Aristotle treats you as a caviller if you impugn this metaphor as
though it were _proprio sensu_.[263] He declares it to be wrong, but
he seems to think that you ought to object to it at once as a
metaphor, without troubling yourself to prove it inappropriate.
[Footnote 263: Ibid. b. 32: [Greek: e)nde/chetai de\ kai\ tê\n
metaphora\n ei)po/nta _sukophantei=n_ ô(s kuri/ôs ei)rêko/ta.] Here
again we have the word [Greek: sukophantei=n] to designate what seems
a legitimate mode of argumentative attack.]
3. Indistinctness will arise if the terms of the definition are rare
or far-fetched or founded upon some fact very little known.[264]
Definitions given by Plato are cited to illustrate this.
[Footnote 264: Ibid. p. 140, a. 3: [Greek: pa=n ga\r a)saphe\s to\
mê\ ei)ôtho/s].]
4. Indistinctness arises from the employment of a poetical image,
which is even worse than a professed metaphor: as where law is
defined to be--a measure or image of things by nature just.[265]
[Footnote 265: Ibid. a. 6-17. [Greek: chei=ron o(poiouou=s tô=n kata\
metaphora\n legome/nôn].]
5. The definition is indistinct, if it does not, while making known
the definiend, make clear at the same time its contrary.[266]
[Footnote 266: Ibid. a. 18.]
6. The definition is also indistinct if it does not, when enunciated,
make known what the definiend is, without requiring that the
definiend itself shall be expressly enunciated. The definition by
itself ought to suggest at once the name of the definiend. Otherwise,
the definer is no better than those archaic painters, who, when
painting a dog or a horse, were compelled to write the name alongside
in order that the animal might be recognized.[267]
[Footnote 267: Ibid. a. 20. This last condition is a high measure of
perfection to exact from a definition. Assuredly Aristotle's own
definitions often fall lamentably short of it.]
Such are the _Loci_ regarding Indistinctness in the setting out of
the definition. The second defect is Redundancy.
1. Redundancy will arise if the terms of the definition include
either all things absolutely, or all things contained in the same
genus as the definiend; since the definition ought to consist of a
generic term to discriminate the definiend from all extra-generic
things, and a differential term to discriminate it from other things
within the same genus. A definition of the kind mentioned will be
useless through redundancy.[268] It will also be open to the like
objection, if it includes what is merely a proprium of the definiend,
over and above the essential attributes; or, indeed, if it includes
any thing else except what is required for clearly bringing out the
definiend.[269] It will be still worse, if it comprises any attribute
not belonging to all individuals of the species; for then it will not
even be a proprium or a reciprocating predication.[270]
[Footnote 268: Topic. VI. iii. p. 140, a. 23-32. Alexander, however,
remarks very pertinently, that the defects of such a definition are
defects of substance rather than of expression. Aristotle has passed
unconsciously from the latter to the former: [Greek: e)n me\n tê=|
prô/tê| tô=n e)pho/dôn do/xeien a)\n o( A)ristote/lês meta/gein ei)s
ta\s pragmatika\s e)xeta/seis] (Schol. p. 287, b. 27, Br.).]
[Footnote 269: Ibid. a. 37: [Greek: a(plô=s d' ei)pei=n, a(/pan
peri/ergon ou(= a)phairethe/ntos to\ loipo\n dê=lon poiei= to\
o(rizo/menon.]]
[Footnote 270: Ibid. b. 16.]
2. Repetition is another fault sometimes committed. The same
attribute may be predicated twice over. Or a particular and narrow
attribute may be subjoined, in addition to a more general and
comprehensive attribute in which it has already been included.[271]
[Footnote 271: Ibid. b. 27-p. 141, a. 22.]
So much for the faults which belong to the manner of expressing the
definition tendered. Next, as bearing on the matter and substance of
the definition, the following _loci_ are distinguishable.
1. The first of these _loci_ is, if the matter of the definition is
not _prius_ and _notius_ as compared with the definiend. It is one of
the canons of Definition, the purpose of which is to impart knowledge
of the definiend, to introduce nothing except what is prior by nature
and better known than the latter. The essence of each definiend--the
being what it is--is one and only one. If a definition be given,
other than that by means of what is _prius_ and _notius_, it would
follow that the same definiend might have two distinct essences;
which is impossible. Accordingly, any proposition tendered as a
definition but enunciating what is not prior by nature and better
known than the definiend sins against this canon, and is to be held
as no true definition at all.[272]
[Footnote 272: Ibid. iv. p. 141, a. 24-b. 2.]
The _locus_ here indicated by this general feature is one, but it
includes a number of varieties.[273] More known, or less known, it
should first be observed, has two distinct meanings: either more or
less known _absolutely_ (_by nature_); or more or less known _to us_.
Absolutely, or by nature, the point is better known than the line;
the line, than the superficies; the superficies, than the solid; the
_prius_, than the _posterius_. But _to us_ the reverse is true. The
solid, as object of sensible perception, is earlier known and more
known than the superficies; the superficies, than the line; the line,
than the point; the _posterius_, than the _prius_. _To us_ means to
the bulk of mankind: _absolutely_ or _by nature_ refers to the
instructed, superior, teaching and expository, intellects.[274] There
may be some cases in which the _notius nobis_ coincides and is
identical with the _notius naturâ_;[275] but, as a rule, the two are
distinct, and the one is the inverse of the other. A genuine and
perfect definition is one which enunciates the essence of the Species
through Genus and Differentiæ, which are both of them absolutely
prior and more knowable than the Species, since, if they be supposed
non-existent, the Species is nowhere to be found. No man can know the
Species without knowing its Genus and Differentiæ; but you may know
the Genus and Differentiæ without knowing the Species; hence the
Species is more unknowable than they are.[276] This is the true
scientific definition; but there are persons incapable of acquiring
knowledge by means of it. To these persons, an imperfect explanation
or quasi-definition must be given, by means of matters knowable to
them.[277] Those, however, who regard such imperfect explanations as
true definitions, must be reminded that, upon that hypothesis, we
should be compelled to admit many distinct definitions of the same
definiend. For individuals differ from each other in respect to what
is more knowable: what is more so to one man is not more so to
another. Indeed the same man differs from himself on this point at
different periods: to the early and untrained mind objects of
sensible perception are the most knowable; but, when a man has been
improved by training and instruction, the case is reversed, and the
objects of intellect become the most familiar to his mind.[278] To
define properly, therefore, we must enunciate, not the _notiora
nobis_ but, the _notiora naturâ_ or _simpliciter_; understanding by
this last phrase, not what is more knowable to all actual men but,
what is more knowable to men of well-trained and well-constituted
intellect; just as, when we speak of the wholesome, we mean what is
wholesome to the well-constituted body.[279] These conditions of
Definition you must thoroughly master, and apply to each debate as
the occasion may require. Your task in refuting an alleged definition
will be the easiest in those cases where it conforms to neither of
the above conditions; that is, when it enunciates neither what is
_notius naturâ_ nor what is _notius nobis_.[280]
[Footnote 273: Ibid. v. p. 142, b. 20.]
[Footnote 274: Topic. VI. iv. p. 141, b. 3-14.]
[Footnote 275: Ibid. b. 22.]
[Footnote 276: Ibid. b. 25.]
[Footnote 277: Ibid. b. 16.]
[Footnote 278: Ibid. b. 34.
The general mental fact here noticed by Aristotle may be seen
philosophically stated and explained in the volume of Professor Bain
on the Emotions and the Will. (Chapter on Consciousness, sect. 19, p.
581, 2nd ed.)
"A sensation is, under any view of it, a conscious element of the
mind. As pleasure or pain, we are conscious in one way; as
discrimination, we are conscious in the other way, namely, in a mode
of neutral excitement.--But this is not all. After much contact with
the sensible world, a new situation arises, and a new variety of the
consciousness, which stands in need of some explanation. When a child
experiences for the first time the sensation of scarlet, there is
nothing but the sensibility of a new impression more or less intense.
. . . It is very difficult for us to realize or define this original
shock, our position in mature life being totally altered. It is the
rarest thing for us _then_ to come under a radically new impression;
and we can only, by help of imperfect analogies, form an approximate
conception of what happens at the first shock of a discriminative
sensation. The process of engraining these impressions on the mind
after repetition, gives to subsequent sensations quite a different
character as compared with the first. The second shock of scarlet, if
it stood alone, would doubtless resemble the preceding; but such is
the nature of the mind, that the new shock will not stand alone, but
restores the notion or idea or trace that survived the former. The
sensation is no longer the primitive stroke of surprise, but a
coalition of a present shock with all that remains of the previous
occasions. Hence it may properly be said, when we see, or hear, or
touch, or move, that what comes before us is really contributed more
by the mind itself than by the object present. The consciousness is
complicated by three concurring elements--the new shock, the flash of
agreement with the sum total of the past, and the feeling of that
past as revived in the present. In truth, the new sensation is apt to
be entirely over-ridden by the old; and, in place of discriminating
by virtue of our susceptibility to what is characteristic in it, our
discrimination follows another course. For example, if I have before
me two shades of colour, instead of feeling the difference exactly as
I am struck at the moment, my judgment resorts to the round-about
process of first identifying each with some reiterated series of past
impressions; and, having two sum-totals in my mind, the difference
that I feel is between those totals. If I made a mistake, it may be
attributed not so much to a wrong act of discrimination, as to a
wrong act of identification.--All sensations, therefore, after the
first of each kind, involve a flash of recovery from the past, which
is what really determines their character. The present shock is
simply made use of as a means of reviving some one past in preference
to all others; the new impression of scarlet is in itself almost
insignificant, serving only as the medium of resuscitating the
cerebral condition resulting from the united force of all the
previous scarlets.--Sensation thus calls into operation the two great
intellectual laws, in addition to the primitive sensibility of
difference.--When we consider ourselves as performing the most
ordinary act of seeing or hearing, we are bringing into play those
very functions of the intellect that make its development and its
glory in its highest manifestations."]
[Footnote 279: Topic. VI. iv. p. 142, a. 10.]
[Footnote 280: Ibid. a. 12; also, a. 32.]
The canon being, That what is _posterius_ must be defined by its
_prius_,--the definer may sin against this in defining the _prius_ by
its _posterius_; _e.g._, if he defines the stationary and the
determinate by means of the moveable and the variable.[281] Also,
when his definition is neither _prius_, nor _posterius_, but of equal
position with the definiend, he is at fault. This may happen (1) when
he defines by an Opposite (for, according to some, the science of
Opposites is one and the same, and it is impossible that either one
of a pair can be absolutely more knowable than the other; though it
is true that no relative can be understood or explained without the
knowledge of its correlative, _e.g._, double and half); or (2) when
he includes the definiend itself in his definition, either under its
proper name or any other name;[282] or (3) when he defines by means
of a contra-specific to the definiend--by something of equal specific
rank or position, which is therefore _simul naturâ_ therewith
(_e.g._, Odd is that which is greater than even by unity); or (4)
when he defines by something specifically subordinate (_e.g._, An
even number is that which may be bisected, where bisected means
divisible by two, itself one among the even numbers[283]).
[Footnote 281: Ibid. a. 20: [Greek: pro/teron ga\r to\ me/non kai\
to\ ô(risme/non tou= a)ori/stou kai\ e)n kinê/sei o)/ntos.]]
[Footnote 282: Topic. VI. iv. p. 142, a. 22-b. 6.]
[Footnote 283: Ibid. b. 7-19: [Greek: pa/lin, ei) tô=|
a)ntidiê|rême/nô| to\ a)ntidiê|rême/non ô(/ristai--o(moi/ôs de\ kai\
ei) dia\ tô=n u(poka/tô to\ e)pa/nô ô(/ristai.]]
2. The second _locus_ (after that bearing on the _Prius et Notius_)
of argument for **impugning a definition is, where it does not
enunciate the genus in which the definiend is really included.
The mention of the genus, as enunciating the fundamental essence of
the definiend, ought to stand first in the definition. If your
opponent defines body--that which has three dimensions, or man--that
which knows how to count, you attack him by asking, What is it that
has three dimensions? What is it that knows how to count? No genus
has been assigned.[284]
[Footnote 284: Ibid. v. p. 142, b. 22-29.]
3. A third _locus_ is, where the definiend is a complex whole having
reference to several distinct facts or phenomena, while the
definition indicates only one of them. Thus, if grammar be
defined--the knowing how to write from dictation, you will object
that it is just as much--the knowing how to read. The definition is
incomplete unless it includes both.[285]
[Footnote 285: Ibid. b. 30.]
4. A fourth _locus_ is, where the definiend admits both of a better
and a worse construction, and where the definition enunciates only
the worse. You may impugn it, on the ground that every cognition and
every power must be understood as tending to its best results.[286]
[Footnote 286: Ibid. p. 143, a. 9.]
6. A fifth _locus_ is, where the definiend is enunciated as ranking,
not in the lowest and nearest species to which it belongs but, in
some higher and more distinct genus. Here the real essence will not
be declared, and the definition will thus be incomplete; unless
indeed it includes, along with the highest genus, the superadded
mention of all the differentiæ descending down to the lowest species.
It will then be complete, because it will include, in circumlocutory
phrase, all that would be declared by enunciating the specific
name.[287]
[Footnote 287: Ibid. a. 15-28.]
6. Assuming the genus to be truly declared in the definition you will
examine whether the differentiæ enunciated are differentiæ at all?
whether they really belong to the definiend? what is it which they
serve to contrast with and exclude,--since, if there be nothing such,
they cannot be truly differentiæ? whether the differential term and
its counter-differential apply to and cover the whole genus? whether,
granting the differentia to be real, it be such, when taken along
with the genus, as to constitute a true species, and whether its
counter-differentia be such also? This is a _locus_ furnishing many
possibilities of impugning the definition.[288]
[Footnote 288: Topic. VI. vi. p. 143, a. 29-b. 10.]
7. Perhaps the definition may enunciate a differentia which is merely
negative; _e.g._, A line is length without breadth. If you are
debating with a respondent who holds the (Platonic) doctrine of
Ideas, and who considers each Idea or genus to be something
numerically one, distinct from all its participants, you will find
here a _locus_ for attacking them.[289] He asserts the existence of a
Self-long or generical long, a Self-animal or generic animal, each
numerically one. Now, upon this hypothesis, since of all long you may
predicate either in the affirmative or the negative (_i.e._, either
it is broad or it is not broad), so this alternative may be
predicated of the Self-long or generical long; and thus the genus
will coincide with, or fall under the definition of, one among its
own species. Or, if this be denied, it will follow that the generic
long must be both broad and not broad; which is a contradiction still
more inadmissible. Accordingly, against one who holds the doctrine of
Ideas, declaring the genus to be _unum numero_, the negative
differentia will furnish grounds for attack; but not against any
other respondent.[290] For there are various cases in which the
negative must be employed as a part of the differentia: _e.g._, in
privative terms, blind is one whose nature it is to see but who does
not see. And, even when the differentia enunciated is affirmative, it
may have for its condivident member only a negative term, _e.g._,
length having-breadth has for its condivident member only the
negative, length not-having-breadth.[291]
[Footnote 289: Ibid. b. 11-30.]
[Footnote 290: Ibid. b. 29: [Greek: ô(/ste _pro\s e)kei/nous mo/nous_
chrê/simos o( to/pos, o(/soi to\ ge/nos e(\n a)rithmô=| phasi\n
ei)=nai. tou=to de\ poiou=sin oi( ta\s i)de/as tithe/menoi; au)to\
ga\r mê=kos kai\ au)to\ zô=|on ge/nos phasi\n ei)=nai.]]
[Footnote 291: Ibid. b. 33.]
8. Perhaps the definition may enunciate as a differentia what is
really a subordinate species; or what is really the genus itself
under another name; or what is not _Quale_, but _Quid_; or what
belongs to the definiend as an accident only. Each of these is a
_locus_ for arguments against the definition.[292]
[Footnote 292: Topica, VI. vi. p. 144, a. 5-27.]
9. Perhaps also, in the definition given, the differentia or the
species may be found predicable of the entire genus; or the genus may
be found predicable of the differentia itself, and not of objects
under it; or the species (sometimes even one of its sub-species) may
be found predicable of the differentia; or perhaps the differentia
may not be a _prius_ as regards the species (which it ought to be,
while it is a _posterius_ as regards the genus). Arguments against
the definition may be drawn from any one of these loci.[293]
[Footnote 293: Ibid. a. 28-b. 11.]
10. Recollect that the same differentia cannot belong to two distinct
genera neither of which comprehends the other, unless both are
comprehended under some higher genus. Examine whether this is
observed in the definition tendered to you.[294]
[Footnote 294: Ibid. b. 12.]
11. No genuine differentia can be derived either from the Category
_Ubi_ or from the Category _Passio_; for neither of them furnishes
characteristics essential to the subject. All _Passio_ when
intensified to a certain degree destroys the essence of the subject
and removes it from its own appropriate species; but the differentia
is inseparable from its subject; accordingly, nothing by virtue of
which the subject is called [Greek: a)lloi=on] can be a true
differentia. If the definition sins against this rule, it will be
open to question.[295]
[Footnote 295: Ibid. b. 31-p. 145, a. 12: [Greek: o(ra=n de\ kai\ ei)
to\ e)/n tini diaphora\n a)pode/dôken ou)si/as; ou) dokei= ga\r
diaphe/rein ou)si/a ousi/as tô=| _pou_ ei)=nai.--pa/lin ei) to\
pa/thos diaphora\n a)pode/dôken.--a(plô=s d' ei)pei=n, kath' o(/sa
a)lloiou=tai to\ e)/chon, ou)de\n tou/tôn diaphora\
e)kei/nou;--a(plô=s ga\r ou)k a)lloiou/metha kata\ ta\s diaphora/s.]]
12. If the subject be relative, its true differentia ought to be
relative also; thus, science or cognition is a _relatum_, and
accordingly its three differentiæ--theoretical, practical,
constructive--are all _relata_ also.[296] The definition must conform
to this; and it must also, in cases where the relative subject has
more than one correlate, declare that correlate which is the ordinary
and natural one, not any other which is rare and realized only on
occasion.[297] You must watch to see whether this condition is
observed; and also whether the correlative enunciated in the
definition is the one strictly proximate. Thus, if the definition
given of prudence be, It is an excellence of man or an excellence of
the soul, this will not be a good definition. It ought to be--an
excellence of the rational department of the soul; for it is through
and by reason of this department that both man and soul are
denominated prudent.[298]
[Footnote 296: Ibid. a. 13.]
[Footnote 297: Ibid. a. 19-26.]
[Footnote 298: Topic. VI. vi. p. 145, a. 28-32. [Greek: prô/ton ga\r
tou= logistikou= a)retê\ ê( phro/nêsis; kata\ ga\r tou=to kai\ ê(
psuchê\ kai\ o( a)/nthrôpos phronei=n le/getai.]]
13. When the definiend is given as an affection or lasting condition
of some subject, you must examine whether it really resides or can
reside (as by nature it ought to do) in the subject to which it is
referred in the definition. If it cannot, the **definition is
untenable; and this mistake is sometimes made, the producing
conditions of a phenomenon being confounded with the phenomenon
itself, or _vice versâ_.[299] Thus, some persons have
defined sleep--incapacity of sensible perception; doubt--equality of
contrary reasonings; pain--breach of continuity violently made in
parts of the organism which naturally grow together. Now sleep does
not reside in perception, nor doubt in reasonings. Sleep is that
which produces or occasions incapacity of sensible perception; doubt
is a state of mind produced by equality of contrary reasonings.[300]
This will be a _locus_ for arguing against the definition.
[Footnote 299: Ibid. b. 11: [Greek: to\ poiou/menon ei)s to\
poiêtiko\n ê)\ a)na/palin sumbai/nei tithe/nai toi=s ou(/tôs
o(rizome/nois.]]
[Footnote 300: Ibid. a. 33-b. 20.]
14. Another _locus_ is, when the definiend has direct bearing and
reference to something different from what is enunciated in the
definition. Thus, if the respondent defines justice--a power tending
to make equal distribution, you may remark hereupon, that the just
man is he who is deliberately resolved to make equal distribution,
not he who has the power to do so. If this definition were allowed,
the justest man would be he who has the greatest power of so
distributing.[301]
[Footnote 301: Ibid. vii. p. 145, b. 34-p. 146, a. 2.]
15. Again, the definition will be assailable, if the definiend admits
graduation of More or Less, while that which is enunciated in the
definition does not admit it, or _vice versâ_; also, if both of them
admit graduation, but the variations of the two are not corresponding
and concomitant. The defining phrase ought to be identical in
signification with the term defined.[302] If both of them agree in
reference to some common correlate, but one is to this in the
relation of more while the other is in the relation of less, the
definition is faulty.[303]
[Footnote 302: Ibid. p. 146, a. 3-12. [Greek: ei)/per dê\ tau)to/n
e)sti to\ kata\ to\n lo/gon a)podothe\n tô=| pra/gmati.]
Here we have a principle of Concomitant Variations analogous to that
which is so well unfolded, as one of the Four Inductive Methods, in
Mr. J. S. Mill's 'System of Logic.' See Book III. ch. viii. sect. 6.]
[Footnote 303: Topic. VI. vii. p. 146, a. 6-20: [Greek: e)/dei d'
a)mpho/tera ma=llon tô=| au)tô=| u(pa/rchein, ei)/per tau)ta\ ê)=n],
&c.]
16. Again, you will be able to object, if the definition enunciate
references to two distinct correlates, severally or alternately:
_e.g._, The beautiful is that which affords pleasure either through
the eye or through the ear; _Ens_ is that which is capable either of
suffering or acting. You may show that, according to this definition,
beautiful and not beautiful, or that _Ens_ and Non-Ens, will coincide
and be predicable of the same subjects.[304]
[Footnote 304: Topic. VI. vii. p. 146, a. 21-32.
The definition here given of _Ens_ appears in the Sophistes of Plato,
p. 247, E. The definition of the beautiful ([Greek: to\ kalo/n])
appears in the Hippias Major of Plato (p. 298, E, seq.), where it is
criticized by Sokrates.]
17. When the definition is tendered, you ought to examine and define
its own terms, which, of course, profess to enunciate genus and
differentia of the definiend.[305] You will see whether the
definitions of those defining terms are in any way inapplicable to
the definiend.
[Footnote 305: Ibid. a. 33-35.]
18. If the definiend be a _Relatum_, the definition ought to
enunciate its true correlate, or the true correlate of the genus to
which it belongs. You must examine whether this is done, and whether
the correlate enunciated be an ultimate end, as it ought to be
(_i.e._ not merely a means towards something ulterior). If the
correlate enunciated is a generation or a process, this will afford
you an argument against the definition; for all generation or process
is a means towards some ulterior end.[306]
[Footnote 306: Ibid. viii. p. 146, a. 36-b. 19. This is a subtle
distinction. He says that desire must be defined (not desire of _the
pleasurable_, but) desire of _pleasure_: we desire _the pleasurable_
for the sake of _pleasure_. He admits, however, that there are cases
in which the argument will not hold: [Greek: schedo\n ga\r oi(
plei=stoi ê(/desthai ma=llon bou/lontai ê)\ pepau=sthai ê(do/menoi;
ô(/ste to\ e)nergei=n ma=llon te/los a)\n poioi=nto tou=
e)nêrgêke/nai.]]
19. The definition ought not to omit any of the differentiæ of the
definiend; if any be omitted, the real essence is not declared. Here
then is a defect in the definition, which it is your business always
to assail on its defective side.[307] Thus, if the definiend be a
_relatum_ corresponding, not to some correlate absolutely but, to
some correlate specially quantified or qualified, the definition
ought to enunciate such quantification or qualification; if it does
not, it is open to attack.
[Footnote 307: Ibid. b. 20: [Greek: pa/lin e)p' e)ni/ôn ei) mê\
diô/rike tou= po/sou, ê)\ poi/ou, ê)\ pou=, ê)\ kata\ ta\s a)/llas
diaphora/s,--a)polei/pôn ga\r diaphora\n ê(ntinou=n ou) le/gei to\ ti
ê)=n ei)=nai; _dei= d' a)ei\ pro\s to\ e)ndee\s e)picheirei=n_.]]
20. Suppose that the definiend is one of the appetites, relative to
an _appetitum_ as correlate, a mode of the good or agreeable. You
will take notice whether the definition given thereof enunciates the
correlate as only an apparent mode of good: if it does not, you have
a _locus_ for attacking it. But if it does, and if the definer be one
who believes in the Platonic Ideas, you may attack him by showing
that his definition will not square with that doctrine. For the
definition as so given will not suit for the ideal or generic
appetite--the Self-appetite; which correlates with the ideal or
generic good--the Self-good. In this no distinction is admissible of
real and apparent: a Self-apparent-good is an absurdity.[308]
[Footnote 308: Topic. VI. viii. p. 146, b. 36-p. 147, a. 11. [Greek:
e)a\n de\ kai\ a)podô=| to\ ei)rême/non, e)pi\ ta\ ei)/dê a)kte/on
to\n tithe/menon i)de/as ei)=nai; ou) ga/r e)stin i)de/a phainome/nou
ou)deno/s, to\ d' ei)=dos pro\s to\ ei)=dos dokei= le/gesthai, oi(=on
au)tê\ e)pithumi/a au)tou= ê(de/os kai\ au)tê\ bou/lêsis au)tou=
a)gathou=. ou)k e)/stai ou)=n phainome/nou a)gathou= ou)de\
phainome/nou ê(de/os; a)/topon ga\r to\ ei)=nai au)to\ phaino/menon
a)gatho\n ê)\ ê(du/.]
Compare Plato, Parmenides, pp. 133-134, where this doctrine that if
the _relatum_ be an Idea (_sensu Platonico_), the _correlatum_ must
also be an Idea, is enunciated and pushed to its consequences:
[Greek: o(/sai tô=n i)deô=n pro\s a)llê/las ei)si\n ai(/ ei)sin,
au)tai\ pro\s au(ta\s tê\n ou)si/an e)/chousin, a)ll' ou) pro\s ta\
par' ê(mi=n ei)/te o(moiô/mata ei)/te o(/pê| dê/ tis au)ta\
ti/thetai], &c.--[Greek: au)tê\ de\ despotei/a au)tê=s doulei/as
e)sti\n o(/ e)sti], &c. (133, C-E.)]
21. Again, suppose that the definiend is a habit or disposition. You
will examine how far the definition fits as applied to the individual
person who has the habit; and how far it fits when taken in
comparison with subjects contrary or congeneric. Every such
definition, if good, implies in a certain way the definition of the
contrary: he who defines cognition furnishes by implication the
definition of ignorance.[309]
[Footnote 309: Topic. VI. ix. p. 147, a. 12-22.]
22. Or suppose the definiend to be a generic _relatum_, and the
definition to enunciate its generic correlate. You must call to mind
the specific terms comprehended under these two generic terms, and
observe whether they fit on to each other respectively. If they do
not, the definition is faulty.[310]
[Footnote 310: Ibid. a. 23-28.]
23. You will farther examine whether the Opposite of the definition
will serve as definition to the Opposite of the definiend, as the
definition of half is opposite to the definition of double; thus, if
double is that which exceeds equality, half is that which is exceeded
by equality. The like is true of Contraries: if the profitable be
that which is productive of good, the hurtful will be that which is
productive of evil or destructive of good. If, on trying the
contraries, you find that this will not hold, the definition
originally given will be found unsatisfactory.[311] In defining the
privative contrary of any term, a man cannot avoid enunciating in the
definition the term of which it is the privative: but he is not
allowed to define the term itself by means of its privative. To
define equality--that which is contrary to inequality, is improper.
You will require him at once to define inequality; and his definition
must be--the privation of equality. Substitute this definition of the
term inequality, in place of that term itself, in the above-named
definition of equality: and the last definition will then run as
follows: Equality is that which is contrary to the privation of
equality. Here the definiend is enunciated as a part of the
definition of itself; a proof that the original definition--Equality
is the contrary of inequality--is itself wrong.[312]
[Footnote 311: Topic. VI. ix. p. 147, a. 29-b. 4.
We most remember that Aristotle, classifying _Relata_ as one species
under the genus _Opposita_, treats double and half as _Opposita_,
_i.e._ _Relative-Opposita_. I have already said that I think this
classification improper, and that _Opposita_ ought to be ranked as a
species under the genus _Relata_.]
[Footnote 312: Topic. VI. ix. p. 147, b. 4-25.]
24. When the definiend is a Privative Term, the definition given
ought to enunciate that which it is, and that of which it is the
privation; also that subject in which it resides naturally and in the
first instance. In defining ignorance, the definition must enunciate
not privation only, but privation of knowledge; nor will this be
sufficient unless it be added that the privation of knowledge is in
the rational department of the soul ([Greek: e)n tô=| logistikô=|]).
Privation of knowledge in the soul or in the man, will not suffice;
because neither of these subjects is that in which the attribute
resides in the first instance: the rational department of the soul
must be named by itself, as being the primary subject of the
attribute. If the definition be wanting in any of these conditions,
you will have an argument for impeaching it.[313]
[Footnote 313: Ibid. b. 26-p. 148, a. 2.]
25. A term that is privative in form may sometimes be used in the
sense of mere negation, not in that of privation. If this term be
defined generally by privation, the definition will not include the
merely negative sense, and will therefore be impeachable. The only
general explanation attainable is that by pure negation, which is
common both to the negative and the privative. Thus, if the
respondent defines ignorance--privation of knowledge, such privation
can be predicated only of subjects whose nature it is to have
knowledge or who might be expected to have it: such privation cannot
be predicated of infants, or of inanimate objects like stones. To
include these, ignorance must be explained as the mere negation or
non-existence of knowledge; the definition thereof by privation is
inadequate.[314]
[Footnote 314: Ibid. p. 148, a. 3-9: [Greek: o(ra=n de\ kai\ ei) mê\
legome/nou kata\ ste/rêsin sterê/sei ô(ri/sato, oi(=on kai\ e)pi\
tê=s a)gnoi/as do/xeien a)\n u(pa/rchein ê( toiau/tê a(marti/a toi=s
mê\ kat' a)po/phasin tê\n a)/gnoian le/gousin.]
Waitz says in note, p. 503:--"Sensus loci hic est. Peccant qui per
privationem ignorantiam definientes non eam ignorantiam definire
voluerunt quæ est [Greek: kat' a)po/phasin], sed eam quæ est [Greek:
kata\ dia/thesin]." Compare Analyt. Poster. I. xvi. p. 79, b. 23.]
26. If you are debating with one who holds the Platonic doctrine of
Ideas, you will note whether any definition that he may give fits not
only the definiend itself but also the Idea of the definiend. Thus,
Plato in defining animal introduces mortality as a part of his
definition;[315] but mortality cannot be predicated of the Idea or
generic animal--the Self-animal; therefore, you will have an argument
against his definition. In like manner, if any active or passive
attribute is brought into his definition, you will object that this
cannot apply to the Ideas; which are avowedly impassive and
unchangeable.[316]
[Footnote 315: Topic. VI. x. p. 148, a. 15: [Greek: oi(=on ô(s
Pla/tôn o(ri/zetai to\ thnêto\n prosa/ptôn e)n toi=s tô=n zô/|ôn
o(rismoi=s.]
This may perhaps allude to Plato's manner of speaking of [Greek:
zô=|a] in Sophistes, p. 246, E., p. 265, C.; Timæus, p. 69, C.]
[Footnote 316: Topica, VI. x. p. 148, a. 14-22. [Greek: a)pathei=s
ga\r kai\ a)ki/nêtoi dokou=sin ai( i)de/ai toi=s le/gousin i)de/as
ei)=nai].]
27. Another _locus_ for counter-argument is, where the definiend is
Equivocal or Analogous, while one and the same definition is made to
apply to all its distinct meanings. Such a definition, pretending to
fit all, will in reality fit none; nothing but an univocal term can
come under one and the same definition. It is wrong to attempt to
define an equivocal term.[317] When its equivocation is not obvious,
the respondent will put it forward confidently as univocal; while you
as assailant will expose the equivocation. Sometimes, indeed, a
respondent may pretend that an univocal word is equivocal, or that an
equivocal word is univocal, in the course of the debate. To obviate
such misconception, you will do well to come to an agreement with him
prior to the debate, or to determine by special antecedent reasonings
what terms are univocal or equivocal; for at that early stage, when
he does not foresee the consequence of your questions, he is more
likely to concede what will facilitate your attack. In the absence of
such preliminary agreement, if the respondent, when you have shown
that his bad definition will not apply universally, resorts to the
pretence that the definiend, though really univocal, is equivocal,
you will press him with the true definition of the part not included
under his definition, and you will show that this true definition
suits also for the remaining parts of the definiend. You will thus
confute him by showing that, upon his original hypothesis, it must
follow that there are two distinct definitions for the same
definiend--the bad one which he has given, and the true one which you
have constrained him to admit.[318] Perhaps, however, the term which
he has undertaken to define may be really equivocal, and therefore
indefinable; nevertheless, when you have shown the insufficiency of
his definition, he may refuse to admit that the term is equivocal,
but will deny a portion of its real meaning. You will then remind him
that, as to the meaning of names, we must recognize tradition and
custom without presuming to disturb it; but that, when we combine
these names in our own discourse, we must beware of those
equivocations which mislead the multitude.[319]
[Footnote 317: Ibid. a. 23-37: [Greek: e)/ti ei) tô=n kath'
o(mônumi/an legome/nôn e(/na lo/gon a(pa/ntôn koino\n
a)pe/dôken.--a)ll' ou)de\n ê(=tton, ei) o(poterôsou=n pepoi/êken,
ê(ma/rtêken.]
Aristotle here cites and censures the definition of life given by a
philosopher named Dionysius; he remarks that life is an equivocal
term, having one meaning in animals, another and a different one in
plants. Dr. Whewell has remarked that even at the present day a good
definition of life is matter of dispute, and still a desideratum with
philosophers.
Mr. John S. Mill adverts, in more than one portion of his 'System of
Logic' (Bk. IV. ch. iii. s. 5, p. 222, seq.; Bk. V. ch. v. s. 8, p.
371), to the mistake and confusion arising from attempts to define
Equivocal Terms. "The inquiries of Plato into the definitions of some
of the most general terms of moral speculation, are characterized by
Bacon as a far nearer approach to a true inductive method than is
elsewhere to be found among the ancients, and are, indeed, almost
perfect examples of the preparatory process of comparison and
abstraction; but, from being unaware of the law just mentioned, he
often wasted the powers of this great logical instrument on inquiries
in which it could realize no result, since the phenomena, whose
common properties he so elaborately endeavoured to detect, had not
really any common properties. Bacon himself fell into the same error
in his speculations on the nature of heat, in which he evidently
confounded, under the name hot, classes of phenomena which had no
property in common."--"He occasionally proceeds like one who seeking
for the cause of hardness, after examining that quality in iron,
flint, and diamond, should expect to find that it is something that
can be traced also in hard water, a hard knot, and a hard heart."]
[Footnote 318: Topic. VI. x. p. 148, a. 37, seq. [Greek: e)pei\ d'
e)/nia lantha/nei tô=n o(mônu/môn, _e)rôtô=nti me\n ô(s sunônu/mois
chrêste/on, au)tô=| d' a)pokrinome/nô| diairete/on_. e)pei\ d'
e)/nioi tô=n a)pokrinome/nôn to\ me\n sunô/numon o(mô/numo/n phasin
ei)=nai, o(/tan mê\ e)pharmo/ttê| e)pi\ pa=n o( a)podothei\s
lo/gos,--prodiomologête/on u(pe\r tô=n toiou/tôn ê)\ prosullogiste/on
o(/ti o(mô/numon ê)\ sunô/numon, o(po/teron a)\n ê)=|; _ma=llon ga\r
sugchôrou=sin ou) proorô=ntes to\ sumbêso/menon_.]
These counsels of Aristotle are remarkable, as bearing on the
details, and even the artifices, of dialectical debate.]
[Footnote 319: Topic. VI. x. p. 148, b. 16-22. [Greek: r(ête/on pro\s
to\n toiou=ton o(/ti tê=| me\n o)nomasi/a| dei= chrê=sthai tê=|
paradedome/nê| kai\ parepome/nê| kai\ mê\ kinei=n ta\ toiau=ta,
e)/nia d' ou) lekte/on o(moi/ôs toi=s polloi=s.]]
28. If the definiend, of which a definition is tendered to you, is a
compound, you may subtract from this definition the definition of one
of the parts of the definiend, and then examine whether the remainder
will suit as a definition of the remaining part of the definiend. If
the remainder should not suit, this will show that the entire
definition tendered is not tenable. Thus, if the definiend be a
finite straight line, and if the definition tendered be, It is the
boundary of a finite plane, of which (boundary) the middle covers or
stands in the way of the extremities; you may subtract from this
definition the definition of a finite line, viz., the boundary of a
plane surface having boundaries, and the remainder of the definition
ought then to suit for the remainder of the definiend. Now the
remainder of the definiend is--straight; and the remainder of the
definition is--that of which the middle covers or stands in the way
of the extremities. But these two will _not_ suit; for a line may be
straight, yet infinite, in which case it will have neither middle nor
extremities. Accordingly, since the remainder of the definition will
not suit for the remainder of the definiend, this will serve as an
argument that the entire definition tendered is not a good one.[320]
[Footnote 320: Topic. VI. xi. p. 148, b. 23-32.]
If the definiend be a compound, and if the definition contain no
greater number of words than the definiend, the definition must be
faulty; it will be nothing better than a substitution of words. Still
more faulty will it be, if it substitutes rare and strange words in
place of others which are known and familiar; or if it introduces a
new word which signifies something different from that which it
replaces.[321]
[Footnote 321: Ibid. b. 32-p. 149, a. 13.]
The definiend, being compound, will contain both a generic and a
differential term. In general, the generic term will be the better
known of the two; yet sometimes the other is the better known.
Whichever of the two is the better known, the definer ought to choose
that, if all that he aims at is a mere substitution of one name in
place of another. But, if he aims at something more or at the
substitution of an explanatory proposition in place of a name
(without which there can be no true definition), he ought then to
choose the differentia in preference to the genus; for the definition
is produced for the purpose of imparting knowledge, and the
differentia, being usually less known than the genus, stands most in
need of extraneous help to cognition.[322] When the definition of the
differentia has thus been tendered, you will examine whether it will
be equally suitable for any other definiend also. If it be, you have
an argument against the goodness of the definition. For example, the
definition of odd number tendered to you may be--number having a
middle. Here, since number is common both to the definiend and to the
definition, having-a-middle is evidently put forward as the
equivalent of odd. But this cannot stand as equivalent to odd; since
various other subjects which are not odd (such, for example, as a
body or a line), nevertheless have a middle. Since, then, we see that
having-a-middle would be suitable in defining definiends which are
not odd, it cannot be admitted, without some qualifying adjunct, as a
good definition of odd. The adjunct annexed must declare in what
sense middle is intended, since it is an equivocal phrase.[323]
[Footnote 322: Ibid. p. 149, a. 14-28.]
[Footnote 323: Ibid. a. 29-37.]
29. If the definiend be a something really existent, the definition
given of it ought not to be a proposition declaring an incompatible
combination, such as neither does nor can exist. Some, for example,
define white--colour mingled with fire; which is incompatible, since
that which is incorporeal (colour) cannot be mingled with a body
(fire).[324]
[Footnote 324: Topic. VI. xii. p. 149, a. 38-b. 3.]
30. Again, suppose the definiend to be a _Relatum_: the correlate
thereof must of course be declared in the definition. Care, however,
must be taken that it shall be declared, not in vague generality but,
distinctly and with proper specialization; otherwise, the definition
will be incorrect either entirely or partially. Thus, if the
respondent defines medicine--the science of the really existent, he
is incorrect either wholly or partially. The _relatum_ ought to
reciprocate or to be co-extensive with its correlate.[325] When the
correlate, however, is properly specialized in the definition, it may
be declared under several different descriptions; for the same real
thing may be at once _ens_, _album_, _bonum_. None of these
descriptions will be incorrect. Yet, if the correlate is thus
described in the definition of a _relatum_, the definition cannot be
considered good or sufficient. For it applies to more things besides
the definiend; and a good definition ought to reciprocate or to be
co-extensive with its definiend.[326]
[Footnote 325: Ibid. b. 4, seq.: [Greek: e)/ti o(/soi mê\ diairou=sin
e)n toi=s pro/s ti pro\s o(\ le/getai, a)ll' e)n plei/osi
perilabo/ntes ei)=pan, ê)\ o(/lôs ê)\ e)pi/ ti pseu/dontai, oi(=on
ei)/ tis tê\n i)atrikê\n e)pistê/mên o)/ntos ei)=pen--o(moi/ôs de\
kai\ e)pi\ tô=n a)/llôn, e)peidê\ a)ntistre/phei pa/nta ta\ pro/s
ti.]]
[Footnote 326: Ibid. b. 12-23. [Greek: e)/ti d' a)du/naton to\n
toiou=ton lo/gon i)/dion tou= a)podothe/ntos ei)=nai;--dê=lon ou)=n
o(/ti o( toiou=tos ou)demia=s e)sti\n e)pistê/mês o(rismo/s; i)/dion
ga\r kai\ ou) koino\n dei= to\n o(rismo\n ei)=nai.]]
31. Another mistake in defining is committed, when a man defines, not
the subject purely and simply but, the subject in a high measure of
excellence. Sometimes the rhetor (_e.g._) is defined--one who can
perceive and produce without omission all that there is plausible in
any cause; the thief is defined--one who takes away secretly what
belongs to another. But these are the definitions, not of a rhetor
and a thief generally but, of a skilful rhetor and skilful thief. The
thief is one who is bent on taking away secretly, not one who _does_
take away secretly.[327]
[Footnote 327: Ibid. b. 24-30. [Greek: ou) ga\r o( la/thra|
lamba/nôn, a)ll' o( boulo/menos la/thra| lamba/nein, kle/ptês
e)sti/n.]]
32. Again, another error consists in defining what is desirable in
itself and on its own account, as if it were desirable as a means
towards some other end--as productive or preservative thereof. For
example, if a man defines justice--that which is preservative of the
laws; or wisdom--that which is productive of happiness, he presents
them as if they were desirable, not for themselves but, with
reference to something different from themselves. This is a mistake;
and it is not less a mistake, though very possibly the same subject
may be desirable both for itself and for the sake of something else.
For the definition ought to enunciate what is best in the definiend;
and the best of everything resides most in its essence, not in what
it is relatively to something else. It is better to be desirable _per
se_, than _alterius causâ_.[328]
[Footnote 328: Topic. VI. xii. p. 149, b. 31-39. [Greek: e(ka/stou
ga\r to\ be/ltiston e)n tê=| ou)si/a| ma/lista, be/ltion de\ to\ di'
au(to\ ai(reto\n ei)=nai tou= di' e(/teron, ô(/ste tou=to kai\ to\n
o(rismo\n e)/dei ma=llon sêmai/nein.]]
33. Perhaps the definition tendered may be a complex proposition,
enunciating two terms either jointly or severally, in one or other of
three combinations. Either the definiend is A and B; or it is that
which springs out of A and B; or it is A with B.[329] In each of
these three cases you may find arguments for impugning the
definition.
[Footnote 329: Ibid. xiii. p. 150, a. 1-4: [Greek: skopei=n de\ kai\
ei)/ tinos o(rismo\n a)podidou\s ta/de, ê)\ to\ e)k tou/tôn, ê)\
to/de meta\ tou=de ô(ri/sato.]]
_a._ Thus, take the first of the three. Suppose the respondent to
define justice by saying, It is temperance and courage. You may urge
against him, that two men, one of whom is temperate without being
courageous, while the other is courageous without being temperate,
will be just together, though neither of them separately is just;
nay, that each of them separately (the one being temperate and
cowardly, the other courageous and intemperate), will be both just
and unjust; since, if justice is temperance and courage, injustice
will be intemperance and cowardice.[330] The definer is open to the
farther objection that he treats enumeration of parts as identical
with the whole; as if he defined a house--bricks and mortar,
forgetting the peculiar mode of putting them together. Bricks and
mortar may exist, and yet there may be no house.[331]
[Footnote 330: Ibid. a. 4-14.]
[Footnote 331: Ibid. a. 15-21. [Greek: dê=lon ga\r o(/ti tô=n merô=n
o)/ntôn ou)de\n kôlu/ei to\ o(/lon mê\ ei)=nai; ô(/ste ou) tau)to\n
ta\ me/rê tô=| o(/lô|.]]
_b._ Next, suppose the definition to declare, that the definiend is
that which springs from A and B--is a result or compound of A and B.
You will then examine whether A and B are such as to yield any
result; for some couples (as a line and a number) yield no result.
Or, perhaps, the definiend may by its own nature inhere in some first
subject, while A and B do not inhere in any one first subject, but
one in the other; in which case the definition is assailable.[332]
Or, even granting that it is the nature of A and B to inhere in the
same first subject, you may find that that first subject is not the
same as the one in which the definiend inheres. Now the whole cannot
thus inhere in one, and the parts in another: you will here have a
good objection. Or, perhaps, it may appear that, if the whole be
destroyed, the parts will be destroyed also; which ought not to be,
but the reverse; for, when the parts are destroyed, the whole must
necessarily vanish. Or, perhaps, the definiend may be good or bad,
while the parts of the definition (A and B) are neither one nor the
other. (Yet this last is not a conclusive objection; for it will
sometimes happen in compound medicines that each of the ingredients
is good, while they are bad if given in conjunction.)[333] Or,
perhaps, the whole may bear the same name as one of its parts: this,
also, will render the definition impeachable. Still more will it be
impeachable, if it enunciates simply a result or compound of A and B,
without specifying the manner of composition; it ought to declare not
merely the parts of the compound, but also the way in which they are
put together to form the compound.[334]
[Footnote 332: Ibid. a. 22-30. [Greek: e)/ti ei) to\ me\n ô(risme/non
e)n e(ni/ tini pe/phuke tô=| prô/tô| gi/nesthai, e)x ô(=n d'
e)/phêsen au)to\ ei)=nai, mê\ e)n e(ni/ tini tô=| prô/tô|, all'
e(ka/teron e)n e(kate/rô|.]]
[Footnote 333: Topic. VI. xiii. p. 150, a. 30-b. 13.]
[Footnote 334: Ibid. b. 14-26. [Greek: e)/ti ei) mê\ ei)/rêke to\n
tro/pon tê=s sunthe/seôs;] &c.]
_c._ Lastly, suppose the definition to declare that the definiend is
A along with B. You will note, first, that this third head must be
identical either with the first or with the second (_e.g._, honey
_with_ water means either honey and water, or the compound of honey
with water); it will therefore be open to impeachment on one or other
of the above-named grounds of objection, according as the respondent
may admit.[335] You may also distinguish all the different senses in
which one thing may be said to be _with_ another (_e.g._, when the
two are in the same recipient, justice and courage together in the
soul; or in the same place; or in the same time), and you may be able
to show that in none of these senses can the two parts of the
definition be truly said to be one along with the other.[336] Or, if
it be true that these two parts are co-existent in time, you may
enquire whether they are not affirmed with relation to different
correlates. _E.g._, The definition of courage may be tendered thus:
Courage is daring along with right intelligence; upon which you may
remark that daring may have reference to an act of spoliation, and
that right intelligence may have reference to the preservation of
health. Now a man who has both daring and right intelligence in
_these_ senses, cannot be termed courageous, and thus you will have
an argument against the definition. And, even if they be affirmed
with reference to the same correlate (_e.g._, the duties of a
physician), a man who has both daring and right intelligence in
reference to these duties will hardly be styled courageous; the term
courage must be so defined as to have reference to its appropriate
end; _e.g._, the dangers of war, or any still more public-spirited
end.[337] Another mistake may, perhaps, be committed in this same
sort of definition--A along with B; as when, for example, the
definition tendered of anger is--pain along with the belief of being
treated with contempt. What the definer really intends here is, that
the pain arises from the belief of being treated with contempt. But
this is not expressed by the terms of his definition, in any one of
their admissible meanings.[338]
[Footnote 335: Ibid. b. 27-32. [Greek: ô(/st' e)a\n o(poterô|ou=n
tô=n ei)rême/nôn tau)to\n _o(mologê/sê|_ ei)=nai to\ to/de meta\
tou=de, tau)ta\ a(rmo/sei le/gein a(/per pro\s e(ka/teron tou/tôn
e)/mprosthen ei)/rêtai.]]
[Footnote 336: Ibid. b. 32-39. [Greek: ê)\ ô(s e)/n tini tau)tô=|
dektikô=|], &c.]
[Footnote 337: Topic. VI. xiii. p. 151, a. 1-13. [Greek: ou)/te ga\r
pro\s e(/teron au)tôn e(ka/teron dei= le/gesthai ou)/te pro\s
tau)to\n to\ tucho/n, a)lla\ pro\s to\ tê=s a)ndrei/as te/los, oi(=on
pro\s tou\s polemikou\s kindu/nous ê)\ ei)/ ti ma=llon tou/tou
te/los.]]
[Footnote 338: Ibid. a. 14-19.]
34. Perhaps the definition, while including two or more distinct
parts, may be tendered in this form: The definiend is the composition
of A and B; _e.g._, animal is the composition of soul and body. You
will first note that the definer has not declared what sort of
composition. There is a great difference between one mode of
composition and another; the mode must be specialized. Both flesh and
bone may be defined--a composition of fire, earth, and water; but one
mode of composition makes flesh, another makes bone, out of these
same elements. You may also take the farther objection that to define
a compound as composition is erroneous; the two are essentially
disparate, one of them being abstract, the other concrete.[339]
[Footnote 339: Ibid. a. 20-31.]
35. If the definiend be in its nature capable of receiving two
contrary attributes, and if the respondent define it by one or other
of them, you have an argument against him. If one of them is
admissible, the other must be equally so; and upon this supposition
there would be two distinct definitions of the same subject; which
has been already declared impossible. Thus, it is wrong to define the
soul as a substance which is recipient of knowledge; the soul is also
recipient of ignorance.[340]
[Footnote 340: Ibid. a. 32-b. 2.]
36. Perhaps the definiend is not sufficiently well known to enable
you to attack the definition as a whole, but you may find arguments
against one or other of its parts; this is sufficient to upset it. If
it be obscure and unintelligible, you should help to correct and
re-model it until it becomes clear; you will then see what are the
really assailable points in it. When you indicate and expose the
obscurity, the respondent must either substitute some clearer
exposition of his own meaning, or else he must acquiesce in that
which you propose as substitute.[341] If the improved definition
which you propose is obviously clearer and better, his previous
definition is of course put out of court; since there cannot be
several definitions of the same subject.[342]
[Footnote 341: Topic. VI. xiv. p. 151, b. 3-11. [Greek: o(/soi t'
a)saphei=s tô=n o(rismô=n, sundiorthô/santa kai\ suschêmati/santa
pro\s to\ dêlou=n ti kai\ e)/chein e)pichei/rêma, ou(/tôs
e)piskopei=n; a)nagkai=on ga\r tô=| a)pokrinome/nô| ê)\ de/chesthai
to\ e)klambano/menon u(po\ tou= e)rôtô=ntos, ê)\ au)to\n diasaphê=sai
ti/ pote tugcha/nei to\ dêlou/menon u(po\ tou= lo/gou.]]
[Footnote 342: Ibid. b. 12-17.]
To conclude, one suggestion may be given bearing upon all the
arguments that you have to carry on against definitions tendered by
respondents:--Reflect on the definiend, and frame a definition of it
for yourself, as cleverly as you can at the moment; or call to mind
any good definition of it which you may have heard before. This will
serve you as a standard with which to compare the definition
tendered, so that you will see at once what there is in it either
defective or redundant, and where you can find arguments against
it.[343]
[Footnote 343: Ibid. b. 18-23. [Greek: a)na/gkê ga\r, ô(/sper pro\s
para/deigma theô/menon, to/ t' e)llei=pon ô(=n prosê=ken e)/chein
to\n o(rismo\n kai\ to\ proskei/menon perie/rgôs kathora=n, ô(/ste
ma=llon e)picheirêma/tôn eu)porei=n.]]
VII.
In the Seventh Book of the Topica Aristotle continues his review of
the manner of debating theses which profess to define, but enters
also on a collateral question connected with that discussion: viz.,
By what arguments are we to determine whether two Subjects or
Predicates are the same _Numero_ (_modo maxime proprio_), as
distinguished from being the same merely _Specie_ or _Genere_? To
measure the extent of identity between any two subjects, is important
towards the attack and defence of a definition.[344]
[Footnote 344: Ibid. VII. i. p. 151, b. 28: [Greek: po/teron de\
tau)to\n ê)\ e(/teron kata\ to\n kuriô/taton tô=n r(êthe/ntôn peri\
tau)tou= tro/pôn (e)le/geto de\ kuriô/tata tau)to\n to\ tô=|
a)rithmô=| e(/n)] &c.]
Two subjects (A and B) being affirmed as the same _numero_, you may
test this by examining the Derivatives, the Co-ordinates, and the
Opposites, of each. Thus, if courage is identical with justice, the
courageous man will be identical with the just man; courageously will
be identical with justly. Likewise, the opposite of courage (in all
the four modes of Opposition) will be identical with the opposite of
justice. Then, again, the generators and destroyers, the generations
and destructions, of courage, will be identical with those of
justice.[345] If there be any predicate applied to courage in the
superlative degree, the same predicate will also be applied to
justice in the superlative degree.[346] If there be a third subject C
with which A is identical, B also will be identical therewith. The
same attributes predicable of A will also be predicable of B; and, if
the two be attributes, each will be predicable of the same subjects
of which the other is predicable. Both will be comprised in the same
Category, and will have the same genus and differentia. Both will
increase or diminish under the same circumstances. Each, when added
to or subtracted from any third subject, will yield the same
result.[347]
[Footnote 345: Ibid. p. 152, a. 2.]
[Footnote 346: Topic. VII. p. 152, a. 5-30: [Greek: skopei=n de\ kai\
ô(=n tha/teron ma/lista le/getai o(tiou=n, ei) kai\ tha/teron tô=n
au)tôn tou/tôn kata\ to\ au)to\ ma/lista le/getai, katha/per
Xenokra/tês to\n eu)dai/mona bi/on kai\ to\n spoudai=on a)podei/knusi
to\n au)to/n, e)peidê\ pa/ntôn tô=n bi/ôn ai(retô/tatos o( spoudai=os
kai\ o( eu)dai/môn; e(\n ga\r to\ ai(retô/taton kai\ to\ me/giston;]
&c.
Aristotle remarks that Xenokrates here carried his inference too far:
that the application of the same superlative predicate to A and B
affords indeed a presumption that they are _Idem numero_, but not a
conclusive proof thereof; that the predicate might be applied in like
manner, if B were a species comprised in A as genus.
Xenokrates made the mistake of drawing an affirmative conclusion from
syllogistic premisses in the Second figure.]
[Footnote 347: Topic. VII. i. p. 152, a. 31-b. 16.]
Farther, in examining the thesis (A is identical _numero_ with B) you
must look not merely whether it involves actually any impossible
consequences, but also whether any cases can be imagined in which it
would involve such;[348] whether the identity is not merely _specie_
or _genere_; finally, whether the one can exist without the
other.[349]
[Footnote 348: Ibid. b. 17-24. Aristotle illustrates this _locus_ as
follows:--Some say that to be _void_, and to be _full of air_, are
the same. But suppose the air to be drawn away; then the place will
no longer be full of air, yet it will still be void, even more than
it was before. One of the two terms declared to be identical is thus
withdrawn, while the other remains. Accordingly, the two are not
really identical. This illustration fits better to the principle laid
down, b. 34: [Greek: ei) du/naton tha/teron a)/neu thate/rou ei)=nai;
ou) ga\r a)\n ei)/ê tau)to/n.]]
[Footnote 349: Ibid. b. 25-35.]
Such are the various _loci_ available for argument against the thesis
affirming the equivocal predicate _same_. All of them may be useful
when you are impugning a definition; for the characteristic of this
is to declare that the defining proposition is equivalent or
identical with the defined name; and, if you can disprove such
identity, you upset the definition. But these _loci_ will be of
little avail, if your task is to defend or uphold a definition; for,
even if you succeed in establishing the above-mentioned identity, the
definition may still be open to attack for other weaknesses or
defects.[350]
[Footnote 350: Ibid. ii. p. 152, b. 36-p. 158, a. 5. [Greek:
a(/pantes oi( pro\s tau)to\n a)naskeuastikoi\ to/poi kai\ pro\s
o(/ron chrê/simoi--tô=n de\ kataskeuastikô=n to/pôn ou)dei\s
chrê/simos pro\s o(/ron;] &c.]
To uphold, or prove by way of syllogism, requires a different
procedure. It is a task hard, but not impossible. Most disputants
assume without proving their definition, in the same way as the
teachers of Geometry and Arithmetic do in their respective sciences.
Aristotle tells us that he does not here intend to give a didactic
exposition of Definition, nor of the proper way of defining
accurately or scientifically. To do this (he says) belongs to the
province of Analytic; while in the present treatise he is dealing
merely with Dialectic. For the purposes, then, of Dialectic, he
declares that syllogistic proof of a definition is practicable,
inasmuch as the definition is only a proposition declaring what is
essential to the definiend; and nothing is essential except genus (or
genera) and differentiæ.[351]
[Footnote 351: Topic. VII. iii. p. 153, a. 6-22. Compare Analyt.
Post. II. iii.-x., where the theory of Scientific Definition is
elaborately worked out; supra, Vol. I. ch. viii. pp. 346-353.]
Towards the establishment of the definition which you have to defend,
you may find arguments by examining the Contraries and Opposites of
the component terms, and of the defining proposition. If the opposite
of the definition is allowed as defining properly the opposite of the
definiend, you may argue from hence that your own definition is a
good one.[352] If you can show that there is declared in your
definition a partial correspondence of contraries either separately
in the genus, or separately in the differentia, you have a certain
force of argument in your favour; and, if you can make out both the
two separately, this will suffice for your entire definition.[353]
You may also draw arguments from the Derivatives, or Co-ordinates of
your own terms; from Analogous Terms, or from Comparates (More or
Less). If the definition of any one of these is granted to you, an
argument is furnished for the defence of an analogous definition in
the case of your own term. If it is conceded as a good definition
that forgetfulness is--the casting away of knowledge, then the
definition must also hold good that to forget is--to cast away
knowledge. If destruction is admitted to be well defined--dissolution
of essence, then to be destroyed is well defined--to be dissolved as
to essence. If the wholesome may be defined--that which is productive
of health, then also the profitable may be defined--that which is
productive of good; that is, if the declaration of the special end
makes a good definition in one case, so it will also in the
other.[354]
[Footnote 352: Ibid. a. 28: [Greek: ei) ga\r o( a)ntikei/menos tou=
a)ntikeime/nou, kai\ to\n ei)rême/nou tou= prokeime/nou a)na/gkê
ei)=nai (o(/ron).]]
[Footnote 353: Ibid. b. 14: [Greek: katho/lou d' ei)pei=n, e)pei\ o(
o(rismo/s e)stin e)k ge/nous kai\ diaphorô=n, a)\n o( tou= e)nanti/ou
o(rismo\s phanero\s ê)=|, kai\ o( tou= prokeime/nou o(rismo\s
phanero\s e)/stai.]]
[Footnote 354: Topic. VII. iii. p. 153, b. 25-p. 154, a. 11: [Greek:
e)/ti e)k tô=n ptô/seôn kai\ tô=n sustoi/chôn; a)na/gkê a)kolouthei=n
ta\ ge/nê toi=s ge/nesin kai\ tou\s o(/rous toi=s o(/rois.--e(no\s
ou)=n o(poiouou=n tô=n ei)rême/nôn o(molêthe/ntos, a)na/gkê ki\ ta\
loipa\ o(mologei=sthai.--kai\ e)k tô=n o(moi/ôs e)cho/ntôn pro\s
a)/llêla--o(moi/ôs ga\r e(/kaston tô=n ei)rême/nôn pro\s to\
oi)kei=on te/los e)/chei.]]
These _loci_, from _Analoga_, from Derivatives, from Conjugates, are
of the most frequent avail in dialectical debates or definitions. The
disputant must acquire promptitude in the employment of them. He must
learn, moreover, to test a definition tendered to him by calling to
mind particulars and sub-species, so as to determine whether the
definition fits them all. Such a procedure will be found especially
serviceable in debate with one who upholds the Platonic Ideas. Care
must also be taken to see whether the definiend is distorted from its
proper signification, or whether it is used in defining itself.[355]
[Footnote 355: Topic. VII. iv. p. 154, a. 12-22.]
These last observations are addressed to the questioner or assailant
of the definition. We have already seen however that his task is
comparatively easy; the grand difficulty is to defend a definition.
The respondent cannot at once see what he ought to aim at; and, even
when he does see it, he has farther difficulty in obtaining the
requisite concessions from his opponent, who may decline to grant
that the two parts of the definition tendered are really the genus
and differentia of the definiend; while, if there be any thing
besides these two parts contained in the essence of the definiend,
there is an excuse for declining to grant it.[356] The opponent
succeeds, if he can establish one single contradictory instance;
accordingly, a syllogism with particular conclusion will serve his
purpose. The respondent on the other hand, must meet each one of
these instances, must establish an universal conclusion, and must
show that his definition reciprocates with the definiend, so that,
wherever the latter is predicable, the former is predicable likewise,
and not in any other case whatever.[357]
[Footnote 356: Topic. VII. v. p. 154, a. 23, seq. [Greek: kai\ ga\r
i)dei=n au)to\n kai\ labei=n para\ tô=n e)rôtôme/nôn ta\s toiau/tas
prota/seis ou)k eu)pete/s], &c.]
[Footnote 357: Ibid. a. 32-b. 12.]
So much greater are the difficulties belonging to the defence of a
Definition, as compared with the attack upon it; and the same may be
said about attack and defence of a Proprium, and of a Genus. In both
cases, the assailant will carry his point, if he can show that the
predicate in question is not predicable, in this relation, of all, or
that it is not predicable, in this relation, of any one. But the
defendant is required to make good the universal against every
separate objection advanced against any one of the particulars. It is
a general rule, that the work of destruction is easier than that of
construction; and the present cases come under that rule.[358] The
hardest of all theses to defend, and the easiest to overthrow, is
where Definition is affirmed; for the respondent in this case is
required to declare well the essence of his subject, and he stands in
need of the greatest number of auxiliary data; while all the _Loci_
for attack, even those properly belonging to the Proprium, the Genus,
and the Accident, are available against him.[359] Next in order, as
regards difficulty of defence, comes the theses affirming Proprium;
where the respondent has to make out, not merely that the predicate
belongs to the subject, but that it belongs thereunto exclusively and
reciprocally: here also all the _Loci_ for attack, even those
properly belonging to Accident, are available.[360] Easiest of all
theses to defend, while it is the hardest to impugn, is that in which
Accident alone is affirmed--the naked fact, that the predicate A
belongs to the Subject B, without investing it with the character
either of Genus or Proprium. Here what is affirmed is a minimum,
requiring the smallest array of data to be conceded; moreover, the
_Loci_ available for attack are the fewest, since many of those which
may be employed against Genus, Proprium, and Definition, have no
application against a thesis affirming merely Accident.[361] Indeed,
if the thesis affirmed be only a proposition particular (and not
universal), affirming Accident (and nothing more), the task of
refuting it will be more difficult than that of maintaining it.[362]
[Footnote 358: Ibid. b. 13-32. [Greek: e)/oike d', ô(/sper kai\ e)n
toi=s a)/llois to\ diaphthei=rai toi= poiê=sai r(a=|on, ou(/tô kai\
e)pi\ tou/tôn to\ a)naskeua/sai tou= kataskeua/sai.]]
[Footnote 359: Topic. VII. v. p. 155, a. 3-21: [Greek: phanero\n de\
kai\ dio/ti pa/ntôn r(a=|ston o(/ron a)naskeua/sai.]]
[Footnote 360: Ibid. a. 23-27. Aristotle has in view the most
complete Proprium: belonging _omni_, _soli_, _et semper_.]
[Footnote 361: Ibid. a. 28-36: [Greek: r(a=|ston de\ pa/ntôn
kataskeua/sai to\ sumbebêko/s;--a)naskeua/zein de\ chalepô/taton to\
sumbebêko/s, o(/ti e)la/chista e)n au)tô=| de/dotai], &c.]
[Footnote 362: Ibid. p. 154, b. 36-p. 155, a. 2: [Greek: to\ d' e)pi\
me/rous a)na/palin r(a=|on kataskeua/sai ê)\ a)naskeua/sai;
kataskeua/zonti me\n ga\r a)po/chrê dei=xai tini\ u(pa/rchon,
a)naskeua/zonti de\ deikte/on o(/ti ou)deni\ u(pa/rchei.]]
VIII.
The Eighth Book of the Topica brings our attention back to the
general considerations contained in the First. In the intervening
part of the treatise we have had the quadruple distribution of
dialectical problems, with the enumeration of those _Loci_ of
argument which bear upon each or all: we are now invited to study the
application of these distinctions in practice, and with this view to
look once more both at the persons and the purposes of dialectical
debate. What is the order of procedure most suitable, first, for the
questioner or assailant; next, for the respondent or defender?[363]
This order of procedure marks the distinctive line of separation
between the dialectician and the man of science or philosopher: to
both of them the _Loci_ of arguments are alike available, though each
of them deals with those arguments in his own way, and in an
arrangement suitable for his purpose.[364] The dialectician, being
engaged in debate, must shape his questions, and regulate his march
as questioner, according to the concessions obtained or likely to be
obtained from his respondent; who, if a question be asked having an
obvious refutative bearing on the thesis, will foresee the
consequences of answering in the affirmative, and will refuse to
grant what is asked. On the contrary, the philosopher, who pursues
investigation with a view to his own satisfaction alone, is under no
similar restriction. He looks out at once for such premisses as
conduct straight to a conclusion; and, the more obvious their bearing
on the conclusion is, the more scientific will the syllogism be, and
the better will he be pleased.[365]
[Footnote 363: Ibid. VIII. i. p. 155, b. 3: [Greek: meta\ de\ tau=ta
peri\ ta/xeôs, kai\ pô=s dei= e)rôta=n, lekte/on.]]
[Footnote 364: Topic. VIII. i. p. 155, b. 7: [Greek: me/chri me\n
ou)=n tou= eu(rei=n to\n to/pon, o(moi/ôs tou= philoso/phou kai\ tou=
dialektikou= ê( ske/psis, to\ d' ê)/dê tau=ta ta/ttein kai\
e)rôtêmati/zein i)/dion tou= dialektikou=.]]
[Footnote 365: Ibid. b. 10-16.]
In the _praxis dialectica_ (as has already been stated) two talkers
are assumed--the respondent who sets up a thesis which he undertakes
to defend, and a questioner who interrogates with a view to impugn
it; or at least with a view to compel the other to answer in an
inconsistent or contradictory manner. We are to assume, farther, a
circle of listeners, who serve to a certain extent as guarantees
against any breach of the rules of debate.[366] Three distinct
purposes may be supposed in the debate. 1. You as a questioner may be
a teacher, and the respondent a learner; your purpose is to teach
what you know, while he wishes to learn from you what he does not
know. 2. You engage in an intellectual contest or duel with the
respondent, each of you seeking only victory over the other, though
subject on both sides to observance of the rules of debate. 3. You
neither seek to teach, nor to conquer; you and the respondent have
both the same purpose--to test the argumentative consequences of
different admissions, and to acquire a larger command of the chains
of reasoning _pro_ and _con_, bearing on some given topic.[367]
[Footnote 366: Ibid. ii. p. 158, a. 10.]
[Footnote 367: Ibid. v. p. 159, a. 26: [Greek: ou) ga\r oi( au)toi\
skopoi\ toi=s dida/skousin ê)\ mantha/nousi kai\ toi=s
a)gnônizome/nois, ou)de\ tou/tois te kai\ toi=s diatri/bousi met'
a)llê/lôn ske/psis cha/rin.]]
According as the aim of the talkers is one or other of these three,
the good or bad conduct of the dialogue, on the part both of
questioner and of respondent, must be differently appreciated. Of
each of the three, specimens may be found in Plato, though not
carefully severed but running one into the other. Aristotle appears
to have been the first to formulate the distinction theoretically,
and to prescribe for the practice of each separately. He tells us
particularly that no one before him had clearly distinguished the
third head, and prescribed for it apart from the second. The merit of
having first done this he expressly claims for the Topica.[368]
[Footnote 368: Topic. VIII. v. p. 159, a. 25-37: [Greek: e)pei\ d'
e)sti\n a)dio/rista toi=s gumnasi/as kai\ pei/ras e(/neka tou\s
lo/gous poioume/nois--e)n de\ tai=s dialektikai=s suno/dois toi=s mê\
a)gô=nos cha/rin a)lla\ pei/ras kai\ ske/pseôs tou\s lo/gous
**poioume/nois, ou) **diê/rthrôtai/ pô ti/nos dei= stocha/zesthai
to\n a)pokrino/menon kai\ o(poi=a dido/nai kai\ poi=a mê/, pro\s to\
kalô=s ê)\ mê\ kalô=s phula/ttein tê\n the/sin. _e)pei\ ou)=n ou)de\n
e)/chomen paradedome/non u(p' a)/llôn, au)toi/ ti peirathô=men
ei)pei=n_.]]
Both the questioner and the respondent have a duty towards the
dialogue; their common purpose is to conduct it well, not only
obeying the peremptory rules, but displaying, over and above, skill
for the attainment of their separate ends. Under the first and third
heads, both may be alike successful. Under the second or contentious
head, indeed, one only of the two can gain the victory; yet, still,
even the defeated party may exhibit the maximum of skill which his
position admits. This is sufficient for his credit; so that the
common work will still be well performed.[369] But a partner who
performs his own part so as to obstruct instead of forwarding this
common work--who conducts the debate in a spirit of ill-tempered
contention rather than of regular Dialectic--deserves censure.[370]
[Footnote 369: Ibid. xi. p. 161, a. 19-b. 10: [Greek: ou) ga\r
e)/stin e)pi\ thate/rô| mo/non to\ lalô=s e)pitelesthê=nai to\
koino\n e)/rgon--e)pei\ de\ phau=los koinôno\s o( e)mpodi/zôn to\
koino\n e)/rgon, dê=lon o(/ti kai\ e)n lo/gô|.] Compare Topica, I.
iii. p. 101, b. 8.]
[Footnote 370: Ibid. a. 33: [Greek: dialektikô=s kai\ _mê\_
e)ristikô=s].--b. 2-18.]
Having thus in view the dialogue as a partnership for common profit,
Aristotle administers counsel to the questioning as well as to the
responding partner. You as questioner have to deal with a thesis set
up by the respondent. You see at once what the syllogism is that is
required to prove the contrary or contradictory of that thesis; and
your business is so to shape your questions as to induce the
respondent to concede the premisses necessary towards that syllogism.
If you ask him at once and directly to concede these premisses, he
sees your drift and answers in the negative. You must therefore begin
your approaches from a greater distance. You must ask questions
bearing only indirectly and remotely upon your ultimate
conclusion.[371] These outlying and preparatory questions will fall
under four principal heads. Either (1) they will be inductive
particulars, multiplied in order that you may obtain assent to an
universal comprising them all; or (2) they will be put for the
purpose of giving dignity to your discourse; or (3) they will be
shaped with a view to conceal or keep out of sight the ultimate
conclusion that you aim at; or (4), lastly, they will be introduced
to make your whole argument clearer.[372] The third of these four
general heads--the head of questions for the purpose of
concealment--comes out principally in dialectical contests for
victory. In those it is of supreme importance, and the result depends
much on the employment of it; but even in other dialectical debates
you must employ it to a certain extent.[373]
[Footnote 371: Topic. VIII. i. p. 155, b. 29: [Greek: ta\s me\n ou)=n
a)nagkai/as, di' ô(=n o( sullogismo/s, ou)k eu)thu\s au)ta\s
protate/on, a)ll' a)postate/on o(/ti a)nôta/tô], &c.]
[Footnote 372: Topic. VIII. i. p. 155, b. 20.]
[Footnote 373: Ibid. b. 26.]
Aristotle goes at great length into the means of Concealment. Suppose
the proposition which you desire to get conceded is, The science of
two contraries is the same. You will find it useful to commence by a
question more general: _e.g._, Is the science of two opposites the
same? If the respondent answers in the affirmative, you will deduce
from his concession, by syllogism, the conclusion which you desire.
If he answers in the negative, you must then try to arrive at your
end by a string of questions respecting particular contraries or
opposites; which if the respondent grants successively, you will
bring in your general question ultimately as the inductive result
from those concessions.[374] Your particulars must be selected from
obvious matters of sense and notoriety. You are likely to obtain in
this way admissions which will serve as premisses for several
different prosyllogisms, not indeed sufficient by themselves, yet
valuable as conditions and preliminaries to the final syllogism
whereby the thesis is refuted. For, when the questions are put in
this way, the respondent will not see your drift nor the consequences
of his own concessions; so that he will more readily concede what you
want.[375] The better to conceal your purpose, you will refrain from
drawing out any of these prosyllogisms clearly at once; you will not
even put the major and minor premiss of any one of them in immediate
sequence; but you will confound the order of them intentionally,
stating first a premiss belonging to one, and next a premiss
belonging to another.[376] The respondent, thus kept in the dark,
answers in the affirmative to each of your questions successively. At
length you find that you have obtained a sufficient number of
concessions from him, to enable you to prove the syllogism
contradictory of his thesis. You inform him of this; and it shows the
perfect skill and success of your procedure, when he expresses
surprise at the announcement, and asks on what premisses you
reckon.[377]
[Footnote 374: Ibid. b. 34: [Greek: a)\n de\ mê\ tithê=|, di'
e)pagôgê=s lêpte/on, protei/nanta e)pi\ tô=n kata\ me/ros
e)nanti/ôn.]]
[Footnote 375: Ibid. p. 156, a. 7: [Greek: kru/ptonta de\
prosullogi/zesthai di' ô(=n o( sullogismo\s tou= e)x a)rchê=s me/llei
gi/nesthai, kai\ tau=ta ô(s plei=sta.]]
[Footnote 376: Ibid. a. 23: [Greek: chrê/simon de\ kai\ to\ mê\
sunechê= ta\ a)xiô/mata lamba/nein e)x ô(=n oi( sullogismoi/, a)ll'
e)nalla\x to\ pro\s e(/teron kai\ e(/teron sumpe/rasma.]]
[Footnote 377: Topic. VIII. i. p. 156, a. 13: [Greek: katho/lou d'
ei)pei=n, ou(/tô dei= e)rôta=n to\n kruptikô=s punthano/menon, ô(/st'
ê)rôtême/nou tou= panto\s lo/gou kai\ ei)po/ntos to\ sumpe/rasma
zêtei=sthai to\ dia\ ti/.]]
There are also other manoeuvres serving your purpose of concealment,
and preventing the respondent from seeing beforehand the full
pertinence of your questions. Thus, if you wish to obtain the
definition of your major, you will do well to ask the definition, not
of the term itself but, of some one among its conjugates. You will
put your question, as if the answer were of little importance in
itself, and as if you did not care whether it was given in the
affirmative or in the negative;[378] you will sometimes even suggest
objections to that which you are seeming to aim at. All this will
give you the air of a candid disputant; it will throw the respondent
off his guard, and make him more ready to answer as he really thinks,
without alarm for the consequences.[379] When you wish to get a
certain premiss conceded, you will put the question first upon a
different premiss analogous to it. In putting your question, you will
add that the answer which you desire is a matter of course, familiar
and admitted by every one; for respondents are shy of contradicting
any received belief, unless they have present to their minds a clear
instance adverse to it.[380] You will never manifest apparent
earnestness about an answer; which would make the respondent less
willing to concede it.[381] You will postpone until the last the
premiss which you wish to obtain, and will begin by putting questions
the answers to which serve as remote premisses behind it, only in the
end conducting to it as consequence. Generally speaking, questioners
do the reverse, putting first the questions about which they are most
anxious; while most respondents, aware of this habit, are most
intractable in regard to the first questions, except some
presumptuous and ill-tempered disputants, who concede what is asked
at first but afterwards become obstinate in denegation.[382] You will
throw in some irrelevant questions with a view to lengthen the
procedure, like fallacious geometers who complicate a diagram by
drawing unnecessary lines. Amidst a multitude of premisses falsehood
is more likely to escape detection; and thus, also, you may perhaps
be able to slip in, unperceived and in a corner, some important
premiss, which, if put as a separate question by itself, would
certainly not have been granted.[383]
[Footnote 378: Ibid. b. 6: [Greek: a(plô=s d' ei)pei=n, o(/ti
ma/lista poiei=n a)/dêlon, po/teron to\ proteino/menon ê)\ to\
a)ntikei/menon bou/letai labei=n; a)dê/lou ga\r o)/ntos tou= pro\s
to\n lo/gon chrêsi/mou, ma=llon to\ dokou=n au(toi=s tithe/asin.]]
[Footnote 379: Ibid. b. 18: [Greek: dei= de\ kai\ au)to/n pote
au(tô=| e)/nstasin phe/rein; a)nupo/ptôs ga\r e)/chousin oi(
a)pokrino/menoi pro\s tou\s dokou=ntas dikai/ôs e)picheirei=n.]]
[Footnote 380: Ibid. b. 10, 20: [Greek: chrê/simon de\ kai\ to\
e)pile/gein o(/ti su/nêthes kai\ lego/menon to\ toiou=ton; o)knou=si
ga\r kinei=n to\ ei)ôtho/s, e)/nstasin mê\ e)/chontes.]]
[Footnote 381: Ibid. b. 23: [Greek: e)/ti to\ mê\ spouda/zein].]
[Footnote 382: Ibid. b. 30-39: [Greek: kai\ to\ e)p' e)scha/tô|
e)rôta=n o(\ ma/lista bou/letai labei=n;] &c.]
[Footnote 383: Topic. VIII. i. p. 157, a. 1-5: [Greek: e)/ti to\
mêku/nein kai\ paremba/llein ta\ mêde\n chrê/sima pro\s to\n lo/gon,
katha/per oi( pseudographou=ntes; pollô=n ga\r o)/ntôn a)/dêlon e)n
o(poi/ô| to\ pseu=dos. dio\ kai\ lantha/nousin e)ni/ote oi(
e)rôtô=ntes e)n parabu/stô| prostithe/ntes a(\ kath' au(ta\
proteino/mena ou)k a)\n tethei/ê.]]
Such are the multifarious suggestions addressed by Aristotle to the
questioner for concealing his method of attack;[384] Concealment
being the third of the four general heads relating to the treatment
of premisses not immediately necessary for proof of the final
refutative conclusion. On the other three general heads--Induction
from particulars to an universal, Dignity, Clearness--Aristotle goes
into less detail. For Clearness, he recommends that examples should
be introduced; especially familiar examples, taken from well-known
poets like Homer, not from obscure poets like Choerilus.[385]
[Footnote 384: Ibid. a. 6: [Greek: ei)s me\n ou)=n pru/psin toi=s
ei)rême/nois chrêste/on], &c.]
[Footnote 385: Ibid. a. 14.]
In regard to Induction, Aristotle points out an embarrassment often
arising from the want of suitable universal names. When, after having
obtained an affirmative answer about several similar particulars, you
wish to put a question generalizing the result, you will sometimes
find no universal term fitting the position. You are obliged to say:
Will it not be so in all such cases? and this lets in a serious
difficulty, how to know what other cases are like, and what are not.
Here the respondent will often dispute your right to include this or
that other particular.[386] You will do well to coin a new universal
term fitting the situation.
[Footnote 386: Ibid. ii. p. 157, a. 18-33. [Greek: dio\ peirate/on
e)pi\ pa/ntôn tô=n toiou/tôn o)nomatopoiei=n au)to/n], &c.]
If the respondent answers in the affirmative to several questions of
similar particulars, but answers in the negative when you sum them up
in an universal comprehending all similar cases,--you may require him
to cite some particular case justifying his denial; though you cannot
require him to do this before he has made the affirmative
answers.[387] It is not sufficient that he should cite, as the single
case of exception, the express case which forms the subject of the
thesis: He ought to produce some distinct and independent instance,
really comprised within the genus, and not merely connected with it
by the link of an equivocal term.[388] If he produces an adverse
instance really comprised within the genus, you may perhaps be able
to re-model your question, so as to make reserve for the basis on
which this objection is founded. The respondent will then be
compelled (unless he can foresee some new case of objection) to
concede the universal with this special qualification; so that you
will have gained all that you really require. Should the respondent
continue to refuse, without producing any new case, he will
transgress the rules of Dialectic; which recognize an universal
affirmative, wherever there are numerous affirmative particulars
without one assignable negative.[389] Indeed, if you know the
universal to hold in many particular cases, and do not know of any
others adverse, you may boldly put your question at once in reference
to the universal (without going first through the series of
particulars). The respondent will hardly venture to deny it, not
having in his mind any negative particulars.[390]
[Footnote 387: Ibid. a. 34-37.]
[Footnote 388: Ibid. a. 37-b. 8.]
[Footnote 389: Topic. VIII. ix. p. 1577, b. 8-33. [Greek: dialektikê\
ga/r e)sti pro/tasis pro\s ê(\n ou(/tôs e)pi\ pollô=n e)/chousan mê\
e)/stin e)/nstasis.]]
[Footnote 390: Ibid. p. 158, a. 3-6.]
You must however keep in mind what a dialectic universal premiss
really is. Not every question requiring an universal answer is
allowed to be put. You must not ask for positive information, nor put
such questions as the following: What is man? In how many different
senses is good employed? A dialectic question is one to which the
respondent makes sufficient reply by saying, Yes or No.[391] You must
ask in this form: Is the definition of man so and so? Is good
enunciated in this or that different sense? To these questions the
respondent may answer Yes or No. But if he persists in negative
answers to your multiplied questions as to this or that sense of the
term good, you may perhaps stand excused for asking him: "In how many
different senses, then, do you yourself use the term good?"[392]
[Footnote 391: Ibid. p. 158, a. 14, seq. [Greek: e)/sti ga\r
pro/tasis dialektikê\ pro\s ê(\n e)/stin a)pokri/nasthai nai\ ê)\
ou)/.]]
[Footnote 392: Ibid. a. 21-24.]
When you have obtained concessions which furnish premisses for a
formal syllogism, you will draw out and propound that syllogism and
its conclusion forthwith, without asking any farther question from
the respondent or any leave from him to do so. He may indeed deny
your right to do this, in spite of the concessions which he has made;
and the auditors around, not fully appreciating all his concessions,
may perhaps think that he is entitled to deny it. But, if you ask his
leave to draw out the syllogism and he refuses to give leave, the
auditors are much more likely to think that your syllogism is not
allowable.[393] If you have the choice between an ostensive syllogism
and a _Reductio ad Absurdum_, you ought always to prefer the former,
as plainer and more incontestable.[394]
[Footnote 393: Ibid. a. 7-12: [Greek: ou) dei= de\ to\ sumpe/rasma
e)rô/têma poiei=n; ei) de\ mê/, a)naneu/santos ou) dokei= gegone/nai
sullogismo/s.]]
[Footnote 394: Topic. VIII. ii. p. 158, b. 34-p. 158, a. 2.]
You must not persevere long in the same line of questions. For, if
the respondent answers them all, it will soon appear that you are in
the wrong course, since your syllogism, if you can get one at all,
will always be obtained from a small number of premisses; and, if the
respondent will not answer them, you have no alternative except to
protest and desist.[395]
[Footnote 395: Ibid. p. 158, a. 25-30.]
The theses that are most difficult to attack are also most easy to
defend; and these are the highest universals, and the lowest
particulars. The highest you cannot deal with, unless you can get a
definition of them; which is sometimes impossible and always
difficult; since the respondent will neither define them himself nor
accept your definitions. Those which are next to the highest are also
difficult to impugn, because there are few intermediate steps of
proof. Again, the lowest particulars are also difficult for the
contrary reason, that there are so many intermediate steps, and it is
tedious to enumerate them all continuously; while, if any are
omitted, the demonstration is incomplete, and the procedure will
appear sophistical.[396] The most difficult of all to impugn are
definitions framed in vague and unintelligible terms, where you do
not know whether they are univocal or equivocal, literal or
metaphorical. When the thesis tendered to you presents such
difficulty, you may presume that it is affected with the obscurity of
terms here indicated; or, at any rate, that its terms stand in need
of definition.[397] In geometrical construction, as well as in
dialectical debate, it is indispensable that the _principia_ or
primary terms should be defined, and defined properly; without this,
neither the one nor the other can be pursued.[398]
[Footnote 396: Ibid. iii. p. 158, a. 31, seq. [Greek: ê)\
sophismatô/dê phai/netai ta\ e)picheirê/mata.]]
[Footnote 397: Ibid. iii. p. 158, b. 8-23; p. 159, a. 3: [Greek:
ou)/koun dei= lantha/nein, o(/tan dusepichei/rêtos ê)=| ê( the/sis,
o(/ti pe/ponthe/ ti tô=n ei)rême/nôn.]]
[Footnote 398: Ibid. p. 158, b. 24-p. 159, a. 2.]
Sometimes the major and minor premisses of your syllogistic
conclusion are more difficult to establish--more beyond the level of
average intelligence--than the thesis itself. In such a case some may
think that the respondent ought to grant these premisses, because, if
he refuses and requires them to be proved, he will be imposing upon
the questioner a duty more arduous than the thesis itself imposes;
others may say that he ought not to grant them, because, if he did,
he would be acknowledging a conclusion derived from premisses
requiring proof as much or more than itself.[399] A distinction must
here be made. If you are putting questions with a view to teach, the
learner ought not to grant such premisses as those above described,
because he is entitled to require that in every step of the process
he shall be inducted from what is more knowable to what is less
knowable. Accordingly, when you attempt to demonstrate to him
something which he knows little, by requiring him to concede
something which he knows still less, he cannot be advised to grant
what you ask. But, if you are debating with a companion for the
purpose of dialectical exercise, he ought to grant what you ask
whenever the affirmative really appears to him true.[400]
[Footnote 399: Topic. VIII. iii. p. 159, a. 4-11. [Greek: o(/tan d'
ê)=| pro\s to\ a)xi/ôma kai\ tê\n pro/tasin mei=zon e)/rgon
dialegê=nai ê)\ tê\n the/sin, diaporê/seien a)/n tis po/teron
thete/on ta\ toiau=ta ê)\ ou)/;] &c.]
[Footnote 400: Ibid. a. 11-14: [Greek: ê)\ tô=| me\n mantha/nonti ou)
thete/on, a)\n mê\ gnôrimô/teron ê)=|, tô=| de\ gumnazome/nô|
thete/on, a)\n a)lêthe\s mo/non phai/nêtai. ô(/ste phanero\n o(/ti
ou)ch o(moi/ôs e)rôtô=nti/ te ki\ dida/skonti a)xiôte/on tithe/nai.]
This section is obscure and difficult. I am not sure that I
understand it. It seems doubtful whether the verb [Greek: tithe/nai]
is intended to apply to the questioner or to the respondent.]
We have now said enough for the purpose of instructing the questioner
how to frame and marshal his interrogations. We must turn to the
respondent, and point out how _he_ must answer in order to do well
and perform his duty to the common work of dialogue. Speaking
generally, the task of the questioner is to conduct the dialogue so
as to make the respondent enunciate the most improbable and absurd
replies which follow necessarily from the thesis that he has
undertaken to defend; while the task of the respondent is to make it
appear that these absurdities follow from the thesis itself, and not
from his manner of defending it. The respondent may err in one of two
ways, or indeed in both together: either he may set up an
indefensible thesis; or he may fail to defend it in the best manner
that it really admits; or he may do both. The second is a worse error
than the first, in reference to the general purpose of
Dialectic.[401]
[Footnote 401: Ibid. iv. p. 159, a. 15-24: [Greek: tou= d'
a)pokrinome/nou to\ mê\ di' au)to\n phai/nesthai sumbai/nein to\
a)du/naton ê)\ to\ para/doxon, a)lla\ dia\ tê\n the/sin; e(te/ra ga\r
i)/sôs a(marti/a to\ the/sthai prô=ton o(\ mê\ dei= kai\ to\
the/menon mê\ phula/xai kata\ tro/pon.]]
Aristotle distinguishes (as has been already stated) three purposes
in the dialogue:--(1) Teaching and Learning; (2) Contention, where
both questioner and respondent strive only for victory; (3)
Investigating and Testing the consequences of some given
doctrine.[402] The first two of these three are dismissed rapidly. In
the first, the teaching questioner has no intention of deceiving, and
the pupil respondent has only to answer by granting all that appears
to him true.[403] In the second, Aristotle tells us only that the
questioner must always appear as if he were making some point of his
own; while the respondent, on his side, must always appear as if no
point were made against him.[404] But in regard to the third
head--dialogues of Search, Testing, Exercise--he is more copious in
suggestions: he considers these as the proper field of Dialectic,
and, as we saw, claims to have been the first who treated them apart
from the didactic dialogues on one side, and the contentious on the
other.[405]
[Footnote 402: Ibid. v. p. 159, a. 24-28.]
[Footnote 403: Ibid. a. 29: [Greek: tô=| me\n ga\r mantha/nonti
thete/on a)ei\ ta\ dokou=nta; kai\ ga\r ou)/d' e)picheirei= pseu=dos
ou)dei\s dida/skein.]]
[Footnote 404: Topic. VIII. iv. p. 159,. a. 30: [Greek: tô=n d'
a)gnônizome/nôn to\n me\n e)rôtô=nta phai/nesthai/ ti dei= poiei=n
pa/ntôs, to\n d' a)pokrino/menon mêde\n phai/nesthai pa/schein.]]
[Footnote 405: Ibid. a. 32-37; xi. p. 161, a. 23-25: [Greek:
duskolai/nontes ou)=n a)gnônistika\s kai\ ou) dialektika\s poiou=ntai
ta\s diatriba/s; e)/ti d' e)pei\ gumnasi/as kai\ pei/ras cha/rin
a)ll' ou) didaskali/as oi( toiou=toi tô=n lo/gôn], &c.]
The thesis which the respondent undertakes to defend (in a dialogue
of Search or Testing) must be either probable, or improbable, or
neither one nor the other. The probability or improbability may be
either simple and absolute, or special and relative--in the
estimation of the respondent himself or of some one or more persons.
Now, if the thesis be improbable, the opposite thereof, which you the
questioner try to prove, must be probable; if the thesis be probable,
the opposite thereof must be improbable; if the thesis be neither,
its opposite will also be neither. Suppose, first, that the thesis is
improbable absolutely. In that case, its opposite, which you the
questioner must fish for premisses to prove, will be probable; the
respondent therefore ought not to grant you any demand which is
either simply improbable or less probable than the conclusion which
you aim at proving; for no such concessions can really serve your
purpose, since you are bound to prove your conclusion from premisses
more probable than itself.[406] Suppose, next, that the thesis is
probable absolutely. In that case, the opposite conclusion, which you
have to make out, will be improbable absolutely. Accordingly,
whenever you ask concessions that are probable, the respondent ought
to grant them; whenever you ask for concessions that are less
improbable than your intended conclusion, he ought to grant these
also; but, if you ask for any thing more improbable than your
intended conclusion, he ought to refuse it.[407] Suppose, thirdly,
that the thesis is neither probable nor improbable. Here, too, the
respondent ought to grant all concessions that appear to him
probable, as well as all that he thinks more probable than the
opposite conclusion which you are seeking to arrive at; but no
others. This is sufficient for the purpose of Dialectic, and for
keeping open the lines of probable argument.[408]
[Footnote 406: Ibid. v. p. 159, b. 9: [Greek: phanero\n ô(s a)do/xou
me\n o)/ntos a(plô=s tou= keime/nou ou) dote/on tô=| a)pokrinome/nô|
ou)/th' o(\ mê\ dokei= a(plô=s, ou)/th' o(\ dokei= me/n ê(=tton de\
tou= sumpera/smatos dokei=. a)do/xou ga\r ou)/sês tê=s the/seôs
e)/ndoxon to\ sumpe/rasma, ô(/ste dei= ta\ lambano/mena e)ndoxa
pa/nt' ei)=nai kai\ ma=llon e)/ndoxa tou= prokeime/nou, ei) me/llei
dia\ tô=n gnôrimôte/rôn to\ ê(=tton gnô/rimon perai/nesthai. ô(/st'
ei)/ ti mê\ toiou=to/n e)sti tô=n e)rôtôme/nôn, ou) thete/on tô=|
a)pokrinome/nô|.]]
[Footnote 407: Ibid. b. 16.]
[Footnote 408: Topic. VIII. v. p. 159, b. 19-23: [Greek: i(kanô=s
ga\r a)\n do/xeie dieile/chthai--ou(/tô ga\r e)ndoxote/rous
sumbê/setai tou\s lo/gous gi/nesthai.]]
When the probability or improbability of the thesis is considered
simply and absolutely, the respondent ought to measure his
concessions by the standard of opinion received usually.[409] When
the probability or improbability of the thesis is considered as
referable to the respondent himself, he has only to consult his own
judgment and estimation in granting or refusing what is asked. When
he undertakes to defend a thesis avowedly as the doctrine of some
known philosopher, such as Herakleitus, he must, in giving his
answers, measure probability and improbability according to what
Herakleitus would determine.[410]
[Footnote 409: Ibid. b. 24: [Greek: pro\s ta\ dokou=nta a(plô=s tê\n
**su/gkrisin poiête/on].]
[Footnote 410: Ibid. b. 25-35. [Greek: pro\s tê\n e)kei/nou dia/noian
a)poble/ponta thete/on e(/kasta kai\ a)rnête/on].]
Since all the questions that you ask must be either probable,
improbable, or neuter, and either relevant[411] or not relevant to
your purpose of refuting the thesis, let us first suppose that you
ask for a concession which is in itself probable, but not relevant.
The respondent ought to grant it, adding that he thinks it probable.
If what you ask is neither probable nor relevant, he ought even then
to grant it; but annexing a notification that he is aware of its
improbability, in order to save his own credit for intelligence.[412]
If it be both probable and relevant, he ought to say that he is aware
of its probability, but that it is too closely connected with the
thesis, and that, if he grants it, the thesis will stand refuted. If
it be relevant, yet at the same time very improbable, he must reply
that, if he grants it, the thesis will be refuted, but that it is too
silly to be propounded. If, being neutral, it is also not relevant,
he ought to grant it without comment; but if, being neutral, it is
relevant, he ought to notify that he is aware that by granting it his
thesis will be refuted.[413]
[Footnote 411: Ibid. vi. p. 159, b. 39: [Greek: ê)\ pro\s to\n
lo/gon, ê)\ mê\ pro\s to\n lo/gon]. By this phrase Aristotle seems to
mean, not simply relevant, but closely, directly, conspicuously
relevant--equivalent to [Greek: li/an suneggu\s tou= e)n a)rchê=|]
(p. 160, a. 5).]
[Footnote 412: Ibid. b. 36-p. 160, a. 2. [Greek: e)a\n de\ mê\
dokou=n kai\ mê\ pro\s to\n lo/gon, dote/on me/n, e)pisêmante/on de\
to\ mê\ dokou=n pro\s eu)la/beian eu)êthei/as.]
How is this to be reconciled with what Aristotle says in the
preceding chapter, p. 159, b. 11-18, that the respondent ought not to
grant such improbabilities at all?]
[Footnote 413: Ibid. p. 160, a. 6-11.]
In this way of proceeding, the march of the dialogue on both sides
will be creditable. The respondent, signifying plainly that he
understands the full consequences of his own concessions, will not
appear to be worsted through any short-comings of his own, but only
through what is inherent in his thesis; while you the questioner,
having asked for such premisses as are really more probable than the
conclusion to be established, and having had them granted, will have
made out your point. It must be understood that you ought not to try
to prove your conclusion from premisses less probable than itself;
and that, if you put questions of this sort, you transgress the rules
of dialectical procedure.[414]
[Footnote 414: Topic. VIII. vi. p. 160, a. 11-16. [Greek: ou(/tô ga\r
o(/ t' a)pokrino/menos ou)de\n do/xei di' au(to\n pa/schein, e)a\n
proorô=n e(/kasta tithê=|, o(/ t' e)rôtô=n teu/xetai sullogismou=
titheme/nôn au)tô=| pa/ntôn e)ndoxote/rôn tou= sumpera/smatos. o(/soi
d' e)x a)doxote/rôn tou= sumpera/smatos e)picheirou=si
sullogi/zesthai, dê=lon ô(s ou) kalô=s sullogi/zontai; dio\ toi=s
e)rôtô=sin ou) thete/on.]]
If you ask a dialectical question in plain and univocal language, the
respondent is bound to answer Yes or No. But if you ask it in terms
obscure or equivocal, he is not obliged to answer thus directly. He
is at liberty to tell you that he does not understand the question;
he ought to have no scruple in telling you so, if such is really the
fact. Suppose the terms of your question to be familiar, but
equivocal; the answer to it may perhaps be either true or false,
alike in all the different senses of the terms. In that case, the
respondent ought to answer Yes or No directly. But, if the answer
would be an affirmation in one sense of the terms and a negation in
another, he must take care to signify that he is aware of the
equivocation, and to distinguish at once the two-fold meaning; for,
if the distinction is not noticed till afterwards, he cannot clearly
show that he was aware of it from the first. If he really was not at
first aware of the equivocation, and gave an affirmative answer
looking only to one among the several distinct meanings, you will try
to convict him of error by pushing him on the other meaning. The best
thing that he can then do will be to confess his oversight, and to
excuse himself by saying that misconception is easy where the same
term or the same proposition may mean several different things.[415]
[Footnote 415: Ibid. vii. p. 160, a. 17-34.]
Suppose you put several particular questions (or several analogous
questions) with the view of arriving ultimately by induction at the
concession of an universal, comprising them all. If they are all both
true and probable, the respondent must concede them all severally;
yet he may still intend to answer No, when the universal is tendered
to him after them. He has no right to answer thus, however, unless he
can produce some contradictory particular instance, real or apparent,
to justify him; and, if he does so without such justification, he is
a perverse dialectician.[416] Perhaps he may try to sustain his
denegation of the universal, after having conceded many particulars,
by a counter-attack founded on some chain of paradoxical reasoning
such as that of Zeno against motion; there being many such paradoxes
contradictory of probabilities, yet hard to refute. But this is no
sufficient justification for refusing to admit the universal, when,
after having admitted many particulars, he can produce no particular
adverse to them. The case will be still worse, if he refuses to admit
the universal, having neither any adverse instance, nor any
counter-ratiocinative attack. It is then the extreme of perverse
Dialectic.[417]
[Footnote 416: Topic. VIII. viii. p. 160, b. 2-5: [Greek: to\ ga\r
a)/neu e)nsta/seôs, ê)\ ou)/sês ê)\ dokou/sês, kôlu/ein to\n lo/gon
duskolai/nein e)sti/n. ei) ou)=n e)pi\ pollô=n phainome/nou mê\
di/dôsi to\ katho/lou mê\ e)/chôn e)/nstasin, phanero\n o(/ti
duskolai/nei.]]
[Footnote 417: Ibid. b. 5, seq. [Greek: e)/ti ei) mêd'
a)ntepicheirei=n e)/chei o(/ti ou)k a)lêthe/s, pollô=| ma=llon a)\n
do/xeie duskolai/nein. kai/toi ou)de\ tou=th' i(kano/n; pollou\s ga\r
lo/gous e)/chomen e)nanti/ous tai=s do/xais, ou(\s chalepo\n lu/ein,
katha/per to\n Zê/nônos o(/ti ou)k e)nde/chetai kinei=sthai ou)de\
to\ sta/dion dielthei=n; _a)ll' ou) dia\ tou=to ta)ntikei/mena
tou/tois ou) thete/on_.]]
Before the respondent undertakes to defend any thesis or definition,
he ought to have previously studied the various modes attacking it,
and to have prepared himself for meeting them.[418] He must also be
cautious of taking up improbable theses, in either of the senses of
improbable. For a thesis is so called when it involves strange and
paradoxical developments, as if a man lays down either that every
thing is in motion or that nothing is in motion; and also, when it
implies a discreditable character and is contrary to that which men
wish to be thought to hold, as, for example, the doctrine that
pleasure is the good, or that it is better to do wrong than to suffer
wrong. If a man defends such theses as these, people hate him because
they presume that he is not merely propounding them as matter for
dialectical argument, but advocating them as convictions of his
own.[419]
[Footnote 418: Ibid. ix. p. 160, b. 14.]
[Footnote 419: Ibid. b. 17-22: [Greek: a)/doxon d' u(po/thesin
eu)labête/on u(pe/chein; ei)/ê d' a)\n a)/doxos dichô=s;] &c.]
The respondent must farther be able, if you bring against him a false
syllogistic reasoning, to distinguish upon which among your premisses
the false conclusion really turns, and to refute that one. Your
reasoning may have more than one false premiss; but he must not
content himself with refuting any one or any other: he must single
out that one which is the chief determining cause of the falsehood.
Thus, if your syllogism be:--Every man in a sitting position is
writing, Sokrates is a man in a sitting position; therefore, Sokrates
is writing,--it will not suffice that the respondent should refute
your minor premiss, though this may be false;[420] because such a
refutation will not apply to the number of other cases in which men
are sitting but not writing; and therefore it will not expose the
full bearing of the falsehood. Your major premiss is that upon which
the full bearing of the falsehood depends; and the respondent must
show that he is aware of this by refuting your major.[421]
[Footnote 420: Topic. VIII. x. p. 160, b. 23-26. [Greek: ou) ga\r o(
o(tiou=n a)nelô\n le/luken, ou)/d' ei) pseu=do/s e)sti to\
a)nairou/menon; e)/choi ga\r a)\n plei/ô pseudê= o( lo/gos.]]
[Footnote 421: Ibid. b. 30-39. [Greek: oi)=de de\ tê\n lu/sin o(
ei)dô\s o(/ti para\ tou=to o( lo/gos--ou) ga\r a)po/chrê to\
e)nstê=nai, ou)/d' a)\n pseu=dos ê)=| to\ a)nairou/menon, a)lla\ kai\
dio/ti pseu=dos a)podeikte/on; _ou(/tô ga\r a)\n ei)/ê phanero\n
po/teron proorô=n ti ê)\ ou)\ poiei=tai tê\n e)/nstasin_.]]
This last-mentioned proceeding--refutation of that premiss upon which
your false conclusion in its full bearing really turns--is the only
regular, valid, and complete objection whereby the respondent can
stop out your syllogistic approaches. There are indeed three other
modes of objection to which he may resort; but these are all either
inconclusive or unfair. He may turn his objection against you
personally; and, without refuting any of your premisses, he may thus
perplex and confuse you, so that you are disqualified from pursuing
the thread of your questions. Or he may turn his objections against
portions of your questions; not refuting any one of your premisses,
but showing that, as they stand, they are insufficient to warrant the
conclusion which you seek to establish; when, if you are master of
your subject, and retain your calmness, you will at once supply the
deficiency by putting additional questions, so that his objection
thus vanishes. Or, lastly, he may multiply irrelevant objections
against time, for the purpose of prolonging the discussion and tiring
you out.[422] Of these four modes of objection open to the respondent
the first is the only one truly valid and conclusive; the three
others are obstructions either surmountable or unfair, and the last
is the most discreditable of all.[423]
[Footnote 422: Ibid. p. 161, a. 1-12: [Greek: e)/sti de\ lo/gon
kôlu=sai sumpera/nasthai tetrachô=s. ê)\ ga\r a)nelo/nta par' o(\
gi/netai to\ pseu=dos. ê)\ pro\s to\n e)rôtô=nta e)/nstasin
ei)po/nta;--tri/ton de\ pro\s ta\ ê)rôtême/na;--teta/rtê de\ kai\
cheiri/stê tô=n e)nsta/seôn ê( pro\s to\n chro/non.]]
[Footnote 423: Ibid. a. 13-15: [Greek: ai( me\n ou)=n e)nsta/seis,
katha/per ei)/pamen, tetrachô=s gi/nontai; lu/sis d' e)sti\ tô=n
ei)rême/nôn ê( prô/tê mo/non, ai( de\ loipai\ kôlu/seis tine\s kai\
e)mpodismoi\ tô=n sumperasma/tôn.]]
To blame the argumentative procedure and to blame the questioner are
two distinct things. Perhaps your manner of conducting the
interrogation, preparatory to your final syllogism, may be open to
censure; yet nevertheless you the questioner may deserve no censure;
for it may be the respondent's fault, not yours. He may refuse to
grant the very premisses which are essential to the good conduct of
your case; he may resort to perverse evasions and contradictions for
the mere purpose of thwarting you; so that you are forced to adapt
yourself to his unworthy manoeuvres rather than to aim at the thesis
itself. Dialectic cannot be well conducted unless both the partners
do their duty to the common purpose; the bad conduct of your
respondent puts you out, and the dialectic presently degenerates on
both sides into angry contention.[424] Apart from this, too, it must
be remembered that the express purpose of Dialectic is not to teach,
but to search and test consequences and to exercise the intellect of
both parties. Accordingly you are not always restricted to true
syllogistic premisses and conclusions. You are allowed to resort
occasionally to false premisses and false conclusions; for, if what
the respondent advances be true, you have no means of refuting it
except by falsehood; and, if what he advances be false, the best way
of refuting it may be through some other falsehood.[425] You render
service to him by doing so; for, since his beliefs are contrary to
truth, if the dialogue is confined to his beliefs, the result may
perhaps contribute to persuade him, but it will not instruct or
profit him.[426] It is your business to bring him round and
emancipate him from these erroneous beliefs; but you must accomplish
this in a manner truly dialectical, and not contentious; whether you
proceed by true or by false conclusions.[427] If you on your side,
indeed, put questions in a contentious spirit, it is you that are to
blame. But often the respondent is most to blame, when he refuses to
grant what he thinks probable, and when he does not apprehend what
you really intend to ask.[428] He is sometimes also to blame for
granting what he ought to refuse; such as _Petitio Principii_ or
Affirmation of Contraries. It is often difficult to distinguish what
questions involve _Petitio Principii_ or Affirmation of Contraries:
they are asked and granted without either party being aware, and the
like mistake is committed by men in private talk, not merely in
formal dialogue. When this happens, the argument will inevitably be a
bad one; but the fault is with the respondent who, having before
refused what he ought to have granted, now grants what he ought to
refuse.[429]
[Footnote 424: Topic. VIII. xi. p. 161, a. 16-24. [Greek:
duskolai/nontes ou)=n a)gônistika\s kai\ ou) dialektika\s poiou=ntai
ta\s diatriba/s.] a. 37: [Greek: phau=los koinôno\s o( e)mpodi/zôn
to\ koino\n e)/rgon.]]
[Footnote 425: Ibid. a. 24-31: [Greek: e)/ti d' e)pei\ gumnasi/as
kai\ pei/ras cha/rin a)ll' ou) didaskali/as oi( toiou=toi tô=n
lo/gôn, dê=lon ô(s ou) mo/non ta)lêthê= sullogiste/on a)lla\ kai\
pseu=dos, ou)de\ di' a)lêthô=n a)ei\ a)ll' e)ni/ote kai\ pseudô=n.
polla/kis ga\r a)lêthou=s tethe/ntos a)nairei=n a)na/gkê to\n
dialego/menon, ô(/ste protate/on ta\ pseudê=. e)ni/ote de\ kai\
pseu/dous tethe/ntos a)nairete/on dia\ pseudô=n.]]
[Footnote 426: Ibid. a. 30: [Greek: ou)de\n ga\r kôlu/ei tini\
dokei=n ta\ mê\ o)/nta ma=llon tô=n a)lêthô=n, ô(/st' e)k tô=n
e)kei/nô| dokou/ntôn tou= lo/gou genome/nou ma=llon e)/stai
pepeisme/nos ê)\ ô)phelême/nos.]]
[Footnote 427: Ibid. a. 33: [Greek: dei= de\ to\n kalô=s
metabiba/zonta dialektikô=s kai\ mê\ e)ristikô=s metabiba/zein.]
About [Greek: to\ metabiba/zein], compare Topica, I. ii. p. 101, a.
23.]
[Footnote 428: Ibid. b. 2: [Greek: o(/ te ga\r e)ristikô=s e)rôtô=n
phau/lôs diale/getai, o(/ t' e)n tô=| a)pokri/nesthai mê\ didou\s ta\
phaino/menon mêd' e)kdecho/menos o(/ ti/ pote bou/letai o( e)rôtô=n
puthe/sthai.]]