Talavera
(1809)
“_The battle of Talavera was the hardest fought of modern times._”
WELLINGTON.
The potentialities of the new project were distinctly promising. After
uniting with Cuesta, Wellesley was to follow the course of the Tagus
and cut off Victor’s army of 33,000 troops while the attention of
Sebastiani and Joseph Bonaparte, who had but 17,000 men all told, was
occupied by Venegas.
When last heard of Soult and Ney were in Galicia busily engaged in
suppressing an insurrection, so no opposition was anticipated from
them. In this matter after events proved the facts to be far different
from the surmise. There seemed every likelihood of a successful issue
provided there was no snapping of individual links of the chain of
operations. Wellesley did not find Cuesta a particularly affable
colleague, but he was not the man to assert his own opinion unless he
thought it imperative. He characterized him as having “no military
genius,” which is certainly more favourable than “that deformed-looking
lump of pride, ignorance, and treachery,” which is the description
given to us by Costello. “He was,” the latter adds, “the most
murderous-looking old man I ever saw.” They came together at Oropesa
on the 20th July, their forces totalling 55,000, of which 35,000 were
Spanish. It was the task of Venegas and his 26,000 men to approach
Madrid from the south, and, by a demonstration in force, distract
the attention of Sebastiani. He proved far too slow, and ere he was
able to interfere, Victor, Sebastiani, and Joseph concentrated in the
neighbourhood of Toledo. On the 26th July the last batch of their
50,000 troops came together.
Had Wellesley been allowed to attack on the 23rd July, as he wished,
it is probable that he would have crushed Victor, whose reinforcements
did not begin to arrive until the following day. Cuesta had already
shown his incompetency, and some of his advanced guard had been roughly
handled by a French cavalry division. It was Wellesley’s opinion
that the psychological moment had arrived, but the Spanish commander
objected. “Had we fought then,” Wellesley afterwards averred, “it
would have been as great a battle as Waterloo, and would have cleared
Spain of the French for that time.” The formidable task before him was
not made lighter by the knowledge that the commissariat and transport
arrangements had utterly broken down.
At Talavera, evacuated by Victor, who moved a few miles to the east,
Wellesley was obliged to halt, and even threatened to withdraw from
Spain because of the ill-treatment accorded his famishing troops. “I
have never seen an army,” he says, “so ill-treated in any country, or,
considering that all depends upon its operations, one which deserved
good treatment so much. It is ridiculous to pretend that the country
cannot supply our wants. The French army is well fed, and the soldiers
who are taken in good health, and well supplied with bread, of which
indeed they left a small magazine behind them. This is a rich country
in corn, in comparison with Portugal, and yet, during the whole of my
operations in that country, we never wanted bread but on one day on
the frontiers of Galicia. In the Vera de Plasencia there are means to
supply this army for 4 months, as I am informed, and yet the alcaldes
have not performed their engagements with me. The Spanish army has
plenty of every thing, and we alone, upon whom every thing depends, are
actually starving.”
After considerable trouble Cuesta consented to Wellesley assuming
supreme command of the combined forces. On the afternoon of the
27th the British General mounted his horse and, accompanied by his
staff, rode out of the town to an old château, known as the Casa de
Salinas. His object was to obtain a bird’s-eye view from the roof of
the movements of the enemy on the Alberche. He apprehended no danger,
because Spanish troops occupied the adjacent woods. In this he was
deceived, for a number of French _tirailleurs_ suddenly appearing, the
troops beat a hasty retreat. The Commander-in-Chief jumped from the
wall and regained his horse not a moment too soon. Had it not been for
the near presence of a body of English infantry, who immediately opened
fire, it is extremely probable that Wellington and his staff would have
been captured.
At five o’clock the opposing forces were within touch, the French
having crossed the river and driven in the British piquets, who lost
about 400 men.
One of the finest descriptions of the ensuing battle--or more
correctly, series of battles--is that of Captain M. de Rocca, a French
officer of Hussars, which has the advantage of giving the point of view
of the enemy, and how Wellesley was regarded by one at least of his
combatants.
“The Spaniards,” he says, “were posted in a situation deemed
impregnable, behind old walls and garden-fences, which border and
encompass the city of Talavera.[51] Their right was defended by the
Tagus, and their left joined the English, near a redoubt constructed
on an eminence. The ground in front of the Anglo-Spanish armies was
very unequal, and intersected here and there by ravines, formed by the
rains of winter. The whole extent of their position was covered by the
channel of a pretty deep torrent, at that time dry. The English left
was strengthened by a conical eminence that commanded the greater part
of the field of battle, and which was separated by a deep extensive
valley from the Castilian chain of mountains.
“This eminence was thus in a manner the key to the enemy’s position,
and against this decisive point of attack, an experienced general,
possessed of that intuitive glance which insures success, would
immediately have led the principal part of his disposable force, to
obtain possession of it. He would either have taken it by assault,
or have turned it by the valley. But King Joseph, when he should
have acted, was seized with an unfortunate spirit of indecision and
uncertainty. He attempted only half measures, he distributed his forces
partially, and lost the opportunity of conquering while feeling the way
for it. Marshal Jourdan, the second in command, had not that spur of
patriotism in the Spanish war, which inspired him when he fought in the
plains of Fleurus, to achieve the independence of France.
“The French commenced the engagement by a cannonade and rifle-fire in
advance of their right; and they despatched a single battalion only,
and some sharp-shooters, by the valley, to take the eminence which
defended the English left, never thinking they would do otherwise
than yield. This battalion, however, having to contend with superior
numbers, was repulsed with loss, and compelled to retire. A division of
dragoons, which had gone to reconnoitre Talavera, found the approaches
to that city strongly fortified with artillery, and could not advance.
“At nightfall, the French made another attempt to gain the hill. A
regiment of infantry, followed at a short distance by two others,
attacked the extreme left of the English with unexampled ardour,
arrived at the summit of the hill, and took possession of it. But
having been fiercely assaulted, in its turn, by an entire division
of the English, just, when having conquered, it was breathless with
exertion, it was immediately obliged to give way. One of the two
regiments, commanded to assist in this attack, had lost its way in a
wood on account of the darkness; the other not getting soon enough over
the ravine, which covered the enemy’s position, had not arrived in time.
“Both these attacks had miscarried, though conducted with intrepid
bravery, because they had been made by an inadequate number of
troops. A single battalion had been sent, and then one division, when
a great proportion of the whole army should have been despatched.
These unsuccessful attempts revealed to the English what we designed
next day; and still more evidently demonstrated the importance of
the station they held. They passed the greater part of the night in
fortifying it with artillery.
“The sun rose next morning on the two armies drawn up in battle order,
and again the cannonade commenced. The defence of Portugal being
entrusted to the English army, the fate of that country, and, perhaps,
of all the Peninsula, was now to be decided by this contest. The
veterans of the first and fourth French corps, accustomed for years to
conquer throughout Europe, and always to witness their ardour seconded
by the combined skill of their chiefs, burned with impatience for
orders to engage, and thought to overthrow all before them by one well
conjoined assault.
“One division alone, of three regiments of infantry, was sent by the
valley to storm the position, of which we had, for a moment, obtained
possession the preceding evening. After considerable loss, this
division reached the top of the eminence, and was just about taking
it. One of the regiments had already advanced as far as the artillery,
when their charge was repulsed, and the whole division was forced to
retire. The English, apprehending by this renewed attack that the
French designed to turn their left by the valley, stationed their
cavalry there; and caused a division of the Spaniards to occupy the
skirts of the high Castilian mountains beyond it. The French receded
to the ground they first occupied. The cannonade continued for another
hour, and then became gradually silent. The overpowering heat of
mid-day obliged both armies to suspend the combat, and observe a kind
of involuntary truce, during which the wounded were removed.
“King Joseph, having at last gone himself to reconnoitre the enemy’s
position, gave orders, at four o’clock, for a general attack against
the army of England. A division of dragoons was left to observe the
Spaniards in the direction of Talavera. General Sebastiani’s corps
marched against the right of the English, while Marshal Victor’s three
divisions of infantry, followed by masses of cavalry, charged against
their left, to attack the eminence by the valley. King Joseph and
Marshal Jourdan took part with the reserve, in the rear of the 4th
division. The artillery and musketry were not long in being heard.
“The English Commander, stationed on the hill which overlooked the
field of battle, was present always where danger demanded his presence.
He could survey, at a glance, every corps of his army, and perceive
below him the least movement of the French. He saw the line of battle
formed, the columns disposed for the conflict; he penetrated their
designs by their arrangements, and thus had time to order his plans,
so as to penetrate and prevent those of his foes. The position of the
English army was naturally strong and difficult of approach, both in
front and flank; but in the rear it was quite accessible, and gave
ample freedom to their troops to hasten to the quarter threatened.
“The French had a ravine to pass before they could reach the enemy.
They had to advance over ground much intersected, very rugged and
unequal, obliging them frequently to break their line; and the
positions they attacked had been previously fortified. The left
could not see the right, or know what was passing there, for the
rising ground between them. Every corps of the army fought apart,
with unparalleled bravery, and ability too, but there was no
co-operation in their efforts. The French were not then commanded by a
General-in-chief, the resources of whose genius might have compensated
for the advantages which the nature of the ground denied them and
yielded to their enemies.
“The division of Lapisse first passed the ravine, attacked the
fortified eminence, ascended it in defiance of a fire of grape-shot
which mowed down its ranks, but was repulsed with the loss of its
General and a great number of officers and soldiers. In retreating,
it left the right of the fourth corps uncovered, which the British
artillery took in flank, and forced for a moment to retire. The left
of General Sebastiani’s corps advanced under a most intense fire of
artillery to the fort of a redoubt on the right of the English, and
between the combined armies. It was too far advanced, and too soon
forward--it was encountered and driven back by the united corps of the
English right and the Spanish left. Assistance came, and the combat
was renewed. In the centre, Marshal Victor rallied the division of
Lapisse at the foot of the hill, and abandoned all further attempt to
gain possession of it. The French then tried to turn it either by the
right or left. Villatte’s division advanced in the valley, and Ruffin’s
moved to the right of this by the foot of the Castilian mountains.
The cavalry, forming a second line, were in readiness to debouch into
the plain in the rear of the enemy whenever the infantry could open a
passage.
“Just as the French began to move, the English, with two regiments
of cavalry, made a charge against their masses. They engaged in the
valley, passed onwards regardless of the fire of several battalions
of infantry, between the divisions of Villatte and Ruffin, and fell
with impetuosity never surpassed on the 10th and 26th regiments of
our chasseurs. The 10th could not resist the charge. They opened their
ranks, but rallied immediately, and nearly the whole of the 23rd
regiment of light dragoons at the head of the English cavalry was
either destroyed or taken captive.
“A division of the English Royal Guards, stationed on the left and
centre of their army, being charged by the French, at first repulsed
them vigorously; but one of its brigades, being too far advanced, was
in its turn taken in flank by the fire of the French artillery and
infantry, sustained considerable loss, and retreated with difficulty
behind their second line. The French took advantage of this success;
they again moved forward, and but one other effort was necessary to
break through into the plain, and combat on equal ground. But King
Joseph thought it was too late to advance with the reserve, and the
attack was delayed till the following day.[52] Night again closed over
us, and the conflict ceased from exhaustion, without either side having
won such a decided advantage as to entitle it to claim the victory.
“The corps of Marshals Victor and Sebastiani withdrew successively
during the night towards the reserve, leaving an advanced guard of
cavalry on the scene of the engagement, to take care of the wounded.
The English, who expected a new attack in the morning, were greatly
surprised when day dawned to see that their enemies, leaving twenty
pieces of cannon, had retreated to their old position on the Alberche.
The English and Spaniards, according to their own accounts, lost 6,616
men.[53] The French had nearly 10,000 slain.”
Wellesley characterizes the battle as “a most desperate one ... we had
about two to one against us; fearful odds! but we maintained all our
positions, and gave the enemy a terrible beating.” Very few of the
Spanish troops were engaged in any real sense, although those who took
an active part behaved well, and one of the cavalry regiments “made
an excellent and well-timed charge.” The majority of them were in a
“miserable state of discipline” and “entirely incapable of performing
any manœuvre, however simple.” There was a sad lack of _morale_,
qualified officers were few, and seemed either unable or unwilling to
follow their allies in the matter of subjecting their men to definite
regulations. When the British soldiers were engaged in removing
the wounded and in burying the dead after Talavera, “the arms and
accoutrements of both were collected and carried away by the Spanish
troops.”
The exhausted condition of his army prevented Wellesley from following
the enemy, but as Venegas was on the move and threatening Madrid, this
was not regarded as of consummate importance. Of more immediate concern
was the alarming intelligence received by the Commander-in-Chief a few
hours later that Soult’s army was no longer in Galicia, but marching to
intercept the British communications with Portugal.