FROM THE SUBJUGATION OF OLYNTHUS BY THE LACEDÆMONIANS DOWN TO THE
CONGRESS AT SPARTA, AND PARTIAL PEACE, IN 371 B.C.
At the beginning of 379 B.C., the empire of the Lacedæmonians on
land had reached a pitch never before paralleled. On the sea, their
fleet was but moderately powerful, and they seem to have held divided
empire with Athens over the smaller islands; while the larger islands
(so far as we can make out) were independent of both. But the whole
of inland Greece, both within and without Peloponnesus,—except Argos,
Attica, and perhaps the more powerful Thessalian cities,—was now
enrolled in the confederacy dependent on Sparta. Her occupation of
Thebes, by a Spartan garrison and an oligarchy of local partisans,
appeared to place her empire beyond all chance of successful
attack; while the victorious close of the war against Olynthus
carried everywhere an intimidating sense of her far-reaching power.
Her allies, too,—governed as they were in many cases by Spartan
harmosts, and by oligarchies whose power rested on Sparta,—were much
more dependent upon her than they had been during the time of the
Peloponnesian war.
Such a position of affairs rendered Sparta an object of the same
mingled fear and hatred (the first preponderant) as had been felt
towards imperial Athens fifty years before, when she was designated
as the “despot city.[160]” And this sentiment was farther aggravated
by the recent peace of Antalkidas, in every sense the work of
Sparta; which she had first procured, and afterwards carried into
execution. That peace was disgraceful enough, as being dictated by
the king of Persia, enforced in his name, and surrendering to him
all the Asiatic Greeks. But it became yet more disgraceful when the
universal autonomy which it promised was seen to be so executed, as
to mean nothing better than subjection to Sparta. Of all the acts
yet committed by Sparta, not only in perversion of the autonomy
promised to every city, but in violation of all the acknowledged
canons of right dealing between city and city,—the most flagrant
was, her recent seizure and occupation of the Kadmeia at Thebes. Her
subversion (in alliance with, and partly for the benefit of, Amyntas
king of Macedonia) of the free Olynthian confederacy was hardly
less offensive to every Greek of large or Pan-hellenic patriotism.
She appeared as the confederate of the Persian king on one side, of
Amyntas the Macedonian, on another, of the Syracusan despot Dionysius
on a third,—as betraying the independence of Greece to the foreigner,
and seeking to put down, everywhere within it, that free spirit which
stood in the way of her own harmosts and partisan oligarchies.
[160] Thucyd. i, 124. πόλιν τύραννον.
Unpopular as Sparta was, however, she stood out incontestably as the
head of Greece. No man dared to call into question her headship,
or to provoke resistance against it. The tone of patriotic and
free-spoken Greeks at this moment is manifested in two eminent
residents at Athens,—Lysias and Isokrates. Of these two rhetors, the
former composed an oration which he publicly read at Olympia during
the celebration of the 99th Olympiad, B.C. 384, three years after
the peace of Antalkidas. In this oration (of which unhappily only a
fragment remains, preserved by Dionysius of Halikarnassus), Lysias
raises the cry of danger to Greece, partly from the Persian king,
partly from the despot Dionysius of Syracuse.[161] He calls upon all
Greeks to lay aside hostility and jealousies one with the other,
and to unite in making head against these two really formidable
enemies, as their ancestors had previously done, with equal zeal for
putting down despots and for repelling the foreigner. He notes the
number of Greeks (in Asia) handed over to the Persian king, whose
great wealth would enable him to hire an indefinite number of Grecian
soldiers, and whose naval force was superior to anything which the
Greeks could muster; while the strongest naval force in Greece was
that of the Syracusan Dionysius. Recognizing the Lacedæmonians as
chiefs of Greece, Lysias expresses his astonishment that they should
quietly permit the fire to extend itself from one city to another.
They ought to look upon the misfortunes of those cities which had
been destroyed, both by the Persians and by Dionysius, as coming home
to themselves; not to wait patiently, until the two hostile powers
had united their forces to attack the centre of Greece, which yet
remained independent.
[161] Lysias, Frag. Orat. xxxiii, (Olympic.) ed. Bekker ap.
Dionys. Hal. Judic. de Lysiâ, p. 520-525, Reisk.
... Ὁρῶν οὕτως αἰσχρῶς διακειμένην τὴν Ἑλλάδα, καὶ πολλὰ μὲν
αὐτῆς ὄντα ὑπὸ τῷ βαρβάρῳ, πολλὰς δὲ πόλεις ὑπὸ τυράννων
ἀναστάτους γεγενημένας.
... Ὁρῶμεν γὰρ τοὺς κινδύνους καὶ μεγάλους καὶ παντάχοθεν
περιεστηκότας. Ἐπίστασθε δὲ, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἀρχὴ τῶν κρατούντων τῆς
θαλάσσης, τῶν δὲ χρημάτων βασιλεὺς ταμίας· ~τὰ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων
σώματα, τῶν δαπανᾶσθαι δυναμένων~· ναῦς δὲ πολλὰς αὐτὸς κέκτηται,
πολλὰς δ’ ὁ τύραννος τῆς Σικελίας....
... Ὥστε ἄξιον—τοὺς προγόνους μιμεῖσθαι, οἱ τοὺς μὲν βαρβάρους
ἐποίησαν, τῆς ἀλλοτρίας ἐπιθυμοῦντας, τῆς σφετέρας αὐτῶν
ἐστερῆσθαι· τοὺς δὲ τυράννους ἐξελάσαντες, κοινὴν ἅπασι τὴν
ἐλευθερίαν κατέστησαν. Θαυμάζω δὲ Λακεδαιμονίους πάντων μάλιστα,
τίνι ποτε γνώμῃ χρώμενοι, ~καιομένην τὴν Ἑλλάδα περιορῶσιν~,
ἡγεμόνες ὄντες τῶν Ἑλλήνων, etc.
... Οὐ τοίνυν ὁ ἐπιὼν καιρὸς τοῦ παρόντος βελτίων· οὐ γὰρ
ἀλλοτρίας δεῖ τὰς τῶν ἀπολωλότων συμφορὰς νομίζειν, ἀλλ’ οἰκείας·
οὐδ’ ἀναμεῖναι, ἕως ἂν ἐπ’ αὐτοὺς ἡμᾶς αἱ δυνάμεις ~ἀμφοτέρων~
(of Artaxerxes and Dionysius) ἔλθωσιν, ἀλλ’ ἕως ἔτι ἔξεστι, τὴν
τούτων ὕβριν κωλῦσαι.
Ephorus appears to have affirmed that there was a plan concerted
between the Persian king and Dionysius, for attacking Greece in
concert and dividing it between them (see Ephori Fragm. 141,
ed. Didot). The assertion is made by the rhetor Aristeides,
and the allusion to Ephorus is here preserved by the Scholiast
on Aristeides (who, however, is mistaken, in referring it to
Dionysius _the younger_). Aristeides ascribes the frustration of
this attack to the valor of two Athenian generals, Iphikrates,
and Timotheus; the former of whom captured the fleet of
Dionysius, while the latter defeated the Lacedæmonian fleet at
Leukas. But these events happened in 373-372 B.C., when the
power of Dionysius was not so formidable or aggressive as it had
been between 387-382 B.C.: moreover, the ships of Dionysius
taken by Iphikrates were only ten in number, a small squadron.
Aristeides appears to me to have misconceived the date to which
the assertion of Ephorus really referred.
Of the two common enemies,—Artaxerxes and Dionysius,—whom Lysias
thus denounces, the latter had sent to this very Olympic festival
a splendid Theôry, or legation to offer solemn sacrifice in his
name; together with several chariots to contend in the race, and
some excellent rhapsodes to recite poems composed by himself. The
Syracusan legation, headed by Thearides, brother of Dionysius, were
clothed with rich vestments, and lodged in a tent of extraordinary
magnificence, decorated with gold and purple; such, probably, as had
not been seen since the ostentatious display made by Alkibiades[162]
in the ninetieth Olympiad (B.C. 420). While instigating the
spectators present to exert themselves as Greeks for the liberation
of their fellow-Greeks enslaved by Dionysius, Lysias exhorted them
to begin forthwith their hostile demonstration against the latter,
by plundering the splendid tent before them, which insulted the
sacred plain of Olympia with the spectacle of wealth extorted from
Grecian sufferers. It appears that this exhortation was partially,
but only partially, acted upon.[163] Some persons assailed the
tents, but were, probably, restrained by the Eleian superintendents
without difficulty. Yet the incident, taken in conjunction with
the speech of Lysias, helps us to understand the apprehensions and
sympathies which agitated the Olympic crowd in B.C. 384. This was
the first Olympic festival after the peace of Antalkidas; a festival
memorable, not only because it again brought thither Athenians,
Bœotians, Corinthians, and Argeians, who must have been prevented
by the preceding war from coming either in B.C. 388 or in B.C.
392,—but also as it exhibited the visitors and Theôries from the
Asiatic Greeks, for the first time since they had been handed over
by Sparta to the Persians,—and the like also from those numerous
Italians and Sicilian Greeks whom Dionysius had enslaved. All these
sufferers, especially the Asiatics, would doubtless be full of
complaints respecting the hardships of their new lot, and against
Sparta as having betrayed them; complaints, which would call forth
genuine sympathy in the Athenians, Thebans, and all others who had
submitted reluctantly to the peace of Antalkidas. There was thus a
large body of sentiment prepared to respond to the declamations of
Lysias. And many a Grecian patriot, who would be ashamed to lay hands
on the Syracusan tents or envoys, would yet yield a mournful assent
to the orator’s remark, that the free Grecian world was on fire[164]
at both sides; that Asiatics, Italians, and Sicilians, had already
passed into the hands of Artaxerxes and Dionysius; and that, if these
two formidable enemies should coalesce, the liberties even of central
Greece would be in great danger.
[162] See Pseudo-Andokides cont. Alkibiad. s. 30; and Vol. VII.
of this History, Ch. lv, p. 53.
[163] Dionys. Hal. Judic. de Lysiâ, p. 519; Diodor. xiv, 109.
ὥστε τινας τολμῆσαι διαρπάζειν τὰς σκηνάς.
Dionysius does not specify the date of this oration of Lysias;
but Diodorus places it at Olympiad 98—B.C. 388—the year before
the peace of Antalkidas. On this point I venture to depart from
him, and assign it to Olympiad 99, or 384 B.C., three years
after the peace; the rather as his Olympic chronology appears not
clear, as may be seen by comparing xv, 7 with xiv, 109.
1. The year 388 B.C. was a year of war, in which Sparta with
her allies on one side,—and Thebes, Athens, Corinth, and Argos
on the other,—were carrying on strenuous hostilities. The war
would hinder the four last-mentioned states from sending any
public legation to sacrifice at the Olympic festival. Lysias, as
an Athenian metic, could hardly have gone there at all; but he
certainly could not have gone there to make a public and bold
oratorical demonstration.
2. The language of Lysias implies that the speech was delivered
after the cession of the Asiatic Greeks to Persia,—ὁρῶν πολλὰ μὲν
αὐτῆς (Ἑλλάδος) ὄντα ὑπὸ τῷ Βαρβάρῳ, etc. This is quite pertinent
after the peace of Antalkidas; but not at all admissible before
that peace. The same may be said about the phrase,—οὐ γὰρ
ἀλλοτρίας δεῖ τὰς τῶν ἀπολωλότων συμφορὰς νομίζειν, ἀλλ’ οἰκείας;
which must be referred to the recent subjection of the Asiatic
Greeks by Persia, and of the Italian and Sicilian Greeks by
Dionysius.
3. In 388 B.C.—when Athens and so large a portion of the
greater cities of Greece were at war with Sparta, and therefore
contesting her headship,—Lysias would hardly have publicly
talked of the Spartans as ἡγεμόνες τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οὐκ ἀδίκως, καὶ
διὰ τὴν ἔμφυτον ἀρετὴν καὶ διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἐπιστήμην.
This remark is made also by Sievers (Geschich. Griech. bis zur
Schlacht von Mantinea, p. 138). Nor would he have declaimed so
ardently against the Persian king, at a time when Athens was
still not despairing of Persian aid against Sparta.
On these grounds (as well as on others which I shall state when
I recount the history of Dionysius), it appears to me that this
oration of Lysias is unsuitable to B.C. 388—but perfectly
suitable to 384 B.C.
[164] Lysias, Orat. Olymp. Frag. καιομένην τὴν Ἑλλάδα περιορῶσιν,
etc.
It is easy to see how much such feeling of grief and shame would
tend to raise antipathy against Sparta. Lysias, in that portion of
his speech which we possess, disguises his censure against her under
the forms of surprise. But Isokrates, who composed an analogous
discourse four years afterwards (which may perhaps have been read at
the next Olympic festival of B.C. 380), speaks out more plainly. He
denounces the Lacedæmonians as traitors to the general security and
freedom of Greece, and as seconding foreign kings as well as Grecian
despots to aggrandize themselves at the cost of autonomous Grecian
cities,—all in the interest of their own selfish ambition. No wonder
(he says) that the free and self-acting Hellenic world was every day
becoming contracted into a narrower space, when the presiding city
Sparta assisted Artaxerxes, Amyntas, and Dionysius to absorb it,—and
herself undertook unjust aggressions against Thebes, Olynthus,
Phlius, and Mantinea.[165]
[165] Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 145, 146: compare his
Orat. viii, (De Pace) s. 122; and Diodor. xv, 23.
Dionysius of Syracuse had sent twenty triremes to join the
Lacedæmonians at the Hellespont, a few months before the peace of
Antalkidas (Xenophon, Hellen. v, 1, 26).
The preceding citations, from Lysias and Isokrates, would be
sufficient to show the measure which intelligent contemporaries
took, both of the state of Greece and of the conduct of Sparta,
during the eight years succeeding the peace of Antalkidas (387-379
B.C.). But the philo-Laconian Xenophon is still more emphatic in his
condemnation of Sparta. Having described her triumphant and seemingly
unassailable position after the subjugation of Olynthus and Phlius,
he proceeds to say,[166]—“I could produce numerous other incidents,
both in and out of Greece, to prove that the gods take careful note
of impious men and of evil-doers; but the events which I am now about
to relate are quite sufficient. The Lacedæmonians, who had sworn to
leave each city autonomous, having violated their oaths by seizing
the citadel of Thebes, were punished by the very men whom they had
wronged,—though no one on earth had ever before triumphed over them.
And the Theban faction who had introduced them into the citadel, with
the deliberate purpose that their city should be enslaved to Sparta
in order that they might rule despotically themselves,—were put down
by no more than seven assailants, among the exiles whom they had
banished.”
[166] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 1. Πολλὰ μὲν οὖν ἄν τις ἔχοι καὶ
ἄλλα λέγειν, καὶ Ἑλληνικὰ καὶ βαρβαρικὰ, ὡς θεοὶ οὔτε τῶν
ἀσεβούντων οὔτε τῶν ἀνόσια ποιούντων ἀμελοῦσι· νῦν γε μὴν λέξω τὰ
προκείμενα. Λακεδαιμόνιοί τε γὰρ, οἱ ὀμόσαντες αὐτονόμους ἐάσειν
τὰς πόλεις, τὴν ἐν Θήβαις ἀκρόπολιν κατασχόντες, ὑπ’ αὐτῶν μόνων
τῶν ἀδικηθέντων ἐκολάσθησαν, πρῶτον οὐδ’ ὑφ’ ἑνὸς τῶν πώποτε
ἀνθρώπων κρατηθέντες. Τούς τε τῶν πολιτῶν εἰσαγαγόντας εἰς τὴν
ἀκρόπολιν αὐτοὺς, καὶ βουληθέντας Λακεδαιμονίοις τὴν πόλιν
δουλεύειν, ὥστε αὐτοὶ τυραννεῖν ... τὴν τούτων ἀρχὴν ἑπτὰ μόνον
τῶν φυγόντων ἤρκεσαν καταλῦσαι.
This passage is properly characterized by Dr. Peter (in his
Commentatio Critica in Xenophontis Hellenica, Hall. 1837, p. 82)
as the turning-point in the history:—
“Hoc igitur in loco quasi editiore operis sui Xenophon subsistit,
atque uno in conspectu Spartanos, et ad suæ felicitatis
fastigium ascendere videt, et rursus ab eo delabi: tantâ autem
divinæ justitiæ conscientiâ tangitur in hac Spartanorum fortunâ
conspicuæ, ut vix suum judicium, quanquam id solet facere,
suppresserit.”
What must have been the hatred, and sense of abused ascendency,
entertained towards Sparta by neutral or unfriendly Greeks, when
Xenophon, alike conspicuous for his partiality to her and for his
dislike of Thebes, could employ these decisive words in ushering
in the coming phase of Spartan humiliation, representing it as a
well-merited judgment from the gods? The sentence which I have just
translated marks, in the commonplace manner of the Xenophontic
Hellenica, the same moment of pointed contrast and transition,—past
glory suddenly and unexpectedly darkened by supervening
misfortune,—which is foreshadowed in the narrative of Thucydides by
the dialogue between the Athenian envoys and the Melian[167] council;
or in the Œdipus and Antigonê of Sophokles,[168] by the warnings of
the prophet Teiresias.
[167] See Vol. VII. of this History,—the close of Chapter lvi.
[168] Soph. Œdip. Tyr. 450; Antigon. 1066.
The government of Thebes had now been for three years (since the blow
struck by Phœbidas) in the hands of Leontiades and his oligarchical
partisans, upheld by the Spartan garrison in the Kadmeia. Respecting
the details of its proceedings we have scarce any information. We can
only (as above remarked) judge of it by the analogy of the Thirty
tyrants at Athens, and of the Lysandrian Dekarchies, to which it was
exactly similar in origin, position, and interests. That the general
spirit of it must have been cruel, oppressive, and rapacious,—we
cannot doubt; though in what degree we have no means of knowing.
The appetites of uncontrolled rulers, as well as those of a large
foreign garrison, would ensure such a result; besides which, those
rulers must have been in constant fear of risings or conspiracies
amidst a body of high-spirited citizens who saw their city degraded,
from being the chief of the Bœotian federation, into nothing better
than a captive dependency of Sparta. Such fear was aggravated by
the vicinity of a numerous body of Theban exiles, belonging to the
opposite or anti-Spartan party; three or four hundred of whom had
fled to Athens at the first seizure of their leader Ismenias, and had
been doubtless joined subsequently by others. So strongly did the
Theban rulers apprehend mischief from these exiles, that they hired
assassins to take them off by private murder at Athens; and actually
succeeded in thus killing Androkleidas, chief of the band and chief
successor of the deceased Ismenias,—though they missed their blows at
the rest.[169] And we may be sure that they made the prison in Thebes
subservient to multiplied enormities and executions, when we read not
only that one hundred and fifty prisoners were found in it when the
government was put down,[170] but also that in the fervor of that
revolutionary movement, the slain gaoler was an object of such fierce
antipathy, that his corpse was trodden and spit upon by a crowd
of Theban women.[171] In Thebes, as in other Grecian cities, the
women not only took no part in political disputes, but rarely even
showed themselves in public;[172] so that this furious demonstration
of vindictive sentiment must have been generated by the loss or
maltreatment of sons, husbands, and brothers.
[169] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 6: compare Plutarch, De Gen. Socr.
c. 29, p. 596 B.
[170] Xenoph. Hellen. v, 4, 14.
[171] Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 33, p. 598 B, C. ᾧ καὶ μεθ’
ἡμέραν ἐπενέβησαν καὶ προσέπτυσαν οὐκ ὀλίγαι γυναῖκες.
Among the prisoners was a distinguished Theban of the democratic
party, named Amphitheus. He was about to be shortly executed,
and the conspirators, personally attached to him, seem to have
accelerated the hour of their plot partly to preserve his life
(Plutarch, De Gen. Socrat. p. 577 D, p. 586 F.).
[172] The language of Plutarch (De Gen. Socrat. c. 33, p. 598
C.) is illustrated by the description given in the harangue of
Lykurgus cont. Leokrat. (c. xi, s. 40)—of the universal alarm
prevalent in Athens after the battle of Chæroneia, such that
even the women could not stay in their houses—ἀναξίως αὐτῶν καὶ
τῆς πόλεως ὁρωμένας, etc. Compare also the words of Makaria, in
the Herakleidæ of Euripides, 475; and Diodor. xiii, 55, in his
description of the capture of Selinus in Sicily.
The Theban exiles found at Athens not only secure shelter, but
genuine sympathy with their complaints against Lacedæmonian
injustice. The generous countenance which had been shown by the
Thebans, twenty-four years before, to Thrasybulus and the other
Athenian refugees, during the omnipotence of the Thirty, was
now gratefully requited under this reversal of fortune to both
cities;[173] and requited too in defiance of the menaces of Sparta,
who demanded that the exiles should be expelled,—as she had in the
earlier occasion demanded that the Athenian refugees should be
dismissed from Thebes. To protect these Theban exiles, however, was
all that Athens could do. Their restoration was a task beyond her
power,—and seemingly yet more beyond their own. For the existing
government of Thebes was firmly seated, and had the citizens
completely under control. Administered by a small faction, Archias,
Philippus, Hypatês, and Leontiades (among whom the first two were at
this moment polemarchs, though the last was the most energetic and
resolute)—it was at the same time sustained by the large garrison of
fifteen hundred Lacedæmonians and allies,[174] under Lysanoridas and
two other harmosts, in the Kadmeia,—as well as by the Lacedæmonian
posts in the other Bœotian cities around,—Orchomenus, Thespiæ,
Platæa, Tanagra, etc. Though the general body of Theban sentiment
in the city was decidedly adverse to the government, and though the
young men while exercising in the palæstra (gymnastic exercises being
more strenuously prosecuted at Thebes than anywhere else except at
Sparta) kept up by private communication the ardor of an earnest,
but compressed, patriotism,—yet all manifestation or assemblage was
forcibly kept down, and the commanding posts of the lower town, as
well as the citadel, were held in vigilant occupation by the ruling
minority.[175]
[173] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 6.
See this sentiment of gratitude on the part of Athenian
democrats, towards those Thebans who had sheltered them at Thebes
during the exile along with Thrasybulus,—strikingly brought out
in an oration of Lysias, of which unfortunately only a fragment
remains (Lysias, Frag. 46, 47, Bekk.; Dionys. Hal. Judic. de
Isæo, p. 594). The speaker of this oration had been received at
Thebes by Kephisodotus the father of Pherenikus; the latter was
now in exile at Athens; and the speaker had not only welcomed
him (Pherenikus) to his house with brotherly affection, but
also delivered this oration on his behalf before the Dikastery;
Pherenikus having rightful claims on the property left behind by
the assassinated Androkleidas.
[174] Diodor. xv, 25; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 12; Plutarch, De
Gen. Socr. c. 17, p. 586 E.
In another passage of this treatise (the last sentence but one)
he sets down the numbers in the Kadmeia at five thousand: but the
smaller number is most likely to be true.
[175] Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 4, p. 577 B; c. 17, p. 587 B; c.
25, p. 594 C; c. 27, p. 595 A.
For a certain time the Theban exiles at Athens waited in hopes of
some rising at home, or some positive aid from the Athenians. At
length, in the third winter after their flight, they began to despair
of encouragement from either quarter, and resolved to take the
initiative upon themselves. Among them were numbered several men of
the richest and highest families at Thebes, proprietors of chariots,
jockeys, and training establishments, for contending at the various
festivals: Pelopidas, Mellon, Damokleidas, Theopompus, Pherenikus,
and others.[176]
[176] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 7, 8.
Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 17, p. 587 D. Τῶν Μέλλωνος ἁρματηλατῶν
ἐπιστάτης.... Ἆρ’ οὐ Χλίδωνα λέγεις, τὸν κέλητι τὰ Ἡραῖα νικῶντα
πέρυσιν;
Of these the most forward in originating aggressive measures, though
almost the youngest, was Pelopidas; whose daring and self-devotion,
in an enterprise which seemed utterly desperate, soon communicated
itself to a handful of his comrades. The exiles, keeping up constant
private correspondence with their friends in Thebes, felt assured of
the sympathy of the citizens generally, if they could once strike a
blow. Yet nothing less would be sufficient than the destruction of
the four rulers, Leontiades and his colleagues,—nor would any one
within the city devote himself to so hopeless a danger. It was this
conspiracy which Pelopidas, Mellon, and five or ten other exiles (the
entire band is differently numbered, by some as seven, by others,
twelve[177]) undertook to execute. Many of their friends in Thebes
came in as auxiliaries to them, who would not have embarked in the
design as primary actors. Of all auxiliaries, the most effective and
indispensable was Phyllidas, the secretary of the polemarchs; next
to him, Charon, an eminent and earnest patriot. Phyllidas, having
been despatched to Athens on official business, entered into secret
conference with the conspirators, concerted with them the day for
their coming to Thebes, and even engaged to provide for them access
to the persons of the polemarchs. Charon not only promised them
concealment in his house, from their first coming within the gates
until the moment of striking their blow should have arrived,—but
also entered his name to share in the armed attack. Nevertheless,
in spite of such partial encouragements, the plan still appeared
desperate to many who wished heartily for its success. Epaminondas,
for example,—who now for the first time comes before us,—resident
at Thebes, and not merely sympathizing with the political views of
Pelopidas, but also bound to him by intimate friendship,—dissuaded
others from the attempt, and declined participating in it. He
announced distinctly that he would not become an accomplice in civil
bloodshed. It appears that there were men among the exiles whose
violence made him fear that they would not, like Pelopidas, draw the
sword exclusively against Leontiades and his colleagues, but would
avail themselves of success to perpetrate unmeasured violence against
other political enemies.[178]
[177] Xenophon says _seven_ (Hellen. v, 4, 1, 2); Plutarch and
Cornelius Nepos say _twelve_ (Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 2, p.
576 C.; Plutarch, Pelopidas c. 8-13; Cornel. Nepos, Pelopidas, c.
2).
It is remarkable that Xenophon never mentions the name of
Pelopidas in this conspiracy; nor indeed (with one exception)
throughout his Hellenica.
[178] Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 3, p. 576 E.; p. 577 A.
The day for the enterprise was determined by Phyllidas the secretary,
who had prepared an evening banquet for Archias and Philippus, in
celebration of the period when they were going out of office as
polemarchs,—and who had promised on that occasion to bring into
their company some women remarkable for beauty, as well as of the
best families in Thebes.[179] In concert with the general body of
Theban exiles at Athens, who held themselves ready on the borders
of Attica, together with some Athenian sympathizers, to march to
Thebes the instant that they should receive intimation,—and in
concert also with two out of the ten Stratêgi of Athens, who took
on themselves privately to countenance the enterprise, without any
public vote,—Pelopidas and Mellon, and their five companions,[180]
crossed Kithæron from Athens to Thebes. It was wet weather, about
December B.C. 379; they were disguised as rustics or hunters, with
no other arms than a concealed dagger; and they got within the gates
of Thebes one by one at nightfall, just when the latest farming men
were coming home from their fields. All of them arrived safe at the
house of Charon, the appointed rendezvous.
[179] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 4. τὰς σεμνοτάτας καὶ καλλίστας τῶν
ἐν Θήβαις. Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 4, p. 577 C.; Plutarch,
Pelopid. c. 9.
The Theban women were distinguished for majestic figure and
beauty (Dikæarchus, Vit. Græc. p. 144, ed Fuhr.).
[180] Plutarch, (Pelopid. c. 25; De Gen. Socr. c. 26, p. 594 D.)
mentions Menekleidês, Damokleidas, and Theopompus among them.
Compare Cornel. Nepos, Pelopid. c. 2.
It was, however, by mere accident that they had not been turned back,
and the whole scheme frustrated. For a Theban named Hipposthenidas,
friendly to the conspiracy, but faint-hearted, who had been let into
the secret against the will of Phyllidas,—became so frightened as the
moment of execution approached, that he took upon himself, without
the knowledge of the rest, to despatch Chlidon, a faithful slave of
Mellon, ordering him to go forth on horseback from Thebes, to meet
his master on the road, and to desire that he and his comrades would
go back to Attica, since circumstances had happened to render the
project for the moment impracticable. Chlidon, going home to fetch
his bridle, but not finding it in its usual place, asked his wife
where it was. The woman, at first pretending to look for it, at last
confessed that she had lent it to a neighbor. Chlidon became so
irritated with this delay, that he got into a loud altercation with
his wife, who on her part wished him ill luck with his journey. He
at last beat her, until neighbors ran in to interpose. His departure
was thus accidentally frustrated, so that the intended message of
countermand never reached the conspirators on their way.[181]
[181] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 8; Plutarch, De Gen. Socrat. c. 17,
p. 586 B.; c. 18, p. 587 D-E.
In the house of Charon they remained concealed all the ensuing day,
on the evening of which the banquet of Archias and Philippus was to
take place. Phyllidas had laid his plan for introducing them at that
banquet, at the moment when the two polemarchs had become full of
wine, in female attire, as being the women whose visit was expected.
The hour had nearly arrived, and they were preparing to play their
parts, when an unexpected messenger knocked at the door, summoning
Charon instantly into the presence of the polemarchs. All within
were thunderstruck with the summons, which seemed to imply that the
plot had been divulged, perhaps by the timid Hipposthenidas. It was
agreed among them that Charon must obey at once. Nevertheless, he
himself, even in the perilous uncertainty which beset him, was most
of all apprehensive lest the friends whom he had sheltered should
suspect him of treachery towards themselves and their cause. Before
departing, therefore, he sent for his only son, a youth of fifteen,
and of conspicuous promise in every way. This youth he placed in the
hands of Pelopidas, as a hostage for his own fidelity. But Pelopidas
and the rest, vehemently disclaiming all suspicion, entreated Charon
to put his son away, out of the reach of that danger in which all
were now involved. Charon, however, could not be prevailed on to
comply, and left his son among them to share the fate of the rest.
He went into the presence of Archias and Philippus; whom he found
already half-intoxicated, but informed, by intelligence from Athens,
that some plot, they knew not by whom, was afloat. They had sent for
him to question him, as a known friend of the exiles; but he had
little difficulty, aided by the collusion of Phyllidas, in blinding
the vague suspicions of drunken men, anxious only to resume their
conviviality.[182] He was allowed to retire and rejoin his friends.
Nevertheless, soon after his departure,—so many were the favorable
chances which befel these improvident men,—a fresh message was
delivered to Archias the polemarch, from his namesake Archias the
Athenian Hierophant, giving an exact account of the names and scheme
of the conspirators, which had become known to the philo-Laconian
party at Athens. The messenger who bore this despatch delivered it to
Archias with an intimation, that it related to very serious matters.
“Serious matters for to-morrow,” said the polemarch, as he put the
despatch, unopened and unread, under the pillow of the couch on which
he was reclining.[183]
[182] Xenophon does not mention this separate summons and visit
of Charon to the polemarchs,—nor anything about the scene
with his son. He only notices Charon as having harbored the
conspirators in his house, and seems even to speak of him as a
person of little consequence—παρὰ Χαρωνί τινι, etc. (v, 4, 3).
The anecdote is mentioned in both the compositions of Plutarch
(De Gen. Socr. c. 28, p. 595; and Pelopidas, c. 9), and is too
interesting to be omitted, being perfectly consistent with
what we read in Xenophon; though it has perhaps somewhat of a
theatrical air.
[183] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 10; Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 30,
p. 596 F. Εἰς αὔριον τὰ σπουδαῖα.
This occurrence also finds no place in the narrative of Xenophon.
Cornelius Nepos, Pelopidas, c. 3. Æneas (Poliorcetic. c. 31)
makes a general reference to the omission of immediate opening
of letters arrived, as having caused the capture of the Kadmeia;
which was, however, only its remote consequence.
Returning to their carousal, Archias and Philippus impatiently called
upon Phyllidas to introduce the women according to his promise. Upon
this the secretary retired, and brought the conspirators, clothed
in female attire, into an adjoining chamber; then going back to
the polemarchs, he informed them that the women would not come in
unless all the domestics were first dismissed. An order was forthwith
given that these latter should depart, while Phyllidas took care
that they should be well provided with wine at the lodging of one
among their number. The polemarchs were thus left only with one or
two friends at table, half-intoxicated as well as themselves; among
them Kabeirichus, the archon of the year, who always throughout his
term kept the consecrated spear of office in actual possession,
and had it at that moment close to his person. Phyllidas now
conducted the pretended women into the banqueting-room; three of
them attired as ladies of distinction, the four others following as
female attendants. Their long veils, and ample folds of clothing,
were quite sufficient as disguise,—even had the guests at table
been sober,—until they sat down by the side of the polemarchs; and
the instant of lifting their veils was the signal for using their
daggers. Archias and Philippus were slain at once and with little
resistance; but Kabeirichus with his spear tried to defend himself,
and thus perished with the others, though the conspirators had not
originally intended to take his life.[184]
[184] The description given by Xenophon, of this assassination
of the polemarchs at Thebes, differs materially from that of
Plutarch. I follow Xenophon in the main; introducing, however,
several of the details found in Plutarch, which are interesting,
and which have the air of being authentic.
Xenophon himself intimates (Hellen. v, 4, 7), that besides the
story given in the text, there was also another story told by
some,—that Mellon and his companions had got access to the
polemarchs in the guise of drunken revellers. It is this latter
story which Plutarch has adopted, and which carries him into
many details quite inconsistent with the narrative of Xenophon.
I think the story, of the conspirators having been introduced in
female attire, the more probable of the two. It is borne out by
the exact analogy of what Herodotus tells us respecting Alexander
son of Amyntas, prince of Macedonia (Herod. v, 20).
Compare Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 10, 11; Plutarch, De Gen. Socrat.
c. 31, p. 597. Polyænus (ii, 4, 3) gives a story with many
different circumstances, yet agreeing in the fact that Pelopidas
in female attire killed the Spartan general. The story alluded to
by Aristotle (Polit. v, 5, 10), though he names both Thebes and
Archias, can hardly refer to this event.
It is Plutarch, however, who mentions the presence of Kabeirichus
the archon at the banquet, and the curious Theban custom that
the archon during his year of office never left out of his hand
the consecrated spear. As a Bœotian born, Plutarch was doubtless
familiar with these old customs.
From what other authors Plutarch copied the abundant details of
this revolution at Thebes, which he interweaves in the life of
Pelopidas and in the treatise called De Genio Socratis—we do not
know. Some critics suppose him to have borrowed from Dionysodôrus
and Anaxis—Bœotian historians whose work comprised this period,
but of whom not a single fragment is preserved (see Fragm.
Histor. Græc. ed. Didot, vol. ii, p. 84).
Having been thus far successful, Phyllidas conducted three of the
conspirators,—Pelopidas, Kephisodôrus, and Damokleidas,—to the house
of Leontiades, into which he obtained admittance by announcing
himself as the bearer of an order from the polemarchs. Leontiades was
reclining after supper, with his wife sitting spinning wool by his
side, when they entered his chamber. Being a brave and powerful man,
he started up, seized his sword, and mortally wounded Kephisodôrus
in the throat; a desperate struggle then ensued between him and
Pelopidas in the narrow doorway, where there was no room for a third
to approach. At length, however, Pelopidas overthrew and killed him,
after which they retired, enjoining the wife with threats to remain
silent, and closing the door after them with peremptory commands
that it should not be again opened. They then went to the house
of Hypatês, whom they slew while he attempted to escape over the
roof.[185]
[185] Xen. Hell. v, 4, 9; Plutarch, Pelop. c. 11, 12; and De Gen.
Socr. p. 597 D-F. Here again Xenophon and Plutarch differ; the
latter represents that Pelopidas got into the house of Leontiades
_without_ Phyllidas,—which appears to me altogether improbable.
On the other hand, Xenophon mentions nothing about the defence
of Leontiades and his personal conflict with Pelopidas, which
I copy from Plutarch. So brave a man as Leontiades, awake and
sober, would not let himself be slain without a defence dangerous
to assailants. Plutarch, in another place, singles out the death
of Leontiades as the marking circumstance of the whole glorious
enterprise, and the most impressive to Pelopidas (Plutarch—Non
posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum—p. 1099 A-E.).
The four great rulers of the philo-Laconian party in Thebes having
been now put to death, Phyllidas proceeded with the conspirators to
the prison. Here the gaoler, a confidential agent in the oppressions
of the deceased governors, hesitated to admit him; but was slain by a
sudden thrust with his spear, so as to ensure free admission to all.
To liberate the prisoners, probably, for the most part men of kindred
politics with the conspirators,—to furnish them with arms taken
from the battle-spoils hanging up in the neighboring porticos,—and
to range them in battle order near the temple of Amphion,—were the
next proceedings; after which they began to feel some assurance
of safety and triumph.[186] Epaminondas and Gorgidas, apprised of
what had occurred, were the first who appeared in arms with a few
friends to sustain the cause; while proclamation was everywhere made
aloud, through heralds, that the despots were slain,—that Thebes
was free,—and that all Thebans who valued freedom should muster in
arms in the market-place. There were at that moment in Thebes many
trumpeters who had come to contend for the prize at the approaching
festival of the Herakleia. Hipposthenidas engaged these men to blow
their trumpets in different parts of the city, and thus everywhere to
excite the citizens to arms.[187]
[186] Xenoph. Hell. v, 4, 8; Plutarch, Pelop. c. 12; De Gen.
Socr. p. 598 B.
[187] This is a curious piece of detail, which we learn from
Plutarch (De Gen. Socr. c. 34. p. 598 D.).
The Orchomenian Inscriptions in Boeckh’s Collection record the
prizes given to these Σαλπιγκταὶ or trumpeters (see Boeckh, Corp.
Inscr. No. 1584, 1585, etc.).
Although during the darkness surprise was the prevalent feeling,
and no one knew what to do,—yet so soon as day dawned, and the
truth became known, there was but one feeling of joy and patriotic
enthusiasm among the majority of the citizens.[188] Both horsemen
and hoplites hastened in arms to the agora. Here for the first time
since the seizure of the Kadmeia by Phœbidas, a formal assembly
of the Theban people was convened, before which Pelopidas and his
fellow-conspirators presented themselves. The priests of the city
crowned them with wreaths, and thanked them in the name of the local
gods; while the assembly hailed them with acclamations of delight and
gratitude, nominating with one voice Pelopidas, Mellon, and Charon,
as the first renewed Bœotarchs.[189] The revival of this title, which
had been dropped since the peace of Antalkidas, was in itself an
event of no mean significance; implying not merely that Thebes had
waked up again into freedom, but that the Bœotian confederacy also
had been, or would be, restored.
[188] The unanimous joy with which the consummation of the
revolution was welcomed in Thebes,—and the ardor with which the
citizens turned out to support it by armed force,—is attested by
Xenophon, no very willing witness,—Hellen. v, 4, 9. ἐπεὶ δ’ ἡμέρα
ἦν καὶ φανερὸν ἦν τὸ γεγενημένον, ταχὺ δὴ καὶ οἱ ὁπλῖται καὶ οἱ
ἱππεῖς σὺν τοῖς ὅπλοις ἐξεβοήθουν.
[189] Plutarch, Pelop. c. 12.
Messengers had been forthwith despatched by the conspirators to
Attica to communicate their success; upon which all the remaining
exiles, with the two Athenian generals privy to the plot, and a body
of Athenian volunteers, or _corps francs_, all of whom were ready on
the borders awaiting the summons,—flocked to Thebes to complete the
work. The Spartan generals, on their side also, sent to Platæa and
Thespiæ for aid. During the whole night, they had been distracted and
alarmed by the disturbance in the city; lights showing themselves
here and there, with trumpets sounding and shouts for the recent
success.[190] Apprised speedily of the slaughter of the polemarchs,
from whom they had been accustomed to receive orders, they knew not
whom to trust or to consult, while they were doubtless beset by
affrighted fugitives of the now defeated party, who would hurry up
the Kadmeia for safety. They reckoned at first on a diversion in
their favor from the forces at Platæa and Thespiæ. But these forces
were not permitted even to approach the city gate; being vigorously
charged, as soon as they came in sight, by the newly-mustered Theban
cavalry, and forced to retreat with loss. The Lacedæmonians in the
citadel were thus not only left without support, but saw their
enemies in the city reinforced by the other exiles, and by the
auxiliary volunteers.[191]
[190] Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. p. 598 E.; Pelop. c. 12.
[191] Xenophon expressly mentions that the Athenians who were
invited to come, and who actually did come, to Thebes, were the
two generals and the volunteers; all of whom were before privy
to the plot, and were in readiness on the borders of Attica—τοὺς
~πρὸς τοῖς ὁρίοις~ Ἀθηναίων καὶ τοὺς δύο τῶν στρατηγῶν—οἱ
Ἀθηναῖοι ~ἀπὸ τῶν ὁρίων~ ἤδη παρῆσαν (Hellen. v, 4, 9, 10).
Meanwhile, Pelopidas and the other new Bœotarchs found themselves at
the head of a body of armed citizens, full of devoted patriotism
and unanimous in hailing the recent revolution. They availed
themselves of this first burst of fervor to prepare for storming
the Kadmeia without delay, knowing the importance of forestalling
all aid from Sparta. And the citizens were already rushing up to
the assault,—proclamation being made of large rewards to those who
should first force their way in,—when the Lacedæmonian commander sent
proposals for a capitulation.[192] Undisturbed egress from Thebes,
with the honors of war, being readily guaranteed to him by oath,
the Kadmeia was then surrendered. As the Spartans were marching out
of the gates, many Thebans of the defeated party came forth also.
But against these latter the exasperation of the victors was so
ungovernable, that several of the most odious were seized as they
passed, and put to death; in some cases, even their children along
with them. And more of them would have been thus despatched, had not
the Athenian auxiliaries, with generous anxiety, exerted every effort
to get them out of sight and put them into safety.[193] We are not
told,—nor is it certain,—that these Thebans were protected under the
capitulation. Even had they been so, however, the wrathful impulse
might still have prevailed against them. Of the three harmosts who
thus evacuated the Kadmeia without a blow, two were put to death,
the third was heavily fined and banished, by the authorities at
Sparta.[194] We do not know what the fortifications of the Kadmeia
were, nor how far it was provisioned. But we can hardly wonder that
these officers were considered to have dishonored the Lacedæmonian
arms, by making no attempt to defend it; when we recollect that
hardly more than four or five days would be required to procure
adequate relief from home,—and that forty-three years afterwards, the
Macedonian garrison in the same place maintained itself against the
Thebans in the city for more than fourteen days, until the return of
Alexander from Illyria.[195] The first messenger who brought news to
Sparta of the conspiracy and revolution at Thebes, appears to have
communicated at the same time that the garrison had evacuated the
Kadmeia and was in full retreat, with a train of Theban exiles from
the defeated party.[196]
[192] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 10, 11. προσέβαλον πρὸς τὴν
ἀκρόπολιν—τὴν προθυμίαν τῶν προσιόντων ἁπάντων ἑώρων, etc.
Diodorus, xv, 25. ἔπειτα τοὺς πολίτας ἐπὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν
παρακαλέσαντες (the successful Theban conspirators, Pelopidas,
etc.) ~συνέργους ἔσχον ἅπαντας τοὺς Θηβαίους~.
[193] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 12.
[194] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 13; Diodor. xv, 27.
Plutarch (Pelopid. c. 13) augments the theatrical effect by
saying that the Lacedæmonian garrison on its retreat, actually
met at Megara the reinforcements under king Kleombrotus, which
had advanced thus far, on their march to relieve the Kadmeia.
But this is highly improbable. The account of Xenophon intimates
clearly that the Kadmeia was surrounded on the next morning after
the nocturnal movement. The commanders capitulated in the first
moment of distraction and despair, without even standing an
assault.
[195] Arrian, i, 6.
[196] In recounting this revolution at Thebes, and the
proceedings of the Athenians in regard to it, I have followed
Xenophon almost entirely.
Diodorus (xv, 25, 26) concurs with Xenophon in stating that the
Theban exiles got back from Attica to Thebes by night, partly
through the concurrence of the Athenians (συνεπιλαβομένων τῶν
Ἀθηναίων)—slew the rulers—called the citizens to freedom next
morning, finding all hearty in the cause—and then proceeded to
besiege the fifteen hundred Lacedæmonians and Peloponnesians in
the Kadmeia.
But after thus much of agreement, Diodorus states what followed,
in a manner quite inconsistent with Xenophon; thus (he tells us)—
The Lacedæmonian commander sent instant intelligence to Sparta
of what had happened, with request for a reinforcement. The
Thebans at once attempted to storm the Kadmeia, but were repulsed
with great loss, both of killed and wounded. Fearing that they
might not be able to take the fort before reinforcement should
come from Sparta, they sent envoys to Athens to ask for aid,
reminding the Athenians that they (the Thebans) had helped to
emancipate Athens from the Thirty, and to restore the democracy
(ὑπομιμνήσκοντες μὲν ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ ~συγκατήγαγον τὸν δῆμον~ τῶν
Ἀθηναίων καθ’ ὃν καιρὸν ὑπὸ τῶν τριάκοντα κατεδουλώθησαν). The
Athenians, partly from desire to requite this favor, partly from
a wish to secure the Thebans as allies against Sparta, passed a
public vote to assist them forthwith. Demophon the general got
together five thousand hoplites and five hundred horsemen, with
whom he hastened to Thebes on the next day; and all the remaining
population were prepared to follow, if necessary (πανδημεί).
All the other cities in Bœotia also sent aid to Thebes too,—so
that there was assembled there a large force of twelve thousand
hoplites and two thousand horsemen. This united force, the
Athenians being among them, assaulted the Kadmeia day and night,
relieving each other; but were repelled with great loss of killed
and wounded. At length the garrison found themselves without
provisions; the Spartans were tardy in sending reinforcement;
and sedition broke out among the Peloponnesian allies who formed
the far larger part of the garrison. These Peloponnesians,
refusing to fight longer, insisted upon capitulating; which the
Lacedæmonian governor was obliged perforce to do, though both he
and the Spartans along with him desired to hold out to the death.
The Kadmeia was accordingly surrendered, and the garrison went
back to Peloponnesus. The Lacedæmonian reinforcement from Sparta
arrived only a little too late.
All these circumstances stated by Diodorus are not only
completely different from Xenophon, but irreconcilable with his
conception of the event. We must reject either the one or the
other.
Now Xenophon is not merely the better witness of the two, but is
in this case sustained by all the collateral probabilities of the
case.
1. Diodorus represents the Athenians as having despatched by
public vote, assistance to Thebes, in order to requite the
assistance which the Thebans had before sent to restore the
Athenian democracy against the Thirty. Now this is incorrect
in point of fact. The Thebans had _never sent any assistance_,
positive or ostensible, to Thrasybulus and the Athenian democrats
against the Thirty. They had assisted Thrasybulus underhand,
and without any public government-act; and they had refused to
serve along with the Spartans against him. But they never sent
any force to help him against the Thirty. Consequently, the
Athenians _could not_ now have sent any public force to Thebes,
_in requital_ for a similar favor done before by the Thebans to
them.
2. Had the Athenians passed a formal vote, sent a large public
army, and taken vigorous part in several bloody assaults on
the Lacedæmonian garrison in the Kadmeia,—this would have been
the most flagrant and unequivocal commencement of hostilities
against Sparta. No Spartan envoys could, after that, have gone
to Athens, and stayed safely in the house of the Proxenus,—as we
know from Xenophon that they did. Besides,—the story of Sphodrias
(presently to be recounted) proves distinctly that Athens was at
peace with Sparta, and had committed no act of hostility against
her, for three or four months at least after the revolution at
Thebes. It therefore refutes the narrative of Diodorus about
the public vote of the Athenians, and the public Athenian force
under Demophon, aiding in the attack of the Kadmeia. Strange
to say,—Diodorus himself, three chapters afterwards (xv, 29),
relates this story about Sphodrias, just in the same manner
(with little difference) as Xenophon; ushering in the story with
a declaration, that _the Athenians were still at peace with
Sparta_, and forgetting that he had himself recounted a distinct
rupture of that peace on the part of the Athenians.
3. The news of the revolution at Thebes must necessarily have
taken the Athenian public completely by surprise (though some
few Athenians were privy to the scheme), because it was a scheme
which had no chance of succeeding except by profound secrecy.
Now, that the Athenian public, hearing the news for the first
time,—having no positive act to complain of on the part of
Sparta, and much reason to fear her power,—having had no previous
circumstances to work them up, or prepare them for any dangerous
resolve,—should identify themselves at once with Thebes,
and provoke war with Sparta in the impetuous manner stated
by Diodorus,—this is, in my judgment, eminently improbable,
requiring good evidence to induce us to believe it.
4. Assume the statement of Diodorus to be true,—what reasonable
explanation can be given of the erroneous version which we
read in Xenophon? The facts as he recounts them conflict most
pointedly with his philo-Laconian partialities; first, the
overthrow of the Lacedæmonian power at Thebes, by a handful
of exiles; still more, the whole story of Sphodrias and his
acquittal.
But assume the statement of Xenophon to be true,—and we can
give a very plausible explanation how the erroneous version
in Diodorus arose. A few months later, after the acquittal of
Sphodrias at Sparta, the Athenians did enter heartily into
the alliance of Thebes, and sent a large public force (indeed
five thousand hoplites, the same number as those of Demophon,
according to Diodorus, c. 32) to assist her in repelling
Agesilaus with the Spartan army. It is by no means unnatural
that their public vote and expedition undertaken about July 378
B.C.,—should have been erroneously thrown back to December 379
B.C. The Athenian orators were fond of boasting that Athens
had saved the Thebans from Sparta; and this might be said with
some truth, in reference to the aid which she really rendered
afterwards. Isokrates (Or. Plataic. s. 31) makes this boast in
general terms; but Deinarchus (cont. Demosthen. s. 40) is more
distinct, and gives in a few words a version the same as that
which we find in Diodorus; so also does Aristeides, in two very
brief allusions (Panathen. p. 172, and Or. xxxviii, Socialis, p.
486-498). Possibly Aristeides as well as Diodorus may have copied
from Ephorus; but however this may be, it is easy to understand
the mistake out of which their version grew.
5. Lastly, Plutarch mentions nothing about the public vote of
the Athenians, and the regular division of troops under Demophon
which Diodorus asserts to have aided in the storming of the
Kadmeia. See Plutarch (De Gen. Socrat. ad fin. Agesil. c. 23;
Pelopid. 12, 13). He intimates only, as Xenophon does, that there
were some Athenian volunteers who assisted the exiles.
M. Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, etc. p. 38-43) discusses
this discrepancy at considerable length, and cites the opinion
of various German authors in respect to it, with none of whom I
altogether concur.
In my judgment, the proper solution is, to reject altogether (as
belonging to a later time) the statement of Diodorus, respecting
the public vote at Athens, and the army said to have been sent to
Thebes under Demophon; and to accept the more credible narrative
of Xenophon; which ascribes to Athens a reasonable prudence, and
great fear of Sparta,—qualities such as Athenian orators would
not be disposed to boast of. According to that narrative, the
question about sending Athenians to aid in storming the Kadmeia
could hardly have been submitted for public discussion, since
that citadel was surrendered at once by the intimidated garrison.
This revolution at Thebes came like an electric shock upon the
Grecian world. With a modern reader, the assassination of the four
leaders, in their houses and at the banquet, raises a sentiment of
repugnance which withdraws his attention from the other features
of this memorable deed. Now an ancient Greek not only had no such
repugnance, but sympathized with the complete revenge for the seizure
of the Kadmeia and the death of Ismenias; while he admired, besides,
the extraordinary personal daring of Pelopidas and Mellon,—the
skilful forecast of the plot,—and the sudden overthrow, by a force
so contemptibly small, of a government which the day before seemed
unassailable.[197] It deserves note that we here see the richest
men in Thebes undertaking a risk, single-handed and with their
own persons, which must have appeared on a reasonable estimate
little less than desperate. From the Homeric Odysseus and Achilles
down to the end of free Hellenism, the rich Greek strips in the
Palæstra,[198] and exposes his person in the ranks as a soldier like
the poorest citizens; being generally superior to them in strength
and bodily efficiency.
[197] The daring _coup de main_ of Pelopidas and Mellon, against
the government of Thebes, bears a remarkable analogy to that by
which Evagoras got into Salamis and overthrew the previous despot
(Isokrates, Or. ix, Evagor. s. 34).
[198] See, in illustration of Greek sentiment on this point,
Xenophon, Hellen. iii, 4, 19; and Xenophon, Enc. Ages. i, 28.
As the revolution in Thebes acted forcibly on the Grecian mind from
the manner in which it was accomplished, so by its positive effects
it altered forthwith the balance of power in Greece. The empire of
Sparta, far from being undisputed and nearly universal over Greece,
is from henceforward only maintained by more or less effort, until at
length it is completely overthrown.[199]
[199] If, indeed, we could believe Isokrates, speaking through
the mouth of a Platæan, it would seem that the Thebans,
immediately after their revolution, sent an humble embassy to
Sparta deprecating hostility, entreating to be admitted as
allies, and promising service, even against their benefactors
the Athenians, just as devoted as the deposed government had
rendered; an embassy which the Spartans haughtily answered by
desiring them to receive back their exiles, and to cast out the
assassins Pelopidas and his comrades. It is possible that the
Thebans may have sent to try the possibility of escaping Spartan
enmity; but it is highly improbable that they made any such
promises as those here mentioned; and it is certain that they
speedily began to prepare vigorously for that hostility which
they saw to be approaching.
See Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 31.
This oration is put into the mouth of a Platæan, and seems to be
an assemblage of nearly all the topics which could possibly be
enforced, truly or falsely, against Thebes.
The exiles from Thebes, arriving at Sparta, inflamed both the ephors,
and the miso-Theban Agesilaus, to the highest pitch. Though it was
then the depth of winter,[200] an expedition was decreed forthwith
against Thebes, and the allied contingents were summoned. Agesilaus
declined to take the command of it, on the ground that he was above
sixty years of age, and therefore no longer liable to compulsory
foreign service. But this (says Xenophon[201]) was not his real
reason. He was afraid that his enemies at Sparta would say,—“Here
is Agesilaus again putting us to expense, in order that he may
uphold despots in other cities,”—as he had just done, and had been
reproached with doing, at Phlius; a second proof that the reproaches
against Sparta (which I have cited a few pages above from Lysias and
Isokrates) of allying herself with Greek despots as well as with
foreigners to put down Grecian freedom, found an echo even in Sparta
herself. Accordingly Kleombrotus, the other king of Sparta, took the
command. He had recently succeeded his brother Agesipolis, and had
never commanded before.
[200] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 14. μάλα χειμῶνος ὄντος.
[201] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 13. εὖ εἰδὼς ὅτι, εἰ στρατηγοίη, λέξειαν
οἱ πολῖται, ὡς Ἀγησίλαος, ὅπως βοηθήσειε τοῖς τυράννοις, πράγματα
τῇ πόλει παρέχοι. Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24.
Kleombrotus conducted his army along the Isthmus of Corinth through
Megara to Platæa, cutting to pieces an outpost of Thebans, composed
chiefly of the prisoners set free by the recent revolution, who had
been placed for the defence of the intervening mountain-pass. From
Platæa he went forward to Thespiæ, and from thence to Kynoskephalæ in
the Theban territory, where he lay encamped for sixteen days; after
which he retreated to Thespiæ. It appears that he did nothing, and
that his inaction was the subject of much wonder in his army, who
are said to have even doubted whether he was really and earnestly
hostile to Thebes. Perhaps the exiles, with customary exaggeration,
may have led him to hope that they could provoke a rising in Thebes,
if he would only come near. At any rate the bad weather must have
been a serious impediment to action; since in his march back to
Peloponnesus through Kreusis and Ægosthenæ the wind blew a hurricane,
so that his soldiers could not proceed without leaving their shields
and coming back afterwards to fetch them. Kleombrotus did not quit
Bœotia, however, without leaving Sphodrias as harmost at Thespiæ,
with one third of the entire army, and with a considerable sum of
money to employ in hiring mercenaries and acting vigorously against
the Thebans.[202]
[202] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 15-18.
The army of Kleombrotus, in its march from Megara to Platæa, had
passed by the skirts of Attica; causing so much alarm to the
Athenians, that they placed Chabrias with a body of peltasts, to
guard their frontier and the neighboring road through Eleutheræ
into Bœotia. This was the first time that a Lacedæmonian army had
touched Attica (now no longer guarded by the lines of Corinth, as
in the war between 394 and 388 B.C.) since the retirement of king
Pausanias in 404 B.C.; furnishing a proof of the exposure of the
country, such as to revive in the Athenian mind all the terrible
recollections of Dekeleia and the Peloponnesian war. It was during
the first prevalence of this alarm,—and seemingly while Kleombrotus
was still with his army at Thespiæ or Kynoskephalæ, close on the
Athenian frontier,—that three Lacedæmonian envoys, Etymoklês and
two others, arrived at Athens to demand satisfaction for the part
taken by the two Athenian generals and the Athenian volunteers, in
concerting and aiding the enterprise of Pelopidas and his comrades.
So overpowering was the anxiety in the public mind to avoid giving
offence to Sparta, that these two generals were both of them accused
before the dikastery. The first of them was condemned and executed;
the second, profiting by this warning (since, pursuant to the
psephism of Kannônus,[203] the two would be put on trial separately),
escaped, and a sentence of banishment was passed against him.[204]
These two generals had been unquestionably guilty of a grave abuse
of their official functions. They had brought the state into public
hazard, not merely without consulting the senate or assembly, but
even without taking the sense of their own board of Ten. Nevertheless
the severity of the sentence pronounced indicates the alarm, as well
as the displeasure, of the general body of Athenians; while it served
as a disclaimer in fact, if not in form, of all political connection
with Thebes.[205]
[203] See Vol. VIII. of this History, Ch. lxiv, p. 196—about the
psephism of Kannônus.
[204] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 19; Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 14.
Xenophon mentions the Lacedæmonian envoys at Athens, but does
not expressly say that they were sent to demand reparation for
the conduct of these two generals or of the volunteers. I cannot
doubt, however, that the fact was so; for in those times, there
were no resident envoys,—none but envoys sent on special missions.
[205] The trial and condemnation of these two generals has
served as the groundwork for harsh reproach against the Athenian
democracy. Wachsmuth (Hellen. Alterth. i, p. 654) denounces
it as “a judicial horror, or abomination—ein Greul-gericht.”
Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, etc. p. 44, 45) says,—“Quid?
quia invasionem Lacedæmoniorum viderant in Bœotiam factam esse,
non puduit eos, damnare imperatores quorum facta suis decretis
comprobaverant?” ... “Igitur hanc _illius facinoris excusationem_
habebimus: Rebus quæ a Thebanis agebantur (_i. e._ by the
propositions of the Thebans seeking peace from Sparta, and trying
to get enrolled as her allies,—alleged by Isokrates, which I
have noticed above as being, in my judgment, very inaccurately
recorded) cognitis, Athenienses, quo _enixius subvenerant,
eo majore pœnitentiâ perculsi_ sunt.... Sed tantum abfuit ut
sibimet irascerentur, ut, _e more Atheniensium, punirentur qui
perfecerant id quod tum populus exoptaverat_.”
The censures of Wachsmuth, Rehdantz, etc. assume as matter of
fact,—1. That the Athenians had passed a formal vote in the
public assembly to send assistance to Thebes, under two generals,
who accordingly went out in command of the army and performed
their instructions. 2. That the Athenians, becoming afterwards
repentant or terrified, tried and condemned these two generals
for having executed the commission entrusted to them.
I have already shown grounds (in a previous note) for believing
that the first of these affirmations is incorrect; the second, as
dependent on it, will therefore be incorrect also.
These authors here appear to me to single out a portion of each
of the two _inconsistent_ narratives of Xenophon and Diodorus,
and blend them together in a way which contradicts both.
Thus, they take from Diodorus the allegation, that the Athenians
sent to Thebes by public vote a large army, which fought along
with the Thebans against the Kadmeia,—an allegation which, not
only is not to be found in Xenophon, but which his narrative
plainly, though indirectly, excludes.
Next, they take from Xenophon the allegation, that the Athenians
tried and condemned the two generals who were accomplices in the
conspiracy of Mellon against the Theban rulers,—τὼ δύω στρατηγὼ,
οἳ συνηπιστάσθην τὴν τοῦ Μέλλωνος ἐπὶ τοὺς περὶ Λεοντιάδην
ἐπανάστασιν (v, 4, 19). Now the mention of these two generals
follows naturally and consistently in _Xenophon_. He had before
told us that there were _two_ out of the Athenian generals, who
both assisted underhand in organizing the plot, and afterwards
went with the volunteers to Thebes. But it cannot be fitted
on to the narrative of _Diodorus, who never says a word about
this condemnation by the Athenians_—nor even mentions _any two
Athenian generals_, at all. He tells us that the Athenian army
which went to Thebes was commanded by Demophon; he notices
no colleague whatever. He says in general words, that the
conspiracy was organized “with the assistance of the Athenians”
(συνεπιλαβομένων Ἀθηναίων); not saying a word about any _two
generals_ as especially active.
Wachsmuth and Rehdantz take it for granted, most gratuitously,
that these two condemned generals (mentioned by Xenophon and not
by Diodorus) are identical with Demophon and another colleague,
commanders of an army which went out by public vote (mentioned by
Diodorus and not by Xenophon).
The narratives of Xenophon and Diodorus (as I have before
observed) are distinct and inconsistent with each other. We have
to make our option between them. I adhere to that of Xenophon,
for reasons previously given. But if any one prefers that of
Diodorus, he ought then to reject altogether the story of the
condemnation of the two Athenian generals (_who nowhere appear
in Diodorus_), and to suppose that Xenophon was misinformed upon
that point, as upon the other facts of the case.
That the two Athenian generals (assuming the Xenophontic
narrative as true) should be tried and punished, when the
consequences of their unauthorized proceeding were threatening to
come with severity upon Athens,—appears to me neither improbable
nor unreasonable. Those who are shocked by the very severity
of the sentence, will do well to read the remarks which the
Lacedæmonian envoys make (Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 23) on the conduct
of Sphodrias.
To turn from one severe sentence to another,—whoever believes the
narrative of Diodorus in preference to that of Xenophon, ought
to regard the execution of those two Lacedæmonian commanders
who surrendered the Kadmeia as exceedingly cruel. According to
Diodorus, these officers had done everything which brave men
could do; they had resisted a long time, repelled many attacks,
and were only prevented from farther holding out by a mutiny
among their garrison.
Here again, we see the superiority of the narrative of
Xenophon over that of Diodorus. According to the former, these
Lacedæmonian commanders surrendered the Kadmeia without any
resistance at all. Their condemnation, like that of the Athenian
two generals, becomes a matter easy to understand and explain.
Even before the Lacedæmonian envoys had quitted Athens, however,
an incident, alike sudden and memorable, completely altered the
Athenian temper. The Lacedæmonian harmost Sphodrias (whom Kleombrotus
had left at Thespiæ to prosecute the war against Thebes), being
informed that Peiræus on its land side was without gates or night
watch,—since there was no suspicion of attack,—conceived the idea of
surprising it by a night-march from Thespiæ, and thus of mastering
at one stroke the commerce, the wealth, and the naval resources of
Athens. Putting his troops under march one evening after an early
supper, he calculated on reaching the Peiræus the next morning before
daylight. But his reckoning proved erroneous. Morning overtook
him when he had advanced no farther than the Thriasian plain near
Eleusis; from whence, as it was useless to proceed farther, he turned
back and retreated to Thespiæ; not, however, without committing
various acts of plunder against the neighboring Athenian residents.
This plan against Peiræus appears to have been not ill conceived. Had
Sphodrias been a man competent to organize and execute movements as
rapid as those of Brasidas, there is no reason why it might not have
succeeded; in which case the whole face of the war would have been
changed, since the Lacedæmonians, if once masters of Peiræus, both
could and would have maintained the place. But it was one of those
injustices, which no one ever commends until it has been successfully
consummated,—“consilium quod non potest laudari nisi peractum.[206]”
As it failed, it has been considered, by critics as well as by
contemporaries, not merely as a crime but as a fault, and its author
Sphodrias as a brave man, but singularly weak and hot-headed.[207]
Without admitting the full extent of this censure, we may see
that his present aggression grew out of an untoward emulation of
the glory which Phœbidas, in spite of the simulated or transient
displeasure of his countrymen, had acquired by seizing the Kadmeia.
That Sphodrias received private instructions from Kleombrotus (as
Diodorus states) is not sufficiently proved; while the suspicion,
intimated by Xenophon as being abroad, that he was wrought upon
by secret emissaries and bribes from his enemies the Thebans, for
the purpose of plunging Athens into war with Sparta, is altogether
improbable;[208] and seems merely an hypothesis suggested by the
consequences of the act,—which were such, that if his enemies had
bribed him, he could not have served them better.
[206] Tacit. Histor. i, 38.
Compare (in Plutarch, Anton. c. 32) the remark of Sextus Pompey
to his captain Menas, when the latter asked his permission to
cut the cables of the ship, while Octavius and Antony were
dining on board, and to seize their persons,—“I cannot permit
any such thing; but you ought to have done it without asking my
permission.” A reply familiar to the readers of Shakspeare’s
Antony and Cleopatra.
[207] Kallisthenes, Frag. 2, ed. Didot, apud Harpokration, v.
Σφοδρίας; Diodor. xv, 29; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 14; Plutarch,
Agesil. c. 24. The miscalculation of Sphodrias as to the time
necessary for his march to Peiræus is not worse than other
mistakes which Polybius (in a very instructive discourse, ix,
12, 20, seemingly extracted from his lost commentaries on
Tactics) recounts as having been committed by various other able
commanders.
[208] Πείθουσι τὸν ἐν ταῖς Θεσπιαῖς ἁρμοστὴν Σφοδρίαν, χρήματα
δόντες, ὡς ὑπωπτεύετο—Xenoph. Hellen. v, 4, 20; Diodor. xv, 29;
Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 14; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24, 25.
Diodorus affirms private orders from Kleombrotus to Sphodrias.
In rejecting the suspicion mentioned by Xenophon,—that it was
the Theban leaders who instigated and bribed Sphodrias,—we may
remark—1. That the plan might very possibly have succeeded; and
its success would have been ruinous to the Thebans. Had they
been the instigators, they would not have failed to give notice
of it at Athens at the same time; which they certainly did not
do. 2. That if the Lacedæmonians had punished Sphodrias, no war
would have ensued. Now every man would have predicted, that
assuming the scheme to fail, they certainly would punish him.
3. The strong interest taken by Agesilaus afterwards in the
fate of Sphodrias, and the high encomium which he passed on the
general character of the latter,—are quite consistent with a
belief on his part that Sphodrias (like Phœbidas) may have done
wrong towards a foreign city from over-ambition in the service
of his country. But if Agesilaus (who detested the Thebans
beyond measure) had believed that Sphodrias was acting under the
influence of bribes from them, he would not merely have been
disposed to let justice take its course, but would have approved
and promoted the condemnation.
On a previous occasion (Hellen. iii, 5, 3) Xenophon had imputed
to the Thebans a similar refinement of stratagem; seemingly with
just as little cause.
The presence of Sphodrias and his army in the Thriasian plain was
communicated shortly after daybreak at Athens, where it excited
no less terror than surprise. Every man instantly put himself
under arms for defence; but news soon arrived that the invader had
retired. When thus reassured, the Athenians passed from fear to
indignation. The Lacedæmonian envoys, who were lodging at the house
of Kallias the proxenus of Sparta, were immediately put under arrest
and interrogated. But all three affirmed that they were not less
astonished, and not less exasperated, by the march of Sphodrias, than
the Athenians themselves; adding, by way of confirmation, that had
they been really privy to any design of seizing the Peiræus, they
would have taken care not to let themselves be found in the city,
and in their ordinary lodging at the house of the proxenus, where
of course their persons would be at once seized. They concluded by
assuring the Athenians, that Sphodrias would not only be indignantly
disavowed, but punished capitally, at Sparta. And their reply was
deemed so satisfactory, that they were allowed to depart; while an
Athenian embassy was sent to Sparta, to demand the punishment of the
offending general.[209]
[209] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 22; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24.
The Ephors immediately summoned Sphodrias home to Sparta, to take
his trial on a capital charge. So much did he himself despair of
his case, that he durst not make his appearance; while the general
impression was, both at Sparta and elsewhere, that he would certainly
be condemned. Nevertheless, though thus absent and undefended, he was
acquitted, purely through private favor and esteem for his general
character. He was of the party of Kleombrotus, so that all the
friends of that prince espoused his cause, as a matter of course.
But as he was of the party opposed to Agesilaus, his friends dreaded
that the latter would declare against him, and bring about his
condemnation. Nothing saved Sphodrias except the peculiar intimacy
between his son Kleonymus and Archidamus son of Agesilaus. The
mournful importunity of Archidamus induced Agesilaus, when this
important cause was brought before the Senate of Sparta, to put aside
his judicial conviction, and give his vote in the following manner:
“To be sure, Sphodrias is guilty; upon that there cannot be two
opinions. Nevertheless, we cannot put to death a man like him, who,
as boy, youth, and man, has stood unblemished in all Spartan honor.
Sparta cannot part with soldiers like Sphodrias.[210]” The friends
of Agesilaus, following this opinion and coinciding with those of
Kleombrotus, ensured a favorable verdict. And it is remarkable,
that Etymoklês himself, who as envoy at Athens had announced as a
certainty that Sphodrias would be put to death,—as senator and friend
of Agesilaus voted for his acquittal.[211]
[210] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 32. Ἐκεῖνός γε (Ἀγησίλαος) πρὸς πάντας
ὅσοις διείλεκται, ταῦτὰ λέγει· Μὴ ἀδικεῖν μὲν Σφοδρίαν ἀδύνατον
εἶναι· ὅστις μέντοι, παῖς τε ὢν καὶ παιδίσκος καὶ ἡβῶν, πάντα τὰ
καλὰ ποιῶν διετέλεσε, χαλεπὸν εἶναι τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἀποκτιννύναι·
τὴν γὰρ Σπάρτην τοιούτων δεῖσθαι στρατιωτῶν.
Xenophon explains at some length (v, 4, 25-33) and in a very
interesting manner, both the relations between Kleonymus and
Archidamus, and the appeal of Archidamus to his father. The
statement has all the air of being derived from personal
knowledge, and nothing but the fear of prolixity hinders me from
giving it in full.
Compare Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 25; Diodor. xv, 29.
[211] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 22-32.
This remarkable incident (which comes to us from a witness not merely
philo-Laconian, but also personally intimate with Agesilaus) shows
how powerfully the course of justice at Sparta was overruled by
private sympathy and interests,—especially, those of the two kings.
It especially illustrates what has been stated in a former chapter
respecting the oppressions exercised by the Spartan harmosts and the
dekadarchies, for which no redress was attainable at Sparta. Here
was a case where not only the guilt of Sphodrias stood confessed,
but in which also his acquittal was sure to be followed by a war
with Athens. If, under such circumstances, the Athenian demand for
redress was overruled by the favor of the two kings, what chance
was there of any justice to the complaint of a dependent city, or
an injured individual, against the harmost? The contrast between
Spartan and Athenian proceeding is also instructive. Only a few days
before, the Athenians condemned, at the instance of Sparta, their two
generals who had without authority lent aid to the Theban exiles.
In so doing, the Athenian dikastery enforced the law against clear
official misconduct,—and that, too, in a case where their sympathies
went along with the act, though their fear of a war with Sparta was
stronger. But the most important circumstance to note is, that at
Athens there is neither private influence, nor kingly influence,
capable of overruling the sincere judicial conscience of a numerous
and independent dikastery.
The result of the acquittal of Sphodrias must have been well known
beforehand to all parties at Sparta. Even by the general voice
of Greece, the sentence was denounced as iniquitous.[212] But
the Athenians, who had so recently given strenuous effect to the
remonstrances of Sparta against their own generals, were stung by
it to the quick; and only the more stung, in consequence of the
extraordinary compliments to Sphodrias on which the acquittal was
made to turn. They immediately contracted hearty alliance with
Thebes, and made vigorous preparations for war against Sparta both
by land and sea. After completing the fortifications of Peiræus, so
as to place it beyond the reach of any future attempt, they applied
themselves to the building of new ships of war, and to the extension
of their naval ascendency, at the expense of Sparta.[213]
[212] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 24.
[213] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 34-63.
From this moment, a new combination began in Grecian politics. The
Athenians thought the moment favorable to attempt the construction
of a new confederacy, analogous to the Confederacy of Delos, formed
a century before; the basis on which had been reared the formidable
Athenian empire, lost at the close of the Peloponnesian war. Towards
such construction there was so far a tendency, that Athens had
already a small body of maritime allies; while rhetors like Isokrates
(in his Panegyrical Discourse, published two years before) had been
familiarizing the public mind with larger ideas. But the enterprise
was now pressed with the determination and vehemence of men smarting
under recent insult. The Athenians had good ground to build upon;
since, while the discontent against the ascendency of Sparta was
widely spread, the late revolution in Thebes had done much to lessen
that sentiment of fear upon which such ascendency chiefly rested. To
Thebes, the junction with Athens was preëminently welcome, and her
leaders gladly enrolled their city as a constituent member of the
new confederacy.[214] They cheerfully acknowledged the presidency of
Athens,—reserving, however, tacitly or expressly, their own rights
as presidents of the Bœotian federation, as soon as that could be
reconstituted; which reconstitution was at this moment desirable even
for Athens, seeing that the Bœotian towns were now dependent allies
of Sparta under harmosts and oligarchies.
[214] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 34; Xen. de Vectigal. v, 7; Isokrates,
Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 20, 23, 37; Diodor. xv, 29.
The Athenians next sent envoys round to the principal islands and
maritime cities in the Ægean, inviting all of them to an alliance
on equal and honorable terms. The principles were in the main the
same as those upon which the confederacy of Delos had been formed
against the Persians, almost a century before. It was proposed that
a congress of deputies should meet at Athens, one from each city,
small as well as great, each with one vote; that Athens should be
president, yet each individual city autonomous; that a common fund
should be raised, with a common naval force, through assessment
imposed by this congress upon each, and applied as the same authority
might prescribe; the general purpose being defined to be, maintenance
of freedom and security from foreign aggression, to each confederate,
by the common force of all. Care was taken to banish as much as
possible those associations of tribute and subjection which rendered
the recollection of the former Athenian empire unpopular.[215]
And as there were many Athenian citizens, who, during those times
of supremacy, had been planted out as kleruchs or out-settlers in
various dependencies, but had been deprived of their properties at
the close of the war,—it was thought necessary to pass a formal
decree,[216] renouncing and barring all revival of these suspended
rights. It was farther decreed that henceforward no Athenian should
on any pretence hold property, either in house or land, in the
territory of any one of the confederates; neither by purchase, nor
as security for money lent, nor by any other mode of acquisition.
Any Athenian infringing this law, was rendered liable to be informed
against before the synod; who, on proof of the fact, were to deprive
him of the property,—half of it going to the informer, half to the
general purposes of the confederacy.
[215] The contribution was now called σύνταξις, not φόρος;
see Isokrates, De Pace, s. 37-46; Plutarch, Phokion, c. 7;
Harpokration, v. Σύνταξις.
Plutarch, De Fortunâ Athen. p. 351. ἰσόψηφον αὐτοῖς τὴν Ἑλλάδα
κατέστησαν.
[216] Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 47. Καὶ ~τῶν μὲν κτημάτων
τῶν ὑμετέρων αὐτῶν ἀπέστητε~, βουλόμενοι τὴν συμμαχίαν ὡς
μεγίστην ποιῆσαι, etc.
Diodor. xv, 28, 29. Ἐψηφίσαντο δὲ καὶ ~τὰς γενομένας κληρουχίας
ἀποκαταστῆσαι τοῖς πρότερον κυρίοις γεγονόσι~, καὶ νόμον ἔθεντο
μηδένα τῶν Ἀθηναίων γεωργεῖν ἐκτὸς τῆς Ἀττικῆς. Διὰ δὲ ταύτης
τῆς φιλανθρωπίας ἀνακτησάμενοι τὴν παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν εὔνοιαν,
ἰσχυροτέραν ἐποιήσαντο τὴν ἰδίαν ἡγεμονίαν.
Isokrates and Diodorus speak loosely of this vote, in language
which might make us imagine that it was one of distinct
restitution, giving back property _actually enjoyed_. But the
Athenians had never actually regained the outlying private
property lost at the close of the war, though they had much
desired it, and had cherished hopes that a favorable turn of
circumstances might enable them to effect the recovery. As the
recovery, if effected, would be at the cost of those whom they
were now soliciting as allies, the public and formal renunciation
of such rights was a measure of much policy, and contributed
greatly to appease uneasiness in the islands; though in point of
fact nothing was given up except rights to property not really
enjoyed.
An Inscription has recently been discovered at Athens, recording
the original Athenian decree, of which the main provisions
are mentioned in my text. It bears date in the archonship of
Nausinikus. It stands, with the restorations of M. Boeckh
(fortunately a portion of it has been found in tolerably good
preservation), in the Appendix to the new edition of his
work,—“Über die Staats-haushaltung der Athener—Verbesserungen und
Nachträge zu den drei Banden der Staats-haushaltung der Athener,”
p. xx.
Ἀπὸ δὲ Ναυσινίκου ἄρχοντος μὴ ἐξεῖναι μήτε ἰδίᾳ μήτε δημοσίᾳ
Ἀθηναίων μηδενὶ ἐγκτήσασθαι ἐν ταῖς τῶν συμμάχων χώραις μήτε
οἰκίαν μήτε χώριον, μήτε πριαμένῳ, μήτε ὑποθεμένῳ, μήτε ἄλλῳ
τρόπῳ μηδενί. Ἐὰν δέ τις ὠνῆται ἢ κτᾶται ἢ τίθηται τρόπῳ ὁτῳοῦν,
ἐξεῖναι τῷ βουλομένῳ τῶν συμμάχων φῆναι πρὸς τοὺς συνέδρους τῶν
συμμάχων. Οἱ δὲ σύνεδροι ἀπο- -μενοι ἀποδόντων [τὸ μὲν ἥ]μισυ
τῷ φῄναντι, τὸ δὲ ἄ[λλο κοιν]ὸν ἔστω τῶν συνμμάχων. Ἐὰν δέ τις
[ἴῃ] ἐπὶ πολέμῳ ἐπὶ τοὺς ποιησαμένους τὴν συμμαχίαν, ἢ κατὰ γῆν
ἢ κατὰ θάλασσαν, βοηθεῖν Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους τούτοις καὶ
κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν παντὶ σθένει κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. Ἐὰν δέ
τις εἴπῃ ἢ ἐπιψηφίσῃ, ἢ ἄρχων ἢ ἰδιώτης, παρὰ τόδε τὸ ψήφισμα,
ὡς λύειν τι δεῖ τῶν ἐν τῷδε τῷ ψηφίσματι εἰρημένων, ὑπαρχέτω μὲν
αὐτῷ ἀτίμῳ εἶναι, καὶ τὰ χρήματα αὐτοῦ δημόσια ἔστω καὶ τῆς θεοῦ
τὸ ἐπιδέκατον· καὶ κρινέσθω ἐν Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τοῖς συμμάχοις ὡς
διαλύων τὴν συμμαχίαν. Ζημιούντων δὲ αὐτὸν θανάτῳ ἢ φυγῇ ὅπου
Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ σύμμαχοι κρατοῦσι. Ἐὰν δὲ θανάτῳ τιμήθῃ, μὴ
ταφήτω ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ μηδὲ ἐν τῇ τῶν συμμάχων.
Then follows a direction, that the Secretary of the Senate of
Five Hundred shall inscribe the decree on a column of stone,
and place it by the side of the statue of Zeus Eleutherius;
with orders to the Treasurers of the goddess to disburse sixty
drachmas for the cost of so doing.
It appears that there is annexed to this Inscription a list of
such cities as had already joined the confederacy, together with
certain other names added afterwards, of cities which joined
subsequently. The Inscription itself directs such list to be
recorded,—εἰς δὲ τὴν στήλην ταύτην ἀναγράφειν τῶν τε οὐσῶν πόλεων
συμμαχίδων τὰ ὀνόματα, καὶ ἥτις ἂν ἄλλη σύμμαχος γίγνηται.
Unfortunately M. Boeckh has not annexed this list, which,
moreover, he states to have been preserved only in a very partial
and fragmentary condition. He notices only, as contained in it,
the towns of Poiessa and Korêsus in the island of Keos,—and
Antissa and Eresus in Lesbos; all four as autonomous communities.
Such were the liberal principles of confederacy now proposed by
Athens,—who, as a candidate for power, was straightforward and
just, like the Herodotean Deiokês,[217]—and formally ratified, as
well by the Athenians as by the general voice of the confederate
deputies assembled within their walls. The formal decree and compact
of alliance was inscribed on a stone column and placed by the side
of the statue of Zeus Eleutherius or the Liberator; a symbol, of
enfranchisement from Sparta accomplished, as well as of freedom to
be maintained against Persia and other enemies.[218] Periodical
meetings of the confederate deputies were provided to be held (how
often, we do not know) at Athens, and the synod was recognized as
competent judge of all persons, even Athenian citizens, charged with
treason against the confederacy. To give fuller security to the
confederates generally, it was provided in the original compact, that
if any Athenian citizen should either speak, or put any question to
the vote, in the Athenian assembly, contrary to the tenor of that
document,—he should be tried before the synod for treason; and
that, if found guilty, he might be condemned by them to the severest
punishment.
[217] Herodot. i, 96. Ὁ δὲ, οἷα δὴ μνεώμενος ἀρχὴν, ἰθύς τε καὶ
δίκαιος ἦν.