[301] Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 4.

The story (told in Plutarch, De Gen. Socrat. p. 583 F.) of Jason

sending a large sum of money to Thebes, at some period anterior

to the recapture of the Kadmeia, for the purpose of corrupting

Epaminondas,—appears not entitled to credit. Before that time,

Epaminondas was too little known to be worth corrupting;

moreover, Jason did not become _tagus_ of Thessaly until long

after the recapture of the Kadmeia (Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 18, 19).

Such were the propositions, and such the ambitious hopes, which the

energetic despot of Pheræ had laid before Polydamas; who replied,

that he himself had long been allied with Sparta, and that he could

take no resolution hostile to her interests. “Go to Sparta, then

(rejoined Jason), and give notice there, that I intend to attack

Pharsalus, and that it is for them to afford you protection. If

they cannot comply with the demand, you will be unfaithful to the

interests of your city if you do not embrace my offers.” It was on

this mission that Polydamas was now come to Sparta, to announce that

unless aid could be sent to him, he should be compelled unwillingly

to sever himself from her. “Recollect (he concluded) that the enemy

against whom you will have to contend is formidable in every way,

both from personal qualities and from power; so that nothing short of

a first-rate force and commander will suffice. Consider, and tell me

what you can do.”

The Spartans, having deliberated on the point, returned a reply in

the negative. Already a large force had been sent under Kleombrotus

as essential to the defence of Phokis; moreover, the Athenians were

now the stronger power at sea. Lastly, Jason had hitherto lent no

active assistance to Thebes and Athens—which he would assuredly be

provoked to do, if a Spartan army interfered against him in Thessaly.

Accordingly the ephors told Polydamas plainly, that they were unable

to satisfy his demands, recommending him to make the best terms that

he could, both for Pharsalus and for himself. Returning to Thessaly,

he resumed his negotiation with Jason, and promised substantial

compliance with what was required. But he entreated to be spared the

dishonor of admitting a foreign garrison into the citadel which had

been confidentially entrusted to his care; engaging at the same time

to bring his fellow-citizens into voluntary union with Jason, and

tendering his two sons as hostages for faithful performance. All this

was actually brought to pass. The politics of the Pharsalians were

gently brought round, so that Jason, by their votes as well as the

rest, was unanimously elected Tagus of Thessaly.[302]

[302] See the interesting account of this mission, and the speech

of Polydamas, which I have been compelled greatly to abridge (in

Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 4-18).

The dismissal of Polydamas implied a mortifying confession of

weakness on the part of Sparta. It marks, too, an important stage in

the real decline of her power. Eight years before, at the instance

of the Akanthian envoys, backed by the Macedonian Amyntas, she had

sent three powerful armies in succession to crush the liberal and

promising confederacy of Olynthus, and to re-transfer the Grecian

cities on the sea-coast to the Macedonian crown. The region to

which her armies had been sent, was the extreme verge of Hellas.

The parties in whose favor she acted, had scarcely the shadow of a

claim, as friends or allies; while those _against_ whom she acted,

had neither done nor threatened any wrong to her: moreover, the

main ground on which her interference was invoked, was to hinder

the free and equal confederation of Grecian cities. _Now_, a claim,

and a strong claim, is made upon her by Polydamas of Pharsalus,

an old friend and ally. It comes from a region much less distant;

lastly, her political interest would naturally bid her arrest the

menacing increase of an aggressive power already so formidable as

that of Jason. Yet so seriously has the position of Sparta altered

in the last eight years (382-374 B.C.), that she is now compelled

to decline a demand which justice, sympathy, and political policy

alike prompted her to grant. So unfortunate was it for the Olynthian

confederacy, that their honorable and well-combined aspirations

fell exactly during those few years in which Sparta was at her

maximum of power! So unfortunate was such coincidence of time, not

only for Olynthus, but for Greece generally:—since nothing but

Spartan interference restored the Macedonian kings to the sea-coast,

while the Olynthian confederacy, had it been allowed to expand,

might probably have confined them to the interior, and averted the

death-blow which came upon Grecian freedom in the next generation

from their hands.

The Lacedæmonians found some compensation for their reluctant

abandonment of Polydamas, in the pacific propositions from Athens

which liberated them from one of their chief enemies. But the peace

thus concluded was scarcely even brought to execution. Timotheus,

being ordered home from Korkyra, obeyed and set sail with his fleet.

He had serving along with him some exiles from Zakynthus; and as

he passed by that island in his homeward voyage, he disembarked

these exiles upon it, aiding them in establishing a fortified post.

Against this proceeding the Zakynthian government laid complaints

at Sparta, where it was so deeply resented, that redress having

been in vain demanded at Athens, the peace was at once broken off,

and war again declared. A Lacedæmonian squadron of twenty-five sail

was despatched to assist the Zakynthians,[303] while plans were

formed for the acquisition of the more important island of Korkyra.

The fleet of Timotheus having now been removed home, a malcontent

Korkyræan party formed a conspiracy to introduce the Lacedæmonians

as friends, and betray the island to them. A Lacedæmonian fleet of

twenty-two triremes accordingly sailed thither, under color of a

voyage to Sicily. But the Korkyræan government, having detected the

plot, refused to receive them, took precautions for defence, and sent

envoys to Athens to entreat assistance.

[303] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 3; Diodor. xv, 45.

The statements of Diodorus are not clear in themselves; besides

that on some points, though not in the main, they contradict

Xenophon. Diodorus states that those exiles whom Timotheus

brought back to Zakynthus, were the philo-Spartan leaders, who

had been recently expelled for their misrule under the empire of

Sparta. This statement must doubtless be incorrect. The exiles

whom Timotheus restored must have belonged to the anti-Spartan

party in the island.

But Diodorus appears to me to have got into confusion by

representing that universal and turbulent reaction against the

philo-Spartan oligarchies, which really did not take place until

after the battle of Leuktra—as if it had taken place some three

years earlier. The events recounted in Diodor. xv, 40, seem to me

to belong to a period _after_ the battle of Leuktra.

Diodorus also seems to have made a mistake in saying that the

Athenians sent _Ktesikles_ as auxiliary commander to _Zakynthus_

(xv, 46); whereas this very commander is announced by himself

in the next chapter (as well as by Xenophon, who calls him

_Stesikles_) as sent to _Korkyra_ (Hellen. v, 2, 10).

I conceive Diodorus to have inadvertently mentioned this Athenian

expedition under Stesiklês or Ktesiklês, twice over; once as sent

to Zakynthus—then again, as sent to _Korkyra_. The latter is the

truth. No Athenian expedition at all appears on this occasion to

have gone to Zakynthus; for Xenophon enumerates the Zakynthians

among those who helped to fit out the fleet of Mnasippus (v, 2,

3).

On the other hand, I see no reason for calling in question the

reality of the two Lacedæmonian expeditions, in the last half of

374 B.C.—one under Aristokrates to Zakynthus, the other under

Alkidas to Korkyra—which Diodorus mentions (Diod. xv, 45, 46). It

is true that Xenophon does not notice either of them; but they

are noway inconsistent with the facts which he does state.

The Lacedæmonians now resolved to attack Korkyra openly, with

the full naval force of their confederacy. By the joint efforts

of Sparta, Corinth, Leukas, Ambrakia, Elis, Zakynthus, Achaia,

Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermionê, and Halieis,—strengthened by pecuniary

payments from other confederates, who preferred commuting their

obligation to serve beyond sea,—a fleet of sixty triremes and a body

of one thousand five hundred mercenary hoplites were assembled;

besides some Lacedæmonians, probably Helots or Neodamodes.[304]

At the same time, application was sent to Dionysius the Syracusan

despot, for his coöperation against Korkyra, on the ground that the

connection of that island with Athens had proved once, and might

prove again, dangerous to his city.

[304] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 3, 5, 16: compare v, 2, 21—about the

commutation of personal service for money.

Diodorus (xv, 47) agrees with Xenophon in the main about the

expedition of Mnasippus, though differing on several other

contemporary points.

It was in the spring of 373 B.C. that this force proceeded against

Korkyra, under the command of the Lacedæmonian Mnasippus; who, having

driven in the Korkyræan fleet with the loss of four triremes, landed

on the island, gained a victory, and confined the inhabitants within

the walls of the city. He next carried his ravages round the adjacent

lands, which were found in the highest state of cultivation, and

full of the richest produce; fields admirably tilled,—vineyards in

surpassing condition,—with splendid farm-buildings, well-appointed

wine-cellars, and abundance of cattle as well as laboring-slaves.

The invading soldiers, while enriching themselves by depredations

on cattle and slaves, became so pampered with the plentiful stock

around, that they refused to drink any wine that was not of the first

quality.[305] Such is the picture given by Xenophon, an unfriendly

witness, of the democratical Korkyra, in respect of its lauded

economy, at the time when it was invaded by Mnasippus; a picture not

less memorable than that presented by Thucydides (in the speech of

Archidamus), of the flourishing agriculture surrounding democratical

Athens, at the moment when the hand of the Peloponnesian devastator

was first felt there in 431 B.C.[306]

[305] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 6. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀπέβη (when Mnasippus

landed), ἐκράτει τε τῆς γῆς καὶ ἐδῄου ἐξειργασμένην μὲν παγκαλῶς

καὶ πεφυτευμένην τὴν χώραν, μεγαλοπρεπεῖς δὲ οἰκήσεις καὶ

οἰνῶνας κατεσκευασμένους ἔχουσαν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγρῶν· ὥστ’ ἔφασαν τοὺς

στρατιώτας εἰς τοῦτο τρυφῆς ἐλθεῖν, ὥστ’ οὐκ ἐθέλειν πίνειν,

εἰ μὴ ἀνθοσμίας εἴη. Καὶ ἀνδράποδα δὲ καὶ βοσκήματα πάμπολλα

ἡλίσκετο ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν.

Οἶνον, implied in the antecedent word οἰνῶνας, is understood

after πίνειν.

[306] Thucyd. i, 82. (Speech of Archidamus) μὴ γὰρ ἄλλο τι

νομίσητε τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν (of the Athenians) ἢ ὅμηρον ἔχειν, καὶ οὐχ

ἧσσον ὅσῳ ἄμεινον ἐξείργασται.

Compare the earlier portion of the same speech (c. 80), and the

second speech of the same Archidamus (ii, 11).

To the same purpose Thucydides speaks, respecting the properties

of the wealthy men established throughout the area of

Attica,—οἱ δὲ δυνατοὶ καλὰ κτήματα κατὰ τὴν χώραν οἰκοδομίαις

τε καὶ πολυτελέσι κατασκευαῖς ἀπολωλεκότες (_i. e._ by the

invasion)—Thucyd. ii, 65.

With such plentiful quarters for his soldiers, Mnasippus encamped

on a hill near the city walls, cutting off those within from

supplies out of the country, while he at the same time blocked

up the harbor with his fleet. The Korkyræans soon began to be in

want. Yet they seemed to have no chance of safety except through

aid from the Athenians; to whom they had sent envoys with pressing

entreaties,[307] and who had now reason to regret their hasty consent

(in the preceding year) to summon home the fleet of Timotheus from

the island. However, Timotheus was again appointed admiral of a new

fleet to be sent thither; while a division of six hundred peltasts,

under Stesiklês, was directed to be despatched by the quickest

route, to meet the immediate necessities of the Korkyræans, during

the delays unavoidable in the preparation of the main fleet and its

circumnavigation of Peloponnesus. These peltasts were conveyed by

land across Thessaly and Epirus, to the coast opposite Korkyra; upon

which island they were enabled to land through the intervention of

Alketas solicited by the Athenians. They were fortunate enough to

get into the town; where they not only brought the news that a large

Athenian fleet might be speedily expected, but also contributed much

to the defence. Without such encouragement and aid, the Korkyræans

would hardly have held out; for the famine within the walls increased

daily; and at length became so severe, that many of the citizens

deserted, and numbers of slaves were thrust out. Mnasippus refused to

receive them, making public proclamation that every one who deserted

should be sold into slavery; and since deserters nevertheless

continued to come, he caused them to be scourged back to the

city-gates. As for the unfortunate slaves, being neither received by

him, nor re-admitted within, many perished outside of the gates from

sheer hunger.[308]

[307] The envoys from Korkyra to Athens (mentioned by Xenophon,

v, 2, 9) would probably cross Epirus and Thessaly, through the

aid of Alketas. This would be a much quicker way for them than

the circumnavigation of Peloponnesus: and it would suggest

the same way for the detachment of Stesiklês presently to be

mentioned.

[308] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 15.

Such spectacles of misery portended so visibly the approaching hour

of surrender, that the besieging army became careless, and the

general insolent. Though his military chest was well-filled, through

the numerous pecuniary payments which he had received from allies in

commutation of personal service,—yet he had dismissed several of his

mercenaries without pay, and had kept all of them unpaid for the last

two months. His present temper made him not only more harsh towards

his own soldiers,[309] but also less vigilant in the conduct of the

siege. Accordingly the besieged, detecting from their watch-towers

the negligence of the guards, chose a favorable opportunity and

made a vigorous sally. Mnasippus, on seeing his outposts driven in,

armed himself and hastened forward with the Lacedæmonians around him

to sustain them; giving orders to the officers of the mercenaries

to bring their men forward also. But these officers replied, that

they could not answer for the obedience of soldiers without pay;

upon which Mnasippus was so incensed, that he struck them with his

stick and with the shaft of his spear. Such an insult inflamed still

farther the existing discontent. Both officers and soldiers came to

the combat discouraged and heartless, while the Athenian peltasts and

the Korkyræan hoplites, rushing out of several gates at once, pressed

their attack with desperate energy. Mnasippus, after displaying

great personal valor, was at length slain, and all his troops, being

completely routed, fled back to the fortified camp in which their

stores were preserved. Even this too might have been taken, and the

whole armament destroyed, had the besieged attacked it at once. But

they were astonished at their own success. Mistaking the numerous

camp-followers for soldiers in reserve, they retired back to the city.

[309] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 16.

Ὁ δ’ αὖ Μνάσιππος ὁρῶν ταῦτα, ἐνόμιζέ τε ὅσον οὐκ ἤδη ἔχειν τὴν

πόλιν, καὶ περὶ τοὺς μισθοφόρους, ἐκαινούργει, καὶ τοὺς μέν τινας

αὐτῶν ἀπομίσθους ἐπεποιήκει, τοῖς δ’ οὖσι καὶ δυοῖν ἤδη μηνοῖν

ὤφειλε τὸν μισθὸν, οὐκ ἀπορῶν, ὡς ἐλέγετο, χρημάτων, etc.

Their victory was however so complete, as to reopen easy

communication with the country, to procure sufficient temporary

supplies, and to afford a certainty of holding out until

reinforcement from Athens should arrive. Such reinforcement, indeed,

was already on its way, and had been announced as approaching to

Hypermenês (second under the deceased Mnasippus), who had now

succeeded to the command. Terrified at the news, he hastened to sail

round from his station,—which he had occupied with the fleet to

block up the harbor,—to the fortified camp. Here he first put the

slaves, as well as the property, aboard of his transports, and sent

them away; remaining himself to defend the camp with the soldiers

and marines,—but remaining only a short time, and then taking these

latter also aboard the triremes. He thus completely evacuated the

island, making off for Leukas. But such had been the hurry,—and so

great the terror lest the Athenian fleet should arrive,—that much

corn and wine, many slaves, and even many sick and wounded soldiers,

were left behind. To the victorious Korkyræans, these acquisitions

were not needed to enhance the value of a triumph which rescued them

from capture, slavery, or starvation.[310]

[310] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 18-26; Diodor. xv, 47.

The Athenian fleet had not only been tardy in arriving, so as to

incur much risk of finding the island already taken,—but when it

did come, it was commanded by Iphikrates, Chabrias, and the orator

Kallistratus,[311]—not by Timotheus, whom the original vote of the

people had nominated. It appears that Timotheus,—who (in April

373 B.C.), when the Athenians first learned that the formidable

Lacedæmonian fleet had begun to attack Korkyra, had been directed to

proceed thither forthwith with a fleet of sixty triremes,—found a

difficulty in manning his ships at Athens, and therefore undertook

a preliminary cruise to procure both seamen and contributory funds,

from the maritime allies. His first act was to transport the six

hundred peltasts under Stesiklês to Thessaly, where he entered into

relations with Jason of Pheræ. He persuaded the latter to become

the ally of Athens, and to further the march of Stesiklês with

his division by land across Thessaly over the passes of Pindus, to

Epirus; where Alketas, who was at once the ally of Athens, and the

dependent of Jason, conveyed them by night across the strait from

Epirus to Korkyra. Having thus opened important connection with the

powerful Thessalian despot, and obtained from him a very seasonable

service, together (perhaps) with some seamen from Pagasæ to man his

fleet,—Timotheus proceeded onward to the ports of Macedonia, where he

also entered into relations with Amyntas, receiving from him signal

marks of private favor,—and then to Thrace as well as the neighboring

islands. His voyage procured for him valuable subsidies in money and

supplies of seamen, besides some new adhesions and deputies to the

Athenian confederacy.

[311] Xen. Hellen. vi. 2, 39.

This preliminary cruise of Timotheus, undertaken with the general

purpose of collecting means for the expedition to Korkyra, began

in the month of April or commencement of May 373 B.C.[312] On

departing, it appears, he had given orders to such of the allies

as were intended to form part of the expedition, to assemble at

Kalauria (an island off Trœzen, consecrated to Poseidon) where he

would himself come and take them up to proceed onward. Pursuant to

such order, several contingents mustered at this island,—among them

the Bœotians, who sent several triremes, though in the preceding

year it had been alleged against them that they contributed nothing

to sustain the naval exertions of Athens. But Timotheus stayed out a

long time. Reliance was placed upon him, and upon the money which he

was to bring home, for the pay of the fleet; and the unpaid triremes

accordingly fell into distress and disorganization at Kalauria,

awaiting his return.[313] In the mean time fresh news reached Athens

that Korkyra was much pressed; so that great indignation was felt

against the absent admiral, for employing in his present cruise

a precious interval essential to enable him to reach the island

in time. Iphikrates (who had recently come back from serving with

Pharnabazus, in an unavailing attempt to reconquer Egypt for the

Persian king) and the orator Kallistratus, were especially loud in

their accusations against him. And as the very salvation of Korkyra

required pressing haste, the Athenians cancelled the appointment of

Timotheus even during his absence,—naming Iphikrates, Kallistratus,

and Chabrias, to equip a fleet and go round to Korkyra without

delay.[314]

[312] The manner in which I have described the preliminary

cruise of Timotheus, will be found (I think) the only way of

uniting into one consistent narrative the scattered fragments of

information which we possess respecting his proceedings in this

year.

The date of his setting out from Athens is exactly determined by

Demosthenes, adv. Timoth. p. 1186—the month Munychion, in the

archonship of Sokratidês—April 373 B.C. Diodorus says that he

proceeded to Thrace, and that he acquired several new members for

the confederacy (xv, 47); Xenophon states that he sailed towards

the islands (Hellen. vi, 2, 12); two statements not directly the

same, yet not incompatible with each other. In his way to Thrace,

he would naturally pass up the Eubœan strait and along the coast

of Thessaly.

We know that Stesikles and his peltasts must have got to Korkyra,

not by sea circumnavigating Peloponnesus, but by land across

Thessaly and Epirus; a much quicker way. Xenophon tells us that

the Athenians “asked Alketas to help them to cross over from

the mainland of Epirus to the opposite island of Korkyra: and

that they were in consequence carried across by night,”—Ἀλκέτου

δὲ ἐδεήθησαν ~συνδιαβιβάσαι~ τούτους· καὶ οὗτοι μὲν ~νυκτὸς

διακομισθέντες~ που τῆς χώρας, εἰσῆλθον εἰς τὴν πόλιν.

Now these troops could not have got to Epirus without crossing

Thessaly; nor could they have crossed Thessaly without the

permission and escort of Jason. Moreover, Alketas himself was the

dependent of Jason, whose goodwill was therefore doubly necessary

(Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 7).

We farther know that in the year preceding (374 B.C.), Jason

was not yet in alliance with Athens, nor even inclined to

become so, though the Athenians were very anxious for it (Xen.

Hellen. vi, 1, 10). But in November 373 B.C., Jason (as well as

Alketas) appears as the established ally of Athens; not as then

becoming her ally for the first time, but as so completely an

established ally, that he comes to Athens for the express purpose

of being present at the trial of Timotheus and of deposing in his

favor—Ἀφικομένου γὰρ Ἀλκέτου καὶ Ἰάσονος ὡς τοῦτον (Timotheus)

ἐν τῷ Μαιμακτηριῶνι μηνὶ τῷ ἐπ’ Ἀστείου ἄρχοντος, ~ἐπὶ τὸν

ἀγῶνα τὸν τούτου, βοηθησόντων αὐτῷ~ καὶ καταγομένων εἰς τὴν

οἰκίαν τὴν ἐν Πειραιεῖ, etc. (Demosthen. adv. Timoth. c. 5, p.

1190). Again,—Αὐτὸν δὲ τοῦτον (Timotheus) ~ἐξαιτουμένων μὲν~

τῶν ἐπιτηδείων καὶ οἰκείων αὐτῷ ἁπάντων, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ~Ἀλκέτου

καὶ Ἰάσονος, συμμάχων ὄντων ὑμῖν~, μόλις μὲν ἐπείσθητε ἀφεῖναι

(Demosthen. ib. c, 3, p. 1187.) We see from hence, therefore,

that the first alliance between Jason and Athens had been

contracted in the early part of 373 B.C.; we see farther that it

had been contracted by Timotheus in his preliminary cruise, which

is the only reasonable way of explaining the strong interest felt

by Jason as well as by Alketas in the fate of Timotheus, inducing

them to take the remarkable step of coming to Athens to promote

his acquittal. It was Timotheus who had first made the alliance

of Athens with Alketas (Diodor. xv, 36; Cornel. Nepos, Timoth. c.

2), a year or two before.

Combining all the circumstances here stated, I infer with

confidence, that Timotheus, in his preliminary cruise, visited

Jason, contracted alliance between him and Athens, and prevailed

upon him to forward the division of Stesikles across Thessaly to

Epirus and Korkyra.

In this oration of Demosthenes, there are three or four exact

dates mentioned, which are a great aid to the understanding of

the historical events of the time. That oration is spoken by

Apollodorus, claiming from Timotheus the repayment of money lent

to him by Pasion the banker, father of Apollodorus; and the dates

specified are copied from entries made by Pasion at the time in

his commercial books (c. 1. p. 1186; c. 9. p. 1197).

[313] Demosthen. adv. Timoth. c. 3, p. 1188. ἄμισθον μὲν τὸ

στράτευμα καταλελύσθαι ἐν Καλαυρίᾳ, etc.—ibid. c. 10, p. 1199.

προσῆκε γὰρ τῷ μὲν Βοιωτίῳ ἄρχοντι παρὰ τούτου (Timotheus) τὴν

τροφὴν τοῖς ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶ παραλαμβάνειν· ~ἐκ γὰρ τῶν κοινῶν

συντάξεων ἡ μισθοφορία ἦν τῷ στρατεύματι· τὰ δὲ χρήματα σὺ~

(Timotheus) ~ἅπαντα ἐξέλεξας ἐκ τῶν συμμάχων~· καὶ σὲ ἔδει αὐτῶν

λόγον ἀποδοῦναι.

[314] Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 2, 12, 13, 39; Demosthen. adv. Timoth.

c. 3. p. 1188.

Before they could get ready, Timotheus returned; bringing several new

adhesions to the confederacy, with a flourishing account of general

success.[315] He went down to Kalauria to supply the deficiencies

of funds, and make up for the embarrassments which his absence had

occasioned. But he could not pay the Bœotian trierarchs without

borrowing money for the purpose on his own credit; for though the sum

brought home from his voyage was considerable, it would appear that

the demands upon him had been greater still. At first an accusation,

called for in consequence of the pronounced displeasure of the

public, was entered against him by Iphikrates and Kallistratus. But

as these two had been named joint admirals for the expedition to

Korkyra, which admitted of no delay,—his trial was postponed until

the autumn; a postponement advantageous to the accused, and doubtless

seconded by his friends.[316]

[315] Diodor. xv, 47.

[316] I collect what is here stated from Demosthen. adv. Timoth.

c. 3. p. 1188; c. 10. p. 1199. It is there said that Timotheus

was about to sail home from Kalauria to take his trial; yet it

is certain that his trial did not take place until the month

Mæmakterion or November. Accordingly, the trial must have been

postponed, in consequence of the necessity for Iphikrates and

Kallistratus going away at once to preserve Korkyra.

Meanwhile Iphikrates adopted the most strenuous measures for

accelerating the equipment of his fleet. In the present temper of

the public, and in the known danger of Korkyra, he was allowed

(though perhaps Timotheus, a few weeks earlier, would not have

been allowed) not only to impress seamen in the port, but even to

coërce the trierarchs with severity,[317] and to employ all the

triremes reserved for the coast-guard of Attica, as well as the two

sacred triremes called Paralus and Salaminia. He thus completed a

fleet of seventy sail, promising to send back a large portion of it

directly, if matters took a favorable turn at Korkyra. Expecting to

find on the watch for him a Lacedæmonian fleet fully equal to his

own, he arranged his voyage so as to combine the maximum of speed

with training to his seamen, and with preparation for naval combat.

The larger sails of an ancient trireme were habitually taken out

of the ship previous to a battle, as being inconvenient aboard:

Iphikrates left such sails at Athens,—employed even the smaller sails

sparingly,—and kept his seamen constantly at the oar; which greatly

accelerated his progress, at the same time that it kept the men in

excellent training. Every day he had to stop, for meals and rest, on

an enemy’s shore; and these halts were conducted with such extreme

dexterity as well as precision, that the least possible time was

consumed, not enough for any local hostile force to get together. On

reaching Sphakteria, Iphikrates learnt for the first time the defeat

and death of Mnasippus. Yet not fully trusting the correctness of

his information, he still persevered both in his celerity and his

precautions, until he reached Kephallenia, where he first fully

satisfied himself that the danger of Korkyra was past. The excellent

management of Iphikrates throughout this expedition is spoken of in

terms of admiration by Xenophon.[318]

[317] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 14. Ὁ δὲ (Iphikrates) ἐπεὶ κατέστη

στρατηγὸς, μάλα ὀξέως τὰς ναῦς ἐπληροῦτο, καὶ τοὺς τριηράρχους

ἠνάγκαζε.

[318] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 27, 32.

Having no longer any fear of the Lacedæmonian fleet, the Athenian

commander probably now sent back the home-squadron of Attica which

he had been allowed to take, but which could ill be spared from

the defence of the coast.[319] After making himself master of some

of the Kephallenian cities, he then proceeded onward to Korkyra;

where the squadron of ten triremes from Syracuse was now on the

point of arriving; sent by Dionysius to aid the Lacedæmonians, but

as yet uninformed of their flight. Iphikrates, posting scouts on the

hills to give notice of their approach, set apart twenty triremes

to be ready for moving at the first signal. So excellent was his

discipline, (says Xenophon,) that “the moment the signal was made,

the ardor of all the crews was a fine thing to see; there was not a

man who did not hasten at a run to take his place aboard.”[320] The

ten Syracusan triremes, after their voyage across from the Iapygian

cape, had halted to rest their men on one of the northern points of

Korkyra; where they were found by Iphikrates and captured, with all

their crews and the admiral Anippus; one alone escaping, through the

strenuous efforts of her captain, the Rhodian Melanôpus. Iphikrates

returned in triumph, towing his nine prizes into the harbor of

Korkyra. The crews, being sold or ransomed, yielded to him a sum

of sixty talents; the admiral Anippus was retained in expectation

of a higher ransom, but slew himself shortly afterwards from

mortification.[321]

[319] Compare vi, 2, 14—with vi, 2, 39.

[320] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 34.

[321] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 35, 38; Diodor. xv, 47.

We find a story recounted by Diodorus (xvi, 57), that the

Athenians under Iphikrates captured, off Korkyra, some triremes

of Dionysius, carrying sacred ornaments to Delphi and Olympia.

They detained and appropriated the valuable cargo, of which

Dionysius afterwards loudly complained.

This story (if there be any truth in it) can hardly allude to

any other triremes than those under Anippus. Yet Xenophon would

probably have mentioned the story, if he had heard it; since

it presents the enemies of Sparta as committing sacrilege. And

whether the triremes were carrying sacred ornaments or not, it is

certain that they were coming to take part in the war, and were

therefore legitimate prizes.

Though the sum thus realized enabled Iphikrates for the time to pay

his men, yet the suicide of Anippus was a pecuniary disappointment

to him, and he soon began to need money. This consideration induced

him to consent to the return of his colleague Kallistratus; who,—an

orator by profession, and not on friendly terms with Iphikrates,—had

come out against his own consent. Iphikrates had himself singled

out both Kallistratus and Chabrias as his colleagues. He was

not indifferent to the value of their advice, nor did he fear

the criticisms, even of rivals, on what they really saw in his

proceedings. But he had accepted the command under hazardous

circumstances; not only from the insulting displacement of Timotheus,

and the provocation consequently given to a powerful party attached

to the son of Konon,—but also in great doubts whether he could

succeed in relieving Korkyra, in spite of the rigorous coërcion

which he applied to man his fleet. Had the island been taken and had

Iphikrates failed, he would have found himself exposed to severe

crimination, and multiplied enemies, at Athens. Perhaps Kallistratus

and Chabrias, if left at home, might in that case have been among

his assailants,—so that it was important to him to identify both of

them with his good or ill success, and to profit by the military

ability of the latter, as well as by the oratorical talent of the

former.[322] As the result of the expedition, however, was altogether

favorable, all such anxieties were removed. Iphikrates could well

afford to part with both his colleagues; and Kallistratus engaged,

that if permitted to go home, he would employ all his efforts to

keep the fleet well paid from the public treasury; or if this were

impracticable, that he would labor to procure peace.[323] So terrible

are the difficulties which the Grecian generals now experience in

procuring money from Athens, (or from other cities in whose service

they are acting,) for payment of their troops! Iphikrates suffered

the same embarrassment which Timotheus had experienced the year

before,—and which will be found yet more painfully felt as we advance

forward in the history. For the present, he subsisted his seamen

by finding work for them on the farms of the Korkyræans, where

there must doubtless have been ample necessity for repairs after

the devastations of Mnasippus, while he crossed over to Akarnania

with his peltasts and hoplites, and there obtained service with the

townships friendly to Athens against such others as were friendly to

Sparta; especially against the warlike inhabitants of the strong town

called Thyrieis.[324]

[322] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 39. The meaning of Xenophon here is not

very clear, nor is even the text perfect.

Ἐγὼ μὲν δὴ ταύτην τὴν στρατηγίαν τῶν Ἰφικράτους οὐχ ἥκιστα

ἐπαινῶ· ἔπειτα καὶ τὸ ~προσελέσθαι κελεῦσαι ἑαυτῷ~ (this shows

that Iphikrates himself singled them out) Καλλίστρατόν τε τὸν

δημήγορον, οὐ μάλα ἐπιτήδειον ὄντα, καὶ Χαβρίαν, μάλα στρατηγικὸν

νομιζόμενον. Εἴτε γὰρ φρονίμους αὐτοὺς ἡγούμενος εἶναι,

συμβούλους λαβεῖν ἐβούλετο, σῶφρόν μοι δοκεῖ διαπράξασθαι· ~εἴτε

ἀντιπάλους νομίζων~, οὕτω θρασέως (some words in the text seem to

be wanting) ... μήτε καταῤῥᾳθυμῶν μήτε καταμελῶν φαίνεσθαι μηδὲν,

μεγαλοφρονοῦντος ἐφ’ ἑαυτῷ τοῦτό μοι δοκεῖ ἀνδρὸς εἶναι.

I follow Dr. Thirlwall’s translation of οὐ μάλα ἐπιτήδειον, which

appears to me decidedly preferable. The word ἠφίει (vi, 3, 3)

shows that Kallistratus was an unwilling colleague.

[323] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 3. ὑποσχόμενος γὰρ Ἰφικράτει

(Kallistratus) ~εἰ αὐτὸν ἠφίει~, ἢ χρήματα πέμψειν τῷ ναυτικῷ, ἢ

εἰρήνην ποιήσειν, etc.

[324] Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 37, 38.

The happy result of the Korkyræan expedition, imparting universal

satisfaction at Athens, was not less beneficial to Timotheus than

to Iphikrates. It was in November, 373 B.C., that the former, as

well as his quæstor or military treasurer Antimachus, underwent each

his trial. Kallistratus, having returned home, pleaded against the

quæstor, perhaps against Timotheus also, as one of the accusers;[325]

though probably in a spirit of greater gentleness and moderation,

in consequence of his recent joint success and of the general good

temper prevalent in the city. And while the edge of the accusation

against Timotheus was thus blunted, the defence was strengthened

not merely by numerous citizen friends speaking in his favor with

increased confidence, but also by the unusual phenomenon of two

powerful foreign supporters. At the request of Timotheus, both

Alketas of Epirus, and Jason of Pheræ, came to Athens a little

before the trial, to appear as witnesses in his favor. They were

received and lodged by him in his house in the Hippodamian Agora,

the principal square of the Peiræus. And as he was then in some

embarrassment for want of money, he found it necessary to borrow

various articles of finery in order to do them honor,—clothes,

bedding, and two silver drinking bowls,—from Pasion, a wealthy

banker near at hand. These two important witnesses would depose to

the zealous service and estimable qualities of Timotheus; who had

inspired them with warm interest, and had been the means of bringing

them into alliance with Athens; an alliance, which they had sealed

at once by conveying Stesikles and his division across Thessaly and

Epirus to Korkyra. The minds of the dikastery would be powerfully

affected by seeing before them such a man as Jason of Pheræ, at

that moment the most powerful individual in Greece; and we are

not surprised to learn that Timotheus was acquitted. His treasurer

Antimachus, not tried by the same dikastery, and doubtless not so

powerfully befriended, was less fortunate. He was condemned to death,

and his property confiscated; the dikastery doubtless believing (on

what evidence we do not know) that he had been guilty of fraud in

dealing with the public money, which had caused serious injury at a

most important crisis. Under the circumstances of the case, he was

held responsible as treasurer, for the pecuniary department of the

money-levying command confided to Timotheus by the people.

[325] Demosthen. cont. Timoth. c. 9, p. 1197, 1198.

As to the military conduct, for which Timotheus himself would be

personally accountable, we can only remark that having been invested

with the command for the special purpose of relieving the besieged

Korkyra, he appears to have devoted an unreasonable length of time

to his own self-originated cruise elsewhere; though such cruise was

in itself beneficial to Athens; insomuch that if Korkyra had really

been taken, the people would have had good reason for imputing the

misfortune to his delay.[326] And although he was now acquitted, his

reputation suffered so much by the whole affair, that in the ensuing

spring he was glad to accept an invitation of the Persian satraps,

who offered him the command of the Grecian mercenaries in their

service for the Egyptian war; the same command from which Iphikrates

had retired a little time before.[327]

[326] The narrative here given of the events of 373 B.C., so far

as they concern Timotheus and Iphikrates, appears to me the only

way of satisfying the exigencies of the case, and following the

statements of Xenophon and Demosthenes.

Schneider in his note, indeed, implies, and Rehdantz (Vitæ

Iphicratis, etc. p. 86) contends, that Iphikrates did not take

command of the fleet, nor depart from Athens, until _after_ the

trial of Timotheus. There are some expressions in the oration of

Demosthenes, which might seem to countenance this supposition;

but it will be found hardly admissible, if we attentively study

the series of facts.

1. Mnasippus arrived with his armament at Korkyra, and began the

siege, either before April, or at the first opening of April, 373

B.C. For his arrival there, and the good condition of his fleet,

was known at Athens _before_ Timotheus received his appointment

as admiral of the fleet for the relief of the island (Xen.

Hellen. vi, 2, 10, 11, 12).

2. Timotheus sailed from Peiræus on this appointed voyage, in

April 373 B.C.

3. Timotheus was tried at Athens in November 373 B.C.; Alketas

and Jason being then present, as allies of Athens and witnesses

in his favor.

Now, if the truth were, that Iphikrates did not depart from

Athens with his fleet until after the trial of Timotheus in

November, we must suppose that the siege of Korkyra by Mnasippus

lasted seven months, and the cruise of Timotheus nearly five

months. Both the one and the other are altogether improbable. The

Athenians would never have permitted Korkyra to incur so terrible

a chance of capture, simply in order to wait for the trial of

Timotheus. Xenophon does not expressly say how long the siege of

Korkyra lasted; but from his expressions about the mercenaries of

Mnasippus (that already pay was owing to them for _as much as two

months_,—καὶ δυοῖν ~ἤδη~ μηνοῖν—vi, 2, 16), we should infer that

it could hardly have lasted more than three months in all. Let

us say, that it lasted four months; the siege would then be over

in August, and we know that the fleet of Iphikrates arrived just

after the siege was concluded.

Besides, is it credible, that Timotheus—named as admiral for the

express purpose of relieving Korkyra, and knowing that Mnasippus

was already besieging the place with a formidable fleet—would

have spent so long a time as _five_ months in his preliminary

cruise?

I presume Timotheus to have stayed out in this cruise about _two_

months; and even this length of time would be quite sufficient to

raise strong displeasure against him at Athens, when the danger

and privations of Korkyra were made known as hourly increasing.

At the time when Timotheus came back to Athens, he found all

this displeasure actually afloat against him, excited in part

by the strong censures of Iphikrates and Kallistratus (Dem.

cont. Timoth. p. 1187. c. 3). The adverse orations in the public

assembly, besides inflaming the wrath of the Athenians against

him, caused a vote to be passed deposing him from his command to

Korkyra, and nominating in his place Iphikrates, with Chabrias

and Kallistratus. Probably those who proposed this vote would at

the same time give notice that they intended to prefer a judicial

accusation against Timotheus for breach or neglect of duty. But

it would be the interest of all parties to postpone _actual

trial_ until the fate of Korkyra should be determined, for which

purpose the saving of time would be precious. Already too much

time had been lost, and Iphikrates was well aware that his whole

chance of success depended on celerity; while Timotheus and his

friends would look upon postponement as an additional chance

of softening the public displeasure, besides enabling them to

obtain the attendance of Jason and Alketas. Still, though trial

was postponed, Timotheus was from this moment under impeachment.

The oration composed by Demosthenes therefore (delivered by

Apollodorus as plaintiff, several years afterwards),—though

speaking loosely, and not distinguishing the angry speeches

against Timotheus _in the public assembly_ (in June 373 B.C.,

or thereabouts, whereby his deposition was obtained), from the

accusing speeches against him at his actual trial in November

373 B.C., _before the dikastery_—is nevertheless not incorrect

in saying,—ἐπειδὴ δ’ ἀπεχειροτονήθη μὲν ὑφ’ ὑμῶν στρατηγὸς

διὰ τὸ μὴ περιπλεῦσαι Πελοπόννησον, ἐπὶ ~κρίσει δὲ παρεδέδοτο

εἰς τὸν δῆμον~, αἰτίας τῆς μεγίστης τυχὼν (c. 3, p. 1187)—and

again respecting his coming from Kalauria to Athens—μέλλων

τοίνυν καταπλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν κρίσιν, ἐν Καλαυρίᾳ δανείζεται, etc.

(p. 1188, 1189.) That Timotheus had been handed over to the

people for trial—that he was sailing back from Kalauria _for

his trial_—might well be asserted respecting his position in

the month of June, though his trial did not actually take place

until November. I think it cannot be doubted that the triremes at

Kalauria would form a part of that fleet which actually went to

Korkyra under Iphikrates; not waiting to go thither until after

the trial of Timotheus in November, but departing as soon as

Iphikrates could get ready, probably about July 373 B.C.

Rehdantz argues that if Iphikrates departed with the fleet in

July, he must have returned to Athens in November to the trial

of Timotheus, which is contrary to Xenophon’s affirmation that

he remained in the Ionian sea until 371 B.C. But if we look

attentively at the oration of Demosthenes, we shall see that

there is no certain ground for affirming Iphikrates to have

been present in Athens in November, during the actual trial of

Timotheus. The phrases in p. 1187—ἐφειστήκει δ’ αὐτῷ Καλλίστρατος

καὶ Ἰφικράτης ... οὕτω δὲ διέθεσαν ὑμᾶς κατηγοροῦντες τούτου

αὐτοί τε καὶ οἱ συναγορεύοντες αὐτοῖς, etc., may be well

explained, so far as Iphikrates is concerned, by supposing them

to allude to those pronounced censures in the public assembly

whereby the vote of deposition against Timotheus was obtained,

and whereby the general indignation against him was first

excited. I therefore see no reason for affirming that Iphikrates

was actually present at the trial of Timotheus in November. But

Kallistratus was really present at the trial (see c. 9. p. 1197,

1198); which consists well enough with the statement of Xenophon,

that this orator obtained permission from Iphikrates to leave

him at Korkyra and come back to Athens (vi, 3, 3). Kallistratus

directed his accusation mainly against Antimachus, the treasurer

of Timotheus. And it appears to me that under the circumstances

of the case, Iphikrates, having carried his point of superseding

Timotheus in the command and gaining an important success at

Korkyra—might be well-pleased to be dispensed from the obligation

of formally accusing him before the dikastery, in opposition to

Jason and Alketas, as well as to a powerful body of Athenian

friends.

Diodorus (xv, 47) makes a statement quite different from

Xenophon. He says that Timotheus was at first deposed from

his command, but afterwards forgiven and re-appointed by the

people (jointly with Iphikrates) in consequence of the great

accession of force which he had procured in his preliminary

cruise. Accordingly the fleet, one hundred and thirty triremes

in number, was despatched to Korkyra under the joint command

of Iphikrates and Timotheus. Diodorus makes no mention of the

trial of Timotheus. This account is evidently quite distinct

from that of Xenophon, which latter is on all grounds to be

preferred, especially as its main points are in conformity with

the Demosthenic oration.

[327] Demosth. cont. Timoth. c. 6. p. 1191; c. 8. p. 1194.

We see from another passage of the same oration, that the

creditors of Timotheus reckoned upon his making a large sum

of money in the Persian service (c. 1, p. 1185). This farther

illustrates what I have said in a previous note, about the

motives of the distinguished Athenian officers to take service in

foreign parts away from Athens.

That admiral, whose naval force had been reinforced by a large

number of Korkyræan triremes, was committing without opposition

incursions against Akarnania, and the western coast of Peloponnesus;

insomuch that the expelled Messenians, in their distant exile at

Hesperides in Libya, began to conceive hopes of being restored by

Athens to Naupaktus, which they had occupied under her protection

during the Peloponnesian war.[328] And while the Athenians were

thus masters at sea both east and west of Peloponnesus,[329] Sparta

and her confederates, discouraged by the ruinous failure of their

expedition against Korkyra in the preceding year, appear to have

remained inactive. With such mental predispositions, they were

powerfully affected by religious alarm arising from certain frightful

earthquakes and inundations with which Peloponnesus was visited

during this year, and which were regarded as marks of the wrath of

the god Poseidon. More of these formidable visitations occurred this

year in Peloponnesus than had ever before been known; especially one,

the worst of all, whereby the two towns of Helikê and Bura in Achaia

were destroyed, together with a large portion of their population.

Ten Lacedæmonian triremes, which happened to be moored on this shore

on the night when the calamity occurred, were destroyed by the rush

of the waters.[330]

[328] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 38; Pausanias, iv, 26, 3.

[329] See a curious testimony to this fact in Demosthen. cont.

Neæram, c. 12, p. 1357.

[330] Diodor. xi, 48, 49; Pausan. vii, 25; Ælian. Hist. Animal.

xi, 19.

Kallisthenes seems to have described at large, with appropriate

religious comments, numerous physical portents which occurred

about this time (see Kallisthen. Fragm. 8, ed. Didot).

Under these depressing circumstances, the Lacedæmonians had recourse

to the same manœuvre which had so well served their purpose fifteen

years before, in 388-387 B.C. They sent Antalkidas again as envoy

to Persia, to entreat both pecuniary aid,[331] and a fresh Persian

intervention enforcing anew the peace which bore his name; which

peace had now been infringed (according to Lacedæmonian construction)

by the reconstitution of the Bœotian confederacy under Thebes as

president. And it appears that in the course of the autumn or

winter, Persian envoys actually did come to Greece, requiring that

the belligerents should all desist from war, and wind up their

dissensions on the principles of the peace of Antalkidas.[332] The

Persian satraps, at this time renewing their efforts against Egypt,

were anxious for the cessation of hostilities in Greece, as a means

of enlarging their numbers of Grecian mercenaries; of which troops

Timotheus had left Athens a few months before to take the command.

[331] This second mission of Antalkidas is sufficiently verified

by an indirect allusion of Xenophon (vi, 3, 12). His known

philo-Laconian sentiments sufficiently explain why he avoids

directly mentioning it.

[332] Diodor. xv, 50.

Diodorus had stated (a few chapters before, xv, 38) that Persian

envoys had also come into Greece a little before the peace of 374

B.C., and had been the originators of that previous peace. But

this appears to me one of the cases (not a few altogether in his

history) in which he repeats himself, or gives the same event

twice over under analogous circumstances. The intervention of the

Persian envoys bears much more suitably on the period immediately

preceding the peace of 371 B.C., than upon that which preceded

the peace of 374 B.C., when, in point of fact, no peace was ever

fully executed.

Dionysius of Halikarnassus also (Judic. de Lysiâ, p. 479)

represents the king of Persia as a party to the peace sworn by

Athens and Sparta in 371 B.C.

Apart, however, from this prospect of Persian intervention, which

doubtless was not without effect,—Athens herself was becoming more

and more disposed towards peace. That common fear and hatred of the

Lacedæmonians, which had brought her into alliance with Thebes in 378

B.C., was now no longer predominant. She was actually at the head

of a considerable maritime confederacy; and this she could hardly

hope to increase by continuing the war, since the Lacedæmonian naval

power had already been humbled. Moreover, she found the expense of

warlike operations very burdensome, nowise defrayed either by the

contributions of her allies or by the results of victory. The orator

Kallistratus,—who had promised either to procure remittances from

Athens to Iphikrates, or to recommend the conclusion of peace,—was

obliged to confine himself to the latter alternative, and contributed

much to promote the pacific dispositions of his countrymen.[333]

[333] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 3.

Moreover, the Athenians had become more and more alienated from

Thebes. The ancient antipathy between these two neighbors had for

a time been overlaid by common fear of Sparta. But as soon as

Thebes had reëstablished her authority in Bœotia, the jealousies

of Athens again began to arise. In 374 B.C., she had concluded a

peace with the Spartans, without the concurrence of Thebes; which

peace was broken almost as soon as made, by the Spartans themselves,

in consequence of the proceedings of Timotheus at Zakynthus. The

Phokians,—against whom, as having been active allies of Sparta in her

invasions of Bœotia, Thebes was now making war,—had also been ancient

friends of Athens, who sympathized with their sufferings.[334]

Moreover, the Thebans on their side probably resented the unpaid and

destitute condition in which their seamen had been left by Timotheus

at Kalauria, during the expedition for the relief of Korkyra in the

preceding year;[335] an expedition of which Athens alone reaped

both the glory and the advantage. Though they remained members of

the confederacy, sending deputies to the congress at Athens, the

unfriendly spirit on both sides continued on the increase, and was

farther exasperated by their violent proceeding against Platæa in the

first half of 372 B.C.

[334] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 1.

[335] Demosthen. cont. Timoth. p. 1188, s. 17.

During the last three or four years, Platæa, like the other towns of

Bœotia, had been again brought into the confederacy under Thebes.

Reëstablished by Sparta after the peace of Antalkidas as a so-called

autonomous town, it had been garrisoned by her as a post against

Thebes, and was no longer able to maintain a real autonomy after

the Spartans had been excluded from Bœotia in 376 B.C. While other

Bœotian cities were glad to find themselves emancipated from their

philo-Laconian oligarchies and rejoined to the federation under

Thebes, Platæa,—as well as Thespiæ,—submitted to the union only by

constraint; awaiting any favorable opportunity for breaking off,

either by means of Sparta or of Athens. Aware probably of the growing

coldness between the Athenians and Thebans, the Platæans were

secretly trying to persuade Athens to accept and occupy their town,

annexing Platæa to Attica;[336] a project hazardous both to Thebes

and Athens, since it would place them at open war with each other,

while neither was yet at peace with Sparta.

[336] Diodor. xv, 46. I do not know from whom Diodorus copied

this statement; but it seems extremely reasonable.

This intrigue, coming to the knowledge of the Thebans, determined

them to strike a decisive blow. Their presidency, over more than one

of the minor Bœotian cities, had always been ungentle, suitable to

the roughness of their dispositions. Towards Platæa, especially, they

not only bore an ancient antipathy, but regarded the reëstablished

town as little better than a Lacedæmonian encroachment, abstracting

from themselves a portion of territory which had become Theban, by

prescriptive enjoyment lasting for forty years from the surrender

of Platæa in 427 B.C. As it would have been to them a loss as

well as embarrassment, if Athens should resolve to close with the

tender of Platæa,—they forestalled the contingency by seizing the

town for themselves. Since the reconquest of Bœotia by Thebes, the

Platæans had come again, though reluctantly, under the ancient

constitution of Bœotia; they were living at peace with Thebes,

acknowledging her rights as president of the federation, and having

their own rights as members guaranteed in return by her, probably

under positive engagement,—that is, their security, their territory,

and their qualified autonomy, subject to the federal restrictions

and obligations. But though thus at peace with Thebes,[337] the

Platæans knew well what was her real sentiment towards them,

and their own towards her. If we are to believe, what seems very

probable, that they were secretly negotiating with Athens to help

them in breaking off from the federation,—the consciousness of

such an intrigue tended still farther to keep them in anxiety and

suspicion. Accordingly, being apprehensive of some aggression from

Thebes, they kept themselves habitually on their guard. But their

vigilance was somewhat relaxed and most of them went out of the city

to their farms in the country, on the days, well known beforehand,

when the public assemblies in Thebes were held. Of this relaxation

the Bœotarch Neokles took advantage.[338] He conducted a Theban armed

force, immediately from the assembly, by a circuitous route through

Hysiæ to Platæa; which town he found deserted by most of its male

adults, and unable to make resistance. The Platæans,—dispersed in the

fields, finding their walls, their wives, and their families, all in

possession of the victor,—were under the necessity of accepting the

terms proposed to them. They were allowed to depart in safety, and to

carry away all their movable property; but their town was destroyed,

and its territory again annexed to Thebes. The unhappy fugitives

were constrained for the second time to seek refuge at Athens, where

they were again kindly received, and restored to the same qualified

right of citizenship as they had enjoyed prior to the peace of

Antalkidas.[339]

[337] This seems to me what is meant by the Platæan speaker in

Isokrates, when he complains more than once that Platæa had

been taken by the Thebans in time of peace,—εἰρήνης οὔσης. The

speaker, in protesting against the injustice of the Thebans,

appeals to two guarantees which they have violated; for the

purpose of his argument, however, the two are not clearly

distinguished, but run together into one. The first guarantee

was, the peace of Antalkidas, under which Platæa had been

restored, and to which Thebes, Sparta, and Athens, were all

parties. The second guarantee, was that given by Thebes when she

conquered the Bœotian cities in 377-370 B.C., and reconstituted

the federation; whereby she ensured to the Platæans existence

as a city, with so much of autonomy as was consistent with the

obligations of a member of the Bœotian federation. When the

Platæan speaker accuses the Thebans of having violated “the oaths

and the agreement” (ὅρκους καὶ ξυνθήκας), he means the terms of

the peace of Antalkidas, subject to the limits afterwards imposed

by the submission of Platæa to the federal system of Bœotia. He

calls for the tutelary interference of Athens, as a party to the

peace of Antalkidas.

Dr. Thirlwall thinks (Hist. Gr. vol. v, ch. 38. p. 70-72) that

the Thebans were parties to the peace of 374 B.C. between Sparta

and Athens; that they accepted it, intending deliberately to

break it; and that under that peace, the Lacedæmonian harmosts

and garrisons were withdrawn from Thespiæ and other places in

Bœotia. I am unable to acquiesce in this view; which appears to

me negatived by Xenophon, and neither affirmed nor implied in

the Plataic discourse of Isokrates. In my opinion, there were

no Lacedæmonian harmosts in Bœotia (except at Orchomenus in the

north) in 374 B.C. Xenophon tells (Hellen. v, 4, 63; vi, 1, 1)

that the Thebans “were recovering the Bœotian cities—had subdued

the Bœotian cities”—in or before 375 B.C., so that they were

able to march out of Bœotia and invade Phokis; which implies the

expulsion or retirement of all the Lacedæmonian forces from the

southern part of Bœotia.

The reasoning in the Plataic discourse of Isokrates is not very

clear or discriminating; nor have we any right to expect that it

should be, in the pleading of a suffering and passionate man.

But the expression εἰρήνης οὔσης and εἰρήνη may always (in my

judgment) be explained, without referring it, as Dr. Thirlwall

does, to the peace of 374 B.C., or supposing Thebes to have been

a party to that peace.

[338] Pausanias, ix, 1, 3.

[339] Diodor. xv, 47.

Pausanias (ix, 1, 3) places this capture of Platæa in the third

year (counting the years from midsummer to midsummer) before

the battle of Leuktra; or in the year of the archon Asteius at

Athens; which seems to me the true date, though Mr. Clinton

supposes it (without ground, I think) to be contradicted by

Xenophon. The year of the archon Asteius reaches from midsummer

373 to 372 B.C. It is in the latter half of the year that I

suppose Platæa to have been taken.

It was not merely with Platæa, but also with Thespiæ, that Thebes

was now meddling. Mistrusting the dispositions of the Thespians, she

constrained them to demolish the fortifications of their town;[340]

as she had caused to be done fifty-two years before, after the

victory of Delium,[341] on suspicion of leanings favorable to Athens.

[340] I infer this from Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 21-38;

compare also sect. 10. The Platæan speaker accuses the Thebans

of having destroyed the walls of some Bœotian cities (over and

above what they had done to Platæa,) and I venture to apply this

to Thespiæ. Xenophon indeed states that the Thespians were at

this very period treated exactly like the Platæans; that is,

driven out of Bœotia, and their town destroyed; except that they

had not the same claim on Athens (Hellen. vi, 3, 1—ἀπόλιδας

γενομένους: compare also vi, 3, 5). Diodorus also (xv, 46)

speaks of the Thebans as having destroyed Thespiæ. But against

this, I gather, from the Plataic Oration of Isokrates, that the

Thespians were not in the same plight with the Platæans when

that oration was delivered; that is, they were not expelled

collectively out of Bœotia. Moreover, Pausanias also expressly

says that the Thespians were present in Bœotia at the time of

the battle of Leuktra, and that they were expelled shortly

afterwards. Pausanias at the same time gives a distinct story,

about the conduct of the Thespians, which it would not be

reasonable to reject (ix, 13, 3; ix, 14, 1). I believe therefore

that Xenophon has spoken inaccurately in saying that the

Thespians were ἀπόλιδες _before_ the battle of Leuktra. It is

quite possible that they might have sent supplications to Athens

(ἱκετεύοντας—Xen. Hell. vi, 3, 1) in consequence of the severe

mandate to demolish their walls.

[341] Thucyd. iv, 133.

Such proceedings on the part of the Thebans in Bœotia excited

strong emotion at Athens; where the Platæans not only appeared as

suppliants, with the tokens of misery conspicuously displayed, but

also laid their case pathetically before the assembly, and invoked

aid to regain their town, of which they had been just bereft. On a

question at once so touching and so full of political consequences,

many speeches were doubtless composed and delivered, one of which has

fortunately reached us; composed by Isokrates, and perhaps actually

delivered by a Platæan speaker before the public assembly. The hard

fate of this interesting little community is here impressively set

forth; including the bitterest reproaches, stated with not a little

of rhetorical exaggeration, against the multiplied wrongs done

by Thebes, as well towards Athens as towards Platæa. Much of his

invective is more vehement than conclusive. Thus when the orator

repeatedly claims for Platæa her title to autonomous existence,

under the guarantee of universal autonomy sworn at the peace of

Antalkidas,[342]—the Thebans would doubtless reply, that at the

time of that peace, Platæa was no longer in existence; but had

been extinct for forty years, and was only renovated afterwards by

the Lacedæmonians for their own political purposes. And the orator

intimates plainly, that the Thebans were noway ashamed of their

proceeding, but came to Athens to justify it, openly and avowedly;

moreover, several of the most distinguished Athenian speakers

espoused the same side.[343] That the Platæans had coöperated with

Sparta in her recent operations in Bœotia against both Athens and

Thebes, was an undeniable fact; which the orator himself can only

extenuate by saying that they acted under constraint from a present

Spartan force,—but which was cited on the opposite side as a proof

of their philo-Spartan dispositions, and of their readiness again

to join the common enemy as soon as he presented himself.[344]

The Thebans would accuse Platæa of subsequent treason to the

confederacy; and they even seem to have contended, that they had

rendered a positive service to the general Athenian confederacy

of which they were members,[345] by expelling the inhabitants of

Platæa and dismantling Thespiæ; both towns being not merely devoted

to Sparta, but also adjoining Kithæron, the frontier line whereby

a Spartan army would invade Bœotia. Both in the public assembly of

Athens, and in the general congress of the confederates at that

city, animated discussions were raised upon the whole subject;[346]

discussions, wherein, as it appears, Epaminondas, as the orator and

representative of Thebes, was found a competent advocate against

Kallistratus, the most distinguished speaker in Athens; sustaining

the Theban cause with an ability which greatly enhanced his growing

reputation.[347]

[342] Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 11, 13, 18, 42, 46, 47,

68.

[343] Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plat.) s. 3. Εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ Θηβαίους

ἑωρῶμεν ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου παρεσκευασμένους πείθειν ὑμᾶς ὡς οὐδὲν

εἰς ἡμᾶς ἐξημαρτήκασι, διὰ βραχέων ἂν ἐποιησάμεθα τοὺς λόγους·

ἐπειδὴ δ’ εἰς τοῦτ’ ἀτυχίας ἤλθομεν, ὥστε μὴ μόνον ἡμῖν εἶναι τὸν

ἀγῶνα πρὸς τούτους ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ῥητόρων τοὺς δυνατωτάτους, οὓς

ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμετέρων αὑτοῖς οὗτοι παρεσκευάσαντο συνηγόρους, etc.

Compare sect. 36.

[344] Isokr. Or. xiv, (Plat.) s. 12, 13, 14, 16, 28, 33, 48.

[345] Isokrat. Or. xiv, (Plat.) s. 23-27. λέγουσιν ὡς ὑπὲρ τοῦ

κοινοῦ τῶν συμμάχων ταῦτ’ ἔπραξαν—φασὶ τὸ Θηβαίους ἔχειν τὴν

ἡμετέραν, τοῦτο σύμφερον εἶναι τοῖς συμμάχοις, etc.

[346] Isokrat. Or. 14, (Plat.) s. 23, 24.

[347] Diodorus, (xv, 38) mentions the parliamentary conflict

between Epaminondas and _Kallistratus_, assigning it to the

period immediately antecedent to the abortive peace concluded

between Athens and Sparta three years before. I agree with

Wesseling (see his note _ad loc._) in thinking that these debates

more properly belong to the time immediately preceding the peace

of 371 B.C. Diodorus has made great confusion between the two;

sometimes repeating twice over the same antecedent phenomena,

as if they belonged to both,—sometimes assigning to one what

properly belongs to the other.

The altercation between Epaminondas and _Kallistratus_ (ἐν τῷ

κοινῷ συνεδρίῳ) seems to me more properly appertaining to debates

in the assembly of the confederacy at Athens,—rather than to

debates at Sparta, in the preliminary discussions for peace,

where the altercations between Epaminondas and _Agesilaus_

occurred.

But though the Thebans and their Athenian supporters, having all the

prudential arguments on their side, carried the point so that no step

was taken to restore the Platæans, nor any hostile declaration made

against those to whom they owed their expulsion,—yet the general

result of the debates, animated by keen sympathy with the Platæan

sufferers, tended decidedly to poison the good feeling, and loosen

the ties, between Athens and Thebes. This change showed itself

by an increased gravitation towards peace with Sparta; strongly

advocated by the orator Kallistratus, and now promoted not merely by

the announced Persian intervention, but by the heavy cost of war,

and the absence of all prospective gain from its continuance. The

resolution was at length taken,—first by Athens, and next, probably,

by the majority of the confederates assembled at Athens,—to make

propositions of peace to Sparta, where it was well known that similar

dispositions prevailed towards peace. Notice of this intention was

given to the Thebans, who were invited to send envoys thither also,

if they chose to become parties. In the spring of 371 B.C., at the

time when the members of the Lacedæmonian confederacy were assembled

at Sparta, both the Athenian and Theban envoys, and those from the

various members of the Athenian confederacy, arrived there. Among

the Athenian envoys, two at least,—Kallias (the hereditary daduch or

torchbearer of the Eleusinian ceremonies) and Autoklês,—were men of

great family at Athens; and they were accompanied by Kallistratus the

orator.[348] From the Thebans, the only man of note was Epaminondas,

then one of the Bœotarchs.

[348] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 3.

It seems doubtful, from the language of Xenophon, whether

Kallistratus was one of the envoys appointed, or only a companion.

Of the debates which took place at this important congress, we

have very imperfect knowledge; and of the more private diplomatic

conversations, not less important than the debates, we have no

knowledge at all. Xenophon gives us a speech from each of the three

Athenians, and from no one else. That of Kallias, who announces

himself as hereditary proxenus of Sparta at Athens, is boastful

and empty, but eminently philo-Laconian in spirit;[349] that of

Autoklês is in the opposite tone, full of severe censure on the past

conduct of Sparta; that of Kallistratus, delivered after the other

two,—while the enemies of Sparta were elate, her friends humiliated,

and both parties silent from the fresh effect of the reproaches of

Autoklês,[350]—is framed in a spirit of conciliation; admitting

faults on both sides, but deprecating the continuance of war, as

injurious to both, and showing how much the joint interests of both

pointed towards peace.[351]

[349] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 4-6.

[350] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 7-10. Ταῦτ’ εἰπὼν, σιωπὴν μὲν παρὰ

πάντων ἐποίησεν (Autoklês), ἡδομένους δὲ τοὺς ἀχθομένους τοῖς

Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐποίησε.

[351] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 10-17.

This orator, representing the Athenian diplomacy of the time,

recognizes distinctly the peace of Antalkidas as the basis upon which

Athens was prepared to treat,—autonomy to each city, small as well

as great; and in this way, coinciding with the views of the Persian

king, he dismisses with indifference the menace that Antalkidas was

on his way back from Persia with money to aid the Lacedæmonians in

the war. It was not from fear of the Persian treasures (he urged),—as

the enemies of peace asserted,—that Athens sought peace.[352] Her

affairs were now so prosperous, both by sea and land, as to prove

that she only did so on consideration of the general evils of

prolonged war, and on a prudent abnegation of that rash confidence

which was always ready to contend for extreme stakes,[353] like a

gamester playing double or quits. The time had come for both Sparta

and Athens now to desist from hostilities. The former had the

strength on land, the latter was predominant at sea; so that each

could guard the other; while the reconciliation of the two would

produce peace throughout the Hellenic world, since in each separate

city, one of the two opposing local parties rested on Athens, the

other on Sparta.[354] But it was indispensably necessary that

Sparta should renounce that system of aggression (already pointedly

denounced by the Athenian, Autoklês) on which she had acted since

the peace of Antalkidas; a system, from which she had at last reaped

bitter fruits, since her unjust seizure of the Kadmeia had ended by

throwing into the arms of the Thebans all those Bœotian cities, whose

separate autonomy she had bent her whole policy to ensure.[355]

[352] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 12, 13.

[353] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 16.

[354] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 14. Καὶ γὰρ δὴ κατὰ γῆν μὲν τις ἂν,

ὑμῶν φίλων ὄντων, ἱκανὸς γένοιτο ἡμᾶς λυπῆσαι; κατὰ θάλαττάν γε

μὴν τις ἂν ὑμᾶς βλάψαι τι, ἡμῶν ὑμῖν ἐπιτηδείων ὄντων;

[355] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 11. Καὶ ὑμῖν δὲ ἔγωγε ὁρῶ διὰ τὰ

ἀγνωμόνως πραχθέντα ἔστιν ὅτε πολλὰ ἀντίτυπα γιγνόμενα· ὧν ἦν καὶ

ἡ καταληφθεῖσα ἐν Θήβαις Καδμεία· νῦν γοῦν, ὡς (?) ἐσπουδάσατε

αὐτονόμους τὰς πόλεις γίγνεσθαι, πᾶσαι πάλιν, ἐπεὶ ἠδικήθησαν οἱ

Θηβαῖοι, ἐπ’ ἐκείνοις γεγένηνται.

Two points stand out in this remarkable speech, which takes a

judicious measure of the actual position of affairs;—first, autonomy

to every city; and autonomy in the genuine sense, not construed and

enforced by the separate interests of Sparta, as it had been at the

peace of Antalkidas; next, the distribution of such preëminence or

headship, as was consistent with this universal autonomy, between

Sparta and Athens; the former on land, the latter at sea,—as the

means of ensuring tranquillity in Greece. That “autonomy perverted

to Lacedæmonian purposes,”—which Perikles had denounced before

the Peloponnesian war as the condition of Peloponnesus, and which

had been made the political canon of Greece by the peace of

Antalkidas,—was now at an end. On the other hand, Athens and Sparta

were to become mutual partners and guarantees; dividing the headship

of Greece by an ascertained line of demarcation, yet neither of them

interfering with the principle of universal autonomy. Thebes, and

her claim to the presidency of Bœotia, were thus to be set aside by

mutual consent.

It was upon this basis that the peace was concluded. The armaments

on both sides were to be disbanded; the harmosts and garrisons

everywhere withdrawn, in order that each city might enjoy full

autonomy. If any city should fail in observance of these conditions,

and continue in a career of force against any other, all were at

liberty to take arms for the support of the injured party; but no

one who did not feel disposed, was bound so to take arms. This last

stipulation exonerated the Lacedæmonian allies from one of their most

vexatious chains.

To the conditions here mentioned, all parties agreed; and on the

ensuing day the oaths were exchanged. Sparta took the oath for

herself and her allies; Athens took the oath for herself only; her

allies afterwards took it severally, each city for itself. Why such

difference was made, we are not told; for it would seem that the

principle of severance applied to both confederacies alike.

Next came the turn of the Thebans to swear; and here the fatal hitch

was disclosed. Epaminondas, the Theban envoy, insisted on taking the

oath, not for Thebes separately, but for Thebes as president of the

Bœotian federation, including all the Bœotian cities. The Spartan

authorities on the other hand, and Agesilaus as the foremost of all,

strenuously opposed him. They required that he should swear for

Thebes alone, leaving the Bœotian cities to take the oath each for

itself.

Already in the course of the preliminary debates, Epaminondas

had spoken out boldly against the ascendency of Sparta. While

most of the deputies stood overawed by her dignity, represented

by the energetic Agesilaus as spokesman,—he, like the Athenian

Autoklês, and with strong sympathy from many of the deputies

present, had proclaimed that nothing kept alive the war except her

unjust pretensions, and that no peace could be durable unless such

pretensions were put aside.[356] Accepting the conditions of peace

as finally determined, he presented himself to swear to them in the

name of the Bœotian federation. But Agesilaus, requiring that each

of the Bœotian cities should take the oath for itself, appealed to

those same principles of liberty which Epaminondas himself had just

invoked, and asked him whether each of the Bœotian cities had not as

good a title to autonomy as Thebes. Epaminondas might have replied

by asking, why Sparta had just been permitted to take the oath for

her allies as well as for herself. But he took a higher ground. He

contended that the presidency of Bœotia was held by Thebes on as

good a title as the sovereignty of Laconia by Sparta.[357] He would

remind the assembly that when Bœotia was first conquered and settled

by its present inhabitants, the other towns had all been planted out

from Thebes as their chief and mother-city; that the federal union of

all, administered by Bœotarchs chosen by and from all, with Thebes

as president, was coeval with the first settlement of the country;

that the separate autonomy of each was qualified by an established

institution, devolving on the Bœotarchs and councils sitting at

Thebes the management of the foreign relations of all jointly.

All this had been already pleaded by the Theban orator fifty-six

years earlier, before the five Spartan commissioners, assembled to

determine the fate of the captives after the surrender of Platæa;

when he required the condemnation of the Platæans as guilty of

treason to the ancestral institutions of Bœotia;[358] and the Spartan

commissioners had recognized the legitimacy of these institutions

by a sweeping sentence of death against the transgressors. Moreover,

at a time when the ascendency of Thebes over the Bœotian cities

had been greatly impaired by her anti-Hellenic coöperation with

the invading Persians, the Spartans themselves had assisted her

with all their power to reëstablish it, as a countervailing force

against Athens.[359] Epaminondas could show, that the presidency of

Thebes over the Bœotian cities was the keystone of the federation;

a right not only of immemorial antiquity, but pointedly recognized

and strenuously vindicated by the Spartans themselves. He could show

farther that it was as old, and as good, as their own right to govern

the Laconian townships; which latter was acquired and held (as one of

the best among their own warriors had boastfully proclaimed)[360] by

nothing but Spartan valor and the sharpness of the Spartan sword.

[356] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 27.

[357] Plutarch. Agesil. c. 28.

[358] Thucyd. iii, 61. ἡμῶν (the Thebans) κτισάντων Πλάταιαν

ὕστερον τῆς ἄλλης Βοιωτίας καὶ ἄλλα χωρία μετ’ αὐτῆς, ἃ

ξυμμίκτους ἀνθρώπους ἐξελάσαντες ἔσχομεν, οὐκ ἠξίουν οὗτοι (the

Platæans), ~ὥσπερ ἐτάχθη τὸ πρῶτον~, ἡγεμονεύεσθαι ὑφ’ ἡμῶν,

~ἔξω δὲ τῶν ἄλλων Βοιωτῶν παραβαίνοντες τὰ πάτρια~, ἐπειδὴ

προσηναγκάζοντο, προσεχώρησαν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, etc.

Again (c. 65) he says respecting the oligarchical Platæans who

admitted the Theban detachment when it came by night to surprise

Platæa,—εἰ δὲ ἄνδρες ὑμῶν οἱ πρῶτοι καὶ χρήμασι καὶ γένει,

βουλόμενοι τῆς μὲν ἔξω ξυμμαχίας ὑμᾶς παῦσαι, ~ἐς δὲ τὰ κοινὰ τῶν

πάντων Βοιωτῶν πάτρια καταστῆσαι~, ἐπεκαλέσαντο ἕκοντες, etc.

Again (c. 66), κατὰ τὰ πάντων Βοιωτῶν πάτρια, etc. Compare ii, 2.

[359] Diodor. xi, 81.

[360] Thucyd. iv, 126.

Brasidas, addressing his soldiers when serving in Macedonia, on

the approach of the Illyrians:—

Ἀγαθοῖς γὰρ εἶναι προσήκει ὑμῖν τὰ πολέμια, οὐ διὰ ξυμμάχων

παρουσίαν ἑκάστοτε, ἀλλὰ δι’ οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν, καὶ μηδὲν πλῆθος

πεφοβῆσθαι ἑτέρων· οἵ γε μηδὲ ἀπὸ πολιτειῶν τοιούτων ἥκετε, ἐν

αἷς οὐ πολλοὶ ὀλίγων ἄρχουσιν, ἀλλὰ πλειόνων μᾶλλον ἐλάσσους·

~οὐκ ἄλλῳ τινὶ κτησάμενοι τὴν δυναστείαν ἢ τῷ μαχόμενοι κρατεῖν~.

An emphatic speech of this tenor, delivered amidst the deputies

assembled at Sparta, and arraigning the Spartans not merely in their

supremacy over Greece, but even in their dominion at home,—was as it

were the shadow cast before, by coming events. It opened a question

such as no Greek had ever ventured to raise. It was a novelty

startling to all,—extravagant probably in the eyes of Kallistratus

and the Athenians,—but to the Spartans themselves, intolerably

poignant and insulting.[361] They had already a long account of

antipathy to clear off with Thebes; their own wrong-doing in seizing

the Kadmeia,—their subsequent humiliation in losing it and being

unable to recover it,—their recent short-comings and failures, in

the last seven years of war against Athens and Thebes jointly. To

aggravate this deep-seated train of hostile associations, their

pride was now wounded in an unforeseen point, the tenderest of all.

Agesilaus, full to overflowing of the national sentiment, which in

the mind of a Spartan passed for the first of virtues, was stung to

the quick. Had he been an Athenian orator like Kallistratus, his

wrath would have found vent in an animated harangue. But a king of

Sparta was anxious only to close these offensive discussions with

scornful abruptness, thus leaving to the presumptuous Theban no

middle ground between humble retraction and acknowledged hostility.

Indignantly starting from his seat, he said to Epaminondas,—“Speak

plainly,—will you, or will you not, leave to each of the Bœotian

cities its separate autonomy?” To which the other replied—“Will

_you_ leave each of the Laconian towns autonomous?” Without saying

another word, Agesilaus immediately caused the name of the Thebans

to be struck out of the roll, and proclaimed them excluded from the

treaty.[362]

[361] One may judge of the revolting effect produced by such

a proposition, before the battle of Leuktra,—by reading the

language which Isokrates puts into the mouth of the Spartan

prince Archidamus, five or six years after that battle,

protesting that all Spartan patriots ought to perish rather than

consent to the relinquishment of Messenia,—περὶ μὲν ἄλλων τινῶν

ἀμφισβητήσεις, ἐγίγνοντο, περὶ δὲ Μεσσήνης, οὔτε βασιλεὺς, οὐθ’

ἡ τῶν Ἀθηναίων πόλις, οὐδὲ πώποθ’ ἡμῖν ἐνεκάλεσεν ὡς ἀδίκως

κεκτημένοις αὐτήν (Isok. Arch. s. 32). In the spring of 371 B.C.,

what had once been Messenia, was only a portion of Laconia, which

no one thought of distinguishing from the other portions (see

Thucyd. iv, 3, 11).

[362] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 28; Pausanias, ix, 13, 1; compare

Diodor. xv, 51. Pausanias erroneously assigns the debate to the

congress preceding the peace of Antalkidas in 387 B.C.; at which

time Epaminondas was an unknown man.

Plutarch gives this interchange of brief questions, between

Agesilaus and Epaminondas, which is in substance the same as that

given by Pausanias, and has every appearance of being the truth.

But he introduces it in a very bold and abrupt way, such as

cannot be conformable to the reality. To raise a question about

the right of Sparta to govern Laconia, was a most daring novelty.

A courageous and patriotic Theban might venture upon it as a

retort against those Spartans who questioned the right of Thebes

to her presidency of Bœotia; but he would never do so without

assigning his reasons to justify an assertion so startling to a

large portion of his hearers. The reasons which I here ascribe to

Epaminondas are such as we know to have formed the Theban creed,

in reference to the Bœotian cities; such as were actually urged

by the Theban orator in 427 B.C., when the fate of the Platæan

captives was under discussion. After Epaminondas had once laid

out the reasons in support of his assertion, he might then, if

the same brief question were angrily put to him a second time,

meet it with another equally brief counter-question or retort. It

is this final interchange of thrusts which Plutarch has given,

omitting the arguments previously stated by Epaminondas, and

necessary to warrant the seeming paradox which he advances. We

must recollect that Epaminondas does not contend that Thebes was

entitled to _as much power_ in Bœotia as Sparta in Laconia. He

only contends that Bœotia, under the presidency of Thebes, was as

much an integral political aggregate, as Laconia under Sparta,—in

reference to the Grecian world.

Xenophon differs from Plutarch in his account of the conduct of

the Theban envoys. He does not mention Epaminondas at all, nor

any envoy by name; but he says that “the Thebans, having entered

their name among the cities which had taken the oaths, came on

the next day and requested, that the entry might be altered,

and that ‘_the Bœotians_’ might be substituted in place of _the

Thebans_, as having taken the oath. Agesilaus told them that he

could make no change; but he would strike their names out if they

chose, and he accordingly did strike them out” (vi, 3, 19). It

seems to me that this account is far less probable than that of

Plutarch, and bears every mark of being incorrect. Why should

such a man as Epaminondas (who doubtless was the envoy) consent

at first to waive the presidential pretensions of Thebes, and to

swear for her alone? If he did consent, why should he retract

the next day? Xenophon is anxious to make out Agesilaus to be as

much in the right as may be; since the fatal consequences of his

proceedings manifested themselves but too soon.

Such was the close of this memorable congress at Sparta in June,

371 B.C. Between the Spartans and Athenians, and their respective

allies, peace was sworn. But the Thebans were excluded, and their

deputies returned home (if we may believe Xenophon[363]) discouraged

and mournful. Yet such a man as Epaminondas must have been well

aware that neither his claims nor his arguments would be admitted by

Sparta. If therefore he was disappointed with the result, this must

be because he had counted upon, but did not obtain, support from the

Athenians or others.

[363] Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 3, 20.

The leaning of the Athenian deputies had been adverse rather than

favorable to Thebes throughout the congress. They were disinclined,

from their sympathies with the Platæans, to advocate the presidential

claims of Thebes, though on the whole it was the political interest

of Athens that the Bœotian federation should be maintained, as

a bulwark to herself against Sparta. Yet the relations of Athens

with Thebes, after the congress as before it, were still those of

friendship, nominal rather than sincere. It was only with Sparta, and

her allies, that Thebes was at war, without a single ally attached to

her. On the whole, Kallistratus and his colleagues had managed the

interests of Athens in this congress with great prudence and success.

They had disengaged her from the alliance with Thebes, which had been

dictated seven years before by common fear and dislike of Sparta,

but which had no longer any adequate motive to countervail the cost

of continuing the war; at the same time, the disengagement had been

accomplished without bad faith. The gains of Athens, during the last

seven years of war, had been considerable. She had acquired a great

naval power, and a body of maritime confederates; while her enemies

the Spartans had lost their naval power in the like proportion.

Athens was now the ascendent leader of maritime and insular

Greece,—while Sparta still continued to be the leading power on land,

but only on land; and a tacit partnership was now established between

the two, each recognizing the other in their respective halves of the

Hellenic hegemony.[364] Moreover, Athens had the prudence to draw her

stake, and quit the game, when at the maximum of her acquisitions,

without taking the risk of future contingencies.

[364] Diodor. xv, 38-82.

On both sides, the system of compulsory and indefeasable

confederacies was renounced; a renunciation which had already been

once sworn to, sixteen years before, at the peace of Antalkidas, but

treacherously perverted by Sparta in the execution. Under this new

engagement, the allies of Sparta or Athens ceased to constitute an

organized permanent body, voting by its majority, passing resolutions

permanently binding upon dissentients, arming the chief state with

more or less power of enforcement against all, and forbidding

voluntary secessions of individual members. They became a mere

uncemented aggregate of individuals, each acting for himself; taking

counsel together as long as they chose, and coöperating so far as

all were in harmony; but no one being bound by any decision of the

others, nor recognizing any right in the others to compel him even

to performance of what he had specially promised, if it became

irksome. By such change, therefore, both Athens and Sparta were

losers in power; yet the latter to a much greater extent than the

former, inasmuch as her reach of power over her allies had been more

comprehensive and stringent.

We here see the exact point upon which the requisition addressed

by Sparta to Thebes, and the controversy between Epaminondas and

Agesilaus, really turned. Agesilaus contended that the relation

between Thebes and the other Bœotian cities was the same as what

subsisted between Sparta and her allies; that accordingly, when

Sparta renounced the indefeasible and compulsory character of

her confederacy, and agreed to deal with each of its members as

a self-acting and independent unit, she was entitled to demand

that Thebes should do the same in reference to the Bœotian towns.

Epaminondas, on the contrary, denied the justice of this parallel.

He maintained that the proper subject of comparison to be taken, was

the relation of Sparta, not to her extra-Laconian allies, but to

the Laconian townships; that the federal union of the Bœotian towns

under Thebes was coeval with the Bœotian settlement, and among the

most ancient phenomena of Greece; that in reference to other states,

Bœotia, like Laconia or Attica, was the compound and organized

whole, of which each separate city was only a fraction; that other

Greeks had no more right to meddle with the internal constitution

of these fractions, and convert each of them into an integer,—than

to insist on separate independence for each of the townships of

Laconia. Epaminondas did not mean to contend that the power of Thebes

over the Bœotian cities was as complete and absolute in degree, as

that of Sparta over the Laconian townships; but merely that her

presidential power, and the federal system of which it formed a part,

were established, indefeasible, and beyond the interference of any

Hellenic convention,—quite as much as the internal government of

Sparta in Laconia.

Once already this question had been disputed between Sparta and

Thebes at the peace of Antalkidas; and already decided once by the

superior power of the former, extorting submission from the latter.

The last sixteen years had reversed the previous decision, and

enabled the Thebans to reconquer those presidential rights of which

the former peace had deprived them. Again, therefore, the question

stood for decision, with keener antipathy on both sides,—with

diminished power in Sparta,—but with increased force, increased

confidence, and a new leader whose inestimable worth was even yet

but half-known,—in Thebes. The Athenians,—friendly with both, yet

allies of neither,—suffered the dispute to be fought out without

interfering. How it was settled will appear in the next chapter.