THE CRUCIAL POINT OF THE WHOLE PROBLEM.
I. The obligation which the threat of the scheme “from Hamburg
to the Persian Gulf” imposes on the Allies.
II. The capital importance of the question of Austria-Hungary.
III. All the racial elements necessary for the destruction of
the Pangerman plan exist in Central Europe.
I.
Now that they have laid their hands on nine-tenths of the territories
which they coveted (see p. 63), the Germans will only give in at the last
extremity. Maximilian Harden has peremptorily declared: “Every means will
be enthusiastically employed against her enemies by the German people. We
will go back to the times of savagery when man was a wolf for his fellow
man” (quoted by _Le Temps_, 9th February, 1916). In face of this firm
resolution of the Germans to achieve at all costs the plan of universal
domination, a plan of which the “Hamburg to the Persian Gulf” project is
the necessary and sufficient backbone, the real destruction of Prussian
militarism becomes more than ever a duty. Only this result can repay the
sacrifices of the admirable “Tommies” of the Allied armies. If they are
determined to hold on as long as necessary, it is not to cover themselves
with military glory; it is to acquire the certainty “that it shall not
begin again, that their children shall not know horrors like those of the
hellish struggle initiated by Prussianized Germany.”
The Allies will certainly issue as conquerors from this dreadful war,
but on condition that in future the struggle should be directed by the
lessons of experience. These essential lessons are the outcome of the
geographical, ethnographical, economic, and strategical elements which
constitute the Pangerman plan of 1911, temporarily accomplished. Now,
these lessons of experience show that the Allies could not possibly
be content with a half-and-half victory; a complete victory alone can
guarantee them against any aggressive revival, after peace, of Prussian
militarism.
The following considerations appear strongly to justify this opinion:
“If in France,” declares Harden, “they think that the re-establishment of
peace can only be made possible by the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine,
and if necessity should oblige us to sign such a peace, the 70 millions
of Germans would very soon tear that peace to tatters” (quoted by _Le
Temps_, 9th February, 1916). Is there a single living Frenchman of sense
who would be willing to recover Alsace-Lorraine under such conditions
that it would be necessary afterwards to make incessant and exhausting
military efforts in order to keep the restored provinces? Certainly
not. The restoration of Alsace-Lorraine will only become of value for
France when the annihilation of Prussian militarism shall guarantee her
a legitimate and peaceful possession of the territories in question.
Now, as I think I have proved, it would be impossible to reckon on this
security if France allowed Berlin to carry out the scheme “from Hamburg
to the Persian Gulf,” which would furnish Germany with superabundant
means to retake Alsace-Lorraine after a short respite.
The imperious necessity of avoiding financial ruin further forces the
Allies to seek a complete victory. Indeed, such a victory alone will
enable them to escape the most frightful impoverishment, which otherwise
threatens the Allied States and their citizens. The fabulous expenses
which the present war necessitates distinguish it, financially speaking,
by a vast gulf from all the wars that have gone before.
After 1870, France was able very quickly to recover her position, and
in spite of the misfortunes of the country, individuals were able, on
the morrow of the peace, to promote the prosperity of their business.
But after the present war, if the Allies did not win a complete victory,
our States, like our individuals (see p. 88), would be faced by almost
inextricable pecuniary difficulties. The endless economic consequences
resulting from crushing taxes, which could not be regularly and
permanently collected, would be such that the States and most individuals
in the Allied countries would see themselves reduced to impotence and
therefore to poverty. This, however, is truly the situation with which
the Allies would be confronted if Germany were to achieve her plan of
domination “from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf,” since that solution would
enable her to retain her enormous spoils of war and to lay hands on
considerable sources of wealth (see p. 85).
Now, would it not be a monstrous iniquity that the people of France,
England, Russia, and Italy should be reduced for tens of years to
terrible poverty because it suited the execrable ambition of the
Hohenzollerns to reduce Europe to slavery?
Only a complete victory can save the Allied countries from financial
ruin, because, no matter what some people say, Germany will be able to
pay the cost of the struggle she has initiated. As she is responsible
for the war, Germany already owes to the united Allies a colossal sum
which can be estimated roundly at between 250 and 300 milliards of
francs. But if the credit of the German Empire is doomed to disappear
on the day of her defeat, the material riches of Germany, which are very
considerable, will continue. They represent much more than 300 milliards
of francs. Of course Germany will only be able to pay her fabulous
debt very gradually. But when means for collecting the German revenues
shall have been systematically and leisurely studied by the conquering
Allies, when these collections of revenue shall have become assured, of
course not by written German promises, worthless scraps of paper, but
by real guarantees in harmony with those precedents of history, which
the government of Berlin strongly contributed to establish in 1870,
Germany will be perfectly able to hand to each of the great conquering
Allies about two milliards of francs a year. This annuity, thanks to
modern financial combinations, will be sufficient to allow each Allied
state to raise annual loans at relatively low rates and therefore easily
procurable; and these will permit each State to spare its citizens the
burden of taxes which would be not only crushing but fatal, and which
would be inevitable if the country had to relinquish the hope of being
recouped for its war expenses by Germany.
Now, a truly complete victory like this, which is indispensable from so
many points of view to the Allies, is perfectly possible in spite of the
faults committed by the Allies, which alone have delayed it.
A line of argument will set this possibility in a proper light. Harden
himself has been constrained, as we have already seen, to face the
hypothesis of a cession of Alsace-Lorraine to France. It is obvious that
when they have come to that pitch at Berlin, it will mean that Germany
at bay, on the brink of absolute disaster, will try to negotiate with
the Allies in order to save her plan of domination “from Hamburg to the
Persian Gulf.” This would enable her, after a short respite, to recover
Alsace-Lorraine from France, as Harden also indicates. Therefore, the
effort needed at the present moment, if the Allies wish to secure a
complete instead of a doubtful victory, which in reality would mean for
them a catastrophe, would be comparatively slight. That effort would
probably only represent the hundredth part of all those already made by
the Allies. We should be mad or criminal not to make it, because it is
that last effort which will put an end to the horrible nightmare conjured
up all over the world by Prussian militarism.
* * * * *
In order to make sure of this complete victory, we need only draw the
appropriate lesson from the mistakes that have been made. As M. Briand
said in Rome, the solidarity of the Allies should be closer than ever.
“They ought to pool all their resources, all their energies, all their
vital forces.” But that co-ordination of the efforts of the Allies, which
is called for on every side, would be greatly facilitated, if the common
objective of the common action of all the Allies were thenceforth clearly
defined in its geographical, military, and political aspects.
The German aggression took the Allies by surprise, and their first duty
was to resist it. Afterwards, through the mere force of circumstances,
the operations of each of them were directed mainly to the particular
objects which each had in view. England and France have reasons of honour
and of interest for defending the absolute independence of Belgium.
France must recover its invaded departments and liberate Alsace-Lorraine.
Russia must not only reconquer its frontiers on the West, but free the
whole of Poland, to which she has promised autonomy. The empire of the
Tsars must also put an end, once for all, to the Turco-German menace on
the south of the Caucasus. Italy must recover her lost lands—_Italia
irredenta_—from the clutch of the Hapsburgs. But all these particular
objects, however legitimate and necessary, have long prevented the Allies
from seeing the war in its European dimensions, and have therefore
diverted their attention from what, alike from the geographical, the
military, and the political point of view, should be the common objective
of all their efforts, an objective of supreme importance, since its
attainment would deliver them at once from the menace of the “Hamburg
to the Persian Gulf” project, which threatens all the Allies alike; and
by striking a decisive blow at Prussian militarism it would assure the
accomplishment and the permanence of the practical results aimed at by
each of the Allies individually.
[Illustration: THE CRUCIAL POINT OF THE EUROPEAN PROBLEM.]
Now this common objective, this geographical, military and political
crux of all the problems which the Allies have to solve, is represented
by Austria-Hungary. On that subject the diplomacy of the Allies, thanks
again to M. Briand and his colleagues, appears to have entered on the
right path. The _Matin_ of 4th February, 1916, reported the reception by
M. Briand of Professor Masaryk, one of the most highly esteemed leaders
of Bohemia. In reference to this meeting the _Matin_ added the following
significant words, which deserve to be borne in mind: “M. Briand
encouraged M. Masaryk to persevere in his propaganda, and expressed to
him his good wishes and his sympathy with the legitimate claims of the
Czech-Slovak people.” But Bohemia is the corner-stone of that group
of non-German peoples included in Austria-Hungary, whose independence
is one of the conditions indispensable to the destruction of Prussian
militarism. Therefore public opinion in the Allied countries should
henceforth clearly understand the close relation which, as I have shown
above, exists between the little understood question of Austria-Hungary
and the end of the Pangerman nightmare. It will then have a fresh and
extremely powerful reason for the conviction, that the complete victory,
which the Pangerman plan renders indispensable for the Allies, cannot
fail to be theirs, provided they set their heart on it and avoid further
mistakes.
II.
In Austria-Hungary lies the crucial point of the European and even of the
world-wide problem raised by the German aggression, because:
1. Austria-Hungary has entered into the struggle in very peculiar
circumstances. This State is not an enemy of the Allies, except at the
bidding of the Hapsburg dynasty, which, by yielding to the injunctions
of Berlin, has betrayed its own peoples. In fact, Francis Joseph declared
war without even daring to consult his parliament, for he knew very well
that nearly three-fourths of his subjects, sympathizing with Russia,
France, and England, and being definitely hostile to Germany, would have
opposed, by the voice of their representatives, any sanguinary conflict
destined to turn to the advantage of Germanism.
2. It is manifest that Germany cannot maintain a war against Europe
except with the help of the Austro-Hungarian soldiers, whom she has
dexterously contrived to enlist in her cause, and of whom the vast
majority only fight because they are forced to do so by the brutal German
Staff Officers who command them.
3. It is clear that after the peace, if Germany were to evacuate all
the territories she now occupies in the East and the West, to restore
Alsace-Lorraine to France, and yet to keep her hold, more or less
disguised, on Austria-Hungary, Berlin would possess all the means for
retaking, after a short delay, Alsace-Lorraine from France, since, as
we saw in the foregoing chapter, the German hold on Austria-Hungary
inevitably implies the accomplishment of the scheme “from Hamburg to the
Persian Gulf.”
4. From this last consideration it follows that if after the peace
Germany were to retain her disguised hold on Austria-Hungary, the solemn
promise given by France, England, and Russia, to re-establish Serbia in
its independence and its integrity, would be practically incapable of
fulfilment.
5. On the contrary, if the freedom from German control of at least the
majority of the Austro-Hungarian territories were assured after the
peace, this would absolutely prevent for the future any aggressive
revival of Prussian militarism. For by the very fact of that independence
the General Staff of Berlin would be deprived of troops which are
indispensable to the forcible execution of the Pangerman projects.
6. A glance at the map (p. 113) will show that in virtue of their
geographical situation nothing but the freedom of the majority of the
Austro-Hungarian territories from German control could enable the Allies
to keep their promises to Serbia, and, by definitely breaking the
backbone of the Pangerman plan, to prevent the immense danger of the
“Hamburg to the Persian Gulf” plan, the accomplishment of which all the
Allies, without any exception (France, England, Russia, Italy, Japan,
Belgium, Serbia, Montenegro) have a really vital interest to prevent.
But, as we shall see at the end of the volume, their interest in this
matter is also the interest of the whole civilized world.
The fact that public opinion in the Allied countries is not yet fully
alive to the capital, the essential importance of the Austro-Hungarian
question for the issue of the war and the future of Europe, is due to a
variety of causes which must be enumerated.
In the first place, the question of Austria-Hungary, an empire composed
of very complex racial and social elements, is undoubtedly very difficult
to grasp.
In the next place, the lamentable want of interest in foreign affairs,
which before the war prevailed in the Allied countries, is responsible
for the extreme inaccuracy of those current beliefs on the subject, which
the German press agents have successfully palmed off on the newspapers of
the present Allies.
As a result, many people in these countries, especially in England, still
imagine that Austria-Hungary, with a population of fifty millions, is
a country mainly German, which is a radically false idea. This serious
mistake is sometimes made, to my knowledge, even by men occupying very
important posts.
Evidently a large part of the public is no longer quite so ignorant as
that. Nevertheless, even for them the Austro-Hungarian question is still
full of obscurities. Need we wonder at it? The official diplomatists
themselves in general, whatever their personal intelligence, have been
able to acquire but a very superficial insight into the internal affairs
of the Hapsburg empire. The reasons for the deficiency have been already
set forth (Chapter I., § 3); they include the old-fashioned means of
observation and information which the diplomatists have been constrained
to employ.
Finally, the learned men who have studied Austria-Hungary only as
historians, that is to say, as foreigners and in books, whatever their
qualifications, have not been able to acquaint themselves with the exact
internal condition of the country, which has been completely transformed,
especially within the last ten years. But it is just this present
condition which it is important, and alone important, to comprehend.
This want of clear notions on the Hapsburg empire involves a very great
danger for the Allies. It has contributed largely to the very grave
mistakes which they have made in the general conduct of the war. An end
must be put to this ignorance. In regard to Austria-Hungary the Allies
must on no account continue to commit such a series of blunders as those
which made up their policy towards the Balkans. Their punishment for such
repeated mistakes would be even more severe than it has been.
The only way of avoiding these mistakes is to listen to the opinions
of the few men, citizens of the Allied states, who in recent years, in
virtue of their thorough-going studies and of their extensive travels in
the whole of Austria-Hungary, have been able to acquire a really exact
and general knowledge of the facts as they are at present.
Those who possess these qualifications are far from numerous. I will
mention first two Russians: M. de Wesselitsky, correspondent of the
_Novoe Vremya_ in London, who knows not only Austria-Hungary, but
all Europe, and has very profound views; and M. Briantchaninoff, of
Petrograd. I know that in official circles the ideas of the latter
gentleman are deemed too violent or extreme, but he is one of the
few Russians who have travelled much for the purpose of acquainting
themselves with foreign affairs. A very intelligent Liberal and a
clearsighted man, he has for a very long time advocated the concession
by Russia of the largest and the most genuine autonomy to Poland. His
opinion with regard to Austria-Hungary, which he has often visited,
deserves to be listened to.
Two Englishmen in particular possess an excellent knowledge of the
Hapsburg empire: Mr. Wickham Steed, foreign editor of _The Times_, who
was for ten years the remarkable correspondent of that powerful organ
at Vienna; Mr. Seton-Watson, who, under the name of _Scotus Viator_,
has published, within the last ten years, the results of his manifold
inquiries in works of the highest value dealing with the nationalities
subject to the German-Magyar yoke.
In France we find M. Louis Léger, Member of the Institute,[4] who for
fifty-one years past, has devoted special study to all the peoples of
Austria-Hungary and knows them thoroughly. Further, M. Ernest Denis,
professor at the Sorbonne, has written a remarkable history of Bohemia.
In studying on the spot for the purpose of writing this book, he has
acquired a very full knowledge of the Czech nation, which by its
geographical position in Bohemia and Moravia, forms the indispensable
basis of every reconstitution of Austria-Hungary in a modern form.
Finally, may I be allowed to cite myself, since for twenty-two years,
by a series of manifold inquiries on the spot, I have endeavoured to
understand in their detail the very complex problems which form the
Austro-Hungarian question?
Now, I have reason to believe that these men, who have thoroughly studied
Austria-Hungary, and whom therefore we ought to trust, are agreed on the
general lines of the policy which the Allies should pursue in regard to
the Hapsburg monarchy. I think that I am not mistaken when I say that the
opinions which I am about to express are on the whole in harmony with the
views of these gentlemen.
Let us first understand that those who still uphold the doctrine of
the maintenance of Austria-Hungary as she is, that is, in subjection
to the Hapsburg dynasty, are at least twenty years behind their time.
To adopt this solution would be to play the German game; for it is
practically impossible to separate the Hapsburgs from the Hohenzollerns.
It would establish the Germanic yoke on the Slav and Latin subjects of
the Hapsburgs, thus facilitating the accomplishment of the scheme “from
Hamburg to the Persian Gulf.”
Finally, the Hapsburg dynasty has given too many proofs of its
incapacity, its duplicity, and its submissiveness to the suggestions of
Berlin, to allow us to consider seriously its maintenance at the head of
the Austro-Hungarian peoples.
In no way must the Allies be dupes of the comedy which the Pangermans of
Berlin, Vienna, and Budapest are getting up now in order to profit by the
ignorance of the Allies as to Austro-Hungarian facts.
All the measures tending to force Austria-Hungary into the German
_Zollverein_, which would make its political absorption inevitable, must
be looked upon as a farce, a simple act of criminal violence done to
the wishes of the immense majority of the populations in the Hapsburg
monarchy. So true is this, that certain Magyar noblemen, who up to the
present have been decided allies of Berlin, are already uttering protests
against the Prussian yoke, understanding at last that it is to be imposed
upon them. Count Theodore Batthyany, vice-president of the Independent
Left of the Hungarian Chamber, declared at the end of March, 1916: “It
is often said among us that the future Customs-Union would create in our
country better economical conditions. This is much more true for Germany,
who will hold both the reins and the whip in the combination.... Besides
the Germans make no secret of it that in the proposed compact there will
be other agricultural states which will be our future competitors (in
allusion to Turkey and the Balkan States). Certainly, from the time that
the union is concluded, all capital will come to us from Germany and
never from elsewhere. The Germans will have the monopoly of capital among
us, and you know what a monopoly is and what it costs. The money will
cost us dear” (_Le Temps_, 1st February, 1916).
In Austria, M. Nemetz, President of the Chamber of Commerce at Prague,
declared: “None of the arguments adduced in favour of a Customs-Union
with Germany will for a moment bear the light of criticism. An
insuperable obstacle is opposed to an intimate Customs-Union between
the two empires: their interests are not identical but on the contrary
competitive” (quoted by _Le Temps_, 9th February, 1916).
These categorical declarations prove what resistance the Pangerman
manœuvre has already to encounter. The Allies have much to gain from
these statements, for they prove the reality of the deep opposition
existing between the interests of Pangerman Germany and those of the
majority of the Austro-Hungarian peoples.
But there remains an essential point to prove, for it gives rise to
special anxiety in the minds of that part of the public in the Allied
countries which still harps on the false idea that Austro-Hungary is a
specially German country. This section of the public doubts whether the
application of the principle of nationalities, which the Allies demand,
would not have the effect of necessarily and considerably increasing
Germany by incorporating in it the Germans of the Hapsburg empire.
It is, therefore, necessary to demonstrate by means of figures and
accurate geographical and ethnographical arguments that this fear is
quite chimerical. Austria-Hungary contains all the elements of a new
State which can be constituted on just and lasting foundations, and under
such conditions that it would form for the future an insurmountable
barrier to Pangermanism. It is there, as we shall see, on the road from
Hamburg to the Persian Gulf, in Central Europe, and nowhere else that we
shall find the solution of the problem set to the world by the hateful
ambition of the Hohenzollerns.
III.
Let us examine in figures what would be the result in Central Europe of
the application of the principle of nationalities, which ought to form
the moral base of the Allies for the reconstitution of future Europe.
The French Socialist Congress at the end of 1915, in my opinion, gave
an excellent definition of the principle of nationalities as we see it
at work in the present war. The manifesto of the Congress declared:
“No durable peace unless the small martyrized nations are restored to
their political and economic independence.... No durable peace unless
the oppressed populations of Europe have restored to them the liberty of
shaping their own destinies” (_L’Humanité_, 30th December, 1915).
As nothing in this world is absolute, it is clear that the principle of
nationalities cannot always receive in practice a complete application.
In order to constitute States with a potentiality of life, we must
take into account not only the nationalities but also the strategical,
defensive, historical, and economical needs of the majority. There
are besides countries like Macedonia and like certain regions of
Austria-Hungary, where the nationalities are so intermingled that the
application of the principle of nationality can only be relative.
On the other hand, sacrifices must sometimes be made at the cost of
the principle of nationalities for the sake of the general European
interest. Thus, for example, France cannot think of incorporating those
who speak French in Belgium and Switzerland. The first of those people
wish to remain Belgians and the second wish to remain Swiss. Their wish
must be all the more respected since the maintenance of the Belgian
state and of the Swiss state is necessary to the balance and the peace
of Europe. There are, moreover, other parts of the continent where this
consideration outweighs the principle of nationalities.
Having given these explanations and made these reservations, let us see
what would be obtained in the main by the application of the principle
of nationalities to the German empire. In virtue of this principle the
Germans ought to restore liberty to those peoples who are included by
force within their boundaries, that is to say about
Inhabitants.
Poles 5,000,000
Inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine 1,500,000
Danes 200,000
---------
Total 6,700,000
The Germany of to-day, which numbered 68 millions of inhabitants in 1914,
including the non-Germans, would be brought down to about 61,300,000, in
round figures, 61,000,000 of genuine Germans.
But the logical application of the principle of nationalities would give
to that Germany the liberty of absorbing those Germans of the Hapsburg
monarchy who on historical, strategical, and geographical grounds can be
legitimately added to Germany after its reduction from 68 to 61 millions
of inhabitants. What would be the result?
Let us look back to p. 32 and examine the map which sums up the
ethnographical situation of Austria-Hungary. On this map the Slav and
Latin nationalities subject to the Hapsburgs, named in the margin,
are indicated by different shadings. The region inhabited by Germans
and that inhabited by the Magyars have been left blank. The two last
ethnographic groups are separated by a dotted line. This map only gives
a very imperfect idea of the ethnographic facts, because it is drawn
from ethnographic documents which are German and Magyar, and which are
purposely falsified. In reality the Slav regions are a good deal more
extensive than is indicated by the blank zones (Germans and Magyars).
This is particularly true in the blank zone to the north and north-west
of the purely Czech region.
Vienna, which, however, is in the centre of a perfectly blank zone, is by
no means, as is generally believed, a purely German city. Her population
is Slav to the amount of about one-third (Poles and especially Czechs).
This fact, which is certain, is yet not recognized by any official
Austrian statistics, because these are drawn up by German functionaries
who have orders to falsify them. Their principal mode of garbling the
figures is as follows:
In the whole of Austria every Slav or Latin, who merely knows a few words
of German, is styled, much against his own will, a German. Now, all the
Slavs who live in Vienna know a few words of German. This allows the
German statisticians of the Austrian Government to conclude that there
are no Slavs in Vienna, and to set down the number of the Slavs in all
the rest of Austria at a figure considerably below the truth.
In Hungary the statistics are garbled with the same effrontery by the
functionaries of the Budapest government in favour of the Magyar element.
The following, however, are the results given for the whole of the
Hapsburg monarchy by the official Germano-Magyar statistics in the census
of 1910:
Round figures in tens
_Austria._ of thousands.
Germans 9,950,000
Czechs 6,440,000
Poles 4,970,000
Ruthenians 3,520,000
Slovenes 1,260,000
Serbo-Croatians 790,000
Italians 770,000
Roumanians 280,000
----------
Total 27,980,000
_Hungary._
Magyars 10,050,000
Roumanians 2,950,000
Serbo-Croatians 2,940,000
Germans 2,040,000
Slovaks 1,970,000
Ruthenians 480,000
----------
Total 20,430,000
_Bosnia and Herzegovina._
Serbo-Croatians (orthodox, or Moslems
of Serbian origin) 2,000,000
According to these figures there are 12 millions of Germans in the
Hapsburg empire, but we shall see that not nearly all these 12 millions
of Germans could be united to Germany. In fact:
1. As the table shows, rather more than two millions of Germans are
in Hungary, where they are scattered in small groups among the other
nationalities. They could not therefore be united to Germany.
2. Out of the 10 millions, roughly speaking, of Germans in Austria,
those of Bohemia, to the north and north-west of the purely Czech zone,
could not be united to Germany, because in that zone they are mixed up
with numerous Czechs, and because the dotted line, which on the map (p.
68) separates Bohemia from the German empire of to-day, represents the
historical and strategical boundaries of the kingdom of Bohemia. Now it
would be impossible without these boundaries to assure the independence
of the Czecho-Slovaks. Clearly we could not think of sacrificing nearly 9
millions of Czecho-Slovaks to 1 million of Germans in Bohemia, especially
as these same Germans simply squatted in the country long ago by sheer
violence and fraud.
3. By this fact the 10 millions of Germans, who might seem to be eligible
for incorporation in Germany, are reduced to about 9 millions. These
form on the map the blank group which stretches from Switzerland to the
dotted line which marks the Magyar ethnographical boundary. But there
are serious reasons for thinking that were a thorough investigation made
of the ethnographical facts, that is to say, of the mixture of Slavs
and Germans to the east of this group, and consequently between the
purely Czech group to the north of Vienna and the purely Slovene group
to the south of Vienna, the result of such an investigation would be
to show that this German group could not in its entirety be united to
Germany. As it would be out of the question here to enter into these very
difficult ethnographical details, we shall, under all possible reserve,
and purely for the convenience of demonstration, make the supposition
that the whole of this German group should be united to Germany. But from
these 9 millions of Germans we should certainly still have to subtract
the Slavs who are included in this figure through the systematic garbling
of the Austrian statistics. The typical example of the city of Vienna,
cited above, proves this necessity. As this deception is practised on an
enormous scale at the expense of the Slavs, we may allow that the true
number of Germans in this part of Austria who could be geographically
incorporated in Germany, amounts to not more than 7 or 8 millions. Let us
take this last figure. If these 8 millions of Germans were incorporated
in Germany, then Germany of to-day, reduced for the reasons indicated on
p. 123 to 61 millions, would be enlarged, at the expense of Austria, by
8 millions of inhabitants. She would then have a total of 69 millions of
inhabitants.
Therefore, as the present German empire had in 1914 a population of 68
millions of inhabitants, we see that the application of the principle of
nationalities would allow Germany to gain on the south-west just about
the equivalent of what the same principle would take from her on the
circumference of the existing empire.
Would a Germany of 69 or 70 millions of genuine Germans be really
dangerous for Europe? I do not think so, for, as we shall see, the
application of the principle of nationalities would have the effect of
withdrawing totally from the influence of Berlin’s Pangermanism all the
rest of the inhabitants of Austria-Hungary.
In fact, if out of the 50 millions of inhabitants in Austria-Hungary of
to-day about 8 millions joined Germany, 42 millions of Austro-Hungarian
subjects would remain. Of this number:
Five millions of Poles would join Poland;
Four millions of Ruthenians would join Russia;
Three millions of Roumanians would join Roumania;
One million of Italians would join Italy;
Making a total of 13 millions of inhabitants.
There would therefore remain a compact group composed of 29 millions of
inhabitants, made up of Czech-Slovaks, Magyars, and Germans, these last
diluted in the solid mass of Magyars and Serbo-Croatians. As the Magyars
and Serbo-Croatians wish to unite with the 5 million Serbians of Serbia,
we thus deduce the presence in Central Europe of a mass of 34 million
inhabitants, containing an infinitesimal proportion of Germans and so
situated geographically that they could perfectly form United States, in
which the rights of each nationality and the form of government of each
State would be respected, and which, nevertheless, would constitute an
economic territory extensive enough to correspond to modern needs.
The obstacle to the creation of such United States might seem to be the
reluctance of the Magyars, who at present play the German game, to come
to an understanding with the neighbouring nationalities. This objection
disappears when we know what is unfortunately known to none but a small
number of experts. Out of the 10 millions of Magyars, there are about 9
millions of poor labourers, almost all agricultural, cynically exploited
by the Magyar nobility, who possess nearly all the land. Now it is
these nobles, owners of enormous landed estates, who, with the Magyar
functionaries whom they nominate, are Prussophile, and not even all of
them are that. It must also be known that the 9 millions of Magyar
proletariat are not so much as represented in the parliament at Budapest,
for elections in Hungary are neither more nor less than barefaced
swindles practised for the benefit of the million Magyars who sweat their
poor compatriots. Now these 9 millions of unhappy peasants by no means
love the Prussians. More than that, they are quite ready to fraternize
with the other democratic masses represented by the nationalities which
surround them. Therefore, on the day when the true Magyar people shall
be delivered from the feudal nobility who oppress them, and shall become
in their turn masters of their own destinies, they will certainly not
stand out against the creation of the United States here adumbrated. I am
quite sure of the popular feeling on this subject, for on my last visits
to Budapest I was able to put myself in communication with the leaders
of the Magyar democratic organizations. It was thus that I learned that
even before the war they had been trying to find a basis for a mutual
understanding with the other Slav nationalities of Hungary. So strong
indeed was this tendency that it furnished the nefarious Count Tisza with
a motive for declaring war in order to elude the democratic movement,
which threatened the privileges of the Magyar nobility, of which he is
one of the leaders.
In short, we may conclude that there is in Austria-Hungary and in Serbia
a mass of 34 millions of inhabitants, who are practically free from
Germanic elements and could form in Central Europe a confederacy of
United States that might in time develop into the United States of Europe.
Thus there undoubtedly exist all the ethnographical elements which
could render possible the erection in Central Europe of a very powerful
triple barrier against every aggressive revival of Pangermanism (see p.
43). The erection of this barrier would form the solution of the great
problem set us by the Pangerman peril. It would free for ever numerous
nationalities from the Prussian yoke. It would coincide not only with the
interests of all the Allies, but also with those of the whole world. For
as I hope to prove in Chapter IX, the inhabitants of both South and North
America would be not less vitally affected than the European Allies and
Japan by the achievement of the scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf.”
Therefore, the necessary but sufficient backbone of the Pangerman plan,
as represented by the formula “Hamburg to the Persian Gulf,” can be
certainly destroyed in Central Europe and there only. The net result
is that the question of Austria-Hungary constitutes the crucial point
of a problem which is not only European but universal, set to all the
civilized States by the war which Prussianized Germany has initiated and
by the execrable ambition of the Hohenzollerns.
The question of Austria-Hungary has besides an aspect of social and
universal interest, which the Liberals and Socialists of Allied or
neutral countries have not yet perhaps sufficiently contemplated.
The supremacy of Germany over Austria-Hungary would have, in fact, a
social consequence of infinite importance: a new lease of crushing and
strengthened power would be ensured to the German-Austrian aristocracy,
to the Magyar aristocracy of Hungary, to the German aristocracy of the
German empire, and above all to the execrable Prussian _Junkers_, who are
principally responsible for the war. This great and insolent triumph of
the _Junker_ spirit, supported by the means of universal domination which
would be put at the disposal of the Berlin government as a consequence
of the accomplishment of the scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf,”
would have a disastrous after-effect by repressing those democratic
and liberal movements, which are at present developing legitimately and
necessarily, not only in the Allied countries but in the whole world.
Finally, it would entail fresh revolutionary crises, causing disturbances
which it is of serious interest to avoid, lest ideas of social justice
should lose the vantage ground of liberty which they have so painfully
conquered.
These considerations, therefore, lead us to the conclusion that the final
liberation of all the Latin and Slav peoples of Austria-Hungary from
the German yoke is a matter of universal social interest. In fact, it
constitutes an essential condition of the progress of liberal ideas, of
the pacific development and organization of democracy in the whole world.