HOW FAR THE PANGERMAN PLAN WAS CARRIED OUT AT THE BEGINNING OF 1916.
I. German pretensions in the West.
II. German pretensions in the East.
III. German pretensions in the South and South-East.
IV. General view of the execution of the Pangerman plan from
1911 to the beginning of 1916.
In this chapter we shall inquire what relation existed between the actual
gains and the pretensions of the Pangermans at the beginning of 1916,
and those which were foreseen in the 1911 plan. In order to be quite
explicit we shall analyse successively those gains and pretensions in the
west, east, south, and south-west. This analysis will enable us finally
to present a general view of the execution of the Pangerman plan at the
period under consideration.
I.
The map (p. 46) sums up Prussianized Germany’s pretensions which she
still expected to carry out west of the Rhine at the beginning of 1916.
The best way to prove this intention is by means of extracts from the
memorial sent by the most powerful German associations on May 20th, 1915,
to the Imperial Chancellor (quoted by _Le Temps_, 12th August, 1915). I
have mentioned (see page 18) why this document must be looked upon as of
extremely exceptional importance.
[Illustration: THE GERMAN CLAIMS IN THE WEST (BEGINNING OF 1916).]
As to what concerns Belgium the memorial says:
“Because it is needful to insure our credit on sea and our military and
economic situation for the future in face of England, because the Belgian
territory, which is of the greatest economic importance, is closely
linked to our principal industrial territory, Belgium must be subjected
to the legislation of the Empire in monetary, financial and postal
matters. Her railways and her water courses must be closely connected
with our communications. By constituting a Walloon territory and a
Flemish territory with a preponderance of the Flemish, and by putting
into German hands the properties and the economic undertakings which are
of vital importance for dominating the country, we shall organize the
government and the administration in such a manner that the inhabitants
will not be able to acquire any influence over the political destiny of
the German Empire.”
In a word, it is slavery that is promised to the Belgians. In order to
prove clearly that this means exactly the achievement of the plan Berlin
had elaborated for twenty-five years, it is important to notice that
the fate of the annexed populations, meted out in the above memorial,
is exactly the same fate mentioned in the pamphlet published under the
auspices of the _Alldeutscher Verband_, the Pangerman Union, wherein the
Pangerman plan of 1895 is set forth (_see the text already quoted, p. 4_).
The only difference to be noticed in the evolution of the Pangerman ideas
between 1895 and 1916 is that after their experience with the Slavs and
Latins of Austria-Hungary, the Germans deem it possible and advantageous,
by an application of Prussian methods of terrorism, to compel non-Germans
to fight for the benefit of Pangermany; true, these people shudder with
horror at the notion, but stiffened by a strong infusion of Germans, they
are forced to march to the shambles in order to secure slavery and bread
for their families under the German yoke.
“As to France,” continues the memorial of the 20th May, 1915, to the
Imperial Chancellor, “always in consideration of our position towards
England, it is of vital interest for us, in respect of our future on the
seas, that we should own the coast which borders on Belgium more or less
up to the Somme, which would give us an outlet on the Atlantic Ocean.
The _Hinterland_, which it is necessary to annex at the same time, must
be of such an extent that economically and strategically the ports,
where the canals terminate, can be utilized to the utmost. Any other
territorial conquest in France, beyond the necessary annexation of the
mining basins of Briey, should only be made in virtue of considerations
of military strategy. In this connection, after the experience of this
war, it is only natural that we should not expose our frontiers to fresh
enemy invasions by leaving to the adversary fortresses which threaten
us, especially Verdun and Belfort and the Western buttresses of the
Vosges, which are situated between those two fortresses. By the conquest
of the line of the Meuse and of the French coast, with the mouths of the
canals, we should acquire, besides the iron districts of Briey already
mentioned, the coal districts of the departments of the _Nord_ and of the
_Pas de Calais_. This expansion of territory, quite an obvious matter
after the experience obtained in Alsace-Lorraine, presupposes that the
populations of the annexed districts shall not be able to obtain a
political influence on the destiny of the German Empire, and that all
means of economic power which exist on these territories, including
landed property, both large and middling, will pass into German hands;
France will receive and compensate the landowners.”
In order to justify these formidable annexations the memorial of the
20th May, in harmony with the frank cynicism of the Pangerman doctrine,
adduces no argument but the convenience of Prussia and the profitableness
of the booty to be got.
“If the fortress of Longwy, with the numerous blast furnaces of the
region, were returned to the French, and if a new war broke out, with
a few long range guns the German furnaces of Luxemburg (list of which
is given) would be paralyzed in a few hours.... Thus about 20% of the
production of crude iron and of German steel would be lost....
“Let us say, bye the bye, that the high production of steel derived from
the iron-ore gives to German agriculture the only chance of obtaining
the phosphoric acid needed when the importation of phosphates is
blockaded.
“The security of the German Empire, in a future war, requires therefore
imperatively the ownership of all mines of iron-ore including the
fortresses of Longwy and of Verdun, which are necessary to defend the
region.”
These various declarations, made on high authority enable us to affirm,
that on the whole the annexations which the Pangermans intended to make
in the West would have extended in France more or less to a line drawn
from the South of Belfort to the mouth of the Somme, that is, so far
as concerns France, they would comprise a total area of 50,271 square
kilometres, which, before the war, held 5,768,000 inhabitants.
Further, as regards France, the intended annexations were, according to
Pangerman conceptions, to have had a double effect.
1º. By taking over the richest industrial and mining French regions,
Germany would secure an enormous booty.
2º. Deprived of her most productive departments, which bear the main
burden of taxes, and which hold mining elements indispensable to economic
life, France would have been maimed and reduced to a state from which it
would have been a sheer impossibility for her to recover or ever again to
become a power capable of thwarting in any shape whatsoever the future
determinations of Germany.
A few figures will enable us to verify this forecast. At the beginning
of 1916 the Germans were holding 138,000 hectares of the coal basin of
the department of the _Nord_, being 41% of the total superficies worked
in France (337,000 hectares), or about three-fourths of the total French
production. The Germans also occupied 63,000 hectares of the iron-ore
basin of Lorraine which represents 75% of the superficies of all the iron
beds worked in France (83,000 hectares), and nine-tenths of the total
production. It is clear, that were such a state of things to continue,
economic and therefore national life would be made radically impossible
in France, shorn of her vital organs. In reality France would be in a
position of entire dependence on Germany in accordance with the Pangerman
schemes for the future.
It is still necessary to mention that in the territories occupied by
Germany in the West, as well as everywhere else, the measures already
taken by the Germans in 1916 were not merely measures of military
defence, but measures for the organization and permanent possession of
the said territories. These measures to ensure permanent possession may
be classed in the following categories:
_Measures of terrorism_ applied in Prussian fashion so as to bring into
subjection all refractory elements.
_Measures of division_, such as in Belgium, the Germans take in order
to rouse, by all possible means, opposition between the Flemish and the
Walloons for the purpose of neutralizing the one by the other.
_Measures of strict and regular administration_ in order, by the bait
of some external or economic advantages, to accustom to the German yoke
those elements of the population whose moral resistance, in the opinion
of Berlin, can be most easily broken.
_Measures tending to prepare the German colonization of the new
territories._ These have mostly consisted in applying the Pangerman
theory of _Evacuation_, that is, by systematically transporting the
unfortunate women or old people whom Germany considers absolutely useless
in her future possessions. She found it, for instance, very convenient
to rid herself without delay of these poor creatures especially when
the question of feeding them cropped up; so these “useless mouths” were
promptly transferred to the shoulders of the enemy, whom Germany already
looked upon as vanquished. That is the theory of _Evacuation_, which
explains to a large extent why the German authorities have sent back to
France that part of the populations of the occupied territories in France
and Belgium whom, on exact inquiry, they regarded as human wastage.
* * * * *
No doubt, as is shown on map (p. 46), Germany did not at the beginning
of 1916 occupy quite all the territories she coveted. She missed Calais,
Belfort, and Verdun, but it is easy to see that she did so only by a
hair’s breadth.
The Western territories which were to enter into the Germanic
Confederation of the 1911 plan include:
Square Kilometres.
Holland 38,141
Belgium 29,451
Luxemburg 2,586
French Departments 50,271
-------
Total 120,449
Now Luxemburg and Belgium were entirely occupied (excepting a patch of
Belgium). If Germany was to hold Belgium, Holland, which is not occupied,
but which is geographically invested, would inevitably be forced to enter
into the Germanic Confederation. We must, therefore, consider Holland
as being virtually under Germany’s thumb. As, on the other hand, out of
50,271 square kilometres which she wished to annex at the expense of
France, Germany, at the beginning of 1916, occupied 20,300, we conclude
that the German enterprises in the West, which, according to programme,
ought to have comprised 120,449 square kilometres, in point of fact
extended directly or indirectly over 90,478 square kilometres.
Germany therefore, early in 1916, had achieved in the West an occupation
foreseen by the plan of 1911 and at the expense of non-Germans in the
proportion of 76% or three-fourths.
II.
The Pangerman plan of 1911 had provided for the permanent exclusion of
Russia as a great power by means of two measures:
1º. To carve out of the Empire of the Tsars and annex to the German
Confederation a slice of territory large enough to cut off Russia
entirely from the West.
2º. To constitute at the expense of Russia, thus reduced, new States
which should bow the knee to Berlin.
Mr. Dietrich Schaefer, the well-known historian, in the Review _Panther_,
affirmed, early in February, 1915: “It is absolutely necessary for us
to expand the sphere of our power, especially eastward ... the immense
Russian force must recede behind the Dnieper” (quoted by _L’Information_,
5th February, 1915).
A Swedish pamphlet, ascribed to the Germanophile, Adrian Molin,
explained, also early in 1915, that Germany, with the help of Sweden,
was to have given the finishing stroke in separating Russia from Europe
by means of a barrier formed of Buffer-States, to wit, Finland and
the Ukraine. Now, for the last twenty-five years in particular, the
Pangerman agents have endeavoured to sow the seeds of rebellion among
the 20 millions of Small-Russians who live in the Russian Governments
grouped around Kieff. Finally, the Moslem regions of Russia (Caucasus,
Central Asia, etc.) were to form special States under the sway of
Turkish suzerainty, and, through that channel, to bear the yoke of German
influence.
[Illustration: THE GERMAN CLAIMS IN THE EAST.]
Such were the means elaborated at Berlin to bring about the annihilation
of Russia as a great power, when once her armies had been destroyed;
and this might have happened perhaps, if the English intervention, by
enabling France to make a stand, had not prevented Germany from first
smashing France and then concentrating all her forces against the Empire
of the Tsar, in accordance with the plan of the General Staff of Berlin.
We can form an estimate of the annexations which Germany, as late as
the beginning of 1916, still hoped to effect at the cost of Russia by
examining the memorial of May 20th, 1915, addressed to the Imperial
Chancellor; although the phraseology in which it is drawn up aims at
concealing the full extent of the Pangerman demands, it yet tallies, in
its tendencies, with the programme published by Tannenberg in 1911:
“With regard to the East,” says that memorial, “the following
consideration must guide us: For the great increase of industrial
power which we expect in the West we must secure a counterpoise by the
annexation of an agricultural territory of equal value in the East.
It is necessary to strengthen the agricultural basis of our national
economy; to secure room for the expansion of a great German agricultural
settlement; to restore to our Empire the German peasants living in a
foreign land, particularly in Russia, who are now actually without the
protection of the law; finally, we must increase considerably the number
of our fellow countrymen able to bear arms; all these matters require an
important extension of the frontiers of the Empire and of Prussia towards
the East through the annexation of at least some parts of the Baltic
provinces and of territories to the South of them, while keeping in view
the necessity of a military defence of the Eastern German frontier.
“As to what political rights to give to the inhabitants of the new
territories and as to what guarantees are necessary to further German
influence and economics, we will merely refer to what we have said about
France. The war indemnity to be exacted from Russia should to a large
extent consist in the surrender of territory” (see _Le Temps_, 12th
August, 1915).
In his speech of 11th December, 1915, William II.’s Chancellor, in a
sentence full of significance, gave his hearers to understand that such
were indeed the pretensions of Germany:
“Our troops,” said he, “in conjunction with the Austro-Hungarian, are
taking up strongly fortified positions of defence far within the Russian
territory. They are ready to resume their forward march.”
Just as in the West, all the measures taken by the Germans in the East
have been not only for defence, but for organization in view of keeping
the occupied territories. These measures come under the various heads I
indicated. (_See_ p. 50.)
With the Poles, the Germans used the same tactics as with the Flemish
people of Belgium. After having terrorized the Poles, the Prussian
authorities granted them, in the use of their own language for scholastic
purposes, certain privileges which compare advantageously with the former
state of things resulting from that detestable bureaucratic régime of
Russia, which, with a complete lack of foresight, had by its vexatious
measures seriously imperilled in Poland the true interests of the empire
of the Tsars. Again, in the East the Germans promoted husbandry. They
constructed railroads and coach roads. No doubt all these steps were
taken mainly in the interest of Germany. It is quite clear that the
advantages conceded to the Poles can only be considered as temporary.
This is proved sufficiently by the Prussian system so long pursued in
Posen. However, the Germans flatter themselves that by these measures
they favourably impress some portion of the Poles, who are simple
enough to imagine that Germany will reconstitute a Polish State of 20
millions of inhabitants in order to give this State to the Poles at the
expense of Russia. It was with such an end in view that Berlin thought
of proclaiming the autonomy of Poland. At the same time Germany reckons
on establishing in Poland a system of conscription so as to utilize, by
force if necessary, the Polish recruits, just as she has done with the
Slavs of Austria-Hungary, in the interest of Pangermany.
* * * * *
From the territorial standpoint the Pangerman pretensions of the 1911
plan in the East are summarized in the following table:
Square
Kilometres. Inhabitants.
The ten Governments of Russian
Poland 127,320 12,467,000
Three Baltic Provinces (Esthonia,
Livonia, Courland) 94,564 2,686,000
The three Russian Governments
at the South of the Baltic
Provinces (Kovno, Vilna, Grodno) 121,840 5,728,000
------- ----------
Total 343,724 20,881,000
Now at the beginning of 1916, out of these 343,724 square kilometres, as
the map will show, the Germans occupied about 260,000. They therefore
had carried out in the East the plan of 1911 at the cost of non-German
populations to the extent of 75% or three-fourths.
III.
The zones of absolute influence, whether direct or indirect, which
Germany, in accordance with the 1911 plan, has tried to secure for
herself in the South and South-East of her present frontiers, comprise
three totally distinct groups of territory: Austria-Hungary, the Balkans,
and Turkey. It is therefore advisable to examine separately how at the
beginning of 1916 Germany stood in respect of each of these three groups.
[Illustration: THE GERMAN CLAIMS IN THE SOUTH AND SOUTH-EAST.]
1º. Austria-Hungary.
Let us make no mistake, Austria-Hungary is actually as much under
William II.’s domination as is Belgium. The European conflict has
enabled Germany artfully to occupy the Empire of the Hapsburgs under
the pretence of defending it, in fact to seize it as provided for by
the plan of 1911. Since the beginning of 1915 all the troops of Francis
Joseph have been entirely under the orders of the Berlin General Staff.
Even if Austria-Hungary wished to make a separate peace, she could not
do so, for all her motive power, diplomatic and military, is exclusively
controlled by the Kaiser’s agents. The Austro-German alliance is merely
a piece of stage scenery. The much-talked of device of smuggling the
Hapsburg Empire into Germany by a back door, that is, by her entrance
into the _Zollverein_ or Customs Union, is a broad farce. It can merely
deceive those, alas still too numerous, who are insufficiently informed
of the true facts in Austria-Hungary. The Austro-German fusion in the
shape of a Customs Union is besides no novelty. The process of absorbing
Austria-Hungary was foreseen and described in detail in the Pangerman
pamphlet of 1895, showing the fundamental lines of the plan of that date.
All the fuss made at the beginning of 1916 by the German Press about the
so-called wishes of the Austro-Hungarians to enter into the _Zollverein_
has been the most “Kolossal” and the most dishonest of bluffs. In truth,
nearly three-fourths of the populations at present subject to Francis
Joseph do not want to be absorbed into Germany at any price, neither
in a political, nor in an economic fashion. All the stir made in the
Central Empires about the entrance of the Hapsburg Monarchy into the
_Zollverein_, has been the doing of Pangerman bear leaders at Berlin
or Vienna and of the Magyar aristocracy, and not at all of the Magyar
people, which is not the same thing. Let us therefore not be duped by the
bluff of the German press on the _Zollverein_ question. The microscopic
minority who wish it in Austria-Hungary plays the Berlin game. What is
undeniable is that at present Austria-Hungary is entirely under the
Prussian thumb.
2º. The Balkans.
The whole of Serbia has been overrun by the Germans. The predicament
of the Serbian population is extremely cruel. Either they have been
massacred, or systematically famished or deported to Germany to work
in the factories or on the German land. These appalling measures of
coercion have not prevented the Kaiser from addressing a manifesto: “To
_my_ noble and heroic Serbian People.” The aim was, by fine words, to
disarm morally the remainder of the Serbian population, terrorized by a
series of sufferings unsurpassed in history. As to Serbia, the Kaiser
offered part of it to Austria, always in accordance with the plan of 1895
which provided for this solution; for to give a fraction of Serbia to
Austria as a member of the _Zollverein_, is practically to put it under
the direct domination of Germany.
As to Bulgaria, the ally of Germany, she is entirely absorbed, and the
Germans there behave as rulers so far as they possibly can. Heroic
Montenegro has suffered exactly the same fate as Serbia, one part of
Albania is also occupied. If the Allies had been fatuous enough not to
understand, at the eleventh hour, the importance of Salonika, Greece
and Roumania, where Germanophile elements are not numerous but very
influential, would already have obeyed to the letter the orders of Berlin.
Supposing, for argument’s sake, that there were a German victory, we
would immediately see Germany constituting a Balkan Confederation under
the headship of Austria, considered as a Balkan power, simply because,
under the name of Austria, it would really be Germany who would impose
her will on the future confederation.
3º. Turkey.
At the beginning of 1916, before the Russian advance in Armenia, the
Ottoman Empire throughout its entire length was subjected to the
influence of Germany; that influence had even spread to Persia. We
have here an event which would have had an extreme importance for the
development of the Panislamic movement directed simultaneously against
Russia, France and England, if the Anglo-Russian attitude had not
recently put a stopper on German intrigues in the Shah’s Empire.
“The establishment of direct relations with Turkey is of inestimable
military value,” said the German Chancellor in his speech of December
11th, 1915, “while on the economic side the possibility of importing
goods from the Balkan States and from Turkey will increase our supplies
in a most satisfactory way” (see _Le Temps_, 11th December, 1915). It
would be a mistake to see in these words the result of a mere bluff, of
which the Germans are so often lavish. If the Allies left Germany time to
draw from Turkey all the military and economic resources expected from
her at Berlin, future events would evidently prove that the Imperial
Chancellor’s words deserve to be taken seriously.
* * * * *
To sum up, the Pangerman plan of 1911 provided in the South and
South-East for:
+------------------------------------+-------------+--------------+
| | Square | |
| | Kilometres. | Inhabitants. |
+------------------------------------+-------------+--------------+
| The absorption of Austria-Hungary | 676,616 | 50,000,000 |
| | | |
| The establishment of immediate | | |
| and absolute German influence on | | |
| the Balkan States | 490,275 | 22,000,000 |
| | | |
| The establishment of exclusive | | |
| German influence on Turkey | 1,792,900 | 20,000,000 |
+------------------------------------+-------------+--------------+
| Total | 2,959,791 | 92,000,000 |
+------------------------------------+-------------+--------------+
Now, at the beginning of 1916, the plan of 1911 was carried out in the
following proportions:
Austria-Hungary had her 676,616 square kilometres occupied (minus the
small area in the hands of the Italians), being more or less 100%.
In the Balkans, at the same date, under direct German influence, we have:
Square Kilometres.
Bulgaria 114,105
Serbia 87,300
Montenegro 14,180
-------
Total 215,585
equalling 43% of the total of the Balkan States’ territory.
In Turkey the German influence was exerted over almost the entire
territory, therefore in the proportion of 100%.
If we now add the figures belonging to the three territorial groups aimed
at by the 1911 plan in the South and South-East we shall see that Germany
has carried out her programme on
Square Kilometres.
Austria-Hungary 676,616
Balkans 215,585
Turkey 1,792,900
---------
Total 2,685,101
As the total plan aimed at the German direct or indirect seizure of
2,968,791 square kilometres, we see that, considered in that light, the
goal of the 1911 plan has been reached in the South and South-East in the
proportion of 89%, being roughly nine-tenths.
Now I have shown (_pp. 52 and 56_) that Germany occupied or controlled
early in 1916:
In the West over 90,478 square kilometres.
In the East over 260,000 square kilometres.
We have just seen that in the South and South-East the German plan has
been achieved over 2,685,101 square kilometres.
Of course all the territories included in that last figure are far from
having the same value, especially those of part of Turkey, but in that
figure Austria-Hungary alone claims 676,616 square kilometres, that is,
she alone represents a seizure, disguised it may be, yet not less real,
which is infinitely more considerable than the German occupations in the
West and East.
From these calculations it clearly follows that the part of the Pangerman
plan which concerns Austria-Hungary, the Balkans and Turkey, that is,
Central Europe and the East, forms by far the main part of the Pangerman
scheme. That is an observation of extreme importance for the Allies and
for Neutrals, because of the world-wide consequences which flow from the
scheme summed up in the formula, “From Hamburg to the Persian Gulf.”
These consequences will be stated in Chapter V.
IV.
The Pangerman plan of 1911 (_see map, p. 12_) included:
1º. The formation of a great German Confederation which was to put under
the absolute supremacy of the present German Empire (540,858 square
kilometres and 68 million inhabitants) foreign territories situated
around Germany, which form a superficies of 1,182,113 square kilometres
and hold 94 million inhabitants.
The figures given (_pp. 52, 56 and 61_) suffice to prove that the German
seizure of these territories extended at the beginning of 1916:
Square Kilometres.
To the West 90,478
To the East 260,000
To the South (Austria-Hungary) 676,616
---------
Total 1,027,094
Germany has therefore, so far as concerns the territories to be absorbed
into the Germanic Confederation, achieved her programme in the proportion
of 86%, or about nine-tenths.
2º. The absolute subordination to Germany of all the Balkan States, whose
superficies is 499,275 square kilometres, holding 22 million inhabitants.
We have seen above (_p. 61_), that the German seizure actually extends
over 215,585 square kilometres. The German programme, therefore, as
regards the Balkans, has been achieved in the proportion of 43%.
3º. The more or less veiled seizure by Germany of the Ottoman Empire,
being 1,792,900 square kilometres, holding 20 million inhabitants. Now,
early in 1916 the exclusive German influence was felt over the whole of
Turkey. As regards her the German plan had therefore been achieved in the
proportion of 100%.
Let us now group the figures which will enable us to show in what
proportion the whole Pangerman plan of 1911 has been actually achieved by
Germany:
+-------------------------------------+-------------+-------------+
| | Provisions | Actual |
| | of the 1911 |achievements.|
| |plan. Square | Square |
| | Kilometres. | Kilometres.|
+-------------------------------------+-------------+-------------+
|1. Territories to be absorbed in the | | |
| great Germanic Confederation | 1,182,113 | 1,027,094 |
|2. Balkans | 499,275 | 215,585 |
|3. Turkey | 1,792,900 | 1,792,900 |
| +-------------+-------------+
| Total | 3,474,288 | 3,035,579 |
+-------------------------------------+-------------+-------------+
These figures prove to demonstration that early in 1916 Germany had
achieved the Pangerman plan of 1911 in the enormous proportion of 87%, or
about nine-tenths.
This figure is graphically confirmed by the annexed map; we can see at
a glance the geographical as well as superficial relations which exist
between the boundaries of the plan of 1911 and the fronts occupied early
in 1916 by armies exclusively subordinate to Berlin.
[Illustration: THE PLAN OF 1911 AND THE EXTENT OF ITS EXECUTION AT THE
BEGINNING OF 1916.]
These geographical and mathematical considerations, the importance of
which cannot escape us, explain why and under what conditions Germany
wished to make peace. She wished it simply because, as the _Frankfurter
Zeitung_ owned, without mincing matters, in December, 1915, the goal of
the war had been reached.
Nine-tenths of the whole of the Pangerman plan of 1911 having been
practically achieved, in spite of England’s intervention, which,
however, had upset the German Staff’s plan, it is absolutely clear that
the results obtained by Germany have been considerable in the extreme.
Nothing could therefore be more to her advantage now than to succeed
in putting an end to the war at a time when German influence extends
unchecked over almost the whole of the invaded territories.
These statements again explain why Berlin has for such a long time
been occupied with the most subtle and most complex manœuvres for the
opening of peace negotiations—attempts at a separate agreement with
Russia, efforts to obtain the Pope’s intervention, advances made by
the pseudo-socialists of the Kaiser towards their former comrades
of belligerent countries, incitements to pacificists of all neutral
countries, etc. Germany would have concluded peace at the moment which
was most favourable to her, so as to be able to impose on the territories
which she has either conquered or controls the special status provided
for each of them by the Pangerman plan. But of course Germany would only
have made such treaties as were compatible with her retention of all the
regions she occupied at the time. As Major Moraht said very clearly in
the _Berliner Tageblatt_: “Our military chiefs are not in the habit of
giving back what we have acquired at the price of blood and of sacrifice”
(_Le Matin_, 27th December, 1915).
Lastly, the chief reason why Berlin wanted peace is that the prolongation
of the war can only compromise and finally ruin all the results obtained
by Germany.