THE CAUSES OF THE WAR.
I. Why the Treaty of Bukarest suddenly raised a formidable
obstacle to the Pangerman plan.
II. How it was that the internal state of Austria-Hungary drove
Germany to let loose the dogs of war.
III. General view of the causes of the war.
Although the Pangerman plan is unquestionably the chief ultimate cause of
the war, yet when William II. started it in August, 1914, he did so for
nearer and for secondary reasons which we must examine carefully if we
wish to have a clear view of events.
I.
Up to 1911, when Tannenberg published the programme of annexations, all
previous great events had favoured William II.’s aims; but from 1912
onward events suddenly raised very serious and quite unexpected obstacles
to the execution of the Pangerman plan.
In 1912, Italy conquered Libya at the cost of Turkey and against
the will and pleasure of Berlin. Again in 1912 Greece, Montenegro,
Serbia and Bulgaria became united against the Ottoman Empire; this
also was contrary to the will and pleasure of Berlin. What was quite
unexpected by the Kaiser’s Staff was the victory of the Balkan peoples
over the Turks. As Germany had upheld the latter she felt profoundly
humiliated. Then, in order to hinder the foundation of an efficient
Balkanic Confederation—that is, one constituted on the principle of
a fair balance—Vienna, and above all, Berlin, used as their tool the
Tsar Ferdinand’s well-known ambition to establish Bulgarian supremacy
in the peninsula. Accordingly instigated by the Germanic powers, the
Bulgarians in June, 1913, attacked their allies, the Serbians and Greeks.
But once more the Kaiser’s calculations were upset. Roumania, escaping
for the first time from German leading strings, intervened against
Bulgaria, which was struggling with her former allies, and thus Bulgaria
was vanquished. Now, the new condition of things which arose from the
Bukarest treaty of August 10th, 1913, suddenly formed a formidable
obstacle to the Pangerman scheme in the East, and this is the reason:
The treaty of Bukarest created in the peninsula two groups of states
sharply opposed to each other. The first was formed of the beaten and
sullen participants in the Balkan wars, Bulgaria and Turkey. The second
group was composed of those peoples who had benefited by the wars and
were satisfied with the result, to wit, Roumania, Serbia, Montenegro and
Greece. These four last states, seeing that their vital interests had
become closely bound together by the territorial annexations made at
the cost of the common enemy, had joined all their forces to insure the
maintenance of the Bukarest treaty which they considered inviolable.
On the other hand, this sharp division of the Balkan States into two
groups whose interests were diametrically opposed, reacted deeply on
general European politics. The force of events led the conquered states
of 1912 and 1913, Turkey and Bulgaria, to support Germanism in the
Balkans; on the contrary, Roumania, as well as Serbia, Montenegro and
Greece, because of their recent acquisitions, were leaning more and more
towards the Triple Entente, quite contrary to the views of Berlin and at
the cost of Turkey, which even then was bound hand and foot to Germany.
[Illustration: THE ANTIGERMANIC BARRIER IN THE BALKANS AFTER THE TREATY
OF BUKAREST (10TH AUGUST, 1913).]
Previous to the Balkan wars the Triple Entente enjoyed an influence in
the peninsula, vastly inferior to that of Germany; after the treaty of
Bukarest, however, the Entente found support in that group of states
which was most powerfully organized and which presented (see map) a very
solid barrier to the accomplishment of Pangerman designs in the East.
This new order of things lashed Berlin into a fury which though outwardly
restrained was none the less intense because the only group (Turkey and
Bulgaria) which was still under German influence, was bound to remain
for a very long time to come practically impotent and powerless to make
singly any attempt against the other group which favoured the Entente.
Indeed, Turkey, which in her defeats had lost almost the whole of her
military stores, could hardly, at the beginning of 1914, put 250,000 men
under arms. Her financial difficulties were such that, if left to her own
resources, it would have taken her many years to replace her military
power on a solid basis.
Bulgaria was in a similar financial predicament. Besides, if she had
taken action it would have been at great risk to herself, in as much as
those states which profited by the Bukarest Treaty (Roumania, Serbia and
Greece), surrounding as they do (see the arrows of the map) Bulgaria on
three sides, could then have delivered a concentric attack on Sofia.
Finally, great was the disproportion of men eligible for the army or
capable of bearing arms between the two groups.
+------------------------+-------------------------+
| Germanophile Group. | Group of the Entente. |
| | |
| Turkey 250,000 | Greece 400,000 |
| Bulgaria 550,000 | Serbia 400,000 |
| | Montenegro 50,000 |
| | Roumania 600,000 |
| ------- | --------- |
| 800,000 | 1,450,000 |
+------------------------+-------------------------+
These figures, taken in conjunction with the geographical situation, show
clearly that, left to its own resources, the Germanophile group could
attempt no attack on the Entente group.
The new balance of military forces in the Balkans which was the outcome
of the Bukarest treaty, therefore reduced almost to naught Germany’s
power of intrigue in the Peninsula.
Had peace reigned for a few years, the new Balkan situation would have
been consolidated and the obstacle to Pangerman ambition in the East
would have been still more serious. It was for these varied reasons that
Berlin decided to intervene directly. Without doubt Serbia was the pivot
on which turned the new Balkanic equilibrium. It was therefore decided
to destroy her without delay, kindling at the same time the European
conflagration, and thus by one single blow to accomplish the plan of 1911.
The Bukarest treaty was signed on the tenth of August, 1913. On November
6th, 1913, King Albert of Belgium was at Potsdam, and the Kaiser said to
him that in his opinion war with France was near and unavoidable (see
Baron Beyen’s _L’Allemagne avant la Guerre_, p. 24).
* * * * *
From this survey it follows that, if the treaty of Bukarest, through its
consequences, proved disastrous to the Pangerman aims, it was, on the
contrary, extremely advantageous to the powers of the Triple Entente, for
it brought to their side the majority of the Balkanic forces.
Unfortunately the diplomacy of the Entente had not even a notion how
favourable the situation was to them. This ignorance was due to the
old-fashioned methods of observation still used by diplomats which
prevented them from believing in the Pangerman scheme, and which also
hindered them from entertaining general and correct views of the varied
problems which form such a tangle in that large territorial zone. Indeed,
though one of the immediate causes of the war was Germany’s wish to
upset the Bukarest treaty, because the consequences of that treaty
ruined the Pangerman aims in the East, the Triple Entente powers were
no sooner at war with Germany than they did all in their power during
ten months to cancel in like manner the consequences of the Bukarest
treaty; for that was in fact the result of the Entente’s ingenuous wish
to satisfy Bulgaria at all costs. Theoretically, the attempt inspired
by the noble thought of avoiding the horrors of war in the Balkans, was
just, but in practice it was an impossibility owing to the fierce hatred
the Bulgarians entertain towards their conquerors of 1913, and above all
towards the Serbians.
What is certain is that the diplomacy of the Allies, during the first
year of war, followed such a policy in the Balkans that, evidently
without knowing it, they played entirely into the hands of Berlin.
II.
Not only were the consequences of the Bukarest treaty disastrous to
Pangerman ambitions in the Balkan peninsula, they also, to the boundless
fury of William II., considerably accelerated that internal political
evolution of Austria-Hungary which of itself had already threatened to
upset all his plans.
Unfortunately the notions held about Austria-Hungary in France, and above
all, in England, have far too long been of a very vague nature. Public
opinion in France and England was totally unable to grasp the situation,
when war broke out. It was incapable of seeing the important part played
during the war, and to be played after the war, by the populations living
in the Hapsburg Monarchy. The vast majority of these peoples devoutly
pray for the victory of the Triple Entente, for they only fight against
it because they are forcibly constrained to do so. At heart they look
to the victory of the Allies for deliverance from a hateful yoke which
has weighed on them heavily for centuries. That is why it is of the
utmost importance to educate public opinion in the allied countries as
to the actual racial facts in Austria-Hungary. Then it will be clearly
understood of what abominable treason Francis Joseph was guilty against
his peoples; then it will be clearly understood also that as these
peoples were more and more inclined, before the war, to lean to the side
of France and England, quite as much as to that of Russia, William II.
had a strong additional motive for precipitating hostilities.
[Illustration: THE NATIONALITIES IN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.]
The nine different nationalities who live in the Hapsburg Monarchy can be
divided into four races:
_Germanic._ _Magyar._
Germans 12,000,000 Magyars 10,000,000
(peculiar race of
Asiatic origin)
_Latin._ _Slav._
Italians 1,000,000 { Czecks and Slovak 8,500,000
Roumanian 3,000,000 { Poles 5,000,000
{ Ruthenes 3,500,000
{ Slovenes 1,000,000
{ Serbo-Croats 6,000,000
--------- ----------
4,000,000 24,000,000
In a political sense the Germans and Magyars, forming a total of 22
millions, have agreed since 1867 to exercise and maintain for their own
profit the supremacy over the Slavs and Latins, although these latter
form the majority of the subjects of the Monarchy, since they constitute
a group of 28 million inhabitants.
Now, it is needful to note and it is important to remember, that the
figures which I quote, are incorrect, because they are those furnished by
the Government statistics at Vienna and at Budapest by German and Magyar
officials. These have their instructions to use various artful tricks
for falsifying systematically the true statistics in favour of their own
races, in order to contribute by that stratagem to the maintenance, as
long as possible, of the supremacy held by the Germans and the Magyars.
In truth, there are in Austria-Hungary far less than 22 million Germans
and Magyars, and far more than 28 Slavs and Latins. What again is
certain, is that for centuries the Slavs and Latins have been oppressed
in Austria-Hungary in the most odious fashion by a feudal aristocracy,
who engross enormous landed properties, and who exercise in the Hapsburg
Monarchy as baneful a social influence as that of the _Junkers_ in
Prussia.
With the exception of the Polish aristocracy of Galicia and a small group
of Ruthenes, who since 1867 joined hands with the Germans, all these
Slavs and Latins have been endeavouring to the very utmost, especially
for the last thirty years, to obtain, in accordance with modern justice,
such political rights as are proportionate to their numbers. In that way
they hope to win for themselves in the Monarchy the legal majority that
is their due, by reason of their being human flesh and blood liable to be
taxed and to be called on for service at the will of the Government.
These tendencies have long excited extreme alarm in William II. and his
Pangermans. This is readily understood, for, if the political power, in
the Hapsburg Monarchy, were vested, as justice demands, in the Slavs and
Latins, who hate Prussianism, that in itself would have been the ruin of
the Kaiser’s plan for the economic absorption of Austria-Hungary. Yet
this very absorption is indispensable to William II. if he is to carry
out his inadmissible plans of exclusive influence in the Balkans and in
the East. His game has therefore been, especially since 1890, to say,
in the main, to Francis Joseph and to the Magyars: “Above all, do not
concede the claims of your Slav and Latin subjects. Keep up absolutely
the Germano-Magyar supremacy. I will uphold you, with all my power,
in your struggle with the Slav-Latin elements.” For a long time these
tactics of the Kaiser were successful but they were on the point of
breaking down a short time before the war.
In spite of the most ingenious and cynical obstacles raised by the
Germans and Magyars the culture of the Slavs and Latins kept growing;
their national organizations kept progressing; also they were much more
prolific than their political rivals. All these conditions together gave
Francis Joseph and his henchmen at Budapest increasing trouble in their
efforts to resist the enlarged demands of their Latin and Slav subjects.
Berlin had already become anxious on that score, when the mental
effervescence stirred up among the Slavs and Latins of Austria-Hungary
by the result of the Bukarest treaty suddenly changed for the worse the
outlook of the Pangerman scheme.
As a matter of fact, almost the whole of the 28 million Slav and Latin
subjects of the Hapsburgs had been roused to enthusiasm by the victories
of the Slavs in the Balkans in 1912, and by the success of Roumania
in 1913; for they saw, above all, in these events, the triumph of the
principle of nationality, that is, their very own cause. Hence they
became more than ever determined in their endeavours to obtain from
Vienna and Budapest those political rights, proportionate to their
number, which the Germano-Magyars persisted in refusing, although of late
years that refusal had lost much of its energy.
If peace had been maintained, the effect of the Bukarest treaty on
Austria-Hungary would have lent irresistible force to the claims of the
Slav and Latin subjects of Francis Joseph. On the other hand, Roumania,
exulting in her annexation of the Bulgarian Dobrudja, cast longing eyes
on Transylvania, and hoped to secure it at the expense of Hungary. The
moment appeared opportune when a thorough transformation of the Hapsburg
Monarchy might be effected, and that transformation seemed relatively so
near that Roumania already looked upon Transylvania as a ripe fruit which
merely needed gathering.
If this new order of things resulting from the treaty of Bukarest had
been allowed to develop fully, the influence of Germanism would have
been infallibly ruined in the Hapsburg Monarchy, just as had happened in
the Balkans. Under the growing pressure of her Slav and Latin elements
the partition, or at any rate, the evolution towards federation of
Austria-Hungary would have become a necessity. This federalism would
not have affected the frontiers of the Hapsburg Dominions, but it would
necessarily, and without doubt, have given political preponderance to
the Slav and Latin elements, which were the most numerous and the most
prolific. Now, those elements form an enormous majority, which was and
is resolutely hostile to any alliance with Germany. Thus, progressively,
the Hapsburg Monarchy in evolution would have become more and more
independent of Berlin in regard to her foreign policy, and as it
gradually shook itself free from its bondage to Berlin, it would, as a
necessary consequence, have drawn closer and closer to Russia, France
and England. Thus Germany would have been deprived of the artificial
prop which she has found at Vienna and at Budapest ever since the days
of Sadowa through the Germano-Magyar predominance. Finally, as a result
of peaceful development, William II. would have been confronted by a
state of things in Austria-Hungary which would have opposed a far more
formidable barrier to his oriental ambitions than that which was created
in 1913 in the Balkans, as a consequence of the treaty of Bukarest.
If we bear in mind the powerful and extraordinarily important series of
after-effects which must have followed on the new situation produced by
the treaty of Bukarest and its inevitable influence on the 28 million
Slavs and Latins of Austria-Hungary, we can readily understand that
had the European peace been maintained, the chances of executing
the Pangerman plan would have been totally and simultaneously ruined
in Turkey, in the Balkans, and in Austria-Hungary; that is to say in
the three territorial zones which, as will be seen from Chapter III,
constituted by far the most important part of the regions mapped out for
Pangerman operations in the plan of 1911.
Thus we see how the internal evolution of Austria-Hungary had reached
a point at which, as the result of the treaty of Bukarest, it was just
about to escape for ever from the influence of Berlin; this would have
broken the pivot on which all the Pangerman combinations revolved. It was
that consideration which decided William II. to make war at once.
III.
The Allies will, in accordance with the general principles of justice,
bring Germany to account for her unheard of crimes, and will exact a
full reparation for the enormous moral and material injuries which she
has done them. Therefore it is necessary to set forth the causes of the
war by a general survey of the facts, to the end that in the eyes of the
civilized world, it may be clearly demonstrated that Germany must pay,
and legitimately so, the price of a responsibility which, in all justice,
should rest on her and on her alone.
To understand the practical necessity of such a survey, if we are to
influence the opinion of neutrals, it is needful to bear in mind that
all discussions which, so far, have been held on the causes of war,
have been merely based on diplomatic documents published by the various
belligerents, and that these documents merely refer to facts which
preceded the outbreak of war only by a few weeks. But in a discussion
which turns on a multitude of texts, belonging to different dates,
all more or less near each other, and therefore liable to be confused,
nothing is easier than for subtle, interested and dishonest reasoners
like the Germans, to interpret the same facts in different ways, and so
to arrive at conclusions diametrically opposed to the truth. In fact,
this is exactly what has happened.
* * * * *
Thanks to its intense intellectual mobilization, which has been foreseen
and carried out as powerfully as its military mobilization, Germany has
succeeded, by fallacious interpretations of diplomatic documents, in
profoundly misleading neutrals, even honest neutrals, as to the real
responsibility for the outbreak of war. Nothing could give a better idea
of the effect thus produced by Germany than the following remarks of the
_Swiss_ Colonel Gortsch published in the _Intelligenzblatt_ of Berne:
“The events which happened at the end of July have convinced every
reasonable man that Germany has been provoked to war, and that the
Emperor William II. has waited long before he took up this challenge.
History will lay the main guilt of the war and its intellectual
responsibility on England; Russia and France will be considered as her
accomplices.... It is the British policy, openly and selfishly free from
any scruples, which has caused the World-War” (quoted by the _Echo de
Paris_, 3rd January, 1916).
This is exactly the proposition which Bethmann-Hollweg wishes neutrals
to believe. It is an absurd proposition to be entertained by any one
who knew England intimately in the years before the war. During that
period the leaders of the British Government were led by the one guiding
thought—pleasant enough in itself, but entirely inaccurate—that war would
not occur, since Great Britain did not wish war. The whole foreign
policy of Great Britain has been inspired by this conception. It explains
the attitude of extreme conciliation taken by the London Cabinet towards
Germany at the time of the annexation of Bosnia and of Herzegovina
(1909), during the Balkan wars (1912-1913), and also when it came to the
question of the Bagdad railway, which most obviously threatened the road
to India. The Liberal Cabinet of London reflected the dominant British
opinion, which believed implicitly in Lord Haldane’s assurances. He was
considered, though quite wrongly so, to have a most perfect knowledge
of Germany, and in a speech at Tranent he affirmed to his countrymen:
“Germany has not the slightest intention of invading us” (quoted by the
_Morning Post_, 16th December, 1915). Up to the declaration of war, Sir
Edward Grey, always inclined to believe in the acumen of his friend
Lord Haldane, had resorted to every conceivable combination which might
have allowed peace to be maintained if William II. had really wished
to maintain it. Finally, does not the total unpreparedness of England
for a continental war, which has been evident since the outbreak of
hostilities, furnish the best proof of her sincerely pacific intentions
before the war?
* * * * *
Other neutrals, and even some Frenchmen, still think that the struggle is
a result of the so-called Delcassé policy. They say: “The Emperor William
frequently tried to show himself friendly to France. If his advances had
been accepted, war would have been avoided.” It is undeniable that at
certain moments William II. has tried to draw France into his own orbit,
but it was precisely in order the better to insure the accomplishment
of the Pangerman plan, which has been his main pre-occupation ever
since his accession. The present military events show clearly that if
France had been beguiled by the smile of the Berlin tempter, any further
efficient coalition of the great powers against Germany would have been
a sheer impossibility. As to France, if she had believed in William II.
she would not have suffered from war, for war would have been useless for
German ends. Indeed, without a struggle, France would have practically
been reduced to such a state of absolute slavery as has never yet been
achieved in history except as the result of a totally ruinous war.
Facts which have come to light enable us to convince ourselves by the
most indisputable evidence, that such would have been the outcome of a
“reconciliation” between France and Germany. We now know to what extent
the Germans had already gained a footing in the greater part of the
organic structure of French finance and industry. If the Paris Government
had come to terms with Berlin nothing could have stopped the total
pacific permeation of France by Germany. Little by little France would
have ceased to be her own mistress; at the end of a few years she would
have been exactly in the same position as Austria-Hungary, unable to free
herself unaided from the Prussian hug.
Finally, can we believe for a moment that, had France carried out such a
policy of “conciliation” with Berlin, it would have induced William II.
to relinquish his dreams of domination? On the contrary, his easy capture
of France in full enjoyment of peace, would merely have whetted the
hereditary appetites of the Hohenzollerns. Had France once been disposed
of by reason of her pacific permeation by Germany, the bulwark which she
now forms against the Prussian domination would have been broken. The
execution of the rest of the Pangerman plan, at the expense of Russia
and England, could then have been effected without encountering any
insuperable obstacle.
It is therefore not the policy called after M. Delcassé which has caused
the war. M. Delcassé will have quite enough to answer for in regard
to the application of his policy before and during war, without being
reproached for a general principle which evidently was theoretically
sound.
In upholding the alliance with Russia, in bringing about the slackening
of tension with Italy, in achieving the Entente Cordiale, M. Delcassé has
followed a policy, the principles of which are just. Actual events prove
it convincingly.
* * * * *
Having laid bare the fallacy of the German argument, let us now, for the
benefit of honest neutrals, attempt to give a general view of the true
causes of the war, and to indicate their sequence. Let us distinguish
between the deep-seated and the immediate causes of the struggle.
The war can be traced to a single deep and remote cause, namely, the will
of William II. to achieve the Pangerman plan; all secondary causes, that
is to say, the economic ones, spring from it. One aim of the Pangerman
plan was actually to put an end to the enormous difficulties which
Germany had created for herself by the hypertrophy of her industries, and
by thus upsetting the proper balance which had formerly existed between
her agricultural and her industrial productions.
The truth of this deep-seated and unique cause of the war is demonstrated
by:
1º. The intellectual preparation, in all domains, of the Pangerman plan
for twenty-five years.
2º. Such explicit and ancient avowals as the following. In 1898
Rear-Admiral von Goetzen, an intimate friend of the Kaiser, being at
Manilla, said to the American, Admiral Dewey, who had just destroyed
the Spanish fleet before Manilla: “You will not believe me, but in about
fifteen years my country will begin war. At the end of two months we
shall hold Paris; but that will only form one step towards our real
goal—the overthrow of England. Every event will happen exactly at its
proper time, for we shall be ready and our enemies will not” (quoted by
the _Echo de Paris_, 24th September, 1915, from the _Naval and Military
Record_).
3º. The material facts of world-wide preparation, obviously for war,
made several months previous to its outbreak, but not till the Kaiser
had decided to start it, that is, towards November, 1913. (Proofs:
declaration of William II. on 6th November, 1913, to King Albert of
Belgium; interview of the Kaiser with the Arch-Duke Ferdinand, April,
1914, at Miramar, and in June, 1914, at Konopischt, where Admiral Tirpitz
accompanied the Kaiser.)
These material facts are endless, but it will suffice to recall the
following as truly significant, because they have required a long and
complicated effort: first, the organization for the victualling of the
piratical German cruisers on all the seas of the globe, in view of a long
war of piracy; and second, the preparation of the revolt against England
in South Africa.
The immediate causes which decided William II. to precipitate the war are:
1º. The defeat of Turkey in 1912 by Italy and the Balkan
peoples—a defeat which, by threatening Berlin influence in
Constantinople, endangered the hold which Germany already had
on the Ottoman Empire.
2º. The consequences of the Bukarest treaty, which in 1913
had erected automatically a formidable barrier against the
Pangerman pretensions in the Balkans.
3º. The internal evolution of Austria-Hungary, which, because
of the steady progress made by the Latin and Slav subjects
of Francis Joseph, threatened shortly to free the Hapsburg
Monarchy from the tutelage of Berlin.
[Illustration: THE THREE BARRIERS OF ANTIGERMANIC PEOPLES IN THE BALKANS
AND IN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.]
The facts of the last two groups would have completed in Central Europe
and in the Balkans the three anti-German barriers indicated on the map
(see p. 43) by deep black lines. Now, these barriers would have hindered
once and for ever the achievement of the Pangerman plan.
To parry these blows only one resource remained to William II., and that
was war—“the national industry of Prussia,” as Mirabeau used to say, and
his very pithy and apt remark has been too long forgotten.