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THE PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED
THE PANGERMAN PLOT
UNMASKED
BERLIN’S FORMIDABLE PEACE-TRAP OF
“THE DRAWN WAR”
BY
ANDRÉ CHÉRADAME
WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY
THE EARL OF CROMER, O.M.
WITH MAPS
NEW YORK
CHARLES SCRIBNER’S SONS
1917
COPYRIGHT, 1916, BY
CHARLES SCRIBNER’S SONS
Published January, 1917
_All Rights Reserved_
[Illustration]
PUBLISHER’S NOTE
As will be understood from the author’s preface, M. Chéradame’s book
was published in Paris in the summer of this year, before the important
occurrences in the Balkans accompanying and following Roumania’s entrance
into the war. In issuing this translation no consideration of these
events has been added; but their bearing on M. Chéradame’s forecast will
be noted by the reader.
The maps have been reproduced direct from the French edition, without
translating the names into English, as they answer their purpose
perfectly well in their present form.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
INTRODUCTION BY LORD CROMER xiii
AUTHOR’S PREFACE xix
PROLOGUE
PANGERMAN AND WILLIAM II. 1
I. The Pangerman Doctrine, p. 1.—II. The Kaiser as
originator of the Pangerman plan, p. 5.
CHAPTER I
THE PANGERMAN PLAN 11
I. The Pangerman plan of 1911, p. 11.—II. The stages by
which it has been effected, p. 16.—III. Why it has been
ignored, p. 19.
CHAPTER II
THE CAUSES OF THE WAR 26
I. Why the Treaty of Bukarest suddenly raised a formidable
obstacle to the Pangerman plan, p. 26.—II. How it was that
the internal state of Austria-Hungary drove Germany to let
loose the dogs of war, p. 31.—III. General view of the
causes of the war, p. 37.
CHAPTER III
HOW FAR THE PANGERMAN PLAN WAS CARRIED OUT AT THE BEGINNING
OF 1916 45
I. German pretensions in the West, p. 45.—II. German
pretensions in the East, p. 52.—III. German pretensions in
the South and South-East, p. 56.—IV. General view of the
execution of the Pangerman plan from 1911 to the beginning
of 1916, p. 62.
CHAPTER IV
SPECIAL FEATURES GIVEN TO THE WAR BY THE PANGERMAN PLAN 66
I. All the great political questions of the old world are
raised and must be solved, p. 67.—II. As the war is made by
Germany in order to achieve a gigantic scheme of slavery,
it follows that it is waged by her in flagrant violation of
international law, p. 69.—III. A struggle of tenacity and
of duplicity on the side of Berlin _versus_ constancy and
solidarity on the side of the Allies, p. 71.
CHAPTER V
THE DODGE OF THE “DRAWN GAME” AND THE SCHEME “FROM HAMBURG TO
THE PERSIAN GULF” 77
I. What would really be the outcome of the dodge called
the “Drawn Game,” p. 78.—II. The financial consequences
for the Allies of this so-called “Drawn Game,” p. 83.—III.
The Allies and the scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian
Gulf,” p. 88.—IV. Panislamic and Asiatic consequences
of the achievement of the scheme “from Hamburg to the
Persian Gulf,” p. 94.—V. Consequences for the world of the
achievement of the scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian
Gulf,” p. 100.
CHAPTER VI
THE CRUCIAL POINT OF THE WHOLE PROBLEM 108
I. The obligation which the threat of the scheme “from
Hamburg to the Persian Gulf,” imposes on the Allies,
p. 108.—II. The capital importance of the question of
Austria-Hungary, p. 114.—III. All the racial elements
necessary for the destruction of the Pangerman plan exist
in Central Europe, p. 121.
CHAPTER VII
THE BALKANS AND THE PANGERMAN PLAN 131
I. The connexion between the Pangerman plan and the plan
of Bulgarian supremacy, p. 132.—II. Greece and Pangerman
ambitions, p. 146.—III. Roumania and the Pangerman plan, p.
152.
CHAPTER VIII
GERMAN MANŒUVRES TO PLAY THE ALLIES THE TRICK OF THE “DRAWN
GAME,” THAT IS, TO SECURE THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE
“HAMBURG TO THE PERSIAN GULF” SCHEME AS THE MINIMUM RESULT
OF THE WAR 158
I. The exceptional importance of the economic union of
the Central Empires, and the danger for the Allies of
establishing a connexion between that union and their own
economic measures after the war, p. 159.—II. Reasons for
the Turko-German dodge of making a separate peace between
the Ottoman empire and the Allies, p. 167.—III. Why a
separate and premature peace with Bulgaria would play the
Pangerman game, p. 174.
CHAPTER IX
THE STILL NEUTRAL STATES WHOSE INDEPENDENCE WOULD BE DIRECTLY
THREATENED BY THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE “HAMBURG TO THE PERSIAN
GULF” SCHEME AND THEREFORE BY GERMANY’S CAPTURE OF
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 183
I. The example of Portugal, p. 183.—II. Holland, p.
187.—III. Switzerland, p. 191.—IV. The States of South
America, p. 193.—V. The United States, p. 198.
CONCLUSIONS
What has been set forth in the preceding nine chapters appears
to justify the following conclusions 213
MAPS
PAGE
The Poles in the East of Germany 1
The Danes in Prussia 2
The Germans and the non-Germans in Austria-Hungary 3
The Pangerman plan of 1911 12
The Antigermanic barrier in the Balkans after the treaty of
Bukarest (10th August, 1913) 28
The nationalities in Austria-Hungary 32
The three barriers of Antigermanic peoples in the Balkans and in
Austria-Hungary 43
The German claims in the West (beginning of 1916) 46
The German claims in the East 53
The German claims in the South and South-East 57
The plan of 1911 and the extent of its execution at the beginning
of 1916 64
The great political questions raised by the war 68
The German fortress at the beginning of 1916 72
The consequences of the dodge called “The Drawn Game” 79
Asiatic consequences of the accomplishment of the scheme “From
Hamburg to the Persian Gulf” 95
World-wide consequences of the “Hamburg to the Persian Gulf”
scheme, as provided for by the plan of 1911 101
The crucial point of the European problem 113
Great Bulgaria 133
Serbian Macedonia 137
Greece after the treaty of Bukarest 147
Great Roumania 153
The nationalities in Turkey 170
Encroachments planned by Bulgaria on neighbouring States 181
Portugal and Colonial Pangermanism 185
The Neutral States of Europe and Pangermanism 188
Colonial Pangermanism and South America 194
Distribution of German-born Germans in the United States 201
Relation between the Pangerman plan of 1911 and the Pangerman
gains at the beginning of 1916 217
The Pangerman gains at the beginning of 1916 223
European States interested in the solution of the Austro-Hungarian
question 231
The States of Asia and America, interested in the solution of the
Austro-Hungarian question 233
INTRODUCTION.
BY THE EARL OF CROMER, O.M.
My reasons for commending M. Chéradame’s most instructive work to the
earnest attention of my countrymen and countrywomen are three-fold.
In the first place, M. Chéradame stands conspicuous amongst that very
small body of politicians who warned Europe betimes of the German danger.
The fact that in the past he proved a true prophet gives him a special
claim to be heard when he states his views as regards the present and the
future.
In the second place, I entertain a strong opinion that M. Chéradame’s
diagnosis of the present situation is, in all its main features, correct.
In the third place, in spite of the voluminous war literature which
already exists, I greatly doubt whether the special aspect of the case
which M. Chéradame wishes to present to the public is fully understood in
this country; neither should I be surprised to hear from those who are
more qualified than myself to speak on the subject that the same remark
applies, though possibly in a less degree, to the public opinion of
France.
It is essential that, before the terms of peace are discussed, a clear
idea should be formed of the reasons which led the German Government
to provoke this war. It is well that, if such a course be at all
possible, those who are personally responsible for the numerous acts of
barbarity committed by the Germans should receive adequate punishment.
But attention to points of this sort, however rational and meritorious,
should not in any degree be allowed to obscure the vital importance
of the permanent political issues which call loudly for settlement.
Otherwise, it is quite conceivable that a peace may be patched up, which
may have some specious appearance of being favourable to the Allies,
but which would at the same time virtually concede to the Germans all
they require in order, after time had been allowed for recuperation, to
renew, with increased hope of success, their attempts to shatter modern
civilization and to secure the domination of the world.
M. Chéradame explains—and I believe with perfect accuracy—the nature of
the German objective. It is, in his opinion, to lay secure and stable
foundations for the system known as Pan-Germanism. What is Pan-Germanism?
It may be doubted whether all that is implied in that term is fully
realized in this country. One interpretation may be given to the word,
which is not merely innocuous, but which may even reasonably appeal
to the sympathies of those who approve of the new map of Europe being
constituted with a view to applying that nationalist principle, which
finds almost universal favour in all democratic countries. It cannot be
too distinctly understood that the political programme now advocated by
Germany has no sort of affinity with a plan of this sort. The Germans
contend not only that all those who are generally denominated Germans by
the rest of the world should be united, but that all who are of what is
termed “German origin” should be brought into the German fold. Moreover,
they give to this latter phrase an expansion and a signification which
is condemned and derided by all who have paid serious attention to
ethnological studies. This, however, is far from stating the whole case.
The object of the German Government is to effect the whole or partial
Germanization of countries inhabited by races which cannot, by any
conceivable ethnological process of reasoning, be held to be of German
stock. In fact, M. Chéradame very correctly describes Pan-Germanism when
he says that its object is to disregard all questions of racial and
linguistic affinity and to absorb huge tracts of country the possession
of which is considered useful to advance Hohenzollern interests. In other
words, what they wish is to establish, under the name of Pan-Germanism, a
world system whose leading and most immediate feature is the creation of
an empire stretching from the Persian Gulf to the North Sea.
That this project has for a long while past been in course of preparation
by the Kaiser and his megalomaniac advisers cannot for a moment be
doubted. When, in November, 1898, William II. pronounced his famous
speech at Damascus, in which he stated that all the three hundred
millions of Mohammedans in the world could rely upon him as their
true friend, the world was inclined to regard the utterance as mere
rhodomontade. It was nothing of the sort. It involved the declaration of
a definite and far-reaching policy, the execution of which was delayed
until a favourable moment occurred and, notably, until the Kiel Canal was
completed. The whole conspiracy very nearly succeeded. In spite of their
careful attention to detail, their talent for organization, and their
elaborate preparations to meet what appears to them every contingency
which may occur, the Germans seem to have a constitutional inability to
grasp the motives which guide the inhabitants of other countries. A very
close analogy to the mistake made by the Kaiser is to be found in an
incident of recent English history. It is alleged, I know not with what
truth, that when, in 1886, Lord Randolph Churchill resigned his position
as Chancellor of the Exchequer in Lord Salisbury’s administration, he
“forgot Goschen,” who, as it will be remembered, was speedily nominated
to succeed him. The Kaiser forgot England. For various reasons, which are
too well-known to require repetition, he and his advisers were firmly
convinced that England would not join in the war. The programme was,
first, to destroy the power of France and Russia, and then, after that
had been done, to fall upon England. In one sense it was fortunate that
the Germans committed the gross international crime of invading Belgium.
Had they not done so, it is quite possible that the English nation would
not have woke up to the realities of the situation. As it was, however,
it became clear, even to the most extreme pacificists, that honour and
interest alike pointed to the necessity of decisive action. Thus as M.
Chéradame indicates, the original German plan was completely upset.
The advance on Paris had to be stayed. But the programme, which was
the result of long and deliberate contemplation, has by no means been
abandoned. On the contrary, with the adhesion of the Bulgarians, who
will eventually, unless the Allies secure a decisive victory, become the
victims of Pan-Germanism, and also that of the Turks, who were manœuvred
into the war by an adroit and absolutely unscrupulous diplomacy, a very
considerable portion of the plan has already been put into execution.
M. Chéradame states with great reason that France, Italy, Russia,
England, and all the minor Powers are vitally interested in frustrating
the German project of establishing their dominion from the Persian Gulf
to the North Sea. He also warns us against making a separate peace with
either Austria-Hungary or Turkey, both of these Powers being merely
vassals of Germany. He is very clearly of opinion that the mere cession
of Alsace-Lorraine to France and the rehabilitation of Belgium cannot
form the foundations of a durable peace. If peace were concluded on this
basis, the Germans would have achieved their main object, and, as Herr
Harden pointed out last February, even if Germany was obliged, under
pressure, to cede Alsace-Lorraine, there would still be seventy millions
of Germans firmly determined to regain possession of those provinces at
the first suitable opportunity. In fact, the realization of the German
project, although accompanied by certain temporary disabilities from the
German point of view, would eventually enable Germany to strangle Europe.
I need not dwell upon all the proposals set forth by M. Chéradame
with a view to the frustration of this plan, but the corner-stone of
his programme is similar to that advocated with great ability in this
country by Mr. Wickham Steed and Mr. Seton Watson. It is to create a
Southern Slav State, which will afford an effectual barrier to German
advance towards the East. It is essential that the immense importance of
dealing with the territories of the Hapsburgs as a preliminary to a final
settlement of all the larger aspects of the Eastern question should be
fully realized. It constitutes the key of the whole situation.
For these reasons, I hope that M. Chéradame’s work, which develops
more fully the arguments which I have very briefly stated above, will
receive in this country the attention which it certainly merits. I
should add that the book is written in a popular style, and that M.
Chéradame’s arguments can be easily followed by those who have no special
acquaintance either with Eastern policy or with the tortuous windings of
Austrian and German diplomacy during the last quarter of a century.
CROMER.
SEPTEMBER 4, 1916.
PREFACE.
The Pangerman plot is the only cause of the war. It is, in fact, the
cause at once of its outbreak and of its prolongation till that victory
of the Allies has been won which is indispensable to the liberty of the
world. In this book I propose to demonstrate this truth by a series of
documents, precise, clear, and intelligible to all. The fate of every
man in the allied countries, and even in some of the countries which
are still neutral, really depends on the issue of the formidable war
now being waged. This cataclysm, unprecedented in history, let loose
by Prussianized Germany, will have infinite reverberations in every
sphere, reverberations which will affect every one of us individually
for good or, alas! too often for ill. Every one, therefore, has a direct
interest in knowing clearly why these inevitable reverberations of the
immense struggle will be produced, and on what fundamental conditions
those of them which bode ill for the Allies, and are yet but imperfectly
understood, can and must be avoided. Hence every one of the Allies should
acquire an exact notion of the present realities. Once fortified by the
evidence, his opinion will become a force for the Allied Governments;
it will then contribute to the victory and to the imposition of the
conditions necessary for the peace.
In writing this popular book my aim has been to bring home, even to those
who are least versed in foreign affairs, the formidable problems raised
by the war. In my opinion this work is addressed to women quite as much
as to men. The reading of it may perhaps bring not only instruction but
consolation to those whose affections have been so cruelly wounded. When
they comprehend better by what an atrocious plan of slavery the world
is threatened, they will understand more fully for what a sublime, what
a stupendous cause their husbands, their sons, their plighted lovers,
are fighting or dying with such heroic self-sacrifice. May that larger
understanding of the formidable events now occurring yield to the women
of the Allies at least some alleviation of their sufferings.
But if this book is a popular work, I beg my readers to remark that it
is not the result of a hasty effort, vamped up by a mere desire to treat
of the moving, the tragic subject of the hour. The book is, indeed,
the logical conclusion of a labour on which I have been engaged for
twenty-one years. As my readers have an interest in knowing how far they
may trust me, they will allow me to explain to them how I was led to
concentrate my studies on the Pangerman policy of Germany, what has been
the result of my efforts, and how they are linked together.
* * * * *
In former days I was the pupil of Albert Sorel at the Free School of
Political Science. That great master was good enough to admit me to his
intimacy; and he brought to light and maturity the latent and instinctive
propensity which I had for foreign politics. My practical studies abroad
led me to Germany in 1894, just at the time when the Pangerman _movement_
had begun. As the movement was manifestly the modern development of the
Prussianism of the Hohenzollerns, I was then extremely struck by its
importance. The movement appeared to me so threatening for the future
that I resolved to follow all the developments of the Pangerman _plot_,
which was already the consequence of the movement, and which from 1895
onward had taken definite shape. The task which I thus laid on myself
was at once arduous, vast, and thrilling, for from that time it was
certain that the Germans based their political and military Pangerman
plan on a study of all the political, ethnographical, economic, social,
military and naval problems not only of Europe but of the whole world.
In truth, the intense labour accomplished in the cause of Pangermanism
by the Germans in the last twenty-one years has been colossal. They have
carried it out everywhere with a formidable tenacity and a methodical
thoroughness which will be the astonishment of history. Indisputably, the
Pangerman plan, which is the result of this gigantic effort, is the most
extraordinary plot which the world has ever witnessed.
I made the study of that plot for twenty-one years the work of my life,
convinced as I was, in spite of the scepticism which long greeted my
efforts to give warning of the peril, that the study would serve a useful
purpose one day.
The study has necessitated very many and very long journeys of inquiry. I
was obliged in fact to go and learn, on the spot, at least the essential
elements of the complex problems mentioned above, which have been the
base of the Pangerman plan, in order that I might be able to grasp the
most distant ramifications of the Prussian programme for dominating the
world.
This obligation led me to sojourn in very different countries. That the
reader may have an idea of at least the material extent of my inquiries,
I will indicate the number of the towns in which I have been led to work
for the purpose of discovering the constituent elements, direct and
indirect, of the Pangerman plan.
The United States, 14; Canada, 11; Japan, 11; Corea, 4; China, 11;
Indo-China, 19; British India, 24; Spain, 1; Italy, 4; Belgium,
6; Luxemburg, 1; Holland, 5; Switzerland, 4; England, 8; Greece,
2; Bulgaria, 4; Roumania, 3; Serbia, 8; Turkey, 3; Germany, 16;
Austro-Hungary, 18.
In these towns, according to the requirement of my studies, I passed
days, weeks, or months, often on repeated occasions. I endeavoured, so
far as the opportunities and the time admitted of it, to enter into
direct relations with the acting ministers, the leaders of the various
political parties, the diplomatists and the consuls, both French and
foreign, some heads of states, influential journalists, officers of
repute, military and naval attachés, well-informed merchants and
manufacturers. It was thus that, by means of information of many sorts
drawn from the most diverse sources, and checked by comparison with each
other, I have attempted to set forth the Pangerman political and military
plan.
Since 1898 I have endeavoured to draw the attention of the public to the
immense danger which that plan was laying up for the world, as my former
works testify, particularly _L’Europe et la Question d’Autriche au seuil
du XXe Siècle_, which appeared in 1901, therefore fifteen years ago, and
contained an exposition, as precise as it was then possible to make it,
of the Pangerman plan of 1895, summed up in the formula “Hamburg to the
Persian Gulf”; also _Le Chemin de fer de Bagdad_, published in 1903,
wherein I set forth the danger of that co-operation between Germany and
Turkey, which was then only nascent, but which we see full-fledged to-day.
I attempted also by numerous lectures to diffuse among the public some
notion of the Pangerman peril. I did not content myself with warning
my countrymen. I am proud to have been one of the first Frenchmen to
preach a cordial understanding between France and England at a time
when there was perhaps some merit in doing so. I deemed it, therefore,
a duty to inform the British public, so far as it lay in my power, that
the Pangerman peril concerned Great Britain quite as much as France. In
1909 the Franco-Scottish Society kindly invited me to lecture to its
members at Edinburgh, Glasgow and Aberdeen. I seized the opportunity, and
took for the subject of my lectures, “The problem of Central Europe and
universal politics.”
_The Aberdeen Free Press_, of May 8th, 1909, summed up very exactly as
follows the substance of what I said, seven years ago, to my British
hearers:
“ ... The lecturer attached enormous importance to the Pan-German
movement, which he regarded as the decisive factor in the situation,
and he pointed out that the propaganda which had gone on in Germany and
in Austria was part of a great policy to extend the boundaries of the
German State and dominate middle and south-eastern Europe. The _rapport
personnel_ established in recent years between Berlin and Vienna pointed,
he said, to the conclusion that Germany and Austria were working hand in
hand. In the recent Balkan crisis he described Aehrenthal as playing a
_partie de poker_, in which his bluff had been crowned with success. The
off-set to the Pan-German movement was to be found in the Triple Entente
between England, France and Russia, and it followed from a consideration
of European politics that the questions confronting England with regard
to the supremacy of the sea were intimately bound up with the question
which concerned the land powers of Europe. In particular, the speaker
thought that the Pan-German aspirations would be effectually combatted by
the growing social and political development of the various minor Slav
peoples in the south-east of Europe. The development of these peoples was
a thing which it was with the interests of England, France and Russia to
encourage to the utmost.”
My Scottish hearers gave me a very kind reception, of which I have
preserved a lively recollection. But truth compels me to declare that I
had the impression that the great majority of them did not believe me. I
strongly suspect that they then saw in me simply a Frenchman, who, moved
by the spirit of revenge, tried above all to stir up the British public
against Germany. The impression did not discourage me any more than many
similar instances of want of success. In 1911 the Central Asian Society
did me the honour of inviting me to express my views in London (22nd
March) on the Bagdad railway. I used this fresh opportunity to expound
a method of Franco-English co-operation which seemed to me necessary to
parry the dangers of the near future.
“Such is,” I then said, “broadly speaking, the affair of Bagdad. The most
moderate conclusion which, in my judgment, inevitably follows is that
from beginning to end the logical and methodical spirit of Germany has
got the better of the French, English, and Russian interests, which have
been compromised by our slowness to grasp the importance of the problem
confronting us, and by the lamentable want of cohesion between the
diplomacies of the three countries.
“The lesson apparently to be drawn from these considerations is, that for
the future we ought no longer to be satisfied with a hand-to-mouth policy
and with seeking solutions only when the difficulties take an acute form.
“If we wish to serve and defend our interests effectually, we must, as
Talleyrand said, keep the future in mind, and learn something of that
German method of which the good results are incontestable.
“So far as the eye can range to the visible political horizon, the
essential interests of England, France, and Russia are in agreement;
it is, therefore, to all appearance, absolutely necessary that the men
who exercise an influence on public opinion in this country, in France,
and in Russia, should enter into personal relations in order to discuss
the great national interests which they have in common, and to adopt a
useful line of conduct, while there is yet time. Such a course would be
effectual, because it would be determined before the decisive events
instead of after them, that is to say, when it is too late.
“Were we to adopt this method, which after all is very simple, the
future attempts of our adversaries against our interests would encounter
effectual obstacles, and we should no longer have to regret miscarriages
such as those of which the Bagdad affair is an example.”
Has the method thus recommended been followed? Apparently not; otherwise
could France and England have been surprised by the war?
My propaganda having had little practical result, I endeavoured at least
to keep myself well informed of the events that were happening.
In December, 1913, and January, February, and March, 1914, I made new
and minute inquiries in Central Europe, the Balkans, and Turkey, and
these inquiries were of particular value to me. The truth is, that the
treaty of Bukarest of August 10th, 1913, by reason of its far-reaching
and important consequences, had completely upset the former state of
affairs, so much so that without my journey of 1914, I should certainly
have been unable to understand the new situation. In the course of my
journey I set myself to apply, with great rigour, my method of research,
which consists essentially in trying to see the situations as they are,
without preconceived ideas, while listening to all opinions in order to
compare them afterwards and extract, if possible, the average truth.
In Serbia, in Greece, in Turkey, in Roumania, in Bulgaria, where for a
long time I had been in personal relations with people of many different
sorts, I was able to have long talks with persons in the most diverse
walks of life. In particular, I had the good fortune to be graciously
received by the sovereigns and princes of the Balkans: King Peter of
Serbia (23rd December, 1913), Prince Alexander, heir of Serbia (December,
1913), King Constantine (25th January, 1914), Prince Nicholas of Greece
(28th January), King Charles of Roumania (18th February), Tsar Ferdinand
(28th February), Prince Boris, heir of Bulgaria (29th February). If I
record the audiences which these high personages were so good as to grant
me, it is because they were really not commonplace. These sovereigns
and princes knew that I had long studied their country impartially, and
they consented to speak with me of the great interests which guided
their policies. During these various audiences, which lasted from half
an hour to two hours, I heard many points of view of real importance set
forth. No doubt each of my various interlocutors only said to me what he
wished to say; but, thanks to the multiplicity of the opinions expressed
and to the variety of my sources of information, I was able at least to
construct a general picture of the true Balkan situation, and to connect
it afterwards with the problem of Central Europe and the general policy
of Germany.
This inquiry, which in returning I completed in Hungary and Austria,
convinced me that, contrary to the opinion which has been held down to
quite recent times in many Allied circles, the treaty of Bukarest by no
means constituted an injustice, as the Allies have supposed—a belief
which has been the source of most of their mistakes in the Balkans in
1915. On the contrary, the treaty of Bukarest, particularly because it
for the first time drew Roumania out of the German orbit, appeared to
me the most astonishingly favourable event which had happened on the
Continent since 1870, and which was entirely in accordance with the
interests of France, England, and Russia. The consequences of this treaty
formed in fact, as we shall see, the most effectual arrangement that
could be conceived for arresting the Pangerman danger and maintaining
peace in Europe. But this pacific dam to keep back the Pangerman flood
was only possible on condition that the Entente powers held themselves
ready for war, which would probably have sufficed to prevent it, and
that at the same time they resolutely and unanimously supported Greece,
Roumania, and Serbia.
On the other hand, the check which the treaty of Bukarest gave to the
Pangerman plan in Europe, appeared to me so pregnant with consequences
that I considered it highly probable that the Government of Vienna,
instigated by that of Berlin, would not shrink from war for the purpose
of undoing the treaty of Bukarest, with its far-reaching effects, at the
earliest possible moment, unless the other powers put themselves on their
guard. On my return to France I tried to explain the imminence of the
danger, but no one would believe it.
In truth, German aggression caught the present Allied countries napping
for the following fundamental reason. No doubt, before the war,
Pangermanism, as a doctrine, was well enough known in some circles, but
the political and military Pangerman plan, the application of which has
been pursued methodically by the government of Berlin since the opening
of hostilities, had not been studied and taken very seriously except by
an extremely small number of private persons in France, England, and
Russia.
The efforts made by these private persons to convince the men at the helm
in the now Allied countries of the awful danger ahead, were vain. The
principal reason why their warnings fell unheeded was this. When by the
help of documents they explained that William II.’s ultimate aim was the
establishment of German supremacy on the ruins of _all_ the great powers,
they were taken for crazy dreamers, so chimerical did such formidable
projects appear.
That is why among the Allies the political and military Pangerman plot
was ignored in its true character and its extent, down to the outbreak
of war. This lack of knowledge in France is proved by a statement in
_Le Temps_ of 16th December, 1915. Before the war, “we did not believe
in the possibility of a war, and we took no pains to prepare for that
redoubtable event.” It was absolutely the same in England, as was
demonstrated by the complete surprise of Great Britain at the German
aggression.
More than that, the Kaiser’s entire plan has continued to be
misunderstood in the Allied countries down to a date which seems quite
recent. In fact, Sir Edward Carson, when explaining his resignation in
the House of Commons, November 2nd, 1915, said: “I hope that the new plan
of campaign has been definitely settled, for while I was a member of the
Cabinet, the Cabinet had no plan” (quoted by _Le Temps_, 4th November,
1915).
But if the Pangerman plan had been known in London, the English and
consequently the French would certainly have long ago adopted the
counter-plan which could not have failed to destroy it; for the
Pangerman plan consists of such definite and precise elements that the
mere recognition of them at once suggests the means of frustrating
it; in particular, the advantages and the necessity of the Salonika
expedition, which has been so sharply opposed and so tardily undertaken,
would have been understood from the beginning of 1915, when M. Briand
recommended it in principle. Besides, as anybody may convince himself,
if the Pangerman plan had been fully known, it is highly probable that
the Allies would never have perpetrated the blunders which they have
committed in the Balkans, the Dardanelles, and Serbia. It appears that
the magnitude of the Pangerman plan, and particularly the part which is
masked behind the pretended “drawn game,” has not even yet been clearly
apprehended in many circles which imagine themselves well acquainted
with the aims pursued by Germany in the war. In fact, quite recently,
in France and in England, certain important organs, though not, it is
true, of an official character, have argued that since Germany means to
extend her _Zollverein_ to Austria-Hungary, the Allies ought to form a
powerful economic league with the view of combatting the Austro-German
union _after the war_. But as we shall see, the question really could
not, except by some deplorable inadvertence, be stated in these terms
in the Allied countries. No connexion should be voluntarily established
by them between the economic union of the Allies, however natural it
may be, and the economic union of Central Europe. In truth, to permit
the future extension of the German _Zollverein_ to Austria-Hungary, in
other words, to acquiesce in that economic alliance, under any form,
between the two Central empires, which has formed the base and condition
of the whole Pangerman plot for twenty-one years (the plot of 1895),
would be to permit implicitly the seizure by Germany of fifty millions
of inhabitants, of whom nearly three-fourths are not Germans; the
inevitable consequence, as I shall prove, would be to accept the German
supremacy over the Balkans and Turkey. Now it is manifest that such
results would be in absolute contradiction to the declarations of the
Allied governments, which have proclaimed that their object in waging the
war has been to destroy Prussian militarism and not, consequently, to
allow such a new state of things as the seizure, direct or indirect, of
Austria-Hungary by Germany, which would multiply her power ten-fold.
The fact that such “inadvertences” can still be committed, after twenty
months of war, in circles which, though not official, are nevertheless
important, suffices to prove that the widest possible publicity of the
Pangerman plot throughout the great masses of the enlightened public in
the Allied countries is really needful, if not indispensable. It is also
extremely desirable that neutrals should know exactly what the Pangerman
plot is in its nature and in its extent. In particular, those Americans
who imagine that they can stand aloof from the present formidable
conflict, will then clearly understand that their future liberty really
depends on the victory of the Allied soldiers, who are fighting not only
for their own independence, but in reality for the independence of the
whole civilized world, and particularly for that of the United States.
I earnestly trust that the English edition of this book may contribute to
bring about this result. Its object is to inform public opinion exactly,
so far as the English tongue is spoken, as to the Berlin plot for the
domination of the globe. Moreover, an exact knowledge of the Pangerman
political and military plot throws a flood of light on all the essential
problems of the war: it brings out the deep-seated cause of the war; it
explains the immediate causes, which are still almost unknown; it shows
why it is indispensable to the freedom of the world that the Allies
should achieve, not a hollow and treacherous peace, but a complete
victory resulting in the destruction of Prussian militarism, which alone
can put an end to the great armaments in Europe and ensure a really
lasting peace.
In order that the demonstration may be as convincing as possible, I shall
refrain, as far as I can, from giving my readers my own personal opinions
and impressions. I shall do my utmost, above all, to lay before them
exact documents and arguments intelligible to all, thus furnishing them
with facts which will enable them to form a judgment for themselves.
In any case, this work has no other aim than to speak the truth, and to
serve a cause the justice of which will appear more and more manifest to
a world long deceived by the energetic and astute propaganda of Germany.
_5th August, 1916._
PROLOGUE.
PANGERMANISM AND WILLIAM II.
I. The Pangerman Doctrine.
II. The Kaiser as originator of the Pangerman plan.
The Germans are truly methodical people. In every department of life
their plans are based on a theory; it may be a true one or a false
one, but once they have conceived it they forge ahead with bull-dog
tenacity. It is therefore necessary for us to grasp the exact meaning
of the Pangerman doctrine, for the whole universal Pangerman plot, both
political and military, springs from that tenet.
I.
[Illustration: THE POLES IN THE EAST OF GERMANY.]
It might be supposed that the expression Pangermanism embodies the theory
in virtue of which the Germans claim to annex only the regions inhabited
by dense masses of Germans, on the borders of the Empire, which, after
all, would be in accordance with the principle of nationalities.
But Pangermanism has by no means such a restricted and legitimate aim.
Again, it might be thought that its object was to gather within the same
political fold the peoples who are more or less Germanic by origin.
Such a claim would of itself be quite inadmissible. But Pangermanism is
more than that. It is really the doctrine, of purely Prussian origin,
which aims at annexing all the various regions, irrespective of race or
language, of which the possession is deemed useful to the power of the
Hohenzollerns.
[Illustration: THE DANES IN PRUSSIA.]
It was in the name of Pangermanism, a theory bred of cupidity and
wanton greed, that Prussia charged the Parliament of Frankfort to
claim as German lands the Eastern Provinces, where in reality the Slavs
predominate to such an extent, that they still contain a population of
about four million Poles.
It was in the name of Pangermanism that in 1864 Prussia seized that part
of Schleswig which was entirely Danish.
[Illustration: THE GERMANS AND THE NON-GERMANS IN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.]
It is in the name of Pangermanism that Austria-Hungary has been for long
the object of German covetousness, although the Germans in that country
are in a very small minority. Statistics show 12 millions of Germans
against 38 millions of non-Germans, and that must be above the mark, for
we have to remember that German statistics systematically exaggerate the
number of Germans dwelling in the Hapsburg Monarchy.
Already in 1859 the _Augsburg Gazette_ avowed the object of Germany’s
designs on Austria with absolute cynicism:
“We loudly declare that if Austria[1] were not a member of the
Confederation; if it were not Austria who happened to be the legitimate
owner of these non-German regions, it would be the duty of the German
nation to conquer them at all costs, because they are absolutely
necessary for her development and for her position as a great power.”
The future Marshal von Moltke, also inspired by Pangermanism, had
written, as far back as 1844: “We hope that Austria will uphold the
rights and protect the future of the Danube lands, and that Germany will
finally succeed in keeping open the mouth of her great rivers” (see V.
Moltke _Schriften_, t. II., p. 313).
The author of a pamphlet published in 1895, _i.e._ exactly twenty-one
years ago, inspired by this doctrine of fraud and protected by the
_Alldeutscher Verband_, the most powerful Pangerman Society, after
expounding the main plan of future annexations, concludes with simple
effrontery thus:
No doubt the newly-constituted Empires will not be peopled merely by
Germans, but: “Germans alone will govern; they alone will exercise
political rights; they alone will serve in the Army and in the Navy; they
alone will have the right to become landowners; thus they will acquire
the conviction that, as in the Middle Ages, the Germans are a people of
rulers. However, they will condescend so far as to delegate inferior
tasks to foreign subjects subservient to Germany” (see _Grossdeutschland
und Mitteleuropa um das Jahr_ 1950, published by Thormann und Goetsch,
Berlin, p. 48).
Identity of race and language served for a long time to justify
Pangermanism; but the facts we have shown and the explicit declarations
we have quoted prove clearly that race and language were merely a pretext
for the diffusion of the Pangerman doctrine inspired by Prussia. If we
dissect this doctrine we find it is composed of cupidity both political
and economic. The truth is that Pangermanism is a scheme of piracy to
be carried on for the benefit of the Prussian monarchy. Its object is,
by successive and indefinite expansions of territory to include within
the same boundaries, at first economic but afterwards political, such
lands and such peoples as are likely to prove a profitable possession
to the Hohenzollerns themselves and to their main support, the German
aristocracy.
To sum up, Pangermanism is a doctrine of international burglary, and
therefore it is exactly the reverse of the principle of nationality, that
noble idea ushered into the world by the French Revolution.
II.
From the Pangerman doctrine the military and political Pangerman plot was
bred and stage-managed by William II. Outside of Germany, the Kaiser was
looked upon, for a long time, as a peace-loving monarch. It is difficult
to explain how such a very serious error could have arisen. Shortly after
his accession in 1888, William II. was secretly hatching that plot which
so recently has caused the European conflagration, and subsequently, by
his public utterances, he has clearly showed his Pangerman tendencies.
On August 28th, 1898, in reply to the Burgomaster of Mayence’s speech,
the Kaiser declared that his wish was to keep inviolate the heritage
bequeathed by his “immortal grandfather.” “But,” added William, “I
can only reach that goal if our authority firmly keeps sway over our
neighbours. For this object the unity and the co-operation of every
German tribe is required.” On the 4th October, 1900, William II., on
laying the foundation stone of the Roman Museum of Saalburg, again said:
“May our German Fatherland become in the future as strongly united, as
powerful, as wonderful as was the Roman universal empire; may this end be
attained by the united co-operation of our princes, of our peoples, of
our armies and of our citizens, in order that in the times to come it may
be said of us as it used to be said of yore: _Civis Romanus sum_.”
On the 28th October, 1900, speaking at an officers’ mess, William II.
affirmed: “My highest aim is to remove whatever separates our great
German people.” Now, in September, 1900, at Stettin, the Kaiser had just
declared: “I have no fear of the future. I am convinced that my plan will
prove successful.” In the Kaiser’s mind the whole matter was summed up in
the chief formula of Pangerman domination: _From Hamburg to the Persian
Gulf_. To accomplish this object the Kaiser had decided to forge closer
and still closer links between Austria-Hungary and Germany. In order to
consolidate his supremacy over the Balkan peoples he reckoned on the
co-operation of such of their Kings as were Germanic by origin (Bulgaria
and Roumania), or on others who were strongly influenced by Germany—in
reality by himself.
Thus he arranged the marriage of his own sister, Sophia, in 1889, with
the heir of the Throne of Greece, King Constantine of to-day. Finally,
almost immediately after his accession he had begun to think of showering
his Imperial favours on the Turks and the Musulmans; this was with the
object of seizing the Ottoman Empire, later on, and of making use of the
Mahometans of the whole world as a mighty lever against all other powers.
On November 8th, 1898, at Damascus, William II. pronounced the famous
words, the full significance of which is only made clear now that we
have seen the German action develop in Turkey and Persia, and that we
have learnt about William’s endeavours to cause an agitation among the
Musulmans of Egypt, India and China:
“May His Majesty the Sultan, as well as the three hundred millions of
Musulmans who venerate him as their Khalifa, be assured that the German
Emperor is their friend for ever.”
The adulation of the sanguinary Sultan Abdul-Hamid proved of practical
use to William II. He obtained on the 27th November, 1899, the first
concession of the Bagdad railway; now that railway, although still
unfinished, has just been utilized by the German offensive both against
Russia and England.
All over his Empire William II. had encouraged the formation of military
and naval leagues—which number millions of members who, for the last
twenty years have carried on an incessant propaganda in favour of such
German armaments by land and sea—as were wanted by the Kaiser.
Again, William II. encouraged the creation of the _Alldeutscher Verband_.
This association or Pangerman Union, counts among its members a large
number of important and influential persons, and at the door of this
society must be laid the most overwhelming responsibility for the
outbreak of the war. Founded in 1894, it has organized thousands of
lectures besides scattering broadcast millions of pamphlets to spread
Pangerman notions and to get the masses of the people to favour schemes
of aggrandizement. It was due to the _Alldeutscher Verband_ that all
the Germans living outside the Empire were formed into a systematic
organization for the present war; this being specially the case in
Austria and in the United States.
Is it possible to believe that such an autocrat as William II. had
not desired this end? How could three powerful associations, with
ever-growing means of action, have carried on a most costly, as well as a
most violent propaganda, in a police-ridden country like Germany, unless
they had been approved of by the authorities usually so meddlesome or so
vigilant?
* * * * *
As to the hour of the war, who set the clock going, if it were not the
Kaiser? As a matter of fact he put the hands of the dial forward (see
Chapter II).
From November, 1913, onward, the Kaiser was busy preparing for early
hostilities; he was aware that the enlargement of the Kiel Canal would be
complete by July, 1914—therefore he arranged to be ready by that date,
and as we know war was declared on August 1st, _i.e._, a few days after
the completion of the Kiel Canal. The Arch-Duke Francis-Ferdinand, the
heir to the Austria-Hungarian throne, tempted by the Kaiser, is dazzled
by the mirage of great profits which were to accrue from a joint action
of the Central Powers. In April, 1914, the Kaiser goes on a visit to
the Archduke at Miramar, near Trieste. Again he meets him at Konopischt
in June, 1914, and is then accompanied by von Tirpitz, that notorious
Chief of Pirates, that submarine Corsair. Now comes the right moment for
drafting the bold main lines of the combined action of the German and
Austrian forces by land and sea. The murder of the Arch-Duke Ferdinand,
on June 28th, 1914, made no change in the Kaiser’s plans, it merely
precipitated events by furnishing an excellent pretext for intervention
against Serbia. Thus the criminal action of the Kaiser stands revealed;
for twenty-five years he had been elaborating the Pangerman plan.
According to Baron de Beyens, who before the war was Belgian Minister
at Berlin, “it has been maintained that William II. was an unconscious
tool in the hands of a caste and of a party who needed war in order to
assert their own power. William has, indeed, listened to them, but he has
lent them an ear because their designs chimed in with his own. In the
judgment of history it is he who is doomed to bear the responsibility
for the disasters by which Europe has been overwhelmed” (Baron Beyens,
_L’Allemagne avant la guerre_, p. 41, G. Van Oest, Paris).
* * * * *
For twenty-five years, and by order of the Kaiser, a violent Pangerman
propaganda had been carried on throughout the Empire; therefore, let
there be no mistake, William II., in declaring war, was supported in his
decision, not only by the influential circles of German opinion, but
by the large majority of the German people. A very notorious German,
Maximilian Harden, has explicitly acknowledged this fact in his review
_Zukunft_ of November, 1914:
“This war has not been forced on us by surprise; we have desired it, and
it was our bounden duty thus to desire it. Germany wages war because of
her immutable conviction that greater world expansion and freer outlets
are due to her by right of her own works” (quoted by _Le Temps_, 20th
November, 1914).
Having thus formed and perfected for twenty years the Pangerman plot of
a European conflagration, William II. had the prodigious audacity to
declare, in his Manifesto to the German people (August 1st, 1915), after
drenching Europe with streams of blood for a whole year: “Before God and
before History, I swear that my conscience is clear. I did not desire
war.”
CHAPTER I.
THE PANGERMAN PLAN.
I. The Pangerman plan of 1911.
II. The stages by which it has been effected.
III. Why it has been ignored.
I.
The Pangerman plot in its broad outlines was laid as early as 1895,
but since that date events have happened throughout the world, which
encouraged Pangermans to enlarge the structure of their scheme.
In 1898 the Fashoda incident almost caused a breach between France and
England. In 1905 Japan compelled Russia to sign peace after a long war
which exhausted all the Tsar’s military resources and disturbed the
balance of power in Europe for a long time to the advantage of Germany.
In 1909 the Vienna Government, under cover of the veiled ultimatum
which Berlin sent to the Tsar, carried out the annexation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, countries which are almost entirely peopled by Serbians.
This seizure of a huge Slav territory was a great triumph for Germanism.
On November 3rd, 1910, at the Potsdam meeting, the Kaiser obtained
from the Tsar’s Government the abandonment of all opposition to the
completion of the Bagdad railway. England and France took up the same
attitude. On July 1st, 1911, the Kaiser ventured on the Agadir episode,
which was clearly an attempt to force a quarrel on France. It led to
the Franco-German treaty of November 4th, 1911, which ceded to Germany
275,000 square kilometres of the French Congo, while at the same time the
commerce of Morocco was heavily mortgaged in favour of Germany.
These various events deeply injured the interests of France, England and
Russia; but these powers preferred to submit to the hardest sacrifices
rather than undertake the dreadful responsibility of letting loose a
fearful war on Europe. The Pangermans misread this attitude as a sign of
weakness, and of a desire to keep the peace at all costs; and accordingly
they were encouraged to entertain high hopes of huge success in a near
future. That is why the original Pangerman plan of 1895, considerably
altered, became the perfected plan of 1911.
[Illustration: THE PANGERMAN PLAN OF 1911.]
This plan of 1911 (_see map_) provided in Europe and in Western Asia:
1º. The establishment, under German rule, of a vast Confederation of
Central Europe, comprising:
+------------------------------------+-----------+------------+
| | Square | |
| |Kilometres.|Inhabitants.|
+------------------------------------+-----------+------------+
| In the West: | | |
| Holland | 38,141 | 6,114,000 |
| Belgium | 29,451 | 7,500,000 |
| Luxemburg | 2,586 | 260,000 |
| Switzerland* | 41,324 | 3,800,000 |
| The Departments of the North of | | |
| France to the N.E. of a line drawn | | |
| from the S. of Belfort to the | | |
| mouth of the Somme about | 50,271 | 5,768,000 |
| +-----------+------------+
| Total | 161,773 | 23,442,000 |
| +-----------+------------+
| To the East: | | |
| Russian Poland | 127,320 | 12,467,000 |
| Baltic Provinces, Esthonia, | | |
| Livonia, Courland | 94,564 | 2,686,000 |
| The three Russian Governments | | |
| of Kovno, Vilna, Grodno | 121,840 | 5,728,000 |
| +-----------+------------+
| Total | 343,724 | 20,881,000 |
| +-----------+------------+
| To the South-East: | | |
| Austria-Hungary† | 676,616 | 50,000,000 |
+------------------------------------+-----------+------------+
| These three groups form a grand total of 1,182,113 Square |
| Kilometres and 94,323,000 inhabitants. |
+-------------------------------------------------------------+
* Minus eventually the French and Italian Cantons which the
Pangermans declare that they do not care to annex.
† Minus the Italian regions of the Trentino, which Berlin
decided to cede (at the expense of Austria) to Italy as the
price of her neutrality.
This confederation was thus to group under German supremacy
Square
Kilometres. Inhabitants.
Actual German Empire 540,858 68,000,000
New territories of the Confederation 1,182,113 94,000,000
----------------------
Total 1,722,971 162,000,000
of whom only 77 millions are Germans and 85 millions non-Germans.
2º. The absolute subordination of the Balkan countries (containing
499,275 square kilometres and 22 millions of non-Germans) to the Great
Central European Confederation. The Balkan States to become mere
satellites of Berlin.
3º. Germany’s political and military seizure of Turkey, which was
afterwards to be enlarged by the annexation of Egypt and Persia. It was
provided that Turkey should be dealt with in two successive stages.
During the first, the handful of “Young Turks” who have ruled the Ottoman
Empire since 1908, and who play the German game, were to remain in power
merely as figure-heads. Turkey was to retain a nominal independence
during this phase, though in reality she was to have been tied to
Germany by a treaty of military alliance. Under pretence of effecting
reforms, numerous German officials were to be placed at the head of
all the Ottoman administrations, and that would have paved the way for
the second stage. The latter had for its aim the putting of Turkey,
with her 1,792,000 square kilometres and her 20 millions of non-German
inhabitants, under the strict protectorate of Germany, to say nothing of
the subject provinces, Egypt and Persia.
* * * * *
The Germanic Confederation of Central Europe was to form a huge
_Zollverein_ or Customs Union. Treaties of Commerce of a special
character imposed on the Balkan States and on subjected Turkey would
have provided for Great Germany an economic outlet and reserved for her
exclusively those vast regions.
Finally, we can sum up the Pangerman plan of 1911 in four formulas:
Berlin—Calais; Berlin—Riga; Hamburg—Salonika; Hamburg—Persian Gulf.
The union of the three groupings—Central Europe, Balkan States and
Turkey—would have placed under the predominating influence of Berlin
4,015,146 square kilometres and 204 millions of inhabitants, of whom 127
millions were to be ruled directly or indirectly by merely 77 millions of
Germans.
This continental Pangerman plan of 1911 was to have been completed by
colonial conquests of great magnitude, of which an account is given at
the end of Chapter V.
William II. was well aware that such a project could only become an
enduring reality if all other great powers disappeared from the face
of the earth. The Kaiser had therefore positively resolved, when
hatching his Pangerman plot, to accomplish the destruction of five great
powers. It is necessary to grasp fully this fundamental truth, if we
wish to understand the nature of the present war. It was foreseen that
Austria-Hungary would disappear by her absorption under cover of entrance
into the German _Zollverein_. France and Russia were to have been
totally ruined by means of a furious preventive war which would entirely
destroy their military forces. England was to be put out of action by
a subsequent operation, which would have been an easy matter when once
France and Russia had been dismembered and reduced to utter impotence.
As to Italy—destined to become a vassal state—she was not considered
as being capable of hindering in the least the Pangerman ambitions.
One of the Kaiser’s agents for propagating this scheme wrote in 1900:
“Italy cannot be looked upon as a rival for she is too incompetent in
warfare” (_Deutschland bei Beginn des 20 Jahrhunderts_, p. 53. Military
publishers, R. Felix, Berlin, 1900).
It must be added that the Pangerman plot of 1911 did not include war
with England. When he declared hostilities in August, 1914, William II.
was convinced that England would take no share in them, at least not
immediately. The Kaiser had laid every conceivable kind of trap to add
fuel to the flames of all internal English disturbances and to deceive
the London Cabinet. At one moment he almost succeeded in his endeavours.
England’s decision to participate without delay in the struggle only
hung by a thread, but that thread was broken. If England had tarried,
if she had tarried only for a few days, German landings in Normandy,
Brittany, and as far as Bordeaux would have been effected. France being
thus rendered quickly powerless on all sides, the English intervention
would have proved futile at a later stage, and the Pangerman plan of
1911 would thus have been fully achieved. But in going to war just at
the right moment and in controlling the sea, Great Britain has, while
saving herself, furnished to civilized humanity the means of avoiding the
Prussian yoke. The initial German plan has truly been upset by English
intervention following on the respite gained by the splendid resistance
of Belgium in arms.
But the Germans are clever, they are stubborn and crafty. Adapting
themselves to new conditions thrust on them, they are still endeavouring
to make an enormous profit out of the war. We must, therefore, try to
understand what operations they have devised for carrying out, even now,
the Pangerman plot almost in its entirety.
II.
As it is necessary to open the eyes of neutrals, many of whom have been
misled by the German propaganda, we must try to expose very clearly the
inner workings of the Pangerman plot as it is revealed to us in the
searchlight of facts.
From 1892 down to the outbreak of the War, that is to say, for twenty-two
years, the Pangerman movement has developed with ever growing intensity;
a multitude of publications, giving full details of the plan, were
scattered among the German people, in order to excite in them the greed
of conquest and so prepare them for the struggle through the allurement
of plunder. Of these publications two are of special importance: first,
the pamphlet published under the auspices of the _Alldeutscher Verband_:
namely, _Grossdeutschland und Mitteleuropa um das Jahr 1950_ (Thormann
und Goetsch, Berlin, 1895), which gives the Pangerman plan of 1895:
second, the book of Otto Richard Tannenberg: _Grossdeutschland, die
Arbeit des 20ᵗᵉⁿ Jahrhunderts_ (Bruno Volger, Leipzig-Gohlis, 1911),
which gives all suitable details of the plan of 1911.
Unfortunately, although this Pangerman literature is very considerable,
full of documentary evidence and spread broadcast among the masses by
most powerful associations, whose patrons are the highest authorities
in the land, few people outside of Germany would believe in its extreme
importance. But now the facts speak for themselves. The reality, the
extent, and the successive stages of the Pangerman plan of 1911 are shown
by:
1º. The course which Germany has taken since August 1st, 1914, in her
political and military operations which have for their object not, as
many have supposed, the obtaining of securities, but the annexation of
territories in the manner set forth in Tannenberg’s book, and more or
less in accordance with the plan of 1911.
2º. The memorial delivered on May 20th, 1915, to the German Chancellor
by the League of Agriculturists, the League of German Peasants, the
Provisional Association of Christian German Peasants, now called the
Westphalian Peasants’ Association, the Central German Manufacturers’
Union, the League of Manufacturers, and the Middle-Class Union of the
Empire (_see_ _Le Temps_, 12th August, 1915). The importance of this
document cannot be overrated, for it is issued by the most powerful
associations of the Empire, including all the influential elements of
the German nation, specially the agrarians and the iniquitous Prussian
squires. Now the purport of that memorial, as will be shown, is to
demand all such annexations mentioned in the Pangerman plan of 1911, as
the development of military operations has so far rendered feasible.
Any one who knows Germany can hardly doubt that this memorial was not
handed in to Bethmann-Hollweg without a previous understanding with him.
Doubtless it was intended that this document should seem to exercise an
overmastering pressure of public opinion on William II.’s government.
But if the ideas expressed in this memorial reflect, as they certainly
do, the wishes of influential German circles, it is also unquestionable
that they correspond very closely to the scheme of aggrandizement, which
William II. has been nursing for over twenty years.
3º. The declarations made at the sitting of the Reichstag of the 11th
December, 1915, prove the exactitude of this statement. The Imperial
Chancellor said:
“If our enemies will not submit now, they will be obliged to do so
later on.... When our enemies shall offer us such peace proposals as
are compatible with the dignity and security of Germany we shall be
ready to discuss them.... But our enemies must understand that the more
unrelentingly they wage war, the higher will be the guarantees exacted.”
Bethmann-Hollweg could hardly have spoken more explicitly, but his
diplomatic game was naturally to unmask Germany’s enormous pretensions
only bit by bit, in order that the eyes of neutrals should not be opened
to the Pangerman monster in all its horror until the last moment. But
hardly had the Chancellor finished his speech than the Deputy Spahn
explained the real drift of it with great precision:
“We await,” said Herr Spahn, “the hour which will allow of peace
negotiations which will safeguard in a permanent way and by all means,
including the needful territorial annexations, all military economic and
political interests of Germany in its total extent.”
The thundering applause which greeted these words proves that they echoed
the sentiments of the overwhelming majority of the German deputies, who
at that moment still believed that it was possible for Germany to achieve
enormous annexations.
III.
The preparation of the Pangerman plan has required for over twenty
years a huge propaganda among the German masses as well as a world-wide
organization. How is it that this plan has been ignored in its nature
and in its extent by the diplomats of France, England and Russia? Such,
however, has been the case, for otherwise the war could not have come
upon these three powers as a surprise. We deal here with a matter which
at first sight seems improbable and which, therefore, needs explanation.
The diplomatic agents of the Allies are certainly not inferior personally
to those of William II., but the Kaiser’s foreign service, as a whole,
includes novel instruments of observation and influence by which,
for the last twenty years, the Government of Berlin has seconded its
official diplomacy without allowing the connexion between it and them
to transpire. None of the Allied countries have employed similar
instruments, the result being that the Entente is considerably inferior
in this department of foreign policy.
* * * * *
The Pangerman plan is founded on a very exact knowledge of all political,
ethnographical, economic, social, military and naval problems, not
only of Europe, but of the whole world; the Germans have acquired that
knowledge by means of an intense labour of over twenty-five years. But
this task has not been performed by the official German diplomats; it has
been carried out either by the members of the _Alldeutscher Verband_, the
Pangerman Union, or by the agents of the German secret service, which
has been enormously extended. These agents might be called connecting
links between the regular spies and the official diplomats; Baron von
Schenk, who worked at Athens from 1915-1916, is a sample of that category
of agents who have studied methodically all the root questions of the
Pangerman plan, who have prepared means to delude the minds of neutrals,
to paralyze the revolt of the Slavs in Austria-Hungary, to corrupt all
such neutral individuals or neutral newspapers as were susceptible of
corruption, etc. After these numerous agents had made their reports,
and when once these had been examined and summarized, they were sent to
the Wilhelmstrasse, to the great German General Staff, whose concerted
operations are always so combined as to answer both to political and
to military needs. At the same time the reports reached William II.’s
private study, and his brain was thus able to store up all technical
means necessary for the achievement of his plan of domination.
Was the diplomatic corps of the Allies so well served that it could
grasp in its universal significance the immense work of preparation
accomplished by the secret Pangerman agents? Indeed, they were not
properly supplied with the right tools for such a task, and we shall see
why it was so.
First of all it is necessary to dispel a false notion which “the man in
the street” has of diplomacy. He fondly thinks that diplomats, while
preparing clever and mysterious combinations, fashion History. Now the
experience of centuries shows that as a general rule diplomats merely
chronicle History but do not make it. My teacher, Albert Sorel, neatly
expressed that truth by saying: “Diplomats are History’s attorneys.”
In fact, the diplomacy of any country helps to prepare and to fashion
history only when there happens to be at its head a great man of large
and just ideas, who knows how to apply these ideas by all the means
available in his time.
It is a strange fact and worthy of notice, that such a great man is
rarely, if ever, a professional diplomat. For example, Richelieu,
Napoleon, Palmerston, Disraeli, Cavour, Bismarck, who all prepared and
fashioned History, were not trained diplomatists. Unfortunately, it does
not seem that Fortune has endowed any of our Allied countries, either
before or since the war, with a head capable of leading, on grand lines,
the diplomatic affairs of the Entente. The latter therefore has been only
served by those diplomats who are mere officials, and who as such await
instructions from higher quarters, and these instructions are very often
found wanting.
Besides, the diplomacy of the Allies, not being seconded, like that of
Germany, by novel means of observation, can only obtain the information
it needs by methods still so old-fashioned that they are almost identical
with those used a century ago. They are totally inadequate to point out
the sequence of ideas or the rapid development of events which in Central
Europe and the Balkans have been, as will be seen, the immediate causes
of the war; nor are the means employed by our diplomats at all sufficient
if they wish to recognize what forms the whole chain of the Pangerman
organization. Just because this organization is huge, just because it is
so complex, its total importance cannot be properly gauged unless the
connecting links between the varied elements are clearly perceived.
The typical professional diplomat lives in a world of his own. Either
his information comes from the office or it is second-hand; it rarely is
reached by direct observation of people or facts. The secretaries at the
Embassies divide their time between office work, copying documents in
copper plate hand, or social functions, pleasant enough but confined to
a particular and narrow set. Few of the secretaries know the language of
the country in which they reside, fewer still travel in the interior of
the land in order to study it.
The events which have led to the European conflagration spring from
two main causes: the stupendous scope of the German ambitions and the
progress of the Austro-Hungarian and Balkan nationalities. Now both these
factors have been revealed on many occasions, by purely local events
which, to a keen observer, would have betrayed most significantly the end
in view, but they have occurred for the most part in places far removed
from capital cities, and to appreciate fully their importance would have
needed direct observation on the spot.
This is quite contrary to the tradition followed by official diplomats.
Those of the Entente had not, at their disposal, agents who could go
and, for instance, hear the numerous lectures given by the Pangerman
propaganda, and who could have procured and translated for them the
illuminating pamphlets of the _Alldeutscher Verband_. Also they had no
means of getting into personal touch with the party leaders, either Slav
or Latin, of Austria-Hungary; often these leaders were men without a
place in parliament, frequently without fortune or social rank; all they
had was their national ideal, their strength of conviction, but they were
real and novel forces, for they acted on the popular masses with whom
they were in complete intellectual sympathy.
As the diplomatic corps of the Entente was not provided with that
indispensable aid—an organization of secondary agents of observation—they
have been reduced to accept information of a superficial and incomplete
nature. Often it was merely provided by press cuttings and even those
were frequently from papers written in a tongue which the diplomats
could not read; at best these cuttings were without any connecting link
and quite insufficient to warn them of the approach of a great peril.
We must add that in diplomatic circles of all periods—unless they are
led by some eminent man—there are certain formulas current, such as: “No
fuss,” “it is necessary to wait and see,” “we must not believe that it
has happened,” which have had a baneful influence. The result has been
a sceptical attitude which in diplomatical circles passes for essential
and in good taste. If we add to this frame of mind the absence of varied,
direct and coherent information, we can understand how it was that before
the war, when any one tried to persuade a professional diplomatist that
William II.’s political aim was nothing short of the establishment
of German supremacy over the whole world, he was soon set down as a
visionary with a head stuffed full of groundless suspicions.
Finally, we must realize that the system by which a diplomat is sent from
pillar to post, often to the antipodes, every four or five years, is not
conducive to the acquirement of a general and exact knowledge, founded
on documentary evidence, of events still in progress, in a wide zone, so
complex and so difficult to study as Central Europe and the Balkans.
These various considerations help us to understand why, during the
twenty-five years which preceded the war, no diplomat of the Allies
has been able to grasp the total Pangerman plan in its nature and in
its extent, though possibly a few of them may have indicated in their
reports now and then some local Pangerman act which aroused suspicion.
These considerations explain also, at least in part, the failure of the
diplomatic corps of the Entente in the Balkans.
* * * * *
To sum up, allied official diplomats are not personally inferior to
German official diplomats, but the latter have an enormous advantage
over their colleagues of the Entente in knowing the general plan of the
Berlin policy, in knowing, each in his own post, in what direction to
proceed and what must be done or prevented in order to attain the final
end. During the last twenty-five years the Kaiser’s foreign policy has
been constructive and framed on a definite plan, while the diplomats of
the Allies, reflecting the policy of their Governments without concrete
plans, have been hampered, because they believed obstinately in Peace, in
a vague and stagnant defensive. On the other hand, the allied diplomacy,
regarded as an instrument of observation, confined to old-fashioned
methods, is like an ordinary magnifying glass which shows nothing but
the largest objects. On the contrary, the German foreign policy, thanks
to the new, busy and secret organs, by which the German diplomacy has
been seconded, may be compared to a workshop provided with powerful
microscopes by which facts can be studied not only in their general
aspect, but also in their most minute details, details which often are
not without their importance.
Finally, the allied diplomacy, regarded as an instrument of action, still
clinging to antiquated traditional methods, may be compared to an army
which possesses only field guns, while the foreign diplomacy of Germany,
in its totality, is comparable to an army equipped both with heavy and
with field artillery.