lamba/nein de\ kai\ ta\ toiau=ta e)x e)pagôgê=s, e)ph' o(/son
chrê/simon.--spa/nion de\ to\ a)na/palin e)pi\ tô=n e)nanti/ôn
sumbai/nei, a)lla\ toi=s plei/stois e)pi\ tau)ta ê( a)kolou/thêsis.
ei) ou)=n mêt' e)pi\ tau)ta\ tô=| e)nanti/ô| to\ e)nanti/on
a)kolouthei= mê/te a)na/palin, dê=lon o(/ti ou)de\ tô=n r(êthe/ntôn
a)kolouthei= to\ e(/teron tô=| e(te/rô|.]]
In regard to _Habitus_ and _Privatio_, the rule is the same as about
Contraries; only that the first of the two above alternatives always
holds, and the second never occurs.[113] If sensible perception can
be predicated of vision, insensibility also can be predicated of
blindness; otherwise, the thesis fails.
[Footnote 113: Ibid. p. 114, a. 7-12.]
In regard to _Relata_, the inference holds from the correlate of the
subject to the correlate of the predicate. If knowledge is belief,
that which is known is believed; if vision is sensible perception,
that which is visible is sensibly perceivable. Some say that there
are cases in which the above does not hold; _e.g._, That which is
sensibly perceivable is knowable; yet sensible perception is not
knowledge. But this objection is not valid; for many persons dispute
the first of the two propositions. This _locus_ will be equally
available for the purpose of refutation--thus, you may argue--That
which is sensibly perceivable is not knowable, because sensible
perception is not knowledge.[114]
[Footnote 114: Ibid. a. 13-25.]
18. You will look at the terms of the proposition, also, in regard to
their Derivatives, Inflections, &c., and to matters associated with
them in the way of production, preservation, &c. This _locus_ serves
both for proof and for refutation. What is affirmable of the subject,
is affirmable also of its derivatives: what is not affirmable of the
derivatives, is not affirmable of the subject itself.[115]
[Footnote 115: Ibid. ix. p. 114, a. 26-b. 5. [Greek: du/stoicha,
ptô/seis, ta\ poiêtika\ kai\ phulaktika/--dê=lon ou)=n o(/ti e(no\s
o(poiouou=n deichthe/ntos tô=n kata\ tê\n au)tê\n sustoichi/an
a)gathou= ê)\ e)painetou=, kai\ ta\ loipa\ pa/nta dedeigme/na
gi/netai.]--b. 23: [Greek: ô(=n me\n ga\r ta\ poiêtika\ a)gatha/,
kai\ au)ta\ tô=n a)gathô=n, ô(=n de\ ta\ phthartika\ a)gatha/, au)ta\
tô=n kakô=n.]]
19. Arguments may often be drawn, both for proof and for refutation,
from matters Similar or Analogous to the subject or predicate of the
thesis. Thus, if one and the same cognition comprehends many things,
one and the same opinion will also comprehend many things. If to
possess vision is to see, then also to possess audition is to hear.
If to possess audition is _not_ to hear, then neither is to possess
vision to see. The argument may be urged whether the resemblance is
real or only generally supposed. Sometimes, however, the inference
will not hold from one to many. Thus, if to know is to cogitate, then
to know many things should be to cogitate many things. But this last
is impossible. A man may know many things, but he cannot cogitate
many things; therefore, to know is _not_ to cogitate.[116]
[Footnote 116: Topic. II. x. p. 114, b. 25-36: [Greek: pa/lin e)pi\
tô=n o(moi/ôn, ei) o(moi/ôs e)/chei,--kai\ e)pi\ tô=n o)/ntôn kai\
tô=n dokou/ntôn; chrê/simos d' o( to/pos pro\s a)/mphô;--skopei=n de\
kai\ ei) e)ph' e(no\s kai\ ei) e)pi\ pollô=n o(moi/ôs e)/chei;
e)niachou= ga\r diaphônei=.]]
20. There are various _loci_ for argument, arising from degrees of
Comparison--more, less, equally. One is the argument from concomitant
variations, which is available both for proof and for disproof. If to
do injustice is evil, to do more injustice is more evil. If an
increase in degree of the subject implies an increase in degree of
the predicate, then the predicate is truly affirmed; if not, not.
This may be shown by Induction, or repetition of particular
instances.[117] Again, suppose the same predicate to be affirmable of
two distinct subjects A and B, but to be more probably affirmable of
A than of B. Then, if you can show that it does _not_ belong to A,
you may argue (_à fortiori_) that it does _not_ belong to B; or, if
you can show that it belongs to B, you may argue (_à fortiori_) that
it belongs also to A. Or, if two distinct predicates be affirmable
respecting the same subject but with unequal degrees of probability,
then, if you can disprove the more probable of the two, you may argue
from thence in disproof of the less probable; and, if you can prove
the less probable, you may argue from thence in proof of the more
probable. Or, if two distinct predicates be affirmable respecting two
distinct subjects but with unequal degrees of probability, then, if
you can disprove the more probable you may argue from thence against
the less probable; and, if you can prove the less probable, you are
furnished with an argument in proof of the more probable.[118] If the
degrees of probability, instead of being unequal, are equal or alike,
you may still, in the cases mentioned, argue in like manner from
proof or disproof of the one to proof or disproof of the other.[119]
[Footnote 117: Ibid. b. 37-p. 115, a. 5: [Greek: ei)si\ de\ tou=
ma=llon to/poi te/ssares, ei(=s me\n ei) a)kolouthei= to\ ma=llon
tô=| ma=llon,--chrê/simos de\ pro\s a)/mphô o( to/pos; ei) me\n ga\r
a)kolouthei= tê=| tou= u(pokeime/nou e)pido/sei ê( tou= sumbebêko/tos
e)pi/dosis, katha/per ei)/rêtai, dê=lon o(/ti sumbe/bêken, ei) de\
mê\ a)kolouthei=, ou) sumbe/bêken. tou=to d' e)pagôgê=| lêpte/on.]]
[Footnote 118: Topic. II. x. p. 115, a. 5-14.]
[Footnote 119: Ibid. a. 15-24: [Greek: e)k tou= o(moi/ôs u(pa/rchein
ê)\ dokei=n u(pa/rchein], &c.]
21. Another _locus_ for argument is, that _ex adjuncto_. If the
subject, prior to adjunction of the attribute, be not white or good,
and if adjunction of the attribute makes it white or good, then, you
may argue that the adjunct must itself be white or good. And you
might argue in like manner, if the subject prior to adjunction were
to a certain extent white or good, but became more white or more good
after such adjunction.[120] But this _locus_ will not be found
available for the negative inference or refutation. You cannot argue,
because the adjunction does not make the subject white or good, that
therefore the adjunct itself is not white or not good.[121]
[Footnote 120: Ibid. xi. p. 115, a. 26-33.]
[Footnote 121: Ibid. a. 32-b. 2.]
22. If the predicate be affirmable of the subject in greater or less
degree, it must be affirmable of the subject simply and absolutely.
Unless the subject be one that can be called white or good, you can
never call it more white or more good. This _locus_ again, however,
cannot be employed in the negative, for the purpose of refutation.
Because the predicate cannot be affirmed of the subject in greater or
less degree, you are not warranted in inferring that it cannot be
affirmed of the subject at all. Sokrates cannot be called in greater
or less degree a man; but you cannot thence infer that he is not
called a man simply.[122] If the predicate can be denied of the
subject simply and absolutely, it can be denied thereof with every
sort of qualification: if it can be affirmed of the subject with
qualification, it can also be affirmed thereof simply and absolutely,
as a possible predicate.[123] This, however, when it comes to be
explained, means only that it can be affirmed of some among the
particulars called by the name of the subject. Aristotle recognizes
that the same predicate may often be affirmed of the subject
_secundum quid_, and denied of the subject simply and absolutely. In
some places (as among the Triballi), it is honourable to sacrifice
your father; simply and absolutely, it is not honourable. To one who
is sick, it is advantageous to undergo medical treatment; speaking
simply and absolutely (_i.e._, to persons generally in the ordinary
state of health), it is not advantageous. It is only when you can
truly affirm the proposition, without adding any qualifying words,
that the proposition is true simply and absolutely.[124]
[Footnote 122: Ibid. b. 3-10.]
[Footnote 123: Ibid. b. 11-35. [Greek: ei) ga\r kata/ ti
e)nde/chetai, kai\ a(plô=s e)nde/chetai.]]
[Footnote 124: Topic. II. xi. p. 115, b. 33: [Greek: ô(/ste o(\ a)\n
mêdeno\s prostitheme/nou dokê=| ei)=nai kalo\n ê)\ ai)schro\n ê)\
a)/llo ti tô=n toiou=tôn, a(plô=s r(êthê/setai.]]
III.
Such are the chief among the thirty-seven _Loci_ which Aristotle
indicates for debating dialectically those theses in which the
predication is only of Accident--not of Genus, or Proprium, or
Definition. He proceeds (in the Third Book of the Topica) to deal
separately with one special branch of such theses, respecting
_Expetenda_ and _Fugienda_: where the question put is, Of two or more
distinct subjects, which is the more desirable or the better? The
cases supposed are those in which the difference of value between the
two subjects compared is not conspicuous and unmistakeable, but where
there is a tolerably near approximation of value between them, so as
to warrant doubt and debate.[125]
[Footnote 125: Ibid. III. i. p. 116, a. 1-12: [Greek: Po/teron d'
ai(retô/teron ê)\ be/ltion duei=n ê)\ pleio/nôn, e)k tô=nde
skepte/on.] &c.]
We must presume that questions of this class occurred very frequently
among the dialectical debates of Aristotle's contemporaries; so that
he thinks it necessary to give advice apart for conducting them in
the best manner.
1. Of two good subjects compared, that is better and more desirable
which is the more lasting; or which is preferred by the wise and good
man; or by the professional artist in his own craft; or by right law;
or by the multitude, all or most of them. That is absolutely or
simply better and more desirable, which is declared to be such by the
better cognition; that is better to any given individual, which is
declared to be better by his own cognition.[126]
[Footnote 126: Topic. III. i. p. 116, a. 13-22.]
2. That is more desirable which is included in the genus good, than
what is not so included; that which is desirable on its own account
and _per se_, is better than what is desirable only on account of
something else and _per accidens_; the cause of what is good in
itself is more desirable than the cause of what is good by
accident.[127]
[Footnote 127: Ibid. a. 23-b. 7.]
3. What is good absolutely and simply (_i.e._, to all and at all
times) is better than what is good only for a special occasion or
individual; thus, to be in good health is better than being cut for
the stone. What is good by nature is better than what is good not by
nature; _e.g._, justice (good by nature), than the just individual,
whose character must have been acquired.[128] What is good, or what
is peculiarly appurtenant, to the more elevated of two subjects is
better than what is good or peculiar to the less elevated. Good,
having its place in the better, prior, and more exalted elements of
any subject, is more desirable than good belonging to the derivative,
secondary, and less exalted; thus, health, which has its seat in
proper admixture and proportion of the fundamental constituents of
the body (wet, dry, hot, cold), is better than strength or
beauty--strength residing in the bones and muscles, beauty in proper
symmetry of the limbs.[129] Next, an end is superior to that which is
means thereunto; and, in comparing two distinct means, that which is
nearer to the end is the better. That which tends to secure the great
end of life is superior to that which tends towards any other end;
means to happiness is better than means to intelligence; also the
possible end, to the impossible. Comparing one subject as means with
another subject as end, we must examine whether the second end is
more superior to the end produced by the first subject, than the end
produced by the first subject is superior to the means or first
subject itself. For example, in the two ends, happiness and health,
if happiness as an end surpasses health as an end in greater
proportion than health surpasses the means of health, then the means
producing happiness is better than the end health.[130]
[Footnote 128: Topic. III. i. p. 116, b. 7-12.]
[Footnote 129: Ibid. b. 12-22: [Greek: kai\ to\ e)n belti/osin ê)\
prote/rois ê)\ timiôte/rois be/ltion, oi(=on u(gi/eia i)schu/os kai\
ka/llous. ê( me\n ga\r e)n u(groi=s kai\ xêroi=s kai\ thermoi=s kai\
psuchroi=s, a(plô=s d' ei)pei=n e)x ô(=n prô/tôn sune/stêke to\
zô=|on, ta\ d' e)n toi=s u(ste/rois; ê( me\n ga\r i)schu\s e)n toi=s
neu/rois kai\ o)stoi=s, to\ de\ ka/llos tô=n melô=n tis summetri/a
dokei= ei)=nai.]
The reason given in this _locus_ for superior estimation is a very
curious one: the fundamental or primary constituents rank higher than
compounds or derivatives formed by them or out of them. Also, the
definition of beauty deserves attention: the Greeks considered beauty
to reside more in proportions of form of the body than in features of
the face.]
[Footnote 130: Ibid. b. 22-36.]
Again, that which is more beautiful, honourable, and praiseworthy
_per se_, is better than what possesses these same attributes in
equal degree but only on account of some other consequence. Thus,
friendship is superior to wealth, justice to strength; for no one
values wealth except for its consequences, whereas we esteem
friendship _per se_, even though no consequences ensue from it.[131]
[Footnote 131: Ibid. b. 33-p. 117, a. 4.]
Where the two subjects compared are in themselves so nearly equal
that the difference of merit can hardly be discerned, we must look to
the antecedents or consequents of each, especially to the
consequents; and, according as these exhibit most of good or least of
evil, we must regulate our estimation of the two subjects to which
they respectively belong.[132] The larger lot of good things is
preferable to the smaller. Sometimes what is not in itself good, if
cast into the same lot with other things very good, is preferable to
another thing that is in itself good. Thus, what is not _per se_
good, if it goes along with happiness, is preferable even to justice
and courage. The same things, when taken along with pleasure or with
the absence of pain, are preferable to themselves without pleasure or
along with pain.[133] Everything is better, at the season when it
tells for most, than itself at any other season; thus, intelligence
and absence of pain are to be ranked as of more value in old age than
in youth; but courage and temperance are more indispensably required,
and therefore more to be esteemed, in youth than in old age. What is
useful on all or most occasions is more to be esteemed than what is
useful only now and then; _e.g._, justice and moderation, as compared
with courage: also that which being possessed by every one, the other
would not be required; _e.g._, justice is better than courage, for,
if every one were just, courage would not be required.[134]
[Footnote 132: Topic. III. i. p. 117, a. 5-15.]
[Footnote 133: Ibid. a. 16-25.]
[Footnote 134: Ibid. a. 26-b. 2.]
Among two subjects the more desirable is that of which the generation
or acquirement is more desirable; that of which the destruction or
the loss is more to be deplored; that which is nearer or more like to
the _Summum Bonum_ or to that which is better than itself (unless
indeed the resemblance be upon the ridiculous side, in the nature of
a caricature, as the ape is to man[135]); that which is the more
conspicuous; the more difficult to attain; the more special and
peculiar; the more entirely removed from all bad accompaniments; that
which we can best share with friends; that which we wish to do to our
friends, rather than to ordinary strangers (_e.g._, doing justice or
conferring benefit, than seeming to do so; for towards our friends we
prefer doing this in reality, while towards strangers we prefer
seeming to do so[136]); that which we cannot obtain from others, as
compared with that which can be hired; that which is unconditionally
desirable, as compared with that which is desirable only when we have
something else along with it; that of which the absence is a ground
of just reproach against us and ought to make us ashamed;[137] that
which does good to the proprietor, or to the best parts of the
proprietor (to his mind rather than his body);[138] that which is
eligible on its own ground, rather than from opinion of others; that
which is eligible on both these accounts jointly, than either.[139]
Acquisitions of supererogation are better than necessaries, and are
sometimes more eligible: thus, to live well is better than life
simply; philosophizing is better than money-making; but sometimes
necessaries are more eligible, as, _e.g._, to a starving man.
Speaking generally, necessaries are more eligible; but the others are
better.[140]
[Footnote 135: Ibid. p. 117, b. 2-17. [Greek: skopei=n de\ kai\ ei)
e)pi\ ta\ geloio/tera ei)/ê o(/moion, katha/per o( pi/thêkos tô=|
a)nthrô/pô|, tou= i(/ppou mê\ o)/ntos o(moi/ou; ou) ga\r ka/llion o(
pi/thêkos, o(moio/teron de\ tô=| a)nthrô/pô|.]]
[Footnote 136: Ibid. b. 20-p. 118, a. 5. [Greek: a(\ pro\s to\n
phi/lon pra=xai ma=llon boulo/metha ê)\ a(\ pro\s to\n tucho/nta,
tau=ta ai(retô/tera, oi(=on to\ dikaiopragei=n kai\ eu)= poiei=n
ma=llon ê)\ to\ dokei=n; tou\s ga\r phi/lous eu)= poiei=n boulo/metha
ma=llon ê)\ dokei=n, _tou\s de\ tucho/ntas a)na/palin_.]]
[Footnote 137: Topic. III. ii. p. 118, a. 16-26.]
[Footnote 138: Ibid. iii. p. 118, a. 29.]
[Footnote 139: Ibid. b. 20. The definition of this last condition
is--that we should not care to possess the thing if no one knew that
we possessed it: [Greek: o(/ros de\ tou= pro\s do/xan, to\ mêdeno\s
suneido/tos mê\ a)\n spouda/sai u(pa/rchein.]]
[Footnote 140: Ibid. p. 118, a. 6-14. [Greek: ou) ga\r ei) belti/ô,
a)nagkai=on kai\ ai(retô/tera; to\ gou=n philosophei=n be/ltion tou=
chrêmati/zesthai, a)ll' ou)ch ai(retô/teron tô=| e)ndeei= tô=n
a)nagkai/ôn. to\ d' e)k periousi/as e)sti/n, o(/tan u(parcho/ntôn
tô=n a)nagkai/ôn a)/lla tina\ proskataskeua/zêtai/ tis tô=n kalô=n.
schedo\n d' i)/sôs ai(retô/teron to\ a)nagkai=o/n e)sti, be/ltion de\
to\ e)k periousi/as.]]
Among many other _loci_, applicable to this same question of
comparative excellence between two different subjects, one more will
suffice here. You must distinguish the various ends in relation to
which any given subject is declared to be eligible: the advantageous,
the beautiful, the agreeable. That which conduces to all the three is
more eligible than that which conduces to one or two of them only. If
there be two subjects, both of them conducive to the same end among
the three, you must examine which of them conduces to it most. Again,
that which conduces to the better end (_e.g._, to virtue rather than
to pleasure) is the more eligible. The like comparison may be applied
to the _Fugienda_ as well as to the _Expetenda_. That is most to be
avoided which shuts us out most from the desirable acquisitions:
_e.g._, sickness is more to be avoided than ungraceful form; for
sickness shuts us out more completely both from virtue and from
pleasure.[141]
[Footnote 141: Ibid. iii. p. 118, b. 27-36.]
The same _loci_ which are available for the question of comparison
will also be available in the question of positive eligibility or
positive ineligibility.[142] Further, it holds for all cases of the
kind that you should enunciate the argument in the most general terms
that each case admits: in this way it will cover a greater number of
particulars. Slight mutations of language will often here strengthen
your case: that which is (good) by nature is more (good) than that
which is (good) not by nature; that which makes the subject to which
it is better than that which does not make the subject good.[143]
[Footnote 142: Ibid. iv. p. 119, a. 1.]
[Footnote 143: Topic. III. v. p. 119, a. 12: [Greek: lêpte/on d'
o(/ti ma/lista katho/lou tou\s to/pous peri\ tou= ma=llon kai\ tou=
mei/zonos; lêphthe/ntes ga\r ou(/tôs pro\s plei/ô chrê/simoi a)\n
ei)/êsan.]]
The _loci_ just enumerated are Universal, and applicable to the
debate of theses propounded in universal terms; but they will also be
applicable, if the thesis propounded be a Particular proposition.
If you prove the universal affirmative, you will at the same time
prove the particular; if you prove the universal negative, you prove
the particular negative also. The universal _loci_ from Opposites,
from Conjugates, from Inflections, will be alike applicable to
particular propositions. Thus, if we look at the universal _locus_
from Contraries, If all pleasure is good, then all pain is
evil,--this will apply also to the particular, If some pleasure is
good, then some pain is evil: in the particular as in the universal
form the proposition is alike an _Endox_ or conformable to common
received opinion. The like may be said about the _loci_ from
_Habitus_ and _Privatio_; also about those from Generation and
Destruction;[144] again, from More, Less, and Equally--this last,
however, with some restriction, for the _locus_ from Less will
serve only for proving an affirmative. Thus, if some capacity is a
less good than science, while yet some capacity is a good, then, _à
fortiori_, some science is a good. But, if you take the same _locus_
in the negative and say that the capacity is a good, you will not be
warranted in saying, for that reason, that no science is a good.[145]
You may apply this same _locus_ from Less to compare, not merely two
subjects in different genera, but also two subjects of different
degrees under the same genus. Thus, let the thesis be, Some science
or cognition is a good. You will disprove this thesis, if you can show
that prudence ([Greek: phro/nêsis]) is not a good; for, if prudence,
which in common opinion is most confidently held to be a good, be
really not so, you may argue that, _à fortiori_ no other science can
be so. Again, let the thesis be propounded with the assumption that,
if it can be proved true or false in any one case, it shall be
accepted as true or false in all universally (for example, that, if
the human soul is immortal, all other souls are immortal also; or if
not that, then none of the others): evidently, the propounder of such
a thesis extends the particular into an universal. If he propounds
his thesis affirmatively, you must try to prove the negative in some
particular case; for this, under the conditions supposed, will be
equivalent to proving an universal negative. If, on the other hand,
he puts his thesis negatively, you will try to prove some particular
affirmative; which (always under the given conditions) will carry
the universal affirmative also.[146]
[Footnote 144: Ibid. vi. p. 119, a. 32-b. 16. [Greek: o(moi/ôs ga\r
e)/ndoxon to\ a)xiô=sai, ei) pa=sa ê(donê\ a)gatho/n, kai\ lu/pên
pa=san ei)=nai kako/n, tô=| ei)/ tis ê(donê\ a)gatho/n, kai\ lu/pên
ei)=nai/ tina kako/n--e)n a(/pasi ga\r o(moi/ôs to\ e)/ndoxon.]]
[Footnote 145: Ibid. b. 17-30. [Greek: dê=lon ou)=n o(/ti
kataskeua/zein mo/non e)k tou= ê(=tton e)/stin.]]
[Footnote 146: Topic. III. vi. p. 119, b. 31-p. 120, a. 5.]
Suppose the respondent to propound his thesis indefinitely, not
carrying the indication either of universal or particular; _e.g._,
Pleasure is good. This can be proved by showing either that all
pleasure is good, or that some pleasure is good; while it can be
refuted only through the universal negative--by showing that no
pleasure is good.[147] But, if the thesis be divested of its
indefinite character and propounded either as universal or as
particular, there will then be two distinct ways of refuting it. If
it be farther specialized--_e.g._, One pleasure only is good--there
will be three ways of refuting: you may show either that all
pleasures are good; or that no pleasure is good; or that more
pleasures than one are good. If the proposition be specialized
farther still--_e.g._, Prudence alone among all the virtues is
science,--there are four lines of argument open for refuting it: you
may prove either that all virtue is science; or that no virtue is
science; or that some other virtue (such as justice) is science; or
that prudence is not science.[148]
[Footnote 147: Ibid. p. 120, a. 6-20: [Greek: a)diori/stou me\n ou)=n
o)/ntos tou= problê/matos monachô=s a)naskeua/zein
e)nde/chetai--a)nairei=n me\n monachô=s e)nde/chetai, kataskeua/zein
de\ dichô=s.] &c.]
[Footnote 148: Ibid. a. 15-31.]
In dealing with a particular proposition as thesis, still other
_loci_ already indicated for dealing with universal propositions will
be available. You will run through the particulars comprised in the
subject, distributed into genera and species. When you have produced
a number of particulars successively to establish the universal,
affirmative or negative, you are warranted in calling on the
respondent either to admit the universal, or to produce on his side
some adverse particular.[149] You will also (as was before
recommended) distribute the predicate of the thesis into the various
species which it comprehends. If no one of these species be truly
affirmable of the subject, then neither can the genus be truly
affirmable; so that you will have refuted the thesis, supposing it to
be affirmative. If, on the contrary, any one of the species be truly
affirmable of the subject, then the genus will also be truly
affirmable; so that you will have refuted the thesis, supposing it to
be negative. Thus, if the thesis propounded be, The soul is a number:
you divide number into its two species, odd and even, and prove that
the soul is neither odd nor even; wherefore, it is not a number.[150]
[Footnote 149: Ibid. a. 32-38: [Greek: a)/n te ga\r panti\ phai/nêtai
u(pa/rchon a)/n te mêdeni/, polla\ proene/gkanti a)xiôte/on katho/lou
o(mologei=n, ê)\ phe/rein e)/nstasin e)pi\ ti/nos ou)ch ou(/tôs.]]
[Footnote 150: Topic. III. vi. p. 120, a. 37-b. 6. It would appear
from the examples here given by Aristotle--[Greek: o( chro/nos ou)
kinei=tai, o( chro/nos ou)/k e)sti ki/nêsis, ê( psuchê\ ou)/k e)stin
a)rithmo/s], that he considers these propositions as either
indefinite or particular.]
IV.
After this long catalogue of _Loci_ belonging to debate on
propositions of Accident, Aristotle proceeds to enumerate those
applicable to propositions of Genus and of Proprium. Neither Genus
nor Proprium is often made subject of debate as such; but both of
them are constituent elements of the debate respecting Definition,
which is of frequent occurrence.[151] For that reason, both deserve
to be studied.
[Footnote 151: Ibid. IV. i. p. 120, b. 12: [Greek: meta\ de\ tau=ta
peri\ tô=n pro\s to\ ge/nos kai\ to\ i)/dion e)piskepte/on; e)/sti
de\ tau=ta stoichei=a tô=n pro\s tou\s o(/rous; peri\ au)tô=n de\
tou/tôn o)liga/kis ai( ske/pseis gi/nontai toi=s dialegome/nois.]]
When the thesis propounded affirms that A is genus of B, you will run
over all the cognates of B, and see whether there is any one among
them respecting which A cannot be affirmed as genus. If there be,
this is a good argument against the thesis; for the genus ought to be
predicable of all. Next, whether what is really no more than an
accident is affirmed as genus, which ought to belong to the essence
of the subject. Perhaps (_e.g._) white is affirmed in the thesis as
being genus of snow; but white cannot be truly so affirmed; for it is
not of the essence of snow, but is only a quality or accident.[152]
Examine whether the predicate A comes under the definition already
given of an Accident,--that which may or may not be predicated of the
subject; also, whether A and B both fall under the same one out of
the ten Categories or Predicaments. If B the subject comes under
_Essentia_, or _Quale_, or _Ad Aliquid_, the predicate ought also to
belong to _Essentia_, or _Quale_, or _Ad Aliquid_: the species and
the genus ought to come under the same Category.[153] If this be not
the case in a thesis of Genus, the thesis cannot be maintained.
[Footnote 152: Ibid. b. 23-29.]
[Footnote 153: Ibid. p. 120, b. 36-p. 121, a. 9. [Greek: katho/lou d'
ei)pei=n u(po\ tê\n au)tê\n diai/resin dei= to\ ge/nos tô=| ei)/dei
ei)=nai.]
Aristotle here enunciates this as universally true, whereas if we
turn to Categor. p. 11, a. 24, seq. we shall find him declaring it
not to be universally true. Compare also Topic. IV. iv. p. 124, b.
15.]
You are aware that the species always partakes of the genus, while
the genus never partakes of the species; to _partake_ meaning that
the species includes the essence or definition of the genus, but the
genus never includes the essence or definition of the species. You
will examine, therefore, whether in the thesis propounded to you this
condition is realized; if not, the thesis may be refuted. Suppose,
_e.g._, that it enunciates some superior genus as including _Ens_ or
_Unum_. If this were true, the genus so assigned would still partake
of _Ens_ and _Unum_; for _Ens_ and _Unum_ maybe predicated of all
existences whatever. Therefore what is enunciated in the thesis as a
genus, cannot be a real genus.[154]
[Footnote 154: Topic. IV. i. p. 121, a. 10-19.]
Perhaps you may find something respecting which the subject (species)
may be truly affirmed, while the predicate (genus) cannot be truly
affirmed. If so, the predicate is not a real genus. Thus, the thesis
may enunciate _Ens_ or _Scibile_ as being the genus of _Opinabile_.
But this last, the species or subject _Opinabile_, may be affirmed
respecting _Non-Ens_ also; while the predicates _Ens_ or _Scibile_
(given as the pretended genus of _Opinabile_) cannot be affirmed
respecting _Non-Ens_. You can thus show that _Ens_ or _Scibile_ is
not the real genus of _Opinabile_.[155] The pretended species
_Opinabile_ (comprising as it does both _Ens_ and _Non-Ens_)
stretches farther than the pretended genus _Ens_ or _Scibile_:
whereas every real genus ought to stretch farther than any one or any
portion of its constituent species.[156] The thesis may thus be
overthrown, if there be any one species which stretches even equally
far or is co-extensive with the pretended genus.[157]
[Footnote 155: Ibid. a. 20-26.]
[Footnote 156: Ibid. b. 1-14. [Greek: stoichei=on de\ pro\s a(/panta
ta\ toiau=ta, to\ e)pi\ ple/on to\ ge/nos ê)\ to\ ei)=dos kai\ tê\n
diaphora\n le/gesthai; e)p' e)/latton ga\r kai\ ê( diaphora\ tou=
ge/nous le/getai.]]
[Footnote 157: Ibid. b. 4.]
It is a general truth that the same species cannot belong to two
distinct genera, unless one of the two be subordinate to the other,
or unless both of them be comprehended under some common higher
genus. You will examine, therefore, whether there is any other genus,
besides the predicate of the thesis, to which the subject of the
thesis can be referred. If there be some other genus, not under
either of the two conditions above indicated, the predicate
enunciated by the thesis cannot be the real genus of the subject.
Thus, if the thesis declares justice to be science (or to belong to
the genus science), you may remark that there is another distinct
genus (virtue) to which justice also belongs. In this particular
case, however, it would be replied that science and virtue can both
be referred to one and the same higher genus, viz., habit and
disposition. Therefore the thesis, Justice is science, will not be
truly open to objection on this ground.[158]
[Footnote 158: Topic. IV. ii. p. 121, b. 24, seq.]
Again, if the predicate of the thesis be the true genus of the
subject, all the higher genera in which the predicate is contained
must also be predicated _in Quid_ (as the predicate itself is**)
respecting the subject. This you must show by an induction of
particular instances, no counter-instance being producible.[159] If
the thesis enunciated does not conform to this condition, you will
have a good argument against it. You will also run over the
sub-species that are comprehended in the subject of the thesis,
considered as a genus; and you will examine whether the predicate of
the thesis (together with all its superior genera) is predicable
essentially or _in Quid_ of all these sub-species. If you can find
any one among these sub-species, of which it is not essentially
predicable, the predicate of the thesis is not the true genus of the
subject;[160] the like also, if the definitions of those genera are
not predicable of the subject or its sub-species.[161]
[Footnote 159: Ibid. p. 122, a. 5-19. [Greek: o(/ti de\ e(no\s e)n
tô=| ti/ e)sti katêgoroume/nou pa/nta ta\ loipa/, a)/nper
katêgorê=tai, e)n tô=| ti/ e)sti katêgorêthê/setai, di' e)pagôgê=s
lêpte/on.]]
[Footnote 160: Ibid. a. 21-b. 6.]
[Footnote 161: Ibid. b. 7-11. [Greek: ei) ou)=n diaphônei=, dê=lon
o(/ti ou) ge/nos to\ a)podothe/n.]]
Perhaps the thesis may enunciate as a genus what is really nothing
more than a differentia. It may also enunciate the differentia either
as a part of the genus or as a part of the species; or it may
enunciate the genus either as a part of the differentia or as a part
of the species. All these are attackable. The differentia is not a
genus, nor does it respond to the question _Quid est_, but to the
question _Quale quid est_. It is always either **more
extensive than the species, or co-extensive therewith.[162] If none
of the differentiæ belonging to a genus can be predicated of a
species, neither can the genus itself be predicated thereof. Thus,
neither odd nor even can be predicated of the soul; accordingly,
neither can the genus (number) be predicated of the soul.[163] If the
species be _prius naturâ_, so that when it disappears the enunciated
genus disappears along with it, this cannot be the real genus; nor,
if the enunciated genus or differentia can be supposed to disappear
and yet the species does not disappear along with them.[164] If the
species partakes of (includes in its essence) something contrary to
the enunciated genus, this last cannot be the real genus; nor, if the
species includes something which cannot possibly belong to what is in
that genus. Thus, if the soul partakes of (or includes in its
essence) life, and if no number can possibly live, the soul cannot be
a species of number.[165]
[Footnote 162: Ibid. b. 12-p. 123, a. 10. [Greek: ou)de\ dokei=
mete/chein ê( diaphora\ tou= ge/nous; pa=n ga\r to\ mete/chon tou=
ge/nous ê)\ ei)=dos ê)\ a)/tomo/n e)stin. a)ei\ ga\r ê( diaphora\
e)p' i)/sês ê)\ e)pi\ plei=on tou= ei)/dous le/getai.--e)pi\ ple/on
te ga\r to\ ge/nos tê=s diaphora=s dei= le/gesthai, kai\ mê\
mete/chein tê=s diaphora=s.]
As an example to illustrate the enclosing of the genus within the
species ([Greek: ei) to\ ge/nos ei)s to\ ei)=dos e)/thêken]),
Aristotle cites a definition given by Plato, who defined [Greek: tê\n
kata\ to/pon ki/nêsin], as [Greek: phora/n]. Now [Greek: phora\] is
less extensive in its meaning than [Greek: ê( kata\ to/pon ki/nêsis],
which includes [Greek: ba/disis] and other terms of motion apart from
or foreign to [Greek: phora/].--Example of enunciating differentia as
a genus is, if immortal be given as the genus to which a god belongs.
Immortal is the differentia belonging to [Greek: zô=|on], and
constituting therewith the species god.--Example of enclosing the
differentia in the genus is, if odd be given as the essence of number
([Greek: o(/per a)rithmo/n]).--Example of enclosing differentia in
the species is, if immortal be put forward as the essence of a god
([Greek: o(/per theo/n]).--Example of enclosing the genus in the
differentia is, number given as the essence of the odd.--Example of
enunciating the genus as a differentia is, when change of place is
given as the differentia of [Greek: phora/].]
[Footnote 163: Topic. IV. ii. p. 123, a. 11-14.]
[Footnote 164: Ibid. a. 14-19.]
[Footnote 165: Ibid. iii. a. 20-26.]
Again, the generic term and the specific term ought to be univocal in
signification. You must examine (according to the tests indicated in
the First Book of the Topica) whether it be taken equivocally in the
thesis. If it be so, you have a ground of attack, and also if it be
taken metaphorically; for every genus ought to be enunciated in the
proper sense of the term, and no metaphor can be allowed to pass as a
genus.[166] Note farther that every true genus has more than one
distinct species. You will, therefore, examine whether any other
species, besides the subject of the thesis, can be suggested as
belonging to the predicate of the thesis. If none, that predicate
cannot be the true genus of the subject.[167]
[Footnote 166: Ibid. a. 27-37. [Greek: skopei=n de\ kai\ ei) to\
metaphora=| lego/menon ô(s ge/nos a)pode/dôken, oi(=on tê\n
sôphrosu/nên sumphôni/an; pa=n ga\r ge/nos kuri/ôs kata\ tô=n ei)dô=n
katêgorei=tai, ê( de\ sumphôni/a kata\ tê=s sôphrosu/nês ou) kuri/ôs
a)lla\ metaphora=|; pa=sa ga\r sumphôni/a e)n phtho/ggois.]]
[Footnote 167: Topic. IV. iii. p. 123, a. 30.]
Several _loci_ are furnished by Contraries, either to the species or
the genus. If there be something contrary to the species, but nothing
contrary to the genus, then that which is contrary to the species
ought to be included under the same genus as the species itself; but,
if there be something contrary to the species, and also something
contrary to the genus, then that which is contrary to the species
ought to be included in that which is contrary to the genus. Each of
these doctrines you will have to make good by induction of particular
cases.[168] If that which is contrary to the species be a genus
itself (_e.g._, _bonum_) and not included in any superior genus, then
the like will be true respecting the species itself: it will not be
included in any genus; and the predicate of the thesis will not be a
true genus. _Bonum_ and _malum_ are not included in any common
superior genus; each is a genus _per se_.[169] Or suppose that the
subject (species) of the thesis, and the predicate (genus) of the
thesis, have both of them contraries; but that in the one there is an
intermediate between the two contraries, and in the other, not. This
shows that the predicate cannot be the true genus of the species;
for, wherever there is an intermediate between the two contraries of
the species, there also is an intermediate between the two contraries
of the genus; and _vice versâ_.[170] If there be an intermediate
between the two contraries of the species, and also an intermediate
between the two contraries of the genus, you will examine whether
both intermediates are of like nature, designated by analogous terms.
If it be not so (if, _e.g._, the one intermediate is designated by a
positive term, and the other only by a negative term), you will have
ground for contending against the thesis, that the predicate
enunciated therein is not the true genus of the subject. At any rate,
this is a probable ([Greek: e)/ndoxon]) dialectical argument--to
insist upon analogy between the two intermediates; though there are
some particular cases in which the doctrine does not hold.[171]
[Footnote 168: Ibid. b. 1-8. [Greek: phanero\n de\ tou/tôn e(/kaston
dia\ tê=s e)pagôgê=s].]
[Footnote 169: Ibid. b. 8-12.]
[Footnote 170: Topic. IV. iii. p. 123, b. 12, seq.]
[Footnote 171: Ibid. b. 17-23: [Greek: e)/nstasis tou/tou o(/ti
u(giei/as kai\ no/sou ou)de\n metaxu/, kakou= de\ kai\ a)gathou=; ê)\
ei) e)/sti me/n ti a)mphoi=n a)na\ me/son, kai\ tô=n ei)dô=n kai\
tô=n genô=n, mê\ o(moi/ôs de/, a)lla\ tô=n me\n kat' a)po/phasin,
tô=n d' ô(s u(pokei/menon. _e)/ndoxon ga\r to\ o(moi/ôs a)mphoi=n_,
katha/per e)p' a)retê=s kai\ kaki/as, kai\ dikaiosu/nês kai\
a)diki/as; a)mphoi=n ga\r kata\ a)po/phasin ta\ a)na\ me/son.]]
Again, suppose different conditions: that there is no contrary to the
genus, but that there is a contrary to the species. You will examine
whether not merely the contrary of the species, but also the
intermediate between its two contraries, is included in the same
genus; for, if the two contraries are included therein, the
intermediate ought also to be included. This is a line of argument
_probable_ (_i.e._, conformable to general presumption, and
recommendable in a dialectical debate), though there are not wanting
examples adverse to it: thus, excess and defect are included in the
same genus evil, but the moderate or measured ([Greek: to\ me/trion])
is not in the genus evil, but in the genus good.[172] We must remark,
moreover, that though it be a probable dialectical argument, that,
wherever the genus has a contrary, the species will also have a
contrary, yet there are cases adverse to this principle. Thus,
sickness in general has for its contrary health in general; but
particular species of sickness (such as fever, ophthalmia, gout, &c.)
have no contrary.[173]
[Footnote 172: Ibid. b. 23-30.]
[Footnote 173: Ibid. b. 30-37.]
Such will be your way of procedure, if the thesis propounded be
Affirmative, and if you have to make out a negative against it. But
if, on the contrary, the thesis be Negative, so that you have to make
out an affirmative against it, you have then three lines of procedure
open. 1. The genus may have no contrary, while the species has a
contrary: in that case, you may perhaps be able to show that the
contrary of the species (subject) is included in the predicate of the
thesis (genus); if so, then the species also will be included
therein. 2. Or, if you can show that the intermediate between the
species and its contrary is included in the predicate (genus), then
that same genus will also include the species and its contrary; for,
wherever the intermediate is, there also are the two extremes between
which it is intermediate. 3. Lastly, if the genus has a contrary as
well as the species, you may be able to show that the contrary of the
species is included in the contrary of the genus; assuming which to
be the case, then the species itself will be included in the
genus.[174] These are the three modes of procedure, if your task is
to make out the negative.
[Footnote 174: Topic. IV. iii. p. 124, a. 1-9.]
If the genus enunciated by the thesis be a true one, all the
Derivatives and Collaterals of the predicate will be fit and suitable
for those of the subject. Thus, if justice be a sort of science,
justly will be scientifically, and the just man will be a scientific
man. This _locus_ is useful to be kept in mind, whether you have to
make out an affirmative or a negative.[175] You may reason in the
same way about the _Analoga_ of the predicate and the subject; about
the productive and destructive causes of each; the manifestations
present, past, and future, of each, &c.[176]
[Footnote 175: Ibid. a. 10-14.]
[Footnote 176: Ibid. iv. p. 124, a. 15-34.]
When the opposite of the species (subject) is Privative, the thesis
will be open to attack in two ways. 1. If the privative opposite be
contained in the predicate, the subject itself will not be contained
therein; for it is a general truth that a subject and its privative
opposite are never both of them contained in the same lowest genus:
thus, if vision is sensible perception, blindness is not sensible
perception. 2. If both the species and the genus have privative
opposites, then if the privative opposite of the species be contained
in the privative opposite of the genus, the species itself will also
be contained in the genus; if not, not. Thus, if blindness be an
inability of sensible perception, vision will be a sensible
perception. This last _locus_ will be available, whether you are
making out an affirmative or a negative.[177]
[Footnote 177: Ibid. a. 35-b. 6.]
If the predicate of the thesis be a true genus, you may convert the
thesis simply, having substituted for the predicate the denial of its
Contradictory; if not, not. _Vice versâ_, if the new proposition so
formed be true, the predicate of the thesis will be a true genus; if
not, not. Thus, if good be the true genus of pleasurable, nothing
that is not good will be pleasurable. This _locus_ also will serve
both for making out an affirmative and for making out a
negative.[178]
[Footnote 178: Topic. IV. iv. p. 124, b. 7-14: [Greek: pa/lin e)pi\
tô=n a)popha/seôn skopei=n a)na/palin], &c.]
If the subject (species) of the thesis be a Relative, you will
examine whether the predicate (genus) be relative also; if not, it
will not be the true genus of the subject. The converse of this rule,
however, will not hold; and indeed the rule itself is not absolutely
universal.[179] You may also argue that, if the correlate of the
genus be not the same as the correlate of the species, the genus
cannot be truly predicated of that species: thus, half is the
correlate of double, but half is not the proper correlate of
multiple; therefore, multiple is not the true genus of double. But
your argument may here be met by contradictory instances; thus,
cognition has reference to the _cognitum_, but _habitus_ and
_dispositio_ (the genera to which _cognitio_ belongs) do not refer to
_cognitum_ but to _anima_.[180] You may also examine whether the
correlate, when applied to the genus, is put in the same case
(_e.g._, genitive, dative, &c.) as when it is applied to the species:
if it be put into a different case, this affords presumption that the
genus is not a true genus; though here again instances may be
produced showing that your presumption will not hold universally.
Farther, you will observe whether the correlates thus similarly
inflected reciprocate like the species and genus; if not, this will
furnish you with the same adverse presumption.[181]
[Footnote 179: Ibid. b. 15-22.]
[Footnote 180: Ibid. b. 23-34.]
[Footnote 181: Ibid. b. 35, seq.]
Again, examine whether the correlate of the genus is genus to the
correlate of the species; if it be not so, you may argue that the
genus is not truly predicated. Thus, if the thesis affirms that
_perceptio_ is the genus of _cognitio_, it will follow that
_percipibile_ is the genus of _cognoscibile_. Now this cannot be
maintained; for there are some _cognoscibilia_ which are not
perceivable, _e.g._, some _cogitabilia_ (_intelligibilia_, [Greek:
noêta/]). Since therefore _percipibile_ is not the true genus of
_cognoscibile_, neither can _perceptio_ be the true genus of
_cognitio_.[182]
[Footnote 182: Ibid. p. 125, a. 25-32: [Greek: o(ra=n de\ kai\ ei)
tou= a)ntikeime/nou to\ a)ntikei/menon ge/nos, oi(=on ei) tou=
diplasi/ou to\ pollapla/sion kai\ tou= ê(mi/seos to\ pollostêmo/rion;
dei= ga\r to\ a)ntikei/menon tou= a)ntikeime/nou ge/nos ei)=nai.]
We must take note here of the large sense in which Aristotle uses
[Greek: A)ntikei/mena]--_Opposita_, including as one of the four
varieties _Relata_ and _Correlata_ = _Relativé-Opposita_ (to use a
technical word familiar in logical manuals). I have before (_supra_,
p. 105) remarked the inconvenience of calling the Relative _opposite_
to its Correlate; and have observed that it is logically incorrect to
treat _Relata_ as a species or mode of the genus _Opposita_. The
reverse would be more correct: we ought to rank _Opposita_ or a
species or mode under the genus _Relata_. Since Aristotle numbers
_Relata_ among the ten Categories, he ought to have seen that it
cannot be included as a subordinate under any superior genus.]
Suppose the thesis predicates of memory that it is--a continuance of
cognition. This will be open to attack, if the predicate be affirmed
as the genus (or even as the accident) of the subject. For every
continuance must be _in_ that which continues. But memory is of
necessity _in_ the soul; it cannot therefore be _in_ cognition.[183]
There is another ground on which the thesis will be assailable, if it
defines memory to be--a habit or acquirement retentive of belief.
This will not hold, because it confounds habit or disposition with
act; which last is the true description of memory. The opposite error
will be committed if the respondent defines perceptivity to be
a--movement through or by means of the body. Here perceptivity, which
is a habit or disposition, is ranked under movement, which is the act
exercising the same, _i.e._, perceptivity in actual exercise.[184]
Or, the mistake may be made of ranking some habit or disposition
under the power consequent on the possession thereof, as if this
power were the superior genus: thus the respondent may define
gentleness to be a continence of anger; courage, a continence of
fears; justice, a continence of appetite of lucre. But the genus here
assigned is not a good one: for a man who feels no anger is called
gentle; a man who feels no fear is called courageous; whereas the
continent man is he who feels anger or fear, but controls them. Such
controlling power is a natural consequence of gentleness and courage,
insomuch that, if the gentle man happened to feel anger, or the
courageous man to feel fear, each would control these impulses; but
it is no part of the essence thereof, and therefore cannot be the
genus under which they fall.[185] A like mistake is made if pain be
predicated as the genus of anger, or supposition as the genus of
belief. The angry man doubtless feels pain, but his pain precedes his
anger in time, and is the antecedent cause thereof; now the genus can
never precede its species in time. So also a man may have the same
supposition sometimes with belief, sometimes without it; accordingly,
supposition cannot be the genus of belief any more than the same
animal can be sometimes a man, sometimes a brute.[186] And indeed the
same negative conclusion would follow, even if we granted that every
supposition was always attended with belief. For, in that case,
supposition and belief would be co-extensive terms; but the generic
term must always be more extensive than its specific.[187]
[Footnote 183: Topic. IV. iv. p. 125, b. 6: [Greek: oi(=on ei) tê\n
mnê/mên _monê\n e)pistê/mês_ ei)=pen. pa=sa ga\r monê\ e)n tô=|
me/nonti kai\ peri\ e)kei=no, ô(/ste kai\ ê( tê=s e)pistê/mês monê\
e)n tê=| e)pistê/mê|. ê( mnê/mê a)/ra e)n tê=| e)pistê/mê|, e)peidê\
monê\ tê=s e)pistê/mês e)sti/n. tou=to d' ou)k e)nde/chetai; mnê/mê
ga\r pa=sa e)n psuchê=|.] A definition similar to this is found in
the Kratylus of Plato, p. 437, B.: [Greek: e)/peita de\ ê( mnê/mê
panti/ pou mênu/ei o(/ti monê/ e)stin e)n tê=| psuchê=|, a)ll' ou)
phora/.]]
[Footnote 184: Ibid. v. p. 125, b. 15-19. [Greek: oi(=on tê\n
ai)/sthêsin _ki/nêsin dia\ sô/matos_; ê( me\n ga\r ai)/sthêsis
e(/xis, ê( de\ ki/nêsis e)ne/rgeia.] This, too, seems to allude to
Plato's explanation of [Greek: ai)/sthêsis] in the Timæus, pp. 43, C,
64, B; compare also the Platonic or pseudo-Platonic Definitiones, p.
414, C.]
[Footnote 185: Topic. IV. v. p. 125, b. 20-27.]
[Footnote 186: Waitz, in his notes (p. 478), says that Aristotle is
here in the wrong. But I do not agree with Waitz. Aristotle considers
[Greek: pi/stis] to be an accidental accompaniment of [Greek:
u(po/lêpsis], not a species thereof. It may be present or absent
without determining any new specific name to [Greek: u(po/lêpsis],
which term has reference only to the intellectual or conceptive part
of the mental supposition. At least there seems to be nothing
contradictory or erroneous in what Aristotle here says, though he
does not adhere everywhere to this restricted meaning of [Greek:
u(po/lêpsis]]
[Footnote 187: Topic. IV. v. p. 125, b. 28-p. 126, a. 2.]
You will farther examine whether the predicate of the thesis be of a
nature to inhere in the same substance as the subject. If it be not,
it cannot be truly predicated thereof, either as genus or even as
accident. White (species) and colour (genus) are of a nature to
inhere or belong to the same substance. But, if the thesis declares
that shame is a species of fear, or that anger is a species of pain,
you may impugn it on the ground that shame belongs to the reasoning
element in man, fear to the courageous or energetic element; and that
pain belongs to the appetitive element, anger to the courageous. This
proves that fear can neither be the genus nor the accident of shame;
that pain can neither be the genus nor the accident of anger.[188]
[Footnote 188: Ibid. p. 126, a. 3-16. Compare V. iv. p. 133, a. 31.
Aristotle appears here to recognize the Platonic doctrine as laid
down in the Republic and Timæus, asserting either three distinct
parts of the soul, or, rather, three distinct souls. In the treatise
De Animâ (III. ix. p. 432, a. 25; I. v. p. 411, b. 25), he dissents
from and impugns this same doctrine.]
Suppose the thesis declares that animal is a species under the genus
_visibile_ or _percepibile_. You may oppose it by pointing out that
animal is only _visibile secundum quid_, or partially; that is, only
so far as regards body, not as regards mind. But the species always
partakes of its genus wholly, not partially or _secundum quid_; thus,
man is not partially animal, but wholly or essentially animal. If
what is predicated as the genus be not thus essentially partaken, it
cannot be a true genus; hence neither _visibile_ nor _percepibile_ is
a true genus of animal.[189]
[Footnote 189: Topic. IV. v. p. 126, a. 17-25.]
Sometimes what is predicated as the genus is, when compared to its
species, only as a part to the whole; which is never the case with a
true genus. Some refer animal to the genus living body; but body is
only part of the whole animal, and therefore cannot be the true genus
thereof.[190] Sometimes a species which is blameworthy and hateful,
or a species which is praiseworthy and eligible, may be referred to
the power or capacity from which it springs, as genus; thus, the
thief, a blameworthy and hateful character, may be referred to the
predicate--capable of stealing another man's property. But this,
though true as a predicate, is not the true genus; for the honest man
is also capable of so acting, but he is distinguished from the thief
by not acting so, nor having the disposition so to act. All power and
capacity is eligible; if the above were the true genus of thief, it
would be a case in which power and capacity is blameworthy and
hateful. Neither, on the other hand, can any thing in its own nature
praiseworthy and eligible, be referred to power and capacity as its
genus; for all power and capacity is praiseworthy and eligible not in
itself or its own nature, but by reason of something else, namely,
its realizable consequences.[191]
[Footnote 190: Ibid. a. 26-29.]
[Footnote 191: Topic. IV. v. p. 126, a. 30-b. 6: [Greek: o(ra=n de\
kai\ ei)/ ti tô=n psektô=n ê)\ pheutô=n ei)s du/namin ê)\ to\
dunato\n e)/thêken, oi(=on to\n sophistê\n ê)\ dia/bolon ê)\ kle/ptên
to\n duna/menon la/thra ta\ a)llo/tria kle/ptein.]
The general drift of Aristotle is here illustrated better by taking
the thief separately, apart from the other two. But we must notice
here the proof of his temper or judgment concerning the persons
called Sophists, when we find him grouping them in the bunch of
[Greek: psekta\] and [Greek: pheukta\] along with thieves. The
majority of his uninstructed contemporaries would probably have
agreed in this judgment, but they would certainly have enrolled
Aristotle himself among the Sophists thus depreciated.]
Again, you may detect in the thesis sometimes the mistake of putting
under one genus a species which properly comes under two genera
conjointly, not subalternate one to the other; sometimes, the mistake
of predicating the genus as a differentia, or the differentia as a
genus.[192] Sometimes, also, the subject in which the attribute or
affection resides is predicated as if it were the genus of such
affection; or, _è converso_, the attribute or affection is predicated
as the genus of the subject wherein it resides; _e.g._, when breath
or wind, which is really a movement of air, is affirmed to be air put
in motion, and thus constituted as a species under the genus air; or
when snow is declared to be water congelated; or mud, to be earth
mixed with moisture.[193] In none of these cases is the predicate a
true genus; for it cannot be always affirmed of the subject.
[Footnote 192: Ibid. b. 7-33.]
[Footnote 193: Ibid. b. 34-p. 127, a. 19.]
Or perhaps the predicate affirmed as genus may be no genus at all;
for nothing can be a genus unless there are species contained under
it; _e.g._, if the thesis declare white to be a genus, this may be
impugned, because white objects do not differ _in specie_ from each
other. Or a mere universal predicate (such as _Ens_ or _Unum_) may be
put forward as a genus or differentia; or a simple concomitant
attribute, or an equivocal term, may be so put forward.[194]
[Footnote 194: Topic. IV. vi. p. 127, a. 20-b. 7.]
Perhaps it may happen that the subject (species) and the predicate
(genus) of the thesis may each have a contrary term; and that in each
pair of contrary terms one may be better, the other worse. If, in
that case, the better species be referred to the worse genus, or
_vice versâ_, this will render the thesis assailable. Or perhaps the
species may be fit to be referred equally to both the contrary
genera; in which case, if the thesis should refer it to the worse of
the two, that will be a ground of objection. Thus, if the soul be
referred to the genus _mobile_, you are at liberty to object that it
is equally referable to the genus _stabile_: and that, as the latter
is the better of the two, it ought to be referred to the better in
preference to the worse.[195]
[Footnote 195: Ibid. b. 8-17.]
There is a _locus_ of More and Less, which may be made available in
various ways. Thus, if the genus predicated admits of being graduated
as more or less, while the species of which it is predicated does not
admit of such graduation, you may question the applicability of the
genus to the species.[196] You may raise the question also, if there
be any thing else which looks equally like the true genus, or more
like it than the genus predicated by the thesis. This will happen
often, when the essence of the species includes several distinct
elements; _e.g._, in the essence of anger, there is included both
pain (an emotional element), and the supposition or belief of being
undervalued (an intellectual element); hence, if the thesis ranks
anger under the genus pain, you may object that it equally belongs to
the genus supposition[197] This _locus_ is useful for raising a
negative question, but will serve little for establishing an
affirmative. Towards the affirmative, you will find advantage in
examining the subject (species) respecting which the thesis
predicates a given genus; for, if it can be shown that this supposed
species is no real species but a genus, the genus predicated thereof
will be _à fortiori_ a genus.[198]
[Footnote 196: Ibid. b. 18-25: [Greek: e)/ti e)k tou= ma=llon kai\
ê(=tton, a)naskeua/zonti me/n, ei) to\ ge/nos de/chetai to\ ma=llon,
to\ d' ei)=dos mê\ de/chetai mê/t' au)to\ mê/te to\ kat' e)kei=no
lego/menon.]]
[Footnote 197: Ibid. b. 26-37: [Greek: chrê/simos d' o( to/pos e)pi\
tô=n toiou/tôn ma/lista e)ph' ô(=n plei/ô phai/netai tou= ei)/dous
e)n tô=| ti/ e)sti katêgorou/mena, kai\ mê\ diô/ristai, mê/d'
e)/chomen ei)pei=n poi=on au)tô=n ge/nos,] &c.]
[Footnote 198: Ibid. b. 38-p. 128, a. 12.]
Some think (says Aristotle)[199] that Differentia as well as Genus is
predicated essentially respecting the Species. Accordingly, Genus
must be discriminated from Differentia. For such discrimination the
following characteristics are pointed out:--1. Genus has greater
extent in predication than Differentia. 2. In replying to the
enquiry, _Quid est?_ it is more suitable and significant to declare
the Genus than the Differentia. 3. Differentia declares a quality of
Genus, and therefore presupposes Genus as already known; but Genus
does not in like manner presuppose Differentia. If you wish to show
that belief is the genus to which cognition belongs, you must examine
whether the _cognoscens_ believes _quâ cognoscens_. If he does so,
your point is made out.[200]
[Footnote 199: Ibid. a. 20, seq.: [Greek: e)pei\ de\ dokei= tisi\
kai\ ê( diaphora\ e)n tô=| ti/ e)sti tô=n ei)dô=n katêgorei=sthai,
chôriste/on to\ ge/nos a)po\ tê=s diaphora=s], &c.]
[Footnote 200: Topic. IV. vi. p. 128, a. 35. If you are trying to
show [Greek: tê\n e)pistê/mên o(/per pi/stin], you must examine
[Greek: ei) o( e)pista/menos ê(=| e)pi/statai pisteu/ei; dê=lon ga\r
o(/ti ê( e)pistê/mê pi/stis a)/n tis ei)/ê.]]
Wherever a predicate is universally true of its subject, while the
proposition is not true if simply converted (_i.e._, wherever the
predicate is of larger extension than the subject), there is
difficulty in distinguishing it from a genus. Accordingly, when you
are respondent, maintaining the affirmative side, you will use such
predicate as if it were a genus; but, when you are assailant, you
will not allow the respondent to do so. You may quote against him the
instance of _Non-Ens_; which is predicable of every thing generated,
but which is not a genus, since it has no species under it.[201]
[Footnote 201: Ibid. a. 38-b. 9.]
V.
Aristotle passes, in the Fifth book of the Topica, to those debates
in which the thesis set up declares the predicate as Proprium of the
subject.
A Proprium may belong to its subject either _per se_ and _semper_, or
relatively to something else and occasionally or sometimes. It is a
proprium _per se_ of man to be an animal by nature tractable. It is a
relative proprium of the soul in regard to the body, to exercise
command; of the body in regard to the soul, to obey command. It is a
proprium _semper_ of a god, to be immortal; it is an occasional
_proprium_ (_i.e._, sometimes) of this or that man, to be walking in
the market-place.[202] When the proprium is set out relatively to
something else, the debate must involve two questions, and may
involve four. Thus, if the thesis affirms that it is a proprium of
man relatively to horse (discriminating man from horse) to be by
nature two-footed, you may (as opponent) either deny that man is
two-footed, or affirm that horse is two-footed; or you may go farther
and affirm that man is by nature four-footed, or deny that horse is
by nature four-footed. If you can succeed in showing any one of these
four, you will have refuted the thesis.[203]
[Footnote 202: Ibid. V. i. p. 128, b. 14-21. That which Aristotle
calls Proprium _per se_ is a proprium of the subject as much
_relative_ as what he calls specially the _relative_ Proprium. The
Proprium _per se_ discriminates the subject from everything else; the
_relative_ Proprium discriminates it from some given correlate.]
[Footnote 203: Topic. V. i. p. 128, b. 22-33.]
The Proprium _per se_ discriminates its subject from everything else,
and is universally true thereof; the _relative_ Proprium
discriminates its subject only from some other assignable subject.
The relative Proprium may be either constant and universally true, or
true with exceptions--true and applicable in the ordinary course of
things: it may be tested through those _Loci_ which have been
enumerated as applicable to the Accident. The Proprium _per se_, and
the _constant_ Proprium, have certain _Loci_ of their own, which we
shall now indicate. These are the most logical (_sensu Aristotelico_)
or suitable for Dialectic; furnishing the most ample matter for
debates.[204]
[Footnote 204: Ibid. b. 34-p. 129, a. 35. [Greek: tô=n d' i)di/ôn
e)sti\ _lo/gika\_ ma/lista;] &c. He explains presently what he means
by [Greek: logika/--logiko\n de\ tou=t' e)sti\ pro/blêma, pro\s o(\
lo/goi ge/noit' a)\n kai\ suchnoi\ kai\ kaloi/]. The distinctions in
this paragraph are not very sharply drawn.]
Aristotle distinguishes (1) those cases in which the alleged proprium
is a true proprium, but is incorrectly or informally set out in the
thesis, from those (2) in which it is untruly predicated, or is no
proprium at all.
To set out a proprium well, that which is predicated ought to be
clearer and better known than the subject of which it is predicated,
since the purpose of predicating the proprium is to communicate
knowledge.[205] If it be more obscure or less known, you may impugn
the thesis as bad in form, or badly set out. Thus, if the thesis
declare, as a proprium of fire, that fire is of all things the most
like to the soul, this is not well set out, because the essence of
the soul is not so well known as the essence of fire. Moreover, the
fact that the predicate belongs to the subject, ought to be better
known even than the subject itself; for whoever is ignorant that A
belongs to B at all, cannot possibly know that A is the proprium of
B.[206] Thus, if the thesis declare, as proprium of fire, that it is
the first or most universal subject in which it is the nature of soul
to be found, the predicate is here doubly unknowable: first, the
hearer does not know that the soul is found in fire at all; next, he
does not know that fire is the _first_ subject in which soul is
found. On the other hand, the respondent will repel your attack if he
can show that his proprium is more knowable in both the two
above-mentioned ways. If, for example, he declares as thesis, To have
sensible perception is the proprium of an animal, here the proprium
is both well known in itself, and well known as belonging to the
given subject. Accordingly, it is well set out, as far as this
condition is concerned.[207]
[Footnote 205: Ibid. p. 129, b. 7: [Greek: gnô/seôs ga\r e(/neka to\
i)/dion poiou/metha; dia\ gnôrimôte/ron ou)=n a)podote/on; ou(/tô
ga\r e)/stai katanoei=n i(kanô=s ma=llon.]
He repeats the same dictum, substantially, in the next page, p. 130,
a. 4: [Greek: to\ ga\r i)/dion tou= mathei=n cha/rin a)podi/dotai];
and, again, p. 131, a. 1.]
[Footnote 206: Ibid. b. 15: [Greek: o( mê\ ga\r ei)dô\s ei) tô=|d'
u(pa/rchei, ou)d' ei) tô=|d' u(pa/rchei mo/nô| gnôriei=.]]
[Footnote 207: Topic. V. ii. p. 129, b. 21-29.]
A second condition of its being well set out is, that it shall
contain neither equivocal term nor equivocal or amphibolical
proposition. Thus, if the thesis declares, To perceive is the
proprium of an animal, it is equivocal; for it may mean either to
have sensible perception, or to exercise sensible perception
actually. You may apply the test to such a thesis, by syllogizing
from one or both of these equivocal meanings. The respondent will
make good his defence, if he shows that there is no such
equivocation: as, for example, if the thesis be, It is a proprium of
fire to be the body most easily moved into the upper region; where
there is no equivocation, either of term or proposition.[208]
Sometimes the equivocation may be, not in the name of the proprium
itself, but in the name of the subject to which it is applied. Where
this last is not _unum et simplex_ but equivocal, the thesis must
specify which among the several senses is intended; and, if that be
neglected, the manner of setting out is incorrect.[209]
[Footnote 208: Ibid. b. 30-p. 130, a. 13.]
[Footnote 209: Ibid. p. 130, a. 15-28.]
Another form of the like mistake is, where the same term is repeated
both in the predicate and in the subject; which is often done, both
as to Proprium and as to Definition, though it is a cause of
obscurity, as well as a tiresome repetition.[210] The repetition may
be made in two ways: either directly, by the same term occurring
twice; or indirectly, when the second term given is such that it
cannot be defined without repeating the first. An example of direct
repetition is, Fire is a _body_ the rarest among _bodies_ (for
proprium of fire). An example of indirect repetition is, Earth is a
_substance_ which tends most of all _bodies_ downwards to the lowest
region (as proprium of earth); for, when the respondent is required
to define _bodies_, he must define them--such and such
_substances_.[211] An example free from objection on this ground is,
Man is an animal capable of receiving cognition (as proprium of man).
[Footnote 210: Ibid. a. 30-34. [Greek: tara/ttei ga\r to\n a)kou/onta
pleona/kis lechthe/n--kai\ pro\s tou/tois a)doleschei=n dokou=sin.]]
[Footnote 211: Ibid. a. 34-b. 5. [Greek: e(/n ga\r kai\ tau)to/n
e)sti sô=ma kai\ ou)si/a toiadi/; e)/stai **ga\r ou(=tos to\
_ou)si/a_ pleona/kis ei)rêkô/s.]]
Another mode of bad or incorrect setting out is, when the term
predicated as proprium belongs not only to the subject, but also to
all other subjects. Such a proposition is useless; for it furnishes
no means of discriminating the subject from anything; whereas
discrimination is one express purpose of the Proprium as well as of
the Definition.[212] Again, another mode is, when the thesis declares
several propria belonging to the same subject, without announcing
that they are several. As the definer ought not to introduce into his
definition any words beyond what are required for declaring the
essence of the subject, so neither should the person who sets out a
proprium add any words beyond those requisite for constituting the
proprium. Thus, if the thesis enunciates, as proprium of fire, that
it is the thinnest and lightest body, here are two propria instead of
one. Contrast with this another proprium, free from the objection
just pointed out--Moist is that which may assume every variety of
figure.[213]
[Footnote 212: Topic. V. ii. p. 130, b. 12: [Greek: a)chrei=on
**ga\r e)/stai to\ mê\ chôri/zon a)po/ tinôn, **to\ d' e)n
toi=s i)di/ois lego/menon chôri/zein dei=, katha/per kai\ ta\ e)n
toi=s o(/rois.]]
[Footnote 213: Ibid. b. 23-37.]
A farther mistake is, when the predicate declaring the proprium
includes either the subject itself or some species comprehended under
the subject; for example, when we are told, as a proprium of animal,
that animal is a substance of which man is a species. We have already
seen that the proprium ought to be better known than its subject; but
man is even less known (posterior in respect to cognition) than
animal, because it is a species under the genus animal.[214]
[Footnote 214: Ibid. iii. p. 130, b. 38.]
Again, our canon--That the Proprium should be better known than its
subject, or should make the subject better known--will be violated in
another way, if the proprium enunciated be something opposite to the
subject, or in any other way _simul naturâ_ as compared with the
subject; and still more, if it be _posterius naturâ_ as compared with
the subject. Thus, if a man enunciates, as proprium of good, that
good is that which is most opposite to evil, his proprium will not be
well or correctly set out.[215]
[Footnote 215: Ibid. p. 131, a. 12-26. This _locus_ is not clear or
satisfactory, as Alexander remarks in Scholia (p. 284, b. 12-23,
Br.). He says that it may pass as an [Greek: e)/ndoxon]--something
sufficiently plausible to be employed in Dialectic. In fact,
Alexander virtually controverts this _locus_ in what he says a little
farther down (Schol. p. 285, a. 31), that the Proprium is always
_simul naturâ_ with its subject.]
Perhaps, again, the thesis may enunciate as proprium what is not
constantly appurtenant to the subject, but is sometimes absent
therefrom; or, intending to enunciate an occasional proprium, it may
omit to specify the qualifying epithet _occasional_. In either case
the proprium is not well set out, and a ground is furnished for
censure, which ought always to be avoided.[216]
[Footnote 216: Topic. V. iii. p. 131, a. 27-b. 18. [Greek: ou)k
e)/stai kalô=s kei/menon to\ i)/dion--ou)/koun dote/on e)sti\n
e)pitimê/seôs skê=psin.]]
Moreover, the proprium will not be well set out, if it be such as
does not necessarily belong to the subject, but is only shown by the
evidence of sense to belong thereunto. In this case, when the subject
is out of the reach of sensible perception, no one knows whether the
supposed proprium still continues as its attribute. Thus, suppose the
thesis to enunciate as a proprium of the sun, that it is the
brightest star borne in movement above the earth: the fact that it is
so borne in movement above the earth is one that we know by sensible
perception only; accordingly, after the sun sets and we cease to see
it, we cannot be sure that it continues to be borne in movement. If a
proprium knowable as such by sense be chosen, it ought to be one
which is also knowable independently, as belonging to the subject by
necessity. Thus, if a man enunciates, as proprium of superficies,
that superficies is what first becomes coloured or first receives
colour, this is a proprium well set out. For we know clearly that it
must always belong to a superficies; though we may also obtain the
additional evidence of sense, by looking at some perceivable
body.[217]
[Footnote 217: Ibid. b. 19-36. [Greek: oi(=on e)pei\ o( the/menos
e)piphanei/as i)/dion o(\ prô=ton ke/chrôstai, ai)sthêtô=| me/n tini
_proske/chrêtai_ tô=| kechrô=sthai, _toiou/tô| d' o(\ phanero/n
e)stin u(pa/rchon a)ei/_, ei)/ê a)\n kata\ tou=to kalô=s
a)podedome/non to\ tê=s e)piphanei/as i)/dion.]
Aristotle means that we know clearly, _by evidence independent of
sense_, that the superficies must be the first portion of the body
that becomes coloured, though we may attain the additional evidence
of our senses ([Greek: _proske/chrêtai_]) to the same fact.]
Perhaps too the thesis may enunciate the Definition as if it were a
Proprium; which is another ground for objecting that the proprium is
not well set out. Thus, the thesis may enunciate, as proprium of man,
that man is a land animal walking on two feet. Here what is given as
proprium is the essence of man, which never ought to be affirmed in
the proprium. To set out the proprium well, the predicate ought to
reciprocate and to be co-extensive with the subject, but it ought not
to affirm the essence thereof. A good specimen of proprium well set
out is the following, Man is an animal by nature gentle; for here the
predicate is co-extensive with the subject, yet does not declare the
essence of the subject.[218]
[Footnote 218: Ibid. b. 37-p. 132, a. 9.]
Lastly, the proprium, to be well set out, though it does not declare
the essence of the subject, yet ought to begin by presupposing the
generic portion of the essence, and to attach itself thereunto as a
constant adjunct or concomitant. Thus, suppose the thesis to
enunciate, as proprium, Animal is that which has a soul; this will
not be well set out, for the predicate is not superadded or attached
to the declared generic essence of animal. But, if the thesis
enunciates, as proprium of man, Man is an animal capable of acquiring
cognition,--this will be a proprium well set out, so far as the
present objection is concerned. For here the predicate declares first
the generic essence of the subject, and then superinduces the
peculiar adjunct thereupon.[219]
[Footnote 219: Topic. V. iii. p. 131, a. 10-21.]
Thus far Aristotle has pointed out certain conditions to be attended
to in determining whether a Proprium is well set out or described,
without determining whether it be really a Propium or not. It may
perhaps be truly predicated of the subject, and may even admit of a
better description which would show it to be a proprium of the
subject; but the description actually set out is defective, and the
assailant is entitled to impeach it on that ground. He now proceeds
to a larger discussion: What are the conditions for determining
whether the supposed Proprium be really a Proprium at all, in respect
to the subject of which it is predicated? Assuming that the
description of it is not open to impeachment on any of the grounds
above enumerated, are there not other real grounds of objection,
disproving its title to the character of Proprium?[220]
[Footnote 220: Ibid. p. 132, a. 22-27. [Greek: po/teron me\n ou)=n
kalô=s ê)\ ou) kalô=s a)pode/dotai to\ i)/dion, dia\ tô=nde
skepte/on; po/teron d' _i)/dio/n e)stin_ o(/lôs to\ ei)rême/non ê)\
ou)k i)/dion, e)k tô=nde theôrête/on.]
The distinction here noted by Aristotle (between the two
questions:--(1) Whether the alleged Proprium is well set out or
clearly described? (2) Whether the alleged Proprium is a Proprium at
all?) is not carried out, nor indeed capable of being carried out,
with strict precision. The two heads of questions run together and
become confounded. Alexander remarks (Scholia, p. 284, b. 24-46, Br.)
that the three or four last-mentioned _loci_ under the first head
embrace the second head also. He allows only three _loci_ as belonging
peculiarly to the first head--[Greek: tou= mê\ kalô=s a)podedo/sthai
to\ i)/dion]:--(1) Equivocal terms; (2) Predicate not reciprocating
or co-extensive with subject; (3) Predicate not more knowable than
subject. The other _loci_ (besides these three) enumerated by
Aristotle under the first head, Alexander considers as belonging
equally to the second head. But he commends Aristotle for making a
distinction between the two heads: [Greek: ou) ga\r pa=n to\
a)pêllotriôme/non tou/tôn, kai\ mê\ e)/chon o(mônu/mous phôna\s ê)/
ti tô=n ei)rême/nôn, kai\ i)/dion r(ête/on e)x a)na/gkês.] The manner
in which M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire explains this nice distinction is
not clear to me (Note to his translation of Topica, p. 177).]
1. Suppose your respondent to set up A as a proprium of B: you will
examine first whether A can be truly predicated of B at all; next, if
it can so be, whether it is truly predicable of B _quâ_ B, or of
every thing that comes under B _quâ_ B. Thus, if he contends that not
to be deceived by reason is a proprium of scientific men, you will be
able to show that this does not hold in geometry, since geometricians
are deceived by pseudographemes or scientific paralogisms. Or, should
the respondent deny that A is a proprium of B, you will succeed in
refuting him, if you can prove that A is truly predicable of every B
and _quâ_ B. Thus, it is a proprium of man to be an animal capable of
acquiring knowledge; because that attribute is truly predicable of
every man _quâ_ man.[221]
[Footnote 221: Topic. V. iv. p. 132, a. 27, seq.]
2. Again, suppose your respondent affirms a given proprium A of B:
you will examine whether A can be truly predicated of every thing
called B, and whether B can be truly predicated of every thing called
A; if not, the alleged proprium will not hold. Thus the affirmation,
A god is an animal participant of knowledge, is a true affirmation;
but it would not be true to say, A god is a man: wherefore, to be
participant of knowledge is not proprium of man; and, if this be the
proprium which the respondent undertakes to maintain, you will be
able to refute him. On the other hand, if what he undertakes is the
negation of a proprium (A is not a proprium of B), you will establish
the affirmative against him by showing that of every thing respecting
which A can be truly affirmed B can be affirmed also, and _vice
versâ_. You will thus show that A is a true proprium of B.[222]
[Footnote 222: Ibid. b. 8-18.]
3. Again, the respondent may perhaps affirm the subject itself as a
proprium of something inherent in the subject. You may refute this by
showing that, if it were so, the same thing would be a proprium of
several things differing from each other in species. On the other
hand, the respondent may perhaps deny that something inherent in the
subject is a proprium: you may then refute him by showing that it is
truly predicable of the subject only, and not truly predicable of any
thing else.[223]
[Footnote 223: Ibid. b. 19-34. Alexander, in the Scholia (p. 285, a.
14, Br.) has stated this _locus_ more clearly than Aristotle--[Greek:
to\ ga\r i)/dion u(pa/rchein dei= e)n e(te/rô|, ou)ch e(/teron e)n
au)tô=|.]]
4. The respondent may perhaps affirm as a proprium something
contained in the essence of the subject: if so, you will refute him
by showing this. On the other hand, if he denies something to be a
proprium, you will refute him by showing that, though it is not
contained in the essence of the subject, it is nevertheless
predicable co-extensively therewith.[224]
[Footnote 224: Topic. V. iv. p. 132, b. 35-p. 133, a. 11.]
5. The respondent may affirm as a proprium that which is not a
necessary concomitant of the subject, but may either precede or
follow it. Or, on the other hand, he may deny something to be a
proprium which you can show to be a constant and necessary
concomitant of the subject, without being included either in its
definition or differentia. In each case you will have a ground for
refuting him.[225]
[Footnote 225: Topic. V. iv. p. 133, a. 12-23.]
6. The respondent may affirm as a proprium of the subject what he has
already denied of the same subject under some other name; or he may
deny of it what he has already affirmed of it under some other name.
You will have grounds for refuting him.[226]
[Footnote 226: Ibid. a. 24-32.]
7. If there be two subjects (_e.g._, man and horse) the same with
each other in species, the respondent may affirm respecting one of
them a proprium which is not the same in species with the proprium of
the other. Thus, it is not a constant proprium of horse to stand
still spontaneously; accordingly neither is it a constant proprium of
man to move spontaneously; these two propria being the same in
species, and belonging both to man and to horse _quatenus_
animal.[227] If, therefore, the respondent affirms the one while he
denies the other, you have an argument in refutation. On the other
hand, he may propound as thesis the denial of the one proprium, while
he affirms or admits the other. Here too you will be able to make
good the counter-affirmation against his denial, on the ground of
that which he admits. Thus, if it be proprium of man to be a
walking-biped, it must also be proprium of bird to be a flying-biped.
The two pairs, man and bird, walking and flying, are the same in
species with each other, since both pairs are subordinates under the
same genus: man and bird are species, flying and walking are
differentiæ, under the same genus animal. This _locus_, however, is
not universally applicable; for perhaps one of the two predicates may
not be of exclusive application to the subject, but may belong to
other subjects also. Thus walking-biped designates only one
variety--man; but walking-quadruped designates several--horse, ass,
dog, &c. Walking-quadruped therefore is not a proprium of horse.[228]
[Footnote 227: Ibid. a. 35-b. 5. [Greek: oi(=on e)pei\ tau)to/n e)sti
tô=| ei)/dei a)/nthrôpos kai\ i(/ppos, ou)k a)ei\ de\ tou= i(/ppou
e)sti\n i)/dion to\ e(sta/nai u(ph' au(tou=, ou)k a)n ei)/ê tou=
a)nthrô/pou i)/dion to\ kinei=sthai u(ph' au(tou=; tau)to\n ga/r
e)sti tô=| ei)/dei to\ kinei=sthai kai\ e(sta/nai u(ph' au(tou=, ê(=|
zô/|ô| e)sti\n e(kate/rô| au)tô=n to\ sumbebêke/nai.] The last words
are very obscure: they are explained by Waitz (p. 486)--"[Greek: ê(=|
to\ sumbebêke/nai e(ka/teron (to\ kinei=sthai kai\ e(sta/nai u(ph'
au(tou=] intell.) [Greek: e(kate/rô| au)tô=n e)sti\ sumbebêke/nai
ê(=| zô/|ô|], quatenus utrumque de utroque, quatenus animal est,
prædicatur."]
[Footnote 228: Topic. V. iv. p. 133, b. 5-14. Alexander declares this
_locus_ to be obscure. He comments, not without reason, on the loose
manner in which Aristotle uses the term [Greek: ei)=dos]; and he
observes that Aristotle himself admits the _locus_ to be [Greek:
kata/ ti pseudê/s] (Schol. p. 285, a. 40-45, Br.). It is strange to
read that man and horse, man and bird, are [Greek: tau)to\n ei)/dei],
the same in _species_.]
8. There is some difficulty in discussing the proprium, when the
respondent is assailed by a sophistical dialectician who avails
himself of the equivocal application of _Idem_ and _Diversum_:
contending that Subject with an Accident becomes a different
subject--_e.g._, _homo albus_, a subject different from _homo_ (so
that, when a proprium has been shown to belong to _homo_, it has not
been shown that the same proprium belongs to _homo albus_); and that
the Abstract is a different subject from the Concrete--_e.g._
cognition, from the cognizing man (so that what has been shown as
proprium of cognition has not been shown as proprium of the cognizing
man). If the respondent shall himself set up these negatives, leaving
to you the task of establishing the proprium against him, you will
meet him by saying that _homo_ is not a subject absolutely different
and distinct from _homo albus_, but that there is only a notional
distinction, the same subject having here two names each with a
distinct connotation: _homo_ has its own connotation; _homo albus_
has also its own connotation, embodying in one total that which each
of the terms connotes. And, when the Sophist remarks that what is a
proprium of _scientia_ cannot be predicated also as a proprium of
_homo sciens_, you will reply that it may be so predicated, only with
a slight change of inflection. For you need not scruple to employ
sophistical refutation against those who debate with you in a
sophistical way.[229]
[Footnote 229: Topic. V. iv. p. 133, b. 15-p. 134, a. 4. [Greek:
pro\s ga\r to\n pa/ntôs e)nista/menon, pa/ntôs a)ntitakte/on
e)sti/n]. It appears to me that Aristotle is not entitled to treat
this objection as sophistical (_i.e._ as unfair Dialectic). He is
here considering predication as Proprium, contrasted with predication
as Accident. What is true as an accident respecting _homo albus_,
will also be true as an accident respecting _homo_: but what is true
as a proprium respecting _homo albus_, will not be true as a proprium
respecting _homo_--nor _vice versâ_. This is a good _locus_ for
objections in predication of Proprium. There is a real distinction
between _homo_ and _homo albus_; between Koriskus and Koriskus
_albus_: and one of the ways of elucidating that distinction is by
pointing out that the proprium of one is not the same as the proprium
of the other. Aristotle treats those who dwelt upon this distinction
as Sophists: what their manner of noticing it may have been he does
not clearly tell us; but if we are to have that logical accuracy of
speech which _his_ classification and theory demand, this distinction
must undoubtedly be brought to view among the rest.]
9. The respondent may perhaps intend to affirm as proprium something
which by nature belongs to the subject; but he may err in his mode of
stating it, and may predicate it as always belonging to the subject.
Thus, he may predicate biped as a proprium always belonging to man.
Under this mode of expression, you will be able to show that he is
wrong; for there are some men who have not two feet. On the other
hand, if the respondent denies biped to be a proprium of man, relying
upon the statement that it is not actually true of every individual,
you will be able to show against him that it is so in the correct
phraseology of belonging to man by nature.[230]
[Footnote 230: Topic. V. v. p. 131, a. 5-17. This _locus_ is a
question rather of phraseology than of real fact, and seems therefore
rather to belong to the former class of _Loci_ respecting the
Proprium--[Greek: po/teron kalô=s ê)\ ou) kalô=s a)pode/dotai to\
i)/dion]--than to the present class, which Aristotle declares (V. iv.
p. 132, a. 25) to relate to the question [Greek: po/teron i)/dio/n
e)stin o(/lôs to\ **ei)rême/non ê)\ ou)k i)/dion].]
10. That which is affirmed as a proprium may belong to its subject
either primarily and immediately, or in a secondary way--relatively
to some prior denomination of the same subject. In such cases it is
difficult to set out the proprium in terms thoroughly
unobjectionable. Thus, the superficies of a body is what is _first_
coloured: when we speak of _corpus album_, this is by reason of its
white superficies. _Album_ is a proprium true both of body and of
superficies; but the explanation usually given of Proprium will not
hold here--that, wherever the predicate can be affirmed, the subject
can be affirmed also. _Album_ is proprium of superficies; and _album_
can be truly affirmed as also proprium of body; but superficies
cannot be truly affirmed of body.[231]
[Footnote 231: Topic. V. v. p. 134, a. 18-25. This is a very obscure
and difficult _locus_. I am not sure that I understand it.]
11. The respondent who is affirming a Proprium may sometimes err by
not clearly distinguishing in what mode, and in respect to what
precise subject, he intends to affirm it. There are ten different
modes, in one or other of which he always proposes to affirm
it:--[232]
_a._ As belonging to the subject by nature. _E.g._, Biped is by
nature a proprium of man.
_b._ As belonging to the subject simply--in some way or other.
_E.g._, To have four fingers, belongs to Koriskus or some other
individual man.
_c._ As belonging to the _species_. _E.g._, It belongs to fire to be
the most subtle of all bodies.
_d._ As belonging absolutely ([Greek: a(plô=s, katha/per zô/|ou to\
zê=n])--in virtue of the essence of the subject--_per se_.[233]
_e._ As belonging to the subject by reason of some primary
intervening aspect or attribute thereof. _E.g._, Prudence is a
proprium of the soul, looked at _quatenus_ reasonable or
intellectual.
_f._ As belonging to that primary attribute or special aspect,
logically distinguished and named separately from the subject.
_E.g._, Prudence is a proprium of the _logistikon_ or _rationale_.
_g._ As belonging to the subject viewed as possessing or holding in
possession. _E.g._, The scientific man possesses that acquired mental
habit which renders him incapable of having his convictions farther
altered by discussion.
_h._ As belonging to some possession held by a possessing person.
_E.g._, Science is unalterable by discussion; where science, a
possession of the scientific man, is assigned as subject of the
proprium, unalterable by discussion.
_i._ As belonging to a subject which is partaken or held in
participation by another subject lying behind. _E.g._, Sensible
perception is a proprium of the genus animal which genus is partaken
or held in participation by this individual man, that individual
horse, &c.; whence it may be predicated not only of animal but also
of man, as thus participant.
_k._ As belonging to the ultimate subject partaking. _E.g._, To live
is a proprium of this particular man or horse, participant in the
genus animal, in the way just indicated.
[Footnote 232: Ibid. a. 26-b. 4: [Greek: sumbai/nei d' e)n e)ni/ois
tô=n i)di/ôn ô(s e)pi\ to\ polu\ gi/nesthai/ tina a(marti/an para\
to\ mê\ diori/zesthai pô=s kai\ ti/nôn ti/thêsi to\ i)/dion.
a(/pantes ga\r e)picheirou=sin a)podido/nai to\ i)/dion ê)\ to\
phu/sei u(pa/rchon], &c.
He then proceeds to enumerate the ten diversities of Proprium which I
have given in the text: this paragraph also is very obscure.
I cannot but repeat the remark here (which I made _supra_ p. 318),
that the contents of this paragraph also belong to the former
investigation (_viz._, How ought the Proprium to be set out and
described?) rather than to the present investigation (_viz._, Whether
the alleged Proprium is really a Proprium of the assigned subject or
not?).]
[Footnote 233: Topic. V. v. p. 134, a. 32: [Greek: ê)\ a(plô=s,
katha/per zô/|ou to\ zê=n.] Is not [Greek: to\ zê=n] included in the
_essentia_ ([Greek: to\ ti\ ê)=n ei)=nai]) of [Greek: zô=|on]? If so,
how can it be admitted as a _proprium_ thereof?]
Now each of these varieties of the Proprium is liable to its own mode
of erroneous setting out or description. Thus the corresponding
errors will be:--[234]
_a._ Not to add the qualifying words _by nature_.
_b._ Not to state the proprium as simply belonging, when it does only
belong to the subject now, and may presently cease to belong.
_c._ Not to state the proprium as belonging _to the species_. If he
omits these words, he may be told that it belongs to one variety
alone among the species (_e.g._, should it be a superlative) and not
to others: perhaps it may belong to some conspicuously, and to others
faintly. Or perhaps, if he does add the express words--_to the
species_, he may err, inasmuch as there exists no real species
properly so called.
_e._ _f._ Not to distinguish whether he means to affirm it of B by
reason of A, or of A directly: he will lay himself open to the
objection that his proprium, and the subject term of which he
declares it to be a proprium, are not co-extensive in predication.
_g._ _h._ Not to distinguish whether he intends as subject the person
possessing, or the possession. If he leaves this undetermined, the
objector may attack him on one ground or the other.
_i._ _k._ Not to distinguish whether he means as subject the
partaker, or the genus which is partaken. Here too the objector will
have ground for attack either from one side or from the other.
[Footnote 234: Topic. V. v. p. 134, b. 5-p. 135, a. 5. For the fourth
head (_d._), no corresponding error is assigned. It should be noted
that the illustration given of it, and remarked upon at the foot of
the last page, is repeated for the concluding head of the list.]
In case the respondent should enunciate his proprium in any one of
the above defective ways, you will thus know where to find objections
against him. But, if you undertake yourself to enunciate a proprium,
you will avoid laying yourself open to the objections, by
discriminating under which of these heads you intend to affirm
it.[235]
[Footnote 235: Topic. V. v. p. 135, a. 5: [Greek: a)/llou me\n ou)=n
ou(/tôs a)podido/ntos to\ i)/dion e)picheirête/on, au)tô=| d' ou)
dote/on e)sti\ tau/tên tê\n e)/nstasin, a)ll' eu)thu\s tithe/menon
to\ i)/dion dioriste/on o(\n tro/pon ti/thêsi to\ i)/dion.]]
12. Again, the respondent may perhaps affirm as proprium a predicate
really identical with the subject, though under a different name.
Thus, he may declare to [Greek: to\ pre/pon] to be a proprium [Greek:
tou= kalou=]: you may then refute him by showing that [Greek:
pre/pon] is identical with [Greek: kalo/n]. If he is on the negative
side, denying A to be a proprium of B on the ground that A is
identical with B, you will make out the affirmative against him by
showing that A is not identical with B, but only co-extensive and
reciprocating therewith. Thus, you may show that animated substance
is not identical with animal, but a proprium of animal.[236]
[Footnote 236: Ibid. a. 11-19.]
13. Where the subject is _homoeomeric_, the respondent may declare as
proprium of the whole what cannot be truly affirmed as proprium of a
part separately; or he may declare as proprium of a part separately
what cannot be truly declared as proprium of the whole. In either
case, you have a plausible argument for refuting him; but your
refutation will not be always conclusive, because there are various
cases in which what is true of each homoeomeric part is not true of
the whole; and _vice versâ_. If your position in the debate is
affirmative, you will select as illustration some case in which what
is by nature true of the whole is also true of each separate part:
_e.g._, The earth as a whole, and each of its parts, tend by nature
downwards. This is a proprium of the earth.[237]
[Footnote 237: Topic. V. v. p. 135, a. 20-b. 6.]
14. Respecting _Opposita_, there are different _loci_ for different
varieties.
_a._ _Contraria_.--Suppose the respondent to affirm A as proprium of
B: you will examine whether the contrary of A is proprium of the
contrary of B. If it be not, then neither is A proprium of B. Thus,
if best is not a proprium of justice, neither can worst be a proprium
of injustice. If the respondent is on the negative side, you may
prove the affirmative against him by showing that the contrary of the
alleged proprium is a proprium of the contrary of the alleged
subject.[238]
[Footnote 238: Ibid. vi. p. 135, b. 7-16.]
_b._ _Relata_.--Suppose the respondent to affirm a _relatum_ A as
proprium of a _relatum_ B, you may refute him by showing that the
correlate of A is not proprium of the correlate of B. Suppose him to
deny the same, you will refute him by proving the affirmative between
correlate and correlate.[239]
[Footnote 239: Ibid. vi. p. 135, b. 17-26.]
_c._ _Habitus et Privatio_.--Suppose the respondent to affirm an
attribute of the _habitus_ B, as proprium thereof: you may refute him
by showing that the corresponding attribute of the _privatio_
correlating with _habitus_ B, is not proprium of that _privatio_.
Suppose him to take the negative side, you will refute him by proving
the affirmative of this latter proposition.[240]
[Footnote 240: Ibid. b. 27-p. 136, a. 4.]
15. Respecting Contradictory Propositions (affirmation and negation
of the same), more than one mode of dealing may be stated. Wherever
the affirmation is a proprium of the subject, the negation cannot
also be a proprium thereof; and _vice versâ_. If the affirmative
predicate be not a proprium of the affirmative subject, neither can
the negative predicate be proprium of the negative subject; and _vice
versâ_. If the affirmative predicate be proprium of the affirmative
subject, the negative predicate will also be proprium of the negative
subject. The same predicate cannot be proprium both of the
affirmative subject and of the negative subject.[241]
[Footnote 241: Ibid. p. 136, a. 5-b. 2. This _locus_ is declared by
Aristotle to furnish arguments for refutation only, and not for
proof.]
16. Respecting two or more Contra-Specific Terms under the same genus
and exhausting the whole genus:--Suppose A and B contra-specific
terms used as subjects; C and D contra-specific terms used as
predicates. If C be not a proprium of A, neither will D be a proprium
of B; thus, if perceivable ([Greek: ai)sthêto/n]) is not a proprium
of any other species (except gods) included under the genus animal,
neither will intelligible ([Greek: noêto/n]) be proprium of a god.
Again, if C be a proprium of A, D also will be a proprium of B. Thus,
if it be a proprium of prudence to be by its own nature the
excellence of the rational or calculating soul ([Greek:
logistikou=]), we must also affirm as proprium of temperance that it
is the excellence of the appetitive soul ([Greek:
e)pithumêtikou=]).[242]
[Footnote 242: Topic. V. vi. p. 136, b. 3-13. "Il faut supposer ici
quatre termes, qui sont deux à deux les membres d'une division: si le
premier n'est pas le propre du troisième, le second ne le sera pas du
quatrième; et réciproquement pour la négation d'abord. Les quatre
termes sont ici: sensible, intelligible, membres d'une même division:
mortel, divinité, membres d'une autre division." (Barthélemy St.
Hilaire, p. 197.)]
17. Respecting Cases or Inflections, either of the subject B, or the
predicate A:--If the case or inflection of the predicate be not a
proprium of the corresponding case or inflection of the subject,
neither will the predicate be proprium of the subject. If the case or
inflection of the predicate be a proprium of the corresponding case
or inflection of the subject, then the predicate itself will also be
proprium of the subject. _Pulchré_ is not proprium of _justé_;
therefore, _pulchrum_ is not proprium of _justum_.
This _locus_ will be found available in combination with the
preceding _locus_ bearing on _Opposita_. Not only _opposita_
themselves, but also the cases and inflections of _opposita_, may be
adduced as arguments, following the rules above laid down.[243]
[Footnote 243: Topica, V. vii. p. 136, b. 15-32.]
18. Analogous cases or propositions:--If the respondent affirms A as
proprium of B, you have an argument against him by showing that
something analogous to A is not proprium of a subject analogous to B.
Thus, the builder, in relation to house-making, is analogous to the
physician, in relation to health-making; now health-making is not the
proprium of the physician, and therefore neither is house-making the
proprium of the builder. If the respondent has advanced a negative,
you will apply this same _locus_ in the affirmative against him:
_e.g._, as it is the proprium of the gymnast to impart a good habit
of body, so it is the proprium of the physician to impart
health.[244]
[Footnote 244: Ibid. b. 33-p. 137, a. 7.]
19. _Esse_, and _Generari_ or _Fieri_:--If A considered as _Ens_ is
not the proprium of B considered as _Ens_, then neither will A
considered as _Fiens_ be the proprium of B considered as _Fiens_.
_Vice versâ_, on the affirmative side: if the former of these two be
the fact, you may argue that the latter is the fact also.[245]
[Footnote 245: Topic. V. vii. p. 137, a. 21-b. 2.]
20. Comparison with the Idea:--If the respondent sets up A as
proprium of B, you will turn your mind to the Idea of B, and note
whether A is proprium of this Idea, in the same sense and under the
same aspect as it is affirmed to be proprium of B. If it be not so,
you will have an argument in refutation of the respondent. Thus, if
he maintains that it is a proprium of man to be at rest, you will
argue that this cannot be so, because to be at rest is not the
proprium of the Self-man ([Greek: au)toa/nthrôpos]) _quatenus_ man,
but _quatenus_ Idea. _Vice versâ_, you will have an affirmative
argument, if you can show that it is the proprium of the Idea. Thus,
since it is a proprium of the self-animal _quatenus_ animal to be
composed of soul and body, you may infer that to be composed of soul
and body is really a proprium of animal.[246]
[Footnote 246: Ibid. b. 3-13.]
21. _Locus_ from More and Less:--Suppose the respondent to affirm A
as proprium of B: you will have an argument against him, if you can
show that what is more A is not proprium of that which is more B.
Thus, if to be more coloured is not proprium of that which is more
body, neither is to be less coloured proprium of that which is less
body; nor is to be coloured proprium of body simply. _Vice versâ_, if
you can show that what is more A is proprium of what is more B, you
will have an affirmative argument to establish that A is proprium of
B. Thus, to perceive more is proprium of that which is more living.
Hence, to perceive simply is proprium of that which is living simply;
also, to perceive most, least, or less, is proprium of that which is
most, least, or less living, respectively.[247]
[Footnote 247: Ibid. viii. p. 137, b. 14-27.]
If you can show that A simply is not proprium of B simply, you have
an argument to establish that what is more or less A is not proprium
of that which is more or less B. If, on the other land, you show the
affirmative of the first, this will be an argument sustaining the
affirmative of the last.[248] Perhaps you can show that what is more
A is not proprium of what is more B: this will be an argument to show
that A is not proprium of B. Thus, to perceive is more proprium of
animal than to know is proprium of man; but to perceive is not
proprium of animal; therefore, to know is not proprium of man. Or
again, if you can show that what is less A is proprium of what is
less B, this will form an argument to show that A is proprium of B.
Thus, natural mansuetude is less proprium of man than life is
proprium of animal; but natural mansuetude _is_ proprium of man:
therefore life is proprium of animal.[249] Farther, if you can show
that A is more a proprium of C than it is a proprium of B, yet
nevertheless that it is not a proprium of C you may thence argue that
A is not a proprium of B. Thus, to be coloured is more a proprium of
superficies than it is a proprium of body; yet it is not a proprium
of superficies; therefore, it is _not_ a proprium of body. This last
variety of the _locus_ of More and Less (Aristotle remarks) affords
no corresponding affirmative plea;[250] for the same predicate cannot
be a proprium of many subjects. If A be really a proprium of
superficies, it cannot be also proprium of body. Lastly, you may
perhaps be able to show that C is more a proprium of B than A is a
proprium of B; yet, if C is _not_ a proprium of B, you will infer
negatively that neither is A proprium of B. Thus, to be perceivable
is more proprium of animal, than to be divisible is proprium of
animal; yet to be perceivable is _not_ proprium of animal, and,
therefore, neither is to be divisible proprium of animal. You may
invert this argument for the affirmative, if you can show that C is
less a proprium of B than A is a proprium of B, yet still that C _is_
a proprium of B; hence you will infer, _à fortiori_, that A is a
proprium thereof. _E.g._, If to perceive is less a proprium of animal
than to live is a proprium thereof, yet to perceive _is_ a proprium
of animal; then, to live is so likewise.[251]
[Footnote 248: Ibid. b. 28-p. 138, a. 3.]
[Footnote 249: Topica, V. viii. p. 138, a. 4-12.]
[Footnote 250: Ibid. p. 138, a. 13-20: [Greek: kataskeua/zonti de\ o(
to/pos ou(=tos ou)/k e)sti chrê/simos; a)du/naton ga/r e)sti tau)to\
pleio/nôn i)/dion ei)=nai.]]
[Footnote 251: Ibid. a. 21-30.]
22. _Locus_ from Equal Relation:--Arguments both negative and
affirmative may in like manner be obtained by comparing different
things which are (not more or less propria, but) alike or equally
propria of some other subject. If A is as much a proprium of B as C
is proprium of D, while yet A is _not_ a proprium of B, you may hence
infer that C is not a proprium of D. If, under this hypothesis, A
_is_ a proprium of B, you may infer affirmatively that C is a
proprium of D.[252] Or, if A and C be, alike and equally, propria of
the same subject B, then, if you show that A is not proprium thereof,
you will infer negatively that C is not so; if you show that A _is_
proprium of B, you will infer affirmatively that C is so likewise.
Or, thirdly, if A be, alike and equally, a proprium of B and of E,
then, if you can show that A is _not_ a proprium of E, you may infer
negatively that it is _not_ a proprium of B. Here, however, the
counter-inference affirmatively is not allowable; for the same
proprium cannot belong as proprium to two distinct subjects, as was
stated before.[253]
[Footnote 252: Ibid. a. 30-b. 15.]
[Footnote 253: Ibid. b. 16-22.]
23. _Locus_ from Potentiality:--No potentiality whatever can belong
to _Non-Ens_. Accordingly, if A, the proprium affirmed of a subject
B, is a potentiality, this must imply some real _Ens_ in which it
inheres, and which is correlate to the subject. But, if in the
specification of the proprium no allusion is made to such correlate,
you will attack it as a bad proprium--as a potentiality inhering in
_Non-Ens_ or nothing. _E.g._, if the case be, It is a proprium of air
to be respirable, you will refute this by pointing out that this is
true only when there exist animals in whom the potentiality of
breathing resides; that no mention is made by the respondent of this
correlate or of any other correlate; in other words, that, so far as
the specification is concerned, the correlate is passed over as
_Non-Ens_ or a non-entity. Therefore the proprium is not a good
proprium.[254] Again, suppose the affirmation to be, It is a proprium
of _Ens_ to be capable of doing or suffering something; this will be
defensible because it is only when the subject _is Ens_, that it is
declared to have such proprium.[255]
[Footnote 254: Topica, V. ix. p. 138, b. 27-37. [Greek: oi(=on e)pei\
o( ei)/pas a)e/ros i)/dion to\ a)napneusto/n tê=| duna/mei me\n
a)pe/dôke to\ i)/dion (to\ ga\r toiou=ton i)/dion _oi(=on
a)napnei=sthai_ a)napneusto/n e)stin), a)pode/dôke de\ kai\ pro\s to\
mê\ o(\n to\ i)/dion; kai\ ga\r mê\ o)/ntos zô/|ou, oi(=on a)napnei=n
pe/phuke to\n a)e/ra, e)nde/chetai a)e/ra ei)=nai; ou) me/ntoi mê\
o)/ntos zô/|ou dunato/n e)stin a)napnei=n; ô(/st' ou)d' a)e/ros
e)/stai i)/dion to\ toiou=ton oi(=on a)napnei=sthai, _to/te o(/te_
zô/|on ou)k e)/stai toiou=ton oi(=on a)napnei=n. ou)k a)\n ou)=n
ei)/ê a)e/ros i)/dion to\ a)napneusto/n.]
_Respirability_ (the proprium here discussed) being a relative term,
Aristotle demands that the correlate thereof shall be named and
included in setting out the proprium. If this be not done, a
refutative argument may be drawn from such omission--that the
respondent was not aware of the relativity. We may remark here that
this objection is founded on a bad or incomplete specification of the
proprium in question: it is not an objection against the reality of
that proprium itself, if carefully described. The objection belongs
to that class which Aristotle had discussed before, at the
commencement of Book V.]
[Footnote 255: Ibid. p. 139, a. 1-8.]
24. _Locus_ from the Superlative:--Suppose the affirmation to be, It
is a proprium of fire to be the lightest of all bodies: this you may
refute by showing that, if fire ceased to exist, there would still be
some other body the lightest of all bodies. Therefore the proprium
may still be predicated of something else, when its alleged subject
has ceased to exist. The proprium and its subject are not
reciprocating and co-extensive; therefore it is not a true
proprium.[256]
[Footnote 256: Ibid. a. 9-20.]
VI.
We now enter on the Sixth Book, containing the _Loci_ bearing on
Definition. In debates respecting Definition, there are five points
on any of which the attack and defence may turn:--[257]
1. That which the definer enunciates as a definition may not be true
at all, even as a predicate of the definiend or subject to be
defined; or at least not true of everything that bears the name of
the subject.
2. The definiend may have been included in a genus, but not in that
genus to which it rightly and specially belongs.
3. The definition given may not be specially appropriate to the
definiend (_i.e._, it may include, not only that but, other matters
besides).
4. The definition, though unobjectionable on any of the above three
grounds, may nevertheless not declare the Essence of the definiend.
5. Lastly, the definition may be good in substance, but badly
expressed or set out.
[Footnote 257: Topic. VI. i. p. 139, a. 24-35: [Greek: tê=s de\ peri\
tou\s o(/rous pragmatei/as me/rê pe/nte e)sti/n.]]
As to the first of these five heads, the _Loci_ bearing thereupon
have already been enumerated in the Third Book, on Accident: in
accidental predications the question raised is always about the truth
or falsehood of the predication.[258] As to the second and third of
the five heads, these have been dealt with in the Fourth and Fifth
Books, enumerating the _Loci_ on Genus and Proprium.[259]
[Footnote 258: Topic. VI. i. p. 139, a. 36.]
[Footnote 259: Ibid. b. 3.]
There remain the fourth and fifth heads, on which we are about to
enter: (1) Whether the definition is well expressed or set out (the
fifth head); (2) Whether it has any right to be called a definition
at all, _i.e._, whether it declares the Essence of the subject (the
fourth).[260] The fifth is taken first, because to do a thing well is
always more difficult than to do it simply, and is therefore likely
to afford greater opening for argumentative attack.
[Footnote 260: Ibid. b. 6.]
The definition, while unobjectionable in substance, may be badly set
out in two ways. First, it may be indistinct in terms--not plain nor
clear. Next, it may be redundant: the terms may include more than is
required for the definition. Under each of these defects of
expression several _loci_ may be indicated.[261]
[Footnote 261: Ibid. b. 12-18.]
1. Indistinctness may arise from the employment of equivocal terms in
the definition. Or it may arise from the term to be defined being
itself equivocal; while the definer, taking no notice of such
equivocation, has tried to comprehend all its senses under one and
the same definition. You may attack him either by denying that the
definition as given covers all the different meanings of the
definiend; or you may yourself distinguish (which the definer has
omitted to do) these different meanings, and show that none of them
or few of them are covered by the definition.[262]
[Footnote 262: Topic. VI. ii. p. 139, b. 19. [Greek: o(moi/ôs de\
kai\ ei) tou= o(rizome/nou pleonachô=s legome/nou mê\ dielô\n
ei)=pen; a)/dêlon ga\r o(pote/rou to\n o(/ron a)pode/dôken,
e)nde/chetai/ te _sukophantei=n_ ô(s ou)k e)pharmo/ttontos tou=
lo/gou e)pi\ pa/nta ô(=n to\n o(rismo\n a)pode/dôken.]
The term [Greek: sukophantei=n] surprises us here, because the point
under consideration is indicated by Aristotle himself as a real
mistake; accordingly he ought not to characterize the procedure
whereby such mistake is exposed as _mere cavil_--[Greek:
sukophanti/a]. Alexander, in the Scholia (p. 287, b. 1, Br.), says
that Aristotle intends to apply the term [Greek: sukophantei=n] to
the respondent who advances this bad definition, not to the assailant
who impeaches it. But the text of Aristotle does not harmonize with
this interpretation.]