Ἐλευθέριος,—Pausanias the victor of Platæa, offers to Zeus
Eleutherius a solemn sacrifice and thanksgiving immediately
after the battle, in the agora of the town (Thucyd. ii, 71). So
the Syracusans immediately after the expulsion of the Gelonian
dynasty (Diodor. xi, 72)—and Mæandrius at Samos (Herodot. iii,
142).
Three Athenian leaders stood prominent as commissioners in the
first organization of the confederacy, and in the dealings with
those numerous cities whose junction was to be won by amicable
inducement,—Chabrias, Timotheus son of Konon, and Kallistratus.[219]
[219] Diodor. xv, 29.
The first of the three is already known to the reader. He and
Iphikrates were the most distinguished warriors whom Athens numbered
among her citizens. But not having been engaged in any war, since
the peace of Antalkidas in 387 B.C., she had had no need of their
services; hence both of them had been absent from the city during
much of the last nine years, and Iphikrates seems still to have
been absent. At the time when that peace was concluded, Iphikrates
was serving in the Hellespont and Thrace, Chabrias with Evagoras
in Cyprus; each having been sent thither by Athens at the head of
a body of mercenary peltasts. Instead of dismissing their troops,
and returning to Athens as peaceful citizens, it was not less
agreeable to the military tastes of these generals, than conducive
to their importance and their profit, to keep together their bands,
and to take foreign service. Accordingly, Chabrias had continued
in service first in Cyprus, next with the native Egyptian king
Akoris. The Persians, against whom he served, found his hostility so
inconvenient, that Pharnabazus demanded of the Athenians to recall
him, on pain of the Great King’s displeasure; and requested at the
same time that Iphikrates might be sent to aid the Persian satraps
in organizing a great expedition against Egypt. The Athenians, to
whom the goodwill of Persia was now of peculiar importance, complied
on both points; recalled Chabrias, who thus became disposable for
the Athenian service,[220] and despatched Iphikrates to take command
along with the Persians.
[220] Diodor. xv, 29.
Iphikrates, since the peace of Antalkidas, had employed his peltasts
in the service of the kings of Thrace: first of Seuthes, near the
shores of the Propontis, whom he aided in the recovery of certain
lost dominions,—next of Kotys, whose favor he acquired, and whose
daughter he presently married.[221] Not only did he enjoy great
scope for warlike operations and plunder, among the “butter-eating
Thracians,”[222]—but he also acquired, as dowry, a large stock of
such produce as Thracian princes had at their disposal, together
with a boon even more important,—a seaport village not far from the
mouth of the Hebrus, called Drys, where he established a fortified
post, and got together a Grecian colony dependent on himself.[223]
Miltiades, Alkibiades, and other eminent Athenians had done the same
thing before him; though Xenophon had refused a similar proposition
when made to him by the earlier Seuthes.[224] Iphikrates thus became
a great man in Thrace, yet by no means abandoning his connection with
Athens, but making his position in each subservient to his importance
in the other. While he was in a situation to favor the projects of
Athenian citizens for mercantile and territorial acquisitions in the
Chersonese and other parts of Thrace,—he could also lend the aid of
Athenian naval and military art, not merely to princes in Thrace,
but to others even beyond those limits,—since we learn that Amyntas
king of Macedonia became so attached or indebted to him as to adopt
him for his son.[225] When sent by the Athenians to Persia, at the
request of Pharnabazus (about 378 B.C. apparently), Iphikrates had
fair ground for anticipating that a career yet more lucrative was
opening before him.[226]
[221] Cornel. Nepos, Iphicrates, c. 2; Chabrias, c. 2, 3.
[222] See an interesting Fragment (preserved by Athenæus, iv,
p. 131) of the comedy called _Protesilaus_—by the Athenian poet
Anaxandrides (Meineke, Comic. Græc. Frag. iii, p. 182). It
contains a curious description of the wedding of Iphikrates with
the daughter of Kotys in Thrace; enlivened by an abundant banquet
and copious draughts of wine given to crowds of Thracians in the
market-place:—
δειπνεῖν δ’ ~ἄνδρας βουτυροφάγας~
αὐχμηροκόμας μυριοπληθεῖς, etc.,
brazen vessels as large as wine vats, full of broth,—Kotys
himself girt round, and serving the broth in a golden basin,
then going about to taste all the bowls of wine and water ready
mixed, until he was himself the first man intoxicated. Iphikrates
brought from Athens several of the best players on the harp and
flute.
The distinction between the _butter_ eaten, or rubbed on the
skin, by the Thracians, and the _olive-oil_ habitually consumed
in Greece, deserves notice. The word αὐχμηροκόμας seems to
indicate the absence of those scented unguents which, at the
banquet of Greeks, would have been applied to the hair of the
guests, giving to it a shining gloss and moisture. It appears
that the Lacedæmonian women, however, sometimes anointed
themselves with butter, and not with oil; see Plutarch, adv.
Koloten, p. 1109 B.
The number of warlike stratagems in Thrace, ascribed to
Iphikrates by Polyænus and other Tactic writers, indicates that
his exploits there were renowned as well as long-continued.
[223] Theopomp. Fragm. 175, ed. Didot; Demosth. cont. Aristokrat.
p. 664.
[224] Xenoph. Anab. vii, 2, 38; vii, 5, 8; vii, 6, 43. Xen.
Hellen. i, 5, 17; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 36.
See also a striking passage (in Lysias Orat. xxviii, cont.
Ergokl. s. 5) about the advice given to Thrasybulus by a
discontented fellow-citizen, to seize Byzantium, marry the
daughter of Seuthes, and defy Athens.
[225] Æschines, Fals. Leg. c. 13. p. 249.
At what time this adoption took place, we cannot distinctly
make out; Amyntas died in 370 B.C., while from 378-371 B.C.,
Iphikrates seems to have been partly on service with the Persian
satraps, partly in command of the Athenian fleet in the Ionian
Sea (see Rehdantz, Vitæ Iphicratis, etc. ch. 4). Therefore, the
adoption took place at some time between 387-378 B.C.; perhaps
after the restoration of Amyntas to his maritime dominions by
the Lacedæmonian expedition against Olynthus—382-380 B.C.
Amyntas was so weak and insecure, from the Thessalians, and
other land-neighbors (see Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 657. s.
112), that it was much to his advantage to cultivate the favor
of a warlike Athenian established on the Thracian coast, like
Iphikrates.
[226] From these absences of men like Iphikrates and Chabrias,
a conclusion has been drawn severely condemning the Athenian
people. They were so envious and ill-tempered (it has been said),
that none of their generals could live with comfort at Athens;
all lived abroad as they could. Cornelius Nepos (Chabrias, c. 3)
makes the remark, borrowed originally from Theopompus (Fr. 117,
ed. Didot), and transcribed by many modern commentators as if
it were exact and literal truth—“Hoc Chabrias nuntio (i. e. on
being recalled from Egypt, in consequence of the remonstrance of
Pharnabazus) Athenas rediit neque ibi diutius est moratus quam
fuit necesse. Non enim libenter erat ante oculos civium suorum,
quod et vivebat laute, et indulgebat sibi liberalius, quam ut
invidiam vulgi posset effugere. Est enim hoc commune vitium in
magnis liberisque civitatibus, ut invidia gloriæ comes sit, et
libenter de his detrahant, quos eminere videant altius; neque
animo æquo pauperes alienam opulentium intuentur fortunam. Itaque
Chabrias, quoad ei licebat, plurimum aberat. Neque vero solus
ille aberat Athenis libenter, sed omnes fere principes fecerunt
idem, quod tantum se ab invidiâ putabant abfuturos, quantum a
conspectu suorum recessissent. Itaque Conon plurimum Cypri vixit,
Iphicrates in Thraciâ, Timotheus Lesbi, Chares in Sigeo.”
That the people of Athens, among other human frailties, had their
fair share of envy and jealousy, is not to be denied; but that
these attributes belonged to them in a marked or peculiar manner,
cannot (in my judgment) be shown by any evidence extant,—and most
assuredly is not shown by the evidence here alluded to.
“Chabrias was fond of a life of enjoyment and luxurious
indulgence.” If instead of being an Athenian, he had been a
Spartan, he would undoubtedly have been compelled to expatriate
in order to gratify this taste; for it was the express drift and
purpose of the Spartan discipline, not to equalize property,
but to equalize the habits, enjoyments, and personal toils,
of the rich and poor. This is a point which the admirers of
Lykurgus,—Xenophon and Plutarch,—attest not less clearly than
Thucydides, Plato, Aristotle, and others. If then it were
considered a proof of envy and ill-temper, to debar rich men
from spending their money in procuring enjoyments, we might
fairly consider the reproach as made out against Lykurgus and
Sparta. Not so against Athens. There was no city in Greece
where the means of luxurious and comfortable living were more
abundantly exhibited for sale, nor where a rich man was more
perfectly at liberty to purchase them. Of this the proofs are
everywhere to be found. Even the son of this very Chabrias,
Ktesippus, who inherited the appetite for enjoyment, without the
greater qualities of his father,—found the means of gratifying
his appetite so unfortunately easy at Athens, that he wasted
his whole substance in such expenses (Plutarch, Phokion, c. 7;
Athenæus, iv, p. 165). And Chares was even better liked at Athens
in consequence of his love of enjoyment and license,—if we are to
believe another Fragment (238) of the same Theopompus.
The allegation of Theopompus and Nepos, therefore, is neither
true as matter of fact, nor sufficient, if it had been true, to
sustain the hypothesis of a malignant Athenian public, with which
they connect it. Iphikrates and Chabrias did not stay away from
Athens because they loved enjoyments or feared the envy of their
countrymen; but because both of them were large gainers by doing
so, in importance, in profit, and in tastes. Both of them were
men πολεμικοὶ καὶ φιλοπόλεμοι ἐσχάτως (to use an expression of
Xenophon respecting the Lacedæmonian Klearchus—Anab. ii, 6, 1);
both of them loved war and had great abilities for war,—qualities
quite compatible with strong appetite for enjoyment; while
neither of them had either taste or talent for the civil routine
and debate of Athens when at peace. Besides, each of them was
commander of a body of peltasts, through whose means he could
obtain lucrative service as well as foreign distinction; so that
we can assign a sufficient reason why both of them preferred to
be absent from Athens during most part of the nine years that
the peace of Antalkidas continued. Afterwards, Iphikrates was
abroad three or four years, in service with the Persian satraps,
by order of the Athenians; Chabrias also went a long time
afterwards, again on foreign service, to Egypt, at the same time
when the Spartan king Agesilaus was there (yet without staying
long away, since we find him going out on command from Athens
to the Chersonese in 359-358 B.C.—Demosth. cont. Aristokr. p.
677, s. 204); but neither he nor Agesilaus, went there to escape
the mischief of envious countrymen. Demosthenes does not talk of
Iphikrates as being uncomfortable in Athens, or anxious to get
out of it; see Orat. cont. Meidiam, p. 535, s. 83.
Again, as to the case of Konon and his residence in Cyprus; it
is truly surprising to see this fact cited as an illustration of
Athenian jealousy or ill-temper. Konon went to Cyprus immediately
after the disaster of Ægospotami, and remained there, or remained
away from Athens, for eleven years (405-393 B.C.) until the
year after his victory at Knidus. It will be recollected that
he was one of the six Athenian generals who commanded the fleet
at Ægospotami. That disaster, while it brought irretrievable
ruin upon Athens, was at the same time such as to brand with
well-merited infamy the generals commanding. Konon was so far
less guilty than his colleagues, as he was in a condition to
escape with eight ships when the rest were captured. But he could
not expect, and plainly did not expect, to be able to show his
face again in Athens, unless he could redeem the disgrace by some
signal fresh service. He nobly paid this debt to his country,
by the victory of Knidus in 394 B.C.; and then came back the
year afterwards, to a grateful and honorable welcome at Athens.
About a year or more after this, he went out again as envoy to
Persia in the service of his country. He was there seized and
imprisoned by the satrap Tiribazus, but contrived to make his
escape, and died at Cyprus, as it would appear, about 390 B.C.
Nothing therefore can be more unfounded than the allegation of
Theopompus, “that Konon lived abroad at Cyprus, because he was
afraid of undeserved ill-temper from the public at Athens.” For
what time Timotheus may have lived at Lesbos, we have no means of
saying. But from the year 370 B.C. down to his death, we hear of
him so frequently elsewhere, in the service of his country, that
his residence cannot have been long.
Iphikrates being thus abroad, the Athenians joined with Chabrias, in
the mission and measures for organizing their new confederacy, two
other colleagues, of whom we now hear for the first time—Timotheus
son of Konon, and Kallistratus the most celebrated orator of
his time.[227] The abilities of Kallistratus were not military
at all; while Timotheus and Chabrias were men of distinguished
military merit. But in acquiring new allies and attracting deputies
to her proposed congress, Athens stood in need of persuasive
appeal, conciliatory dealing, and substantial fairness in all
her propositions, not less than of generalship. We are told that
Timotheus, doubtless as son of the liberator Konon, from the
recollections of the battle of Knidus—was especially successful in
procuring new adhesions; and probably Kallistratus,[228] going round
with him to the different islands, contributed by his eloquence
not a little to the same result. On their invitation, many cities
entered as confederates.[229] At this time (as in the earlier
confederacy of Delos) all who joined must have been unconstrained
members. And we may understand the motives of their junction, when
we read the picture drawn by Isokrates (in 380 B.C.) of the tyranny
of the Persians on the Asiatic mainland, threatening, to absorb the
neighboring islands. Not only was there now a new basis of imposing
force, presented by Athens and Thebes in union—but there was also
a wide-spread hatred of imperial Sparta, aggravated since her
perversion of the pretended boon of autonomy, promised by the peace
of Antalkidas; and the conjunction of these sentiments caused the
Athenian mission of invitation to be extremely successful. All the
cities in Eubœa (except Histiæa, at the north of the island)—as well
as Chios, Mitylênê, Byzantium, and Rhodes—the three former of whom
had continued favorably inclined to Athens ever since the peace of
Antalkidas,[230]—all entered into the confederacy. An Athenian fleet
under Chabrias, sailing among the Cyclades and the other islands of
the Ægean, aided in the expulsion of the Lacedæmonian harmosts,[231]
together with their devoted local oligarchies, wherever they still
subsisted; and all the cities thus liberated became equal members of
the newly-constituted congress at Athens. After a certain interval,
there came to be not less than seventy cities, many of them
separately powerful, which sent deputies to it;[232] an aggregate
sufficient to intimidate Sparta, and even to flatter Athens with the
hope of restoration to something like her former lustre.
[227] Æschines, Fals. Leg. c. 40, p. 283.
[228] The employment of the new word συντάξεις, instead
of the unpopular term φόρους, is expressly ascribed to
Kallistratus,—Harpokration in Voce.
[229] Isokrates gives the number twenty-four cities (Or. xv,
Permut. s. 120). So also Deinarchus cont. Demosthen. s. 15;
cont. Philokl. s. 17. The statement of Æschines, that Timotheus
brought seventy-five cities into the confederacy, appears large,
and must probably include all that that general either acquired
or captured (Æsch. Fals. Leg. c. 24, p. 263). Though I think
the number twenty-four probable enough, yet it is difficult
to identify what towns they were. For Isokrates, so far as he
particularizes, includes Samos, Sestos, and Krithôtê, which were
not acquired until many years afterwards,—in 366-365 B.C.
Neither of these orators distinguish between those cities which
Timotheus brought or persuaded to come into the confederacy, when
it was first formed (among which we may reckon Eubœa, or most
part of it—Plutarch, De Glor. Athen. p. 351 A.)—from those others
which he afterwards took by siege, like Samos.
[230] Isokrates, Or. xiv, Plataic. s. 30.
[231] Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plat.) s. 20. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὑφ’ ὑμῶν κατὰ
κράτος ἁλόντες εὐθὺς μὲν ἁρμοστοῦ καὶ δουλείας ἀπηλλάγησαν, νῦν
δὲ τοῦ συνεδρίου καὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας μετέχουσιν, etc.
The adverb of time here used indicates about 372 B.C., about a
year before the battle of Leuktra.
[232] Diodor. xv, 30.
The first votes both of Athens herself, and of the newly-assembled
congress, threatened war upon the largest scale. A resolution was
passed to equip twenty thousand hoplites, five hundred horsemen, and
two hundred triremes.[233] Probably the insular and Ionic deputies
promised each a certain contribution of money, but nothing beyond.
We do not, however, know how much,—nor how far the engagements,
large or small, were realized,—nor whether Athens was authorized to
enforce execution against defaulters,—or was in circumstances to act
upon such authority, if granted to her by the congress. It was in
this way (as the reader will recollect from my fifth volume) that
Athens had first rendered herself unpopular in the confederacy of
Delos,—by enforcing the resolutions of the confederate synod against
evasive or seceding members. It was in this way that what was at
first a voluntary association had ultimately slid into an empire
by constraint. Under the new circumstances of 378 B.C., we may
presume that the confederates, though ardent and full of promises
on first assembling at Athens, were even at the outset not exact,
and became afterwards still less exact, in performance; yet that
Athens was forced to be reserved in claiming, or in exercising,
the right of enforcement. To obtain a vote of contribution by the
majority of deputies present, was only the first step in the process;
to obtain punctual payment, when the Athenian fleet was sent round
for the purpose of collecting,—yet without incurring dangerous
unpopularity,—was the second step, but by far the most doubtful and
difficult.
[233] Diodor. xv, 29.
Polybius (ii, 62) states that the Athenians _sent out_ (not
merely, _voted_ to send out) ten thousand hoplites, and manned
one hundred triremes.
Both these authors treat the resolution as if it were taken by
the Athenians alone; but we must regard it in conjunction with
the newly-assembled synod of allies.
It must, however, be borne in mind that at this moment, when the
confederacy was first formed, both Athens and the other cities
came together from a spontaneous impulse of hearty mutuality and
coöperation. A few years afterwards, we shall find this changed;
Athens selfish, and the confederates reluctant.[234] Inflamed, as
well by their position of renovated headship, as by fresh animosity
against Sparta, the Athenians made important efforts of their own,
both financial and military. Equipping a fleet, which for the time
was superior in the Ægean, they ravaged the hostile territory of
Histiæa in Eubœa, and annexed to their confederacy the islands of
Peparêthus and Skiathus. They imposed upon themselves also a direct
property-tax; to what amount, however, we do not know.
[234] Xen. De Vectigal. v, 6. οὔκουν καὶ τότ’, ἐπεὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν
ἀπεσχόμεθα, πάλιν ~ὑπὸ τῶν νησιωτῶν ἑκόντων προστάται~ τοῦ
ναυτικοῦ ἐγενόμεθα;
In the early years of this confederacy, votive offerings of
wreaths or crowns, in token of gratitude to Athens, were decreed
by the Eubœans, as well as by the general body of allies. These
crowns were still to be seen thirty years afterwards at Athens,
with commemorative inscriptions (Demosthen. cont. Androtion. c.
21, p. 616; cont. Timokrat. c. 41, p. 756).
It was on the occasion of this tax that they introduced a great
change in the financial arrangements and constitution of the city;
a change conferring note upon the archonship of Nausinikus, (B.C.
378-377). The great body of substantial Athenian citizens as well as
metics were now classified anew for purposes of taxation. It will
be remembered that even from the time of Solon[235] the citizens of
Athens had been distributed into four classes,—Pentakosiomedimni,
Hippeis, Zeugitæ, Thêtes,—distinguished from each other by the
amount of their respective properties. Of these Solonian classes,
the fourth, or poorest, paid no direct taxes; while the three former
were taxed according to assessments representing a certain proportion
of their actual property. The taxable property of the richest (or
Pentakosiomedimni, including all at or above the minimum income of
five hundred medimni of corn per annum) was entered in the tax-book
at a sum equal to twelve times their income; that of the Hippeis
(comprising all who possessed between three hundred and five hundred
medimni of annual income) at ten times their income; that of the
Zeugitæ (or possessors of an annual income between two hundred and
three hundred medimni) at five times their income. A medimnus of
corn was counted as equivalent to a drachma; which permitted the
application of this same class-system to movable property as well
as to land. So that, when an actual property-tax (or _eisphora_)
was imposed, it operated as an equal or proportional tax, so far as
regarded all the members of the same class; but as a graduated or
progressive tax, upon all the members of the richer class as compared
with those of the poorer.
[235] For the description of the Solonian census, see Vol. III,
Ch. xi, p. 117, of this History.
The three Solonian property-classes above named appear to have
lasted, though probably not without modifications, down to the
close of the Peloponnesian war; and to have been in great part
preserved, after the renovation of the democracy in B.C. 403,
during the archonship of Eukleides.[236] Though eligibility to the
great offices of state had before that time ceased to be dependent
on pecuniary qualification, it was still necessary to possess some
means of distinguishing the wealthier citizens, not merely in case
of direct taxation being imposed, but also because the liability to
serve in liturgies or burdensome offices was consequent on a man’s
enrolment as possessor of more than a given minimum of property. It
seems, therefore, that the Solonian census, in its main principles
of classification and graduation, was retained. Each man’s property
being valued, he was ranged in one of three or more classes according
to its amount. For each of the classes, a fixed proportion of taxable
capital to each man’s property was assumed, and each was entered in
the schedule, not for his whole property, but for the sum of taxable
capital corresponding to his property, according to the proportion
assumed. In the first or richest class, the taxable capital bore a
greater ratio to the actual property than in the less rich; in the
second, a greater ratio than in the third. The sum of all these items
of taxable capital, in all the different classes, set opposite to
each man’s name in the schedule, constituted the aggregate census
of Attica; upon which all direct property-tax was imposed, in equal
proportion upon every man.
[236] This is M. Boeckh’s opinion, seemingly correct, as far
as can be made out on a subject very imperfectly known (Public
Economy of Athens, B, iv, ch. 5).
Respecting the previous modifications in the register of taxable
property, or the particulars of its distribution into classes, which
had been introduced in 403 B.C. at the archonship of Eukleides, we
have no information. Nor can we make out how large or how numerous
were the assessments of direct property-tax, imposed at Athens
between that archonship and the archonship of Nausinikus in 378
B.C. But at this latter epoch the register was again considerably
modified, at the moment when Athens was bracing herself up for
increased exertions. A new valuation was made of the property of
every man possessing property to the amount of twenty-five minæ
(or twenty-five hundred drachmæ) and upwards. Proceeding upon this
valuation, every one was entered in the schedule for a sum of taxable
capital equal to a given fraction of what he possessed. But this
fraction was different in each of the different classes. How many
classes there were, we do not certainly know; nor can we tell, except
in reference to the lowest class taxed, what sum was taken as the
minimum for any one of them. There could hardly have been less,
however, than three classes, and there may probably have been four.
But respecting the first or richest class, we know that each man was
entered in the schedule for a taxable capital equal to one-fifth of
his estimated property; and that possessors of fifteen talents were
included in it. The father of Demosthenes died in this year, and the
boy Demosthenes was returned by his guardians to the first class, as
possessor of fifteen talents; upon which his name was entered on the
schedule with a taxable capital of three talents set against him;
being one-fifth of his actual property. The taxable capital of the
second class was entered at a fraction less than one-fifth of their
actual property (probably enough, one-sixth, the same as all the
registered metics); that of the third, at a fraction still smaller;
of the fourth (if there was a fourth), even smaller than the third.
This last class descended down to the minimum of twenty-five minæ, or
twenty-five hundred drachmæ; below which no account was taken.[237]
[237] Demosthen. cont. Aphob. i, p. 815, 816; cont. Aphob. ii, p.
836; cont. Aphob. de Perjur. p. 862. Compare Boeckh, Publ. Econ.
Ath. iv, 7.
In the exposition which M. Boeckh gives of the new
property-schedule introduced under the archonship of Nausinikus,
he inclines to the hypothesis of four distinct Classes, thus
distributed (p. 671 of the new edition of his Staats-haushaltung
der Athener):—
1. The first class included all persons who possessed property to
the value of twelve talents and upwards. They were entered on the
schedule, each for one-fifth, or twenty per cent. of his property.
2. The second class comprised all who possessed property to
the amount of six talents, but below twelve talents. Each was
enrolled in the schedule, for the amount of sixteen per cent.
upon his property.
3. The third class included all whose possessions amounted to the
value of two talents, but did not reach six talents. Each was
entered in the schedule at the figure of twelve per cent. upon
his property.
4. The fourth class comprised all, from the minimum of
twenty-five minæ, but below the maximum of two talents. Each was
entered in the schedule for the amount of eight per cent. upon
his property.
This detail rests upon no positive proof; but it serves to
illustrate the principle of distribution, and of graduation, then
adopted.
Besides the taxable capitals of the citizens, thus graduated, the
schedule also included those of the metics or resident aliens; who
were each enrolled (without any difference of greater or smaller
property, above twenty-five minæ) at a taxable capital equal to
one-sixth of his actual property;[238] being a proportion less than
the richest class of citizens, and probably equal to the second
class in order of wealth. All these items summed up amounted to
five thousand seven hundred and fifty or six thousand talents,[239]
forming the aggregate schedule of taxable property; that is,
something near about six thousand talents. A property-tax was no part
of the regular ways and means of the state. It was imposed only on
special occasions; and whenever it was imposed, it was assessed upon
this schedule,—every man, rich or poor, being rated equally according
to his taxable capital as there entered. A property-tax of one per
cent. would thus produce sixty talents; two per cent., one hundred
and twenty talents, etc. It is highly probable that the exertions of
Athens during the archonship of Nausinikus, when this new schedule
was first prepared, may have caused a property-tax to be then
imposed, but we do not know to what amount.[240]
[238] Demosthen. cont. Androtion. p. 612, c. 17. τὸ ἑκτὸν μέρος
εἰσφέρειν μετὰ τῶν μετοίκων.
[239] Polybius states the former sum (ii, 62), Demosthenes the
latter (De Symmoriis, p. 183, c. 6). Boeckh however has shown,
that Polybius did not correctly conceive what the sum which he
stated really meant.
[240] I am obliged again, upon this point, to dissent from
M. Boeckh, who sets it down as positive matter of fact that
a property-tax of five per cent., amounting to three hundred
talents, was imposed and levied in the archonship of Nausinikus
(Publ. Econ. Ath. iv, 7, 8; p. 517-521, Eng. Transl.). The
evidence upon which this is asserted, is, a passage of
Demosthenes cont. Androtion. (p. 606. c. 14). Ὑμῖν ~παρὰ τὰς
εἰσφορὰς τὰς ἀπὸ Ναυσινίκου~, παρ’ ἴσως τάλαντα τριακόσια ἢ
μικρῷ πλείω, ἔλλειμμα τέτταρα καὶ δέκα ἐστὶ τάλαντα· ὧν ἑπτὰ
οὗτος (Androtion) εἰσέπραξεν. Now these words imply,—not that
a property-tax of about three hundred talents had been levied
or called for _during_ the archonship of Nausinikus, but—that
a total sum of three hundred talents, or thereabouts, had been
levied (or called for) by all the various property-taxes imposed
_from the archonship of Nausinikus down to the date of the
speech_. The oration was spoken about 355 B.C.; the archonship
of Nausinikus was in 378 B.C. What the speaker affirms,
therefore, is, that a sum of three hundred talents had been
levied or called for by all the various property-taxes imposed
between these two dates; and that the aggregate sum of arrears
due upon all of them, at the time when Androtion entered upon his
office, was fourteen talents.
Taylor, indeed, in his note, thinking that the sum of three
hundred talents is very small, as the aggregate of all
property-taxes imposed for twenty-three years, suggests that
it might be proper to read ~ἐπὶ~ Ναυσινίκου instead of ~ἀπὸ~
Ναυσινίκου; and I presume that M. Boeckh adopts that reading.
But it would be unsafe to found an historical assertion upon
such a change of text, even if the existing text were more
indefensible than it actually is. And surely the plural number
τὰς εἰσφορὰς proves that the orator has in view, not the single
property-tax imposed in the archonship of Nausinikus, but two
or more property-taxes, imposed at different times. Besides,
Androtion devoted himself to the collection of outstanding
arrears generally, in whatever year they might have accrued. He
would have no motive to single out those which had accrued in
the year 378 B.C.; moreover, those arrears would probably have
become confounded with others, long before 355 B.C. Demosthenes
selects the year of Nausinikus as his initial period, because it
was then that the new schedule and a new reckoning, began.
Along with this new schedule of taxable capital, a new distribution
of the citizens now took place into certain bodies called Symmories.
As far as we can make out, on a very obscure subject, it seems that
these Symmories were twenty in number, two to each tribe; that each
contained sixty citizens, thus making one thousand two hundred in
all; that these one thousand two hundred were the wealthiest citizens
of the schedule,—containing, perhaps, the two first out of the four
classes enrolled. Among these one thousand two hundred, however, the
three hundred wealthiest stood out as a separate body; thirty from
each tribe. These three hundred were the wealthiest men in the city,
and were called “the leaders or chiefs of the Symmories.” The three
hundred and the twelve hundred corresponded, speaking roughly, to
the old Solonian classes of Pentakosiomedimni and Hippeis; of which
latter class there had also been twelve hundred, at the beginning of
the Peloponnesian war.[241] The liturgies, or burdensome and costly
offices, were discharged principally by the Three Hundred, but partly
also by the Twelve Hundred. It would seem that the former was a body
essentially fluctuating, and that after a man had been in it for
some time, discharging the burdens belonging to it, the Stratêgi
or Generals suffered him to be mingled with the Twelve Hundred,
and promoted one of the latter body to take his place in the Three
Hundred. As between man and man, too, the Attic law always admitted
the process called Antidosis, or Exchange of Property. Any citizen
who believed himself to have been overcharged with costly liturgies,
and that another citizen, as rich or richer than himself, had not
borne his fair share,—might, if saddled with a new liturgy, require
the other to undertake it in his place; and in case of refusal, might
tender to him an exchange of properties, under an engagement that he
would undertake the new charge, if the property of the other were
made over to him.
[241] Respecting the Symmories, compare Boeckh,
Staats-haushaltung der Athener, iv, 9, 10; Schömann, Antiq. Jur.
Publ. Græcor. s. 78; Parreidt, De Symmoriis, p. 18 _seq._
It is to be observed, that besides the twelve hundred wealthiest
citizens who composed the Symmories, there were a more considerable
number of less wealthy citizens not included in them, yet still
liable to the property-tax; persons who possessed property from the
minimum of twenty-five minæ, up to some maximum that we do not know,
at which point the Symmories began,—and who corresponded, speaking
loosely, to the third class or Zeugitæ of the Solonian census.
The two Symmories of each tribe (comprising its one hundred and
twenty richest members) superintended the property-register of each
tribe, and collected the contributions due from its less wealthy
registered members. Occasionally, when the state required immediate
payment, the thirty richest men in each tribe (making up altogether
the three hundred) advanced the whole sum of tax chargeable upon
the tribe, having their legal remedy of enforcement against the
other members for the recovery of the sum chargeable upon each. The
richest citizens were thus both armed with rights and charged with
duties, such as had not belonged to them before the archonship of
Nausinikus. By their intervention (it was supposed) the schedule
would be kept nearer to the truth as respects the assessment on each
individual, while the sums actually imposed would be more immediately
forthcoming, than if the state directly interfered by officers of
its own. Soon after, the system of the Symmories was extended to the
trierarchy; a change which had not at first been contemplated. Each
Symmory had its chiefs, its curators, its assessors, acting under the
general presidency of the Stratêgi. Twenty-five years afterwards, we
also find Demosthenes (then about thirty years of age) recommending a
still more comprehensive application of the same principle, so that
men, money, ships, and all the means and forces of the state, might
thus be parcelled into distinct fractions, and consigned to distinct
Symmories, each with known duties of limited extent for the component
persons to perform, and each exposed not merely to legal process,
but also to loss of esteem, in the event of non-performance. It will
rather appear, however, that, in practice, the system of Symmories
came to be greatly abused, and to produce pernicious effects never
anticipated.
At present, however, I only notice this new financial and political
classification introduced in 378 B.C., as one evidence of the ardor
with which Athens embarked in her projected war against Sparta. The
feeling among her allies, the Thebans, was no less determined. The
government of Leontiades and the Spartan garrison had left behind
it so strong an antipathy, that the large majority of citizens,
embarking heartily in the revolution against them, lent themselves
to all the orders of Pelopidas and his colleagues; who, on their
part, had no other thought but to repel the common enemy. The Theban
government now became probably democratical in form; and still more
democratical in spirit, from the unanimous ardor pervading the
whole mass. Its military force was put under the best training; the
most fertile portion of the plain north of Thebes, from which the
chief subsistence of the city came, was surrounded by a ditch and
a palisade,[242] to repel the expected Spartan invasion; and the
memorable Sacred Band was now for the first time organized. This was
a brigade of three hundred hoplites, called the Lochus, or regiment
of the city, as being consecrated to the defence of the Kadmeia, or
acropolis.[243] It was put under constant arms and training, at the
public expense, like the Thousand at Argos, of whom mention was made
in my seventh volume.[244] It consisted of youthful citizens from the
best families, distinguished for their strength and courage amidst
the severe trials of the palæstra in Thebes, and was marshalled in
such manner, that each pair of neighboring soldiers were at the same
time intimate friends; so that the whole band were thus kept together
by ties which no dangers could sever. At first its destination, under
Gorgidas its commander (as we see by the select Three Hundred who
fought in 424 B.C. at the battle of Delium),[245] was to serve as
front rank men, for the general body of hoplites to follow. But from
a circumstance to be mentioned presently, it came to be employed by
Pelopidas and Epaminondas as a regiment by itself, and in a charge
was then found irresistible.[246]
[242] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 38.
[243] Plutarch. Pelopid. c. 18, 19.
[244] Hist. of Greece. Vol. VII, ch. lv, p. 11.
[245] Diodor. xii, 70.
These pairs of neighbors who fought side by side at Delium, were
called Heniochi and Parabatæ,—Charioteers and Side Companions; a
name borrowed from the analogy of chariot-fighting, as described
in the Iliad and probably in many of the lost epic poems; the
charioteer being himself an excellent warrior, though occupied
for the moment with other duties,—Diomedes and Sthenelus,
Pandarus and Æneas, Patroklus and Automedon, etc.
[246] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 18, 19.
Ὁ συνταχθεὶς ὑπὸ Ἐπαμινώνδου ἱερὸς λόχος (Hieronymus apud
Athenæum, xiii, p. 602 A.). There was a Carthaginian military
division which bore the same title, composed of chosen and
wealthy citizens, two thousand five hundred in number (Diodor.
xvi, 80).
We must remark that the Thebans had always been good soldiers, both
as hoplites and as cavalry. The existing enthusiasm, therefore, with
the more sustained training, only raised good soldiers into much
better. But Thebes was now blessed with another good fortune, such as
had never yet befallen her. She found among her citizens a leader of
the rarest excellence. It is now for the first time that Epaminondas,
the son of Polymnis, begins to stand out in the public life of
Greece. His family, poor rather than rich, was among the most ancient
in Thebes, belonging to those Gentes called Sparti, whose heroic
progenitors were said to have sprung from the dragon’s teeth sown
by Kadmus.[247] He seems to have been now of middle age; Pelopidas
was younger, and of a very rich family; yet the relations between
the two were those of equal and intimate friendship, tested in a day
of battle, wherein the two were ranged side by side as hoplites,
and where Epaminondas had saved the life of his wounded friend, at
the cost of several wounds, and the greatest possible danger, to
himself.[248]
[247] Pausan. viii, 11, 5.
Dikæarchus, only one generation afterwards, complained that
he could not find out the name of the mother of Epaminondas
(Plutarch, Agesil. c. 19).
[248] Plutarch, Pelop. c. 4; Pausan. ix, 13, 1. According to
Plutarch, Epaminondas had attained the age of forty years, before
he became publicly known (De Occult. Vivendo, p. 1129 C.).
Plutarch affirms that the battle (in which Pelopidas was
desperately wounded, and saved by Epaminondas) took place
at Mantinea, when they were fighting on the side of the
Lacedæmonians, under king Agesipolis, against the Arcadians; the
Thebans being at that time friends of Sparta, and having sent a
contingent to her aid.
I do not understand what battle Plutarch can here mean. The
Thebans were never so united with Sparta as to send any
contingent to her aid, after the capture of Athens (in 404 B.C.).
Most critics think that the war referred to by Plutarch, is, the
expedition conducted by Agesipolis against Mantinea, whereby the
city was broken up into villages—in 385 B.C.; see Mr. Clinton’s
Fasti Hellenici ad 385 B.C. But, in the first place, there cannot
have been any Theban contingent then assisting Agesipolis; for
Thebes was on terms unfriendly with Sparta,—and certainly was not
her ally. In the next place, there does not seem to have been any
battle, according to Xenophon’s account.
I therefore am disposed to question Plutarch’s account, as to
this alleged battle of Mantinea; though I think it probable that
Epaminondas may have saved the life of Pelopidas at some earlier
conflict, before the peace of Antalkidas.
Epaminondas had discharged, with punctuality, those military and
gymnastic duties which were incumbent on every Theban citizen.
But we are told that in the gymnasia he studied to acquire the
maximum of activity rather than of strength; the nimble movements
of a runner and wrestler,—not the heavy muscularity, purchased in
part by excessive nutriment, of the Bœotian pugilist.[249] He also
learned music, vocal and instrumental, and dancing; by which, in
those days, was meant, not simply the power of striking the lyre or
blowing the flute, but all that belonged to the graceful, expressive,
and emphatic management, either of the voice or of the body;
rhythmical pronunciation, exercised by repetition of the poets,—and
disciplined movements, for taking part in a choric festival with
becoming consonance amidst a crowd of citizen performers. Of such
gymnastic and musical training, the combination of which constituted
an accomplished Grecian citizen, the former predominated at Thebes,
the latter at Athens. Moreover, at Thebes the musical training
was based more upon the flute (for the construction of which,
excellent reeds grew near the Lake Kopaïs); at Athens more upon
the lyre, which admitted of vocal accompaniment by the player. The
Athenian Alkibiades[250] was heard to remark, when he threw away
his flute in disgust, that flute-playing was a fit occupation for
the Thebans, since they did not know how to speak; and in regard
to the countrymen of Pindar[251] generally, the remark was hardly
less true than contemptuous. On this capital point, Epaminondas
formed a splendid exception. Not only had he learnt the lyre[252]
as well as the flute from the best masters, but also, dissenting
from his brother Kapheisias and his friend Pelopidas, he manifested
from his earliest years an ardent intellectual impulse, which would
have been remarkable even in an Athenian. He sought with eagerness
the conversation of the philosophers within his reach, among whom
were the Theban Simmias and the Tarentine Spintharus, both of
them once companions of Sokrates; so that the stirring influence
of the Sokratic method would thus find its way, partially and at
second-hand, to the bosom of Epaminondas. As the relations between
Thebes and Athens, ever since the close of the Peloponnesian war, had
become more and more friendly, growing at length into alliance and
joint war against the Spartans,—we may reasonably presume that he
profited by teachers at the latter city as well as at the former. But
the person to whom he particularly devoted himself, and whom he not
only heard as a pupil, but tended almost as a son, during the close
of an aged life,—was a Tarentine exile, named Lysis; a member of the
Pythagorean brotherhood, who, from causes which we cannot make out,
had sought shelter at Thebes, and dwelt there until his death.[253]
With him, as well as with other philosophers, Epaminondas discussed
all the subjects of study and inquiry then afloat. By perseverance
in this course for some years, he not only acquired considerable
positive instruction, but also became practised in new and enlarged
intellectual combinations; and was, like Perikles,[254] emancipated
from that timorous interpretation of nature, which rendered so many
Grecian commanders the slaves of signs and omens. His patience as a
listener, and his indifference to showy talk on his own account, were
so remarkable, that Spintharus (the father of Aristoxenus), after
numerous conversations with him, affirmed that he had never met with
any one who understood more, or talked less.[255]
[249] Cornel. Nepos, Epamin. c. 2; Plutarch, Apophth. Reg. p. 192
D.; Aristophan. Acharn. 872.
Compare the citations in Athenæus, x, p. 417. The perfection of
form required in the runner was also different from that required
in the wrestler (Xenoph. Memor. iii, 8, 4; iii, 10, 6).
[250] Plutarch, Alkib. c. 2.
[251] Pindar, Olymp. vi, 90.
ἀρχαῖον ὄνειδος—Βοιώτιον ὗν, etc.
[252] Aristoxenus mentions the flute, Cicero and Cornelius Nepos
the lyre (Aristoxen. Fr. 60, ed. Didot, ap. Athenæ. iv, p. 184;
Cicero, Tusc. Disp. i, 2, 4; Cornel. Nepos, Epamin. c. 2).
[253] Aristoxenus, Frag. 11, ed. Didot; Plutarch, De Gen. Socr.
p. 583, Cicero, De Offic. i, 44, 155; Pausan. ix, 13, 1; Ælian,
V. H. iii, 17.
The statement (said to have been given by Aristoxenus, and copied
by Plutarch as well as by Jamblichus) that Lysis, who taught
Epaminondas, had been one of the persons actually present in
the synod of Pythagoreans at Kroton when Kylon burnt down the
house, and that he with another had been the only persons who
escaped—cannot be reconciled with chronology.
[254] Compare Diodor. xv, 52 with Plutarch, Perikles, c. 6, and
Plutarch, Demosthenes, c. 20.
[255] Plutarch, De Gen. Sokrat. p. 576 D. μετείληφε παιδείας
διαφόρου καὶ περιττῆς—(p. 585 D.) τὴν ἀρίστην τροφὴν ἐν
φιλοσοφίᾳ—(p. 592 F.) Σπίνθαρος ὁ Ταραντῖνος οὐκ ὀλίγον αὐτῷ
(Epaminondas) συνδιατρίψας ἐνταῦθα χρόνον, ἀεὶ δήπου λέγει,
μηδενί που τῶν καθ’ ἑαυτὸν ἀνθρώπων ἐντετευχέναι, μήτε πλείονα
γιγνώσκοντι μήτε ἐλάττονα φθεγγομένῳ. Compare Cornel. Nepos,
Epamin. c. 3—and Plutarch, De Audiend. c. 3, p. 39 F.
We may fairly presume that this judgment of Spintharus was
communicated by him to his son Aristoxenus, from whom Plutarch
copied it; and we know that Aristoxenus in his writings mentioned
other particulars respecting Epaminondas (Athenæus, iv, p.
184). We see thus that Plutarch had access to good sources of
information respecting the latter. And as he had composed a life
of Epaminondas (Plutarch, Agesil. c. 28), though unfortunately
it has not reached us, we may be confident that he had taken
some pains to collect materials for the purpose, which materials
would naturally be employed in his dramatic dialogue, “De Genio
Socratis.” This strengthens our confidence in the interesting
statements which that dialogue furnishes respecting the
character of Epaminondas; as well as in the incidental allusions
interspersed among Plutarch’s other writings.
Nor did such reserve proceed from any want of ready powers of
expression. On the contrary, the eloquence of Epaminondas, when
he entered upon his public career, was shown to be not merely
preëminent among Thebans, but effective even against the best
Athenian opponents.[256] But his disposition was essentially modest
and unambitious, combined with a strong intellectual curiosity
and a great capacity; a rare combination amidst a race usually
erring on the side of forwardness and self-esteem. Little moved by
personal ambition, and never cultivating popularity by unworthy
means, Epaminondas was still more indifferent on the score of
money. He remained in contented poverty to the end of his life,
not leaving enough to pay his funeral expenses, yet repudiating
not merely the corrupting propositions of foreigners, but also the
solicitous tenders of personal friends;[257] though we are told
that, when once serving the costly office of choregus, he permitted
his friend Pelopidas to bear a portion of the expense.[258] As
he thus stood exempt from two of the besetting infirmities which
most frequently misguided eminent Greek statesmen, so there was a
third characteristic not less estimable in his moral character;
the gentleness of his political antipathies,—his repugnance to
harsh treatment of conquered enemies,—and his refusal to mingle in
intestine bloodshed. If ever there were men whose conduct seemed
to justify unmeasured retaliation, it was Leontiades and his
fellow-traitors. They had opened the doors of the Kadmeia to the
Spartan Phœbidas, and had put to death the Theban leader Ismenias.
Yet Epaminondas disapproved of the scheme of Pelopidas and the
other exiles to assassinate them, and declined to take part in it;
partly on prudential grounds, but partly, also, on conscientious
scruples.[259] None of his virtues was found so difficult to imitate
by his subsequent admirers, as this mastery over the resentful and
vindictive passions.[260]
[256] Cornel. Nepos, Epaminond. c. 5; Plutarch, Præcept. Reip.
Gerend. p. 819 C. Cicero notices him as the only man with any
pretensions to oratorical talents, whom Thebes, Corinth, or Argos
had ever produced (Brutus, c. 13, 50).
[257] Plutarch (De Gen. Socr. p. 583, 584; Pelopid. c. 3; Fab.
Max. c. 27. Compar. Alcibiad. and Coriol. c. 4): Cornel. Nepos.
Epamin. c. 4.
[258] Plutarch, Aristeides, c. 1; Justin, vi, 8.
[259] Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. p. 576 F. Ἐπαμεινώνδας δὲ, μὴ
πείθων ὡς οἴεται βέλτιον εἶναι ταῦτα μὴ πράσσειν· εἰκότως
ἀντιτείνει πρὸς ἃ μὴ πέφυκε, μηδὲ δοκιμάζει, παρακαλούμενος.
... Ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ πείθει τοὺς πολλοὺς, ἀλλὰ ταύτην ὡρμήκαμεν τὴν
ὁδὸν, ἐᾷν αὐτὸν κελεύει φόνου καθαρὸν ὄντα καὶ ἀναίτιον ἐφεστᾶναι
τοῖς καιροῖς, μετὰ τοῦ δικαίου τῷ συμφέροντι προσοισόμενον.
Compare the same dialogue, p. 594 B.; and Cornelius Nepos,
Pelopidas, c. 4.
Isokrates makes a remark upon Evagoras of Salamis, which may
be well applied to Epaminondas; that the objectionable means,
without which the former could not have got possession of the
sceptre, were performed by others and not by him; while all the
meritorious and admirable functions of command were reserved for
Evagoras (Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 28).
[260] See the striking statements of Plutarch and Pausanias about
Philopœmen,—καίπερ Ἐπαμεινώνδου βουλόμενος εἶναι μάλιστα ζηλωτὴς,
τὸ δραστήριον καὶ συνετὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ ὑπὸ χρημάτων ἀπαθὲς ἰσχυρῶς
ἐμιμεῖτο, τῷ δὲ πράῳ καὶ βαθεῖ καὶ φιλανθρώπῳ παρὰ τὰς πολιτικὰς
διαφορὰς ἐμμένειν οὐ δυνάμενος, δι’ ὀργὴν καὶ φιλονεικίαν, μᾶλλον
ἐδόκει στρατιωτικῆς ἢ πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς οἰκεῖος εἶναι. To the like
purpose, Pausanias, viii, 49, 2; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 25:
Cornel. Nepos, Epamin. c. 3—“patiens admirandum in modum.”
Before Epaminondas could have full credit for these virtues, however,
it was necessary that he should give proof of the extraordinary
capacities for action with which they were combined, and that he
should achieve something to earn that exclamation of praise which
we shall find his enemy Agesilaus afterwards pronouncing, on seeing
him at the head of the invading Theban army near Sparta,—“Oh! thou
man of great deeds!”[261] In the year B.C. 379, when the Kadmeia
was emancipated, he was as yet undistinguished in public life,
and known only to Pelopidas with his other friends; among whom,
too, his unambitious and inquisitive disposition was a subject of
complaint as keeping him unduly in the background.[262] But the
unparalleled phenomena of that year supplied a spur which overruled
all backwardness, and smothered all rival inclinations. The Thebans,
having just recovered their city by an incredible turn of fortune,
found themselves exposed single-handed to the full attack of Sparta
and her extensive confederacy. Not even Athens had yet declared
in their favor, nor had they a single other ally. Under such
circumstances, Thebes could only be saved by the energy of all her
citizens,—the unambitious and philosophical as well as the rest. As
the necessities of the case required such simultaneous devotion, so
the electric shock of the recent revolution was sufficient to awaken
enthusiasm in minds much less patriotic than that of Epaminondas.
He was among the first to join the victorious exiles in arms, after
the contest had been transferred from the houses of Archias and
Leontiades to the open market-place; and he would probably have been
among the first to mount the walls of the Kadmeia, had the Spartan
harmost awaited an assault. Pelopidas being named Bœotarch, his
friend Epaminondas was naturally placed among the earliest and most
forward organizers of the necessary military resistance against the
common enemy; in which employment his capacities speedily became
manifest. Though at this moment almost an unknown man, he had
acquired, in B.C. 371, seven years afterwards, so much reputation
both as speaker and as general, that he was chosen as the expositor
of Theban policy at Sparta, and trusted with the conduct of the
battle of Leuktra, upon which the fate of Thebes hinged. Hence we
may fairly conclude, that the well-planned and successful system of
defence, together with the steady advance of Thebes against Sparta,
during the intermediate years, was felt to have been in the main his
work.[263]
[261] Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 32. Ὦ τοῦ μεγαλοπράγμονος ἀνθρώπου!
[262] Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. p. 576 E. Ἐπαμεινώνδας δὲ, Βοιωτῶν
ἁπάντων τῷ πεπαιδεῦσθαι πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀξιῶν διαφέρειν, ἀμβλὺς ἐστι
καὶ ἀπρόθυμος.
[263] Bauch, in his instructive biography of Epaminondas
(Epaminondas, und Thebens Kampf um die Hegemonie: Breslau, 1834,
p. 26), seems to conceive that Epaminondas was never employed
in any public official post by his countrymen, until the period
immediately preceding the battle of Leuktra. I cannot concur in
this opinion. It appears to me that he must have been previously
employed in such posts as enabled him to show his military
worth. For all the proceedings of 371 B.C. prove that in that
year he actually possessed a great and established reputation,
which must have been acquired by previous acts in a conspicuous
position; and as he had no great family position to start from,
his reputation was probably acquired only by slow degrees.
The silence of Xenophon proves nothing in contradiction of this
supposition; for he does not mention Epaminondas even at Leuktra.
The turn of politics at Athens which followed the acquittal of
Sphodrias was an unspeakable benefit to the Thebans, in seconding as
well as encouraging their defence; and the Spartans, not unmoved at
the new enemies raised up by their treatment of Sphodrias, thought
it necessary to make some efforts on their side. They organized on
a more systematic scale the military force of their confederacy,
and even took some conciliatory steps with the view of effacing
the odium of their past misrule.[264] The full force of their
confederacy,—including, as a striking mark of present Spartan power,
even the distant Olynthians,[265]—was placed in motion against
Thebes in the course of the summer under Agesilaus; who contrived,
by putting in sudden requisition a body of mercenaries acting in
the service of the Arcadian town Kleitor against its neighbor
the Arcadian Orchomenus, to make himself master of the passes of
Kithæron, before the Thebans and Athenians could have notice of his
passing the Lacedæmonian border.[266] Then crossing Kithæron into
Bœotia, he established his head-quarters at Thespiæ, a post already
under Spartan occupation. From thence he commenced his attacks
upon the Theban territory, which he found defended partly by a
considerable length of ditch and palisade—partly by the main force of
Thebes, assisted by a division of mixed Athenians and mercenaries,
sent from Athens under Chabrias. Keeping on their own side of the
palisade, the Thebans suddenly sent out their cavalry, and attacked
Agesilaus by surprise, occasioning some loss. Such sallies were
frequently repeated, until, by a rapid march at break of day, he
forced his way through an opening in the breastwork into their
inner country, which he laid waste nearly to the city walls.[267]
The Thebans and Athenians, though not offering him battle on equal
terms, nevertheless kept the field against him, taking care to hold
positions advantageous for defence. Agesilaus on his side did not
feel confident enough to attack them against such odds. Yet on one
occasion he had made up his mind to do so; and was marching up to
the charge, when he was daunted by the firm attitude and excellent
array of the troops of Chabrias. They had received orders to await
his approach, on a high and advantageous ground, without moving
until signal should be given; with their shields resting on the
knee, and their spears protended. So imposing was their appearance,
that Agesilaus called off his troops without daring to complete the
charge.[268] After a month or more of devastations on the lands of
Thebes, and a string of desultory skirmishes in which he seems to
have lost rather than gained, Agesilaus withdrew to Thespiæ; the
fortifications of which he strengthened, leaving Phœbidas with a
considerable force in occupation, and then leading back his army to
Peloponnesus.
[264] Diodor. xv, 31.
[265] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 54; Diodor. xv, 31.
[266] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 36-38.
[267] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 41.
[268] Diodor. xv, 32; Polyæn. ii, 1, 2; Cornel. Nepos, Chabrias,
c. 1,—“obnixo genu scuto,”—Demosthen. cont. Leptinem, p. 479.
The Athenian public having afterwards voted a statue to the honor
of Chabrias, he made choice of this attitude for the design
(Diodor. xv, 33).
Phœbidas,—the former captor of the Kadmeia,—thus stationed at
Thespiæ, carried on vigorous warfare against Thebes; partly with his
own Spartan division, partly with the Thespian hoplites, who promised
him unshrinking support. His incursions soon brought on reprisals
from the Thebans; who invaded Thespiæ, but were repulsed by Phœbidas
with the loss of all their plunder. In the pursuit, however, hurrying
incautiously forward, he was slain by a sudden turn of the Theban
cavalry;[269] upon which all his troops fled, chased by the Thebans
to the very gates of Thespiæ. Though the Spartans, in consequence of
this misfortune, despatched by sea another general and division to
replace Phœbidas, the cause of the Thebans was greatly strengthened
by their recent victory. They pushed their success not only against
Thespiæ, but against the other Bœotian cities, still held by local
oligarchies in dependence on Sparta. At the same time, these
oligarchies were threatened by the growing strength of their own
popular or philo-Theban citizens, who crowded in considerable numbers
as exiles to Thebes.[270]
[269] Xen. Hellen. v, 4. 42-45; Diodor. xv, 33.
[270] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 46. Ἐκ δὲ τούτου πάλιν αὖ τὰ τῶν Θηβαίων
ἀνεζωπυρεῖτο, καὶ ἐστρατεύοντο εἰς Θεσπιὰς, καὶ εἰς τὰς ἄλλας
τὰς περιοικίδας πόλεις. Ὁ μέντοι δῆμος ἐξ αὐτῶν εἰς τὰς Θήβας
ἀπεχώρει· ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς πόλεσι δυναστεῖαι καθειστήκεσαν,
ὥσπερ ἐν Θήβαις· ὥστε καὶ οἱ ἐν ταύταις ταῖς πόλεσι φίλοι τῶν
Λακεδαιμονίων βοηθείας ἐδέοντο.
A second expedition against Thebes, undertaken by Agesilaus in the
ensuing summer with the main army of the confederacy, was neither
more decisive nor more profitable than the preceding. Though he
contrived, by a well-planned stratagem, to surprize the Theban
palisade, and lay waste the plain, he gained no serious victory;
and even showed, more clearly than before, his reluctance to engage
except upon perfectly equal terms.[271] It became evident that
the Thebans were not only strengthening their position in Bœotia,
but also acquiring practice in warfare and confidence against
the Spartans; insomuch that Antalkidas and some other companions
remonstrated with Agesilaus, against carrying on the war so as only
to give improving lessons to his enemies in military practice,—and
called upon him to strike some decisive blow. He quitted Bœotia,
however, after the summer’s campaign, without any such step.[272] In
his way he appeased an intestine conflict which was about to break
out in Thespiæ. Afterwards, on passing to Megara, he experienced
a strain or hurt, which grievously injured his sound leg, (it has
been mentioned already that he was lame of one leg,) and induced his
surgeon to open a vein in the limb for reducing the inflammation.
When this was done, however, the blood could not be stopped until he
swooned. Having been conveyed home to Sparta in great suffering, he
was confined to his couch for several months; and he remained during
a much longer time unfit for active command.[273]
[271] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 47, 51.
The anecdotes in Polyænus (ii, 1, 18-20), mentioning
faint-heartedness and alarm among the allies of Agesilaus, are
likely to apply (certainly in part) to this campaign.
[272] Diodor. xv, 33, 34; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 26.
[273] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 58.
The functions of general now devolved upon the other king
Kleombrotus, who in the next spring conducted the army of the
confederacy to invade Bœotia anew. But on this occasion, the
Athenians and Thebans had occupied the passes of Kithæron, so that he
was unable even to enter the country, and was obliged to dismiss his
troops without achieving anything.[274]
[274] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 59.
His inglorious retreat excited such murmurs among the allies when
they met at Sparta, that they resolved to fit out a large naval
force, sufficient both to intercept the supplies of imported corn
to Athens, and to forward an invading army by sea against Thebes,
to the Bœotian port of Kreusis in the Krissæan Gulf. The former
object was attempted first. Towards midsummer, a fleet of sixty
triremes, fitted out under the Spartan admiral Pollis, was cruising
in the Ægean; especially round the coast of Attica, near Ægina,
Keos, and Andros. The Athenians, who, since their recently renewed
confederacy, had been undisturbed by any enemies at sea, found
themselves thus threatened, not merely with loss of power, but also
with loss of trade and even famine; since their corn-ships from the
Euxine, though safely reaching Geræstus (the southern extremity of
Eubœa), were prevented from doubling Cape Sunium. Feeling severely
this interruption, they fitted out at Peiræus a fleet of eighty
triremes,[275] with crews mainly composed of citizens; who, under
the admiral Chabrias, in a sharply contested action near Naxos,
completely defeated the fleet of Pollis, and regained for Athens the
mastery of the sea. Forty-nine Lacedæmonian triremes were disabled
or captured, eight with their entire crews.[276] Moreover, Chabrias
might have destroyed all or most of the rest, had he not suspended
his attack, having eighteen of his own ships disabled, to pick up
both the living men and the dead bodies on board, as well as all
Athenians who were swimming for their lives. He did this (we are
told[277]), from distinct recollection of the fierce displeasure
of the people against the victorious generals after the battle of
Arginusæ. And we may thus see, that though the proceedings on that
memorable occasion were stained both by illegality and by violence,
they produced a salutary effect upon the public conduct of subsequent
commanders. Many a brave Athenian (the crews consisting principally
of citizens) owed his life, after the battle of Naxos, to the
terrible lesson administered by the people to their generals in 406
B.C., thirty years before.
[275] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 61. ἐνέβησαν αὐτοὶ εἰς τὰς ναῦς, etc.
Boeckh (followed by Dr. Thirlwall, Hist. Gr. ch. 38, vol. v, p.
58) connects with this maritime expedition an Inscription (Corp.
Insc. No. 84, p. 124) recording a vote of gratitude, passed by
the Athenian assembly in favor of Phanokritus, a native of Parium
in the Propontis. But I think that the vote can hardly belong
to the present expedition. The Athenians could not need to be
informed by a native of Parium about the movements of a hostile
fleet near Ægina and Keos. The information given by Phanokritus
must have related more probably, I think, to some occasion of the
transit of hostile ships along the Hellespont, which a native
of Parium would be the likely person first to discover and
communicate.
[276] Diodor. xv, 35; Demosthen. cont. Leptin. c. 17, p. 480.
I give the number of prize-ships taken in this action, as stated
by Demosthenes; in preference to Diodorus, who mentions a smaller
number. The orator, in enumerating the exploits of Chabrias in
this oration, not only speaks from a written memorandum in his
hand, which he afterwards causes to be read by the clerk,—but
also seems exact and special as to numbers, so as to inspire
greater confidence than usual.
[277] Diodor. xv, 35. Chabrias ἀπέσχετο παντελῶς τοῦ διωγμοῦ,
ἀναμνησθεὶς τῆς ἐν Ἀργινούσαις ναυμαχίας, ἐν ᾗ τοὺς νικήσαντας
στρατηγοὺς ὁ δῆμος ἀντὶ μεγάλης εὐεργεσίας θανάτῳ περιέβαλεν,
~αἰτιασάμενος ὅτι τοὺς τετελευτηκότας κατὰ τὴν ναυμαχίαν οὐκ
ἔθαψαν~· εὐλαβήθη οὖν (see Wesseling and Stephens’s note)
μή ποτε τῆς περιστάσεως ὁμοίας γενομένης κινδυνεύσῃ παθεῖν
παραπλήσια. Διόπερ ~ἀποστὰς τοῦ διώκειν, ἀνελέγετο τῶν πολιτῶν
τοὺς διανηχομένους, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἔτι ζῶντας διέσωσε, τοὺς
δὲ τετελευτηκότας ἔθαψεν~. Εἰ δὲ μὴ περὶ ταύτην ἐγένετο τὴν
ἐπιμέλειαν, ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἅπαντα τὸν πολεμίων στόλον διέφθειρε.
This passage illustrates what I remarked in my preceding volume
(Vol. VIII, Ch. lxiv, p. 175), respecting the battle of Arginusæ
and the proceedings at Athens afterwards. I noticed that Diodorus
incorrectly represented the excitement at Athens against the
generals as arising from their having neglected to pick up the
bodies of the _slain_ warriors for burial,—and that he omitted
the more important fact, that they left many living and wounded
warriors to perish.
It is curious, that in the first of the two sentences above
cited, Diodorus repeats his erroneous affirmation about the
battle of Arginusæ; while in the second sentence he corrects the
error, telling us that Chabrias, profiting by the warning, took
care to pick up the _living_ men on the wrecks and in the water,
as well as the dead bodies.
This was the first great victory (in September, 376 B.C.[278])
which the Athenians had gained at sea since the Peloponnesian war;
and while it thus filled them with joy and confidence, it led to
a material enlargement of their maritime confederacy. The fleet
of Chabrias,—of which a squadron was detached under the orders of
Phokion, a young Athenian now distinguishing himself for the first
time and often hereafter to be mentioned,—sailed victorious round
the Ægean, made prize of twenty other triremes in single ships,
brought in three thousand prisoners with one hundred and ten talents
in money, and annexed seventeen new cities to the confederacy,
as sending deputies to the synod and furnishing contributions.
The discreet and conciliatory behavior of Phokion, especially
obtained much favor among the islanders, and determined several
new adhesions to Athens.[279] To the inhabitants of Abdêra in
Thrace, Chabrias rendered an inestimable service, by aiding them to
repulse a barbarous horde of Triballi, who quitting their abode from
famine, had poured upon the sea-coast, defeating the Abderites and
plundering their territory. The citizens, grateful for a force left
to defend their town, willingly allied themselves with Athens, whose
confederacy thus extended itself to the coast of Thrace.[280]
[278] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 6; Plutarch, Camillus, c. 19.
[279] Demosthen. cont. Leptin. p. 480; Plutarch, Phokion, c. 7.
[280] Diodor. xv, 36. He states by mistake, that Chabrias was
afterwards assassinated at Abdera.
Having prosperously enlarged their confederacy to the east of
Peloponnesus, the Athenians began to aim at the acquisition of new
allies in the west. The fleet of sixty triremes, which had recently
served under Chabrias, was sent, under the command of Timotheus, the
son of Konon, to circumnavigate Peloponnesus and alarm the coast of
Laconia; partly at the instance of the Thebans, who were eager to
keep the naval force of Sparta occupied, so as to prevent her from
conveying troops across the Krissæan Gulf from Corinth to the Bœotian
port of Kreusis.[281] This Periplus of Peloponnesus,—the first
which the fleet of Athens had attempted since her humiliation at
Ægospotami,—coupled with the ensuing successes, was long remembered
by the countrymen of Timotheus. His large force, just dealing,
and conciliatory professions, won new and valuable allies. Not
only Kephallenia, but the still more important island of Korkyra,
voluntarily accepted his propositions; and as he took care to avoid
all violence or interference with the political constitution, his
popularity all around augmented every day. Alketas, prince of
the Molossi,—the Chaonians with other Epirotic tribes,—and the
Akarnanians on the coast,—all embraced his alliance.[282] While near
Alyzia and Leukas on this coast, he was assailed by the Peloponnesian
ships under Nikolochus, rather inferior in number to his fleet. He
defeated them, and being shortly afterwards reinforced by other
triremes from Korkyra, he became so superior in those waters, that
the hostile fleet did not dare to show itself. Having received only
thirteen talents on quitting Athens, we are told that he had great
difficulty in paying his fleet; that he procured an advance of
money, from each of the sixty trierarchs in his fleet, of seven minæ
towards the pay of their respective ships; and that he also sent
home requests for large remittances from the public treasury;[283]
measures which go to bear out that honorable repugnance to the
plunder of friends or neutrals, and care to avoid even the suspicion
of plunder, which his panegyrist Isokrates ascribes to him.[284]
This was a feature unhappily rare among the Grecian generals on
both sides, and tending to become still rarer, from the increased
employment of mercenary bands.
[281] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 62.
[282] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 64; Diodor. xv, 36.
[283] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 66; Isokrates, De Permutat. s. 116;
Cornelius Nepos, Timotheus, c. 2.
The advance of seven minæ respectively, obtained by Timotheus
from the sixty trierarchs under his command, is mentioned by
Demosthenes cont. Timotheum (c. 3, p. 1187). I agree with M.
Boeckh (Public Economy of Athens, ii, 24, p. 294) in referring
this advance to his expedition to Korkyra and other places in the
Ionian Sea in 375-374 B.C.; not to his subsequent expedition of
373 B.C., to which Rehdantz, Lachmann, Schlosser, and others
would refer it (Vitæ Iphicratis, etc. p. 89). In the second
expedition, it does not appear that he ever had really sixty
triremes, or sixty trierarchs, under him. Xenophon (Hellen. v,
4, 63) tells us that the fleet sent with Timotheus to Korkyra
consisted of sixty ships; which is the exact number of trierarchs
named by Demosthenes.
[284] Isokrates, Orat. De Permutat. s. 128, 131, 135.
The demands of Timotheus on the treasury of Athens were not favorably
received. Though her naval position was now more brilliant and
commanding than it had been since the battle of Ægospotami,—though
no Lacedæmonian fleet showed itself to disturb her in the
Ægean,[285]—yet the cost of the war began to be seriously felt.
Privateers from the neighboring island of Ægina annoyed her commerce,
requiring a perpetual coast-guard; while the contributions from the
deputies to the confederate synod were not sufficient to dispense
with the necessity of a heavy direct property tax at home.[286]
[285] Isokrates, De Permutat. s. 117; Cornel. Nepos, Timoth. c. 2.
[286] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 1.
In this synod the Thebans, as members of the confederacy, were
represented.[287] Application was made to them to contribute towards
the cost of the naval war; the rather, as it was partly at their
instance that the fleet had been sent round to the Ionian Sea. But
the Thebans declined compliance,[288] nor were they probably in any
condition to furnish pecuniary aid. Their refusal occasioned much
displeasure at Athens, embittered by jealousy at the strides which
they had been making during the two last years, partly through the
indirect effect of the naval successes of Athens. At the end of the
year 377 B.C., after the two successive invasions of Agesilaus, the
ruin of two home crops had so straitened the Thebans, that they were
forced to import corn from Pagasæ in Thessaly; in which enterprise
their ships and seamen were at first captured by the Lacedæmonian
harmost at Oreus in Eubœa, Alketas. His negligence, however, soon
led not only to an outbreak of their seamen who had been taken
prisoners, but also to the revolt of the town from Sparta, so that
the communication of Thebes with Pagasæ became quite unimpeded.
For the two succeeding years, there had been no Spartan invasion
of Bœotia; since, in 376 B.C., Kleombrotus could not surmount the
heights of Kithæron,—while in 375 B.C., the attention of Sparta had
been occupied by the naval operations of Timotheus in the Ionian
Sea. During these two years, the Thebans had exerted themselves
vigorously against the neighboring cities of Bœotia, in most of which
a strong party, if not the majority of the population, was favorable
to them, though the government was in the hands of the philo-Spartan
oligarchy, seconded by Spartan harmosts and garrison.[289] We hear of
one victory gained by the Theban cavalry near Platæa, under Charon;
and of another near Tanagra, in which Panthöides, the Lacedæmonian
harmost in that town, was slain.[290]
[287] See Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 21, 23, 37.
[288] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 1. Οἱ δ’ Ἀθηναῖοι, αὐξανομένους μὲν
ὁρῶντες διὰ σφᾶς τοὺς Θηβαίους, χρήματά δ’ οὐ συμβαλλομένους
εἰς τὸ ναυτικὸν, αὐτοὶ δ’ ἀποκναιόμενοι καὶ χρημάτων εἰσφοραῖς
καὶ λῃστείαις ἐξ Αἰγίνης, καὶ φυλακαῖς τῆς χώρας, ἐπεθύμησαν
παύσασθαι τοῦ πολέμου.
[289] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 46-55.
[290] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 15-25.
But the most important of all their successes was that of Pelopidas
near Tegyra. That commander, hearing that the Spartan harmost, with
his two (moræ or) divisions in garrison at Orchomenus, had gone
away on an excursion into the Lokrian territory, made a dash from
Thebes with the Sacred Band and a few cavalry, to surprise the place.
It was the season in which the waters of the Lake Kopaïs were at
the fullest, so that he was obliged to take a wide circuit to the
north-west, and to pass by Tegyra, on the road between Orchomenus and
the Opuntian Lokris. On arriving near Orchomenus, he ascertained
that there were still some Lacedæmonians in the town, and that no
surprise could be effected; upon which he retraced his steps. But
on reaching Tegyra, he fell in with the Lacedæmonian commanders,
Gorgoleon and Theopompus, returning with their troops from the
Lokrian excursion. As his numbers were inferior to theirs by half,
they rejoiced in the encounter; while the troops of Pelopidas were
at first dismayed, and required all his encouragement to work them
up. But in the fight that ensued, closely and obstinately contested
in a narrow pass, the strength, valor, and compact charge of the
Sacred Band proved irresistible. The two Lacedæmonian commanders were
both slain; their troops opened, to allow the Thebans an undisturbed
retreat; but Pelopidas, disdaining this opportunity, persisted in the
combat until all his enemies dispersed and fled. The neighborhood of
Orchomenus forbade any long pursuit, so that Pelopidas could only
erect his trophy, and strip the dead, before returning to Thebes.[291]
[291] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 17; Diodor. xv, 37.
Xenophon does not mention the combat at Tegyra. Diodorus
mentions, what is evidently this battle, near Orchomenus; but he
does not name Tegyra.
Kallisthenes seems to have described the battle of Tegyra, and to
have given various particulars respecting the religious legends
connected with that spot (Kallisthenes, Fragm. 3, ed. Didot, ap.
Stephan. Byz. v. Τεγύρα).
This combat, in which the Lacedæmonians were for the first time
beaten in fair field by numbers inferior to their own, produced a
strong sensation in the minds of both the contending parties. The
confidence of the Thebans, as well as their exertion, was redoubled;
so that by the year 374 B.C., they had cleared Bœotia of the
Lacedæmonians, as well as of the local oligarchies which sustained
them; persuading or constraining the cities again to come into
union with Thebes, and reviving the Bœotian confederacy. Haliartus,
Korôneia, Lebadeia, Tanagra, Thespiæ, Platæa, and the rest, thus
became again Bœotian;[292] leaving out Orchomenus alone, (with its
dependency Chæroneia,) which was on the borders of Phokis, and still
continued under Lacedæmonian occupation. In most of these cities, the
party friendly to Thebes was numerous, and the change, on the whole,
popular; though in some the prevailing sentiment was such, that
adherence was only obtained by intimidation. The change here made by
Thebes, was not to absorb these cities into herself, but to bring
them back to the old federative system of Bœotia; a policy which she
had publicly proclaimed on surprising Platæa in 431 B.C.[293] While
resuming her own ancient rights and privileges as head of the Bœotian
federation, she at the same time guaranteed to the other cities,—by
convention, probably express, but certainly implied,—their ancient
rights, their security, and their qualified autonomy, as members; the
system which had existed down to the peace of Antalkidas.
[292] That the Thebans thus became again presidents of all
Bœotia, and revived the Bœotian confederacy,—is clearly stated by
Xenophon, Hellen. v, 4, 63; vi, 1, 1.
[293] Thucyd. ii, 2. Ἀνεῖπεν ὁ κήρυξ (the Theban herald after the
Theban troops had penetrated by night into the middle of Platæa)
εἴ τις βούλεται ~κατὰ τὰ πάτρια τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν~ ξυμμαχεῖν,
τίθεσθαι παρ’ αὐτοὺς τὰ ὅπλα, νομίζοντες σφίσι ῥᾳδίως τούτῳ τῷ
τρόπῳ προσχωρήσειν τὴν πόλιν.
Compare the language of the Thebans about τὰ πάτρια τῶν Βοιωτῶν
(iii, 61, 65, 66). The description which the Thebans give of
their own professions and views, when they attacked Platæa in 431
B.C., may be taken as fair analogy to judge of their professions
and views towards the recovered Bœotian towns in 376-375 B.C.
The position of the Thebans was materially improved by this
reconquest or reconfederation of Bœotia. Becoming masters of Kreusis,
the port of Thespiæ,[294] they fortified it, and built some triremes
to repel any invasion from Peloponnesus by sea across the Krissæan
Gulf. Feeling thus secure against invasion, they began to retaliate
upon their neighbors and enemies the Phokians, allies of Sparta, and
auxiliaries in the recent attacks on Thebes,—yet also, from ancient
times, on friendly terms with Athens.[295] So hard pressed were
the Phokians,—especially as Jason of Pheræ in Thessaly was at the
same time their bitter enemy,[296]—that unless assisted, they would
have been compelled to submit to the Thebans, and along with them
Orchomenus, including the Lacedæmonian garrison then occupying it;
while the treasures of the Delphian Temple would also have been laid
open, in case the Thebans should think fit to seize them. Intimation
being sent by the Phokians to Sparta, King Kleombrotus was sent to
their aid, by sea across the Gulf, with four Lacedæmonian divisions
of troops, and an auxiliary body of allies.[297] This reinforcement,
compelling the Thebans to retire, placed both Phokis and Orchomenus
in safety. While Sparta thus sustained them, even Athens looked upon
the Phokian cause with sympathy. When she saw that the Thebans had
passed from the defensive to the offensive,—partly by her help, yet
nevertheless refusing to contribute to the cost of her navy,—her
ancient jealousy of them became again so powerful, that she sent
envoys to Sparta, to propose terms of peace. What these terms were,
we are not told; nor does it appear that the Thebans even received
notice of the proceeding. But the peace was accepted at Sparta, and
two of the Athenian envoys were despatched at once from thence,
without even going home, to Korkyra, for the purpose of notifying the
peace to Timotheus, and ordering him forthwith to conduct his fleet
back to Athens.[298]
[294] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 3; Compare Diodor. xv, 53.
[295] Diodor. xv, 31; Xen. Hellen, vi, 3, 1; iii, 6, 21.
[296] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 21-27.
[297] Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 1; vi, 21.
This expedition of Kleombrotus to Phokis is placed by Mr. Fynes
Clinton in 375 B.C. (Fast. Hel. ad 375 B.C.). To me it seems
to belong rather to 374 B.C. It was not undertaken until the
Thebans had reconquered all the Bœotian cities (Xen. Hell. vi, 1,
1); and this operation seems to have occupied them all the two
years,—376 and 375 B.C. See v, 4, 63, where the words οὔτ’ ἐν ᾧ
Τιμόθεος περιέπλευσε must be understood to include, not simply
the time which Timotheus took in _actually circumnavigating_
Peloponnesus, but the year which he spent afterwards in the
Ionian Sea, and the time which he occupied in performing his
exploits near Korkyra, Leukas, and the neighborhood generally.
The “Periplus” for which Timotheus was afterwards honored at
Athens (see Æschines cont. Ktesiphont. c. 90, p. 458) meant the
exploits performed by him during the year and with the fleet of
the “Periplus.”
It is worth notice that the Pythian games were celebrated in this
year 374 B.C.,—ἐπὶ Σωκρατίδου ἄρχοντος; that is, in the first
quarter of that archon, or the third Olympic year; about the
beginning of August, Chabrias won a prize at these games with a
chariot and four; in celebration of which, he afterwards gave a
splendid banquet at the point of sea-shore called Kôlias, near
Athens (Demosthen. cont. Neæram. c. 11, p. 1356).
[298] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 1, 2.
Kallias seems to have been one of the Athenian envoys (Xen.
Hellen. vi, 3, 4).
This proposition of the Athenians, made seemingly in a moment of
impetuous dissatisfaction, was made to the advantage of Sparta, and
served somewhat to countervail a mortifying revelation which had
reached the Spartans a little before from a different quarter.
Polydamas, an eminent citizen of Pharsalus in Thessaly, came to
Sparta to ask for aid. He had long been on terms of hospitality
with the Lacedæmonians; while Pharsalus had not merely been in
alliance with them, but was for some time occupied by one of their
garrisons.[299] In the usual state of Thessaly, the great cities
Larissa, Pheræ, Pharsalus, and others, each holding some smaller
cities in a state of dependent alliance, were in disagreement with
each other,—often even in actual war. It was rare that they could
be brought to concur in a common vote for the election of a supreme
chief or Tagus. At his own city of Pharsalus, Polydamas was now
in the ascendant, enjoying the confidence of all the great family
factions who usually contended for predominance; to such a degree,
indeed, that he was entrusted with the custody of the citadel and the
entire management of the revenues, receipts as well as disbursements.
Being a wealthy man, “hospitable and ostentatious in the Thessalian
fashion,” he advanced money from his own purse to the treasury
whenever it was low, and repaid himself when public funds came
in.[300]
[299] Diodor. xiv, 82.
[300] Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 3. Καὶ ὁπότε μὲν ἐνδεὴς εἴη,
παρ’ ἑαυτοῦ προσετίθει· ὁπότε δὲ περιγένοιτο τῆς προσόδου,
ἀπελάμβανεν· ἦν δὲ καὶ ἄλλως φιλόξενός τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπὴς τὸν
Θετταλικὸν τρόπον.
Such loose dealing of the Thessalians with their public revenues
helps us to understand how Philip of Macedon afterwards got into
his hands the management of their harbors and customs-duties
(Demosthen. Olynth. i, p. 15; ii. p. 20). It forms a striking
contrast with the exactness of the Athenian people about
their public receipts and disbursements, as testified in the
inscriptions yet remaining.
But a greater man than Polydamas had now arisen in Thessaly,—Jason,
despot of Pheræ; whose formidable power, threatening the independence
of Pharsalus, he now came to Sparta to denounce. Though the force of
Jason can hardly have been very considerable when the Spartans passed
through Thessaly, six years before, in their repeated expeditions
against Olynthus, he was now not only despot of Pheræ, but master of
nearly all the Thessalian cities (as Lykophron of Pheræ had partially
succeeded in becoming thirty years before),[301] as well as of a
large area of tributary circumjacent territory. The great instrument
of his dominion was, a standing and well-appointed force of six
thousand mercenary troops, from all parts of Greece. He possessed
all the personal qualities requisite for conducting soldiers with
the greatest effect. His bodily strength was great; his activity
indefatigable; his self-command, both as to hardship and as to
temptation, alike conspicuous. Always personally sharing both in the
drill and in the gymnastics of the soldiers, and encouraging military
merits with the utmost munificence, he had not only disciplined them,
but inspired them with extreme warlike ardor and devotion to his
person. Several of the neighboring tribes, together with Alketas,
prince of the Molossi in Epirus, had been reduced to the footing
of his dependent allies. Moreover, he had already defeated the
Pharsalians, and stripped them of many of the towns which had once
been connected with them, so that it only remained for him now to
carry his arms against their city. But Jason was prudent, as well as
daring. Though certain of success, he wished to avoid the odium of
employing force, and the danger of having malcontents for subjects.
He therefore proposed to Polydamas, in a private interview, that he
(Polydamas) should bring Pharsalus under Jason’s dominion, accepting
for himself the second place in Thessaly, under Jason installed as
Tagus or president. The whole force of Thessaly thus united, with
its array of tributary nations around, would be decidedly the first
power in Greece, superior on land either to Sparta or Thebes, and
at sea to Athens. And as to the Persian king, with his multitudes
of unwarlike slaves, Jason regarded him as an enemy yet easier to
overthrow; considering what had been achieved first by the Cyreians,
and afterwards by Agesilaus.