by Bekker from

a MS.). These two last-mentioned occurrences are altogether

unknown. We may perhaps suppose them to refer to the period when

Iphikrates was commanding the forces of Athens in these regions,

from 368-365 B.C.

8. ἐκπεμφθεὶς ὑπὸ Τιμοθέου Ἀλκíμαχος ἀπέτυχεν αὐτοῦ, παραδόντων

αὑτοὺς Θρᾳξὶν ἐπὶ Τιμοκράτους Ἀθήνῃσιν ἄρχοντος.

The word Τιμοθέου is here inserted by Bekker from a MS., in place

of Τιμοσθένους, which appeared in Reiske’s edition.

9. Τιμόθεος ἐπιστρατεύσας ἡττήθη ἐπὶ Καλαμιώνος.

Here are two defeats of Timotheus specified, one in the

archonship of Timokrates, which exactly coincides with the

command of Timotheus in these regions (Midsummer 364 to Midsummer

363 B.C.). But the other archon Kalamion, is unknown in the Fasti

of Athens. Winiewski (Comment. in Demosth. de Corona, p. 39),

Böhnecke, and other commentators follow Corsini in representing

Kalamion to be a corruption of _Kallimedes_, who was archon

from Midsummer 360-359 B.C.; and Mr. Clinton even inserts the

fact in his tables for that year. But I agree with Rehdantz

(Vit. Iph. Chab. et Tim. p. 153) that such an occurrence after

Midsummer 360 B.C., can hardly be reconciled with the proceedings

in the Chersonese before and after that period, as reported by

Demosthenes in the Oration against Aristokrates. Without being

able to explain the mistake about the name of the archon, and

without determining whether the real mistake may not consist

in having placed ἐπὶ in place of ὑπὸ,—I cannot but think that

Timotheus underwent two repulses, one by his lieutenant, and

another by himself, near Amphipolis,—both of them occurring in

364 or the early part of 363 B.C. During great part of 363 B.C.,

the attention of Timotheus seems to have been turned to the

Chersonese, Byzantium, Kotys, etc.

My view of the chronology of this period agrees generally with

that of Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. vol. v, ch. 42, p. 244-257).

Timotheus next turned his attention to the war against Kotys in

Thrace, and to the defence of the newly-acquired Athenian possessions

in the Chersonese, now menaced by the appearance of a new and

unexpected enemy to Athens in the eastern waters of the Ægean,—a

Theban fleet.

I have already mentioned that in 366 B.C., Thebes had sustained

great misfortunes in Thessaly. Pelopidas had been fraudulently seized

and detained as prisoner by Alexander of Pheræ; a Theban army had

been sent to rescue him, but had been dishonorably repulsed, and had

only been enabled to effect its retreat by the genius of Epaminondas,

then serving as a private, and called upon by the soldiers to take

the command. Afterwards, Epaminondas himself had been sent at the

head of a second army to extricate his captive friend, which he had

accomplished, but not without relinquishing Thessaly and leaving

Alexander more powerful than ever. For a certain time after this

defeat, the Thebans remained comparatively humbled and quiet. At

length, the aggravated oppressions of the tyrant Alexander occasioned

such suffering, and provoked such missions of complaint on the part

of the Thessalians to Thebes, that Pelopidas, burning with ardor

to revenge both his city and himself, prevailed on the Thebans to

place him at the head of a fresh army for the purpose of invading

Thessaly.[651]

[651] Plutarch Pelopid. c. 31; Diodor. xv, 80.

At the same time, probably, the remarkable successes of the Athenians

under Timotheus, at Samos and the Chersonese, had excited uneasiness

throughout Greece, and jealousy on the part of the Thebans.

Epaminondas ventured to propose to his countrymen that they should

grapple with Athens on her own element, and compete for the headship

of Greece not only on land but at sea. In fact the rescript brought

down by Pelopidas from the Persian court sanctioned this pretension,

by commanding Athens to lay up her ships of war, on pain of incurring

the chastisement of the Great King;[652] a mandate, which she had so

completely defied as to push her maritime efforts more energetically

than before. Epaminondas employed all his eloquence to impress upon

his countrymen, that, Sparta being now humbled, Athens was their

actual and prominent enemy. He reminded them,—in language such as had

been used by Brasidas in the early years of the Peloponnesian war,

and by Hermokrates at Syracuse,[653]—that men such as the Thebans,

brave and trained soldiers on land, could soon acquire the like

qualities on shipboard; and that the Athenians themselves had once

been mere landsmen, until the exigencies of the Persian war forced

them to take to the sea.[654] “We must put down this haughty rival

(he exhorted his countrymen); we must transfer to our own citadel,

the Kadmeia, those magnificent Propylæa which adorn the entrance of

the acropolis at Athens.”[655]

[652] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 36.

[653] Thucyd ii, 87; vii, 21.

[654] Diodor. xv, 78.

[655] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 276, c. 32, s. 111. Ἐπαμινώνδας,

οὐχ ὑποπτήξας τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀξίωμα, εἶπε διαῤῥήδην ἐν τῷ

πλήθει τῶν Θηβαίων, ὡς δεῖ τὰ τῆς Ἀθηναίων ἀκροπόλεως προπύλαια

μετενεγκεῖν εἰς τὴν προστασίαν τῆς Καδμείας.

Such emphatic language, as it long lived in the hostile recollection

of Athenian orators, so it excited at the moment extreme ardor on

the part of the Theban hearers. They resolved to build and equip

one hundred triremes, and to construct docks with ship-houses fit

for the constant maintenance of such a number. Epaminondas himself

was named commander, to sail with the first fleet, as soon as it

should be ready, to the Hellespont and the islands near Ionia;

while invitations were at the same time despatched to Rhodes,

Chios, and Byzantium, encouraging them to prepare for breaking with

Athens.[656] Some opposition however was made in the assembly to the

new undertaking; especially by Menekleidas, an opposition speaker,

who, being frequent and severe in his criticisms upon the leading men

such as Pelopidas and Epaminondas, has been handed down by Nepos

and Plutarch in odious colors. Demagogues like him, whose power

resided in the public assembly, are commonly represented as if they

had a natural interest in plunging their cities into war, in order

that there might be more matter of accusation against the leading

men. This representation is founded mainly on the picture which

Thucydides gives of Kleon in the first half of the Peloponnesian war:

I have endeavored in my sixth volume to show,[657] that it is not a

fair estimate even of Kleon separately, much less of the demagogues

generally, unwarlike men both in tastes and aptitudes. Menekleidas

at Thebes, far from promoting warlike expeditions in order that

he might denounce the generals when they came back, advocated the

prudence of continued peace, and accused Epaminondas of involving his

country in distant and dangerous schemes, with a view to emulate the

glories of Agamemnon by sailing from Aulis in Bœotia, as commander

of an imposing fleet to make conquests in the Hellespont. “By the

help of Thebes (replied Epaminondas) I have already done more than

Agamemnon. He, with the forces of Sparta and all Greece besides, was

ten years in taking a single city; while _I_, with the single force

of Thebes and at the single day of Leuktra, have crushed the power of

the Agamemnonian Sparta.”[658] While repelling the charge of personal

motives, Epaminondas contended that peace would be equivalent to an

abnegation of the headship of Greece; and that, if Thebes wished

to maintain that ascendant station, she must keep her citizens in

constant warlike training and action.

[656] Diodor. xv, 78, 79.

[657] See Vol. VI. Ch. liv. p. 475.

[658] Cornelius Nepos, Epaminond. c. 5; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c.

25; Plutarch, De Sui Laude, p. 542 A.

Neither of these the authors appear to me to conceive rightly

either the attack, or the reply, in which the name of Agamemnon

is here brought forward. As I have given it in the text, there is

a real foundation for the attack, and a real point in the reply;

as it appears in Cornelius Nepos, there is neither one nor the

other.

That the Spartans regarded themselves as having inherited the

leadership of Greece from Agamemnon, may be seen by Herodotus,

vii, 159.

To err with Epaminondas may be considered, by some readers, as

better than being right with Menekleidas. But on the main point of

this debate, Menekleidas appears to have been really right. For

the general exhortations ascribed to Epaminondas resemble but too

closely those feverish stimulants, which Alkibiades administered at

Athens to wind up his countrymen for the fatal expedition against

Syracuse.[659] If we should even grant his advice to be wise, in

reference to land-warfare, we must recollect that he was here

impelling Thebes into a new and untried maritime career, for which

she had neither aptitude nor facilities. To maintain ascendency

on land alone, would require all her force, and perhaps prove

too hard for her; to maintain ascendency by land and sea at once

would be still more impracticable. By grasping at both she would

probably keep neither. Such considerations warrant us in suspecting,

that the project of stretching across the Ægean for ultramarine

dependencies was suggested to this great man not so much by a sound

appreciation of the permanent interests of Thebes, as by jealousy of

Athens,—especially since the recent conquests of Timotheus.[660]

[659] Thucyd. vi, 17, 18.

[660] Plutarch (Philopœmen, c. 14) mentions that some authors

represented Epaminondas as having consented unwillingly to this

maritime expedition. He explains such reluctance by reference

to the disparaging opinion expressed by Plato about maritime

service. But this opinion of Plato is founded upon reasons

foreign to the character of Epaminondas; and it seems to me

evident that the authors whom Plutarch here followed, introduced

the opinion only as an hypothesis to explain why so great a

general on land as Epaminondas had accomplished so little at sea,

when he took command of a fleet; putting himself in a function

for which he had little capacity, like Philopœmen (Plutarch,

Reipublic. Gerend. Præcep. p. 812 E.).

Bauch (in his tract, Epaminondas und Thebens Kampf um die

Hegemonie, Breslau, 1834, p. 70, 71) maintains that Epaminondas

was constrained against his own better judgment to undertake this

maritime enterprise. I cannot coincide in his opinion. The oracle

which Bauch cites from Pausanias (viii, 11, 6) proves as little

as the above extract from Plutarch.

The project however was really executed, and a large Theban fleet

under Epaminondas crossed the Ægean in 363 B.C. In the same year,

apparently, Pelopidas marched into Thessaly, at the head of a Theban

land-force, against Alexander of Pheræ. What the fleet achieved,

we are scarcely permitted to know. It appears that Epaminondas

visited Byzantium; and we are told that he drove off the Athenian

guard-squadron under Laches, prevailing upon several of the allies

of Athens to declare in his favor.[661] Both he and Timotheus

appear to have been in these seas, if not at the same time, at least

with no great interval of time between. Both were solicited by the

oligarchy of the Pontic Herakleia against the people; and both

declined to furnish aid.[662] Timotheus is said to have liberated

the besieged town of Kyzikus: by whom it was besieged, we do not

certainly know, but probably by the Theban fleet.[663] Epaminondas

brought back his fleet at the end of the year, without having gained

any splendid victory or acquired any tenable possession for Thebes;

yet not without weakening Athens, unsettling her hold upon her

dependencies, and seconding indirectly the hostilities carried on

by Kotys; insomuch that the Athenian affairs in the Chersonese and

Thrace were much less prosperous in 362 B.C. than they had been in

364 B.C. Probably Epaminondas intended to return with his fleet in

the next year (362 B.C.), and to push his maritime enterprises still

farther;[664] but we shall find him imperatively called elsewhere, to

another and a fatal battle-field. And thus the first naval expedition

of Thebes was likewise the last.

[661] Isokrates. Or. v, (Philip.) s. 53; Diodor. xv, 78. ἰδίας

τὰς πόλεις τοῖς Θηβαίοις ἐποίησεν. I do not feel assured that

these general words apply to Chios, Rhodes, and Byzantium, which

had before been mentioned.

[662] Justin, xvi, 4.

[663] Diodor. xv, 81; Cornel. Nepos, Timotheus, c. 1.

[664] Diodor. xv, 79.

Meanwhile his friend and colleague Pelopidas had marched into

Thessaly against the despot Alexander; who was now at the height of

his power, holding in dependence a large portion of Thessaly together

with the Phthiot Achæans and the Magnetes, and having Athens as his

ally. Nevertheless, so revolting had been his cruelties, and so

numerous were the malcontents who had sent to invite aid from Thebes,

that Pelopidas did not despair of overpowering him. Nor was he

daunted even by an eclipse of the sun, which is said to have occurred

just as he was commencing his march, nor by the gloomy warnings which

the prophets founded upon it; though this event intimidated many of

his fellow-citizens, so that his force was rendered less numerous

as well as less confident. Arriving at Pharsalus, and strengthening

himself by the junction of his Thessalian allies, he found Alexander

approaching to meet him at the head of a well-appointed mercenary

force, greatly superior in number. The two chiefs contended who

should occupy first the hills called Kynos Kephalæ, or the Dog’s

Heads. Pelopidas arrived there first with his cavalry, beat the

cavalry of the enemy, and pursued them to some distance; but he thus

left the hills open to be occupied by the numerous infantry of the

enemy, while his own infantry, coming up later, were repulsed with

loss in their attempt to carry the position. Thus unpromising did the

battle appear, when Pelopidas returned from the pursuit. Ordering

his victorious cavalry to charge the infantry on the hill in flank,

he immediately dismounted, seized his shield, and put himself at

the head of his own discouraged infantry, whom he again led up the

hill to attack the position. His presence infused so much fresh

ardor, that his troops, in spite of being twice repulsed, succeeded

in a third attempt to drive the enemy from the summit of the hill.

Thus master of the hill, Pelopidas saw before him the whole army

of the enemy, retiring in some disorder, though not yet beaten;

while Alexander in person was on the right wing, exerting himself

to rally and encourage them. When Pelopidas beheld, as it were

within his reach, this detested enemy,—whose treacherous arrest and

dungeon he had himself experienced, and whose cruelties filled every

one’s mouth,—he was seized with a transport of rage and madness,

like Cyrus the younger on the field of Kunaxa at the sight of his

brother Artaxerxes. Without thinking of his duties as a general, or

even looking to see by whom he was followed, he rushed impetuously

forward, with loud cries and challenges to Alexander to come forth

and fight. The latter, declining the challenge, retired among his

guards, into the midst of whom Pelopidas plunged, with the few who

followed him; and there, while fighting with desperate bravery, met

his death. So rapidly had this rash proceeding been consummated, that

his army behind did not at first perceive it. But they presently

hastened forward to rescue or avenge him, vigorously charged the

troops of Alexander, and put them to flight with severe loss.[665]

[665] For the description of this memorable scene, see Plutarch,

Pelopidas, c. 31, 32; Diodor. xv, 80, 81; Cornel. Nepos. Pelopid.

c. 5.

Yet this victory, though important to the Thebans, and still more

important to the Thessalians, was to both of them robbed of all its

sensible value by the death of Pelopidas. The demonstrations of grief

throughout the army were unbounded and universal. The soldiers yet

warm from their victory, the wounded men with wounds yet untended,

flocked around the corpse, piling up near to it as a trophy the arms

of the slain enemies. Many, refusing either to kindle fire, or to

touch their evening meal, testified their affliction by cutting off

their own hair as well as the manes of their horses. The Thessalian

cities vied with each other in tokens of affectionate respect, and

obtained from the Thebans permission to take the chief share in

his funeral, as their lost guardian and protector. At Thebes, the

emotion was no less strikingly manifested. Endeared to his countrymen

first as the head of that devoted handful of exiles who braved

every peril to rescue the city from the Lacedæmonians, Pelopidas

had been reëlected without interruption to the annual office of

Bœotarch during all the years that had since elapsed[666] (378-364

B.C.). He had taken a leading part in all their struggles, and

all their glories; he had been foremost to cheer them in the hour

of despondency; he had lent himself, with the wisdom of a patriot

and the generosity of a friend, to second the guiding ascendency

of Epaminondas, and his moderation of dealing towards conquered

enemies.[667]

[666] Diodor. xv, 81. Plutarch (Pelop. c. 34) states

substantially the same.

[667] Plutarch, Compar. Pelopid. and Marcell. c. 1.

All that Thebes could do, was, to avenge the death of Pelopidas. The

Theban generals, Malkitas and Diogeiton,[668] conducted a powerful

force of seven thousand hoplites into Thessaly, and put themselves at

the head of their partisans in that country. With this united army,

they pressed Alexander hard, completely worsted him, and reduced him

to submit to their own terms. He was compelled to relinquish all

his dependencies in Thessaly; to confine himself to Pheræ, with its

territory near the Gulf of Pagasæ; and to swear adherence to Thebes

as a leader. All Thessaly, together with the Phthiot Achæans and the

Magnêtes, became annexed to the headship of the Thebans, who thus

acquired greater ascendency in Northern Greece than they had ever

enjoyed before.[669] The power of Alexander was effectually put down

on land; but he still continued both powerful and predatory at sea,

as will be seen in the ensuing year.

[668] Diodor. (xv, 78) places in one and the same year both,—1.

The maritime project of Epaminondas, including his recommendation

of it, the equipment of the fleet, and the actual expedition. 2.

The expedition of Pelopidas into Thessaly, with its immediate

consequences.—He mentions the former of the two first, but he

places both in the first year of Olympiad 104, the year in which

Timokrates was archon at Athens; that is, from Midsummer 364

to Midsummer 363 B.C. He passes immediately from the maritime

expedition into an allusion to the battle of Mantinea, which (he

says) proved fatal to Epaminondas and hindered him from following

up his ideas of maritime activity.

The battle of Mantinea took place in June or July 362 B.C. The

maritime expedition, immediately preceding that battle, would

therefore naturally take place in the summer of 363 B.C.; the

year 364 B.C. having been occupied in the requisite naval

equipments.

I incline to think that the march of Pelopidas into Thessaly also

took place during 363 B.C., and that his death thus occurred

while Epaminondas was absent on shipboard. A probable reason is

thus supplied why the second Theban army which went to avenge

Pelopidas, was commanded, not by his friend and colleague

Epaminondas, but by other generals. Had Epaminondas been then at

home, this would hardly have been.

The eclipse of the sun, which both Plutarch and Diodorus mention

to have immediately preceded the out-march of Pelopidas, does

not seem to have been as yet certainly identified. Dodwell, on

the authority of an astronomical friend, places it on the 13th

of June, 364 B.C., at five o’clock in the morning. On the other

hand, Calvisius places it on the 13th of July in the same Julian

year, at a quarter before eleven o’clock in the day (see L’Art de

Vérifier les Dates, tom. i, p. 257). We may remark, that the day

named by Dodwell (as he himself admits) would not fall within the

Olympic year 364-363 B.C., but during the months preceding the

commencement of that year. Moreover Dodwell speaks as if there

were no other months in the year, except June, July, and August,

fit for military expeditions; an hypothesis not reasonable to

admit.

Sievers and Dr. Thirlwall both accept the eclipse mentioned by

Dodwell, as marking the time when the expedition of Pelopidas

commenced—June 364 B.C. But against this, Mr. Clinton takes

no notice of it in his tables; which seems to show that he was

not satisfied as to the exactness of Dodwell’s statement or

the chronological identity. If it should turn out, on farther

astronomical calculations, that there occurred no eclipse of

the sun in the year 363 B.C., visible at Thebes,—I should then

fix upon the eclipse mentioned by Calvisius (13 July 364 B.C.)

as identifying the time of the expedition of Pelopidas; which

would, on that supposition, precede by eight or nine months

the commencement of the transmarine cruise of Epaminondas. The

eclipse mentioned by Calvisius is preferable to that mentioned by

Dodwell, because it falls within the Olympic year indicated by

Diodorus.

But it appears to me that farther astronomical information is

here required.

[669] Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 35.