The Lines of Torres Vedras
(1810)
“_France is not an enemy whom I despise, nor does it deserve I
should._”
WELLINGTON.
Pasquier, who had the privilege of knowing most of the generals of the
Revolution and of the Empire, says of Masséna that he was “France’s
first military commander after Napoleon.” Neither Pichegru, Moreau,
Kléber, nor Lannes gave the Chancellor “as completely as Masséna, the
idea of a born warrior, possessing a genius for war, and endowed with
all the qualities which render victory certain. His eagle eye seemed
made to scan a field of battle. One could understand, on seeing him,
that the soldier under his command never believed it was possible to
retreat.”
[Illustration: “You are too young, sir, to be killed!”
Thomas Maybank]
Masséna’s first important operation in the Peninsula was the siege of
the Spanish fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo. Although Wellington was in
the neighbourhood he was not to be enticed away from his immediate
objects, which were the defence of Lisbon and the thorough organization
of the army for service when action became absolutely imperative.
Notwithstanding a splendid defence for over two months on the part of
Governor Herrasti, the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo was compelled to
surrender on the 10th July. In August, Masséna crossed the frontier
preparatory to beginning the siege of Almeida, near the river Coa,
next to Elvas the strongest place in Portugal.
On the 24th July, Craufurd and his famous Light Division--not Light
Brigade as some would have it--had a fierce tussle with Ney’s corps
of 24,000 men. Craufurd, who had only 4000 troops at his disposal,
entertained no wild notion of preventing the investment of the place,
but as he was suddenly attacked he was obliged to fight. Had he been
a more cautious soldier he would have crossed the Coa before Ney came
up, as Wellington had suggested on the 22nd. Indeed, so early as the
11th, the Commander-in-Chief had said, “I would not wish you to fall
back beyond that place (_i.e._ Almeida), unless it should be necessary.
But it does not appear necessary that you should be so far, and it
will be safer that you should be nearer, at least with your infantry.”
He delayed too late, and thereby lost over 300 men. While the last of
the soldiers were crossing the bridge which spanned the swollen river,
for it had rained in torrents the previous night, a lanky Irish lad
of nineteen years, named Stewart, and known by the 43rd as “The Boy,”
positively refused to pass over. “So this is the end of our boasting!
This is our first battle, and we retreat! The Boy Stewart will not
live to hear that said,” he cried, and turning back he slashed at
the oncoming French until he fell dead. Even more courageous was the
conduct of Sergeant Robert M‘Quade, five years Stewart’s senior. He
happened to catch sight of two French soldiers with levelled muskets
awaiting the British to ascend a bank. A boy of sixteen, afterwards
famous as Sir George Brown (Colonel-in-Chief of the Rifle Brigade) was
on the verge of being shot by them when the sergeant pulled him back
from the fatal spot. “You are too young, sir, to be killed,” he cried
as his own body received two bullets and fell in a lifeless heap at the
feet of the youth.
That Colonel Cox, who was in charge of the fortress, would have stayed
Masséna’s advance for a considerable time is extremely likely,
but unfortunately he was not given the opportunity to display his
prowess. The powder-magazine blew up, almost destroying the town and
necessitating immediate surrender. The pursuit of Wellington, “to drive
him into the sea,” seemed a comparatively easy task until the advance
showed that the British General had caused the country to be stripped
almost entirely of provisions. Thus Napoleon’s policy of making “war
support war” by plundering and raiding the enemy’s country, completely
broke down. “In war all that is useful is legitimate,” he says, and
Wellington had followed the maxim, after having obtained permission
for the destruction of provisions from the Portuguese Regency, which
included Mr Charles Stuart, the British Minister at Lisbon. What
Wellington’s measures meant to Masséna’s army is summed up in a single
sentence by Sir Harry Smith, who carried a dispatch to Lord Hill
through territory occupied by the enemy. “The spectacle,” he says, “of
hundreds of miserable wretches of French soldiers on the road in a
state of _starvation_ is not to be described.” Nor was this all. Not
only did the place resemble a desert in the difficulty of obtaining
means of sustenance, but the majority of the inhabitants had fled, some
seeking the fastnesses of the mountains, others the larger cities such
as Lisbon and Oporto.
As Masséna advanced so Wellington retreated towards the celebrated
lines of Torres Vedras, upon the construction of which thousands of
peasants, under the direction of British engineers, had been busy for
six months.
These magnificent defences are thus described by one who knew them.[58]
They “consisted of redoubts and field-works of various kinds; according
to the ground they were to defend, and all connected with each other
by entrenchments, etc., so that, when occupied by the army, it would
almost be impossible to force them. But, even supposing this first line
of defence should be carried by the enemy, there was another, much
more contracted, to retreat upon, where a very small force could hold
out against the French army and cover the embarkation of the British,
should Lord Wellington be at last forced to quit Portugal. I cannot
help considering this retreat to the lines, and the pertinacity with
which he held them in spite of every difficulty, and the remonstrances
of the Government at home, which was seized with alarm, as the greatest
proof of a master mind and genius that could be given, and proved
Lord Wellington to be superior to any general the French had, except
Napoleon; in short, that he was, next to Buonaparte himself, the
first general of the day. And I am further convinced that, had he the
same opportunities that Napoleon had, he would have proved as great a
general, as his capacity and powers of mind would have strengthened and
expanded in proportion to the vastness of his views and the obstacles
to be surmounted.”
An officer of the 60th Rifles, who served behind them, furnishes a
more detailed pen-sketch. “The line of defence was double,” he writes.
“The first, which was twenty-nine miles long, began at Alhandra, on
the Tagus, crossed the valley of Armia, which was rather a weak point,
and passed along the skirts of Mount Agraça, where there was a large
and strong redoubt; it then passed across the valley of Zibreira, and
skirted the ravine of Runa to the heights of Torres Vedras, which were
well fortified; and from thence followed the course of the little
river Zizandre to its mouth on the sea-coast. The line followed the
sinuosities of the mountain track which extends from the Tagus to the
sea, about thirty miles north of Lisbon. Lord Wellington’s headquarters
were fixed at Pero Negro, a little in the rear of the centre of the
line, where a telegraph was fixed corresponding with every part of the
position. The second line, at a distance varying from six to ten miles
in the rear of the first, extended from Quintella, on the Tagus, by
Bucellas, Montechique, and Mafra, to the mouth of the little river
S. Lourenço, on the sea-coast, and was twenty-four miles long. This
was the stronger line of the two, both by Nature and art, and if the
first line were forced by the enemy, the retreat of the army upon the
second was secure at all times. Both lines were secured by breastworks,
abattis, stone walls with banquettes, and scarps. In the rear of the
second line there was a line of embarkation, should that measure become
necessary, enclosing an entrenched camp and the fort of St Julian.” As
many as 120 redoubts and 427 pieces of artillery were scattered along
these lines. “Lord Wellington had received reinforcements from England
and Cadiz; the Portuguese army had also been strengthened, and the
Spanish division of La Romana, 5000 strong, came from Estremadura to
join the Allies;[59] so that the British commander had about 60,000
regular troops posted along the first and second lines, besides the
Portuguese militia and artillery (which manned the forts and redoubts
and garrisoned Lisbon), a fine body of English marines which occupied
a line of embarkation, a powerful fleet in the Tagus, and a flotilla
of gun-boats flanking the right of the British line. It was altogether
a stupendous line of defence, conceived by the military genius of the
British commander, and executed by the military skill of the British
engineer officers.”
Wellington continued to fall back until he reached “Busaco’s iron
ridge,” north of the Mondego. Here he determined to offer Masséna
battle, for three principal reasons. First, there was a growing
discontent amongst the rank and file of his army by reason of lack
of active warfare and the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, and a
victory would put an end to this growing despondency. Second, also a
military consideration, the orders he had given for the laying waste of
the districts about Lisbon were not yet fully carried out. Third, from
a political point of view it was necessary because it would show that
he was not about to lock himself up within the lines of Torres Vedras
because he was incapable or afraid of Napoleon’s legions. In a word, it
would “restore confidence,” a matter of first importance. It is quite
incorrect to term Busaco a “useless battle” as some historians have
done.
“On the 25th and 26th,”[60] says M. de Rocca, “the French corps
arrived successively at the foot of the mountains Sierra de Busaco,
whose summits they found occupied by the Anglo-Portuguese army. At six
o’clock, on the morning of the 27th, they marched in column against the
right and centre of that army, in the two roads leading to Coimbra, by
the village of San Antonio de Cantaro, and by the convent of Busaco.
These roads were cut up in several places, and defended by artillery.
The mountain over which they pass is besides encumbered with steep
rocks, and is very difficult of access.
“The French column which attacked the right of the English advanced
with intrepidity, in spite of the fire of their artillery and
light troops. It reached the top of the eminence after sustaining
considerable loss, and began to deploy in line with the greatest
coolness, and most perfect regularity. But a superior force again
assaulted it, and compelled it to retire. It soon rallied, made a
second attack, and was again repulsed. The French battalions, which
advanced against the convent of Busaco, where the left and centre of
the English divisions joined, were also driven back, a little before
they reached that post. General Simon, who had been struck by two balls
during the charge, was left on the height, and a great many wounded
officers and soldiers.
“The position occupied by the English and Portuguese on the brow of
the hill, formed the arc of a circle, whose two extremes embraced
the ground over which the French had to advance. The allied army saw
the least movements made below them, and had time to form to receive
any powerful body before it arrived. This circumstance materially
contributed to the advantage they obtained....
“Marshal Masséna judged that the position of Lord Wellington could
not be carried in front, and resolved to turn it. He kept up an
irregular fire till the evening, and sent off a body of troops by the
mountain-road, which leads from Mortago to Oporto. The English and
Portuguese, in consequence of this movement, abandoned their position
on the mountain of Busaco.”
The attack on the British left was led by Ney, and it succeeded in
driving in the sharp-shooters. The French had practically reached the
summit, as Rocca states, when Craufurd’s division, concealed in a
hollow, gave them the full benefit of their fire. “The enemy,” says Sir
Charles Stewart, who fought on this memorable day, “unable to retreat,
and afraid to resist, were rolled down the steep like a torrent of
hailstones driven before a powerful wind; and not the bayonets only,
but the very hands of some of our brave fellows, became in an instant
red with the blood of the fugitives. More brilliant or more decisive
charges than those executed this day by the two divisions which bore
the brunt of the action, were never perhaps witnessed; nor could
anything equal the gallantry and intrepidity of our men throughout,
except perhaps the hardihood which had ventured upon so desperate an
attack.”
Reynier’s two divisions, 15,000 men in all, attacked Picton’s 3rd
division on the right. The troops of Generals Hill and Leith, moving
rapidly to Picton’s aid, decided their fate. “The right of the 3rd
division had been, in the first instance, borne back,” says an
eye-witness, “the 8th Portuguese had suffered most severely; the enemy
had formed, in good order, upon the ground which they had so boldly
won, and were preparing to bear down to the right, and sweep our field
of battle. Lord Wellington arrived on the spot at this moment, and
aided the gallant efforts of Picton’s regiments, the fire of whose
musketry was terrible, by causing two guns to play upon the French
flank with grape. Unshaken even with this destruction, they still held
their ground, till, with levelled bayonets and the shout of the charge,
the 45th and 88th regiments, British, most gallantly supported by the
8th Portuguese, rushed forwards, and hurried them down the mountain
side with a fearful slaughter.”
“This movement,” writes Wellington, “has afforded me a favorable
opportunity of showing the enemy the description of troops of which
this army is composed; it has brought the Portuguese levies into action
with the enemy for the first time in an advantageous situation; and
they have proved that the trouble which has been taken with them has
not been thrown away, and that they are worthy of contending in the
same ranks with British troops in this interesting cause, which they
afford the best hopes of saving.
“Throughout the contest on the Serra, and in all the previous marches,
and those which we have since made, the whole army have conducted
themselves in the most regular manner. Accordingly all the operations
have been carried on with ease; the soldiers have suffered no
privations, have undergone no unnecessary fatigue, there has been no
loss of stores, and the army is in the highest spirits.”
The total British and Portuguese losses, according to the official
figures, were 197 killed, 1014 wounded, and 58 missing. Masséna
reported casualties to the number of 4486 men, including five
generals. Anything but a kindly feeling existed between the French
Commander-in-Chief and Ney previous to the battle; the result merely
deepened their unfriendliness, a pitiful contrast to the cordial
relations of Wellington and his colleagues.[61]
It is both delightful and pathetic to know that, after the last roll of
the guns had echoed through the valley, the British and the French put
aside their weapons and worked side by side in the humanitarian task of
searching for the wounded. It was the final scene of the tragedy, acted
after the curtain had fallen. It is recorded, as one of the incidents,
that a German officer serving with Napoleon’s colours, who had a
brother in the British 60th Regiment, asked a sworn enemy of an hour
ago if he knew what had happened to his relative? He answered his own
pathetic question by finding the soldier’s corpse.
_Books may tell of its story,
But only the heart can know
How war is robbed of its glory,
By the brave ones lying low,_