Some such are extant; but they are referred by K. O. Müller, as

well as by M. Boeckh (Metrologisch. Untersuchungen, p. 92) to a

later date subsequent to the foundation of Megalopolis.

On the other hand, Ernst Curtius (Beyträge zur Aeltern Münzkunde,

p. 85-90, Berlin, 1851) contends that there is a great difference

in the style and execution of these coins, and that several

in all probability belong to a date earlier than the battle

of Leuktra. He supposes that these older coins were struck in

connection with the Pan-Arcadian sanctuary and temple of Zeus

Lykæus, and probably out of a common treasury at the temple of

that god for religious purposes; perhaps also in connection

with the temple of Artemis Hymnia (Pausan. viii, 5, 11) between

Mantinea and Orchomenus.

[440] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 6. συνῆγον ἐπὶ τὸ συνιέναι πᾶν τὸ

Ἀρκαδικὸν, καὶ ὅ,τι νικῴη ἐν τῷ κοινῷ, τοῦτο κύριον εἶναι καὶ τῶν

πόλεων, etc.

Compare Diodor. xv, 59-62.

[441] See Pausanias, viii, 27, 2, 3.

[442] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 11.

[443] For the relations of these Arcadian cities, with Sparta and

with each other, see Thucyd. iv, 134; v, 61, 64, 77.

Among the population of Tegea, however, a large proportion were

ardent partisans of the new Pan-Arcadian movement, and desirous

of breaking off their connection with Sparta. At the head of

this party were Proxenus and Kallibius; while Stasippus and his

friends, supported by a senate composed chiefly of their partisans,

vehemently opposed any alteration of the existing system. Proxenus

and his partisans resolved to appeal to the assembled people, whom

accordingly they convoked in arms; pacific popular assemblies, with

free discussion, forming seemingly no part of the constitution

of the city. Stasippus and his friends appeared in armed numbers

also; and a conflict ensued, in which each party charged the other

with bad faith and with striking the first blow.[444] At first

Stasippus had the advantage. Proxenus with a few of the opposite

party were slain, while Kallibius with the remainder maintained

himself near the town-wall, and in possession of the gate on the

side towards Mantinea. To that city he had before despatched an

express, entreating aid, while he opened a parley with the opponents.

Presently the Mantinean force arrived, and was admitted within

the gates; upon which Stasippus, seeing that he could no longer

maintain himself, escaped by another gate towards Pallantium. He took

sanctuary with a few friends in a neighboring temple of Artemis,

whither he was pursued by his adversaries, who removed the roof,

and began to cast the tiles down upon them. The unfortunate men

were obliged to surrender. Fettered and placed on a cart, they were

carried back to Tegea, and put on their trial before the united

Tegeans and Mantineans, who condemned them and put them to death.

Eight hundred Tegeans, of the defeated party, fled as exiles to

Sparta.[445]

[444] Xenophon in his account represents Stasippus and his

friends as being quite in the right, and as having behaved

not only with justice but with clemency. But we learn from an

indirect admission, in another place, that there was also another

story, totally different, which represented Stasippus as having

begun unjust violence. Compare Hellenic. vi, 5, 7, 8 with vi, 5,

36.

The manifest partiality of Xenophon, in these latter books,

greatly diminishes the value of his own belief on such a matter.

[445] Xen. Hellen. vi. 5. 8, 9, 10.

Such was the important revolution which now took place at Tegea; a

struggle of force on both sides, and not of discussion,—as was in

the nature of the Greek oligarchical governments, where scarce any

serious change of policy in the state could be brought about without

violence. It decided the success of the Pan-Arcadian movement, which

now proceeded with redoubled enthusiasm. Both Mantinea and Tegea were

cordially united in its favor; though Orchomenus, still strenuous in

opposing it, hired for that purpose, as well as for her own defence,

a body of mercenaries from Corinth under Polytropus. A full assembly

of the Arcadian name was convoked at a small town called Asea, in

the mountainous district west of Tegea. It appears to have been

numerously attended; for we hear of one place, Eutæa (in the district

of Mount Mænalus,[446] and near the borders of Laconia), from whence

every single male adult went to the assembly. It was here that the

consummation of the Pan-Arcadian confederacy was finally determined;

though Orchomenus and Heræa still stood aloof.[447]

[446] Pausanias, viii, 27, 3.

[447] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 11, 12.

There could hardly be a more fatal blow to Sparta than this loss

to herself, and transfer to her enemies, of Tegea, the most

powerful of her remaining allies.[448] To assist the exiles and

avenge Stasippus, as well as to arrest the Arcadian movement,

she resolved on a march into the country, in spite of her present

dispirited condition; while Heræa and Lepreum, but no other places,

sent contingents to her aid. From Elis and Argos, on the other

hand, reinforcements came to Mantinea and Tegea. Proclaiming that

the Mantineans had violated the recent peace by their entry into

Tegea, Agesilaus marched across the border against them. The first

Arcadian town which he reached was Eutæa,[449] where he found

that all the male adults had gone to the great Arcadian assembly.

Though the feebler population, remaining behind, were completely

in his power, he took scrupulous care to respect both person and

property, and even lent aid to rebuild a decayed portion of the

wall. At Eutæa he halted a day or two, thinking it prudent to wait

for the junction of the mercenary force and the Bœotian exiles under

Polytropus, now at Orchomenus. Against the latter place, however,

the Mantineans had marched under Lykomêdes, while Polytropus, coming

forth from the walls to meet them, had been defeated with loss, and

slain.[450] Hence Agesilaus was compelled to advance onward with

his own unassisted forces, through the territory of Tegea up to the

neighborhood of Mantinea. His onward march left the way from Asea

to Tegea free, upon which the Arcadians assembled at Asea broke up,

and marched by night to Tegea; from whence, on the next day, they

proceeded to Mantinea, along the mountain range eastward of the

Tegeatic plain; so that the whole Arcadian force thus became united.

Agesilaus on his side, having ravaged the fields and encamped within

little more than two miles from the walls of Mantinea, was agreeably

surprised by the junction of his allies from Orchomenus, who had

eluded by a night-march the vigilance of the enemy. Both on one side

and on the other, the forces were thus concentrated. Agesilaus found

himself on the first night, without intending it, embosomed in a

recess of the mountains near Mantinea, where the Mantineans gathered

on the high ground around, in order to attack him from above, the

next morning. By a well-managed retreat, he extricated himself from

this inconvenient position, and regained the plain; where he remained

three days, prepared to give battle if the enemy came forth, in order

that he might “not seem (says Xenophon) to hasten his departure

through fear.”[451] As the enemy kept within their walls, he marched

homeward, on the fourth day, to his former camp in the Tegean

territory. The enemy did not pursue, and he then pushed on his march,

though it was late in the evening, to Eutæa; “wishing (says Xenophon)

to get his troops off before even the enemies’ fires could be seen,

in order that no one might say that his return was a flight. He

thought that he had raised the spirit of Sparta out of the previous

discouragement, by invading Arcadia and ravaging the country without

any enemy coming forth to fight him.”[452] The army was then brought

back to Sparta and disbanded.

[448] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 2.

See the prodigious anxiety manifested by the Lacedæmonians

respecting the sure adhesion of Tegea (Thucyd. v, 64).

[449] I cannot but think that Eutæa stands marked upon the maps

of Kiepert at a point too far from the frontier of Laconia, and

so situated in reference to Asea, that Agesilaus must have passed

very near Asea in order to get to it; which is difficult to

suppose, seeing that the Arcadian convocation was assembled at

Asea. Xenophon calls Eutæa πόλιν ὅμορον with reference to Laconia

(Hellen. vi, 5, 12); this will hardly suit with the position

marked by Kiepert.

The district called Mænalia must have reached farther southward

than Kiepert indicates on his map. It included Oresteion, which

was on the straight road from Sparta to Tegea (Thucyd. v, 64;

Herodot. ix, 11). Kiepert has placed Oresteion in his map

agreeably to what seems the meaning of Pausanias, viii, 44, 3.

But it rather appears that the place mentioned by Pausanias must

have been _Oresthasion_, and that _Oresteion_ must have been a

different place, though Pausanias considers them the same. See

the geographical Appendix to K. O. Müller’s Dorians, vol. ii, p.

442—Germ. edit.

[450] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 13, 14; Diodor. xv, 62.

[451] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 20. ὅπως μὴ δοκοίη φοβούμενος σπεύδειν

τὴν ἔφοδον.

See Leake’s Travels in the Morea, vol. iii, c. xxiv, p. 74, 75.

The exact spot designated by the words τὸν ὄπισθεν κόλπον τῆς

Μαντινικῆς, seems hardly to be identified.

[452] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 21. βουλόμενος ἀπαγαγεῖν τοὺς ὁπλίτας,

πρὶν καὶ τὰ πυρὰ τῶν πολεμίων ἰδεῖν, ἵνα μή τις εἴπῃ, ὡς φεύγων

ἀπαγάγοι. Ἐκ γὰρ τῆς πρόσθεν ἀθυμίας ἐδόκει τε ἀνειληφέναι τὴν

πόλιν, ὅτι καὶ ἐμβεβλήκει εἰς τὴν Ἀρκαδίαν, καὶ δῃοῦντι τὴν χώραν

οὐδεὶς ἠθελήκει μάχεσθαι: compare Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30.

It had now become a matter of boast for Agesilaus (according to his

own friendly historian) to keep the field for three or four days,

without showing fear of Arcadians and Eleians! So fatally had Spartan

pride broken down, since the day (less than eighteen months before)

when the peremptory order had been sent to Kleombrotus, to march out

of Phokis straight against Thebes!

Nevertheless it was not from fear of Agesilaus, but from a wise

discretion, that the Arcadians and Eleians had kept within the

walls of Mantinea. Epaminondas with the Theban army was approaching

to their aid, and daily expected; a sum of ten talents having been

lent by the Eleians to defray the cost.[453] He had been invited by

them and by others of the smaller Peloponnesian states, who felt

the necessity of some external protector against Sparta,—and who

even before they applied to Thebes for aid, had solicited the like

interference from Athens (probably under the general presidency

accepted by Athens, and the oaths interchanged by her with various

inferior cities, since the battle of Leuktra), but had experienced a

refusal.[454]

[453] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 19.

[454] Diodor. xv, 62. Compare Demosthenes, Orat. pro Megalopolit.

pp. 205-207, s. 13-23.

Epaminondas had been preparing for this contingency ever since the

battle of Leuktra. The first use made of his victory had been to

establish or confirm the ascendency of Thebes both over the recusant

Bœotian cities and over the neighboring Phokians and Lokrians,

etc. After this had been accomplished, he must have been occupied

(during the early part of 370 B.C.) in anxiously watching the

movements of Jason of Pheræ,—who had already announced his design

of marching with an imposing force to Delphi for the celebration of

the Pythian games (about August 1.) Though this despot was the ally

of Thebes, yet as both his power, and his aspirations towards the

headship of Greece,[455] were well known, no Theban general, even

of prudence inferior to Epaminondas, could venture in the face of

such liabilities to conduct away the Theban force into Peloponnesus,

leaving Bœotia uncovered. The assassination of Jason relieved Thebes

from such apprehensions, and a few weeks sufficed to show that his

successors were far less formidable in power as well as in ability.

Accordingly, in the autumn of 370 B.C. Epaminondas had his attention

free to turn to Peloponnesus, for the purpose both of maintaining

the anti-Spartan revolution which had taken place in Tegea, and

of seconding the pronounced impulse among the Arcadians towards

federative coalition.

[455] Diodor. xv, 60.

But the purposes of this distinguished man went farther still;

embracing long-sighted and permanent arrangements, such as should

forever disable Sparta from recovering her prominent station in the

Grecian world. While with one hand he organized Arcadia, with the

other he took measures for replacing the exiled Messenians on their

ancient territory. To achieve this, it was necessary to dispossess

the Spartans of the region once known as independent Messenia, under

its own line of kings, but now, for near three centuries, the best

portion of Laconia, tilled by Helots for the profit of proprietors

at Sparta. While converting these Helots into free Messenians, as

their forefathers had once been, Epaminondas proposed to invite back

all the wanderers of the same race who were dispersed in various

portions of Greece; so as at once to impoverish Sparta by loss of

territory, and to plant upon her flank a neighbor bitterly hostile.

It has been already mentioned, that during the Peloponnesian war, the

exiled Messenians had been among the most active allies of Athens

and Sparta,—at Naupaktus, at Sphakteria, at Pylus, in Kephallenia,

and elsewhere. Expelled at the close of that war by the triumphant

Spartans,[456] not only from Peloponnesus, but also from Naupaktus

and Kephallenia, these exiles had since been dispersed among various

Hellenic colonies; at Rhegium in Italy, at Messênê in Sicily, at

Hesperides in Libya. From 404 B.C. (the close of the war) to 373

B.C., they had remained thus without a home. At length, about the

latter year (when the Athenian confederate navy again became equal

or superior to the Lacedæmonian on the west coast of Peloponnesus),

they began to indulge the hope of being restored to Naupaktus.[457]

Probably their request may have been preferred and discussed in the

synod of Athenian allies, where the Thebans sat as members. Nothing

however had been done towards it by the Athenians,—who soon became

fatigued with the war, and at length made peace with Sparta,—when the

momentous battle of Leuktra altered, both completely and suddenly,

the balance of power in Greece. A chance of protection was now opened

to the Messenians from Thebes, far more promising than they had

ever had from Athens. Epaminondas, well aware of the loss as well

as humiliation that he should inflict upon Sparta by restoring them

to their ancient territory, entered into communication with them,

and caused them to be invited to Peloponnesus from all their distant

places of emigration.[458] By the time of his march into Arcadia, in

the late autumn of 370 B.C., many of them had already joined him,

burning with all their ancient hatred of Sparta, and contributing to

aggravate the same sentiment among Thebans and allies.

[456] Diodor. xiv, 34.

[457] Pausanias. iv, 26, 3.

[458] Diodor. xv, 66; Pausanias, iv, 26, 3, 4.

With the scheme of restoring the Messenians, was combined in the

mind of Epaminondas another, for the political consolidation of

the Arcadians; both being intended as parts of one strong and

self-supporting organization against Sparta on her own border. Of

course he could have accomplished nothing of the kind, if there had

not been a powerful spontaneous movement towards consolidation among

the Arcadians themselves. But without his guidance and protection,

the movement would have proved abortive, through the force of local

jealousies within the country, fomented and seconded by Spartan aid

from without. Though the general vote for federative coalition had

been passed with enthusiasm, yet to carry out such a vote to the

satisfaction of all, without quarrelling on points of detail, would

have required far more of public-minded sentiment, as well as of

intelligence, than what could be reckoned upon among the Arcadians.

It was necessary to establish a new city; since the standing jealousy

between Mantinea and Tegea, now for the first time embarked in one

common cause, would never have permitted that either should be

preferred as the centre of the new consolidation.[459] Besides fixing

upon the new site required, it was indispensable also to choose

between conflicting exigencies, and to break up ancient habits, in a

way such as could hardly have been enforced by any majority purely

Arcadian. The authority here deficient was precisely supplied by

Epaminondas; who brought with him a victorious army and a splendid

personal name, combined with impartiality as to the local politics of

Arcadia, and single-minded hostility to Sparta.

[459] To illustrate small things by great—At the first formation

of the Federal Constitution of the United States of America, the

rival pretensions of New York and Philadelphia were among the

principal motives for creating the new federal city of Washington.

It was with a view to these two great foundations, as well as to

expel Agesilaus, that Epaminondas now marched the Theban army

into Arcadia; the command being voluntarily intrusted to him by

Pelopidas and the other Bœotarchs present. He arrived shortly after

the retirement of Agesilaus, while the Arcadians and Eleians

were ravaging the lands of the recusant town of Heræa. As they

speedily came back to greet his arrival, the aggregate confederate

body,—Argeians, Arcadians, and Eleians, united with the Thebans

and their accompanying allies,—is said to have amounted to forty

thousand, or according to some, even to seventy thousand men.[460]

Not merely had Epaminondas brought with him a choice body of

auxiliaries,—Phokians, Lokrians, Eubœans, Akarnanians, Herakleots,

Malians, and Thessalian cavalry and peltasts,—but the Bœotian bands

themselves were so brilliant and imposing, as to excite universal

admiration. The victory of Leuktra had awakened among them an

enthusiastic military ardor, turned to account by the genius of

Epaminondas, and made to produce a finished discipline which even the

unwilling Xenophon cannot refuse to acknowledge.[461] Conscious of

the might of their assembled force, within a day’s march of Laconia,

the Arcadians, Argeians, and Eleians pressed Epaminondas to invade

that country, now that no allies could approach the frontier to its

aid. At first he was unwilling to comply. He had not come prepared

for the enterprise; being well aware, from his own journey to Sparta

(when the peace-congress was held there prior to the battle of

Leuktra), of the impracticable nature of the intervening country, so

easy to be defended, especially during the winter-season, by troops

like the Lacedæmonians, whom he believed to be in occupation of all

the passes. Nor was his reluctance overcome until the instances

of his allies were backed by assurances from the Arcadians on the

frontier, that the passes were not all guarded; as well as by

invitations from some of the discontented Periœki, in Laconia. These

Periœki engaged to revolt openly, if he would only show himself

in the country. They told him that there was a general slackness

throughout Laconia in obeying the military requisitions from Sparta;

and tendered their lives as atonement if they should be found to

speak falsely. By such encouragements, as well as by the general

impatience of all around him to revenge upon Sparta her long career

of pride and abused ascendency, Epaminondas was at length induced to

give the order of invasion.[462]

[460] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 31; and compare Agesil. and Pomp. c.

4; Diodor. xv, 62. Compare Xenophon, Agesilaus, 2, 24.

[461] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 23. Οἱ δὲ Ἀρκάδες καὶ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ

Ἠλεῖοι ἔπειθον αὐτοὺς ἡγεῖσθαι ὡς τάχιστα εἰς τὴν Λακωνικήν,

ἐπιδείκνυντες μὲν τὸ ἑαυτῶν πλῆθος, ὑπερεπαινοῦντες δὲ τὸ τῶν

Θηβαίων στράτευμα. Καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν Βοιωτοὶ ἐγυμνάζοντο πάντες περὶ

τὰ ὅπλα, ἀγαλλόμενοι τῇ ἐν Λεύκτροις νίκῃ, etc.

[462] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 24, 25.

That he should have hesitated in taking this responsibility, will

not surprise us, if we recollect, that over and above the real

difficulties of the country, invasion of Laconia by land was

an unparalleled phenomenon,—that the force of Sparta was most

imperfectly known,—that no such thought had been entertained when he

left Thebes,—that the legal duration of command, for himself and his

colleagues, would not permit it,—and that though his Peloponnesian

allies were forward in the scheme, the rest of his troops and his

countrymen might well censure him, if the unknown force of resistance

turned out as formidable as their associations from old time led them

to apprehend.

The invading army was distributed into four portions, all penetrating

by different passes. The Eleians had the westernmost and easiest

road, the Argeians the easternmost;[463] while the Thebans themselves

and the Arcadians formed the two central divisions. The latter

alone experienced any serious resistance. More daring even than

the Thebans, they encountered Ischolaus the Spartan at Ium or Oeum

in the district called Skiritis, attacked him in the village, and

overpowered him by vehemence of assault, by superior numbers, and

seemingly also by some favor or collusion[464] on the part of the

inhabitants. After a desperate resistance, this brave Spartan with

nearly all his division perished. At Karyæ, the Thebans also found

and surmounted some resistance; but the victory of the Arcadians

over Ischolaus operated as an encouragement to all, so that the four

divisions reached Sellasia[465] and were again united in safety.

Undefended and deserted (seemingly) by the Spartans, Sellasia was

now burnt and destroyed by the invaders, who, continuing their march

along the plain or valley towards the Eurotas, encamped in the sacred

grove of Apollo. On the next day they reached the Eurotas, at the

foot of the bridge which crossed that river and led to the city of

Sparta.

[463] Diodor. xv, 64.

See Colonel Leake’s Travels in the Morea, vol. iii, ch. 23, p. 29.

[464] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 26. When we read that the Arcadians got

on the roofs of the houses to attack Ischolaus, this fact seems

to imply that they were admitted into the houses by the villagers.

[465] Respecting the site of Sellasia, Colonel Leake thinks, and

advances various grounds for supposing, that Sellasia was on the

road from Sparta to the north-east, towards the Thyreatis; and

that Karyæ was on the road from Sparta northward, towards Tegea.

The French investigators of the Morea, as well as Professor Ross

and Kiepert, hold a different opinion, and place Sellasia on the

road from Sparta northward towards Tegea (Leake, Peloponnesiaca,

p. 342-352; Ross, Reisen im Peloponnes. p. 187; Berlin, 1841).

Upon such a point, the authority of Colonel Leake is very high;

yet the opposite opinion respecting the site of Sellasia seems to

me preferable.

Epaminondas found the bridge too well-guarded to attempt forcing it;

a strong body of Spartan hoplites being also discernible on the other

side, in the sacred ground of Athênê Alea. He therefore marched down

the left bank of the river, burning and plundering the houses in his

way, as far as Amyklæ, between two and three miles below Sparta. Here

he found a ford, though the river was full, from the winter season;

and accomplished the passage, defeating, after a severe contest, a

body of Spartans who tried to oppose it. He was now on the same side

of the river as Sparta, to which city he slowly and cautiously made

his approach; taking care to keep his Theban troops always in the

best battle order, and protecting them, when encamped, by felled

trees; while the Arcadians and other Peloponnesian allies dispersed

around to plunder the neighboring houses and property.[466]

Great was the consternation which reigned in the city; destitute

of fortifications, yet hitherto inviolate in fact and unassailable

even in idea. Besides their own native force, the Spartans had

no auxiliaries except those mercenaries from Orchomenus who had

come back with Agesilaus; nor was it certain beforehand that

even these troops would remain with them, if the invasion became

formidable.[467] On the first assemblage of the irresistible army

on their frontier, they had despatched one of their commanders of

foreign contingents (called Xenâgi) to press the instant coming of

such Peloponnesian allies as remained faithful to them; and also

envoys to Athens, entreating assistance from that city. Auxiliaries

were obtained, and rapidly put under march, from Pellênê, Sikyon,

Phlius, Corinth, Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermionê, and Halieis.[468] But

the ordinary line of march into Laconia was now impracticable to

them; the whole frontier being barred by Argeians and Arcadians.

Accordingly they were obliged to proceed first to the Argolic

peninsula, and from thence to cross by sea (embarking probably at

Halieis on the south-western coast of the peninsula) to Prasiæ on the

eastern coast of Laconia; from whence they made their way over the

Laconian mountains to Sparta. Being poorly provided with vessels,

they were forced to cross in separate detachments, and to draw lots

for priority.[469] By this chance the Phliasian contingent did not

come over until the last; while the xenagus, eager to reach Sparta,

left them behind, and conducted the rest thither, arriving only

just before the confederate enemies debouched from Sellasia. The

Phliasians, on crossing to Prasiæ, found neither their comrades nor

the xenagus, but were obliged to hire a guide to Sparta. Fortunately

they arrived there both safely and in time, eluding the vigilance of

the enemy, who were then near Amyklæ.

[466] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 30; Diodor. xv, 65.

[467] This I apprehend to be the meaning of the phrase—ἐπεὶ

μέντοι ἔμενον μὲν οἱ ἐξ Ὀρχομένου μισθόφοροι, etc.

[468] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 29; vii, 2, 2.

[469] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 2. Καὶ ~διαβαίνειν τελευταῖοι

λαχόντες~ (the Phliasians) εἰς Πρασιὰς τῶν συμβοηθησάντων

... οὐ γὰρ πώποτε ἀφέστασαν, ἀλλ’ οὐδ’, ἐπεὶ ὁ ξεναγὸς ~τοὺς

προδιαβεβῶτας~ λαβὼν ἀπολιπὼν αὐτοὺς ᾤχετο, οὐδ’ ὡς ἀπεστράφησαν,

ἀλλ’ ἡγεμόνα μισθωσάμενοι ἐκ Πρασιῶν, ὄντων τῶν πολεμίων περὶ

Ἀμύκλας, ὅπως ἐδύναντο διαδύντες ἐς Σπάρτην ἀφίκοντο.

These reinforcements were no less seasonable to Sparta, than

creditable to the fidelity of the allies. For the bad feeling which

habitually reigned in Laconia, between the Spartan citizens on one

side, and the Periœki and Helots on the other, produced in this hour

of danger its natural fruits of desertion, alarm, and weakness.

Not only were the Periœki and Helots in standing discontent, but

even among the Spartan citizens themselves, a privileged fraction

called Peers had come to monopolize political honors; while the

remainder,—poorer men, yet ambitious and active, and known under

the ordinary name of the Inferiors,—were subject to a degrading

exclusion, and rendered bitterly hostile. The account given in a

previous chapter of the conspiracy of Kinadon, will have disclosed

the fearful insecurity of the Spartan citizen, surrounded by so many

disaffected companions; Periœki and Helots in Laconia, inferior

citizens at Sparta. On the appearance of the invading enemy,

indeed, a certain feeling of common interest arose, since even the

disaffected might reasonably imagine that a plundering soldiery, if

not repelled at the point of the sword, would make their condition

worse instead of better. And accordingly, when the ephors made public

proclamation, that any Helot who would take heavy armor and serve

in the ranks as an hoplite, should be manumitted,—not less than

six thousand Helots gave in their names to serve. But a body thus

numerous, when seen in arms, became itself the object of mistrust to

the Spartans; so that the arrival of their new allies from Prasiæ

was welcomed as a security, not less against the armed Helots within

the city, than against the Thebans without.[470] Open enmity,

however, was not wanting. A considerable number both of Periœki and

Helots actually took arms on behalf of the Thebans; others remained

inactive, disregarding the urgent summons from the ephors, which

could not now be enforced.[471]

[470] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 28, 29. ὥστε φόβον αὖ οὗτοι παρεῖχον

συντεταγμένοι καὶ λίαν ἐδόκουν πολλοὶ εἶναι, etc.

[471] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 25; vi, 5, 32; vii, 2, 2.

It is evident from the last of these three passages, that the

number of Periœki and Helots who actually revolted, was very

considerable; and that the contrast between the second and third

passages evinces the different feelings with which the two seem

to have been composed by Xenophon.

In the second, he is recounting the invasion of Epaminondas,

with a wish to soften the magnitude of the Spartan disgrace and

calamity as much as he can. Accordingly, he tells us no more

than this,—“there were some among the Periœki, who even took

active service in the attack of Gythium, and fought along with

the Thebans,”—ἦσαν δέ τινες τῶν Περιοίκων, οἳ καὶ ἐπέθεντο καὶ

συνεστρατεύοντο τοῖς μετὰ Θηβαίων.

But in the third passage (vii, 2, 2: compare his biography called

Agesilaus, ii, 24) Xenophon is extolling the fidelity of the

Phliasians to Sparta under adverse circumstances of the latter.

Hence it then suits his argument, to magnify these adverse

circumstances, in order to enhance the merit of the Phliasians;

and he therefore tells us,—“_Many_ of the Periœki, all the

Helots, and all the allies except a few, had revolted from

Sparta,”—σφαλέντων δ’ αὐτῶν τῇ ἐν Λεύκτροις μάχῃ, καὶ ἀποστάντων

μὲν πολλῶν Περιοίκων, ἀποστάντων δὲ πάντων τῶν Εἱλώτων, ἔτι δὲ

τῶν συμμάχων πλὴν πάνυ ὀλίγων, ἐπιστρατευόντων δ’ αὐτοῖς, ὡς

εἰπεῖν, πάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων, πιστοὶ διέμειναν (the Phliasians).

I apprehend that both statements depart from the reality, though

in opposite directions. I have adopted in the text something

between the two.

Under such wide-spread feelings of disaffection the defence even of

Sparta itself against the assailing enemy was a task requiring all

the energy of Agesilaus. After having vainly tried to hinder the

Thebans from crossing the Eurotas, he was forced to abandon Amyklæ

and to throw himself back upon the city of Sparta, towards which they

immediately advanced. More than one conspiracy was on the point of

breaking out, had not his vigilance forestalled the projects. Two

hundred young soldiers of doubtful fidelity were marching, without

orders, to occupy a strong post (sacred to Artemis) called the

Issorium. Those around him were about to attack them, but Agesilaus,

repressing their zeal, went up alone to the band, addressed them in

language betokening no suspicion, yet warning them that they had

mistaken his orders: their services were needed, not at the Issorium,

but in another part of the city. They obeyed his orders, and moved to

the spot indicated; upon which he immediately occupied the Issorium

with troops whom he could trust. In the ensuing night, he seized

and put to death fifteen of the leaders of the two hundred. Another

conspiracy, said to have been on the point of breaking out, was

repressed by seizing the conspirators in the house where they were

assembled, and putting them to death untried; the first occasion

(observes Plutarch) on which any Spartan was ever put to death

untried,[472]—a statement which I hesitate to believe without knowing

from whom he borrowed it, but which, if true, proves that the Spartan

kings and ephors did not apply to Spartan citizens the same measure

as to Periœki and Helots.

[472] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 32; Polyænus, ii, 1, 14; Ælian, V. H.

xiv, 27.

By such severe proceedings, disaffection was kept under; while the

strong posts of the city were effectively occupied, and the wider

approaches barricaded by heaps of stones and earth.[473] Though

destitute of walls, Sparta was extremely defensible by position.

Epaminondas marched slowly up to it from Amyklæ; the Arcadians and

others in his army spreading themselves to burn and plunder the

neighborhood. On the third or fourth day his cavalry occupied the

Hippodrome (probably a space of level ground near the river, under

the hilly site of the town), where the Spartan cavalry, though

inferior both in number and in goodness, gained an advantage

over them, through the help of three hundred chosen hoplites whom

Agesilaus had planted in ambush hard by, in a precinct sacred to the

Dioskuri. Though this action was probably of little consequence, yet

Epaminondas did not dare to attempt the city by storm. Satisfied with

having defied the Spartans and manifested his mastery of the field

even to their own doors, he marched away southward down to Eurotas.

To them, in their present depression, it was matter of consolation

and even of boasting,[474] that he had not dared to assail them

in their last stronghold. The agony of their feelings,—grief,

resentment, and wounded honor,—was intolerable. Many wished to go out

and fight, at all hazard; but Agesilaus resisted them with the same

firmness as Perikles had shown at Athens, when the Peloponnesians

first invaded Attica at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war.

Especially the Spartan women, who had never before beheld an enemy,

are said to have manifested emotions so furious and distressing, as

to increase much the difficulty of defence.[475] We are even told

that Antalkidas, at that time one of the ephors, sent his children

for safety away from Sparta to the island of Kythêra. Epaminondas

knew well how desperate the resistance of the Spartans would be if

their city were attacked; while to himself, in the midst of a hostile

and impracticable country, repulse would be absolute ruin.[476]

[473] Æneas, Poliorceticus, c. 2, p. 16.

[474] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 32. Καὶ τὸ μὲν μὴ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν

προσβαλεῖν ἂν ἔτι αὐτοὺς, ἤδη τι ἐδόκει θαῤῥαλεώτερον, εἶναι.

This passage is not very clear, nor are the commentators

unanimous either as to the words or as to the meaning. Some omit

μὴ, construe ἐδόκει as if it were ἐδόκει τοῖς Θηβαίοις, and

translate θαῤῥαλεώτερον “excessively rash.”

I agree with Schneider in dissenting from this alteration and

construction. I have given in the text what I believe to be the

meaning.

[475] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 28; Aristotel. Politic. ii, 6, 8;

Plutarch, Agesil. c. 32, 33; Plutarch, comp. Agesil. and Pomp. c.

4.

[476] Aristotle (in his Politica, iv, 10, 5), discussing the

opinion of those political philosophers who maintained that a

city ought to have no walls, but to be defended only by the

bravery of its inhabitants,—gives various reasons against such

opinion, and adds “that these are old-fashioned thinkers; that

the cities which made such ostentatious display of personal

courage, have been proved to be wrong by actual results”—λίαν

ἀρχαίως ὑπολαμβάνουσι, καὶ ταῦθ’ ὁρῶντες ἐλεγχομένας ἔργῳ τὰς

ἐκείνως καλλωπισαμένας.

The commentators say (see the note of M. Barth. St. Hilaire) that

Aristotle has in his view Sparta at the moment of this Theban

invasion. I do not see what else he can mean; yet at the same

time, if such be his meaning, the remark is surely difficult to

admit. Epaminondas came close up to Sparta, but did not dare

to attempt to carry it by assault. If the city had had walls

like those of Babylon, they could not have procured for her

any greater protection. To me the fact appears rather to show

(contrary to the assertion of Aristotle) that Sparta was so

strong by position, combined with the military character of her

citizens, that she could dispense with walls.

Polyænus (ii, 2, 5) has an anecdote, I know not from whom

borrowed, to the effect that Epaminondas might have taken

Sparta, but designedly refrained from doing so, on the ground

that the Arcadians and others would then no longer stand in need

of Thebes. Neither the alleged matter of fact, nor the reason,

appear to me worthy of any credit. Ælian (V. H. iv, 8) has the

same story, but with a different reason assigned.

On leaving Sparta, Epaminondas carried his march as far as Helos

and Gythium on the sea-coast; burning and plundering the country,

and trying for three days to capture Gythium, which contained the

Lacedæmonian arsenal and ships. Many of the Laconian Periœki joined

and took service in his army; nevertheless his attempt on Gythium

did not succeed; upon which he turned back and retraced his steps to

the Arcadian frontier. It was the more necessary for him to think of

quitting Laconia, since his Peloponnesian allies, the Arcadians and

others, were daily stealing home with the rich plunder which they had

acquired, while his supplies were also becoming deficient.[477]

[477] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 50; Diodor. xv, 67.

Epaminondas had thus accomplished far more than he had projected

when quitting Thebes; for the effect of the expedition on Grecian

opinion was immense. The reputation of his army, as well as his

own, was prodigiously exalted; and even the narrative of Xenophon,

unfriendly as well as obscure, bears involuntary testimony both to

the excellence of his generalship and to the good discipline of his

troops. He made his Thebans keep in rank and hold front against the

enemy, even while their Arcadian allies were dispersing around for

plunder. Moreover, the insult and humiliation to Sparta were still

greater than that inflicted by the battle of Leuktra; which had

indeed shown that she was no longer invincible in the field, but

had still left her with the admitted supposition of an inviolable

territory and an unapproachable city.

The resistance of the Spartans indeed (except in so far as regards

their city) had been far less than either friends or enemies

expected; the belief in their power was thus proportionally

abridged. It now remained for Epaminondas to complete their

humiliation by executing those two enterprises which had formed the

special purpose of his expedition: the reëstablishment of Messênê,

and the consolidation of the Arcadians.

The recent invasion of Laconia, victorious as well as lucrative,

had inspired the Arcadians with increased confidence and antipathy

against Sparta, and increased disposition to listen to Epaminondas.

When that eminent man proclaimed the necessity of establishing a

strong frontier against Sparta on the side of Arcadia, and when

he announced his intention of farther weakening Sparta by the

restoration of the exiled Messenians,—the general feeling of the

small Arcadian communities, already tending in the direction of

coalescence, became strong enough to overbear all such impediments

of detail as the breaking up of ancient abode and habit involves.

Respecting early Athenian history, we are told by Thucydides,[478]

that the legendary Theseus, “having become powerful, in addition

to his great capacity,” had effected the discontinuance of those

numerous independent governments which once divided Attica, and had

consolidated them all into one common government at Athens. Just

such was the revolution now operated by Epaminondas, through the

like combination of intelligence and power. A Board of Œkists or

Founders was named to carry out the resolution taken by the Arcadian

assemblies at Asea and Tegea, for the establishment of a Pan-Arcadian

city and centre. Of this Board, two were from Tegea, two from

Mantinea, two from Kleitor, two from the district of Menalus, two

from that of the Parrhasians. A convenient site being chosen upon

the river Helisson (which flowed through and divided the town in

two), about twenty miles west of Tegea, well-fitted to block up the

marches of Sparta in a north-westerly direction,—the foundation of

the new Great City (Megalopolis) was laid by the Œkists jointly with

Epaminondas. Forty distinct Arcadian townships,[479] from all sides

of this centre, were persuaded to join the new community. Ten were

from the Mænalii, eight from the Parrhasii, six from the Eutresii,

three great sections of the Arcadian name, each an aggregate of

villages. Four little townships, occupying a portion of the area

intended for the new territory, yet being averse to the scheme, were

constrained to join; but in one of them, Trapezus, the aversion was

so strong, that most of the inhabitants preferred to emigrate, and

went to join the Trapezuntines in the Euxine Sea (Trebizond), who

received them kindly. Some of the leading Trapezuntines were even

slain by the violent temper of the Arcadian majority. The walls of

the new city enclosed an area of fifty stadia in circumference (more

than five miles and a half); while an ample rural territory was also

gathered around it, extending northward as much as twenty-four miles

from the city, and conterminous on the east with Tegea, Mantinea,

Orchomenus, and Kaphyæ,—on the west with Messênê,[480] Phigalia, and

Heræa.

[478] Thucyd. ii, 15. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ Θησεὺς ἐβασίλευσε, γενόμενος μετὰ

τοῦ ξυνετοῦ καὶ δυνατὸς, etc.

[479] Diodor. xv, 72.

[480] Pausan. viii, 27; viii, 35, 5. Diodor. xv, 63.

See Mr. Fynes Clinton, Fasti Hellenici, Appendix, p. 418, where

the facts respecting Megalopolis are brought together and

discussed.

It is remarkable that though Xenophon (Hellen. v, 2, 7) observes

that the capture of Mantinea by Agesipolis had made the

Mantineans see the folly of having a river run through their

town,—yet in choosing the site of Megalopolis, this same feature

was deliberately reproduced: and in this choice the Mantineans

were parties concerned.

The other new city,—Messênê,—was founded under the joint auspices

of the Thebans and their allies, Argeians and others; Epitelês

being especially chosen by the Argeians for that purpose.[481]

The Messenian exiles, though eager and joyful at the thought of

regaining their name and nationality, were averse to fix their new

city either at Œchalia or Andania, which had been the scenes of their

calamities in the early wars with Sparta. Moreover the site of Mount

Ithômê is said to have been pointed out by the hero Kaukon, in a

dream, to the Ageian general Epitelês. The local circumstances of

this mountain (on which the last gallant resistance of the revolted

Messenians against Sparta had been carried on, between the Persian

and Peloponnesian wars) were such, that the indications of dreams,

prophets, and religious signs coincided fully with the deliberate

choice of a judge like Epaminondas. In after days, this hill Ithômê

(then bearing the town and citadel of Messênê), together with the

Akrocorinthus, were marked out by Demetrius of Pharus as the two

horns of Peloponnesus: whoever held these two horns, was master of

the bull.[482] Ithômê was near two thousand five hundred feet above

the level of the sea, having upon its summit an abundant spring of

water, called Klepsydra. Upon this summit the citadel or acropolis

of the new town of Messênê was built; while the town itself was

situated lower down on the slope, though connected by a continuous

wall with its acropolis. First, solemn sacrifices were offered,

by Epaminondas, who was recognized as Œkist or Founder,[483] to

Dionysius and Apollo Ismenius,—by the Argeians, to the Argeian Hêrê

and Zeus Nemeius,—by the Messenians, to Zeus Ithomatês and the

Dioskuri. Next, prayer was made to the ancient Heroes and Heroines

of the Messenian nation, especially to the invincible warrior

Aristomenes, that they would now come back and again take up their

residence as inmates in enfranchised Messênê. After this, the ground

was marked out and the building was begun, under the sound of Argeian

and Bœotian flutes, playing the strains of Pronomus and Sakadas.

The best masons and architects were invited from all Greece, to

lay out the streets with regularity, as well as to ensure a proper

distribution and construction of the sacred edifices.[484] In respect

of the fortifications, too, Epaminondas was studiously provident.

Such was their excellence and solidity, that they exhibited matter

for admiration even in the after-days of the traveller Pausanias.[485]

[481] Pausan. iv, 26, 6.

[482] Strabo. viii, p. 361: Polybius, vii, 11.

[483] Pausan. ix, 14, 2: compare the inscription on the statue of

Epaminondas (ix, 15, 4).

[484] Pausan. iv, 27, 3.

[485] Pausan. iv, 31, 5.

From their newly-established city on the hill of Ithômê, the

Messenians enjoyed a territory extending fifteen miles southward

down to the Messenian Gulf, across a plain, then as well as now, the

richest and most fertile in Peloponnesus; while to the eastward,

their territory was conterminous with that of Arcadia and the

contemporary establishment of Megalopolis. All the newly-appropriated

space was land cut off from the Spartan dominion. How much was cut

off in the direction south-east of Ithômê (along the north-eastern

coast of the Messenian Gulf), we cannot exactly say. But it would

appear that the Periœki of Thuria, situated in that neighborhood,

were converted into an independent community and protected by

the vicinity of Messênê.[486] What is of more importance to

notice, however, is,—that all the extensive district westward

and south-westward of Ithômê,—all the south-western corner of

Peloponnesus, from the river Neda southward to Cape Akritas,—was now

also subtracted from Sparta. At the beginning of the Peloponnesian

war, the Spartan Brasidas had been in garrison near Methônê[487] (not

far from Cape Akritas); Pylus,—where the Athenian Demosthenes erected

his hostile fort, near which the important capture at Sphakteria

was effected,—had been a maritime point belonging to Sparta, about

forty-six miles from the city;[488] Aulon (rather farther north, near

the river Neda) had been at the time of the conspiracy of Kinadon a

township of Spartan Periœki, of very doubtful fidelity.[489] Now all

this wide area, from the north-eastern corner of the Messenian Gulf

westward, the best half of the Spartan territory, was severed from

Sparta to become the property of Periœki and Helots, converted into

freemen; not only sending no rent or tribute to Sparta, as before,

but bitterly hostile to her from the very nature of their tenure.

It was in the ensuing year that the Arcadian army cut to pieces the

Lacedæmonian garrison at Asinê,[490] killing the Spartan polemarch

Geranor; and probably about the same time the other Lacedæmonian

garrisons in the south-western peninsula must have been expelled.

Thus liberated, the Periœki of the region welcomed the new Messênê as

the guarantee of their independence. Epaminondas, besides confirming

the independence of Methônê and Asinê, reconstituted some other

towns,[491] which under Lacedæmonian dominion had probably been kept

unfortified and had dwindled away.

[486] Pausan. iv, 31, 2.

[487] Thucyd. ii, 25.

[488] Thucyd. iv, 3.

[489] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 8.

[490] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 25.

[491] Pausan. iv, 27, 4. ἀνῴκιζον δὲ καὶ ἄλλα πολίσματα, etc.

Pausanias, following the line of coast from the mouth of the

river Pamisus in the Messenian Gulf, round Cape Akritas to the

mouth of the Neda in the Western Sea,—enumerates the following

towns and places,—Kôronê, Kolônides, Asinê, the Cape Akritas,

the Harbor Phœnikus, Methônê, or Mothônê, Pylus, Aulon (Pausan.

iv, 34, 35, 36). The account given by Skylax (Periplus, c.

46, 47) of the coast of these regions, appears to me confused

and unintelligible. He reckons Asinê and Mothônê as cities of

Laconia; but he seems to have conceived these cities as being in

the _central southern_ projection of Peloponnesus (whereof Cape

Tænarus forms the extremity); and not to have conceived at all

the _south-western_ projection, whereof Cape Akritas forms the

extremity. He recognizes Messene, but he pursues the Paraplus of

the Messenian coast from the mouth of the river Neda to the coast

of the Messenian Gulf south of Ithômê without interruption. Then

after that, he mentions Asinê, Mothônê, Achilleios Limên, and

Psamathus, with Cape Tænarus between them. Besides, he introduces

in Messenia two different cities,—one called Messênê, the other

called Ithômê; whereas there was only one Messênê situated on

Mount Ithome.

I cannot agree with Niebuhr, who, resting mainly upon this

account of Skylax, considers that the south-western corner of

Peloponnesus remained a portion of Laconia and belonging to

Sparta, long after the establishment of the city of Messênê. See

the Dissertation of Niebuhr on the age of Skylax of Karyanda,—in

his Kleine Schriften, p. 119.

In the spring of 425 B.C., when Demosthenes landed at Pylus,

Thucydides considers it a valuable acquisition for Athens, and

a serious injury to Sparta, to have lodged a small garrison of

Messenians in that insignificant post, as plunderers of Spartan

territory and instigators of Helots to desertion,[492]—especially as

their dialect could not be distinguished from that of the Spartans

themselves. How prodigious must have been the impression throughout

Greece, when Epaminondas, by planting the Messenian exiles and others

on the strong frontier city and position of Ithômê, deprived Sparta

in a short time of all the wide space between that mountain and the

western sea, enfranchising the Periœki and Helots contained in it!

We must recollect that the name Messênê had been from old times

applied generally to this region, and that it was never bestowed

upon any city before the time of Epaminondas. When therefore the

Spartans complained of “the liberation of Messênê,”—“the loss of

Messênê,”—they included in the word, not simply the city on Mount

Ithômê, but all this territory besides; though it was not all

comprised in the domain of the new city.

[492] Thucyd. iv, 3, 42.

They complained yet more indignantly, that along with the genuine

Messenians, now brought back from exile,—a rabble of their own

emancipated Periœki and Helots had been domiciled on their

border.[493] Herein were included, not only such of these two

classes as, having before dwelt in servitude throughout the

territory westward of Ithômê, now remained there in a state of

freedom—but also doubtless a number of others who deserted from

other parts of Laconia. For as we know that such desertions had

been not inconsiderable, even when there was no better shelter than

the outlying posts of Pylus and Kythêra—so we may be sure that they

became much more numerous, when the neighboring city of Messênê

was founded under adequate protection, and when there was a chance

of obtaining, westward of the Messenian Gulf, free lands with a

new home. Moreover, such Periœki and Helots as had actually joined

the invading army of Epaminondas in Laconia, would be forced from

simple insecurity to quit the country when he retired, and would be

supplied with fresh residences in the newly-enfranchised territory.

All these men would pass at once, out of a state of peculiarly harsh

servitude, into the dignity of free and equal Hellens,[494] sending

again a solemn Messenian legation or Theôry to the Olympic festival,

after an interval of more than three centuries,[495]—outdoing their

former masters in the magnitude of their offerings from the same

soil,—and requiting them for previous ill-usage by words of defiance

and insult, instead of that universal deference and admiration which

a Spartan had hitherto been accustomed to look upon as his due.

[493] The Oration (vi,) called Archidamus, by Isokrates. exhibits

powerfully the Spartan feeling of the time, respecting this

abstraction of territory, and emancipation of serfs, for the

purpose of restoring Messênê, s. 30. Καὶ εἰ μὲν τοὺς ὡς ἀληθῶς

Μεσσηνίους κατῆγον (the Thebans), ἠδίκουν μὲν ἂν, ὅμως δ’

εὐλογωτέρως ἂν εἰς ἡμᾶς ἐξημάρτανον· νῦν δὲ τοὺς Εἵλωτας ὁμόρους

ἡμῖν παρακατοικίζουσιν, ὥστε μὴ τοῦτ’ εἶναι χαλεπώτατον, εἰ τῆς

χώρας στερησόμεθα παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλ’ εἰ τοὺς δούλους ἡμετέρους

ἐποψόμεθα κυρίους αὐτῆς ὄντας.

Again—s. 101. ἢν γὰρ παρακατοικισώμεθα τοὺς Εἵλωτας, καὶ τὴν

πόλιν ταύτην περιΐδωμεν αὐξηθεῖσαν, τίς οὐκ οἶδεν ὅτι πάντα τὸν

βίον ἐν ταραχαῖς καὶ κινδύνοις διατελοῦμεν ὄντες; compare also

sections 8 and 102.

[494] Isokrates, Orat. vi, (Archidam.) s. 111. Ἄξιον δὲ καὶ τὴν

Ὀλυμπιάδα καὶ τὰς ἄλλας αἰσχυνθῆναι πανηγύρεις, ἐν αἷς ἕκαστος

ἡμῶν (Spartans) ζηλωτότερος ἦν καὶ θαυμαστότερος τῶν ἀθλητῶν

τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι τὰς νίκας ἀναιρουμένων. Εἰς ἃς τίς ἂν ἐλθεῖν

τολμήσειεν, ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι καταφρονηθησόμενος—ἔτι δὲ πρὸς

~τούτοις ὀψόμενος μὲν τοὺς οἰκέτας ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας~ ἧς οἱ πατέρες

ἡμῖν κατέλιπον ἀπαρχὰς καὶ θυσίας μείζους ἡμῶν ποιουμένους,

ἀκουσόμενος δ’ ~αὐτῶν τοιαύταις βλασφημίαις χρωμένων, οἵαις περ

εἰκὸς τοὺς χαλεπώτερον τῶν ἄλλων δεδουλευκότας~, ἐξ ἴσου δὲ νῦν

τὰς συνθήκας τοῖς δεσπόταις πεποιημένους.

This oration, composed only five or six years after the battle of

Leuktra, is exceedingly valuable as a testimony of the Spartan

feeling under such severe humiliations.

[495] The freedom of the Messenians had been put down by the

first Messenian war, after which they became subjects of Sparta.

The second Messenian war arose from their revolt.

No free Messenian legation could therefore have visited Olympia

since the termination of the first war; which is placed by

Pausanias (iv, 13, 4) in 723 B.C.; though the date is not to be

trusted. Pausanias (iv, 27, 3) gives two hundred and eighty-seven

years between the end of the second Messenian war and the

foundation of Messênê by Epaminondas. See the note of Siebelis on

this passage. Exact dates of these early wars cannot be made out.

The enfranchisement and reörganization of all Western Laconia, the

renovation of the Messenian name, the foundation of the two new

cities (Messênê and Megalopolis) in immediate neighborhood and

sympathy,—while they completed the degradation of Sparta, constituted

in all respects the most interesting political phenomena that Greece

had witnessed for many years. To the profound mortification of the

historian,—he is able to recount nothing more than the bare facts,

with such inferences as these facts themselves warrant. Xenophon,

under whose eyes all must have passed, designedly omits to notice

them;[496] Pausanias, whom we have to thank for most of what we

know, is prompted by his religious imagination to relate many divine

signs and warnings, but little matter of actual occurrence. Details

are altogether withheld from us. We know neither how long a time was

occupied in the building of the two cities, nor who furnished the

cost; though both the one and the other must have been considerable.

Of the thousand new arrangements, incident to the winding up of many

small townships, and the commencement of two large cities, we are

unable to render any account. Yet there is no point of time wherein

social phenomena are either so interesting or so instructive. In

describing societies already established and ancient, we find the

force of traditional routine almost omnipotent in its influence

both on men’s actions and on their feelings; bad as well as good

is preserved in one concrete, since the dead weight of the past

stifles all constructive intelligence, and leaves little room even

for improving aspirations. But the forty small communities which

coalesced into Megalopolis, and the Messenians and other settlers

who came for the first time together on the hill of Ithômê, were in

a state in which new exigencies of every kind pressed for immediate

satisfaction. There was no file to afford a precedent, nor any

resource left except to submit all the problems to discussion by

those whose character and judgment was most esteemed. Whether the

problems were well- or ill-solved, there must have been now a genuine

and earnest attempt to strike out as good a solution as the lights of

the time and place permitted, with a certain latitude for conflicting

views. Arrangements must have been made for the apportionment of

houses and lands among the citizens, by purchase, or grant, or both

together; for the political and judicial constitution; for religious

and recreative ceremonies, for military defence, for markets, for

the security and transmission of property, etc. All these and many

other social wants of a nascent community must now have been provided

for, and it would have been highly interesting to know how. Unhappily

the means are denied to us. We can record little more than the bare

fact that these two youngest members of the Hellenic brotherhood of

cities were born at the same time, and under the auspices of the

same presiding genius, Epaminondas; destined to sustain each other

in neighborly sympathy and in repelling all common danger from the

attacks of Sparta; a purpose, which, even two centuries afterwards,

remained engraven on the mind of a Megalopolitan patriot like

Polybius.[497]

[496] The partiality towards Sparta, visible even from the

beginning of Xenophon’s history, becomes more and more

exaggerated throughout the two latter books wherein he recounts

her misfortunes; it is moreover intensified by spite against the

Thebans and Epaminondas as her conquerors. But there is hardly

any instance of this feeling, so glaring or so discreditable,

as the case now before us. In describing the expedition of

Epaminondas into Peloponnesus in the winter of 370-369 B.C., he

totally omits the foundation both of Messênê and Megalopolis;

though in the after part of his history, he alludes (briefly)

both to one and to the other as facts accomplished. He represents

the Thebans to have come into Arcadia with their magnificent

army, for the simple purpose of repelling Agesilaus and the

Spartans, and to have been desirous of returning to Bœotia, as

soon as it was ascertained that the latter had already returned

to Sparta (vi, 5, 23). Nor does he once mention the name of

Epaminondas as general of the Thebans in the expedition, any more

than he mentions him at Leuktra.

Considering the momentous and striking character of these

facts, and the eminence of the Theban general by whom they were

achieved, such silence on the part of an historian, who professes

to recount the events of the time, is an inexcusable dereliction

of his duty to state the _whole truth_. It is plain that

Messênê and Megalopolis wounded to the quick the philo-Spartan

sentiment of Xenophon. They stood as permanent evidences of

the degradation of Sparta, even after the hostile armies had

withdrawn from Laconia. He prefers to ignore them altogether. Yet

he can find space to recount, with disproportionate prolixity,

the two applications of the Spartans to Athens for aid, with the

favorable reception which they obtained,—also the exploits of the

Phliasians in their devoted attachment to Sparta.

[497] See a striking passage in Polybius, iv, 32. Compare also

Pausan. v, 29, 3; and viii, 27, 2.

Megalopolis was intended not merely as a great city in itself, but as

the centre of the new confederacy; which appears to have comprised

all Arcadia, except Orchomenus and Heræa. It was enacted that a synod

or assembly, from all the separate members of the Arcadian name,

and in which probably every Arcadian citizen from the constituent

communities had the right of attending, should be periodically

convoked there. This assembly was called the Ten Thousand, or the

Great Number. A body of Arcadian troops, called the Epariti, destined

to uphold the federation, and receiving pay when on service, was

also provided. Assessments were levied upon each city for their

support, and a Pan-Arcadian general (probably also other officers)

was named. The Ten Thousand, on behalf of all Arcadia, received

foreign envoys,—concluded war, or peace, or alliance,—and tried all

officers or other Arcadians brought before them on accusations of

public misconduct.[498] The great Athenian orators, Kallistratus,

Demosthenes, Æschines, on various occasions pleaded before it.[499]

What were its times of meeting, we are unable to say. It contributed

seriously, for a certain time, to sustain a Pan-Arcadian communion

of action and sentiment which had never before existed;[500] and to

prevent, or soften, those dissensions which had always a tendency

to break out among the separate Arcadian cities. The patriotic

enthusiasm, however, out of which Megalopolis had first arisen,

gradually became enfeebled. The city never attained that preëminence

or power which its founders contemplated, and which had caused the

city to be laid out on a scale too large for the population actually

inhabiting it.[501]

[498] Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 1, 38; vii, 4, 2, 33, 34; vii, 3, 1.

[499] Demosthen. Fals. Legat. p. 344, s. 11, p. 403, s. 220,

Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 296, c. 49; Cornel. Nepos. Epamin. c. 6.

[500] Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 1, 38; vii, 4, 33; Diodor. xv, 59;

Aristotle—Ἀρκάδων Πολιτεία—ap. Harpokration, v. Μύριοι, p. 106,

ed. Neumann.

[501] Polybius, ii, 55.

Not only was the portion of Laconia west of the Messenian Gulf now

rendered independent of Sparta, but also much of the territory which

lies north of Sparta, between that city and Arcadia. Thus the Skiritæ

(hardy mountaineers of Arcadian race, heretofore dependent upon

Sparta, and constituting a valuable contingent to her armies),[502]

with their territory forming the northern frontier of Laconia

towards Arcadia, became from this time independent of and hostile to

Sparta.[503] The same is the case even with a place much nearer to

Sparta,—Sellasia; though this latter was retaken by the Lacedæmonians

four or five years afterwards.[504]

[502] Thucyd. v, 66.

[503] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 21.

[504] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 12; Diodor. xv, 64.

Epaminondas remained about four months beyond the legal duration of

his command in Arcadia and Laconia.[505] The sufferings of a severe

mid-winter were greatly mitigated to his soldiers by the Arcadians,

who, full of devoted friendship, pressed upon them an excess of

hospitality which he could not permit consistently with his military

duties.[506] He stayed long enough to settle all the preliminary

debates and difficulties, and to put in train of serious execution

the establishment of Messênê and Megalopolis. For the completion

of a work thus comprehensive, which changed the face and character

of Peloponnesus, much time was of course necessary. Accordingly, a

Theban division under Pammenes was left to repel all obstruction from

Sparta;[507] while Tegea also, from this time forward, for some

years, was occupied as a post by a Theban harmost and garrison.[508]

[505] The exact number of eighty-five days, given by Diodorus

(xv. 67), seems to show that he had copied literally from Ephorus

or some other older author.

Plutarch, in one place (Agesil. c. 32), mentions “three entire

months,” which differs little from eighty-five days. He expresses

himself as if Epaminondas spent all this time in ravaging

Laconia. Yet again, in the Apophth. Reg. p. 194 B. (compare

Ælian, V. H. xiii, 42), and in the life of Pelopidas (c. 25),

Plutarch states, that Epaminondas and his colleagues held the

command four whole months over and above the legal time, being

engaged in their operations in Laconia and Messenia. This seems

to me the more probable interpretation of the case; for the

operations seem too large to have been accomplished in either

three or four months.

[506] See a remarkable passage in Plutarch—An Seni sit gerenda

Respublica (c. 8, p. 788 A.).

[507] Pausan. viii, 27, 2. Pammenes is said to have been an

earnest friend of Epaminondas, but of older political standing;

to whom Epaminondas partly owed his rise (Plutarch, Reip. Ger.

Præcep. p. 805 F.).

Pausanias places the foundation of Megalopolis in the same

Olympic year as the battle of Leuktra, and a few months after

that battle, during the archonship of Phrasikleides at Athens;

that is, between Midsummer 371 and Midsummer 370 B.C. (Pausan.

viii, 27, 6). He places the foundation of Messênê in the next

Olympic year, under the archonship of Dyskinêtus at Athens; that

is, between Midsummer 370 and Midsummer 369 B.C. (iv, 27, 5).

The foundation of Megalopolis would probably be understood to

date from the initial determination taken by the assembled

Arcadians, soon after the revolution at Tegea, to found a

Pan-Arcadian city and federative league. This was probably taken

before Midsummer 370 B.C., and the date of Pausanias would thus

be correct.

The foundation of Messênê would doubtless take its æra from the

expedition of Epaminondas,—between November and March 370-369

B.C. which would be during the archonship of Dyskinêtus at

Athens, as Pausanias affirms.

What length of time was required to complete the erection and

establishment of either city, we are not informed.

Diodorus places the foundation of Megalopolis in 368 B.C. (xv,

72).

[508] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 36.

Meanwhile the Athenians were profoundly affected by these proceedings

of Epaminondas in Peloponnesus. The accumulation of force against

Sparta was so powerful, that under a chief like him, it seemed

sufficient to crush her; and though the Athenians were now neutral in

the contest, such a prospect was not at all agreeable to them,[509]

involving the aggrandizement of Thebes to a point inconsistent with

their security. It was in the midst of the successes of Epaminondas

that envoys came to Athens from Sparta, Corinth, and Phlius, to

entreat her aid. The message was one not merely humiliating to the

Lacedæmonians, who had never previously sent the like request to any

Grecian city,—but also difficult to handle in reference to Athens.

History showed abundant acts of jealousy and hostility, little

either of good feeling or consentient interest, on the part of the

Lacedæmonians towards her. What little was to be found, the envoys

dexterously brought forward; going back to the dethronement of the

Peisistratids from Athens by Spartan help, the glorious expulsion

of Xerxes from Greece by the joint efforts of both cities,—and the

auxiliaries sent by Athens into Laconia in 465 B.C., to assist the

Spartans against the revolted Messenians on Mount Ithômê. In these

times (he reminded the Athenian assembly) Thebes had betrayed the

Hellenic cause by joining Xerxes, and had been an object of common

hatred to both. Moreover the maritime forces of Greece had been

arrayed under Athens in the Confederacy of Delos, with full sanction

and recommendation from Sparta; while the headship of the latter by

land had in like manner been accepted by the Athenians. He called on

the assembly, in the name of these former glories, to concur with

Sparta in forgetting all the deplorable hostilities which had since

intervened, and to afford to her a generous relief against the old

common enemy. The Thebans might even now be decimated (according to

the vow said to have been taken after the repulse of Xerxes), in

spite of their present menacing ascendency,—if Athens and Sparta

could be brought heartily to coöperate; and might be dealt with as

Thebes herself had wished to deal with Athens after the Peloponnesian

war, when Sparta refused to concur in pronouncing the sentence of

utter ruin.[510]

[509] Isokrates (Archidamus), Or. vi, s. 129.

[510] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 34, 35.

This appeal from Sparta was earnestly seconded by the envoys

from Corinth and Phlius. The Corinthian speaker contended, that

Epaminondas and his army, passing through the territory of Corinth

and inflicting damage upon it in their passage into Peloponnesus,

had committed a glaring violation of the general peace, sworn in

371 B.C., first at Sparta and afterwards at Athens, guaranteeing

universal autonomy to every Grecian city. The envoy from

Phlius,—while complimenting Athens on the proud position which she

now held, having the fate of Sparta in her hands,—dwelt on the meed

of honor which she would earn in Greece, if she now generously

interfered to rescue her ancient rival, forgetting past injuries and

remembering only past benefits. In adopting such policy, too, she

would act in accordance with her own true interests; since, should

Sparta be crushed, the Thebans would become undisputed heads of

Greece, and more formidable still to Athens.[511]

[511] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 38-48.

It was not among the least marks of the prostration of Sparta, that

she should be compelled to send such an embassy to Athens, and to

entreat an amnesty for so many untoward realities during the past.

The contrast is indeed striking, when we set her present language

against that which she had held respecting Athens, before and through

the Peloponnesian war.

At first, her envoys were heard with doubtful favor; the sentiment

of the assembly being apparently rather against than for them. “Such

language from the Spartans (murmured the assembled citizens) is

intelligible enough during their present distress; but so long as

they were in good circumstances, we received nothing but ill-usage

from them.”[512] Nor was the complaint of the Spartans, that the

invasion of Laconia was contrary to the sworn peace guaranteeing

universal autonomy, admitted without opposition. Some said that

the Lacedæmonians had drawn the invasion upon themselves, by their

previous interference with Tegea and in Arcadia; and that the

intervention of the Mantineans at Tegea had been justifiable, since

Stasippus and the philo-Laconian party in that city had been the

first to begin unjust violence. On the other hand, the appeal made

by the envoys to the congress of Peloponnesian allies held in 404

B.C., after the surrender of Athens,—when the Theban deputy had

proposed that Athens should be totally destroyed, while the Spartans

had strenuously protested against so cruel a sentence—made a powerful

impression on the assembly, and contributed more than anything else

to determine them in favor of the proposition.[513] “As Athens was

then, so Sparta is now, on the brink of ruin, from the fiat of the

same enemy: Athens was then rescued by Sparta, and shall she now

leave the rescue unrequited?” Such was the broad and simple issue

which told upon the feelings of the assembled Athenians, disposing

them to listen with increasing favor both to the envoys from Corinth

and Phlius, and to their own speakers on the same side.

[512] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 35. Οἱ μέντοι Ἀθηναῖοι οὐ πάνυ

ἐδέξαντο, ἀλλὰ θροῦς τις τοιοῦτος διῆλθεν, ὡς νῦν μὲν ταῦτα

λέγοιεν· ὅτε δὲ εὖ ἔπραττον, ἐπέκειντο ἡμῖν.

[513] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 35. Μέγιστον δὲ τῶν λεχθέντων παρὰ

Λακεδαιμονίων ἐδόκει εἶναι, etc.

To rescue Sparta, indeed, was prudent as well as generous. A

counterpoise would thus be maintained against the excessive

aggrandizement of Thebes, which at this moment doubtless caused

serious alarm and jealousy to the Athenians. And thus, after the

first ebullition of resentment against Sparta, naturally suggested

by the history of the past, the philo-Spartan view of the situation

gradually became more and more predominant in the assembly.

Kallistratus[514] the orator spoke eloquently in support of the

Lacedæmonians; while the adverse speakers were badly listened to,

as pleading in favor of Thebes, whom no one wished to aggrandize

farther. A vote, decisive and enthusiastic, was passed for assisting

the Spartans with the full force of Athens; under the command of

Iphikrates, then residing as a private citizen[515] at Athens, since

the peace of the preceding year, which had caused him to be recalled

from Korkyra.

[514] Demosthenes cont. Neær. p. 1353.

Xenokleides, a poet, spoke in opposition to the vote for

supporting Sparta (ib.).

[515] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 49; Dionys. Hal. Judic. de Lysiâ, p.

479.

As soon as the sacrifices, offered in contemplation of this

enterprise were announced to be favorable, Iphikrates made

proclamation that the citizens destined for service should equip

themselves and muster in arms in the grove of Akadêmus (outside the

gates), there to take their evening meal, and to march the next

morning at daybreak. Such was the general ardor, that many citizens

went forth from the gates even in advance of Iphikrates himself;

and the total force which followed him is said to have been twelve

thousand men,—not named under conscription by the general, but

volunteers.[516] He first marched to Corinth, where he halted some

days; much to the discontent of his soldiers, who were impatient to

accomplish their project of carrying rescue to Sparta. But Iphikrates

was well aware that all beyond Corinth was hostile ground, and that

he had formidable enemies to deal with. After having established his

position at Corinth, and obtained information regarding the enemy,

he marched into Arcadia, and there made war without any important

result. Epaminondas and his army had quitted Laconia, while many of

the Arcadians and Eleians had gone home with the plunder acquired;

so that Sparta was, for the time, out of danger. Impelled in part

by the recent manifestation of Athens,[517] the Theban general

himself soon commenced his march of return into Bœotia, in which

it was necessary for him to pass the line of Mount Oneium between

Corinth and Kenchreæ. This line was composed of difficult ground,

and afforded good means of resistance to the passage of an army;

nevertheless Iphikrates, though he occupied its two extremities, did

not attempt directly to bar the passage of the Thebans. He contented

himself with sending out from Corinth all his cavalry, both Athenian

and Corinthian, to harass them in their march. But Epaminondas beat

them back with some loss, and pursued them to the gates of Corinth.

Excited by this spectacle, the Athenian main body within the town

were eager to march out and engage in general battle. Their ardor was

however repressed by Iphikrates; who, refusing to go forth, suffered

the Thebans to continue their retreat unmolested.[518]

[516] This number is stated by Diodorus (xv, 63).

[517] To this extent we may believe what is said by Cornelius

Nepos (Iphicrates, c. 2).

[518] The account here given in the text coincides as to the

matter of fact with Xenophon, as well as with Plutarch; and also

(in my belief) with Pausanias (Xen. Hell. vi, 5, 51; Plutarch,

Pelop. c. 24; Pausan. ix, 14, 3).

But though I accept the facts of Xenophon, I cannot accept either

his suppositions as to the purpose, or his criticisms on the

conduct, of Iphikrates. Other modern critics appear to me not

to have sufficiently distinguished Xenophon’s _facts_ from his

_suppositions_.

Iphikrates (says Xenophon), while attempting to guard the line

of Mount Oneium, in order that the Thebans might not be able

to reach Bœotia,—left the excellent road adjoining to Kenchreæ

unguarded. Then,—wishing to inform himself, whether the Thebans

had as yet passed the Mount Oneium, he sent out as scouts all the

Athenian and all the Corinthian cavalry. Now (observes Xenophon)

a few scouts can see and report as well as a great number; while

the great number find it more difficult to get back in safety.

By this foolish conduct of Iphikrates, in sending out so large a

body, several horsemen were lost in the retreat; which would not

have happened if he had only sent out a few.

The criticism here made by Xenophon appears unfounded. It is

plain, from the facts which he himself states, that Iphikrates

never intended to bar the passage of the Thebans; and that he

sent out his whole body of cavalry, not simply as scouts, but to

harass the enemy on ground which he thought advantageous for the

purpose. That so able a commander as Iphikrates should have been

guilty of the gross blunders with which Xenophon here reproaches

him, is in a high degree improbable; it seems to me more probable

that Xenophon has misconceived his real purpose. Why indeed

should Iphikrates wish to expose the whole Athenian army in a

murderous conflict for the purpose of preventing the homeward

march of the Thebans? His mission was, to rescue Sparta; but

Sparta was now no longer in danger; and it was for the advantage

of Athens that the Thebans should go back to Bœotia, rather than

remain in Peloponnesus. That he should content himself with

harassing the Thebans, instead of barring their retreat directly,

is a policy which we should expect from him.

There is another circumstance in this retreat which has excited

discussion among the commentators, and on which I dissent from

their views. It is connected with the statement of Pausanias, who

says,—Ὡς προϊὼν τῷ στρατῷ (Epaminondas) κατὰ Λέχαιον ἐγίνετο,

καὶ διεξιέναι τῆς ὁδοῦ τὰ στενὰ καὶ δύσβατα ἔμελλεν, Ἰφικράτης

ὁ Τιμοθέου πελταστὰς καὶ ἄλλην Ἀθηναίων ἔχων δύναμιν, ἐπιχειρεῖ

τοῖς Θηβαίοις. Ἐπαμινώνδας δὲ τοὺς ἐπιθεμένους τρέπεται, ~καὶ

πρὸς αὐτὸ ἀφικόμενος Ἀθηναίων τὸ ἄστυ~, ὡς ἐπεξιέναι μαχουμένους

τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐκώλυεν Ἰφικράτης, ὁ δὲ αὖθις ἐς τὰς Θήβας

ἀπήλαυνε.

In this statement there are some inaccuracies, as that of calling

Iphikrates “son of Timotheus;” and speaking of _Lechæum_, where

Pausanias ought to have named _Kenchreæ_. For Epaminondas could

not have passed Corinth on the side of Lechæum, since the Long

Walls, reaching from one to the other, would prevent him;

moreover, the “rugged ground” was between Corinth and Kenchreæ,

not between Corinth and Lechæum.

But the words which occasion most perplexity are those which

follow: “Epaminondas repulses the assailants, and _having come to

the city itself of the Athenians_, when Iphikrates forbade the

Athenians to come out and fight, he (Epaminondas) again marched

away to Thebes.”

What are we to understand _by the city of the Athenians_? The

natural sense of the word is certainly Athens; and so most of

the commentators relate. But when the battle was fought between

Corinth and Kenchreæ, can we reasonably believe that Epaminondas

pursued the fugitives to Athens—through the city of Megara, which

lay in the way, and which seems then (Diodor. xv, 68) to have

been allied with Athens? The station of Iphikrates was _Corinth_;

from thence he had marched out,—and thither his cavalry, when

repulsed, would go back, as the nearest shelter.

Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Greece, vol. v, ch. 39, p. 141) understands

Pausanias to mean, that Iphikrates retired with his defeated

cavalry to Corinth,—that Epaminondas then marched straight on

to Athens,—and that Iphikrates followed him. “Possibly (he

says) the only mistake in this statement is, that it represents

the _presence_ of Iphikrates, instead of his _absence_, as the

cause which prevented the Athenians from fighting. According to

Xenophon, Iphikrates must have been in the rear of Epaminondas.”

I cannot think that we obtain this from the words of Xenophon.

Neither he nor Plutarch countenance the idea that Epaminondas

marched to the walls of Athens, which supposition is derived

solely from the words of Pausanias. Xenophon and Plutarch

intimate only that Iphikrates interposed some opposition, and not

very effective opposition, near Corinth, to the retreating march

of Epaminondas, from Peloponnesus into Bœotia.

That Epaminondas should have marched to Athens at all, under

the circumstances of the case, when he was returning to Bœotia,

appears to me in itself improbable, and to be rendered still more

improbable by the silence of Xenophon. Nor is it indispensable

to put this construction even upon Pausanias; who may surely

have meant by the words—πρὸς αὐτὸ Ἀθηναίων τὸ ἄστυ,—not Athens,

but _the city then occupied by the Athenians engaged_,—that is,

_Corinth_. _The city of the Athenians_, in reference to this

battle, was Corinth; it was the city out of which the troops of

Iphikrates had just marched, and to which, on being defeated,

they naturally retired for safety, pursued by Epaminondas to the

gates. The statement of Pausanias,—that Iphikrates would not let

the Athenians in the town (Corinth) go out to fight,—then follows

naturally. Epaminondas, finding that they would not come out,

drew back his troops, and resumed his march to Thebes.

The stratagem of Iphikrates noticed by Polyænus (iii, 9, 29),

can hardly be the same incident as this mentioned by Pausanias.

It purports to be a nocturnal surprise planned by the Thebans

against Athens; which certainly must be quite different (if it

be in itself a reality) from this march of Epaminondas. And the

stratagem ascribed by Polyænus to Iphikrates is of a strange and

highly improbable character.

On returning to Thebes, Epaminondas with Pelopidas and the other

Bœotarchs, resigned the command. They had already retained it for

four months longer than the legal expiration of their term. Although,

by the constitutional law of Thebes, any general who retained his

functions longer than the period fixed by law was pronounced worthy

of death, yet Epaminondas, while employed in his great projects

for humiliating Sparta and founding the two hostile cities on her

border, had taken upon himself to brave this illegality, persuading

all his colleagues to concur with him. On resigning the command, all

of them had to undergo that trial of accountability which awaited

every retiring magistrate, as a matter of course,—but which, in the

present case, was required on special ground, since all had committed

an act notoriously punishable as well as of dangerous precedent.

Epaminondas undertook the duty of defending his colleagues as well

as himself. That he as well as Pelopidas had political enemies,

likely to avail themselves of any fair pretext for accusing him,—is

not to be doubted. But we may well doubt, whether on the present

occasion any of these enemies actually came forward to propose that

the penalty legally incurred should be inflicted; not merely because

this proposition, in the face of a victorious army, returning elate

with their achievements and proud of their commanders, was full of

danger to the mover himself,—but also for another reason,—because

Epaminondas would hardly be imprudent enough to wait for the case

to be stated by his enemies. Knowing that the illegality committed

was flagrant and of hazardous example,—having also the reputation

of his colleagues as well as his own to protect,—he would forestall

accusation by coming forward himself to explain and justify the

proceeding. He set forth the glorious results of the expedition

just finished; the invasion and devastation of Laconia, hitherto

unvisited by any enemy,—the confinement of the Spartans within their

walls,—the liberation of all Western Laconia, and the establishment

of Messênê as a city,—the constitution of a strong new Arcadian city,

forming, with Tegea on one flank and Messênê on the other, a line

of defence on the Spartan frontier, so as to ensure the permanent

depression of the great enemy of Thebes,—the emancipation of Greece

generally, from Spartan ascendency, now consummated.

Such justification,—whether delivered in reply to a substantive

accuser, or (which is more probable) tendered spontaneously by

Epaminondas himself,—was not merely satisfactory, but triumphant.

He and the other generals were acquitted by acclamation; without

even going through the formality of collecting the votes.[519] And

it appears that both Epaminondas and Pelopidas were immediately

re-appointed among the Bœotarchs of the year.[520]

[519] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 25; Plutarch, Apophthegm. p. 194

B.; Pausan. ix, 14, 4; Cornelius Nepos, Epaminond. c. 7, 8;

Ælian, V. H. xiii, 42.

Pausanias states the fact plainly and clearly; the others,

especially Nepos and Ælian, though agreeing in the main fact,

surround it with colors exaggerated and false. They represent

Epaminondas as in danger of being put to death by ungrateful

and malignant fellow-citizens; Cornelius Nepos puts into his

mouth a justificatory speech of extreme insolence (compare

Arist. Or. xlvi, περὶ τοῦ παραφθέγματος—p. 385 Jebb.; p. 520

Dindorf.); which, had it been really made, would have tended more

than anything else to set the public against him,—and which is

moreover quite foreign to the character of Epaminondas. To carry

the exaggeration still farther, Plutarch (De Vitioso Pudore, p.

540 E.) describes Pelopidas as trembling and begging for his life.

Epaminondas had committed a grave illegality, which could not be

passed over without notice in his trial of accountability. But

he had a good justification. It was necessary that he should put

in the justification; when put in, it passed triumphantly. What

more could be required? The facts, when fairly stated, will not

serve as an illustration of the alleged ingratitude of the people

towards great men.

[520] Diodorus (xv, 81) states that Pelopidas was Bœotarch

without interruption, annually re-appointed, from the revolution

of Thebes down to his decease. Plutarch also (Pelopid. c. 34)

affirms that when Pelopidas died, he was in the thirteenth year

of his appointment; which may be understood as the same assertion

in other words. Whether Epaminondas was rechosen, does not appear.

Sievers denies the reappointment as well of Pelopidas as of

Epaminondas. But I do not see upon what grounds; for, in my

judgment, Epaminondas appears again as commander in Peloponnesus

during this same year (369 B.C.) Sievers holds Epaminondas to

have commanded without being Bœotarch; but no reason is produced

for this (Sievers, Geschicht. Griech. bis zur Schlacht von

Mantinea, p. 277).