THE BALKANS AND THE PANGERMAN PLAN.
I. The connexion between the Pangerman plan and the plan of
Bulgarian supremacy.
II. Greece and the Pangerman ambitions.
III. Roumania and the Pangerman plan.
In virtue of the geographical position which they occupy in the zone
“from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf,” the Balkan States are of extreme
importance for the making or the marring of the whole Pangerman plan.
Moreover, events have proved to the satisfaction of the most sceptical
the influence which these States exert on the issue of the struggle.
Public opinion, therefore, both in Allied and neutral countries, should
note very clearly the intimate relation which exists between the Balkan
factors and the universal Pangerman plan.
I can here touch only on the fundamental Balkan factors, those that
have a durable and permanent character, not on the attitude of certain
governments in the Eastern peninsula. That attitude for the last year
has been singularly vacillating. It shifts, in fact, under the action
of those parasitic German influences which, through the dynastic
ties of the reigning families, backed by the threats of Berlin, sway
these governments in opposition to the national interests which it is
their bounden duty to defend. Moreover, simple justice compels us to
acknowledge, that the diplomatic mistakes made by the Allies, especially
in 1915, in consequence of their imperfect acquaintance with Balkan
facts, has been singularly favourable to the success of the German
influences.
Thus, for example, at Athens, the present Cabinet, formed after the
arbitrary dissolution of the Greek parliament, and therefore destitute of
all constitutional authority, has been instigated by King Constantine,
brother-in-law of the Emperor William II., to persevere in a policy
which all influential Greeks who are free to speak their minds regard as
disastrous to the true interests of Hellenism. Similarly at Bukarest the
attitude of the Bratiano cabinet is subjected by eminent Roumanians to
searching criticism. Thus _La Roumanie_, the organ of M. Take Jonescu,
speaking of the commercial agreement between Germany and Roumania, has
recently said: “This agreement makes Roumania the dupe of Germany”[5]
(see _Le Journal_, 20th April, 1916). The final decision of certain
Balkan governments is, therefore, for the moment still in suspense, but
whatever it may be, each of the Balkan peoples would infallibly see its
future interests thwarted or menaced by the triumph of the Pangerman
plan. It is important to clear up these prospects. So far as Montenegro
and Serbia are concerned, any discussion would be superfluous, so evident
is it that a German victory would mean for these two States their
definite and final disappearance.
I.
It is otherwise with Bulgaria. Indeed, the key of the whole Balkan
situation lies in the plan of a Bulgarian supremacy, which, as we shall
see, is closely bound up, at least in principle, with the Pangerman plan.
It was said long ago that the Bulgarians are the Prussians of the East.
Now it is just their fixed idea of achieving at any cost their dream of
dominating the Balkans which has led the Bulgarians to throw in their
lot with Berlin, without perceiving that, though they might benefit by
the first phase of this combination, they would finally fall victims to
Pangermanism.
[Illustration: GREAT BULGARIA.]
The pretensions of Bulgaria to supremacy, though even less has been known
about them than about the Pangerman plan, are nevertheless relatively
old, as is conclusively proved by the following facts:
The map printed above is a document of the highest importance, for it
enables us to detect the real policy, first of Bulgaria, and next of the
other Balkan States. This map is an exact translation and reproduction of
the map which is to be found on p. 56 of the historical part of a book
published in Bulgarian at Sofia and called: _The Soldier’s Companion_,
_Manual for the Soldiers of all arms_. This is an official work of
propaganda in the army, and therefore in the whole Bulgarian people,
since all Bulgarians go through the ranks; and it was published in
obedience to order No. 76 of March 14th, 1907, issued by the Bulgarian
Ministry of War, approved and authorized by the Chief of the Headquarters
Staff of the Bulgarian army. This manual has been recommended by the
Bulgarian Ministry of War, in circular No. 28 of March 21st, 1907. Hence
we are confronted with an official Bulgarian book dating from 1907, which
proves very clearly beyond the possibility of dispute the ideas which
have been systematically instilled into the whole Bulgarian people for at
least nine years.
In this map, entitled Great Bulgaria, which is coloured in the eighth
edition of the Bulgarian original, the part said to be “already set free
by the Bulgarians” is coloured pink (represented by large hatchings on
our map), and the parts said to be “not set free by the Bulgarians” are
coloured red (represented by closer hatchings on our map). This official
Bulgarian document helps us to understand, both what happened in the
Balkan wars, and the conduct of the government of Sofia during the
European war.
In fact, when in 1912 the Bulgarians entered into an alliance with the
Greeks and Serbians against Turkey, they were not even then true to
their Allies. At that time they had a very low opinion of the Greeks and
Serbians as soldiers. But they thought it very expedient to employ the
forces of these nations against the principal enemy, Turkey, intending
afterwards to settle accounts with their temporary allies by means of the
increase of power which they expected to gain at the expense of Turkey.
As these intentions were suspected at Belgrade and Athens, it may easily
be conceived that from the very beginning of their joint action the
Greek and Serbian governments did not repose full confidence in that of
Sofia. The distrust of the Greeks and Serbians was, moreover, thoroughly
aroused when King Ferdinand, before he allowed his troops to hurl
themselves against the lines of Chataldja, disclosed his claim to enter
Constantinople, with the evident intention of staying there if he could.
Given the Bulgarian claims in the west, which are set forth in our map,
we can further explain why in 1913 the Bulgarians, whose character is
hard and unyielding, refused all compromise when the Serbians, excluded
by Europe from the Adriatic, demanded from the Bulgarians an equitable
compensation to the south of Uskub.
Moreover, always instigated by their desire of supremacy, and stirred up
by Vienna and Berlin, the Bulgarians thought that the moment had come
to annihilate the Serbians and Greeks. So they made the sudden attack
of June 17-30, 1913, on their former allies. But the wary Serbians and
Greeks were ready for the encounter. Roumania, as little inclined to
tolerate Bulgarian supremacy as Greece or Serbia, marched her troops
to within ten kilometres of Sofia. The Bulgarians were crushed by the
Serbians at Bregalnitza, and were compelled to sign, on August 10th,
1913, the treaty of Bukarest. But from that moment, animated by a
boundless hatred of their conquerors, they had but one desire, and that
was to take vengeance on the victors, one after the other, and above all
to destroy the treaty of Bukarest at the first favourable opportunity.
Hence
1º. The treaties made by Sofia with Berlin and Constantinople, before
April, 1914, as M. Radoslavoff has disclosed (see _Havas_, quoted by _Le
Petit Parisien_, 26th March, 1916, and _Le Temps_, 10th April, 1916).
2º. Bulgaria’s participation in the European war on the side of Germany,
whose plans for the future, like the Bulgarian ambitions, were threatened
by the consequence of the treaty of Bukarest (_see_ Chapter II, § 1).
* * * * *
An examination of the Bulgarian map, which serves us as a document,
proves that the Bulgarian pretentions to supremacy, like those of
Pangermanism, aim at absorbing, regardless of language or race, the
regions whose possession is deemed useful to Bulgaria. Thus the rapacious
doctrine of the Bulgarians is absolutely identical with that of the
Prussians. This identity has facilitated the understanding between the
two peoples. In fact, the Great Bulgaria of our official document of 1907
(see the map on p. 133) includes the following: the Roumanian Dobrudja
as far as Galatz and Sulina, on which clearly the Bulgarians can lay no
justifiable claim; the shores of the Ægean Sea; the territory from Serres
to Gumuldjina, where the Greek element is dominant; the region of Nisch,
which is Serbian; the region of Prizrend, which had been recognized as
Serbian by the Bulgarians themselves in their treaty of alliance with the
Serbians in 1912. As to the region of Uskub as far as Lake Ochrida, near
Albania, the Bulgarians in their treaty with the Serbians admitted it to
be disputable. Its allotment was to be referred to the arbitration of
the Emperor of Russia, which the Bulgarians never seriously desired, and
to which they opposed a solid obstacle by their attack on the Serbians
in June, 1913. Lastly, the region south of Uskub, that is, the portion
of Macedonia which forms the south of the present Serbia, requires a
detailed exposition by itself. This is essential, for concerning Serbian
Macedonia many misconceptions have been propagated by the Allied Press
and have been the source of the mistakes committed by the Allies in the
Balkans in 1915. It is therefore absolutely necessary to correct these
misconceptions, if the Allies would avoid falling into fresh mistakes in
the Balkans, for which they would again have to pay a heavy price.
[Illustration: SERBIAN MACEDONIA.]
In short, to look the difficulties clearly in the face, we must answer
the question, Is the south of Serbia Bulgarian? (see the map, above).
The territory in the south of Serbia on which divergent opinions have
been expressed is represented with tolerable exactness:
1º. By a triangle of which the apex lies a little to the north of Veles,
and of which the other angles are formed by Guevgheli on the east and
Lake Ochrida on the west.
2º. By a strip of territory which lies to the east of this triangle, and
which, between the left bank of the Vardar and Bulgaria, contains the
regions of Kotchana, Stip, and Stroutmitza-gare. The Bulgarians contend
that all the territory formed by this triangle and this lateral strip is
incontestably Bulgarian; last year some Allied writers supported this
contention. In the first place, it was said, the treaty of San Stefano
(1878) assigned to Bulgaria what is now the south of Serbia. They forgot
that in 1878 the ethnographic study of the Ottoman empire had not yet
begun, and that at that time the Russians and the English were both
inclined, for different reasons, to consider almost all the inhabitants
of European Turkey as Bulgarians, without inquiry or distinction. The
Russians, who then aimed at establishing themselves ultimately in the
Balkans, were impelled by this aim to regard the Bulgarians as extremely
numerous. As for the English, burning with indignation at the “Bulgarian
atrocities” of Gladstone, they very generously thought of nothing but
liberating from the Turkish yoke as many Christians as possible, and
these in Macedonia were labelled indiscriminately Bulgarians.
Be that as it may, it was only after the treaty of San Stefano that the
ethnographical study of Macedonia was taken up in earnest. Moreover,
it is proper to add that most of the writers who have discussed the
subject have drawn their information, not from inquiries on the spot,
but from Belgrade, Athens and Sofia. In these three centres they
were supplied with minute statistics, very well printed, and to all
appearance perfectly convincing, but which laboured under the serious
disadvantage that they flatly contradicted each other. For my own part,
I acknowledged that I was not able to arrive at a comparatively clear
idea of the complicated ethnography of this part of Macedonia till I had
carried out my inquiries of 1914, not as before in the Balkan capitals,
but on the spot, at Uskub, at Prizrend, at Prichtina, at Monastir, at
Ochrida, and at Strouga.
This inquiry, conducted six months before the war, led me to the
following conclusions. Serbian Macedonia contains two quite distinct
groups of population.
1º. The one is formed of Turks, Albanians, Kutzo-Wallachians or
Roumanians, Greeks, Jews, and Gipsies, who are scattered all over the
country.
2º. The second group is composed of the Macedonian Slavs.
In the absence of trustworthy statistics it is impossible to say which of
these two groups is numerically the stronger. Thus, at Uskub, the Turks
and the Jews alone were reckoned as numerous as the exarchists, that is
to say, as those who, attending the churches and schools of the Bulgarian
exarchate, were considered to be Bulgarians.
But what is quite certain is that the Serbs and the Bulgarians are found
in the second group of the population, that of the Macedonian Slavs.
Now this group itself comprises four sections, namely, native Serbs,
native Bulgarians, “floating” Serbs, and “floating” Bulgarians. The
two “floating” sections seem to be more numerous than the two native
sections. This singular expression, “floating,” is justified by the
following explanation. In 1870 the Bulgarians of Macedonia, then Ottoman
subjects, obtained from the Sultan leave to be considered, from the
religious point of view, not as before members of the Greek Orthodox
Church, but as members of a separate and autonomous church, the Bulgarian
Exarchate, of which the seat was fixed at Constantinople. The Bulgarians
of Bulgaria, who also joined the new church, took advantage of the
condition of things which resulted from this creation to organize in
Macedonia a propaganda nominally religious but really political, being
designed to gain over to the Bulgarian nation as many Macedonian Slavs
as possible; and this propaganda was directed and actively assisted by
the Bulgarian Exarch, Mgr. Joseph, who resided in Constantinople and was
an Ottoman subject. In those days the Macedonian Slavs were very poor
peasants, who had been oppressed by the Turks for centuries, and the
greater number of them did not care a straw whether they belonged to one
nationality or to another. The propaganda of the Bulgarian Exarchate in
Macedonia came into conflict with the Greek propaganda, and a little
later with the Serbian propaganda, which two propagandas, the one
directed from Athens and the other from Belgrade, had one and the same
object. All three propagandas together employed in Macedonia the most
diverse means—money, schools, and terrorism—to win over the Macedonian
Slavs, who were still hesitating, to the national Bulgarian cause, to the
national Greek cause, and to the national Serbian cause.
These various propagandas very often led to extraordinary results, which
proved, the artificial character of the movements. For example, before
the European war you might find in many Macedonian villages families of
three blood brothers, of whom one would say he was a Greek, the second
would solemnly affirm that he was a Serb, and the third would swear
he was a Bulgarian. Frequently, under the influence of the forcible
arguments applied to them, their national convictions would undergo a
sudden and radical change, so that the man who yesterday was a Serb,
to-day would give himself out as a Bulgarian, or contrariwise. It is
to persons whose nationality is of this unstable and erratic character
that the adjective “floating” is appropriately applied. At the same
time there is no question that the Serbian propaganda, having started
business in Macedonia about fifteen years later than its Bulgarian
rival, had gathered into the fold fewer of those “floating” sheep,
who were still sitting on the nationalist fence, not yet having made
up their minds whether to come down on the Serbian or the Macedonian
side. The two elements which compose the Bulgarian group in Macedonia,
namely, the genuine Bulgarians and the “floating” Bulgarians, have,
besides, a geographical distribution which is comparatively definite.
Though mixed up with Turkish elements, the inhabitants of the region of
Kotchana and Istip (Stip in Serbian), on the right bank of the Vardar
and on the Bulgarian boundary (see the map on p. 137) are for the most
part indisputably genuine Bulgarians. If at the time of the treaty of
Bukarest the Serbians claimed these mountainous regions, they did so
for strategical reasons, in order to ensure the defence of the railway,
which, passing through the valley of the Vardar, connects Belgrade,
Nisch, and Uskub with Salonika, and is therefore of vital importance
for Serbia. The present war has proved that this point of view was not
without justification.
On the other hand, on the right bank of the Vardar, and therefore in
the greater part of Serbian Macedonia, the Bulgarian elements, whether
genuine or “floating,” are more or less scattered among all the other
racial elements. Undoubtedly there are to the west of the Vardar some
Bulgarians whose descent is very ancient and beyond dispute. A certain
number, who have emigrated from these regions, exercise a predominant
political influence even in Bulgaria. Thus General Boyadjeff was born at
Ochrida, and M. Genadieff was born at Monastir. But these Bulgarians by
descent are certainly a minority in the whole population of Macedonia.
For example, at Monastir, in 1914, out of 60,000 inhabitants about a
third were Bulgarians. It is true that round about Monastir and Uskub you
might find villages inhabited almost entirely by Bulgarians, but beside
these villages were others formed of different Macedonian nationalities
(Serbs, Roumanians, etc.).
As for the “floating” Bulgarians, after a Serbian occupation which had
lasted only five months since the treaty of Bukarest, many of them
already proclaimed themselves Serbs. For example, the Serbian mayor of
the little town of Strouga had been in Turkish times the pillar of the
Bulgarian propaganda in the district of Strouga. Similar cases were
very numerous. The Bulgarians of Sofia, unable to deny this wholesale
transformation into Serbians of quondam Bulgarians who had been raked
into the fold by the propaganda of the Exarchate, gave out that this
sudden conversion was the effect of that reign of terror which, according
to them, the Serbians resorted to for the purpose of establishing
their dominion in Macedonia. The allegation seems to me untenable. I
traversed most of the roads of Serbian Macedonia in the winter (January,
1914), accompanied only by one or two persons. I very often met Serbian
soldiers, who came from the garrisons on the Albanian frontier and were
going on furlough to Northern Serbia. Now these soldiers were travelling
singly or in groups of two or three. With nothing but a walking-stick
in their hand they were making their way over the 60 or 70 kilometres
which separated them from the nearest railway. If the country had really
been inhabited by convinced Bulgarians who detested the Serbians, is it
not evident that there would have been attacks on these isolated and
defenceless Serbian soldiers? But there were no such attacks, and from
personal observation I can affirm that the most complete tranquillity
prevailed in Serbian Macedonia, which in the days of the Turks had been
the scene of incessant murders; and these murders were generally brought
about by the terrorist means employed by the Bulgarian propaganda.
What is certain is, that at the beginning of 1914 the “floating”
Bulgarians, who were in fact the more numerous, acquiesced without
resistance in the Serbian rule and called themselves Serbians. The
Bulgarian Exarch, Mgr. Joseph, who had organized and directed the
Bulgarian propaganda since 1870, was not at all surprised at this result.
He acknowledged to me at Sofia, in February, 1914, that the Bulgarian
game was up in the south of Macedonia, and that in a short time most of
the adherents whom he had enlisted in former days would prove themselves
very good Serbians. Indeed, he had made up his mind to it, for he had
been opposed to the attack of June, 1913, on the Serbians and the Greeks,
and he thought that Bulgaria should accept a situation for which she
herself was responsible, and of which she must bear the consequences.
For these manifold reasons it is impossible to say that the south
of Macedonia is Bulgarian. But the Bulgarian people of Bulgaria has
been completely intoxicated by the intense propaganda which has been
organized, especially during the last thirty years, in Bulgaria itself
by Bulgarians who are natives of Ottoman Macedonia. These men, most of
them very energetic, have in reality engrossed all the important posts,
military, political, and administrative, in Bulgaria. So well have they
done the business of propaganda that the lowest Bulgarian peasant of
Bulgaria believes in his heart and soul that all Serbian Macedonia is
Bulgarian. It is easy to understand how German policy at Sofia has been
able to turn this state of mind to account for the purpose of hurrying
the Bulgarian people into the war on the side of Pangermanism.
To recapitulate, the south of Macedonia is really Macedonia, that is
to say, it is a territory inhabited by motley peoples, who are almost
everywhere jumbled up together. The Bulgarians who live there cannot
therefore rightfully claim that the treaty of Bukarest violated the
principle of nationalities to their detriment by assigning South-Western
Macedonia to Serbia. In fact, just because it is Macedonia, that is,
an extraordinary jumble of heterogeneous peoples, the principle of
nationalities cannot possibly be applied to Macedonia. In strict justice,
the destiny of this peculiar country should be settled simply and solely
with reference to the general strategical and economic needs of the
surrounding States. Now if there are Bulgarians in Macedonia there are
also Serbians, and neither strategically nor economically is the south of
Macedonia necessary to Bulgaria. On the other hand, Serbia has a really
vital interest, both economic and defensive, in maintaining a direct
geographical contact with Greece, in order to have by means of Salonika
that access to the Ægean Sea which is for her indispensable.
* * * * *
What proves, moreover, in ample measure that the exorbitant Bulgarian
pretensions are not founded on a racial basis is that at present the
ambitions of the government of Sofia considerably exceed even the extreme
limits of the map which serves us as a document (see p. 133). Indeed, not
only does Bulgaria desire to keep the region of Nisch, but she aims at
expanding as far as Hungary, which in her turn also wishes to encroach
on Serbia. In February, 1916, Mr. Take Jonescu declared at Bukarest that
he had it from a sure source that Germany had just promised to Bulgaria
the possession of Salonika and the Roumanian Dobrudja as far as Sulina
(see _Le Matin_, 25th February, 1916), that is, exactly that part of the
Roumanian Dobrudja which, according to our documentary map the Bulgarians
have coveted ever since 1907 at least. As to King Ferdinand, he wishes
to obtain for his son the whole of central Albania, which would allow
Bulgaria under colour of an eventual arrangement, more or less forced on
a few Albanian tribes, to spread from the Black Sea to the Adriatic—an
old plan familiar to all who are versed in the ambitions of the Coburg
prince at Sofia. It is, moreover, probable, so far as Albania and the
Roumanian Dobrudja are concerned, that the Berlin government will curb
the Bulgarian ambitions in order not to hurt the feelings of Vienna,
and to prolong the neutrality of Roumania by nursing the illusions of
the Bratiano cabinet. There will be plenty of time afterwards to punish
Roumania for hesitating to submit to the German yoke, when the hour for
freeing herself from it shall have passed for ever.
The secret treaty, the negotiations for which between the Kaiser and
the Tsar Ferdinand were revealed by _Le Temps_ of 29th February, 1916,
would ensure to Ferdinand the means of ultimately putting the last
touches to his plan of Bulgarian supremacy. But this treaty, linking
the fate of Bulgaria to that of Germany in a military, economic, and
political aspect, would involve the inclusion of Bulgaria in the Germanic
Confederation. Therefore, finally, always in pursuance of the plan of
1911, Bulgaria would serve as a broad bridge between the Germanic
Confederation of Central Europe and Prussianized Turkey.
This recent revelation completes the demonstration of the mode and form
in which the plan of Bulgarian supremacy is closely bound up with the
Pangerman plan of world-wide domination.
II.
The evidence of the facts as they now stand appears to be bringing the
Greeks to recognize, that if the Allies have committed faults in the
Balkans—through excess of candour, misconception of the mental factors,
and with the best intentions in the world—the government of Athens has
been equally deceived as to the surest means of safeguarding Hellenic
interests.
According to the treaty of alliance with Serbia of 16-29th June, 1913,
Greece was bound to come to the help of her ally, in case the latter were
attacked by any third power. This article was clear. It is needless to
harp on the point, for even without a treaty, it was a vital necessity
for Greece not to let the Bulgarians upset the balance of power, to
her detriment, in the Balkans and intrude themselves between her and
Serbia. That necessity imperiously required the government of Athens
not to suffer Serbia to be crushed. Now, as we know, the allied armies
under General Sarrail at the end of 1915 very nearly effected a junction
with the troops of the Voivode Putnik. It is, therefore, manifest that
if, on the landing of the Allies at Salonika, Greece had joined her
efforts to theirs, Serbia would have been saved. That is a truth which
M. Venizelos and a great part of Greek public opinion well understood,
but King Constantine would not admit it. History will prove whether in
this grave crisis of his country his relationship of brother-in-law to
the Kaiser did not greatly prejudice the judgment of the King of Greece.
What is certain is, that no rational explanation has yet been given of
King Constantine’s conduct, and that his policy has elicited the protests
of Greek colonies in foreign countries, which, being free to speak,
declared, in an appeal drawn up by their congresses in February, 1916:
“While we nurse a meaningless neutrality which provokes derision, we run
the risk, not only of failing to achieve the aspirations bequeathed to
us by our fathers, but also of losing our independence” (quoted by _Le
Temps_, 26th February, 1916).
[Illustration: GREECE AFTER THE TREATY OF BUKAREST.]
The vehemence of these protests is intelligible, for just in virtue of
the policy which for some months the government of Athens has pursued,
Greece is now confronted by vital problems which she must absolutely
solve without delay, if she would ensure her future.
The annexed map, which represents the state of Greece before and after
the war, will render intelligible the essential interests which Greece
has to defend.
Greece has always taken deeply to heart the many Greeks living in the
East outside her boundaries. She would either incorporate them or at
least ensure them a tolerable existence.
These Greeks are to be found in the ethnographical regions indicated by
cross hatchings on the map, which I have copied exactly from the map No.
2 in the _Pangerman Atlas_ of Paul Langhans, published at Gotha by Justus
Perthes in 1900. Thus the Pangermans themselves recognize the presence
of many Greeks in the south of Albania and especially in Bulgaria and
Turkey. No doubt, since the Balkan wars the density of the Greeks in
the Hellenic regions of Bulgaria and Turkey has undergone serious
modifications. Many of these Greeks have been massacred either by the
Turks or by the Bulgarians. Under the pressure of these Turko-Bulgarian
persecutions about 500,000 Greeks have been obliged, since 1912, to take
refuge in Greece. But the Greeks who have sources of exact information
estimate that there still remain about 200,000 Greeks on the Ægean coasts
of new Bulgaria, and 2,300,000 in the Ottoman empire. It is clear that
if Bulgaria and Turkey, by the help of Germany, were finally victorious,
these 2,500,000 Greeks would be lost once and for all to Greece.
Therefore, if the government of Athens would save the Greeks, it has a
primary and fundamental reason for speedily withstanding the progress
of the Bulgarians as well as of the Turks. In point of fact the Ottoman
Greeks are actually harassed most systematically by the fanatical young
Turks. On the other hand the Russian successes in Armenia make a profound
impression on public opinion at Athens, if not on the government of King
Constantine. The Greeks of Greece are too well acquainted with the
decadence of the Ottoman empire not to know that its days are numbered.
The majority of Greeks understand that the moment is approaching when,
by joining the Allies, the adversaries of Turkey, Greece should secure
for herself a voice in their councils, in order that, when peace is
concluded, she may be able to shape the destinies of the Greeks of Turkey
in conformity with Greek interests. This is all the more necessary
because these Greeks of Turkey, as the map shows, are in the peculiar
position of being dispersed in small groups over the Ottoman coasts,
without anywhere forming an aggregate large enough to confer the right of
being treated as a definite part of the Ottoman empire.
With regard to Bulgaria, the interest of Greece is twofold. It
consists, in the first place, in preventing, as speedily as possible, a
continuation of those systematic persecutions, deportations, outrages and
robberies of which the Greeks of Turkey and of the invaded regions of
Serbia are at present the victims. But, above all, Greece has a really
vital interest in preventing the government of Sofia from carrying out
its plan of supremacy in the Balkans (see the map on p. 133). It is
well known at Athens that the Bulgarians covet Salonika, and that if,
even without including that city, Great Bulgaria extended to Albania,
Greece would thereby be cut off from the north of Europe by a rancorous
and implacable neighbour, and would thus find herself in an untenable
position, alike from the military and the economic point of view. It is
this serious danger that is emphasized by the organs of M. Venizelos,
who since 1909 has been truly the saviour of Greece. As this conviction
is deeply rooted in the heart of almost all Greeks, who view with
irreconcilable aversion the Bulgarians as their hereditary enemies, it
constitutes a mental factor which, more than any other motive, will at
last, in all probability, open the eyes of Greece to the danger which
she incurs through the alliance of the Bulgarians and the Germans.
But though the Pangerman plan in itself threatens the interests of
Greece most directly, we must recognize that this truth has not yet
been sufficiently apprehended by Greek public opinion. Nevertheless, it
is manifest that Great Germany’s ultimate aim is to rule at Salonika,
perhaps not at first directly, but at all events through the agency
of the Prussianized Bulgarians. But the great railway which, starting
from Vienna, goes by Belgrade, Nisch, Uskub, and Salonika, now ends
at the Piræus, since, quite lately, the junction has been effected by
the continuation of the Greek line of Larissa from Papapouli to Guida,
a station on the trunk line from Salonika to Monastir. In consequence
of this junction line, 96 kilometres long, a great Continental railway
has just been completed, which, after peace has been concluded, will
have a considerable economic importance for Greece and even for the
whole of Europe. In fact, the distance of Marseilles from Alexandria
is 1,404 sea miles, that of Brindisi from Alexandria is 836, and that
of the Piræus from Alexandria is only 514. Supposing, then, that the
average speed of the mail steamers is 15 miles an hour, we infer that
the voyage to Alexandria takes about 93 hours from Marseilles, 55 from
Brindisi, and only 34 from the Piræus. The new railway will therefore be
greatly preferable, not only for travellers, but for perishable goods
and for the post. Hence it is indisputable that, after the peace, part
of the sea traffic of Europe will be transferred from Marseilles and the
Italian ports to the Piræus. From this transference of economic activity
certain and important profits will accrue to Greece, to say nothing of
the considerable portion of the wealthy classes of the Continent, who
spend some months of every year in Egypt, and who will then stop at
Athens before embarking and make tours to the classical ruins, leaving
behind them, as tourists do, quite appreciable sums of money, which will
be a clear gain to the country. If Serbia is re-established, Greece is
certain to draw all the profits from this new situation. On the contrary,
were the Pangerman designs in the Balkans to succeed, it would be Great
Germany that would secure for herself all the advantages to be got from
the great new trunk railway through the Balkans, the control of which
she covets as usual. But it is clear that if Germany triumphed, nothing
could prevent her from stretching her economic tentacles over Salonika,
the Piræus, and the whole of Greece, so that in this form also the
independence of Greece would be doomed.
Consequently, the Pangerman plan threatens all the vital interests of
Greece, since its success would necessarily entail for that country an
economic invasion, the ruin of Hellenism, and Bulgarian supremacy in the
Balkans. On the contrary, nothing but a victory of the Entente powers
can save Greece from these dangers. Greek public opinion understands
this better and better. Moreover, in a letter published by _Le Temps_ of
20th February, 1916, Prince Nicolas of Greece, the able diplomat of the
royal family, plainly proposed to clear up loyally the misunderstandings
that exist between the government of Athens and the Entente. In this
letter the following declarations are particularly memorable, because
coming from the brother of the King of Greece, they have a bearing which
is sufficiently obvious. “There are only two currents in Greece: the
one impels Greece to throw herself into the struggle on the side of the
Entente, the other favours neutrality. But nobody has ever uttered the
thought that in this war we should have taken part on the side of the
Central Powers. Greece has remained neutral. She has never declared that
nothing could induce her to abandon her neutrality.”
On March 9th, the _Patris_ of Athens published an article of General
Danglis, formerly Minister of War in the Venizelos Cabinet, which
concluded thus: “Greece ought without delay to proceed to the revision of
all the classes of her army capable of being called up for service; for
without any doubt Greece will be obliged to employ her forces during the
present war” (see _Le Temps_, 10th March, 1916).
III.
The serious consequence which Germany’s alliance with Bulgaria would
entail on Roumania, must ultimately oblige that country, despite the
temporizing attitude of its government, to defend its vital interests.
These interests now stand out more and more clearly. In the first place
it is certain that the plan of Bulgarian supremacy in the Balkans (see
p. 133) is as little acceptable to the Roumanians as to the Greeks.
The frontier incidents, which have multiplied lately, between the
Bulgarians and the Roumanians are manifest symptoms of the mutual and
irreconcilable dislike of the two peoples. Besides, the Roumanians have
been specially alarmed by what has happened in the part of the Dobrudja
which Bulgaria was compelled to cede to Roumania in 1913 (indicated by
crossed hatchings on the subjoined map). The syndicates of Bulgarian
peasants in this region have plainly shown their separatist tendencies.
Further, it has lately been discovered that in the New Dobrudja,
the Bulgarian system of espionage has been worked, under colour of
archæological excursions, by Germans, who afterwards transmitted to
the Bulgarian military authorities photographs and plans of great
importance. Lastly, at the beginning of 1916 Mr. Take Jonescu made known
at Bukarest that Germany had promised to Bulgaria, at the expense of
Roumania, not only the territory which Bulgaria had lost in 1913, but
also the Roumanian Dobrudja as far as Galatz and Sulina. Since then
Berlin has been obliged to throw a sop to Roumania by assuring Bukarest
that Germany will put a curb on Bulgarian ambition. But this promise, a
sort of blackmail extorted by the needs of the moment, forms but a very
precarious guarantee for the Roumanians. They feel themselves threatened
by Bulgarian ambitions, and there seems little reason to doubt that as
soon as circumstances shall appear favourable, Roumania will make an
end of the Bulgarian peril, as “she ought to have done in 1913,” if the
Roumanian Government does not allow itself to be “hypnotized” by that of
Berlin, to use the language of the _Universal_, the official connection
of which with the military authorities at Bukarest is well known (quoted
by _Le Temps_, 19th March, 1916).
[Illustration: GREAT ROUMANIA.]
On the other hand the national policy of Roumania is influenced in the
highest degree by the two questions of Bessarabia and Transylvania. As
the map on the opposite page shows, Roumania _irredenta_ is composed of
two great racial and territorial elements: about 1,000,000 Roumanians
live in Russian Bessarabia, but 3,700,000 Roumanians inhabit Transylvania
and Bukovina, that is to say, vast regions of Hungary and Austria. The
Roumanian ideal, in its entirety, would evidently be to incorporate at
the same time the Roumanian brothers of the East and the West, but as the
ideal is not practicable, a choice must be made. The partisans of Germany
at Bukarest, led by M. Carp and Marghiloman, maintain that Roumania
should elect for Bessarabia and therefore march against Russia. To this
the practical politicians of Bukarest reply: “We should certainly be
glad to incorporate the Roumanians of Bessarabia also, but that policy
would only be possible if Russia were completely destroyed by Germany,
which has not been done and cannot be done, for the facts so far prove
that Russia could not be decisively beaten. Therefore Roumania cannot be
such a fool as to incur the permanent hostility of the enormous empire
of the Tzar. Moreover, in order to incorporate the 1,000,000 Roumanians
of Bessarabia, we must abandon the 3,700,000 Roumanians of Transylvania,
besides accepting into the bargain the supremacy of the Bulgarians in the
Balkans, since they are the allies of the Central Empires.”
Such are the essential arguments which incline Roumanian opinion to make
a decided choice for the acquisition of Transylvania. In order that the
relations between Russia and Roumania should become cordial enough to
permit of an alliance between St. Petersburg and Bukarest it remains,
perhaps, for Russia to reassure Roumania with regard to the control of
the Straits. It is certainly well understood at Bukarest that after the
enormous sacrifices which she has made Russia cannot consent to remain
bottled up by the Turks in the Black Sea, and that after the peace she
must hold a preponderant position at Constantinople. On the other hand,
it is the interest of all Europe and of Russia herself that she should
ensure for the future a large amount of liberty in the control of the
Straits. I cannot see, therefore, why Bukarest and Petrograd should not
come to an understanding on this important subject.
In order to prevent, or at least retard, the intervention of Roumania, of
which Berlin is much afraid, the Kaiser’s diplomacy is putting pressure
on Vienna and on Budapest in order to obtain “large concessions” in
favour of the Roumanians of Transylvania and Bukovina. But at Bukarest
people know by experience the value to be attached to the promises of
Vienna, and especially to those of the Magyar nobility. Besides, as
Roumania desires the annexation, pure and simple, of Transylvania and
of the Roumanian region of Bukovina, she could not be content with mere
concessions. So the offers of the Central Empires at Bukarest have little
chance of being seriously considered.
They will have still less, if the Roumanians yield to the force of
evidence by recognizing, that even if the Pangerman plan were to provide
for the cession of Transylvania to Roumania, at the expense of Hungary,
that plan would still threaten their independence in the most direct
and indisputable manner. In her attempt to win Roumania to her side,
Berlin has promised to give Bessarabia, with Odessa, to Roumania at
the expense of Russia. In order to appreciate the character and the
sincerity of this offer, the Roumanians need only refer to the pamphlet
long ago circulated by the _Alldeutscher Verband_, which sets forth the
fundamental plan of 1894, and which I have often quoted. It bears the
title, _Great Germany and Central Europe in 1950_. On p. 36 that work
defines as follows the fate which Pangermanism has in store for Roumania
on the East. “In the case of a victorious war against Russia, Roumania
might get Upper Bessarabia as far as the Dniester. Austria would annex
Lower Bessarabia in the form of a Margraviate of Bessarabia, and by means
of the German colonies, which already exist, she would transform it into
a purely German region. The boundaries of this Austro-German Margraviate
of Bessarabia would include the cities of Odessa, Bender, Borodino,
Formosa, Beni, Ismail, and the mouths of the Danube at Sulina. A
reciprocal exchange of populations with the neighbouring countries would
easily ensure the exclusively German colonization of this Margraviate.
German ships of war would mount guard at the mouth of the German Danube.”
This fundamental plan, which dates from twenty-one years ago, would now
be completed, as we saw (p. 133) by the ultimate establishment in the
Roumanian Dobrudja of the Bulgarians, who would thus be in direct contact
with the new Margraviate of Prussianized Austria.
Hence, supposing the Germans were victorious, the Roumanians, who
have been much alarmed by the idea of seeing the Russians installed
at Constantinople, would be confronted by the danger of being soon
entirely cut off from both the Black Sea and from the Mediterranean. The
Bulgarians would take possession of the Roumanian Dobrudja, the Germans
would remain at Constantinople and the Dardanelles, _where they are
already_, and besides they would be dominant at Odessa and the mouths
of the Danube, according to the plan drawn up, as far back as 1844, by
the future Marshal Moltke (_see_ p. 4). The authority of that name may
satisfy the Roumanians that the scheme is no mere fantasy.
Moreover, it is plain enough that were Roumania once encircled, she could
no longer dream of creating, as she so ardently desires to do, a national
industry, since she would be no more than an economic territory reduced
to impotence, a mere dumping-ground for goods made in Pangermany.
To sum up, we see that this is really a question of life or death for
Roumania. A Prussian victory, in fact, would imperil her national
independence in the most direct and indubitable manner. It appears
that the general opinion in Roumania is alive to the danger and to the
necessity of Roumanian intervention in the conflict. It remains to be
seen whether German influences at Bukarest will be adroit enough and
powerful enough to delude the Roumanian authorities into shilly-shallying
till the decisive hour shall have come and gone.