CHAPTER LXXVIII.

BATTLE OF LEUKTRA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.

Immediately after the congress at Sparta in June 371 B.C., the

Athenians and Lacedæmonians both took steps to perform the covenants

sworn respectively to each other as well as to the allies generally.

The Athenians despatched orders to Iphikrates, who was still at

Korkyra or in the Ionian Sea, engaged in incursions against the

Lacedæmonian or Peloponnesian coasts,—that he should forthwith

conduct his fleet home, and that if he had made any captures

subsequent to the exchange of oaths at Sparta, they should all be

restored;[365] so as to prevent the misunderstanding which had

occurred fifty-two years before with Brasidas,[366] in the peninsula

of Pallênê. The Lacedæmonians on their side sent to withdraw their

harmosts and their garrisons from every city still under occupation.

Since they had already made such promise once before, at the peace

of Antalkidas, but had never performed it,—commissioners,[367] not

Spartans, were now named from the general congress, to enforce the

execution of the agreement.

[365] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 1.

[366] Thucyd. iv.

[367] Diodorus, xv, 38. ἐξαγωγεῖς, Xen. Hellen. _l. c._

Diodorus refers the statements in this chapter to the peace

between Athens and Sparta in 374 B.C. I have already remarked

that they belong properly to the peace of 371 B.C.; as Wesseling

suspects in his note.

No great haste, however, was probably shown in executing this part

of the conditions; for the whole soul and sentiment of the Spartans

were absorbed by their quarrel with Thebes. The miso-Theban impulse

now drove them on with a fury which overcame all other thoughts;

and which, though doubtless Agesilaus and others considered it at

the time as legitimate patriotic resentment for the recent insult,

appeared to the philo-Laconian Xenophon, when he looked back upon it

from the subsequent season of Spartan humiliation, to be a misguiding

inspiration sent by the gods,[368]—like that of the Homeric Atê. Now

that Thebes stood isolated from Athens and all other allies out of

Bœotia, Agesilaus had full confidence of being able to subdue her

thoroughly. The same impression of the superiority of Spartan force

was also entertained both by the Athenians and by other Greeks; to a

great degree even by the Thebans themselves. It was anticipated that

the Spartans would break up the city of Thebes into villages (as they

had done at Mantinea) or perhaps retaliate upon her the fate which

she had inflicted upon Platæa—or even decimate her citizens and her

property to the profit of the Delphian god, pursuant to the vow that

had been taken more than a century before, in consequence of the

assistance lent by the Thebans to Xerxes.[369] Few persons out of

Bœotia doubted of the success of Sparta.

[368] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 3. ἤδη γὰρ, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ δαιμόνιον

ἦγεν, etc.

[369] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 20; Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 20; Diodor.

xv, 51.

To attack Thebes, however, an army was wanted; and as Sparta, by the

peace just sworn, had renounced everything like imperial ascendency

over her allies, leaving each of them free to send or withhold

assistance as they chose,—to raise an army was no easy task; for

the allies, generally speaking, being not at all inflamed with the

Spartan antipathy against Thebes, desired only to be left to enjoy

their newly-acquired liberty. But it so happened, that at the moment

when peace was sworn, the Spartan king Kleombrotus was actually at

the head of an army, of Lacedæmonians and allies, in Phokis, on the

north-western frontier of Bœotia. Immediately on hearing of the

peace, Kleombrotus sent home to ask for instructions as to his future

proceedings. By the unanimous voice of the Spartan authorities and

assembly, with Agesilaus as the most vehement of all,[370] he was

directed to march against the Thebans, unless they should flinch

at the last moment (as they had done at the peace of Antalkidas),

and relinquish their presidency over the other Bœotian cities.

One citizen alone, named Prothöus, interrupted this unanimity. He

protested against the order, first, as a violation of their oaths,

which required them to disband the army and reconstitute it on the

voluntary principle,—next, as imprudent in regard to the allies, who

now looked upon such liberty as their right, and would never serve

with cordiality unless it were granted to them. But Prothöus was

treated with disdain as a silly alarmist,[371] and the peremptory

order was despatched to Kleombrotus; accompanied, probably, by a

reinforcement of Spartans and Lacedæmonians, the number of whom, in

the ensuing battle, seems to have been greater than can reasonably be

imagined to have been before serving in Phokis.

[370] Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 28.

[371] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 2, 3. ἐκεῖνον μὲν φλυαρεῖν ἡγήσατο, etc.

Meanwhile no symptoms of concession were manifested at Thebes.[372]

Epaminondas, on his return, had found cordial sympathy with the

resolute tone which he had adopted both in defence of the Bœotian

federation and against Sparta. Though every one felt the magnitude

of the danger, it was still hoped that the enemy might be prevented

from penetrating out of Phokis into Bœotia. Epaminondas accordingly

occupied with a strong force the narrow pass near Koroneia, lying

between a spur of Mount Helikon on one side and the Lake Kopaïs on

the other; the same position as had been taken by the Bœotians, and

forced by the army returning from Asia under Agesilaus, twenty-three

years before. Orchomenus lay northward (that is, on the Phokian side)

of this position; and its citizens, as well as its Lacedæmonian

garrison, now doubtless formed part of the invading army of

Kleombrotus. That prince, with a degree of military skill rare in

the Spartan commanders, baffled all the Theban calculations. Instead

of marching by the regular road from Phokis into Bœotia, he turned

southward by a mountain-road scarcely deemed practicable, defeated

the Theban division under Chæreas which guarded it, and crossed the

ridge of Helikon to the Bœotian port of Kreusis on the Crissæan Gulf.

Coming upon this place by surprise, he stormed it, capturing twelve

Theban triremes which lay in the harbor. He then left a garrison

to occupy the port, and marched without delay over the mountainous

ground into the territory of Thespiæ on the eastern declivity

of Helikon; where he encamped on the high ground, at a place of

ever-memorable name, called Leuktra.[373]

[372] It is stated that either the Lacedæmonians from Sparta,

or Kleombrotus from Phokis, sent a new formal requisition to

Thebes, that the Bœotian cities should be left autonomous; and

the requisition was repudiated (Diodor. xv, 51; Aristeides, Or.

(Leuktr.) ii, xxxiv, p. 644, ed. Dindorf). But such mission seems

very doubtful.

[373] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 3, 4; Diodor. xv, 53; Pausan. ix, 13, 2.

Here was an important success, skilfully gained; not only placing

Kleombrotus within an easy march of Thebes, but also opening a sure

communication by sea with Sparta, through the port of Kreusis, and

thus eluding the difficulties of Mount Kithæron. Both the king

and the Lacedæmonians around him were full of joy and confidence;

while the Thebans on their side were struck with dismay as well as

surprise. It required all the ability of Epaminondas, and all the

daring of Pelopidas, to uphold the resolution of their countrymen,

and to explain away or neutralize the terrific signs and portents,

which a dispirited Greek was sure to see in every accident of the

road. At length, however, they succeeded in this, and the Thebans

with their allied Bœotians were marched out from Thebes to Leuktra,

where they were posted on a declivity opposite to the Spartan camp.

They were commanded by the seven Bœotarchs, of whom Epaminondas

was one. But such was the prevalent apprehension of joining battle

with the Spartans on equal terms, that even when actually on the

ground, three of these Bœotarchs refused to concur in the order for

fighting, and proposed to shut themselves up in Thebes for a siege,

sending their wives and families away to Athens. Epaminondas was

vainly combatting their determination, when the seventh Bœotarch,

Branchylides, arrived from the passes of Kithæron, where he had been

on guard, and was prevailed upon to vote in favor of the bolder

course. Though a majority was thus secured for fighting, yet the

feeling throughout the Theban camp was more that of brave despair

than of cheering hope; a conviction that it was better to perish in

the field, than to live in exile with the Lacedæmonians masters

of the Kadmeia. Some encouraging omens, however, were transmitted

to the camp, from the temples in Thebes as well as from that of

Trophonius at Lebadeia:[374] and a Spartan exile named Leandrias,

serving in the Theban ranks, ventured to assure them that they were

now on the very spot foredoomed for the overthrow of the Lacedæmonian

empire. Here stood the tomb of two females (daughters of a Leuktrian

named Skedasus) who had been violated by two Lacedæmonians and had

afterwards slain themselves. Skedasus, after having in vain attempted

to obtain justice from the Spartans for this outrage, came back,

imprecating curses on them, and slew himself also. The vengeance of

these departed sufferers would now be sure to pour itself out on

Sparta, when her army was in their own district and near their own

tomb. And the Theban leaders, to whom the tale was full of opportune

encouragement, crowned the tomb with wreaths, invoking the aid of its

inmates against the common enemy now present.[375]

[374] Kallisthenes, apud Cic. de Divinatione, i, 34, Fragm. 9,

ed. Didot.

[375] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 7; Diodor. xv, 54; Pausan. ix, 13, 3;

Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 20, 21; Polyænus, ii, 3, 8.

The latter relates that Pelopidas in a dream saw Skedasus,

who directed him to offer on this tomb “an auburn virgin” to

the deceased females. Pelopidas and his friends were greatly

perplexed about the fulfilment of this command; many urged

that it was necessary for some maiden to devote herself, or to

be devoted by her parents, as a victim for the safety of the

country, like Menœkeus and Makaria in the ancient legends; others

denounced the idea as cruel and inadmissible. In the midst of the

debate, a mare, with a chestnut filly, galloped up, and stopped

not far off; upon which the prophet Theokritus exclaimed,—“Here

comes the victim required, sent by the special providence of the

gods.” The chestnut filly was caught and offered as a sacrifice

on the tomb; every one being in high spirits from a conviction

that the mandate of the gods had been executed.

The prophet Theokritus figures in the treatise of Plutarch De

Genio Socratis (c. 3, p. 576 D.) as one of the companions of

Pelopidas in the conspiracy whereby the Theban oligarchy was put

down and the Lacedæmonians expelled from the Kadmeia.

While others were thus comforted by the hope of superhuman aid,

Epaminondas, to whom the order of the coming battle had been

confided, took care that no human precautions should be wanting. His

task was arduous; for not only were his troops dispirited, while

those of the enemy were confident,—but their numbers were inferior,

and some of the Bœotians present were hardly even trustworthy.

What the exact numbers were on either side, we are not permitted

to know. Diodorus assigns about six thousand men to the Thebans;

Plutarch states the numbers of Kleombrotus at eleven thousand.[376]

Without placing faith in these figures, we see good reason for

believing that the Theban total was decidedly inferior. For such

inferiority Epaminondas strove to make up by skilful tactics, and by

a combination at that time novel as well as ingenious. In all former

Grecian battles, the opposite armies had been drawn up in line,

and had fought along the whole line; or at least such had been the

intention of the generals,—and if it was not realized, the cause was

to be sought in accidents of the ground, or backwardness or disorder

on the part of some division of the soldiers. Departing from this

habit, Epaminondas now arrayed his troops so as to bring his own left

to bear with irresistible force upon the Spartan right, and to keep

back the rest of his army comparatively out of action. Knowing that

Kleombrotus, with the Spartans and all the official persons, would be

on the right of their own line, he calculated that, if successful on

this point against the best troops, he should find little resistance

from the remainder. Accordingly he placed on his own left wing

chosen Theban hoplites, to the prodigious depth of fifty shields,

with Pelopidas and the Sacred Band in front. His order of advance

was disposed obliquely or in echelon, so that the deep column on

the left should join battle first, while the centre and right kept

comparatively back and held themselves more in a defensive attitude.

[376] Diodor. xv, 52-56; Plutarch, Pelop. c. 20.

In 371 B.C., such a combination was absolutely new, and betokened

high military genius. It is therefore no disgrace to Kleombrotus

that he was not prepared for it, and that he adhered to the ordinary

Grecian tactics of joining battle at once along the whole line.

But so unbounded was the confidence reigning among the Spartans,

that there never was any occasion on which peculiar precautions

were less thought of. When, from their entrenched camp on the

Leuktrian eminence, they saw the Thebans encamped on an opposite

eminence, separated from them by a small breadth of low ground and

moderate declivities,—their only impatience was to hurry on the

decisive moment, so as to prevent the enemy from escaping. Both the

partisans and the opponents of Kleombrotus united in provoking

the order for battle, each in their own language. The former urged

him, since he had never yet done anything against the Thebans, to

strike a blow, and clear himself from the disparaging comparisons

which rumor instituted between him and Agesilaus; the latter gave

it to be understood, that if Kleombrotus were now backward, their

suspicions would be confirmed that he leaned in his heart towards

the Thebans.[377] Probably the king was himself sufficiently eager

to fight, and so would any other Spartan general have been, under

the same circumstances, before the battle of Leuktra. But even had

he been otherwise, the impatience, prevalent among the Lacedæmonian

portion of his army, left him no option. Accordingly, the decided

resolution to fight was taken. The last council was held, and the

final orders issued by Kleombrotus, after his morning meal, where

copious libations of wine both attested and increased the confident

temper of every man. The army was marched out of the camp, and

arrayed on the lower portion of the declivity; Kleombrotus with

the Spartans and most of the Lacedæmonians being on the right, in

an order of twelve deep. Some Lacedæmonians were also on the left,

but respecting the order of the other parts of the line, we have no

information. The cavalry was chiefly posted along the front.

[377] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 5.

Meanwhile, Epaminondas also marched down his declivity, in his

own chosen order of battle: his left wing being both forward, and

strengthened into very deep order, for desperate attack. His cavalry

too were posted in front of his line. But before he commenced his

march, he sent away his baggage and attendants home to Thebes;

while at the same time he made proclamation that any of his Bœotian

hoplites, who were not hearty in the cause, might also retire, if

they chose. Of such permission the Thespians immediately availed

themselves;[378] so many were there, in the Theban camp, who

estimated the chances to be all in favor of Lacedæmonian victory. But

when these men, a large portion of them unarmed, were seen retiring,

a considerable detachment from the army of Kleombrotus, either with

or without orders, ran after to prevent their escape, and forced

them to return for safety to the main Theban army. The most zealous

among the allies of Sparta present,—the Phokians, the Phliasians, and

the Herakleots, together with a body of mercenaries,—executed this

movement; which seems to have weakened the Lacedæmonians in the main

battle, without doing any mischief to the Thebans.

[378] Polyæn. ii, 2, 2; Pausanias, ix, 13, 3; ix, 14, 1.

The cavalry first engaged, in front of both lines; and here the

superiority of the Thebans soon became manifest. The Lacedæmonian

cavalry,—at no time very good, but at this moment unusually bad,

composed of raw and feeble novices, mounted on horses provided by

the rich,—was soon broken and driven back upon the infantry, whose

ranks were disturbed by the fugitives. To reëstablish the battle,

Kleombrotus gave the word for the infantry to advance, himself

personally leading the right. The victorious Theban cavalry probably

hung upon the Lacedæmonian infantry of the centre and left, and

prevented them from making much forward movement; while Epaminondas

and Pelopidas with their left, advanced according to their intention

to bear down Kleombrotus and his right wing. The shock here was

terrible; on both sides victory was resolutely and desperately

disputed, in a close hand-combat, with pushing of opposite shields

and opposite masses. But such was the overwhelming force of the

Theban charge,—with the sacred band or chosen warriors in front,

composed of men highly trained in the palæstra,[379] and the deep

column of fifty shields propelling behind,—that even the Spartans,

with all their courage, obstinacy, and discipline, were unable to

stand up against it. Kleombrotus, himself either in or near the

front, was mortally wounded, apparently early in the battle; and

it was only by heroic and unexampled efforts, on the part of his

comrades around, that he was carried off yet alive, so as to preserve

him from falling into the hands of the enemy. Around him also fell

the most eminent members of the Spartan official staff; Deinon the

polemarch, Sphodrias, with his son Kleonymus, and several others.

After an obstinate resistance and a fearful slaughter, the right wing

of the Spartans was completely beaten, and driven back to their camp

on the higher ground.

[379] Plutarch, Symposiac. ii. 5, p. 639 F.

It was upon this Spartan right wing, where the Theban left was

irresistibly strong, that all the stress of the battle fell,—as

Epaminondas had intended that it should. In no other part of the line

does there appear to have been any serious fighting; partly through

his deliberate scheme of not pushing forward either his centre or

his right,—partly through the preliminary victory of the Theban

cavalry, which probably checked a part of the forward march of the

enemy’s line,—and partly also through the lukewarm adherence, or even

suppressed hostility, of the allies marshalled under the command of

Kleombrotus.[380] The Phokians and Herakleots,—zealous in the cause

from hatred of Thebes,—had quitted the line to strike a blow at the

retiring baggage and attendants; while the remaining allies, after

mere nominal fighting and little or no loss, retired to the camp

as soon as they saw the Spartan right defeated and driven back to

it. Moreover, even some Lacedæmonians on the left wing, probably

astounded by the lukewarmness of those around them, and by the

unexpected calamity on their own right, fell back in the same manner.

The whole Lacedæmonian force, with the dying king, was thus again

assembled and formed behind the entrenchment on the higher ground,

where the victorious Thebans did not attempt to molest them.[381]

[380] Pausanias (ix, 13, 4; compare viii, 6, 1) lays great stress

upon this indifference or even treachery of the allies. Xenophon

says quite enough to authenticate the reality of the fact (Hellen.

vi, 4, 15-24); see also Cicero De Offic. ii, 7, 26.

Polyænus has more than one anecdote respecting the dexterity of

Agesilaus in dealing with faint-hearted conduct or desertion on

the part of the allies of Sparta (Polyæn. ii, 1, 18-20).

[381] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 13, 14.

But very different were their feelings as they now stood arrayed

in the camp, from that exulting boastfulness with which they had

quitted it an hour or two before; and fearful was the loss when

it came to be verified. Of seven hundred Spartans who had marched

forth from the camp, only three hundred returned to it.[382] One

thousand Lacedæmonians, besides, had been left on the field, even

by the admission of Xenophon; probably the real number was even

larger. Apart from this, the death of Kleombrotus was of itself an

event impressive to every one, the like of which had never occurred

since the fatal day of Thermopylæ. But this was not all. The allies

who stood alongside of them in arms were now altered men. All were

sick of their cause, and averse to farther exertion; some scarcely

concealed a positive satisfaction at the defeat. And when the

surviving polemarchs, now commanders, took counsel with the principal

officers as to the steps proper in the emergency, there were a few,

but very few, Spartans who pressed for renewal of the battle, and for

recovering by force their slain brethren in the field, or perishing

in the attempt. All the rest felt like beaten men; so that the

polemarchs, giving effect to the general sentiment, sent a herald to

solicit the regular truce for burial of their dead. This the Thebans

granted, after erecting their own trophy.[383] But Epaminondas,

aware that the Spartans would practise every stratagem to conceal

the magnitude of their losses, coupled the grant with a condition

that the allies should bury their dead first. It was found that the

allies had scarce any dead to pick up, and that nearly every slain

warrior on the field was a Lacedæmonian.[384] And thus the Theban

general, while he placed the loss beyond possibility of concealment,

proclaimed at the same time such public evidence of Spartan courage,

as to rescue the misfortune of Leuktra from all aggravation on the

score of dishonor. What the Theban loss was, Xenophon does not tell

us. Pausanias states it at forty-seven men,[385] Diodorus at three

hundred. The former number is preposterously small, and even the

latter is doubtless under the truth; for a victory in close fight,

over soldiers like the Spartans, must have been dearly purchased.

Though the bodies of the Spartans were given up to burial, their arms

were retained; and the shields of the principal officers were seen by

the traveller Pausanias at Thebes five hundred years afterwards.[386]

[382] Xen. Hellen. l. c. Plutarch (Agesil. c. 28) states a

thousand Lacedæmonians to have been slain; Pausanias (ix, 13, 4)

gives the number as more than a thousand; Diodorus mentions four

thousand (xv. 56), which is doubtless above the truth, though the

number given by Xenophon may be fairly presumed as somewhat below

it. Dionysius of Halikarnassus (Antiq. Roman. ii, 17) states that

seventeen hundred Spartans perished.

[383] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 15.

[384] Pausan. ix, 13, 4; Plutarch, Apotheg. Reg. p. 193 B.;

Cicero, de officiis, ii, 7.

[385] Pausan. ix, 13, 4; Diodor. xv, 55.

[386] Pausan. ix, 16, 3.

Twenty days only had elapsed, from the time when Epaminondas quitted

Sparta after Thebes had been excluded from the general peace, to

the day when he stood victorious on the field of Leuktra.[387]

The event came like a thunderclap upon every one in Greece, upon

victors as well as vanquished,—upon allies and neutrals, near and

distant, alike. The general expectation had been that Thebes would

be speedily overthrown and dismantled; instead of which, not only

she had escaped, but had inflicted a crushing blow on the military

majesty of Sparta. It is in vain that Xenophon,—whose account of the

battle is obscure, partial, and imprinted with that chagrin which

the event occasioned to him,[388]—ascribes the defeat to untoward

accidents,[389] or to the rashness and convivial carelessness of

Kleombrotus; upon whose generalship Agesilaus and his party at Sparta

did not scruple to cast ungenerous reproach,[390] while others

faintly exculpated him by saying that he had fought contrary to

his better judgment, under fear of unpopularity. Such criticisms,

coming from men wise after the fact, and consoling themselves for

the public calamity by censuring the unfortunate commander, will

not stand examination. Kleombrotus represented on this occasion the

feeling universal among his countrymen. He was ordered to march

against Thebes with the full belief, entertained by Agesilaus and all

the Spartan leaders, that her unassisted force could not resist him.

To fight the Thebans on open ground was exactly what he and every

other Spartan desired. While his manner of forcing the entrance of

Bœotia, and his capture of Kreusis, was a creditable manœuvre, he

seems to have arranged his order of battle in the manner usual with

Grecian generals at the time. There appears no reason to censure

his generalship, except in so far as he was unable to divine,—what

no one else divined,—the superior combinations of his adversary,

then for the first time applied to practice. To the discredit of

Xenophon, Epaminondas is never named in his narrative of the battle,

though he recognizes in substance that the battle was decided by

the irresistible Theban force brought to bear upon one point of

the enemy’s phalanx; a fact which both Plutarch and Diodorus[391]

expressly refer to the genius of the general. All the calculations

of Epaminondas turned out successful. The bravery of the Thebans,

cavalry as well as infantry, seconded by the training which they had

received during the last few years, was found sufficient to carry

his plans into full execution. To this circumstance, principally,

was owing the great revolution of opinion throughout Greece which

followed the battle. Every one felt that a new military power had

arisen, and that the Theban training, under the generalship of

Epaminondas, had proved itself more than a match on a fair field,

with shield and spear, and with numbers on the whole inferior,—for

the ancient Lykurgean discipline; which last had hitherto stood

without a parallel as turning out artists and craftsmen in war,

against mere citizens in the opposite ranks, armed but without the

like training.[392] Essentially stationary and old-fashioned, the

Lykurgean discipline was now overborne by the progressive military

improvement of other states, handled by a preëminent tactician; a

misfortune predicted by the Corinthians[393] at Sparta sixty years

before, and now realised, to the conviction of all Greece, on the

field of Leuktra.

[387] This is an important date, preserved by Plutarch (Agesil.

c. 28). The congress was broken up at Sparta on the fourteenth of

the Attic month Skirrophorion (June), the last month of the year

of the Athenian archon Alkisthenes; the battle was fought on the

fifth of the Attic month of Hekatombæon, the first month of the

next Attic year, of the archon Phrasikleidês; about the beginning

of July.

[388] Diodorus differs from Xenophon on one important matter

connected with the battle; affirming that Archidamus son of

Agesilaus was present and fought, together with various other

circumstances, which I shall discuss presently, in a future note.

I follow Xenophon.

[389] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 8. Εἰς δ’ οὖν τὴν μάχην τοῖς μὲν

Λακεδαιμονίοις πάντα τἀναντία ἐγίγνετο, τοῖς δὲ (to the Thebans)

πάντα καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης κατωρθοῦτο.

[390] Isokrates, in the Oration vi, called _Archidamus_ (composed

about five years after the battle, as if to be spoken by

Archidamus son of Agesilaus), puts this statement distinctly

into the mouth of Archidamus—μέχρι μὲν ταυτησὶ τῆς ἡμέρας

δεδυστυχηκέναι δοκοῦμεν ἐν τῇ μάχῃ τῇ πρὸς Θηβαίους, καὶ τοῖς μὲν

σώμασι κρατηθῆναι ~διὰ τὸν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἡγησάμενον~, etc. (s. 9).

I take his statement as good evidence of the real opinion

entertained both by Agesilaus and by Archidamus; an opinion the

more natural, since the two contemporary kings of Sparta were

almost always at variance, and at the head of opposing parties;

especially true about Agesilaus and Kleombrotus, during the life

of the latter.

Cicero (probably copying Kallisthenes or Ephorus) says, de

Officiis, i, 24, 84—“Illa plaga (Lacedæmoniis) pestifera,

quâ, quum Cleombrotus invidiam timens temere cum Epaminondâ

conflixisset, Lacedæmoniorum opes corruerunt.” Polybius remarks

(ix. 23, we know not from whom he borrowed) that all the

proceedings of Kleombrotus during the empire of Sparta, were

marked with a generous regard for the interests and feelings

of the allies; while the proceedings of Agesilaus were of the

opposite character.

[391] Diodor. xv, 55. Epaminondas, ἰδίᾳ τινι καὶ περιττῇ τάξει

χρησάμενος, διὰ τῆς ἰδίας στρατηγίας περιεποιήσατο τὴν περιβόητον

νίκην ... διὸ καὶ λοξὴν ποιήσας τὴν φάλαγγα, τῷ τοὺς ἐπιλέκτους

ἔχοντι κέρατι ἔγνω κρίνειν τὴν μάχην, etc. Compare Plutarch,

Pelop. c. 23.

[392] See Aristotel. Politic. viii, 3, 3, 5.

Compare Xenophon, De Repub. Laced. xiii, 5. τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους

αὐτοσχεδιαστὰς εἶναι τῶν στρατιωτικῶν, Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ μόνους

τῷ ὄντι τεχνίτας τῶν πολεμικῶν—and Xenoph. Memorab. iii, 5, 13,

14.

[393] Thucyd. i, 71. ἀρχαιότροπα ὑμῶν (of you Spartans) τὰ

ἐπιτηδεύματα πρὸς αὐτούς ἐστιν. ~Ἀνάγκη δ’ ὥσπερ τέχνης ἀεὶ τὰ

ἐπιγιγνόμενα κρατεῖν~· καὶ ἡσυχαζούσῃ μὲν πόλει τὰ ἀκίνητα νόμιμα

ἄριστα, πρὸς πολλὰ δὲ ἀναγκαζομένοις ἰέναι, ~πολλῆς καὶ τῆς

ἐπιτεχνήσεως δεῖ~, etc.

But if the Spartan system was thus invaded and overpassed in its

privilege of training soldiers, there was another species of teaching

wherein it neither was nor could be overpassed,—the hard lesson of

enduring pain and suppressing emotion. Memorable indeed was the

manner in which the news of this fatal catastrophe was received at

Sparta. To prepare the reader by an appropriate contrast, we may turn

to the manifestation at Athens twenty-seven years before, when the

trireme called Paralus arrived from Ægospotami, bearing tidings of

the capture of the entire Athenian fleet. “The moan of distress (says

the historian)[394] reached all up the Long Walls from Peiræus to

Athens, as each man communicated the news to his neighbor: on that

night, not a man slept, from bewailing for his lost fellow-citizens

and for his own impending ruin.” Not such was the scene at Sparta,

when the messenger arrived from the field of Leuktra, although there

was everything calculated to render the shock violent. For not only

was the defeat calamitous and humiliating beyond all former parallel,

but it came at a moment when every man reckoned on victory. As soon

as Kleombrotus, having forced his way into Bœotia, saw the unassisted

Thebans on plain ground before him, no Spartan entertained any doubt

of the result. Under this state of feeling, a messenger arrived

with the astounding revelation, that the army was totally defeated,

with the loss of the king, of four hundred Spartans, and more than

a thousand Lacedæmonians; and that defeat stood confessed by having

solicited the truce for interment of the slain. At the moment when

he arrived, the festival called the Gymnopædia was actually being

celebrated, on its last day; and the chorus of grown men was going

through its usual solemnity in the theatre. In spite of all the

poignancy of the intelligence, the ephors would not permit the

solemnity to be either interrupted or abridged. “_Of necessity, I

suppose, they were grieved_,—but they went through the whole as if

nothing had happened, only communicating the names of the slain to

their relations, and issuing a general order to the women, to make

no noise or wailing, but to bear the misfortune in silence.” That

such an order should be issued, is sufficiently remarkable; that it

should be issued and obeyed, is what could not be expected; that it

should not only be issued and obeyed, but overpassed, is what no man

could believe, if it were not expressly attested by the contemporary

historian. “On the morrow (says he) you might see those whose

relations had been slain, walking about in public with bright and

cheerful countenances; but of those whose relatives survived, scarce

one showed himself; and the few who were abroad, looked mournful and

humbled.”[395]

[394] Xen. Hellen. ii, 2, 3.

[395] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 16. Γενομένων δὲ τούτων, ὁ μὲν εἰς τὴν

Λακεδαίμονα ἀγγελῶν τὸ πάθος ἀφικνεῖται, Γυμνοπαιδιῶν τε οὐσῶν

τῆς τελευταίας, καὶ τοῦ ἀνδρικοῦ χόρου ἔνδον ὄντος· Οἱ δὲ ἔφοροι,

ἐπεὶ ἤκουσαν τὸ πάθος, ἐλυποῦντο μὲν, ὥσπερ οἶμαι, ἀνάγκῃ· τὸν

μέντοι χόρον οὐκ ἐξήγαγον, ἀλλὰ διαγωνίσασθαι εἴων. Καὶ τὰ μὲν

ὀνόματα πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους ἑκάστου τῶν τεθνηκότων ἀπέδοσαν·

προεῖπον δὲ ταῖς γυναιξὶ, μὴ ποιεῖν κραυγὴν, ἀλλὰ σιγῇ τὸ πάθος

φέρειν. Τῇ δὲ ὑστεραίᾳ ἦν ὁρᾷν, ὧν μὲν ἐτέθνασαν οἱ προσήκοντες,

λιπαροὺς καὶ φαιδροὺς ἐν τῷ φανερῷ ἀναστρεφομένους· ὧν δὲ ζῶντες

ἠγγελμένοι ἦσαν, ὀλίγους ἂν εἶδες, τούτους δὲ σκυθρωποὺς καὶ

ταπεινοὺς περιϊόντας—and Plutarch, Agesil. c. 29.

See a similar statement of Xenophon, after he has recounted the

cutting in pieces of the Lacedæmonian mora near Lechæum, about

the satisfaction and even triumph of those of the Lacedæmonians

who had lost relations in the battle; while every one else was

mournful (Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 10). Compare also Justin, xxviii,

4—the behavior after the defeat of Sellasia.

In comparing this extraordinary self-constraint and obedience to

orders, at Sparta, under the most trying circumstances,—with the

sensitive and demonstrative temper, and spontaneous outburst of

feeling at Athens, so much more nearly approaching to the Homeric

type of Greeks,—we must at the same time remark, that in reference

to active and heroic efforts for the purpose of repairing past

calamities and making head against preponderant odds, the Athenians

were decidedly the better of the two. I have already recounted

the prodigious and unexpected energy displayed by Athens, after

the ruinous loss of her two armaments before Syracuse, when no one

expected that she could have held out for six months: I am now

about to recount the proceedings of Sparta, after the calamity at

Leuktra,—a calamity great and serious indeed, yet in positive amount

inferior to what had befallen the Athenians at Syracuse. The reader

will find that, looking to the intensity of active effort in both

cases, the comparison is all to the advantage of Athens; excusing at

least, if not justifying, the boast of Perikles[396] in his memorable

funeral harangue,—that his countrymen, without the rigorous drill

of Spartans, were yet found noway inferior to Spartans in daring

exertion, when the hour of actual trial arrived.

[396] Thucyd. ii, 39.

It was the first obligation of the ephors to provide for the safety

of their defeated army in Bœotia; for which purpose they put in march

nearly the whole remaining force of Sparta. Of the Lacedæmonian

moræ, or military divisions (seemingly six in the aggregate), two

or three had been sent with Kleombrotus; all the remainder were now

despatched, even including elderly citizens up to near sixty years of

age, and all who had been left behind in consequence of other public

offices. Archidamus took the command (Agesilaus still continuing

to be disabled), and employed himself in getting together the aid

promised from Tegea,—from the villages representing the disintegrated

Mantinea,—from Corinth, Sikyon, Phlius, and Achaia; all these places

being still under the same oligarchies which had held them under

Lacedæmonian patronage, and still adhering to Sparta. Triremes were

equipped at Corinth, as a means of transporting the new army across

to Kreusis, and thus joining the defeated troops at Leuktra; the port

of Kreusis, the recent acquisition of Kleombrotus, being now found

inestimable, as the only means of access into Bœotia.[397]

[397] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 17-19.

Meanwhile the defeated army still continued in its entrenched camp

at Leuktra, where the Thebans were at first in no hurry to disturb

it. Besides that this was a very arduous enterprise, even after the

recent victory,—we must recollect the actual feeling of the Thebans

themselves, upon whom their own victory had come by surprise, at a

moment when they were animated more by despair than by hope. They

were doubtless absorbed in the intoxicating triumph and exultation

of the moment, with the embraces and felicitations of their families

in Thebes, rescued from impending destruction by their valor. Like

the Syracusans after their last great victory[398] over the Athenian

fleet in the Great Harbor, they probably required an interval to give

loose to their feelings of ecstasy, before they would resume action.

Epaminondas and the other leaders, aware how much the value of Theban

alliance was now enhanced, endeavored to obtain reinforcement from

without, before they proceeded to follow up the blow. To Athens they

sent a herald, crowned with wreaths of triumph, proclaiming their

recent victory. They invited the Athenians to employ the present

opportunity for taking full revenge on Sparta, by joining their hands

with those of Thebes. But the sympathies of the Athenians were now

rather hostile than friendly to Thebes, besides that they had sworn

peace with Sparta, not a month before. The Senate, who were assembled

in the acropolis when the herald arrived, heard his news with evident

chagrin, and dismissed him without even a word of courtesy; while

the unfortunate Platæans, who were doubtless waiting in the city in

expectation of the victory of Kleombrotus, and of their own speedy

reëstablishment, found themselves again struck down and doomed to

indefinite exile.

[398] See Thucyd. vii, 73.

To Jason of Pheræ in Thessaly, another Theban herald was sent for the

same purpose, and very differently received. The despot sent back

word that he would come forthwith by sea, and ordered triremes to be

equipped for the purpose. But this was a mere deception; for at the

same time, he collected the mercenaries and cavalry immediately near

to him, and began his march by land. So rapid were his movements,

that he forestalled all opposition,—though he had to traverse the

territory of the Herakleots and Phokians, who were his bitter

enemies,—and joined the Thebans safely in Bœotia.[399] But when the

Theban leaders proposed that he should attack the Lacedæmonian camp

in flank, from the high ground, while they would march straight

up the hill and attack it in front,—Jason strongly dissuaded the

enterprise as too perilous; recommending that they should permit the

enemy’s departure under capitulation. “Be content (said he) with the

great victory which you have already gained. Do not compromise it

by attempting something yet more hazardous, against Lacedæmonians

driven to despair in their camp. Recollect that a few days ago,

_you_ yourselves were in despair, and that your recent victory is

the fruit of that very feeling. Remember that the gods take pleasure

in bringing about these sudden changes of fortune.”[400] Having by

such representations convinced the Thebans, he addressed a friendly

message to the Lacedæmonians, reminding them of their dangerous

position, as well as of the little trust to be reposed in their

allies,—and offering himself as mediator to negotiate for their safe

retreat. Their acquiescence was readily given; and at his instance,

a truce was agreed to by both parties, assuring to the Lacedæmonians

the liberty of quitting Bœotia. In spite of the agreement, however,

the Lacedæmonian commander placed little faith either in the Thebans

or in Jason, apprehending a fraud for the purpose of inducing him

to quit the camp and of attacking him on the march. Accordingly,

he issued public orders in the camp for every man to be ready for

departure after the evening meal, and to march in the night to

Kithæron, with a view of passing that mountain on the next morning.

Having put the enemy on this false scent, he directed his real

night-march by a different and not very easy way, first to Kreusis,

next to Ægosthena in the Megarian territory.[401] The Thebans offered

no opposition; nor is it at all probable that they intended any

fraud, considering that Jason was here the guarantee, and that he had

at least no motive to break his word.

[399] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 20, 21.

However, since the Phokians formed part of the beaten army at

Leuktra, it must be confessed that Jason had less to fear from

them at this moment, than at any other.

[400] Pausanias states that immediately after the battle,

Epaminondas gave permission to the allies of Sparta to depart and

go home, by which permission they profited, so that the Spartans

now stood alone in the camp (Paus. ix, 14, 1). This however is

inconsistent with the account of Xenophon (vi, 4, 26), and I

think improbable.

Sievers (Geschichte, etc. p. 247) thinks that Jason preserved

the Spartans by outwitting and deluding Epaminondas. But it

appears to me that the storming of the Spartan camp was an

arduous enterprise, wherein more Thebans than Spartans would

have been slain: moreover, the Spartans were masters of the port

of Kreusis, so that there was little chance of starving out the

camp before reinforcements arrived. The capitulation granted by

Epaminondas seems to have been really the wisest proceeding.

[401] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 22-25.

The road from Kreusis to Leuktra, however, must have been that by

which Kleombrotus arrived.

It was at Ægosthena that the retreating Lacedæmonians met Archidamus,

who had advanced to that point with the Laconian forces, and was

awaiting the junction of his Peloponnesian allies. The purpose of his

march being now completed, he advanced no farther. The armament was

disbanded, and Lacedæmonians as well as allies returned home.[402]

[402] This is the most convenient place for noticing the

discrepancy, as to the battle of Leuktra, between Diodorus and

Xenophon. I have followed Xenophon.

Diodorus (xv, 54) states both the arrival of Jason in Bœotia, and

the out-march of Archidamus from Sparta, to have taken place,

_not after_ the battle of Leuktra, but _before_ it. Jason (he

says) came with a considerable force to the aid of the Thebans.

He prevailed upon Kleombrotus, who doubted the sufficiency of

his own numbers, to agree to a truce and to evacuate Bœotia.

But as Kleombrotus was marching homeward, he met Archidamus

with a second Lacedæmonian army, on his way to Bœotia, by order

of the ephors, for the purpose of reinforcing him. Accordingly

Kleombrotus, finding himself thus unexpectedly strengthened,

openly broke the truce just concluded, and marched back with

Archidamus to Leuktra. Here they fought the battle, Kleombrotus

commanding the right wing, and Archidamus the left. They

sustained a complete defeat, in which Kleombrotus was slain; the

result being the same on both statements.

We must here make our election between the narrative of

Xenophon and that of Diodorus. That the authority of the

former is greater, speaking generally, I need hardly remark;

nevertheless his philo-Laconian partialities become so glaring

and preponderant, during these latter books of the Hellenica

(where he is discharging the mournful duty of recounting

the humiliation of Sparta), as to afford some color for the

suspicions of Palmerius, Morus, and Schneider, who think that

Xenophon has concealed the direct violation of truce on the part

of the Spartans, and that the facts really occurred as Diodorus

has described them. See Schneider ad Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 5, 6.

It will be found, however, on examining the facts, that such

suspicion ought not to be admitted, and that there are grounds

for preferring the narrative of Xenophon.

1. He explains to us how it happened that the remains of the

Spartan army, after the defeat of Leuktra, escaped out of Bœotia.

Jason arrives after the battle, and prevails upon the Thebans

to allow them to retreat under a truce; Archidamus also arrives

after the battle to take them up. If the defeat had taken place

under the circumstances mentioned by Diodorus,—Archidamus and the

survivors would have found it scarcely possible to escape out of

Bœotia.

2. If Diodorus relates correctly, there must have been

a violation of truce on the part of Kleombrotus and the

Lacedæmonians, as glaring as any that occurs in Grecian history.

But such violation is never afterwards alluded to by any one,

among the misdeeds of the Lacedæmonians.

3. A part, and an essential part, of the story of Diodorus,

is, that Archidamus was present and fought at Leuktra. But we

have independent evidence rendering it almost certain that

he was not there. Whoever reads the Discourse of Isokrates

called _Archidamus_ (Or. vi, sect. 9, 10, 129), will see that

such observations could not have been put into the mouth of

Archidamus, if he had been present there, and (of course) in

joint command with Kleombrotus.

4. If Diodorus be correct, Sparta must have levied a new army

from her allies, just after having sworn the peace, which peace

exonerated her allies from everything like obligation to follow

her headship; and a new army, not for the purpose of extricating

defeated comrades in Bœotia, but for pure aggression against

Thebes. This, to say the least, is eminently improbable.

On these grounds, I adhere to Xenophon and depart from Diodorus.

In all communities, the return of so many defeated soldiers,

liberated under a capitulation by the enemy, would have been a

scene of mourning. But in Sparta it was pregnant with grave and

dangerous consequences. So terrible was the scorn and ignominy

heaped upon the Spartan citizen who survived a defeat, that life

became utterly intolerable to him. The mere fact sufficed for his

condemnation, without any inquiry into justifying or extenuating

circumstances. No citizen at home would speak to him, or be seen

consorting with him in tent, game, or chorus; no other family would

intermarry with his; if he was seen walking about with an air of

cheerfulness, he was struck and ill-used by the passers-by, until

he assumed that visible humility which was supposed to become his

degraded position. Such rigorous treatment (which we learn from

the panegyrist Xenophon)[403] helps to explain the satisfaction of

the Spartan father and mother, when they learned that their son

was among the slain and not among the survivors. Defeat of Spartan

troops had hitherto been rare. But in the case of the prisoners

at Sphakteria, when released from captivity and brought back to a

degraded existence at Sparta, some uneasiness had been felt, and some

precautions deemed necessary to prevent them from becoming dangerous

malcontents.[404] Here was another case yet more formidable. The

vanquished returning from Leuktra were numerous, while the severe

loss sustained in the battle amply attested their bravery. Aware of

the danger of enforcing against them the established custom, the

ephors referred the case to Agesilaus; who proposed that for that

time and case the customary penalties should be allowed to sleep;

but should be revived afterwards and come into force as before. Such

was the step accordingly taken;[405] so that the survivors from

this fatal battle-field were enabled to mingle with the remaining

citizens without dishonor or degradation. The step was indeed doubly

necessary, considering the small aggregate number of fully qualified

citizens; which number always tended to decline,—from the nature

of the Spartan political franchise combined with the exigencies of

Spartan training,[406]—and could not bear even so great a diminution

as that of the four hundred slain at Leuktra. “Sparta (says

Aristotle) could not stand up against a single defeat, but was ruined

through the small number of her citizens.”[407]

[403] Xenoph. Rep. Lac. c. ix; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30.

[404] Thucyd. v, 34.

[405] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30; Plutarch, Apophtheg. Lacon. p. 214

B.; Apophtheg. Reg. p. 191 C.; Polyænus, ii, 1, 13.

A similar suspension of penalties, for the special occasion, was

enacted after the great defeat of Agis and the Lacedæmonians by

Antipater, B.C. 330. Akrotatus, son of King Kleomenes, was the

only person at Sparta who opposed the suspension (Diodor. xix,

70). He incurred the strongest unpopularity for such opposition.

Compare also Justin, xxviii, 4—describing the public feeling at

Sparta after the defeat at Sellasia.

[406] The explanation of Spartan citizenship will be found in an

earlier part of this History, Vol. II, Ch. vi.

[407] Aristotel. Polit. ii, 6, 12. Μίαν γὰρ πληγὴν οὐχ ὑπήνεγκεν

ἡ πόλις, ἀλλ’ ἀπώλετο διὰ τὴν ὀλιγανθρωπίαν.

The cause here adverted to by Aristotle, as explaining the utter

loss of ascendency abroad, and the capital diminution both of power

and of inviolability at home, which will now be found to come thick

upon Sparta, was undoubtedly real and important. But a fact still

more important was, the alteration of opinion produced everywhere

in Greece with regard to Sparta, by the sudden shock of the battle

of Leuktra. All the prestige and old associations connected with

her long-established power vanished; while the hostility and

fears, inspired both by herself and by her partisans, but hitherto

reluctantly held back in silence,—now burst forth into open

manifestation.

The ascendency, exercised down to this time by Sparta north of the

Corinthian Gulf, in Phokis and elsewhere, passed away from her,

and became divided between the victorious Thebans and Jason of

Pheræ. The Thebans, and the Bœotian confederates who were now in

cordial sympathy with them, excited to enthusiasm by their recent

success, were eager for fresh glories, and readily submitted to the

full exigencies of military training; while under a leader like

Epaminondas, their ardor was turned to such good account, that

they became better soldiers every month.[408] The Phokians, unable

to defend themselves single-handed, were glad to come under the

protection of the Thebans, as less bitterly hostile to them than

the Thessalian Jason,—and concluded with them obligations of mutual

defence and alliance.[409] The cities of Eubœa, together with the

Lokrians (both Epiknemidian and Opuntian,) the Malians and the

town of Heraklea, followed the example. The latter town was now

defenceless; for Jason, in returning from Bœotia to Thessaly, had

assaulted it and destroyed its fortifications; since by its important

site near the pass of Thermopylæ, it might easily be held as a

position to bar his entrance into Southern Greece.[410] The Bœotian

town of Orchomenus, which had held with the Lacedæmonians even until

the late battle, was now quite defenceless; and the Thebans, highly

exasperated against its inhabitants, were disposed to destroy the

city, reducing the inhabitants to slavery. Severe as this proposition

was, it would not have exceeded the customary rigors of war, nor

even what might have befallen Thebes herself, had Kleombrotus been

victorious at Leuktra. But the strenuous remonstrance of Epaminondas

prevented it from being carried into execution. Alike distinguished

for mild temper and for long-sighted views, he reminded his

countrymen that in their present aspiring hopes towards ascendency in

Greece, it was essential to establish a character for moderation of

dealing[411] not inferior to their military courage, as attested by

the recent victory. Accordingly, the Orchomenians were pardoned upon

submission, and re-admitted as members of the Bœotian confederacy. To

the Thespians, however, the same lenity was not extended. They were

expelled from Bœotia, and their territory annexed to Thebes. It will

be recollected, that immediately before the battle of Leuktra, when

Epaminondas caused proclamation to be made that such of the Bœotians

as were disaffected to the Theban cause might march away, the

Thespians had availed themselves of the permission and departed.[412]

The fugitive Thespians found shelter, like the Platæans, at

Athens.[413]

[408] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 24. Καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν Βοιωτοὶ πάντες

ἐγυμνάζοντο περὶ τὰ ὅπλα, ἀγαλλόμενοι τῇ ἐν Λεύκτροις νίκῃ, etc.

These are remarkable words from the unwilling pen of Xenophon:

compare vii, 5, 12.

[409] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 23; vii, 5, 4; Diodor. xv, 57.

[410] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 27; vi, 5, 23.

[411] Diodor. xv, 57.

[412] Pausan. ix, 13, 3; ix, 14, 1.

[413] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 1.

I have already given my reasons (in a note on the preceding

chapter) for believing that the Thespians were not ἀπόλιδες

_before_ the battle of Leuktra.

While Thebes was commemorating her recent victory by the erection

of a treasury chamber,[414] and the dedication of pious offerings

at Delphi,—while the military organization of Bœotia was receiving

such marked improvement, and the cluster of dependent states attached

to Thebes was thus becoming larger, under the able management of

Epaminondas,—Jason in Thessaly was also growing more powerful every

day. He was tagus of all Thessaly; with its tributary neighbors under

complete obedience,—with Macedonia partly dependent on him,—and with

a mercenary force, well paid and trained, greater than had ever

been assembled in Greece. By dismantling Heraklea, in his return

home from Bœotia, he had laid open the strait of Thermopylæ, so

as to be sure of access into southern Greece whenever he chose.

His personal ability and ambition, combined with his great power,

inspired universal alarm; for no man knew whither he would direct

his arms; whether to Asia, against the Persian king, as he was fond

of boasting,[415]—or northward against the cities in Chalkidikê—or

southward against Greece.

[414] Pausanias, x, 11, 4.

[415] Isokrates, Or. v, (Philipp.) s. 141.

The last-mentioned plan seemed the most probable, at the beginning

of 370 B.C., half a year after the battle of Leuktra: for Jason

proclaimed distinctly his intention of being present at the Pythian

festival (the season for which was about August 1, 370 B.C.,

near Delphi), not only with splendid presents and sacrifices to

Apollo, but also at the head of a numerous army. Orders had been

given that his troops should hold themselves ready for military

service,[416]—about the time when the festival was to be celebrated;

and requisitions had been sent round, demanding from all his

tributaries victims for the Pythian sacrifice, to a total of not

less than one thousand bulls, and ten thousand sheep, goats, and

swine; besides a prize-bull to take the lead in the procession, for

which a wreath of gold was to be given. Never before had such honor

been done to the god; for those who came to offer sacrifice were

usually content with one or more beasts bred on the neighboring

plain of Kirrha.[417] We must recollect, however, that this Pythian

festival of 370 B.C. occurred under peculiar circumstances; for the

two previous festivals in 374 B.C. and 378 B.C. must have been

comparatively unfrequented; in consequence of the war between Sparta

and her allies on one side, and Athens and Thebes on the other,—and

also of the occupation of Phokis by Kleombrotus. Hence the festival

of 370 B.C., following immediately after the peace, appeared to

justify an extraordinary burst of pious magnificence, to make up for

the niggardly tributes to the god during the two former; while the

hostile dispositions of the Phokians would be alleged as an excuse

for the military force intended to accompany Jason.

[416] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 30. παρήγγειλε δὲ καὶ ὡς

στρατευσομένοις εἰς τὸν περὶ τὰ Πύθια χρόνον Θετταλοῖς

παρασκευάζεσθαι.

I agree with Dr. Arnold’s construction of this passage (see his

Appendix ad. Thucyd. v, 1, at the end of the second volume of his

edition of Thucydides) as opposed to that of Mr. Fynes Clinton.

At the same time, I do not think that the passage proves much

either in favor of his view, or against the view of Mr. Clinton,

about the month of the Pythian festival; which I incline to

conceive as celebrated about August 1; a little later than Dr.

Arnold, a little earlier than Mr. Clinton, supposes. Looking

to the lunar months of the Greeks, we must recollect that the

festival would not always coincide with the same month or week of

our year.

I cannot concur with Dr. Arnold in setting aside the statement of

Plutarch respecting the coincidence of the Pythian festival with

the battle of Koroneia.

[417] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 29, 30. βοῦν ἠγεμόνα, etc.

But there were other intentions, generally believed though not

formally announced, which no Greek could imagine without uneasiness.

It was affirmed that Jason was about to arrogate to himself the

presidency and celebration of the festival, which belonged of

right to the Amphiktyonic assembly. It was feared, moreover, that

he would lay hands on the rich treasures of the Delphian temple; a

scheme said to have been conceived by the Syracusan despot Dionysius

fifteen years before, in conjunction with the epirot Alketas, who

was now dependent upon Jason.[418] As there were no visible means

of warding off this blow, the Delphians consulted the god to know

what they were to do if Jason approached the treasury; upon which

the god replied, that he would himself take care of it,—and he kept

his word. This enterprising despot, in the flower of his age and at

the summit of his power, perished most unexpectedly before the day

of the festival arrived.[419] He had been reviewing his cavalry near

Pheræ, and was sitting to receive and answer petitioners, when seven

young men approached, apparently in hot dispute with each other, and

appealing to him for a settlement. As soon as they got near, they set

upon him and slew him.[420] One was killed on the spot by the guards,

and another also as he was mounting on horseback; but the remaining

five contrived to reach horses ready prepared for them and to gallop

away out of the reach of pursuit. In most of the Grecian cities which

these fugitives visited, they were received with distinguished honor,

as having relieved the Grecian world from one who inspired universal

alarm,[421] now that Sparta was unable to resist him, while no other

power had as yet taken her place.

[418] Diodor. xv, 13.

[419] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 30. ἀποκρίνασθαι τὸν θεὸν, ὅτι αὐτῷ

μελήσει. ~Ὁ δ’ οὖν ἀνὴρ, τηλικοῦτος ὢν, καὶ τοσαῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα

διανοούμενος~, etc.

Xenophon evidently considers the sudden removal of Jason as a

consequence of the previous intention expressed by the god to

take care of his own treasure.

[420] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 31, 32.

The cause which provoked these young men is differently stated:

compare Diodor. xv, 60; Valer. Maxim. ix, 10, 2.

[421] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 32.

The death of Jason in the spring or early summer of 370 B.C.,

refutes the compliment which Cornelius Nepos (Timoth. c. 4) pays

to Timotheus; who can never have made war upon Jason after 373

B.C., when he received the latter at Athens in his house.

Jason was succeeded in his dignity, but neither in his power, nor

ability, by two brothers,—Polyphron and Polydorus. Had he lived

longer, he would have influenced most seriously the subsequent

destinies of Greece. What else he would have done, we cannot say; but

he would have interfered materially with the development of Theban

power. Thebes was a great gainer by his death, though perfectly

innocent of it, and though in alliance with him to the last; insomuch

that his widow went to reside there for security.[422] Epaminondas

was relieved from a most formidable rival, while the body of Theban

allies north of Bœotia became much more dependent than they would

have remained, if there had been a competing power like that of Jason

in Thessaly. The treasures of the god were preserved a few years

longer, to be rifled by another hand.

[422] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 37.

While these proceedings were going on in Northern Greece, during

the months immediately succeeding the battle of Leuktra, events

not less serious and stirring had occurred in Peloponnesus. The

treaty sworn at Sparta twenty days before that battle, bound the

Lacedæmonians to disband their forces, remove all their harmosts

and garrisons, and leave every subordinate city to its own liberty

of action. As they did not scruple to violate the treaty by the

orders sent to Kleombrotus, so they probably were not zealous in

executing the remaining conditions; though officers were named, for

the express purpose of going round to see that the evacuation of the

cities was really carried into effect.[423] But it probably was not

accomplished in twenty days; nor would it perhaps have been ever more

than nominally accomplished, if Kleombrotus had been successful in

Bœotia. But after these twenty days came the portentous intelligence

of the fate of that prince and his army. The invincible arm of

Sparta was broken; she had not a man to spare for the maintenance

of foreign ascendency. Her harmosts disappeared at once, (as they

had disappeared from the Asiatic and insular cities twenty-three

years before, immediately after the battle of Knidus,[424]) and

returned home. Nor was this all. The Lacedæmonian ascendency had

been maintained everywhere by local oligarchies or dekarchies,

which had been for the most part violent and oppressive. Against

these governments, now deprived of their foreign support, the

long-accumulated flood of internal discontent burst with irresistible

force, stimulated probably by returning exiles. Their past

misgovernment was avenged by severe sentences and proscription, to

the length of great reactionary injustice; and the parties banished

by this anti-Spartan revolution became so numerous, as to harass and

alarm seriously the newly-established governments. Such were the

commotions which, during the latter half of 371 B.C., disturbed

many of the Peloponnesian towns,—Phigaleia, Phlius, Corinth, Sikyon,

Megara, etc., though with great local difference, both of detail and

of result.[425]

[423] Diodor. xv, 38. ἐξαγωγεῖς.

[424] Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 8, 1-5.

[425] Diodor. xv, 39, 40.

Diodorus mentions these commotions as if they had taken place

after the peace concluded in 374 B.C., and not after the peace

of 371 B.C. But it is impossible that they can have taken place

after the former, which in point of fact, was broken off almost

as soon as sworn,—was never carried into effect,—and comprised no

one but Athens and Sparta. I have before remarked that Diodorus

seems to have confounded, both in his mind and in his history,

these two treaties of peace together, and has predicated of the

former what really belongs to the latter. The commotions which he

mentions come in, most naturally and properly, immediately after

the battle of Leuktra.

He affirms the like reaction against Lacedæmonian supremacy and

its local representatives in the various cities, to have taken

place even after the peace of Antalkidas in 387 B.C. (xv, 5).

But if such reaction began at that time, it must have been

promptly repressed by Sparta, then in undiminished and even

advancing power.

Another occurrence, alleged to have happened after the battle of

Leuktra, may be properly noticed here. Polybius (ii, 39), and

Strabo seemingly copying him (viii, p. 384), assert that both

Sparta and Thebes agreed to leave their disputed questions of

power to the arbitration of the Achæans, and to abide by their

decision. Though I greatly respect the authority of Polybius, I

am unable here to reconcile his assertion either with the facts

which unquestionably occurred, or with general probability. If

any such arbitration was ever consented to, it must have come to

nothing; for the war went on without interruption. But I cannot

bring myself to believe that it was even consented to, either by

Thebes or by Sparta. The exuberant confidence of the former, the

sense of dignity on the part of the latter, must have indisposed

both to such a proceeding; especially to the acknowledgment of

umpires like the Achæan cities, who enjoyed little estimation in

370 B.C., though they acquired a good deal a century and a half

afterwards.

But the city where intestine commotion took place in its most violent

form was Argos. We do not know how this fact was connected with

the general state of Grecian politics at the time, for Argos had

not been in any way subject to Sparta, nor a member of the Spartan

confederacy, nor (so far as we know) concerned in the recent war,

since the peace of Antalkidas in 387 B.C. The Argeian government

was a democracy, and the popular leaders were vehement in their

denunciations against the oligarchical opposition party—who were men

of wealth and great family position. These last, thus denounced,

formed a conspiracy for the forcible overthrow of the government.

But the conspiracy was discovered prior to execution, and some of

the suspected conspirators were interrogated under the torture, to

make them reveal their accomplices; under which interrogation one of

them deposed against thirty conspicuous citizens. The people, after

a hasty trial, put these thirty men to death, and confiscated their

property, while others slew themselves to escape the same fate. So

furious did the fear and wrath of the people become, exasperated by

the popular leaders, that they continued their executions until they

had put to death twelve hundred (or, as some say, fifteen hundred)

of the principal citizens. At length the popular leaders became

themselves tired and afraid of what they had done; upon which the

people were animated to fury against them, and put them to death

also.[426]

[426] Diodor. xv, 57, 58.

This gloomy series of events was termed the Skytalism, or Cudgelling,

from the instrument (as we are told) by which these multiplied

executions were consummated; though the name seems more to indicate

an impetuous popular insurrection than deliberate executions. We know

the facts too imperfectly to be able to infer anything more than

the brutal working of angry political passion amidst a population

like that of Argos or Korkyra, where there was not (as at Athens)

either a taste for speech, or the habit of being guided by speech,

and of hearing both sides of every question fully discussed. Cicero

remarks that he had never heard of an Argeian orator. The acrimony

of Demosthenes and Æschines was discharged by mutual eloquence of

vituperation, while the assembly or the dikastery afterwards decided

between them. We are told that the assembled Athenian people, when

they heard the news of the Skytalism at Argos, were so shocked at it,

that they caused the solemnity of purification to be performed round

the assembly.[427]

[427] Plutarch, Reipubl. Gerend. Præcept. p. 814 B.; Isokrates.

Or. v, (Philip.) s. 58.; compare Dionys. Halic. Antiq. Rom. vii,

66.

Though Sparta thus saw her confidential partisans deposed, expelled,

or maltreated, throughout so many of the Peloponnesian cities,—and

though as yet there was no Theban interference within the isthmus,

either actual or prospective,—yet she was profoundly discouraged,

and incapable of any effort either to afford protection or to uphold

ascendency. One single defeat had driven her to the necessity of

contending for home and family;[428] probably too the dispositions of

her own Periœki and Helots in Laconia, were such as to require all

her force as well as all her watchfulness. At any rate, her empire

and her influence over the sentiments of Greeks out of Laconia,

became suddenly extinct, to a degree which astonishes us, when

we recollect that it had become a sort of tradition in the Greek

mind, and that, only nine years before, it had reached as far as

Olynthus. How completely her ascendency had passed away, is shown in

a remarkable step taken by Athens, seemingly towards the close of

371 B.C., about four months after the battle of Leuktra. Many of

the Peloponnesian cities, though they had lost both their fear and

their reverence for Sparta, were still anxious to continue members

of a voluntary alliance under the presidency of some considerable

city. Of this feeling the Athenians took advantage, to send envoys

and invite them to enter into a common league at Athens, on the

basis of the peace of Antalkidas, and of the peace recently sworn

at Sparta.[429] Many of them, obeying the summons, entered into an

engagement to the following effect: “I will adhere to the peace sent

down by the Persian king, and to the resolutions of the Athenians and

the allies generally. If any of the cities who have sworn this oath

shall be attacked, I will assist her with all my might.” What cities,

or how many, swore to this engagement, we are not told; we make out

indirectly that Corinth was one;[430] but the Eleians refused it,

on the ground that their right of sovereignty over the Marganeis,

the Triphylians, and the Skilluntians, was not recognized. The

formation of the league itself, however, with Athens as president, is

a striking fact, as evidence of the sudden dethronement of Sparta,

and as a warning that she would henceforward have to move in her

own separate orbit, like Athens after the Peloponnesian war. Athens

stepped into the place of Sparta, as president of the Peloponnesian

confederacy, and guarantee of the sworn peace; though the cities

which entered into this new compact were not for that reason

understood to break with their ancient president.[431]

[428] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 10.

The discouragement of the Spartans is revealed by the unwilling,

though indirect, intimations of Xenophon,—not less than by

their actual conduct—Hellen. vi, 5, 21; vii, 1, 30-32; compare

Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30.

[429] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 1-3.

Ἐνθυμηθέντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ὅτι οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἔτι οἴονται, χρῆναι

ἀκολουθεῖν, καὶ οὔπω διακέοιντο οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ὥσπερ τοὺς

Ἀθηναίους διέθεσαν—μεταπέμπονται τὰς πόλεις, ὅσοι βούλονται τῆς

εἰρήνης μετέχειν, ἣν βασιλεὺς κατέπεμψεν.

In this passage, Morus and some other critics maintain that

we ought to read οὔπω (which seems not to be supported by any

MSS.), in place of οὕτω. Zeune and Schneider have admitted the

new reading into the text; yet they doubt the propriety of the

change, and I confess that I share their doubts. The word οὕτω

will construe, and gives a clear sense; a very different sense

from οὔπω, indeed,—yet more likely to have been intended by

Xenophon.

[430] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 37.

[431] Thus the Corinthians still continued allies of Sparta (Xen.

Hellen. vii, 4, 8).

Another incident too, apparently occurring about the present time,

though we cannot mark its exact date,—serves to mark the altered

position of Sparta. The Thebans preferred in the assembly of

Amphiktyons an accusation against her, for the unlawful capture of

their citadel the Kadmeia by Phœbidas, while under a sworn peace; and

for the sanction conferred by the Spartan authorities on this act, in

detaining and occupying the place. The Amphiktyonic assembly found

the Spartans guilty, and condemned them to a fine of five hundred

talents. As the fine was not paid, the assembly, after a certain

interval, doubled it; but the second sentence remained unexecuted as

well as the first, since there were no means of enforcement.[432]

Probably neither those who preferred the charge, nor those who

passed the vote, expected that the Lacedæmonians would really submit

to pay the fine. The utmost which could be done, by way of punishment

for such contumacy, would be to exclude them from the Pythian games,

which were celebrated under the presidency of the Amphiktyons; and we

may perhaps presume that they really were thus excluded.

[432] Diodor. xvi, 23-29; Justin, viii, 1.

We may fairly suppose that both of them borrow from Theopompus,

who treated at large of the memorable Sacred War against the

Phokians, which began in 355 B.C., and in which the conduct of

Sparta was partly determined by this previous sentence of the

Amphiktyons. See Theopompi Fragm. 182-184, ed. Didot.

The incident however deserves peculiar notice, in more than one

point of view. First, as indicating the lessened dignity of Sparta.

Since the victory of Leuktra and the death of Jason, Thebes had

become preponderant, especially in Northern Greece, where the

majority of the nations or races voting in the Amphiktyonic assembly

were situated. It is plainly through the ascendency of Thebes,

that this condemnatory vote was passed. Next, as indicating the

incipient tendency, which we shall hereafter observe still farther

developed, to extend the functions of the Amphiktyonic assembly

beyond its special sphere of religious solemnities, and to make it

the instrument of political coërcion or revenge in the hands of

the predominant state. In the previous course of this history, an

entire century has passed without giving occasion to mention the

Amphiktyonic assembly as taking part in political affairs. Neither

Thucydides nor Xenophon, though their united histories cover seventy

years, chiefly of Hellenic conflict, ever speak of that assembly.

The latter, indeed, does not even notice this fine imposed upon the

Lacedæmonians, although it falls within the period of his history. We

know the fact only from Diodorus and Justin; and unfortunately merely

as a naked fact, without any collateral or preliminary details.

During the sixty or seventy years preceding the battle of Leuktra,

Sparta had always had her regular political confederacy and synod of

allies convened by herself: her political ascendency was exercised

over them, _eo nomine_, by a method more direct and easy than that of

perverting the religious authority of the Amphiktyonic assembly, even

if such a proceeding were open to her.[433] But when Thebes, after

the battle of Leuktra, became the more powerful state individually,

she had no such established confederacy and synod of allies, to

sanction her propositions, and to share or abet her antipathies.

The Amphiktyonic assembly, meeting alternately at Delphi and at

Thermopylæ, and composed of twelve ancient races, principally

belonging to Northern Greece, as well as most of them inconsiderable

in power,—presented itself as a convenient instrument for her

purposes. There was a certain show of reason for considering the

seizure of the Kadmeia by Phœbidas as a religious offence; since it

was not only executed during the Pythian festival, but was in itself

a glaring violation of the public law and interpolitical obligations

recognized between Grecian cities; which, like other obligations,

were believed to be under the sanction of the gods; though probably,

if the Athenians and Platæans had preferred a similar complaint to

the Amphiktyons against Thebes for her equally unjust attempt to

surprise Platæa under full peace in the spring of 431 B.C.,—both

Spartans and Thebans would have resisted it. In the present case,

however, the Thebans had a case against Sparta sufficiently

plausible, when combined with their overruling ascendency, to carry a

majority in the Amphiktyonic assembly, and to procure the imposition

of this enormous fine. In itself the sentence produced no direct

effect,—which will explain the silence of Xenophon. But it is the

first of a series of proceedings, connected with the Amphiktyons,

which will be found hereafter pregnant with serious results for

Grecian stability and independence.

[433] See Tittmann, Ueber den Bund der Amphiktyonen, pp. 192-197

(Berlin, 1812).

Among all the inhabitants of Peloponnesus, none were more powerfully

affected, by the recent Spartan overthrow at Leuktra, than the

Arcadians. Tegea, their most important city, situated on the border

of Laconia, was governed by an oligarchy wholly in the interest of

Sparta: Orchomenus was of like sentiment; and Mantinea had been

broken up into separate villages (about fifteen years before) by the

Lacedæmonians themselves—an act of high-handed injustice committed

at the zenith of their power after the peace of Antalkidas. The

remaining Arcadian population were in great proportion villagers;

rude men, but excellent soldiers, and always ready to follow the

Lacedæmonian banners, as well from old habit and military deference,

as from the love of plunder.[434]

[434] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 19.

The defeat of Leuktra effaced this ancient sentiment. The Arcadians

not only ceased to count upon victory and plunder in the service of

Sparta, but began to fancy that their own military prowess was not

inferior to that of the Spartans; while the disappearance of the

harmosts left them free to follow their own inclinations. It was by

the Mantineans that the movement was first commenced. Divested of

Grecian city-life, and condemned to live in separate villages, each

under its own philo-Spartan oligarchy, they had nourished a profound

animosity, which manifested itself on the first opportunity of

deposing these oligarchies and coming again together. The resolution

was unanimously adopted, to re-establish Mantinea with its walls, and

resume their political consolidation; while the leaders banished by

the Spartans at their former intervention, now doubtless returned to

become foremost in the work.[435] As the breaking up of Mantinea had

been one of the most obnoxious acts of Spartan omnipotence, so there

was now a strong sympathy in favor of its re-establishment. Many

Arcadians from other quarters came to lend auxiliary labor, while the

Eleians sent three talents as a contribution towards the cost. Deeply

mortified by this proceeding, yet too weak to prevent it by force,

the Spartans sent Agesilaus with a friendly remonstrance. Having

been connected with the city by paternal ties of hospitality, he had

declined the command of the army of coërcion previously employed

against it; nevertheless, on this occasion, the Mantinean leaders

refused to convene their public assembly to hear his communication,

desiring that he would make known his purpose to them. Accordingly,

he intimated that he had come with no view of hindering the

re-establishment of the city, but simply to request that they would

defer it until the consent of Sparta could be formally given; which

(he promised) should soon be forthcoming, together with a handsome

subscription to lighten the cost. But the Mantinean leaders answered,

that compliance was impossible, since a public resolution had already

been taken to prosecute the work forthwith. Enraged at such a rebuff,

yet without power to resent it, Agesilaus was compelled to return

home.[436] The Mantineans persevered and completed the rebuilding of

their city, on a level site, and in an elliptical form, surrounded

with elaborate walls and towers.

[435] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 6; vi, 5, 3.

[436] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 4, 5.

Pausanias (viii, 8, 6: ix, 14, 2) states that the Thebans

reëstablished the city of Mantinea. The act emanated from the

spontaneous impulse of the Mantineans and other Arcadians, before

the Thebans had yet begun to interfere actively in Peloponnesus,

which we shall presently find them doing. But it was doubtless

done in reliance upon Theban support, and was in all probability

made known to, and encouraged by, Epaminondas. It formed the

first step to that series of anti-Spartan measures in Arcadia,

which I shall presently relate.

Either the city of Mantinea now built was not exactly in the

same situation as the one dismantled in 385 B.C., since the

river Ophis did not run through it, as it had run through the

former,—or else the course of the Ophis has altered. If the

former, there would be three successive sites, the oldest of

them being on the hill called Ptolis, somewhat north of Gurzuli.

Ptolis was perhaps the larger of the primary constituent

villages. Ernst Curtius (Peloponnesos, p. 242) makes the hill

Gurzuli to be the same as the hill called Ptolis; Colonel Leake

distinguishes the two, and places Ptolis on his map northward

of Gurzuli (Peloponnesiaca, p. 378-381). The summit of Gurzuli

is about one mile distant from the centre of Mantinea (Leake,

Peloponnes. p. 383).

The walls of Mantinea, as rebuilt in 370 B.C., form an ellipse

of about eighteen stadia, or a little more than two miles in

circumference. The greater axis of the ellipse points north and

south. It was surrounded with a wet ditch, whose waters join into

one course at the west of the town, and form a brook which Sir

William Gell calls the Ophis (Itinerary of the Morea, p. 142).

The face of the wall is composed of regularly cut square stones;

it is about ten feet thick in all,—four feet for an outer wall,

two feet for an inner wall, and an intermediate space of four

feet filled up with rubbish. There were eight principal double

gates, each with a narrow winding approach, defended by a round

tower on each side. There were quadrangular towers, eighty feet

apart, all around the circumference of the walls (Ernst Curtius,

Peloponnesos, p. 236, 237).

These are instructive remains, indicating the ideas of the Greeks

respecting fortification in the time of Epaminondas. It appears

that Mantinea was not so large as Tegea, to which last Curtius

assigns a circumference of more than three miles (p. 253).

The affront here offered, probably studiously offered, by Mantinean

leaders who had either been exiles themselves, or sympathized with

the exiles,—was only the prelude to a series of others (presently

to be recounted) yet more galling and intolerable. But it was

doubtless felt to the quick both by the ephors and by Agesilaus,

as a public symptom of that prostration into which they had so

suddenly fallen. To appreciate fully such painful sentiment, we must

recollect that an exaggerated pride and sense of dignity, individual

as well as collective, founded upon military excellence and earned

by incredible rigor of training,—was the chief mental result imbibed

by every pupil of Lykurgus, and hitherto ratified as legitimate by

the general testimony of Greece. This was his principal recompense

for the severe fatigue, the intense self-suppression, the narrow,

monotonous, and unlettered routine, wherein he was born and died.

As an individual, the Spartan citizen was pointed out by the finger

of admiration at the Olympic and other festivals;[437] while he

saw his city supplicated from the most distant regions of Greece,

and obeyed almost everywhere near her own border, as Pan-hellenic

president. On a sudden, with scarce any preparatory series of events,

he now felt this proud prerogative sentiment not only robbed of its

former tribute, but stung in the most mortifying manner. Agesilaus,

especially, was the more open to such humiliation, since he was not

only a Spartan to the core, but loaded with the consciousness of

having exercised more influence than any other king before him,—of

having succeeded to the throne at a moment when Sparta was at the

maximum of her power,—and of having now in his old age accompanied

her, in part brought her by his misjudgments, into her present

degradation.

[437] Isokrates, Or. vi, (Archidamus) s. 111.

Agesilaus had, moreover, incurred unpopularity among the Spartans

themselves, whose chagrin took the form of religious scruple and

uneasiness. It has been already stated that he was, and had been

from childhood, lame; which deformity had been vehemently insisted

on by his opponents (during the dispute between him and Leotychides

in 398 B.C. for the vacant throne) as disqualifying him for the

regal dignity, and as being the precise calamity against which an

ancient oracle—“Beware of a lame reign”—had given warning. Ingenious

interpretation by Lysander, combined with superior personal merit

in Agesilaus, and suspicions about the legitimacy of Leotychides,

had caused the objection to be then overruled. But there had always

been a party, even during the palmy days of Agesilaus, who thought

that he had obtained the crown under no good auspices. And when

the humiliation of Sparta arrived, every man’s religion suggested

to him readily the cause of it,[438]—“See what comes of having set

at nought the gracious warning of the gods, and put upon ourselves

a lame reign!” In spite of such untoward impression, however, the

real energy and bravery of Agesilaus, which had not deserted even

an infirm body and an age of seventy years, was more than ever

indispensable to his country. He was still the chief leader of

her affairs, condemned to the sad necessity of submitting to this

Mantinean affront, and much worse that followed it, without the least

power of hindrance.

[438] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30, 31, 34.

The reëstablishment of Mantinea was probably completed during the

autumn and winter of B.C. 371-370. Such coalescence of villages

into a town, coupled with the predominance of feelings hostile to

Sparta, appears to have suggested the idea of a larger political

union among all who bore the Arcadian name. As yet, no such union

had ever existed; the fractions of the Arcadian name had nothing in

common, apart from other Greeks, except many legendary and religious

sympathies, with a belief in the same heroic lineage and indigenous

antiquity.[439] But now the idea and aspiration, espoused with

peculiar ardor by a leading Mantinean named Lykomedes, spread itself

rapidly over the country, to form a “commune Arcadum,” or central

Arcadian authority, composed in certain proportions out of all the

sections now autonomous,—and invested with peremptory power of

determining by the vote of its majority. Such central power, however,

was not intended to absorb or set aside the separate governments, but

only to be exercised for certain definite purposes; in maintaining

unanimity at home, together with concurrent, independent action, as

to foreign states.[440] This plan of Pan-Arcadian federation was

warmly promoted by the Mantineans, who looked to it as a protection

to themselves in case the Spartan power should revive; as well as

by the Thebans and Argeians, from whom aid was expected in case of

need. It found great favor in most parts of Arcadia, especially in

the small districts bordering on Laconia, which stood most in need

of union to protect themselves against the Spartans,—the Mænalians,

Parrhasians, Eutresians, Ægytes,[441] etc. But the jealousies among

the more considerable cities made some of them adverse to any scheme

emanating from Mantinea. Among these unfriendly opponents were

Heræa, on the west of Arcadia bordering on Elis,—Orchomenus,[442]

conterminous with Mantinea to the north—and Tegea, conterminous

to the south. The hold of the Spartans on Arcadia had been always

maintained chiefly through Orchomenus and Tegea. The former was the

place where they deposited their hostages taken from other suspected

towns; the latter was ruled by Stasippus and an oligarchy devoted to

their interests.[443]

[439] It seems, however, doubtful whether there were not some

common Arcadian coins struck, even before the battle of Leuktra.