THE DODGE OF THE “DRAWN GAME” AND THE SCHEME “FROM HAMBURG TO THE PERSIAN
GULF.”
I. What would really be the outcome of the dodge called the
“Drawn Game.”
II. The financial consequences for the Allies of this so-called
“Drawn Game.”
III. The Allies and the scheme “From Hamburg to the Persian
Gulf.”
IV. Panislamic and Asiatic consequences of the achievement of
the scheme “From Hamburg to the Persian Gulf.”
V. Consequences for the world of the achievement of the scheme
“From Hamburg to the Persian Gulf.”
If the Allies really wish, as their Governments have often proclaimed,
to put an end to the peril of Prussian militarism, they must resolutely
face the facts as they are, even when these are unpalatable to their
self-esteem. They must understand fully that the chance of carrying out
the Pangerman plan rests in a large measure on the ignorance of the
Allies. Berlin knew that before the war the countries now allied were
unaware of the totally new face which within recent years has been put
on all the political problems of the Balkans and Austria-Hungary by the
labours of Pangermanism and the movement of nationalities. Undoubtedly
that ignorance of the Allies has been as minutely studied and appraised
as were their military deficiencies; the conviction that the Allies
did not understand how to grapple with the situation has certainly
contributed to Berlin’s decision to unloose the dogs of war. Now, the
dodge of the “Drawn Game,” the last trump of the Berlin Government, is a
fresh gamble based on the ignorance of the Allies about foreign affairs.
I.
The dodge of the “Drawn Game” will be based on the following train of
reasoning, which unquestionably prevails in Berlin:
“The Allied diplomats have grasped neither our plan, nor our Pangerman
organization, although that has required a preparation lasting twenty
years. The Allied diplomats have understood neither the true position of
the Balkans after the treaty of Bukarest (though that position was so
favourable to themselves), nor the importance of the Balkan forces for
the issue of the war. Still less do the Allied diplomats and the public
of their respective countries know about the real state of affairs in
Austria-Hungary. In France, and above all in England, a considerable
proportion of the public continue to believe that Austria-Hungary is
chiefly a German country, and that its more or less formal union with the
Empire is a natural and almost inevitable event. Therefore, if we are
compelled to give way in the East and in the West we may still, if we
are clever, have a chance of achieving the third part of our Pangerman
plan. The Allies will not understand the future danger in store for them
if we carry out that part which is, indeed, the principal part of our
scheme, namely, our designs on the South and South-East, symbolized by
the formula: From Hamburg to the Persian Gulf.”
Indeed, the dodge of the “Drawn Game” aims at nothing less than at
that result. We must own that the German argument which has just been
summarized is not devoid of foundation; for up to now the Press of
the Allies has published articles on Austria-Hungary revealing a total
misconception of the facts, and they have thus unconsciously encouraged
the Pangerman project as regards the Hapsburg Monarchy.
[Illustration: THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DODGE CALLED THE “DRAWN GAME.”]
In the Allied Press, also, the expression: “Drawn Game” is currently
employed to mean that Germany might be considered as vanquished if she
evacuates the now occupied territories in the East and in the West;
but nobody has yet pointed out with the necessary precision that the
so-called “Drawn Game” would not be a draw at all, since it would allow
Germany to effect enormous acquisitions, which would make her much more
powerful than before the war.
And yet the Allies ought not to be again the dupes of a German stratagem;
which, if it succeeded, would involve consequences infinitely more
serious than all the former errors of the Allies. To ward off that danger
it suffices to look it full in the face and thoroughly to fathom what
would be the outcome of a peace negotiated on the so-called principle of
a “Drawn Game.”
The term “Drawn Game” evidently denotes that each country would keep the
frontiers which existed before the war; also that each country would
bear the burden of the outlays it has made during the struggle. But we
will argue on a hypothesis infinitely more favourable for the Western
Allies than that of the so-called “Drawn Game” in order to demonstrate
super-abundantly and as decisively as possible what would be concealed
behind this apparent and partial German capitulation.
Let us suppose (see map, p. 79) that, in consequence of victorious
offensives of the Allies, Germany should declare herself disposed, not
only to evacuate totally Poland, the French Departments, Belgium, and
Luxemburg, but also to restore Alsace-Lorraine to France, and even to
give, as an indemnity all the rest of the left bank of the Rhine, under
the sole and tacit condition that Germany should keep her preponderant
influence, direct or indirect, over Austria-Hungary, the Balkans and
Turkey.
There are surely in the Allied Western countries many worthy people who,
at present, no more see the result of such a peace, than a year ago
they understood the enormous influences which the Balkans would exert
on the course of the war. These good creatures, weary of the prolonged
strife, would at once say: “After all, these are most acceptable terms:
Alsace-Lorraine, the left bank of the Rhine!... let us make peace.”
If matters are probed to the bottom it will be easily seen that, should
the Allies negotiate peace with Germany on such a basis, the restitution
of Alsace-Lorraine could only be temporary; for with such a peace as
that, Germany would secure all the elements of power which might enable
her, after a very short respite, to retake Alsace-Lorraine, and in
the end to overcome all the Allies and to achieve in its entirety the
Pangerman plan, not only in Europe, but in Asia, nay in the whole world.
* * * * *
To relinquish the left bank of the Rhine, according to our hypothesis,
would mean for Germany that she would lose:
Square
Provinces. Kilometres. Population.
Rhenish-Prussia 27,000 7,000,000
Rhenish-Bavaria 5,928 1,000,000
Alsace-Lorraine 14,522 2,000,000
------ ----------
Total 47,450 10,000,000
The present German Empire would therefore be reduced to 493,408 square
kilometres and 58 million inhabitants. But this loss in the West would
be far more than counterbalanced by that close union of Austria-Hungary
to the German Empire, which would be none the less real because it would
be disguised. On this reckoning Berlin’s influence would be exercised
directly and absolutely over:
Square
Kilometres. Population.
German Empire curtailed in the West 493,408 58,000,000
Austria-Hungary 676,616 50,000,000
--------- -----------
Total 1,170,024 108,000,000
It is evident that a solid block of States, established in Central Europe
under the direction of Berlin, would exercise, simply by contiguity an
absolutely preponderant pressure on:
Square
Kilometres. Population.
The Balkans 499,275 22,000,000
Turkey 1,792,900 20,000,000
--------- ----------
Total 2,292,175 42,000,000
Therefore Berlin’s preponderant influence would be wielded, directly
or indirectly, over 3,462,199 square kilometres and over 150 million
inhabitants.
We now see clearly that in the end the dodge of the “Drawn Game” would
lead in reality to an enormous increase of the German Empire, and to the
achievement of the principal part of the Pangerman plan summarized in the
formula “from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf” (p. 109 of original). What
then would be the general position of Great Germany thus constituted?
“Having cut Europe in two, mistress of the Adriatic as well as of the
North Sea, secure in her fleets and in her armies, Great Germany would
be an incubus on the world. Trieste, the Hamburg of the South, would
feed her in peace and revictual her in war. Her industry, equipped with
plant of incomparable power, would flood with her wares those very
countries which she now schemes so artfully to monopolize:—Holland and
Belgium, which are already penetrated; Hungary, her client; Roumania,
her satellite; Bulgaria, a broken barrier; Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
portals of the East. And, beyond the Bosphorus, Germany would reach
Asia-Minor, that immense quarry of wealth. The huge German railroad
projected to run from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf without a break,
would link Berlin to the Far East. Then would the Emperor William’s
Brobdingnagian dream be fulfilled. Germany would rule the world by her
might and by her commercial wealth. The state of things which then would
exist might be described by slightly modifying what Metternich wrote
of Napoleonic France: ‘The German system which to-day is triumphant is
directed against all the great states in their entirety, against every
power able to maintain its own independence.’”
Such are the words which I published fifteen years ago in my book,
_L’Europe et la Question d’Autriche au seuil du XXᵉ siècle, p. 353 (Plon,
Nourrit, editeurs, Paris)_. A careful study of the Pangerman plan of
1895 had then convinced me that the whole future policy of Berlin would
tend to carry out the plan laid down in the formula “from Hamburg to the
Persian Gulf.” In what I then wrote a few minute discrepancies may now be
detected, but, unfortunately, the facts of to-day show that still on the
whole my words correspond exactly with events. The dodge of the “Drawn
Game,” which the Germans keep up their sleeve, hoping still to profit by
the ignorance or the weariness of some of the Allies, would indeed have
for its indisputable object the achievement of that huge plan.
The terrible danger which this would bring upon the Allies will be better
perceived (supposing they fall into the trap laid for them) when we shall
have demonstrated with precision, what would be the consequences for them
if the scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf” were to succeed.
II.
If we suppose for the sake of argument that the dodge of the “Drawn
Game” were to succeed so far as to allow the Germans, by binding
Austria-Hungary to the German Empire, to carry through their plan
“from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf,” their success would involve certain
general financial consequences. These we must unfold, if we would clearly
understand the full extent of the craft hidden under the cloak of that
manœuvre called the “Drawn Game,” which is still to be played.
The Germans having failed to crush the Allies, begin to think that the
expenses of war may possibly fall on themselves. The _Berlin Post_
has already calculated: “If we do not receive a war indemnity we must
reckon on a yearly increase of taxes of at least four milliard marks,”
being five milliard francs for 68 million inhabitants (_Le Temps_, 1st
February, 1916).
The disappointment is certainly keen for the Germans who counted on
exacting from France alone an indemnity of 35 milliard francs; but we
must nevertheless fully understand that the dodge of the “Drawn Game”
(which, for the sake of argument, we suppose to have succeeded) would
place Germany in a financial position vastly more advantageous than that
of the Allies.
As a matter of fact, the cost of war has been much less for Germany than
for her adversaries. This is a point which must be fully considered,
all the more because it helps to explain why the economic resistance of
Germany is more prolonged than was generally expected.
From the beginning of hostilities, Austro-German troops have lived at
the vast expense of enemy or Allied territories, such as Turkey and
Bulgaria, whose accumulated resources they slowly drain. Besides, in
enemy countries, particularly in Belgium and in France, which are the
richest regions on earth, the Germans have collected a large amount of
plunder. On Belgium alone they have levied a war contribution in specie
of 480 million francs a year. Out of Belgium and France the Germans draw
large quantities of coal and iron scot free. In both these countries they
have purloined raw goods, machines, furniture, valuables, representing
the value certainly of several milliard francs. In the French towns of
the Nord alone the Germans have stolen about 550 million francs worth
of wool. Everywhere they have seized innumerable securities which they
have already tried to convert into money, though with small success, in
the United States. But if a complete victory did not compel the Germans
to restore those bonds to the Allies who own them, some at least of them
would suffer a heavy loss of capital, by the mere fact of their warrants
being detained; the effect of this would unavoidably react on the general
wealth of the Allied countries. To these losses would probably be added
those of the numerous milliards of francs, lent by the French or English
to Austria, to the Balkan States, and to Turkey, and represented by bonds
which at present are, it is true, in Allied lands, but whose value would
become exceedingly uncertain and hazardous the day that Germany ruled
from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf. Teutonic good faith would then serve as
the only guarantee that dividends would be paid. The war, therefore, has
put within Germany’s power not only vast territories which have enabled
her to carry on the struggle with far less expense than the Allies, but
also the Germans have been able to lay their hands on enormous wealth,
representing tens of milliards of francs, which, being partly convertible
into specie, have reduced by that amount the direct financial war outlay
of Germany.
Clearly, the Allies are not in an equal position.
Always supposing, for the sake of argument, that peace were concluded
with Berlin on the basis of the “Drawn Game,” each one of the Allies
would have to bear, without any reduction, the immense expenses incurred
to maintain a war made by Germany. It is easy to perceive that these
war costs have been and are considerably higher for each of the Allies
and more miscellaneous than has been the case for Germany. The Allies
found it necessary to improvise an enormous war plant under most costly
conditions, while Germany had been able during peace, that is, under
relatively economical conditions, to produce all the material of her
fighting equipment.
The Allies are bound to take care of and to maintain millions of refugees
from invaded regions, whereas the Germans have only temporarily borne
such a burden and merely for a small part of Eastern Prussia. After the
war, Belgium, Russia and especially France will have to provide for some
tens of milliards of francs worth of extra charges for repairs of the
colossal damages done by the Germans in invaded territories, to private
persons, State properties, railways, roads, etc. The Germans would not
have a similar outlay, at least not anything like in the same proportion.
In their conception of the “Drawn Game” the Germans certainly reckon
that these financial differences would almost ensure, after peace, the
ulterior impotence of the Allied countries as against Great Germany.
What, for instance, would be the position of France if a war indemnity
were not paid to her? A few familiar figures, which everyone can check,
will enable us to form an opinion on that score. If the struggle lasts,
let us say, for two years, we can estimate at 50 milliards of francs
the direct outlay for France, and about 20 milliards would be required
for her indirect expenditure, that is, what must be paid after peace
for repairing the prodigious damage caused to individuals and to the
State—remaking of roads, rebuilding of railways, etc., the total of the
expenses mounting up to some 70 milliards of francs. As the national debt
of France, before the war, was 30 milliards of francs, it would therefore
have increased after peace to about 100 milliard francs.
On the other hand the budget of France in 1914 was in round figures
five milliard francs. The single item of the rise in price of daily
commodities will in itself inevitably be increased after war at least
by 10%, therefore the budget after peace will require, let us say, an
initial increase of 500 million francs. On the other hand, this same
budget would have to bear interest at 5% on the 70 milliard francs of
newly incurred war debts; this would make a yearly outlay of 3,500
million francs. Finally, it is clear that pensions to be given to the
wounded, to widows of combatants, will burden the budget by a yearly
outlay of at least a milliard francs. Probably even that figure will be
insufficient. Altogether the French budget of five milliard francs, as it
was in 1914, would have to be increased by about five milliard francs; in
other words, it will have to be doubled. Already we well know that this
figure is much below what would be needed. And yet that enormous increase
makes no allowance for sums required to effect important social reforms,
nor for the great improvements necessary to bring up the economic
national plant of France to a proper standard for resuming business
actively.
We remember how hard it was in France before the war to find, by means
of taxes, even the 500 million of francs needed for new expenditures.
How could we find annually an additional sum of five milliard francs
of taxes in a country cruelly devastated by the struggle and where the
re-organization of economic life would have to be complete? It is
obvious that the most crushing taxes levied on every person would not
suffice for such a sum to be regularly raised.
Such a situation must inevitably tend to raise for the State and for
every Frenchman individually considerable financial difficulties. The
same would apply to economic undertakings. Thousands of these, at
present in the hands of shareholders or bond-holders, would be in a most
precarious condition, or the securities would be immensely depreciated.
Landed property, overburdened by taxes and specially affected by the
shortage of labour, would lose a great part of its value. This situation
would lead to a general rise in prices for the commodities of daily life,
and that again would lay a fresh burden on the back of every Frenchman.
The financial position would be analogous for the Russians and for the
English, who of all the belligerents have spent most on the war.
The Germans, in trying their “Drawn Game” trick, reckon oil these
financial consequences to reduce the Allies to ultimate impotence. The
only way to avoid this danger is to win that complete victory which all
the Allies desire, since it would enable them to impose on Germany the
payment of the war indemnity which she unquestionably owes, as she is
responsible for the hostilities. Annuities paid to each of the Allies
will be used as the basis of loans, which will help to tide over the
serious financial difficulties that infallibly await all the belligerents
after the war.
III.
The menace involved in the scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf”
creates between the Allies in Europe, a common bond of interest, which is
far superior to their own individual interests, and which ought to keep
them firmly united to the end.
France, England, Russia and Italy have an identical and an absolutely
vital interest in defeating for ever the scheme of an empire that should
reach from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf. This is quite apart from the
purely humanitarian consideration that the numerous non-German peoples
who live between Bohemia and the Persian Gulf should not be finally
subservient to Germany. The achievement of the “Hamburg to the Persian
Gulf” scheme threatens all neutral states, for it would guarantee to
Germany, as we shall see presently, her domination over the world.
Always on the supposition that this scheme succeeded, it would, regarded
from the general economic point of view, place Germany in every respect
in an infinitely superior position to that of the Allies. Her direct
or indirect seizure of Austria-Hungary, of the Balkans and the Ottoman
Empire would secure for Germany an extraordinary economic power, against
which all eventual combinations of the Allies would be impotent. The
German dogged power of work, spirit of enterprise and organizing skill
need no further demonstration. We must therefore not doubt for a moment
that they would draw, to their enormous advantage, all possible profits
from Austria-Hungary, vast regions of which can still be turned to
account. The same would apply to the Balkan countries, many of which are
still quite virgin, and contain, to a considerable extent, unexplored
sources of wealth, both agricultural and mineral. This would also be true
of Asiatic Turkey. As early as 1886 the German Orientalist, Dr. Spenger,
stated: “Asia Minor is the only territory of the world which has not
yet been monopolized by a Great Power. And yet it is the finest field
for colonization. If Germany does not miss the opportunity and seizes it
before the Cossacks grab it, she will have secured the best part in the
division of the world.”
It is an illusion to imagine that the Turks would seriously raise
obstacles to the economic exploitation of their country by Germany. If
the Germans were masters of Central Europe and the Balkans, they would be
in a position to sweep away all obstacles. The Prussian Pangermans are
quite sure of it, thanks to their liege-men of Constantinople. This is
proved sufficiently by the way in which the hereditary prince of Turkey,
Yussuf-Izzedin, was “suicided” at the end of January, 1916, because
he was anti-German. The Germans would perfectly understand the art of
showering, as hitherto, the amplest personal advantages on the handful of
Young Turks of Enver Pasha’s clique, while at the same time they would
grant such nominal concessions as would enable Berlin under the same to
exploit thoroughly the Ottoman Empire.
Do not let us be deceived, if the scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian
Gulf” succeeded, it would place in Berlin’s hands every element of a
formidable economic power unprecedented in history. It would secure,
in fact, to Germany the exclusive monopoly of economic influence on
about three million square kilometres of European and Asiatic lands
(Austria-Hungary, Balkans, Turkey), and it would include, beside, the
seizure of numerous strategical places of the highest importance (the
coasts of the Adriatic and the Ægean Sea, the Dardanelles, etc.).
Now the permanence of these enormous advantages would be assured to
Great Germany through the expansion of Prussian militarism. For it must
be clearly understood—the point is essential—that Prussian militarism
would become considerably more powerful than it was in 1914, if the
scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf” were achieved. Yet it is
the destruction of Prussian militarism which is the true, legitimate,
and necessary object of the war, an object infinitely above any mere
territorial annexation whatsoever.
The increase of power which would accrue to Prussian militarism through
the accomplishment of the scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf” is
readily intelligible. The close attachment of Austria-Hungary to Germany,
by placing under the immediate authority of the Headquarters Staff of
Berlin a population of 108 millions, would enable it to mobilize at least
10 millions of soldiers. Now, in virtue of the central geographical
position of the two empires, and of the network of Austro-German
railways, which would be brought to the highest degree of technical
perfection, this immense army might, even more easily than to-day, be
very rapidly concentrated on any point of the periphery of the Germanic
confederation. But that is not all. The predominance of Berlin over
the Balkans and Turkey, by means of political alliances forced on the
satellite states of the South-East, would give in addition to the Berlin
Staff control of 42 million inhabitants, that is to say, of about four
millions of soldiers.
Supposing then that the mobilization applied to only ten per cent. of
the population, the accomplishment of the scheme “from Hamburg to the
Persian Gulf” would place under the influence, direct or indirect, of
the Hohenzollerns, a total of about fifteen millions of soldiers. If the
mobilization applied to fourteen per cent. of the population, which is
the proportion attained by Serbia and apparently by Austria-Hungary, the
figure would be 21 millions of soldiers.
Now the course of the present war proves incontestably that the control
of great military masses, placed in a single hand and elaborated as
minutely as the Berlin Staff, forms a power infinitely greater than that
of far more numerous masses under a control which is not sufficiently
co-ordinated.
Hence the accomplishment of the scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf”
would place Germany in a military position considerably superior to that
of all the Allied countries together.
In any case, those who are fighting for the purpose of putting an end
to great armaments would find themselves once more plunged into the
vortex of the most rigorous militarism, for they could not contend with
Great Germany except at the cost of formidable armaments, which would
absorb all their resources and all their attention. Now, would they be
in a position to undertake such armaments in the infinitely difficult
financial situation in which, according to hypothesis, they would stand?
(see p. 86). Would they even have the resolution to undertake them, after
the frightful moral disappointment of their peoples, who would learn too
late the enormous mistake committed by their governments in negotiating
peace on the basis of the so-called “Drawn Game,” which would have
enabled Berlin to carry out its scheme of domination “from Hamburg to the
Persian Gulf”?
Besides, even if the Allies were willing to attempt once more the
overthrow of the atrocious Prussian militarism, now much more oppressive
than before the war, Great Germany would certainly not give them time to
prepare for it.
We may be quite sure that the day peace was concluded on the basis
supposed, Berlin would set about organizing economically and militarily,
with the utmost speed, the immense territory over which its supremacy
would be extended. Supposing that Russia, France, England and Italy were
disposed to renew the conflict, they would, in the assumed financial and
moral situation, be certainly reduced to impotence before they could make
head against the new German colossus.
Finally, it would be ignoring completely the tenacity and ambition of
the Hohenzollerns to imagine that Great Germany, once mistress of an
empire from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf, would sincerely renounce the
ambition of dominating the North Sea and the English Channel. Hence the
evacuation of Belgium and the retrocession of Alsace-Lorraine, which on
our hypothesis Germany would have yielded to France, would only have
been temporary. The apparent capitulation of Berlin would have been,
therefore, nothing but a cunning device to allow Germany, driven almost
to bay, to recover herself for a renewal of the struggle. Indeed, she
is already preparing for it in union with her actual allies. _La Nation
Tchèque_, of 15th March, 1916, an excellent review edited by M. Ernest
Denis, professor at the Sorbonne, brought to light the following fact.
On the 29th February, 1916, the Chamber of Commerce of Budapest met,
all members being present, in order to study what measures to take for
a future war intended to complete the insufficient results of a peace,
looked upon as “imperfect.” In this discussion it was stated that with
the prospect of a fresh conflagration the States allied to Germany in the
present war must form an Economic Union.
Thus, already, the Hohenzollern are stirring up even their allies to
organize the future conflagration which they will set ablaze if the
Allies do not crush Prussian militarism. William II. and his Pangermans
want, at all costs, to carry out the scheme known as “from Hamburg to the
Persian Gulf” because they know very well that the completion of that
scheme, as we shall see presently, would suffice to provide them with
all the means of afterwards accomplishing in its entirety their programme
of universal domination.
IV.
The Pangerman plan of 1911 provides that the results of the “Hamburg to
the Persian Gulf” scheme should be made the most of even in the furthest
points of the Far East. Facts to hand and well-known Pangerman programmes
enable us to form an idea of what help Germany meant to find in Asia
during the war, and what profit would have accrued to her afterwards from
the said scheme, if she had succeeded in finally carrying it out.
William II. tried to play the Panislamic card, which is one of the
leading trumps of the Pangerman game. In a word, the object was to stir
up a Panislamic movement, both political and military, which would help
Germany to vanquish the Entente powers, since these hold among their
possessions numerous Moslem subjects: France, particularly in Tunis,
Algiers and Morocco; Italy in Libya; Russia in the Crimea and in the
Caucasus, in the region of Kazan, in Central Asia and in Siberia; England
in Egypt, in India, in Burma, in the Straits Settlements and in the
greater part of her African Colonies.
As Panislamism is ostensibly founded on the restoration and considerable
extension of the influence and powers of the Sultan of Constantinople,
Commander of the Faithful, it could not fail to flatter deeply the
neo-nationalism of the Turks, which has manifested itself particularly
since the failure of the Allies at the Dardanelles. The result is that,
thanks to Panislamism, the Kaiser’s interests have been well served by
the Sultan’s Moslem subjects; a clever propaganda has dazzled their eyes
with a prospect of the restoration of a great empire, even greater than
in days of old.
[Illustration: ASIATIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE SCHEME
“FROM HAMBURG TO THE PERSIAN GULF.”]
The Panislamic movement, minutely and long prepared during peace by
Germany, was started by her as soon as hostilities began. On the advice
of Berlin, the Sultan proclaimed, as early as the end of 1914, the Jehad
or Holy War. No doubt the Moslem insurrection has not become general,
but the Islamic agitation has nevertheless yielded local results, which
will be better understood after the war, and which have hampered the
Allies in India, in Egypt, in Libya and in the French possessions of
North Africa. Particularly in April, 1915, an insurrection of British
Indian troops at Singapore very nearly succeeded. About the same time in
Siam, numerous German officers, with the assistance of Indian and Burmese
revolutionaries, had begun to muster a small army of 16,000 men, who,
after being armed, were to attack British Burma. This Islamic agitation
was threatening to assume serious proportions, when the success of the
Russians in Armenia and in Persia fortunately checked it by striking a
heavy blow at the prestige of the Sultan, the Commander of the Faithful.
Nevertheless, what Berlin has already attempted to achieve with the help
of Islam, should serve the Allies as a strong warning of what Germany
would certainly do in time to come, if the future peace left her the
necessary means. As soon as the Turco-German junction had been effected
across Serbia in October, 1915, the Panislamic policy of the Kaiser
assumed a more decided form. At the behest of the Kaiser, his familiar
spirit at Constantinople, Enver Pacha, who then was all-powerful,
mobilized the whole of such of his Ottoman subjects as were able to
carry the arms provided for them, which only at the beginning of 1916
began to pour in from the Central Empires, after communications had
been established across invaded Serbia. At the same time, hundreds
of thousands of Armenians were systematically massacred, in order to
eliminate a non-Moslem population, which thwarted the Turco-German
plans for the future. As to the military and Panislamic activity of
the Turks, directed by the Germans, it has endeavoured to radiate from
Constantinople in many directions towards Egypt, the Caucasus, Persia,
Central-Russian Asia, Afghanistan and India.
After the war, if by our hypothesis, peace were made on the basis of a
“Drawn Game,” that is to say, if the scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian
Gulf” were carried out, all these other plans would be taken up again.
How would the Turks free themselves from the German clutches? Their
financial position binds them entirely to Germany. Such large personal
advantages as the Kaiser’s agents would inevitably offer to all Turks
whose help would be considered useful, would suffice to ensure Berlin’s
predominance in the Sultan’s Empire, that classical land of backsheesh
(_see_ map, p. 95).
Now, there are in Persia, in the Azerbijan, about 400,000 men who would
make quite useful soldiers, and who would provide what is necessary
for an offensive against Russia; in Afghanistan 500,000 first class
combatants would be found. Once armed they could be let loose in Northern
India, which contains about 50 million Moslems. These, so far, have
collectively remained loyal to Great Britain, but their feelings might be
subject to a change if, as a fact, Germany appeared to be victorious by
remaining mistress of the route from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf. Hence
we conclude that very soon after a peace negotiated on such a basis, the
English and the Russians might have to face very grave difficulties.
That is not all; German propaganda has extended to the whole of China
by various means. First of all the 20 to 30 million Moslems who dwell
in the Celestial Empire, have been worked up by Turco-German agents in
the same way as the Moslem population in other Islamic regions. But
as the Chinese Moslems are geographically not well grouped to form a
sufficiently powerful basis for the German agitation, the latter has
fastened on the vital and motor organs of China. The German agents have
bought in China, as elsewhere, all the newspapers which could be utilized
for their object, particularly the _Peking Post_, written in English,
and the Chinese review, _Hsie-Ho-Pao_. They have also made use of the
_Ostasiatische Lloyd_, which was published at Tien-Tsin before the war.
Since its outbreak they have founded the _German China Gazette_. All
these organs have propagated everywhere in the Celestial Empire the
doctrine of German invincibility. Thanks to this, says the _Frankfurter
Zeitung_, “every coolie knows by now that Germany is victorious.”
For the moment the policy which Germany pursues in China consists in
stirring up everywhere trouble and unrest. In Northern China it upholds
the President Yuan-Shi-Kai.[2] In his set the Germans have gained
numerous followers. Thanks to their influence, German officers already
occupy very important posts in the Chinese army. But in Southern China,
Germany is rousing the populations against the authority of Yuan-Shi-Kai.
The aim of Berlin in this apparent contradictory policy, is to create
such a position in China that it will engross the attention of Japan,
and prevent her from intervening with her troops in Europe; such an
intervention has been already contemplated and would be still possible.
The present Berlin policy in the Celestial Empire has also for its object
to prepare the German policy of the future in the Far East. When once
peace is concluded, on the basis on which she counts, Germany would
pursue in China exactly the same policy which she intends to pursue
in Turkey. Then Berlin will say to the Chinese, as she now says to
the Turks, “See, we are bold financiers, enterprising manufacturers,
energetic business men. We will help you to turn your country to account.
We shall procure for you the experts whom you need. We will give you the
means of defending yourselves against your neighbours. We, who are the
finest soldiers in the world, will bring up to a proper standard your
endless and magnificent military forces, now in embryo. With your 300
millions of inhabitants you can be the absolute rulers of all Asia. We
will, therefore, build up for you a formidable army and a very powerful
navy.”
It is easy to perceive what is hidden behind this programme, with its
obvious attraction for the Chinese. In reality, it is a preparation for
the seizure by Germany of part of China, and her economic exploitation
under exactly the same conditions and by the same measures as those
already employed in Turkey. Moreover, this policy is a signal vengeance
which Germany means to wreak in the future on Japan after the victory of
which she thinks herself assured. No doubt, in order to break the union
of her adversaries, Berlin has already hinted to Tokio the idea of a
separate peace, but that is merely a piece of tactics exacted by the need
of the moment.
Never would a Great Germany, mistress of the route from Hamburg to the
Persian Gulf, and exercising a predominant influence in China, forgive
Japan for having driven her out of Kiao-Chau. Now, if and when an immense
Chinese army shall have been created, under the direction of German
officers, Japan, in spite of the bravery of her soldiers, would at once
be unable to avoid the consequences of the intolerable situation in which
she would be placed through the relative smallness of her population (70
millions, with her colonies, against 300 millions of Chinese). Japan is,
therefore, directly aimed at by the scheme of domination from Hamburg to
the Persian Gulf, which really endangers her future.
Finally, we can see that thanks to a combination of Panislamism and a
Chinophile policy, at least one that is outwardly so, the achievement
of the scheme of domination from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf, would
assure to Germany the means not only of dominating Europe, but also of
exercising a preponderant influence over the whole of Asia. After having
obtained for herself in Europe the possibility of drawing exclusive
profit from strategic positions of inestimable value, such as the shores
of the Adriatic, the Ægean, and the Dardanelles, Germany would be
mistress, by mere force of circumstances, of the Suez Canal and would
command besides numerous vantage points on the Chinese coasts. Thus the
defeat of the “Hamburg to the Persian Gulf” project is a vital question
not only for France, England, Russia, and Italy, but also for Japan.
V.
In order to demonstrate the really extraordinary importance of the
scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf,” we have still to show how
its achievement would not only make Germany mistress in Europe and
preponderant in Asia, but would carry with it the accomplishment of the
Pangerman plan in its world-wide form. The world-wide elements of this
plan, graphically shown on the map herewith, have been set forth in the
book of Otto Richard Tannenberg, _The Greater Germany, the Work of the
20th Century_,[3] which appeared at Leipsic in 1911. As this book, which
_bearing date 1911_, contains the exact programme of the seizures to be
effected in Europe and Turkey, nine-tenths of which the German General
Staff has already carried out to the letter, the exceptional importance
of Tannenberg’s book is indisputable. It is demonstrated, in fact, that
the annexations and seizures which he advocated in 1911 correspond as
completely as possible with the execrable ambitions of the government of
Berlin.
[Illustration: WORLD-WIDE CONSEQUENCES OF THE “HAMBURG TO THE PERSIAN
GULF” SCHEME, AS PROVIDED FOR BY THE PLAN OF 1911.]
As for the territorial acquisitions which Tannenberg advocates in Asia,
in Africa, in Oceania, and in America, they would be the perfectly
logical consequences of the accomplishment of the “Hamburg to the Persian
Gulf” project. If that project became a reality, it would be because the
European Allies, through their blunders in the management of the war,
would have had to forego the notion of beating Germany and to leave the
German General Staff to command an army of from 15 to 21 millions of men
(see p. 91). Therefore, it is obvious that on this hypothesis the Allied
peoples, after a treacherous peace, morally and financially exhausted,
having to face the formidable armies of Pangermany, would be unable to
oppose the accomplishment of those colonial schemes, which the success of
the “Hamburg to the Persian Gulf” plan would afford to Great Germany the
means of carrying out, since, always on the assumption in question, they
would have given way on an issue much more vital for them—that of the
independence of Europe.
Once grant this supposition, and we shall be convinced that Tannenberg’s
world-wide plan of Pangerman annexations is quite stripped of that
chimerical character which at first sight we might be disposed to ascribe
to it.
Besides, we must add that the programme, which is fully described below,
was drawn up by Tannenberg on the supposition, on which the Berlin
Government also reckoned, that England would not take part in the war.
In order to purchase her neutrality, Tannenberg advocated dividing the
colonies of the other European powers between London and Berlin. But now
that England has thrown herself into the struggle, it is clear that,
assuming Germany to be victorious, she would take possession also of
those colonies which Tannenberg proposed to assign to Great Britain,
since Britain would be incapable of resisting. It follows that the
world-wide acquisitions of Pangermany, sketched in the plan of 1911 and
summarized below, are in fact less than Germany would be able to effect,
since having presumably accomplished the scheme of domination “from
Hamburg to the Persian Gulf,” no organized force on earth would be
powerful enough to curb the boundless ambition of Berlin.
We have proved above that if the Allies allowed Germany to secure her
hold on Austria-Hungary, the predominant and exclusive influence of
Berlin over all the Balkans and Turkey would be inevitable. Tannenberg
(_op. cit._, p. 323) explains that finally Asia Minor, Syria, and
Mesopotamia, Palestine, Western Persia, and the larger part of Arabia
would pass under the absolute protectorate of the German Empire, making a
total of, say, 3,200,000 square kilometres and 16,500,000 inhabitants.
Once masters of the coasts of the Adriatic, the Ægean, the Dardanelles,
and Aden, helped by the Panislamic propaganda, the Turco-German seizure
of Egypt, and therefore the Suez Canal, would necessarily follow.
Germany, if she commanded these essential strategical points, would then
obviously be able to retake her colonies in Africa and Oceania.
Square Native
Kilometres. Population.
Togo 87,000 1,003,000
Kameroon 790,000 2,540,000
South-West Africa 835,000 87,000
Eastern Africa 995,000 7,510,000
Kaiser Wilhelm Land, Bismarck
Archipelago, Caroline Islands,
Marshall Islands, the Marianes,
Samoa 245,000 647,000
--------- ----------
Making a total of 2,952,000 11,787,000
Always on the assumption which we have made, the Allies, having given
way in Europe, could not prevent Great-Germany from snatching, according
to Tannenberg’s programme, the Belgian, Portuguese, and Dutch Colonies,
namely:
Square Native
Kilometres. Population.
Belgian Congo 2,365,000 15,000,000
Portuguese Angola 1,270,000 4,200,000
Dutch East Indies 2,045,000 38,106,000
--------- ----------
Total 5,680,000 57,306,000
Next would come the turn of those French colonies, the cession of which
to Great Germany was foreshadowed by Tannenberg, _op. cit._, p. 313.
Square Native
Kilometres. Population.
Morocco 416,000 3,000,000
French Congo 1,439,000 9,800,000
Madagascar 585,000 3,232,000
Mayotta and the Comoros Islands 2,000 97,000
Reunion 2,000 173,000
Obok and dependencies (East
Africa) 120,000 208,000
Indo-China 803,000 16,990,000
French Islands of Oceania 24,000 88,000
--------- ----------
Making a total of 3,391,000 33,588,000
The combination of Panislamism and the so-called Chinophile movement
would prepare for the German seizures in Asia. As we have seen (p. 99),
the Berlin plan consists first in arming China powerfully enough under
the orders of German officers, to expel the Japanese from Kiao-Chau and
from the province of Shantung. Germany would thus inflict a first and
striking vengeance on the Empire of the Rising Sun. But that would not
be all. The policy which Berlin foreshadows with regard to China is
identical with the one which it is now pursuing in Turkey. If Germany
armed China, it would be under conditions such that the Celestial Empire
would have to submit to the strict influence of Pangermany. Tannenberg
(_op. cit._, p. 321) tells us that the outcome of these tactics would
be the establishment of a vast zone of special German influence on the
whole lower course of the Yangtse-Kiang and the Hoangho, that is to say,
over that vast portion of China which forms the hinterland of Kiao-Chau,
making a total of about 750,000 square kilometres and 50 millions of
inhabitants.
Tannenberg finally gives an exact enumeration of the various German
protectorates which would be established in the southern part of South
America, where dwell many German colonists, whose aggressive tendencies
are already plain enough. “Germany,” says Tannenberg literally, “takes
under her protection the republics of Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay,
the southern third of Bolivia, so far as it belongs to the basin of the
Rio de la Plata, together with that part of southern Brazil, in which
German culture is dominant” (_op. cit._, p. 321).
Square
Kilometres. Population.
Argentina 2,950,000 7,091,000
Chili 757,000 3,415,000
Uruguay 187,000 1,225,000
Paraguay 253,000 800,000
⅓ Bolivia 500,000 666,000
⅕ Brazil 1,700,000 5,000,000
--------- ----------
Making a total of 6,347,000 18,197,000
“German South America,” concludes Tannenberg, “will provide for us in
the temperate zone a colonial region where our emigrants will be able to
settle as farmers. Chili and Argentina will preserve their language and
their autonomy. But we shall require that in the schools German shall be
taught as a second language. Southern Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay are
countries of German culture. German will there be the national tongue”
(_op. cit._, p. 337).
Even during the war, Germany has laid the train for some of these
explosions. The Chicago _Tribune_ has learned that the Committee of
Foreign Affairs for the Senate of the United States possesses the proofs
of German intrigues carried on in the American hemisphere in defiance of
the Monroe doctrine (_Le Temps_, 16th February, 1916). These official
Pangerman machinations, proved up to the hilt and entirely in harmony
with Tannenberg’s American plan of campaign, demonstrate the identity of
his colonial views with those of the government of Berlin.
To sum up, the result of the Pangerman programme for countries outside
of Europe would be to assure to Germany, under the form of colonies,
protectorates, or zones of special influence:
Square
Kilometres. Population.
In Asia 4,753,000 83,490,000
In Africa 8,906,000 46,850,000
In Oceania 2,314,000 38,841,000
In America 6,347,000 18,197,000
---------- -----------
Making a total of 22,320,000 187,378,000
Germany, which occupied or controlled, at the beginning of 1916, in
Europe, 3,576,237 square kilometres, including the Empire, and more
than 160 millions of inhabitants, would then have a universal domain of
influence reaching over 25,896,237 square kilometres and 347 millions of
inhabitants. This figure includes at the utmost 90 millions of Germans;
therefore, these will exercise their supremacy over 257 millions of
non-Germans.
It must be clearly understood also that the enormous possessions of
Pangermany in both hemispheres would be thoroughly under the domination
of Berlin; indeed, a glance at the map (p. 101) will show that the
universal Pangerman plan aims at seizing all the essential strategic
points which command the seas of the world, especially, in addition
to those already mentioned, the Straits of Gibraltar from the side of
Morocco, Cape Horn, Madagascar, and all the naval bases of Oceania.
To sum up, the complete Pangerman plan aims at procuring for Germany all
the means of domination by land and sea, which would enable Pangermany to
hold the entire world in the dreadful hug of Prussian militarism screwed
up to its highest degree of power.
Not for a moment do the Pangermans pause to reflect how criminal is
this programme of universal slavery. “War,” says Tannenberg, with his
monstrous cynicism, “must leave nothing to the vanquished but their
eyes to weep with. Modesty on our part would be purely madness” (_op.
cit._, p. 304). Now, it is a fundamental truth, of which I should like
to convince my readers, that the universal Pangerman plan is solely
and wholly based on the achievement of the scheme “from Hamburg to the
Persian Gulf,” which forms its backbone. If this is broken, the whole
of the Pangerman plan falls to the ground, and the projects of Prussian
domination are destroyed for ever. The principal problem which the Allies
have to solve, if they wish to ensure their liberty and that of the whole
world, is to make impossible the achievement of the plan “from Hamburg
to the Persian Gulf.”