Sir Arthur’s Return to Portugal
(1809)
“_We are not naturally a military people; the whole business of an
army upon service is foreign to our habits, and is a constraint
upon them, particularly in a poor country like this._”
WELLINGTON.
Baron de Frénilly, travelling to Paris in December 1808, notes that
“the roads along which we passed were crowded with splendid troops
who were on their way to find a grave in the Peninsula.” Napoleon, in
the Constitution he granted to Spain, assumes for himself not only
the so-called “divine right of kings,” but the special favour of
Providence. “God,” he says, “has given me the power and the will to
overcome all obstacles.” Frénilly, writing after the Emperor’s death,
merely states an historical fact; Napoleon, at the height of his
stupendous power, regards himself as omnipotent, and proves within a
few years that he is not.
Yet it must be conceded that the Dictator of Europe--apart from moral
considerations, which never troubled him to any extent--had a certain
right to infer from his past experience that the Almighty was on his
side. It was not for him to foresee that the Peninsula was to prove a
running sore of the Imperial body politic. To be sure, Joseph had not
been particularly successful on the throne of the Spanish Bourbons,
Murat had displayed many foolish qualities, Dupont had surrendered,
Junot had evacuated Portugal, and eleven millions had rebelled either
practically or theoretically against French domination, but there was
still himself, and God was “on the side of the heaviest battalions!”
“I may find in Spain the Pillars of Hercules, but not the limits of
my power.” Thus he endeavoured to encourage his brother, and there is
no reason to suspect that he imagined otherwise. He announced that he
would pour between 300,000 and 400,000 troops across the Pyrenees--he
actually began the new campaign with over 200,000, which compared more
than favourably with the 120,000 ill-organized patriots under Castaños,
Palafox, Vives, Belvedere, Blake, and La Romana, who usually acted
without any idea of the value of co-operation.
The number of those ready and willing to engage in a guerilla warfare
cannot be given.[46] Statistics fail in such a matter as this. Names
indelibly associated with Napoleon’s greatness were either present or
coming--Victor, Bessières, Moncey, Lefebvre, Ney, St Cyr, Mortier, and
Junot.
When Dalrymple, Burrard, and Wellesley sailed from Portugal the
British command devolved upon Sir John Moore. This being a biography
of Wellington, Moore’s astounding campaign can only be referred to in
the briefest way, but it is necessary to mention the more important
incidents if we are to understand the various phases of the war.
Leaving 9000 men at Lisbon with Lieutenant-General Sir John Cradock,
and taking with him 14,000 troops, Moore advanced into Spain to
co-operate with the Spaniards according to his instructions. His own
columns reached Salamanca, the point of concentration, in November
1808, but Baird, who, with a reinforcement of 13,000 men, was to
effect a junction with him, found it impossible to do so. There was
much delay in consequence.
In the first week of the following month the Emperor was at Madrid, and
the Spanish capital once again in the hands of the French. Disaster
after disaster had followed hard in the tracks of the national forces.
It was Moore’s hope that by slowly retreating northward the enemy would
follow, and thus enable his allies in the south to recover. Having
united with Baird, and learned that Soult, with not more than 20,000,
was near Sahagun, Moore was on the eve of combat when the startling
intelligence reached him that Napoleon was in pursuit. The Emperor had
told the Senate, “I am determined to carry on the war with the utmost
activity, and to destroy the armies that England has disembarked in
that country.” With wonderful promptitude Moore turned towards Coruña,
where he believed the British fleet awaited him. Napoleon, hearing
disconcerting news from Paris, made off for his capital, leaving Soult,
“the Iron Duke of France,” and Ney to pursue the red-coats.
On the 16th January 1809, the battle in which Moore received his
death-wound was fought. Within twenty-four hours the victorious troops
embarked for the homeland. Not a British soldier, other than deserters
or stragglers, was left in Spain. In the sister kingdom there were
some 12,000, of whom 9000 had been left at Lisbon by Moore when he had
set out for Salamanca; the remainder had arrived from England in the
previous November and December. In addition, Sir Robert Wilson had
succeeded in equipping some 1300 men at Oporto for his Loyal Lusitanian
Legion.
It soon became evident that war would shortly break out between
France and Austria, thus precluding any thought on Napoleon’s part of
going back to the Peninsula. Castlereagh, notwithstanding previous
experiences, was as enthusiastic as ever. Baird and his ragged troops
were no sooner home than it was remarked that the Secretary for War
and Wellesley were very frequently together. Wiseacres foretold an
early return of the latter to Spain and Portugal.
Sir Arthur prepared a lengthy Memorandum on the defence of Portugal,
which was placed in the hands of the Cabinet for careful consideration.
“I have always been of opinion,” it begins, “that Portugal might be
defended, whatever might be the result of the contest in Spain; and
that in the meantime the measures adopted for the defence of Portugal
would be highly useful to the Spaniards in their contest with the
French.”
Wellesley suggested the thorough reorganization of the native
Portuguese troops, part of the expense being borne by Great Britain,
and the employment of not less than 30,000 British troops, including
4000 or 5000 cavalry and a large body of artillery. The entire army
was to be commanded by British officers. Riflemen and 3000 British or
German cavalry should be sent as additional reinforcements as soon as
possible, in addition to a corps of engineers for an army of 60,000.
He perfectly understood that the French would not be caught napping,
for “it may be depended upon that as soon as the newspapers shall have
announced[47] the departure of Officers for Portugal, the French armies
in Spain will receive orders to make their movements towards Portugal,
so as to anticipate our measures for its defence. We ought therefore to
have every thing on the spot, or nearly so, before any alarm is created
at home respecting our intentions.”
Thanks in no small measure to Castlereagh, Wellesley was appointed
to the supreme command of the new expedition. He left England on
the 14th April 1809, a few weeks after Soult’s vanguard had crossed
the Portuguese frontier, and landed at Lisbon on the 22nd, after
a most eventful voyage, having encountered terrible weather off
the Isle of Wight which threatened to drive his vessel ashore. The
Commander-in-Chief thus sums up the situation in the Peninsula: “At
that time,” he says, “the French had got possession of Zaragoza,
Marshal Soult held Oporto and the northern provinces of Portugal. The
battle of Medellin had been fought on the 29th March; and General
Cuesta was endeavouring to recover from its effects, and to collect
an army again at Monasterio, in the mountains of the Sierra Morena.
The French, under Marshal Victor, were in possession of the Guadiana,
and had their advanced posts as forward as Los Santos. Sebastiani
was at Ciudad Real, and held in check the army of La Carolina, at
that time under the command of General Venegas, consisting of about
12,000 men. Ney was in possession of Galicia; Salamanca was held by a
small detachment of French troops; St Cyr was at Catalonia with his
corps of 25,000 men; and Kellermann, who had succeeded to Bessières
in the command of the 6th corps, was at Valladolid. Mortier, with his
corps,[48] and the Duc d’Abrantès (Junot), with the 8th corps, at
Zaragoza. The Portuguese army was totally disorganized, and nearly
annihilated; and the Spanish troops were scarcely able to hold their
positions in the Sierra Morena. The Marquis de la Romana, who had been
with his corps on the frontiers of Portugal, near Chaves, from the
period of the embarkation of the British army at Coruña, in the month
of January, till the month of March, had moved from thence when Soult
invaded Portugal by Chaves, and afterwards moved towards the Asturias
with his army, and went himself into that province.”
The greeting the Commander-in-Chief received at the hands of the
populace of Lisbon would have been embarrassing to one possessing
a less cool head, but Wellesley knew perfectly well that applause
to-day is apt to become condemnation to-morrow. He was appointed
Marshal-General in the Portuguese Army, which was now placed in the
capable hands of General Beresford by the British Cabinet, Wellesley’s
one second-in-command being Major-General Rowland Hill. According to
his instructions, “the defence of Portugal you will consider as the
first and immediate object of your attention. But, as the security
of Portugal can only be effectually provided for in connection with
the defence of the Peninsula in the larger sense, his Majesty on this
account, as well as from the unabated interest he takes in the cause
of Spain, leaves it to your judgment to decide, when your army shall
be advanced on the frontier of Portugal, how your efforts can be best
combined with the Spanish, as well as the Portuguese troops, in support
of the common cause. In any movements you may undertake, you will,
however, keep in mind that, until you receive further orders, your
operations must necessarily be conducted with especial reference to the
protection of that country.”
Of British troops the Commander-in-Chief now had at his disposal
23,455, namely, 18,935 infantry, 4270 cavalry, and 250 attached
to the wagon train; Portugal contributed 16,000 men. Costello, a
non-commissioned officer of the 95th Rifles, and later a Captain in
the British Legion, has nothing good to say of the Portuguese troops.
In his record of the Peninsular War[49] he gives several instances of
their unreliability and treacherous nature. One example must suffice:
“The sanguinary nature of the Portuguese,” he says, “during the whole
period of the war was notorious. When crossed or excited, nothing but
the shedding of blood could allay their passion. It was always with
the greatest difficulty that we could preserve our French prisoners
from being butchered by them, even in cold blood. They would hang upon
the rear of a detachment with prisoners, like so many carrion birds,
waiting every opportunity to satiate their love of vengeance, and it
required all the firmness and vigilance of our troops to keep them in
check. It was well known that even our men fell in stepping between
them and the French whom they had marked out as victims. Indeed, it was
not unfrequent for our men to suffer from the consequences of their
ferocity, and I myself, while at Vallée, had a narrow escape. I had
crossed the hills to purchase some necessaries at the quarters of the
52nd Regiment, and on my return fell in with several of the soldiers
of the 3rd Caçadores. One of them, a fierce-looking scoundrel, evinced
a great inclination to quarrel, the more particularly as he perceived
that I was unarmed and alone. Having replied rather sharply to some
abuse they had cast upon the English, by reflecting on their countrymen
in return, he flew into a rage, drew his bayonet, and made a rush at
me, which I avoided by stepping aside, and tripping him head foremost
on the ground. I was in the act of seizing his bayonet, when a number
of his comrades came up, to whom he related, in exaggerated terms, the
cause of our disagreement. Before he had half concluded, a general cry
arose of ‘Kill the English dog’; and the whole, drawing their bayonets,
were advancing upon me when a party of the 52nd came up, the tables
were turned, and the Caçadores fled in all directions.”
Wellesley at once prepared to advance, and had not been at Lisbon a
week before representations were made to him by the Junta of Spanish
Estremadura for aid in behalf of the southern provinces. He replied
that until “the enemy who has invaded Portugal shall have been removed”
he could not hope to lend them the requisite assistance. “The enemy”
consisted of the corps under Soult and Victor. The army of the former,
which had left Coruña and invaded Portugal by Napoleon’s imperative
orders, now occupied Oporto. This, the second city in the kingdom
and the centre of the most prosperous district, fell after a gallant
if unscientific resistance on the part of the inhabitants under the
Bishop. The Marshal took dire vengeance on the insurgents during the
journey from Galicia, perhaps because he had suffered from the guerilla
warfare, now almost universal throughout the Peninsula. Victor’s army
was to take Badajoz and afterwards Seville, while Sebastiani held the
south in check. Wellesley decided to attack Soult, which necessitated
a march of over eighty miles of difficult country. Leaving two small
detachments of his own and of Portuguese troops upon the Tagus to
watch the movements of Victor, he set out with 13,000 British, 9000
Portuguese, and 3000 Germans--25,000 in all.
The right column, consisting of 9000 men under Beresford, was sent to
Lamego, on the Douro, so as to be ready to cut off Soult’s retreat,
the left making for Oporto with Wellesley. On the 10th May the cavalry
and advanced guard of the latter crossed the Vouga, hoping to surprise
the French troops at Albergaria and the neighbouring villages, but the
movement was not completely successful, although a number of prisoners
and cannon were taken.
The advanced guard reached Vendas Novas on the following day, and
drove in the outposts of the French advanced guard. The latter were
vigorously attacked in the woods and village, and defeated with
considerable loss. All this augured well for the ensuing operations,
and on the 12th the vanguard reached the southern bank of the Douro.
The French were stationed on the opposite bank, having taken the
precaution to burn the bridge after crossing, and to withdraw all the
boats they could discover.
Unfortunate in this matter, Wellesley was favoured in another. His
army was screened by cliffs and a hill called the Serra. This bold
rock was surmounted by a Franciscan convent, where the Commander
posted batteries and made his observations. As the river winds a great
deal, his movements were unobserved by those on the look-out at the
French headquarters, to the left of Wellesley as he peered through his
glass across the wide waterway. He had already perceived an extensive
building, known as the Seminary, surrounded by high walls with but one
entrance on the landward side, and open to the river. This he knew
would be an excellent position to secure, especially as it was almost
opposite to him.
There was in the army a certain Colonel Waters, a keen-eyed officer
with an infinite amount of resource and a ready wit. He contended that
it was scarcely probable that Soult could have secured every boat, and
interrogated a refugee on the point. He found that the man had crossed
in a small skiff.[50] With the aid of the prior of Amarante, the
fugitive, and several peasants, he heaved the boat out of the mud, and,
crossing the stream, brought back a number of barges. In these three
companies of the Buffs, under Lieut.-General Paget, effected a landing
on the opposite side. This excellent officer was seriously wounded
almost immediately afterward, but the passage of the Douro had been
secured.
General Murray, who had been ordered to cross at Barca d’Avintas, also
managed to get over, and signally failed to check the retiring columns
after the battle. As additional troops gained the opposite shore the
French made repeated attempts to hurl them back, but were ultimately
obliged to retreat “in the utmost confusion” towards Amarante.
According to a letter from General Stewart to his brother, Lord
Castlereagh, the French fled with such haste that “Sir Arthur Wellesley
dined at their headquarters on the dinner which had been prepared for
Marshal Soult.”
On the 19th May, Soult was across the frontier, having been compelled
to abandon over fifty guns and his baggage. In making his way across
the Sierra Catalina to escape the pursuing troops, his rear-guard was
defeated at Salamonde, with severe loss. He eventually reached Orense,
in Galicia, minus some 5000 men, including the sick and wounded he had
left behind him in Oporto.
“The road from Penafiel to Montealegre,” says Wellesley, “is strewed
with the carcases of horses and mules, and of French soldiers, who were
put to death by the peasantry before our advanced guard could save
them. This last circumstance is the natural effect of the species of
warfare which the enemy have carried on in this country. Their soldiers
have plundered and murdered the peasantry at their pleasure; and I
have seen many persons hanging in the trees by the sides of the road,
executed for no reason that I could learn, excepting that they have not
been friendly to the French invasion and usurpation of the government
of their country; and the route of their column, on their retreat,
could be traced by the smoke of the villages to which they set fire.”
Within a fortnight Wellesley was writing of the defects of his own men.
“I have long been of opinion,” he says, “that a British army could
bear neither success nor failure, and I have had manifest proofs of
the truth of this opinion in the first of its branches in the recent
conduct of the soldiers of this army. They have plundered the country
most terribly, which has given me the greatest concern....
“They have plundered the people of bullocks, among other property, for
what reason I am sure I do not know, except it be, as I understand
is their practice, to sell them to the people again. I shall be very
much obliged to you if you will mention this practice to the Ministers
of the Regency, and bid them to issue a proclamation forbidding the
people, in the most positive terms, to purchase any thing from the
soldiers of the British army.”
The Commander-in-Chief relates the same terrible facts to Castlereagh.
“The army behave terribly ill,” is his expression. “They are a rabble
who cannot bear success any more than Sir J. Moore’s army could bear
failure. I am endeavoring to tame them; but, if I should not succeed, I
must make an official complaint of them, and send one or two corps home
in disgrace. They plunder in all directions.”
Meanwhile Victor, far from taking Badajoz and marching on Seville as
the Emperor wished, had found it necessary to move in the direction
of Madrid, where he could secure much needed assistance. He therefore
took up his position at Talavera. Wellesley, intent upon crushing him,
arrived at Abrantes about the same time as the Marshal was evacuating
Estremadura and consequently abandoning the fruits of his victory over
Cuesta at Medellin. For Wellesley to have followed Victor with the
relatively few men at his disposal would have been to court disaster,
and he therefore acquiesced in a new plan of operations suggested
by Cuesta, in which the Spaniards were to be given an opportunity
of showing their capabilities or proving their incapacity. This,
says Professor Oman, was “the first and only campaign which he ever
undertook in company with a Spanish colleague and without supreme
control over the whole conduct of affairs.”