Wellesley’s Defence of Portugal
(1809-10)
“_If I fail, God will, I hope, have mercy upon me, for nobody else
will._”
WELLESLEY.
Soult, joined by Mortier and Ney, had some 50,000 men with which to
face the victor of Talavera. Had Cuesta guarded the mountain passes as
he was supposed to do, Wellesley would not have found himself in so
awkward a predicament. Both his front and rear were threatened, the
former by Victor and Sebastiani and the latter by Soult. While his
ranks were sadly depleted, those of the French were augmented. By great
good fortune General Craufurd and his celebrated Light Division arrived
on the morning of the 29th July, the day following the conclusion of
the battle.
Rumour proved on this occasion a powerful ally of the
Commander-in-Chief, for had not Craufurd heard of the supposed death
of Sir Arthur, it is scarcely likely that he would have urged his men,
each loaded with forty pounds weight on his back, to march forty-three
English miles in twenty-two hours. Wellesley made up his mind to
advance against Soult, but was forced to abandon the idea when he
heard that the enemy had entered Plasencia in great force, thereby
severing the British communications with Lisbon. A retreat “to take up
the defensive line of the Tagus” became eminently necessary. “We were
in a bad scrape,” he writes on the 8th August, “from which I think I
have extricated both armies; and I really believe that, if I had not
determined to retire at the moment I did, all retreat would have been
cut off for both.” “Both,” of course, includes the Spaniards, whose
“train of mismanagement,” added to Soult’s advance, were contributing
causes of his withdrawal.
The Spaniards promised to remain at Talavera to watch the movements of
the enemy and to assist the wounded. No sooner was Wellesley out of the
way than Cuesta felt that the position was untenable, with the result
that many British soldiers, rendered unable to keep up with the Spanish
troops by reason of their wounds, were made prisoners by Victor, who
soon afterwards took possession of the town.
The Tagus was crossed at Arzobispo, and a rearguard of 8000 Spaniards,
under Cuesta, left to defend the passage. At Almarez the bridge of
boats was broken to arrest Soult’s advance from Naval Moral, no great
distance away, and on the high road. As it happened, the French
Marshal was able to cross the river at Arzobispo by means of a ford.
He promptly defeated the Spanish force there and captured their guns.
Not a few of the defenders fled, throwing away their arms and clothing,
a very usual device. This was followed by the defeat of Venegas by
Joseph and Sebastiani at Almonacid, near Toledo, where several thousand
men were either killed, wounded, or captured, and of a Portuguese and
Spanish column which had been detached from the main army, under Sir
Robert Wilson, by Ney at the Puerto de Baños.
In the middle of August 1809 the various armies were occupying the
following positions: British, Jaraicejo; Eguia, Deleytosa; Vanegas, La
Carolina; Ney, Salamanca; Kellermann, Valladolid; Soult, Plasencia;
Mortier, Oropesa and Arzobispo; Victor, Talavera and Toledo;
Sebastiani, La Mancha.
The storm was followed by a lull, for the contesting armies were all
but worn out and required rest. Wellesley made his headquarters
first at Deleytosa, and, when that place was vacated on the 11th, at
Jaraicejo; the Spanish made the former town their headquarters, and the
Portuguese army, under Beresford, withdrew within their home frontier.
“While the army remained in this position,” namely, Deleytosa, General
Sir George T. Napier records: “We suffered dreadfully from want of
food; nothing but a small portion of unground wheat and (when we could
_catch them_) about a quarter of a pound of old goats’ flesh each man;
no salt, bread, or wine; and as the Spaniards had plundered the baggage
of the British army during the battle of Talavera, there was nothing
of any kind to be procured to help us out, such as tea or sugar.”[54]
These defects the General determined to remedy, for “no troops can
serve to any good purpose unless they are regularly fed,” a maxim
equivalent to that of Napoleon that “an army moves on its stomach.”
Cuesta resigned his command, which was given to Eguia, but from
henceforth the British Commander placed his sole reliance on his own
forces. The lack of co-operation in the combined army was also evident
in that of the French, for the various marshals had separated, and, to
Napoleon’s disgust, lost a golden opportunity of crushing the hated
English, which was never again vouchsafed to them. “Force Wellesley
to fight on every possible occasion,” was his frequent cry. “Win if
you can, but lose a battle rather than deliver none. We can afford to
expend three men for every one he loses, and you will thus wear him
out in the end.” Wellesley preferred to conserve his energy, not to
squander it.
After repeated requests for provisions and means of transport, all
more or less evasively answered by the Spanish authorities, Wellesley
carried out his threat and fell back upon the frontiers of Portugal.
Not without a certain suggestion of irony, he was at this time
appointed a Captain-General in the Spanish service, and received six
Andalusian horses “in the name of King Ferdinand the VIIth.” Shortly
afterwards he was notified that he had been elevated to the Peerage,
with the titles of Baron Douro of Wellesley, and Viscount Wellington of
Talavera. From henceforth we shall style him Wellington, a signature he
first adopted on the 16th September 1809.
“Nothing,” he writes from Merida, on the 25th August, to Castlereagh,
“can be worse than the officers of the Spanish army; and it is
extraordinary that when a nation has devoted itself to war, as this
nation has, by the measures it has adopted in the last two years,
so little progress has been made in any one branch of the military
profession by any individual, and that the business of an army should
be so little understood. They are really children in the art of war,
and I cannot say that they do any thing as it ought to be done, with
the exception of running away and assembling again in a state of
nature.” In his opinion the Portuguese, under English officers, were
better than the Spaniards, but both “want the habits and spirit of
soldiers--the habits of command on one side, and of obedience on the
other--mutual confidence between officers and men; and, above all, a
determination in the superiors to obey the spirit of the orders they
receive, let what will be the consequence, and the spirit to tell the
true cause if they do not. In short, the fact is, there is so much
trick in the Portuguese army....”
At the beginning of September he was at Badajoz, on the frontier,
the advantage being, as Wellington says, “that the British army was
centrically posted, in reference to all the objects which the enemy
might have in view; and at any time, by a junction with a Spanish corps
on its right, or a Portuguese or Spanish corps on its left, it could
prevent the enemy from undertaking any thing, excepting with a much
larger force than they could allot to any one object.” Here he heard
that there was a likelihood of Soult attacking Ciudad Rodrigo. This
information he obtained from an intercepted letter to Joseph. “The
success of this scheme,” he avers, “would do them more good, and the
allies more mischief, than any other they could attempt; and it is most
likely of all others to be successful.” For this reason he ordered
Wilson to stay north of the Tagus so as to watch Soult’s movements.
In the middle of the month the Spanish army of Estremadura, stationed
at Deleytosa, was reduced to 6000 soldiers, the remainder, with Eguia,
marching towards La Mancha. About the same time an army of some 13,000
men, under La Romana, whom Wellington describes as “more intelligent
and reasonable” than most of his countrymen, moved from Galicia to
the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo. La Romana himself proceeded to
Seville and was succeeded by the Duque del Parque, who marched towards
Salamanca.
Wellington watched del Parque’s forward movements with dismay, and
ordered magazines to be prepared upon the Douro and Mondego “to assist
in providing for these vagabonds if they should retire into Portugal,
which I hope they will do, as their only chance of salvation.”
On the 10th October Wellington was at Lisbon to arrange future
operations, and where he studied “on the ground” the possibility of
defending Portugal. This reconnaissance resulted in the defence known
as the “Lines of Torres Vedras,” of which particulars will be given as
the story proceeds.[55]
By the end of the month he was back at Badajoz, writing endless
dispatches relative to the thousand and one concerns--military,
political and financial--of the two armies. By the beginning of
November del Parque was obliged to retire owing to the arrival from
Estremadura of some 36,000 men under Mortier in Old Castile. Eguia’s
entry into La Mancha from Estremadura two months before had been
followed by the arrival of 30,000 of the enemy’s troops under Victor
in that province, whereupon the Spanish commander had withdrawn to the
Sierra Morena, and the French to the Tagus.
The Spanish Government now entertained the hope of gaining the complete
possession of Madrid. Two forces were to be honoured with the carrying
out of this ambitious project. The army of La Mancha, now under the
inexperienced General Areizaga, joined by the greater part of the army
of Estremadura, and consisting of 50,000 men, was to march from the
Sierra Morena. Del Parque, with the army of Galicia, 20,000 strong, was
to take Salamanca and then present himself before the capital. Areizaga
met with some temporary success, but on the 19th November some 4000
of his men were either lying dead or wounded on the bloody field of
Ocaña, within easy distance of Madrid. No fewer than 18,000 were taken
prisoners by King Joseph’s troops. When the distressed General gathered
together the fragments of his shattered army in the Sierra Morena, only
a half of the original number were present, which means that 3000 had
deserted. He must have been sadly deficient in cannon, for the French
had captured over fifty pieces.
Del Parque was scarcely more successful. He was attacked at Tamames
on the 19th October by troops under Marchand, whom he defeated. Thus
encouraged, he advanced to Salamanca, which the French had occupied,
and taken possession of. In the last week of November he was beaten
at Alba de Tormes, to which he had retreated, with a loss of 3000
men. Some of his troops retired on Galicia, the remainder on Ciudad
Rodrigo.[56]
With the object of giving the Spanish Government time to repair their
losses in southern Spain, and surmising that whatever reinforcements
the French might receive would be for use against the British now that
the armies under Blake, Areizaga, and del Parque were scattered,
Wellington prepared to move the greater part of his army north of the
Tagus, towards the frontiers of Castile, but leaving a body of troops
under Lieutenant-General Hill at Abrantes, so that the Lower Tagus
might not be left unguarded. Early in January 1810, Wellington made
his headquarters at Coimbra, on the Mondego, and within comparatively
easy distance of the sea, conceivably a useful ally now that Napoleon
was sending additional reinforcements, and Soult had 70,000 men at his
disposal.
The passes of Despeña Perros, and Puerto del Rey through the Sierra
Morena, but weakly defended by Spanish troops under Areizaga, were
forced by the French without difficulty. On the last day of January
1810, Seville capitulated. That Wellington anticipated this is proved
by a letter he wrote on that date to Lord Liverpool. Cadiz was saved
from a similar fate by the Duke of Albuquerque, who reached the city
in the nick of time, although Victor’s outposts had been seen on the
banks of the Guadalquivir. Major-General the Hon. W. Stewart was sent
to assist in the defence of the place, and arrived towards the end of
February with some 5000 British and Portuguese troops, while a British
fleet lay in the Bay.
Meanwhile Wellington was able to report considerable progress in
some of the regiments in the Portuguese army, thanks very largely to
the exertions of Marshal Beresford. Fifteen regiments he had seen
while marching from Badajoz to Coimbra showed decided improvement in
discipline, and he had “no doubt that the whole will prove an useful
acquisition to the country.” They were “in general unhealthy.” The
conduct of his own troops was “infamous” when not under the inspection
of officers. “They have never brought up a convoy of money that they
have not robbed the chest; nor of shoes, or any other article that
could be of use to them, or could produce money, that they do not steal
something.”
The failure of the Walcheren Expedition[57] not only led to a
duel between Canning and Castlereagh and the fall of Portland’s
administration, but caused the British public to lose faith in things
military. It seemed not at all improbable that the new Ministry formed
by Perceval, in which Lord Wellesley became Foreign Secretary, and
Lord Liverpool Secretary for War and the Colonies, would withdraw the
British army from the Peninsula, especially as Talavera had aroused
little or no enthusiasm, and a retreat was regarded by the man in
the street as scarcely better than a defeat. In this connexion it
is interesting to note that when Wellington was asked what was the
best test of a great general, he gave as his answer, “To know when to
retreat; and to dare to do it.” Aware of the state of public opinion,
he did not press for further reinforcements.
In a letter to the Rt. Hon. John Villiers, dated Viseu, 14th January
1810, the Commander-in-Chief definitely states “that in its present
state” the army was “not sufficient for the defence of Portugal.” He
anticipated having 30,000 effective British troops when the soldiers
then on their way from England and those in hospital were available:
“I will fight a good battle for the possession of Portugal, and see
whether that country cannot be saved from the general wreck.”
“I conceive,” he concludes, “that the honor and interests of the
country require that we should hold our ground here as long as
possible; and, please God, I will maintain it as long as I can; and I
will neither endeavor to shift from my own shoulders on those of the
Ministers the responsibility for the failure, by calling for means
which I know they cannot give, and which, perhaps, would not add
materially to the facility of attaining our object; nor will I give to
the Ministers, who are not strong, and who must feel the delicacy of
their own situation, an excuse for withdrawing the army from a position
which, in my opinion, the honor and interest of the country require
they should maintain as long as possible.
“I think that if the Portuguese do their duty, I shall have enough to
maintain it; if they do not, nothing that Great Britain can afford can
save the country; and if from that cause I fail in saving it, and am
obliged to go, I shall be able to carry away the British army.”
The war in Spain still continued see-saw fashion. A province would be
apparently conquered by Napoleon’s troops when no sooner did the troops
march on than the trouble began again. This happened more especially
with Suchet in Aragon. In Catalonia the intrepid O’Donnell and his men
flitted about like a will-o’-the-wisp and worked sad havoc whenever
they came across a detached force, though Hostalrich fell and Lerida
surrendered in May, as well as the castle of Mequinenza a little later.
Napoleon had not been sleeping. In the previous year he had been too
occupied in humbling Austria and annexing Rome and the Ecclesiastical
States to give much attention to the Peninsula. He now placed Marshal
Masséna, Prince of Essling, who by reason of his success was known
as “the spoilt child of victory”--incidentally he was the son of an
inn-keeper--in command of 180,000 troops, for which purpose he arrived
at Valladolid in the middle of May 1810. Within a month the French
forces in Spain were raised to no fewer than 366,000 men of all ranks
and arms.
Surely “the heir of Charlemagne,” as Napoleon termed himself, was on
the point of crushing the resistance of the Iberian Peninsula, and
with it insignificant Portugal and Wellington? Was it feasible that
60,000 British, Germans, and Portuguese, sometimes aided but more often
hindered by an “insurgent” rabble, and indirectly by the two remaining
Spanish armies in Galicia and Estremadura, could contest with any
likelihood of success more than a third of a million of trained troops?
The law of probability answered in the negative.