e)sti\n a)dio/riston po/te ta)nanti/a kai\ po/te ta\ e)n a)rchê=|
lamba/nousin oi( a)/nthrôpoi (polla/kis ga\r kath' au(tou\s le/gontes
ta)nanti/a le/gousi, kai\ a)naneu/santes pro/teron dido/asin
u(/steron; dio/per e)rôtô/menoi ta)nanti/a kai\ to\ e)n a)rchê=|
polla/kis u(pakou/ousin)--a)na/gkê phau/lous gi/nesthai tou\s
lo/gous; ai)/tios d' o( a)pokrino/menos, ta\ me\n ou) didou/s, ta\
de\ toiau=ta didou/s.]
This passage is not very clear.]
Such then are the cases in which the conduct of the dialogue is open
to censure, without any fault on your part as questioner. But there
are other cases in which the fault is really yours. These are five in
number:--(1) When all or most of your questions are so framed as to
elicit premisses either false or improbable, so that neither the
conclusion which you seek to obtain, nor any other conclusion at all,
follows from them; (2) When, from similar defects, the proper
conclusion that you seek to obtain cannot be drawn from your
premisses; (3) When the proper conclusion would follow, if certain
additions were made to your premisses, but such additions are of a
character worse than the premisses already obtained, and are even
less probable than the conclusion itself; (4) When you have
accumulated a superfluous multitude of premisses, so that the proper
conclusion does not follow from all of them but from a part of them
only (5) When your premisses are more improbable and less trustworthy
than the proper conclusion, or when, though true, they are harder and
more troublesome to prove than the problem itself.[430]
[Footnote 430: Ibid. b. 19-33: [Greek: kath' au(to\n de\ tô=| lo/gô|
pe/nte ei)si\n e)pitimê/seis].]
In regard to the last item, however, the fault may sometimes be in
the problem itself rather than in you as questioner. Some problems,
being in their own nature hard and not to be settled from probable or
plausible data, ought not to be admitted into Dialectic. All that can
be required from you as questioner is that you shall know and obtain
the most probable premisses that the problem admits: your procedure
may be thus in itself blameable, yet it may even deserve praise,
having regard to the problem, if this last be very intractable; or it
may be in itself praiseworthy, yet blameable in regard to the
problem, if the problem admit of being settled by premisses still
more probable.[431] You may even be more blameable, if you obtain
your conclusion but obtain it from improbable premisses, than if you
failed to obtain it; the premisses required to make it complete being
true and probable and not of capital importance, but being refused by
the respondent.[432] However, you ought not to be blamed if you
obtain your true and proper conclusion but obtain it through
premisses in themselves false; for this is recognized in analytical
theory as possible: if the conclusion is false, the premisses (one or
both) must be false, but a true conclusion may be drawn from false
premisses.[433]
[Footnote 431: Ibid. b. 34-p. 162, a. 3.]
[Footnote 432: Ibid. p. 162, a. 3-8.]
[Footnote 433: Topic. VIII. xi. p. 162, a. 8-11: [Greek: toi=s de\
dia\ pseudô=n a)lêthe\s sumperainome/nois ou) di/kaion e)pitima=n--
phanero\n d' e)k tô=n A)nalutikô=n.]]
When you have obtained your premisses and proved a conclusion, these
same premisses will not serve as proof of any other proposition
separate and independent of the conclusion; such may sometimes seem
to be the case, but it is a mere sophistical delusion. If your
premisses are both of them probable, your conclusion may in some
cases be more probable than either.[434]
[Footnote 434: Ibid. a.12-24.
Aristotle here introduces four definitions of terms, which are useful
in regard to his thoughts but have no great pertinence in the place
where they occur: [Greek: e)/sti de\ _philoso/phêma_ me\n
sullogismo\s a)podeiktiko/s, _e)pichei/rêma_ de\ sullogismo\s
dialektiko/s, _so/phisma_ de\ sullogismo\s e)ristiko/s, _a)po/rêma_
de\ sullogismo\s dialektiko\s a)ntipha/seôs.]]
One other matter yet remains in which your procedure as questioner
may be blameable. The premisses through which you prove your
conclusion may be long and unnecessarily multiplied; the conclusion
may be such that you ought to have obtained it through fewer, yet
equally pertinent premisses.[435]
[Footnote 435: Ibid. a. 24-34.
The example whereby Aristotle illustrates this position is obscure
and difficult to follow. It is borrowed from the Platonic theory of
Ideas. The point which you are supposed to be anxious to prove is,
that one opinion is more opinion than another ([Greek: o(/ti e)sti\
do/xa ma=llon e(te/ra e(te/ras]). To prove it you ask as premisses:
(1) That the Idea of every class of things is more that thing than
any one among the particulars of the class; (2) That there is an Idea
of _matter of opinion_, and that this Idea is more opinion than any
one of the particular matters of opinion. If this Idea is more
opinion, it must also be more true and accurate than any particular
matter of opinion. And it is this last conclusion that Aristotle
seems to indicate as the conclusion to be proved: [Greek: ô(/ste
au(tê\ ê( do/xa a)kribeste/ra e)sti/n] (a. 32).
As I understand it, Aristotle supposes that the doctrine which you
are here refuting is, that all [Greek: e)/ndoxa] are on an equal
footing as to truth and accuracy; and that the doctrine which you are
proving against it is, that one [Greek: e)/ndoxon] is more true and
accurate than another. If you attempt to prove this last by invoking
the Platonic theory of Ideas, you will introduce premisses
far-fetched and unnecessary, even if true; whereas you might prove
your conclusion from premisses easier and more obvious.
The fault is (he says) that such roundabout procedure puts out of
sight the real ground of the proof: [Greek: ti/s de\ ê( mochthêri/a?
ê)\ o(/ti poiei=, par' o(\ o( lo/gos, lantha/nein to\ ai)/tion] (a.
33). The dubitative and problematical form here is remarkable. How
would Aristotle himself have proved the above conclusion? By
Induction? He does not tell us.]
The cases in which your argument will carry the clearest evidence,
impressing itself even on the most vulgar minds, are those in which
you obtain such premisses as will enable you to draw your final
conclusion without asking any farther concessions. But this will
rarely happen. Even after you have obtained all the premisses
substantially necessary to your final conclusion, you will generally
be forced to draw out two or more prosyllogisms or preliminary
syllogisms, and to ask the assent of the respondent to these, before
you can venture to enunciate the final conclusion. This second grade
of evidence is however sufficient, even if the premisses fall short
of the highest probability.[436]
[Footnote 436: Topic. VIII. xii. p. 162, a. 35-b. 2.]
On the other hand, your argument may deserve to be pronounced false
on four distinct grounds:--(1) If your syllogism appears to prove the
conclusion but does not really prove it, being then an _eristic_ or
_contentious_ syllogism; (2) If the conclusion be good but not
**relevant to the thesis, which is most likely to happen
where you employ _Reductio ad Impossible_; (3) If your conclusion
though valid and even relevant, is not founded on the premisses and
_principia_ appropriate to the thesis; (4) If your premisses are
false, even though the conclusion in itself may prove true, since it
has already been said that a true conclusion may sometimes be
obtained from false premisses.[437]
[Footnote 437: Ibid. b. 3-15: [Greek: pseudê\s de\ lo/gos kalei=tai
tetrachô=s], &c.]
Falsehood in your argument will be rather your own fault than that of
your argument, especially if you yourself are not aware of its
falsehood. Indeed, there are some false arguments which are more
valuable in Dialectic than many true ones; where, for example, from
highly probable premisses you refute some recognized truth. Such an
argument is sure to serve as a demonstration of other truths; at the
very least, it shows that some one of the propositions concerned is
altogether untrue.[438] On the other hand, if you prove a true
conclusion by premisses false and improbable, your argument will be
more worthless than many others in which the conclusion is false;
from such premisses, indeed, the conclusion may well be really
false.[439]
[Footnote 438: Ibid. b. 16-22: [Greek: to\ me\n ou)=n pseudê= to\n
lo/gon ei)=nai tou= le/gontos a(ma/rtêma ma=llon ê)\ tou= lo/gou,
kai\ ou)de\ tou= le/gontos a)ei\ to\ a(ma/rtêma, a)ll' o(/tan
lantha/nê| au)to/n, e)pei\ kath' au(to/n _ge pollô=n a)lêthô=n
a)podecho/metha ma=llon, a)\n e)x o(/ti ma/lista dokou/ntôn a)nairê=|
ti tô=n a)lêthô=n; toiou=tos ga\r ô)\n e(te/rôn a)lêthô=n
a)po/deixi/s e)stin_; dei= ga\r tô=n keime/nôn ti mê\ ei)=nai
pantelô=s, ô(/st' e)/stai _tou/tou_ a)po/deixis.]]
[Footnote 439: Ibid. b. 22-24.]
In estimating the dialectical value of an argument, therefore, we
must first look whether the conclusion is formally valid; next,
whether the conclusion is true or false; lastly, what are the
premisses from whence it is derived.[440] For, if it be derived from
premisses false yet probable, it has logical or dialectical value;
while, if derived from premisses true yet improbable, it has
none.[441] If derived from premisses both false and improbable, it
will of course be worthless; either absolutely in itself, or with
reference to the thesis under debate.
[Footnote 440: Ibid. b. 24: [Greek: ô(/ste dê=lon o(/ti prô/tê me\n
e)pi/skepsis lo/gou kath' au(to\n ei) sumperai/netai, deute/ra de\
po/teron a)lêthe\s ê)\ pseu=dos; tri/tê d' e)k poi/ôn tinô=n.]]
[Footnote 441: Topic. VIII. xii. p. 162, b. 27: [Greek: ei) me\n ga\r
e)k pseudô=n e)ndo/xôn de/, logiko/s, ei) d' e)x o)/ntôn me\n
a)do/xôn de/, phau=los], &c.]
Two faults of questioners in Dialectic are dealt with specially by
Aristotle:--(1) _Petitio Principii_; (2) _Petitio Contrariorum_. He
had touched upon both of them (in the Analytica Priora) as they
concerned the demonstrative process, or the proving of truth: he now
deals with them as they concern the dialectical process, or the
setting out of opinions and probabilities.[442]
[Footnote 442: Ibid. xiii. p. 162, b. 31: [Greek: to\ d' e)n a)rchê=|
kai\ ta\ e)nanti/a pô=s ai)tei=tai o( e)rôtô=n, _kat' a)lê/theian_
me\n e)n toi=s A)nalutikoi=s] (Priora, II. xvi.) [Greek: ei)/rêtai,
_kata\ do/xan_ de\ nu=n lekte/on.]]
Five distinct modes may be enumerated of committing the fault called
_Petitio Principii_:--
1. You may put as a question the very conclusion which it is
incumbent on you to prove, in refutation of the thesis of the
respondent. If this is done in explicit terms, your opponent can
hardly fail to perceive it; but he possibly may fail, if you
substitute an equivalent term or the definition in place of the
term.[443]
[Footnote 443: Ibid. b. 34. [Greek: prô=ton ei)/ tis au)to\ to\
dei/knusthai de/on ai)tê/sei; tou=to d' e)p' au)tou= me\n ou)
r(a/|dion lantha/nein, e)n de\ toi=s sunônu/mois, kai\ e)n o(/sois
to\ o)/noma kai\ o( lo/gos to\ au)to\ sêmai/nei, ma=llon.]]
2. If the conclusion which you are seeking to prove is a particular
one, you may put as a question the universal in which it is
comprised. Thus, if you are to prove that the knowledge of Contraries
is one and the same, you may put as a question, Is not the knowledge
of Opposites one and the same? You are asking the very point which it
was your business to show; but you are asking along with it much more
besides.[444]
[Footnote 444: Ibid. p. 163, a. 1.]
3. If you are seeking to prove an universal conclusion, **you
may put as a question one of the particulars comprised therein. Thus,
if you are to prove that the knowledge of Contraries is one and the
same, you may put as a question, Is not the knowledge of white and
black, good and evil, or any other pair of particular contraries, one
and the same? It was your business to prove this particular, along
with many others besides; but you are now asking it as a question
separately.[445]
[Footnote 445: Ibid. a. 5.]
4. If the conclusion which you are seeking to prove has two terms
conjointly, you may put as a question one or the other of these
separately. Thus, when you are trying to show that the healing art is
knowledge of what is wholesome and unwholesome, you may ask, Is it a
knowledge of the wholesome?[446]
[Footnote 446: Ibid. a. 8.]
5. Suppose there are two conclusions necessarily implicated with each
other, and that it is your business to prove one of them: you may put
as a question the other of the two. Thus, if you are seeking to prove
that the diagonal is incommensurable with the side, you may put as a
question, Is not the side incommensurable with the diagonal?[447]
[Footnote 447: Topic. VIII. xiii. p. 163, a. 10.]
There are also five distinct modes of _Petitio Contrariorum_:--
1. You may ask the respondent, in plain terms, to grant first the
affirmative, next, the negative, of a given proposition.[448]
[Footnote 448: Ibid. a. 14: [Greek: prô=ton me\n ga\r ei)/ tis ta\s
a)ntikeime/nas ai)tê/saito pha/sin kai\ a)nti/phasin.]]
2. You may ask him to grant, first, that a given subject is, _e.g._,
good, next, that the same subject is bad.[449]
[Footnote 449: Ibid. a. 16: [Greek: deu/teron de\ ta)nanti/a kata\
tê\n a)nti/thesin, oi(=on a)gatho\n kai\ kako\n tau)to/n.]]
3. After he has granted to you the affirmative universally, you may
ask him to grant the negative in some particular case under the
universal: _e.g._, after he has granted that the knowledge of
Contraries is one and the same, you ask him to grant that the
knowledge of wholesome and unwholesome is not one and the same. Or
you may proceed by the way of reversing this process.[450]
[Footnote 450: Ibid. a. 17-21.]
4. You may ask the contrary of that which follows necessarily from
the premisses admitted.[451]
[Footnote 451: Ibid. a. 21.]
5. Instead of asking the two contraries in plain and direct terms,
you may ask the two contraries in different propositions, yet
necessarily implicated with the first two.[452]
[Footnote 452: Ibid. a. 22.]
There is this difference between _Petitio Principii_, and _Petitio
Contrariorum_: the first has reference to the conclusion which you
have to prove, and the wrong procedure involved in it is relative to
that conclusion; but in the second the wrong procedure affects only
the two propositions themselves and the relation subsisting between
them.[453]
[Footnote 453: Ibid. a. 24: [Greek: diaphe/rei de\ to\ ta)nanti/a
lamba/nein tou= e)n a)rchê=|, o(/ti tou= me/n e)stin ê( a(marti/a
pro\s to\ sumpe/rasma (pro\s ga\r e)kei=no ble/pontes to\ e)n
a)rchê=| le/gomen ai)tei=sthai), ta\ d' e)nanti/a e)sti\n e)n tai=s
prota/sesi tô=| e)/chein pôs tau/tas pro\s a)llê/las.]]
Aristotle now, finally, proceeds to give some general advice for
exercise and practice in Dialectic. You ought to accustom yourself to
treat arguments by converting the syllogisms of which they consist;
that is, by applying to them the treatment of which the _Reductio ad
Absurdum_ is one case.[454] You ought to test every thesis by first
assuming it to be true, then assuming it to be false, and following
out the consequences on both sides.[455] When you have hunted out
each train of arguments, look out at once for the counter-arguments
available against it. This will strengthen your power both as
questioner and as respondent. It is indeed an exercise so valuable,
that you will do well to go through it by yourself, if you have no
companion.[456] Put the different trains of argument, bearing on the
same thesis, into comparison with each other. A wide command of
arguments affirmative as well as negative will serve you well both
for attack and for defence.[457]
[Footnote 454: Ibid. xiv. p. 163, a. 29: [Greek: pro\s de\ gumnasi/an
kai\ mele/tên tô=n toiou/tôn lo/gôn prô=ton me\n a)ntistre/phein
e)thi/zesthai chrê\ tou\s lo/gous.] For _Conversion_ of Syllogism,
see p. 174.]
[Footnote 455: Topic. VIII. xiv. p. 163, a. 36: [Greek: pro\s
a(/pasa/n te the/sin kai\ o(/ti ou(/tôs kai\ o(/ti ou)ch ou(/tôs to\
e)pichei/rêma skepte/on.]]
[Footnote 456: Ibid. b. 3: [Greek: ka)\n pro\s mêde/na a)/llon
e)/chômen, pro\s au(tou/s.]]
[Footnote 457: Ibid. b. 5: [Greek: tou=to ga\r _pro/s te to\
bia/zesthai_ pollê\n eu)pori/an poiei= kai\ pro\s to\ e)le/gchein
mega/lên e)/chei boê/theian, o(/tan eu)porê=| tis kai\ o(/ti ou(/tôs
kai\ o(/ti ou)ch ou(/tôs; pro\s ta\ e)nanti/a ga\r sumbai/nei
poiei=sthai tê\n phulakê/n.]
Instead of [Greek: pro/s te to\ bia/zesthai], ought we not to read
here [Greek: pro/s te to\ mê bia/zesthai], taking this verb in the
passive sense? Surely [Greek: bia/zesthai] in the active sense gives
the same meaning substantially as [Greek: e)le/gchein], which comes
afterwards, both of them referring to the assailant or questioner,
whereas Aristotle intends here to illustrate the usefulness of the
practice to _both_ parties.]
This same accomplishment will be of use, moreover, for acquisitions
even in Science and Philosophy. It is a great step to see and grasp
in conjunction the trains of reasoning on both sides of the question;
the task that remains--right determination which of the two is the
better--becomes much easier. To do this well, however,--to choose the
true and to reject the false correctly--there must be conjoined a
good natural predisposition. None but those who are well constituted
by nature, who have their likings and dislikes well set in regard to
each particular conjuncture, can judge correctly what is best and
what is worst.[458]
[Footnote 458: Ibid. b. 12-16: [Greek: dei= de\ pro\s to\ toiou=to
u(pa/rchein eu)phua=; kai\ tou=t' e)/stin ê( kat' a)lê/theian
eu)phui+/a, to\ du/nasthai kalô=s e(le/sthai ta)lêthe\s kai\ phugei=n
to\ pseu=dos; o(/per oi( pephuko/tes eu)= du/nantai poiei=n; eu)=
ga\r philou=ntes kai\ misou=ntes to\ prosphero/menon eu)= kri/nousi
to\ be/ltiston.]]
In regard to the primary or most universal theses, and to those
problems which are most frequently put in debate, you will do well to
have reasonings ready prepared, and even to get them by heart. It is
on these first or most universal theses that respondents become often
reluctant and disgusted. To be expert in handling primary doctrines
and probabilities, and to be well provided with the definitions from
which syllogisms must start, is to the dialectician an acquisition of
the highest moment; like familiarity with the Axioms to a geometer,
and ready application of the multiplication table to an arithmetical
calculator.[459] When you have these generalities and major
propositions firmly established in your mind, you will recall, in a
definite order and arrangement, the particular matters falling under
each of them, and will throw them more easily into syllogisms. They
will assist you in doing this, just as the mere distribution of
places in a scheme for topical memory makes you recollect what is
associated with each. You should lodge in your memory, however,
universal major premisses rather than complete and ready-made
reasonings; for the great difficulty is about the _principia_.[460]
[Footnote 459: Ibid. b. 17-26.]
[Footnote 460: Topic. VIII. xiv. p. 163, b. 27-33: [Greek: o(moi/ôs
kai\ e)n toi=s lo/gois to\ pro/cheiron ei)=nai peri\ ta\s a)rcha\s
kai\ ta\s prota/seis a)po\ sto/matos e)xepi/stasthai; katha/per ga\r
e)n tô=| mnêmonikô=| mo/non oi( to/poi tethe/ntes eu)thu\s poiou=sin
au)ta\ mnêmoneu/ein, kai\ tau=ta poiê/sei sullogistikô/teron dia\ to\
pro\s ô(risme/nas au)ta\s ble/pein kat' a)rithmo/n; pro/tasi/n te
koinê\n ma=llon ê)\ lo/gon ei)s mnê/mên thete/on; a)rchê=s ga\r kai\
u(pothe/seôs eu)porê=sai metri/ôs chalepo/n.]]
You ought also to accustom yourself to break down one reasoning into
many; which will be done most easily when the theme of the reasoning
is most universal. Conceal this purpose as well as you can; and in
this view begin with those particulars which lie most remote from the
subject in hand.[461] In recording arguments for your own
instruction, you will generalize them as much as possible, though
perhaps when spoken they may have been particular; for this is the
best way to break down one into several. In conducting your own case
as questioner you will avoid the higher generalities as much as you
can.[462] But you must at the same time take care to keep up some
common or general premisses throughout the discourse; for every
syllogistic process, even where the conclusion is particular, implies
this, and no syllogism is valid without it.[463]
[Footnote 461: Ibid. b. 34.]
[Footnote 462: Ibid. p. 164, a. 2-7: [Greek: dei= de\ kai\ ta\s
a)pomnêmoneu/seis katho/lou poiei=sthai tô=n lo/gôn, ka)\n ê)=|
dieilegme/nos e)pi\ me/rous;--au)to\n de\ o(/ti ma/lista pheu/gein
e)pi\ to\ katho/lou phe/rein tou\s sullogismou/s.]
This passage is to me obscure. I have given the best meaning which it
seems to offer.]
[Footnote 463: Ibid. a. 8.]
Exercise in inductive discourse is most suitable for a young
beginner; exercise in deductive or syllogistic discourse, for skilful
veterans. From those who are accomplished in the former you can learn
the art of multiplying particular comparisons; from those who are
accomplished in the latter you derive universal premisses; such being
the strong points of each. When you go through a dialectical
exercise, try to bring away with you for future use either some
complete syllogism, or some solution of an apparent refutation, or a
major premiss, or a well-sustained exceptional example ([Greek:
e)/nstasin]); note also whether either you or your respondent
question correctly or otherwise, and on what reason such correctness
or incorrectness turned.[464] It is the express purpose of
dialectical exercise to acquire power and facility in this procedure,
especially as regards universal premisses and special exceptions.
Indeed the main characteristic of the dialectician is to be apt at
universal premisses, and apt at special exceptions. In the first of
these two aptitudes he groups many particulars into one universal,
without which he cannot make good his syllogism; in the second of the
two he breaks up the one universal into many, distinguishing the
separate constituents, and denying some while he affirms others.[465]
[Footnote 464: Ibid. a. 12-19. [Greek: o(/lôs d' e)k tou=
gumna/zesthai dialego/menon peirate/on a)pophe/resthai ê)\
sullogismo\n peri\ tinos, ê)\ lu/sin ê)\ pro/tasin ê)\ e)/nstasin],
&c.]
[Footnote 465: Topic. VIII. xiv. p. 164, b. 2-6: [Greek: e)/sti ga\r
ô(s a(plô=s ei)pei=n dialektiko\s o( protatiko\s kai\ e)nstatiko/s;
e)/sti de\ to\ me\n protei/nesthai e(\n poiei=n ta\ plei/ô (dei=
**ga\r e(\n o(/lôs lêphthê=nai pro\s o(\ o( lo/gos), to\ d'
e)ni/stasthai to\ e(\n polla/; ê)\ ga\r diairei= ê)\ a)nairei=, to\
me\n didou\s to\ d' ou)\ tô=n **proteinome/nôn.]]
You must take care however not to carry on this exercise with every
one, especially with a vulgar-minded man. With some persons the
dispute cannot fail to take a discreditable turn. When the respondent
tries to make a show of escaping by unworthy manoeuvres, the
questioner on his part must be unscrupulous also in syllogizing; but
this is a disgraceful scene. To keep clear of such abusive discourse,
you must be cautious not to discourse with commonplace, unprepared,
respondents.[466]
[Footnote 466: Ibid. b. 8-15: [Greek: pro\s ga\r to\n pa/ntôs
peirô/menon phai/nesthai diapheu/gein, di/kaion me\n pa/ntôs
peira=sthai sullogi/sasthai, ou)k eu)/schêmon de/.]]
CHAPTER X.
SOPHISTICI ELENCHI.
The Sophist (according to Aristotle) is one whose professional
occupation it is to make money by a delusive show of wisdom without
the reality--by contriving to make others believe falsely that he
possesses wisdom and knowledge. The abstract substantive noun
_Sophistic_, with the verb _to practice as a Sophist_ ([Greek:
sophisteu/ein]), expresses such profession and purpose.[1] This
application of the term is derived from Plato, who has in various
dialogues (Protagoras, Hippias, Euthydêmus, &c.) introduced Sokrates
conversing with different professional Sophists, and who has, in a
longer dialogue called Sophistes, attempted an elaborate definition
of the intellectual peculiarities of the person so named. It is the
actual argumentative procedure of the Sophist that Aristotle proposes
to himself as the theme of this little treatise, appended to his
general theory of the Syllogism; a treatise which, though forming
properly the Ninth and concluding Book of the Topica, is commonly
known as a separate appendix thereto, under the title of Sophistici
Elenchi, or Sophistical Refutations.
[Footnote 1: Soph. El. i. p. 165, a. 21, 28, 32: [Greek: e)/sti ga\r
ê( sophistikê\ phainome/nê sophi/a ou)=sa d' ou)/, kai\ o( sophistê\s
chrêmatistê\s a)po\ phainome/nês sophi/as a)ll' ou)k
ou)/sês;--a)na/gkê ou)=n _tou\s boulome/nous sophisteu/ein to\_ tô=n
ei)rême/nôn lo/gôn ge/nos zêtei=n;--o(/ti me\n ou)=n e)/sti ti
toiou=ton lo/gôn ge/nos, kai\ o(/ti toiau/tês e)phi/entai duna/meôs
_ou(\s kalou=men sophista/s_, dê=lon.] Also xi. p. 171, b. 27.]
The Sophistical Elenchus or Refutation, being a delusive semblance of
refutation which imposes on ordinary men and induces them to accept
it as real, cannot be properly understood without the theory of
Elenchus in general; nor can this last be understood without the
entire theory of the Syllogism, since the Elenchus is only one
variety of Syllogism.[2] The Elenchus is a syllogism with a
conclusion contradictory to or refutative of some enunciated thesis
or proposition. Accordingly we must first understand the conditions
of a good and valid Syllogism, before we study those of a valid
Elenchus; these last, again, must be understood, before we enter on
the distinctive attributes of the Pseudo-elenchus--the sophistical,
invalid, or sham, refutation. In other words, an enumeration and
classification of Fallacies forms the closing section of a treatise
on Logic--according to the philosophical arrangement originating with
Aristotle, and copied by most logicians after him.
[Footnote 2: Ibid. x. p. 171, a. 1-5.]
Aristotle begins by distinguishing reality and mere deceptive
appearance; and by stating that this distinction is found to prevail
not less in syllogisms than in other matters. Next he designates a
notorious class of persons, called Sophists, who made it their
profession to study and practise the deceptive appearance of
syllogizing; and he then proceeds to distinguish four species of
debate:--(1) Didactic; (2) Dialectic; (3) Peirastic; (4) Eristic or
Sophistic.[3] In this quadruple arrangement, however, he is not
consistent with his own definitions, when he ranks the four as
distinct and co-ordinate species. The marked and special antithesis
is between Didactic and Dialectic. Both Peirastic and Eristic fall as
varieties or sub-species under the species Dialectic; and there is
under the species Didactic a variety called Pseudo-graphic or
Pseudo-didactic, which stands to Didactic in the same relation in
which Eristic stands to Dialectic.[4]
[Footnote 3: Soph. El. ii. p. 165, a. 38: [Greek: e)/sti dê\ tô=n e)n
tô=| diale/gesthai lo/gôn te/ttara ge/nê, didaskalikou\ kai\
dialektikoi\ kai\ peirastikoi\ kai\ e)ristikoi/.]]
[Footnote 4: Ibid. xi. p. 171, b. 34.]
Didactic discourse is not applicable to all matters indiscriminately,
but only to certain special sciences; each of which has its own
separate, undemonstrable _principia_, from which its conclusions, so
far as true and valid, must be deduced. It supposes a teacher
acquainted with these _principia_ and deductions, talking with some
one who being ignorant of them wishes to learn. The teacher puts
questions, to which the learner makes the best answers that he can;
and, if the answers are wrong, corrects them and proceeds to draw,
according to syllogistic canons, conclusions from premisses which he
himself knows to be the truth. These premisses the learner must
believe upon the teacher's authority. Properly speaking, indeed, the
didactic process is not interrogative (in the same sense that
Dialectic is): the teacher does not accept the learner's answer and
reason from it, if he thinks it wrong.[5]
[Footnote 5: Ibid. xi. p. 172, a. 11: [Greek: nu=n d' ou)k e)/stin o(
dialektio\s peri\ ge/nos ti ô(risme/non, ou)de\ deiktiko\s ou)deno/s,
ou)de\ toiou=tos oi(=os o( katho/lou. ou)/te ga/r e)stin a(/panta e)n
e(ni/ tini ge/nei, ou)/te ei) ei)/ê, oi(=o/n te u(po\ ta\s au)ta\s
a)rcha\s ei)=nai ta\ o)/nta. ô(/st' ou)demi/a te/chnê tô=n
deiknuousô=n tina\ phu/sin e)rôtêtikê/ e)stin; ou) ga\r e)/xestin
o(poteronou=n tô=n mori/ôn dou=nai; sullogismo\s ga\r ou) gi/netai
e)x a)mphoi=n. ê( de\ dialektikê\ e)rôtêrikê/ e)stin; ei) d'
e)dei/knuen, ei) kai\ mê\ pa/nta, a)lla\ ta/ ge prô=ta kai\ ta\s
oi)kei/as a)rcha/s, ou)k a)\n ê)rô/ta. mê\ dido/ntos ga\r ou)k a)\n
e)/ti ei)=chen e)x ô(=n e)/ti diale/xetai pro\s tê\n e)/nstasin.]
When Aristotle, therefore, reckons [Greek: lo/gous didaskalikou/s] as
one of the four species [Greek: tô=n e)n tô=| diale/gesthai lo/gôn]
(Soph. El. ii. p. 165, a. 38), we must understand [Greek: to\
diale/gesthai] in a very wide and vague sense, going much beyond the
derivative noun [Greek: dialektikê/].]
Dialectic, on the contrary, is applicable to all matters universally
and indiscriminately, including even the undemonstrable _principia_
which the teacher assumes as the highest premisses of his didactic
syllogisms. It supposes, in place of teacher and learner, an
interrogator (or opponent) and a respondent. The respondent declares
a problem or thesis, which he undertakes to defend; while the other
puts questions to him respecting it, with the purpose of compelling
him either to contradict the thesis, or to contradict himself on some
other point. The interrogator is allowed only to ask questions, and
to deduce legitimate conclusions from the premisses granted by the
respondent in answer: he is not permitted to introduce any other
premisses. The premisses upon which the debate turns are understood
all to be probable--opinions accredited either among an ordinary
multitude or among a few wise men, but to have no higher authority.
Accordingly there is often a conflict of arguments _pro_ and _con_,
much diversified. The process is essentially controversial; and, if
the questioner does not succeed in exposing a contradiction, the
respondent is victorious, and remains in possession of the field.
Such is the capital antithesis, much dwelt upon by Aristotle, between
Didactic and Dialectic. But that which he calls Peirastic, and that
which he calls Eristic, are not species co-ordinate with and
distinguished from Dialectic: they are peculiar aspects, subordinate
varieties or modes, of Dialectic itself. Aristotle himself, indeed,
admits Peirastic to be a mode or variety of Dialectic;[6] and the
like is equally true respecting what he terms Eristic or Sophistic.
[Footnote 6: Soph. El. xi. p. 171, b. 4-9: [Greek: ê( ga\r
peirastikê/ e)sti dialektikê/ tis], &c.--p. 172, a. 35: [Greek: o(
te/chnê| sullogistikê=| peirastiko/s, dialektiko/s].--viii. p. 169,
b. 25: [Greek: e)/sti d' ê( peirastikê\ me/ros tê=s dialektikê=s.]]
These subordinate distinctions turn upon the manner, the limitations,
and the purpose, for and under which the dialectical process is
conducted. Dialectic is essentially gymnastic and peirastic:[7] it
may be looked at either as gymnastic, in reference to the two
debaters, or as peirastic, in reference to the arguments and
doctrines brought forward; intellectual exercise and stimulation of
the two speakers and the auditors around being effected by testing
and confronting various probable doctrines. It is the common purpose
([Greek: koino\n e)/rgon])[8] of the two champions, to improve and
enlarge this exercise for the instruction of all, by following out a
variety of logical consequences and logical repugnancies, bearing
more or less directly on the thesis which the respondent chooses and
undertakes to defend against a testing cross-examination. Certain
rules and limitations are prescribed both for questioner and
respondent; but, subject to these rules, each of them is bound to
exert all his acuteness for the purpose of gaining victory; and,
though one only can gain it, the debate may be well and creditably
conducted on both sides. If the rules are not observed, if the
assailing champion, bent upon victory at all cost, has recourse to
dishonest interrogative tricks, or the defensive champion to perverse
and obstructive negations, beyond the prescribed boundary, in that
case the debate is called by Aristotle _eristic_ or _contentious_,
from the undue **predominance of the controversial spirit and
purpose; also _sophistic_, from the fact that there existed (as
he asserts) a class or profession of persons called Sophists, who
regularly studied and practised these culpable manoeuvres, first with
a view to reputation, and ultimately with a view to pecuniary profit,
being pretenders to knowledge and wisdom without any reality to
justify them.[9]
[Footnote 7: Topic. I. ii. p. 101, a. 26, b. 2: [Greek: pro\s
gumnasi/an--e)xetastikê\ ga\r ou)=sa], &c. Compare also Topica, VIII.
xi. p. 161, a. 25; xiv. p. 163, a. 29, p. 164, b. 1: [Greek: to\ de\
gumna/zesthai duna/meôs cha/rin, kai\ ma/lista peri\ ta\s prota/seis
kai\ e)nsta/seis; e)/sti ga\r ô(s a(plô=s ei)pei=n dialektiko\s o(
protatiko\s kai\ e)nstatiko/s.]]
[Footnote 8: Topic. VIII. xi. p. 161, a. 20, 37.]
[Footnote 9: Soph. El. xi. p. 171, b. 25-35: [Greek: oi( me\n ou)=n
tê=s ni/kês au)tê=s cha/rin toiou=toi e)ristikoi\ a)/nthrôpoi kai\
phile/rides dokou=sin ei)=nai, oi( de\ do/xês cha/rin tê=s ei)s
chrêmatismo\n sophistikoi/;--kai\ tô=n lo/gôn tô=n au)tô=n me/n
ei)sin oi( phile/rides kai\ sophistai/, a)ll' ou) tô=n au)tô=n
e(/neken. kai\ lo/gos o( au)to\s me\n e)/stai sophistiko\s kai\
e)ristiko/s, a)ll' ou) kata\ tauto/n, a)ll' ê(=| me\n ni/kês
phainome/nês, e)ristiko/s, ê(=| de\ sophi/as, sophistiko/s.] &c.]
We thus see plainly that Peirastic and Eristic are not to be ranked
as two distinct species of discourse, co-ordinate with Didactic and
Dialectic; but that _peirastic_ is in fact an epithet applicable
generally to Dialectic, bringing to view one of its useful and
appropriate functions; while _eristic_ designates only a peculiar
mode of conducting the process, the essential feature of which is
that it is abusive or that it transgresses the rules and regulations.
Still less ought Sophistic to be ranked as a distinct species; since
it involves no intrinsic or intellectual _differentia_, but connotes
only ethical and personal peculiarities ascribed to the Sophist, who
is treated as an impostor practising dishonest tricks for the sake of
pecuniary profit.[10]
[Footnote 10: Aristot. Rhetoric. I. i. p. 1355, b. 17: [Greek: o(
ga\r sophistiko\s ou)k e)n tê=| duna/mei, a)ll' e)n tê=|
proaire/sei;--sophistê\s me\n kata\ tê\n proai/resin, dialektiko\s d'
ou) kata\ tê\n proai/resin a)lla\ kata\ tê\n du/namin.] To the same
purpose he speaks in Metaphys. [Greek: G]. ii. p. 1004, b. 25,
distinguishing the Sophist by his [Greek: proai/resis] from the
Dialectician, but recognizing that in point of [Greek: du/namis] both
are alike. Mr. Poste observes justly (in Transl. of the Soph. El.,
notes, p. 99):--"[Greek: du/namis], capacity, is in the intellect;
[Greek: proai/resis], purpose, in the will. The antithesis between
these terms may throw light on what Aristotle conceived to be the
relation between Sophistic and Dialectic. . . The power _plus_ the
will to deceive is called Sophistic; the power without the will,
Dialectic (p. 100)."]
While, however, we recognize as main logical distinctions only the
two heads Didactic and Dialectic, we note another way that Aristotle
has of bringing in what he calls Sophistic as a variety of the
latter. Both in Didactic and Dialectic (he tells us) the speakers
enunciate and prove their propositions by Syllogism; the didactic
syllogism is derived from the _principia_ belonging specially to one
particular science, and proceeds from premisses that are true to
conclusions that are true; while the dialectic syllogism starts from
probable premisses (_i.e._, accredited by the ordinary public or by a
few wise men), and marches in correct form to conclusions that are
probable. Now, corresponding to each of these two, Aristotle
recognizes farther a sort of degenerate counterpart. To the didactic
syllogism there corresponds the _pseudographic_ syllogism or the
_paralogism_: which draws its premisses (as the didactic syllogism
does) from the special matters of some given science,[11] yet which
nevertheless has only the appearance of truth without the reality;
either because it is incorrect in syllogistic form, or because the
matter of the premisses (the major, the minor, or both) is untrue. To
the dialectic syllogism in like manner, there corresponds the
_eristic_ or _sophistic_ syllogism: which is a good syllogism in
appearance, but not in reality; either because it is incorrect in
form, or because its premisses, in respect of their matter, appear to
be probable without being really probable.[12]
[Footnote 11: Topic. I. i. p. 101, a. 5-15. [Greek: oi( e)k tô=n
peri/ tinas e)pistê/mas oi)kei/ôn gino/menoi paralogismoi/, katha/per
e)pi\ tê=s geômetri/as kai\ tô=n tau/tê| suggenô=n sumbe/bêken
e)/chein;--e)k tô=n oi)kei/ôn me\n tê=| e)pistê/mê| lêmma/tôn, ou)k
a)lêthô=n de/, to\n sullogismo\n poiei=tai.]]
[Footnote 12: Ibid. p. 100, a. 31-p. 101, a. 16; Soph. El. i. p. 164,
a. 20-b. 21.]
One would suppose that the relation between the pseudo-didactic and
the didactic syllogism, was the same as that between the
pseudo-dialectic and the dialectic; so that, if the pseudo-dialectic
deserved to be called sophistic or eristic, the pseudo-didactic would
deserve these appellations also; especially, since the formal
conditions of the syllogism are alike for both. This Aristotle does
not admit, but draws instead a remarkable distinction. The Sophist
(he says) is a dishonest man, making it his professional purpose to
deceive; the pseudo-graphic man of science is honest always, though
sometimes mistaken. So long as the pseudo-graphic syllogism keeps
within the limits belonging to its own special science, it may be
false, since the geometer may be deceived even in his own science
geometry,[13] but it cannot be sophistic or eristic; yet, whenever it
transgresses those limits, even though it be true and though it
solves the problem proposed, it deserves to be called by those two
epithets. Thus, there were two distinct methods proposed for the
quadrature of the circle--one by Hippokrates, on geometrical
principles, the other by Bryson, upon principles extra-geometrical.
Both demonstrations were false and unsuccessful; yet that of
Hippokrates was not sophistic or eristic, because he kept within the
sphere of geometry; while that of Bryson was so, because it travelled
out of geometry. Nay more, this last would have been equally
sophistic and eristic, and on the same ground, even if it had
succeeded in solving the problem.[14] If indeed the pseudo-graphic
syllogism be invalid in form, it must be considered as sophistic,
even though within the proper scientific limits as to matter; but, if
it be correct in form and within these same limits, then, however
untrue its premisses may be, it is to be regarded as not sophistic or
eristic.[15]
[Footnote 13: Topic. V. iv. p. 132, a. 32.]
[Footnote 14: Soph. El. xi. p. 171, b. 12-20: [Greek: ta\ ga\r
pseudographê/mata ou)k e)ristika/ (kata\ ga\r ta\ u(po\ tê\n te/chnên
oi( paralogismoi/), ou)de/ g' ei)/ ti/ e)sti pseudogra/phêma peri\
a)lêthe/s, oi(=on to\ I(ppokra/tous ê)\ o( tetragônismo\s o( dia\
tô=n mêni/skôn. a)ll' ô(s Bru/sôn e)tetragô/nize to\n ku/klon, _ei)
kai\ tetragôni/zetai o( ku/klos, a)ll' o(/ti ou) kata\ to\ pra=gma,
dia\ tou=to sophistiko/s_.] Also p. 172, a. 1-8.]
[Footnote 15: Ibid. xi. p. 171, b. 19-20. Compare Topic. VIII. xi. p.
161, a. 33: [Greek: dei= de\ to\n kalô=s metabiba/zonta dialektikô=s
kai\ mê\ e)ristikô=s metabiba/zein, katha/per to\n geôme/trên
geômetrikô=s, a)/n te pseu=dos a)/n t' a)lêthe\s ê)=| to\
sumperaino/menon.] Also Topic. VIII. xii. p. 162, b. 10.]
Such is the test whereby Aristotle distinguishes the sophistication
of the didactic process from the legitimate working of that process.
Now this same test cannot be applied to Dialectic, which has no
appropriate or exclusive specialty of matters, but deals with _Omne
Scibile_, universally and indiscriminately. Aristotle therefore puts
the analogy in another way. Both in Didactic and in Dialectic the
Sophist is one who sins against the fundamental conditions of the
task which he undertakes; these conditions being, that in Didactic he
shall confine himself to the matters and premisses of a given
science,--in Dialectic, to matters probable of whatever kind they may
be. Transgression of these conditions constitutes unfair and
dishonest manoeuvre, whether of teacher or questioner; like breach of
the regulations on the part of competitors, bent on victory at all
price, in the Olympic games. Aristotle ranks this dishonesty as a
species, under the name of Sophistic or Eristic, admitting of being
analysed and defined;[16] and his treatise on Sophistical Refutations
is intended to describe and illustrate the _Loci_ belonging to it,
and contributing to its purpose.[17]
[Footnote 16: Soph. El. xi. p. 171, b. 22: [Greek: ô(/sper ga\r ê(
e)n a)gô=ni a)diki/a ei)=do/s ti e)/chei kai\ e)/stin a)dikomachi/a
tis, ou(/tôs e)n a)ntilogi/a| a)dikomachi/a ê( e)ristikê/ e)stin;
e)kei= te ga\r oi( pa/ntôs nika=n proairou/menoi pa/ntôn a(/ptontai,
kai\ e)ntau=tha oi( e)ristikoi/.]]
[Footnote 17: Soph. El. ix. p. 170, a. 34: [Greek: dê=lon ou)=n o(/ti
ou) pa/ntôn tô=n e)/legchôn a)lla\ tô=n para\ tê\n dialektikê\n
lêpte/on tou\s to/pous.]]
Fallacious dialectical refutation being thus referred altogether to
dishonesty of purpose (either contentious or profit-seeking) and
being assumed as unknown in fair dialectical debate, we have to see
by what characteristic Aristotle discriminates fallacious premisses
from fair and admissible premisses. Dialectic (he tells us) has for
its appropriate matter probable premisses--beliefs accredited either
by the multitude or by a wise few. But (he goes on to say) not
everything which appears probable is really probable. Nothing that is
really probable is a mere superficial fancy; wherever this last is
the case, the _probabilia_ are apparent only and not real; they have
the character of falsehood stamped upon them, so as to be immediately
manifest and obvious, even to persons of very narrow intelligence. It
is such apparent _probabilia_ as these, which make up the premisses
of eristic or sophistic discourse, and upon which the sophistical or
fallacious refutations turn.[18]
[Footnote 18: Topic. I. i. p. 100, b. 23: [Greek: e)ristiko\s d'
e)/sti sullogismo\s o( e)k phainome/nôn e)ndo/xôn mê\ o)/ntôn de/,
kai\ o( e)x e)ndo/xôn ê)\ phainome/nôn e)ndo/xôn phaino/menos. ou)
ga\r pa=n to\ phaino/menon e)/ndoxon, kai\ e)/stin e)/ndoxon.
ou)the\n ga\r tô=n legome/nôn e)ndo/xôn e)pipo/laion e)/chei
pantelô=s tê\n phantasi/an, katha/per peri\ ta\s tô=n e)ristikô=n
lo/gôn a)rcha\s sumbe/bêken e)/chein; parachrê=ma ga\r kai\ ô(s e)pi\
to\ polu/ toi=s kai\ mikra\ sunora=n duname/nois kata/dêlos e)n
au)toi=s ê( tou= pseu/dous e)sti\ phu/sis.] Compare Soph. El. ii. p.
165, b. 7.]
Aristotle thus draws a broad and marked line between Dialectic on the
one hand, and Eristic or Sophistic on the other; and he treats the
whole important doctrine of Logical Fallacies as coming under this
latter department. The distinction that he draws between them is
two-fold: first as to purpose, next as to subject-matter. On the part
of the litigious or sophistical debater there is the illicit purpose
of victory at all cost, or for profit; and probabilities merely
apparent--such as any one may see not to be real
probabilities--constitute the matter of his syllogisms.
Now, as to the distinction of purpose, we may put aside the idea of
profit as having no essential connection with the question. It is
quite possible to suppose the fair Dialectician, not less than the
Sophist, as exhibiting his skill for pecuniary reward; while the
eagerness for victory on both sides is absolutely indispensable even
in well-conducted debate, in order that the appropriate stimulus and
benefit of dialectical exercise may be realized. But, if the
distinction of purpose and procedure, between the Dialectician and
the Sophist, is thus undefined and unsatisfactory, still more
unsatisfactory is the distinction of subject-matter. To discriminate
between what is really probable (_i.e._, accredited either by the
multitude or by a wise few), and what is only probable in appearance
and not in reality--is a task of extreme difficulty. The explanation
given by Aristotle himself[19]--when he describes the apparently
probable as that which has only superficial show, and which the most
ordinary intelligence discerns at once to be false--includes only the
more gross and obvious fallacies, but leaves out all the rest.
Nothing can be more incorrect than the assumption, in regard to
fallacies generally, that the appearance of probability is too faint
to impose upon any ordinary man. If all fallacies could be supposed
to come under this definition, the theory of Fallacies would
undoubtedly be worthless (as Mr. Poste suggests that it is, in the
Preface to his translation of the Sophistici Elenchi); and the most
dishonest Sophist would at any rate be harmless. But, in fact,
Aristotle himself departs from this definition even in the beginning
of the Sophistici Elenchi; for he there treats the sophistic
syllogism and refutation as having a semblance of validity plausible
enough to impose upon many persons, and to be difficult of detection;
like base metals having the exterior appearance of gold and silver,
and like men got up for the purpose of looking finer and stronger
than they really are.[20] Here we have the eristic or sophistic
syllogism presented as fallacious, yet as very likely to be mistaken
for truth, by unprepared auditors, unless warning and precaution be
applied; not (as it was set forth in the definition above cited) as
bearing the plain and obvious stamp of falsehood, recognizable even
by the vulgar. At the time when Aristotle constructed that
definition, he probably had present to his mind such caricatures of
dialectical questions as Plato (in the dialogue Euthydêmus) puts into
the mouth of the Sophists Euthydêmus and Dionysodorus. And, since
Aristotle chose to connect fallacious reasoning with dishonest
purposes, and to announce it as employed exclusively by dishonest
debaters, he seems to have found satisfaction in describing it as
something which no honest man of ordinary understanding could accept
as true: the Sophist being thus presented not merely as a knave but
as a fool.
[Footnote 19: Topic. I. i. p. 100, b. 24, seq.]
[Footnote 20: Soph. El. i. p. 164, a. 23-b. 27. [Greek: to\n au)to\n
de\ tro/pon kai\ sullogismo\s kai\ e)/legchos o( me\n e)/stin, o( d'
ou)k e)/sti me/n, phai/netai de\ dia\ tê\n a)peiri/an; oi( ga\r
a)/peiroi ô(/sper a)\n a)pe/chontes po/r)r(ôthen theôrou=sin.]]
I think it a mistake on the part of Aristotle to treat the fallacies
incidental to the human intellect as if they were mere traps laid by
Sophists and litigants; and as if they would never show themselves,
assuming dialectical debate to be conducted entirely with a view to
its legitimate purposes of testing a thesis and following out
argumentative consequences. It is true that, if there are infirmities
incident to the human intellect, a dishonest disputant will be likely
to take advantage of them. So far it may be well to note his
presence. But the dishonest disputant does not originate these
infirmities: he finds them already existing, and manifested
undesignedly not merely in dialectical debate, but even in ordinary
discourse. It is the business of those who theorize on the
intellectual processes to specify and discriminate the Fallacies as
liabilities to intellectual error among mankind in general, honest or
dishonest, with a view to precaution against their occurrence, or
correction if they do occur; not to present them as inventions of a
class of professional cheats,[21] or as tares sown by the enemy in a
field where the natural growth would be nothing but pure wheat.
[Footnote 21: Soph. El. i. p. 165, a. 19, seq.]
In point of fact the actual classification of Fallacies given by
Aristotle is far sounder than his announcement would lead us to
expect. Though he entitles them Sophistical Refutations, describing
them as intentionally cultivated and exclusively practised by
professional Sophists for gain, or by unprincipled litigants for
victory, yet he recognises them as often very difficult of detection,
and as an essential portion of the theory of Dialectic generally.[22]
The various general heads under which he distributes them are each
characterized by intellectual or logical marks.
[Footnote 22: Ibid. xi. p. 172, b. 7.]
His first and most general observation is, that language is the usual
medium and instrument through which fallacies are operated.[23] Names
and propositions are of necessity limited in number; but things named
or nameable are innumerable; hence it happens inevitably that the
same name or the same proposition must have several different
meanings. Since we cannot talk of things except by means of their
names, the equivocation inseparable from these names is a constant
source of false conclusions.[24]
[Footnote 23: Ibid. i. p. 165, a. 5.]
[Footnote 24: Ibid. a. 10: [Greek: ta\ me\n ga\r o)no/mata
pepe/rantai kai\ to\ tô=n lo/gôn plê=thos, ta\ de\ pra/gmata to\n
a)rithmo\n a)/peira/ e)stin. a)nagkai=on ou)=n plei/ô to\n au)to\n
lo/gon kai\ tou)/noma to\ e(\n sêmai/nein.]]
In dialectical procedure, the Sophist and the litigious debater aim
at the accomplishment of five distinguishable ends:--(1) To refute,
or obtain the false appearance of refuting, the thesis; (2) To catch,
or appear to catch, the opponent in affirming something false or
contradictory; (3) Or in affirming something paradoxical; (4) Or in
uttering incorrect and ungrammatical speech; (5) Or in tautological
repetition. The first of these five ends is what the Sophist most
desires; where that cannot be had, then, as secondary purposes, the
succeeding four, in the order in which they are enumerated.[25]
[Footnote 25: Soph. El. iii. p. 165, b. 12-22.]
The syllogism whereby the Sophist appears to refute without really
refuting, is either faulty in form, or untrue in matter, or
irrelevant to the purpose. The Fallacies that he employs to bring
about this deceitful appearance of refutation are various, and may be
distributed first under two great divisions:--
I. _Fallaciæ Dictionis_.
II. _Fallaciæ Extra Dictionem_.
I. The first division--_Fallaciæ Dictionis_--includes all those cases
wherein, under the same terms or propositions, more than one meaning
is expressed. Six heads may be distinguished:--
1. Homonymy (Equivocation): where the double meaning resides in one
single term--noun or verb.
2. Amphiboly: where the double meaning resides, not in a single word
but, in a combination of words--proposition, phrase, or sentence.
3. Conjunction (hardly distinguishable from that immediately
preceding--Amphiboly).
4. Disjunction: where what is affirmed conjunctively is not true
disjunctively, or the reverse. (_E.g._, Five are two and three; but
you cannot say, Five are even and odd. The greater is equal and
something besides; but you cannot say, The greater is equal.)
5. Accentuation: where the same word differently accentuated has a
different meaning.
6. _Figura Dictionis_: where two words, from being analogous in form,
structure, or conjugation, are erroneously supposed to be analogous
in meaning also.[26]
[Footnote 26: Ibid. iv. p. 165, b. 23-p. 166, b. 19.]
Such are the six heads of _Fallaciæ Dictionis_--Fallacies or
Paralogisms arising from words as such, or something directly
appertaining to them.
II. Under the second division--Fallacies or Paralogisms _Extra
Dictionem_--there are seven heads:
1. _Fallacia Accidentis_.
2. _Fallacia a dicto Secundum Quid ad dictum Simpliciter_.
3. _Ignoratio Elenchi_.
4. _Fallacia Consequentis_
5. _Petitio Principii_.
6. _Non Causa pro Causâ_.
7. _Fallacia Plurium Interrogationum_.[27]
[Footnote 27: Soph. El. v. p. 166, b. 20-27.]
1. The first of these varieties, called _Fallacia Accidentis_, arises
when a syllogism is made to conclude that, because a given predicate
may be truly affirmed of a given subject, the same predicate may also
be truly affirmed respecting all the accidents of that subject: as
when Koriskus is denied to be a man, because he is not Sokrates, who
is a man; or is denied to be Koriskus, because he is a man, while a
man is not Koriskus.
In the title given to this general head of Fallacy,[28] we must
understand Accident, not in its special logical sense as opposed to
Essence, but in a far larger sense, including both Genus when
predicated separately from Differentia, and Differentia when
predicated separately from Genus; including, in fact, every thing
which is distinguishable from the subject in any way, and at the same
time predicable of it--every thing except the Definition, which
conjoins Genus and Differentia together, and is thus identical and
convertible with the _definitum_.
[Footnote 28: Ibid. b. 29: [Greek: oi( para\ to\ sumbebêko\s
paralogismoi/]. Every man is an animal; but, because a predicate is
true of the subject man, you cannot infer that the same predicate is
true of the subject animal. This title comprehends within its range
another, which is presently announced as distinct and
separate--_Fallacia Consequentis_.]
2. The second general variety arises when a proposition is affirmed
with qualification or limitation in the premisses, but is affirmed
without qualification, simply and absolutely, in the conclusion. The
Ethiopian is white in his teeth and black in his skin; therefore, he
is both white and not white--both white and black. In this example
the fallacy is obvious, and can hardly escape any one; but there are
many other cases in which the distinction is not so conspicuous, and
in which the respondent will hesitate whether he ought to grant or
refuse a question simply and absolutely.[29] One example given by
Aristotle deserves notice on its own account: _Non-Ens est
opinabile_, therefore _Non-Ens est_; or, again, _Ens non est homo_,
therefore, _Ens non est_. This is one among Aristotle's ways of
bringing to view what modern logicians describe as the double
function of the substantive verb--to serve as copula in predication,
and to predicate existence.[30] He regards the confusion between
these two functions as an example of the Fallacy now before us--of
passing _a dicto Secundum Quid ad dictum Simpliciter_.[31]
[Footnote 29: Ibid. b. 37, seq. [Greek: o(/tan to\ e)n me/rei
lego/menon ô(s a(plô=s ei)rême/non lêphthê=|--to\ de\ toiou=ton e)p'
e)ni/ôn me\n panti\ theôrê=sai r(a/|dion--e)p' e)ni/ôn de\ lantha/nei
polla/kis.]]
[Footnote 30: The same double or multiple meaning of _Est_ is
discriminated by Aristotle in the Metaphysica, but in a different
way--[Greek: to\ o)\n ô(s a)lêthe/s, kai\ to\ mê\ o)\n ô(s
pseu=dos]--[Greek: D].] vii. p. 1017, a. 31; E. iv. p. 1027, b. 18-36.
Bonitz (ad. Metaphys. Z. iv. p. 310) says:--"Quid quod etiam illud
_esse_ huc refert, quo non existentiam significamus, sed predicati
cum subjecto conjunctionem." Aristotle is even more precise than
modern logicians in analysing the different meanings of [Greek: to\
o)/n]: he distinguishes _four_ of them.]
[Footnote 31: Soph. El. v. p. 167, a. 1: [Greek: oi(=on ei) to\ mê\
o)/n e)sti doxasto/n, o(/ti to\ mê\ o)\n e)/stin; ou) ga\r tau)to\n
ei)=nai te/ ti kai\ ei)=nai a(plô=s.]
Compare Metaphys. Z. iv. p. 1030, a. 25, and De Interpretatione, p.
21, a. 25-34: [Greek: ô(/sper O(/mêro/s e)sti/ ti, oi(=on poiêtê/s;
a)=r' ou)=n kai\ e)/stin, ê) ou)/? kata\ sumbebêko\s ga\r
katêgorei=tai tou= O(mê/rou to\ e)/stin; o(/ti ga\r poiêtê/s e)stin,
a)ll' ou) kath' au(to/, katêgorei=tai kata\ tou= O(mê/rou to\
e)/stin.]
It is clear from the above passages that Aristotle was thoroughly
aware of the logical fact which Hobbes, James Mill, and Mr. John
Stuart Mill, have more fully brought out and illustrated, as the
confusion between the two distinct functions of the substantive verb.
Many excellent remarks on the subject will be found in the 'System of
Logic,' by Mr. J. S. Mill (Bk. I. ch. iv. s. 1); also in the
'Analysis of the Human Mind,' by James Mill, especially in the recent
edition of that work, containing the explanatory notes by Mr. J. S.
Mill and Dr. Findlater (Vol. I. ch. iv. p. 174, seq.). Mr. J. S.
Mill, however, speaks too unreservedly of this confusion as having
escaped the notice of Aristotle, and as having been brought to light
only by or since Hobbes. He says (in a note on the 'Analysis,' p.
183):--"As in the case of many other luminous thoughts, an approach
is found to have been made to it by previous thinkers. Hobbes, though
he did not reach it, came very close to it; and it was still more
distinctly anticipated by Laromiguière, though without any sufficient
perception of its value . . . in the following words:--'Quand on dit,
l'être est, &c., le mot _est_, ou le verbe, n'exprime pas la même
chose que le mot _être_, sujet de la définition. Si j'énonce la
proposition suivante: Dieu est existant, je ne voudrais pas dire
assurément, Dieu existe existant: cela ne ferait pas un sens: de
même, si je dis que Virgile est poète, je ne veux pas donner à
entendre que Virgile existe. Le verbe _est_ dans la proposition
n'exprime dont pas l'existence réelle; il n'exprime qu'un rapport
spécial entre le sujet et l'attribut, &c.'" The passages above cited
from Aristotle show that he had not only enunciated the same truth as
Laromiguière, but even illustrated it by the same example (Homer
instead of Virgil). I shall in another place state more fully the
views of Aristotle respecting _Existence_.]
3. The third of these heads of Fallacy--_Ignoratio Elenchi_--is, when
the speaker, professing to contradict the thesis, advances another
proposition which contradicts it in appearance only but not in
reality, because he does not know what are the true and sufficient
conditions of a valid Elenchus. In order to be valid, it must be
real, not merely verbal; it must be proved by good syllogistic
premisses, without any _Petitio Principii_; and it must deny the same
matter, in the same relations, and at the same time, as that which
the thesis affirmed. Thus, it is no contradiction to affirm and deny
doubleness of the same body; both affirmation and denial may be true,
if you take the comparison against different numbers or different
bodies, or at different times. Sometimes persons neglect some of
these conditions, and fancy that they have contradicted the thesis,
when they have not: this is _Ignoratio Elenchi_.[32] (If the thesis
be an affirmative universal, it _is_ sufficient contradiction if you
prove a negative particular against it.)
[Footnote 32: Soph. El. v. p. 167, a. 21-35: [Greek: oi( de\ para\
to\ mê\ diôri/sthai ti/ e)sti sullogismo\s ê)\ ti/ e)/legchos, a)lla\
para\ tê\n e)/lleipsin gi/nontai tou= lo/gou.]
We may remark, by the way, that it is not very consistent in
Aristotle to recognize one general head of Sophistical Refutation
called _Ignoratio Elenchi_, after the definition that he has given of
the Sophist at the beginning of this treatise. He had told us that
the Sophist was a dishonest man, who made it his profession to study
and practise these tricks, for the purpose of making himself pass for
a clever man, and of getting money. According to this definition,
there is no _Ignoratio Elenchi_ in the Sophist, though there may be
in the person who supposes himself refuted. The Sophist is assumed to
know what he is about, and to be aware that his argument is a
fallacious one.]
4. The fourth head includes what are called _Fallaciæ Consequentis_:
when a man inverts the relation between predicate and subject in a
categorical proposition affirmative and universal, thinking that it
may be simply converted or that the subject may be truly affirmed of
the predicate; or when, in an hypothetical proposition, he inverts
the relation between antecedent and consequent, arguing that, because
the consequent is true, the antecedent must for that reason be true
also. Honey is of yellow colour; you see a yellow substance, and you
infer for that reason that it must be honey. Thieves generally walk
out by night; you find a man walking out by night, and you infer that
he must be a thief. These are inferences from Signs, opinions founded
on facts of sense, such as are usually employed in Rhetoric; often or
usually true, but not necessarily or universally true, and therefore
fallacious when used as premisses in a syllogism.[33]
[Footnote 33: Soph. El. v. p. 167, b. 1-18. This head (_Fallacia
Consequentis_) is not essentially distinguishable from the first
(_Fallacia Accidentis_), being nothing more than a peculiar species
or variety thereof, as Aristotle himself admits a little farther
on--vi. p. 168, a. 26; vii. p. 169, b. 7; viii. p. 170, a. 3. Compare
also xxviii. p. 181, a. 25.]
5. The fifth head is that of _Petitio Principii_: a man sometimes
assumes for his premiss what is identical with the conclusion to be
proved, without being aware of the identity.[34]
[Footnote 34: Ibid. v. p. 167, a. 38: [Greek: dia\ to\ mê\ du/nasthai
sunora=n to\ tau)to\n kai\ to\ e(/teron].]
6. The sixth head of Fallacy--_Non Causa pro Causâ_--is, when we
mistake for a cause that which is not really a cause; or, to drop the
misleading word _cause_, and to adopt the clearer terms in which this
same fallacy is announced in the Analytica Priora[35]--_Non per
Hoc_--_Non propter Hoc_, it arises when we put forward, as an essential
premiss of a given conclusion, something that is not really an
essential premiss thereof. When you intend to refute a given thesis
by showing, that, if admitted, it leads to impossible or absurd
conclusions, you must enunciate that thesis itself among the
premisses that lead to such absurdities.[36] But, though enunciated
in this place, it may often happen that the thesis may be an
unnecessary adjunct--not among the premisses really pertinent and
essential: and that the impossible conclusion may be sufficiently
proved, even though the thesis were omitted. Still, since the thesis
is declared along with the rest, it will appear falsely to be a part
of the real proof. It will often appear so even to yourself the
questioner; you not detecting the fallacy.[37] Under such
circumstances the respondent meets you by _Non propter Hoc_. He
admits your conclusion to be impossible, and at the same time to be
duly proved, but he shows you that it is proved by evidence
independent of his thesis, and not by reason or means of his thesis.
Accordingly you have advanced a syllogism good in itself, but not
good for the purpose which you aimed at;[38] viz., to refute the
thesis by establishing that it led to impossible consequences. You
will fail, even if the impossible consequence which you advance is a
proposition conjoined with the thesis through a continuous series of
intermediate propositions, each of them having one common term with
the next. Much more will you fail, if your impossible consequence is
quite foreign and unconnected with the thesis; as we sometimes find
in Dialectic.
[Footnote 35: Ibid. b. 21; vii. p. 169, b. 13. Compare Analyt. Prior.
II. xvii. p. 65.
In commenting on the above chapter of the Analytica Priora, I have
already remarked (Vol. I. p. 258, note) how much better is the
designation there given of the present fallacy--_Non per Hoc_
([Greek: ou) para\ tê\n the/sin to\ pseu=dos])--than the designation
here given of the same fallacy--_Non Causa pro Causâ_. Aristotle is
speaking of a syllogistic process, consisting of premisses and a
conclusion; the premisses being the _reasons_ or grounds of the
conclusion, not the _cause_ thereof, as that term is commonly
understood. The term _cause_ is one used in so many different senses
that we cannot be too careful in reasoning upon it. See Whately's
remarks on this subject, Bk. iii. Sect. 14, of his Logic: also his
Appendix I. to that work, under article _Reason_.]
[Footnote 36: Soph. El. v. p. 167, b. 24: [Greek: e)a\n ou)=n
e)gkatarithmê/thê| e)n toi=s a)nagkai/ois e)rôtê/masi pro\s to\
sumbai=non a)du/naton, do/xei para\ tou=to gi/nesthai polla/kis o(
e)/legchos.]]
[Footnote 37: Ibid. b. 35: [Greek: kai\ lantha/nei polla/kis ou)ch
ê(=tton au)tou\s tou\s e)rôtô=ntas to\ toiou=ton.]]
[Footnote 38: Ibid. b. 34: [Greek: a)sullo/gistoi me\n ou)=n a(plô=s
ou)k ei)si\n oi( toiou=toi lo/goi, pro\s de\ to\ prokei/menon
a)sullo/gistoi.]]
7. The seventh and last of these heads of Fallacy is, when the
questioner puts two distinct questions in the same form of words, as
if they were one--_Fallacia Plurium Interrogationum ut Unius_. In
well-conducted Dialectic the respondent was assumed to reply either
Yes or No to the question put; or, if it was put in the form of an
alternative, he accepted distinctly one term of the alternative.
Under such conditions he could not reply to one of these
double-termed questions without speaking falsely or committing himself.
Are the earth and the sea liquid? Is the heaven or the earth sea? The
questions are improperly put, and neither admits of any one correct
answer. You ought to confine yourself to one question at a time, with
one subject and one predicate, making what is properly understood by
one single proposition. The two questions here stated as examples
ought properly to be put as four.[39]
[Footnote 39: Ibid. b. 38-p. 168, a. 16; vi. p. 169, a. 6-12. [Greek:
ê( ga\r pro/tasi/s e)stin e(\n kath' e(no/s.--ei) ou)=n mi/a
pro/tasis ê( e(\n kath' e(no\s a)xiou=sa, kai\ a(plô=s e)/stai
pro/tasis ê( toiau/tê e)rô/têsis.]
The examples given of this fallacy by Aristotle are so palpable--the
expounder of every fallacy _must_ make it clear by giving examples
that every one sees through at once--that we are tempted to imagine
that no one can be imposed on by it. But Aristotle himself remarks,
very justly, that there occur many cases in which we do not readily
see whether one question only, or more than one, is involved; and in
which one answer is made, though two questions are concerned. To set
out distinctly all the separate debateable points is one of the most
essential precautions for ensuring correct decision. The importance
of such discriminating separation is one of the four rules prescribed
by Descartes in his Discours de la Méthode. The present case comes
under Mr. Mill's Fallacies of Confusion.]
Aristotle has thus distinguished and classified Fallacies under
thirteen distinct heads in all--six _In Dictione_, and seven _Extra
Dictionem_; among which last one is _Ignoratio Elenchi_. He now
proceeds to show that, in another way of looking at the matter, all
the Fallacies ranged under the thirteen heads, may be shown to be
reducible to this single one--_Ignoratio Elenchi_. Every Fallacy,
whatever it be, transgresses or fails to satisfy, in some way or
other, the canons or conditions which go to constitute a valid
Elenchus,[40] or a valid Syllogism. For a true Elenchus is only one
mode of a true Syllogism; namely, that of which the conclusion is
contradictory to some given thesis or proposition.[41] With this
particular added, the definition of a valid Syllogism will also be
the definition of a good Elenchus. And thus _Ignoratio
Elenchi_--misconception or neglect of the conditions of a good
Elenchus--understood in its largest meaning, is rather a
characteristic common to all varieties of Fallacy, than one variety
among others.[42]
[Footnote 40: Soph. El. vi. p. 168, a. 19: [Greek: e)/sti ga\r
a(/pantas a)nalu=sai tou\s lechthe/ntas tro/pous ei)s to\n tou=
e)le/gchou diorismo/n.]]
[Footnote 41: Ibid. a. 35.]
[Footnote 42: Ibid. p. 169, b. 15.]
In regard to two among the thirteen heads--_Fallacia Accidentis_ and
_Fallacia Consequentis_ (which however ought properly to rank as only
one head, since the second is merely a particular variety of the
first)--Aristotle's observations are remarkable. After having pointed
out that a Syllogism embodying this fallacy will not be valid or
conclusive (thus showing that it involves _Ignoratio Elenchi_), he
affirms that even scientific men were often not aware of it, and
conceived themselves to be really refuted by an unscientific opponent
urging against them such an inconclusive syllogism. To take an
example:--Every triangle has its three angles equal to two right
angles; every triangle is a figure; therefore, every figure has its
three angles equal to two right angles.[43] Here we have an invalid
syllogism; for it is in the Third figure, and sins against the
conditions of that figure, by exhibiting an universal affirmative
conclusion: it is a syllogism properly concluding in _Darapti_, but
with conclusion improperly generalized. Yet Aristotle intimates that
a scientific geometer of his day, in argument with an unscientific
opponent, would admit the conclusion to be well proved, not knowing
how to point out where the fallacy lay: he would, if asked, grant the
premisses necessary for constructing such a syllogism; and, even if
not asked, would suppose that he had already granted them, or that
they ought to be granted.[44]
[Footnote 43: Ibid. p. 168, a. 40: [Greek: ou)d' ei) to\ tri/gônon
duoi=n o)rthai=n i)/sas e)/chei, _sumbe/bêke d' au)tô=| schê/mati
ei)=nai_ ê)\ prô/tô| ê)\ a)rchê=|, o(/ti _schê=ma_ ê)\ a)rchê\ ê)\
prô=ton tou=to.]
Here we have Figure reckoned as an _accident_ of Triangle. This is a
specimen of Aristotle's occasional laxity in employing the word
[Greek: sumbebêko/s]. He commonly uses it as contrasted with
_essential_, of which last term Mr. Poste says very justly (notes, p.
129):--"To complete the statement of Aristotle's view, it should be
added, that essential propositions are those whose predicate cannot
be defined without naming the subject, or whose subject cannot be
defined without naming the predicate." Now figure is the genus to
which triangle belongs, and triangle cannot be defined without naming
its genus figure. But to include Genus as a predicable under the head
of [Greek: sumbebêko/s]or Accident, is in marked opposition to
Aristotle's own doctrine elsewhere: see Topic. I. v. p. 102, b. 4;
iv. p. 101, b. 17; Analyt. Post. I. ii. p. 71, b. 9; Metaphys. E. p.
1026, b. 32. It is a misfortune that Aristotle gave to this general
head of Fallacy the misleading title of _Fallacia
Accidentia_--[Greek: para\ to\ sumbebêko/s]. When he gave this title,
he probably had present to his mind only such examples as he indicates
in Soph. El. v. p. 166, b. 32. Throughout the Topica and elsewhere,
Genus is distinguished pointedly from [Greek: sumbebêko/s], though
examples occur occasionally in which the distinction is neglected. The
two Fallacies called _Accidentis_ and _Consequentis_, would both be
more properly ranked under one common logical title--_Supposed
convertibility or interchangeableness between Subject and
Predicate_--[Greek: ei) to/de a)po\ tou=de mê\ chôri/zetai, mêd' a)po\
thate/rou chôri/zesthai tha/teron] (vii. p. 169, b. 8).]
[Footnote 44: Soph. El. vi. p. 168, b. 6: [Greek: a)lla\ para\ tou=to
kai\ oi( techni=tai kai\ o(/lôs oi( e)pistê/mones u(po\ tô=n
a)nepistêmo/nôn e)le/gchontai; kata\ sumbebêko\s ga\r poiou=ntai
tou\s sullogismou\s pro\s tou\s ei)do/tas; oi( d' ou) duna/menoi
diairei=n ê)\ e)rôtô/menoi dido/asin ê)\ ou) do/ntes oi)/ontai
dedôke/nai.]]
The passage affords us a curious insight into the intellectual grasp
of the scientific men contemporary with Aristotle. Most of them were
prepared to admit fallacious inferences (such as the above) which
assumed the interchangeability of subject and predicate. They had
paid little or no attention to the logical relations between one
proposition and another, and between the two different terms of the
same proposition. The differences of essential from accidental
predication, and of each among the five Predicables from the others,
must have been practically familiar to them, as to others, from the
habit of correct speaking in detail; but they had not been called
upon to consider correct speaking and reasoning in theory, nor to
understand upon what conditions it depended whether the march of
their argumentative discourse landed them in true or false results.
And, if even the scientific men were thus unaware of logical
fallacies, we may be sure that this must have been still more the
case with unscientific men, of ordinary intelligence and education.
Aristotle tells us here, in more than one passage, how widespread
such illogical tendencies were: to fancy that two subjects which had
one predicate the same must be the same with each other in all
respects;[45] to understand each predicate applied to a subject as
being itself an independent subject, implying a new _Hoc Aliquid_ or
_Unum_;[46] to treat the universal, not as a common epithet but, as a
substantive and singular apart;[47] to use equivocal words or
phrases, even the most wide and vague, without any attempt to
discriminate their various meanings.[48] Such insensibility to the
conditions of accurate reasoning prevailed alike among ordinary men
and among the men of special science. A geometer would be imposed
upon by the inconclusive syllogism stated in the last paragraph,
which, as being founded on the _Fallacia Accidentia_ (or
interchangeability of subject and predicate), Aristotle numbers among
Sophistical Refutations. Such a refutation, however, even when
successful, would not at all prove that the geometer was deficient in
knowledge of his own science;[49] for it would puzzle the really
scientific man as well as the pretender.
[Footnote 45: Soph. El. vi. p. 168, b. 31: [Greek: ta\ ga\r e(ni\
tau)ta/, kai\ a)llê/lois a)xiou=men ei)=nai tau)ta/.]--vii. p. 169,
b. 7: [Greek: e)/ti kai\ e)pi\ pollô=n phai/netai _kai\ a)xiou=tai
ou(/tôs_, ei) to/de a)po\ tou=de mê\ chôri/zetai, mêd' a)po\
thate/rou chôri/zesthai tha/teron.]]
[Footnote 46: Ibid. vii. p. 169, a. 33: [Greek: o(/ti _pa=n to\
katêgorou/meno/n tinos u(polamba/nomen to/de ti kai\ ô(s e(\n
u(pakou/omen_; tô=| ga\r e(ni\ kai\ tê=| ou)si/a| ma/lista dokei=
pare/pesthai to\ to/de ti kai\ to\ o)/n.]]
[Footnote 47: Ibid. xxii. p. 178, b. 37-p. 179, a. 10.]
[Footnote 48: Ibid. vii. p. 169, a. 22.]
[Footnote 49: Ibid. viii. p. 169, b. 27: [Greek: oi( de\ sophistikoi\
e)/legchoi, a)\n kai\ sullogi/zôntai tê\n a)nti/phasin, ou) poiou=si
dê=lon ei) a)gnoei=; kai\ ga\r to\n ei)do/ta e)mpodi/zousi tou/tois
toi=s lo/gois.] Compare vi. p. 168, b. 6.]
We must always recollect that Aristotle was the first author who
studied the logical relations between Terms and Propositions, with a
view to theory and to general rules founded thereupon. The
distinctions which he brought to view were in his time novelties;
even the simplest rules, such as those relating to the Conversion of
propositions, or to Contraries and Contradictories, had never been
stated in general terms before. Up to a certain point, indeed,
acquired habit, even without these generalities, would doubtless lead
to correct speech and reasoning; yet liable to be perverted in many
cases by erroneous tendencies, requiring to be indicated and guarded
against by a logician. When we are told that even a professed
geometer was imposed upon by these fallacies, we learn at once how
deep-seated were such illogical deficiencies, how useful was
Aristotle's theoretical study in marking them out, and how
insufficient was his classification when he described the Fallacies
as obvious frauds, broached only by dishonest professional Sophists.
As he himself states, the cause of deceit turns upon a quite trifling
difference; having its root in the imperfection of language and in
our frequent habit of using words without much attention to logical
distinctions.[50]
[Footnote 50: Soph. El. vii. p. 169, b. 14: [Greek: e)n a(/pasi ga\r
ê( a)pa/tê dia\ to\ para\ mikro/n; ou) ga\r diakribou=men ou)/te tê=s
prota/seôs ou)/te tou= sullogismou= to\n o(/ron dia\ tê\n ei)rême/nên
ai)ti/an.] Compare v. p. 167, a. 5-14; i. p. 165, a. 6-19.]
Under one or other, then, of the thirteen general heads above
enumerated, all Paralogisms must be included--merely apparent
syllogisms, or refutations, which are not real and valid;[51] and all
of them designated by Aristotle as sophistic or eristic. Besides
these, moreover, he includes, as we saw, under the same designation,
syllogisms or refutations valid in form, and true as to conclusion,
yet founded on premisses not suited to the matter in debate; _i.e._,
not suited to Dialectic. Now, here it is that difficulty arises.
Dialectic and Rhetoric are carefully distinguished by Aristotle from
all the special sciences (such as Geometry, Astronomy, Medicine,
&c.); and are construed as embracing every variety of authoritative
_dicta_, current beliefs, and matters of opinion, together with all
the most general maxims and hypotheses of Ontology and Metaphysics,
of Physics and Ethics, and the common Axioms assumed in all the
sciences, as discriminated from what is special and peculiar to each.
Construed in this way, we might imagine that the subject-matter of
Dialectic was all-comprehensive, and that every thing without
exception belonged to it, except the specialties of Geometry and of
the other sciences; and such is the usual language of Aristotle. Yet
in the treatise before us we find him exerting himself to establish
another classification, and to part off Dialectic from a certain
other science or art which he acknowledges under the title of
Sophistic or Eristic.[52] Elsewhere he describes Sophistic as
occupied in the study of accidents or occasional conjunctions; and
this characteristic feature parts it off from Demonstration and
Science. But there is greater difficulty when he tries to part it off
from Dialectic. Where are we to find a clear line of distinction
between the matter of dialectic debate (gymnastic or testing) on the
one hand, and the matter of debate sophistic or litigious, on the
other? At the beginning of the Topica Aristotle assigned, as the
distinction, that the Dialectician argues upon premisses _really_
probable, while the litigious Sophist takes up premisses which are
probable _in appearance only_, and not in reality; such apparent
_probabilia_ (he goes on to say) having only the most superficial
semblance of truth, and being seen immediately to be manifest
falsehoods by persons of very ordinary intelligence.[53] But I have
already pointed out that this description of apparent _probabilia_,
if considered as applying to fallacious reasoning generally, is both
untenable in itself, and contradicted by Aristotle himself elsewhere.
The truth is, that there is no clear distinction between the matter
of Dialectic and the matter of Sophistic. And so, indeed, Aristotle
must be understood to admit, when he falls back upon an alleged
distinction of aim and purpose between the practitioners of one and
the other. The litigious man (he tells us) is bent upon nothing but
victory in debate, _per fas et nefas_: the Sophist aims at passing
himself off falsely for a wise or clever man, and making money
thereby.[54]
[Footnote 51: Ibid. viii. p. 170, a. 10.]
[Footnote 52: Metaphys. K. viii. p. 1064, b. 26: [Greek: tou=to de\
(to\ sumbebêko/s) ou)demi/a zêtei= tô=n o(mologoume/nôs ou)sô=n
e)pistêmô=n, _plê\n ê( sophistikê/_; peri\ to\ sumbebêko\s ga\r
au(/tê mo/nê pragmateu/etai.] Compare Analyt. Poster. I. ii. p. 71,
b. 10.]
[Footnote 53: Topic. I, i. p. 100, b. 26: [Greek: ou) ga\r pa=n to\
phaino/menon e)/ndoxon kai\ e)/stin e)/ndoxon. ou)the\n ga\r tô=n
legome/nôn e)/ndoxôn e)pipo/laion e)/chei pantelô=s tê\n phantasi/an,
katha/per peri\ ta\s tô=n e)ristikô=n lo/gôn a)rcha\s sumbe/bêken
e)/chein; parachrê=ma ga\r kai\ ô(s e)pi\ to\ polu\ toi=s kai\ mikra\
sunora=n duname/nois kata/dêlos e)n au)toi=s ê( tou= pseudou=s e)sti\
phu/sis.] It is by reference to this distinction between [Greek:
e)/ndoxa] which are genuine and [Greek: e)/ndoxa] which are only such
in appearance that the Scholiast (p. 306, b. 40) explains the meaning
of Aristotle in the eleventh chapter of Sophistici Elenchi: [Greek:
o( me\n ou)=n kata\ to\ pra=gma theôrô=n ta\ koina\ dialektiko/s, o(
de\ tou=to phainome/nôs poiô=n sophistiko/s] (p. 171, b. 6-20). I
confess that I attach no distinct meaning to the words [Greek: kata\
to\ pra=gma theôrô=n ta\ koina\], which characterizes the
Dialectician as contrasted with the Sophist; nor can I learn much
from the notes either of Waitz, or of Mr. Poste (p. 129, seq.) on the
passage. Take for example the last half of the Parmenides of Plato,
or Book B. of the Metaphysics of Aristotle. Are we to say that in
these two compositions Plato and Aristotle speculate on to [Greek:
ta\ koina\ kata\ to\ pra=gma], or that they do so only in
appearance?]
[Footnote 54: Soph. El. xi. p. 171, b. 25-35; i. p. 165, a. 21-31.]
Now, in regard to the distinction of aim or disposition drawn by
Aristotle between the dialectical disputant and the litigious or
sophistic disputant, we see at once, as was before suggested, that it
lies apart from the critical estimate of art, science, or philosophy;
and that it belongs, so far as it is well founded, to the estimate of
individuals ethically and politically, as worthy men or patriotic
citizens. Whether Euripides or Sophokles composed finer tragedies (as
we find argued in the Ranæ of Aristophanes), must be decided by
examining the tragedies themselves, not by enquiring whether one of
them was vain and greedy of money, the other free from these
blemishes. A theorist who is laying down general principles of
Rhetoric, and illustrating them by the study of Æschines and
Demosthenes, will appreciate the oration against Ktesiphon and the
oration De Coronâ in their character of compositions intended for a
particular purpose. For Rhetoric it is of no moment whether Æschines
was venal or disinterested--a malignant rival or an honest patriot;
this is an enquiry important indeed, but belonging to the historian
and not to the rhetorical theorist. Whether Aristotle was or was not
guided, in his animadversions on Plato, by an unworthy and captious
jealousy of his master, is an interesting question in reference to
his character; but our appreciation of his philosophy must proceed
upon an examination, not of his motives but, of his doctrines and
reasonings as we find them. A good argument is not deprived of its
force when enunciated by a knave, nor is a bad argument rendered good
because it proceeds from a virtuous man. Indeed, so far as the
character of the speaker counts at all, in falsifying the fair
logical estimate of an argument, it operates in a direction opposite
to that here indicated by Aristotle. The same argument in the mouth
of one who is esteemed and admired counts for more than its worth; in
the mouth of a person of low character it counts for less than it is
worth.[55] To distribute arguments into two classes--those employed
by persons of dishonourable character and those employed by
honourable men--is a departure from the scientific character of
Logic.
[Footnote 55: Eurip. Hecub. 293.
[Greek: to\ d' a)xi/ôma, ka)\n kaô=s le/gê|s, to\ so\n
pei/sei; lo/gos ga\r e)/k t' a)doxou/ntôn i)ô\n
ka)\k tô=n dokou/ntôn au)to\s ou) tau)to\n sthe/nei.]
Aristot. Rhetoric. I. ii. p. 1356, a. 5-15.]
As to the other part of the case (if it is still necessary to recur
to it), touching the peculiarity of the matter of sophistical
arguments, the inconsistency of Aristotle is most apparent. In
enumerating the Sophistical Refutations he tells us that these
fallacies are indeed sometimes palpable and easily detected, but that
they are often very difficult to detect and very misleading; that an
unprepared hearer will generally be imposed upon by several of them,
and even a scientific hearer by some; and that, even where the
fallacy does not actually deceive, the proper mode of meeting and
exposing it will not occur unless to one previously exercised in
Dialectic.[56] That Fallacies _In Dictione_, taken as a class (though
these are what he declares to be the most usual _modus operandi_ of
the sham dialecticians called Sophists[57]), often passed
unperceived, and were hard to solve and elucidate even when
perceived--we know to have been his opinion; for it is not only in
the Topica and Sophistici Elenchi, but also in the Metaphysica and
other works,[58] that he takes pains to analyse and discriminate the
several distinct meanings borne by terms familiar to every one, such
as _idem_, _unum_, _pulchrum_, _bonum_, _amare_, _album_, _acutum_,
&c., which terms therefore, when employed in argument, were always
liable to introduce a fallacy of Equivocation or Amphiboly. He tells
us the like in specifying the seven Fallacies _Extra Dictionem_: that
they also were often unnoticed, and required vigilant practice to see
through and solve. The description in detail, therefore, which
Aristotle gives (in Sophistici Elenchi) of the working process
peculiar to the litigious Sophist, is completely at variance with the
definition which he had given of the sophistic syllogism at the
commencement of the Topica. That definition is indeed suitable for
the _type-specimens_ which he and other logicians give to illustrate
this or that class of Fallacies: the type-specimen produced must
carry absurdity on the face of it, so that the reader may at first
sight recognize it as a fallacy; and he may even find difficulty in
believing that any one can really be imposed upon by such trifling.
But, though suitable for the type-specimen taken separately, this
definition fails in the essential character which Aristotle
postulates for a definition, since it is quite untrue and unsuitable
for numerous instances of the class intended to be illustrated.[59]
Aristotle was the first who attempted to distribute Fallacies into
classes, such that, while in each class there were certain specimens
palpably stamped with the fallacious character, there were also in
each class an indefinite multitude of analogous cases wherein the
fallacious character did not reveal itself openly or easily, but
required attentive consideration to detect it, often indeed remaining
undetected, and producing its natural fruit of error and confusion.
This was one of his many great merits in regard to Logic; and the
classification of Fallacies (modified as to details) has passed to
all subsequent logicians, so that we find difficulty in understanding
that the contemporaries of Sokrates and Plato had no idea of it. But
the value of his service to Logic would be much lessened, if all
fallacies were sophistic syllogisms, intended to deceive but never
really deceiving, corresponding to his definition at the beginning of
the Topica; if (as he tells us in the Sophistici Elenchi) they were
only impudent forgeries put in circulation by a set of professional
knaves called Sophists; and if all non-sophistical dialecticians, and
all the world without, could be trusted as speaking correctly by
nature and as never falling into them.
[Footnote 56: Soph. El. v. p. 167, a. 5-15, b. 5-35. [Greek: kai\
lantha/nei polla/kis ou)ch ê(=tton au)tou\s tou\s e)rôtô=ntas to\
toiou=ton.]--vii. p. 169, a. 22-30, b. 8-15: [Greek: e)n a(/pasi ga\r
ê( a)pa/tê dia\ to\ para\ mikro/n].--xv. p. 175, a. 20.]
[Footnote 57: Ibid. i. p. 165, a. 2-20.]
[Footnote 58: Topic. I. vii. p. 103, a. 6-39; p. 106, b. 3-9; p. 107,
a. 12, b. 7: [Greek: polla/kis de\ kai\ e)n au)toi=s toi=s lo/gois
lantha/nei parakolouthou=n to\ o(mô/numon.] Cf. Topic. II. iii. p.
110, b. 33; V. ii. p. 129, b. 30, seq.; VI. x. p. 148, a. 23, seq.
Soph. El. x. p. 171, a. 17.
Compare also Book [Greek: D]. of the Metaphysica, and the frequent
recognition and analysis [Greek: tô=n polla/kô=s legome/nôn]
throughout the other Books of the Metaphysica.]
[Footnote 59: Topic. VI. i. p. 139, a. 26: [Greek: dei= ga\r to\n
tou= a)nthrô/pou o(rismo\n kata\ panto\s a)nthrô/pou
a)lêtheu/esthai.]--VI. x. p. 148, x. p. 148, b. 2: [Greek: dei= ga\r
e)pi\ pa=n to\ sunô/numon e)pharmo/ttein.]
Whoever reads the Sixth Book of the Topica, wherein Aristotle
indicates to the questioner _Loci_ for impugning a definition, will
see how little this definition of the Sophistic Syllogism will stand
such attacks.]
The appeal made by Aristotle to a difference of character and motives
as the distinction between the Dialectician and the Sophist is all
the more misplaced, because he himself lays down as the essential
feature of Dialectic generally, that it is a match or contention
between two rivals, each anxious to obtain the victory. It is like a
match at chess between two expert players, or a fencing-match between
two celebrated masters at arms. Its very nature is to be an attack
and defence, in which each combatant resorts to stratagem, and each
outwits the other if he can. Whether the match is played for money or
for nothing--whether the contentious spirit is more or less
intense--does not concern the theorist on dialectical procedure. It
is indispensable that both the questioner and the respondent should
exert their full force, the one in thrusting, the other in parrying:
if they do not, the purpose of Dialectic, which is the common
business of both, will not be attained. That purpose is clearly
declared by Aristotle. It is not didactic: he distinguishes it
expressly from teaching,[60] where one man who knows communicates
such knowledge to an ignorant pupil. It is gymnastic, exercising the
promptitude and invention of both parties; or peirastic, testing
whether the respondent knows a given thesis in such manner as to
avoid being driven into answers inconsistent with each other or
notoriously false.[61] Each party seeks, not to help or enlighten
but, to puzzle and defeat the other. As at chess or in fencing, to
mask one's projects and deceive the adversary is essential to the
work and to its purpose; each expects it from the other, and
undertakes to meet and parry it. The theses debated were always such
that arguments might be found both for the affirmative and for the
negative.
[Footnote 60: Soph. El. ii. p. 165, b. 1-5; x. p. 171, a. 32-b. 2.
Cf. Topic. VIII. xi. p. 161, a. 25.]
[Footnote 61: Topic. I. i. p. 100, a. 20; VIII. i. p. 155, b. 10-28.]
According to Aristotle himself, therefore, the Dialectician is
agonistic and eristic, just as much as the Sophist. If the one tries
to entrap his opponent for the purpose of victory, so also does the
other: the line which Aristotle draws between them is one not founded
upon any real distinction between two purposes and modes of
procedure, but is merely verbal and sentimental; putting aside under
a discredited title what he himself disliked. He admits that the
dialectical questioner, whenever the thesis which he undertakes to
refute is true, can never refute it except by inducing the respondent
to concede what is false; that, even where the thesis is false, he
often can only refute it by some other incompatible falsehood,
because he cannot obtain from the respondent better premisses; that,
where the thesis is probable and conformable to received opinion, his
only way of refuting it is by entrapping the respondent into
concessions paradoxical and contrary to received opinion.[62] But
these ends--fallacious refutation, falsehood, and paradox--are the
very same as those which Aristotle (in the Sophistici Elenchi)[63]
sets forth as the peculiar characteristics of the litigious Sophist.
And the improving intellectual tendencies which he ascribes to
Sophistic, are almost identical with those attributed to Dialectic,
being declared in very similar words.[64] That there were
dialecticians of every degree of merit, in the time of Aristotle,
cannot be doubted; some clever and ready, others stupid and destitute
of invention. But that there were any two classes of dialecticians
such as he describes and contrasts--one heretical class, called
Sophists, who purposely and habitually employed the thirteen
fallacious refutations, and another orthodox class who purposely
avoided or habitually abstained from them--we may most reasonably
doubt. If the argument in the Sophistici Elenchi is good at all, it
is good against all Dialectic. The Sophist, as Aristotle describes
him, is only the Dialectician looked at on the unfavourable side and
painted by an enemy. We know that there were in Greece many enemies
of Dialectic generally; the intense antipathy inspired by the
cross-examining colloquy of Sokrates, and attested by his own
declarations, is a sufficient proof of this. The enemies of Sokrates
depicted him--as Aristotle depicts the Sophist in the Sophistici
Elenchi--as a clever fabricator of fallacious contradictions and
puzzles; to which Aristotle adds the farther charge (advanced by
Plato before him) against the Sophist, of arguing for lucre--which
is an irrelevant charge, travelling out of the region of art, and
bearing on the personal character of the individual. If the
sophistical stratagems were discreditable and mischievous when
exhibited for money, they would be no less such if exhibited
gratuitously. The sophistical discourse is not (as Aristotle would
have us believe) generically distinguishable from the dialectical;[65]
nor is Sophistic an art distinct from Dialectic while adjoining to it,
but an inseparable portion of the tissue of Dialectic itself.[66] If
the Sophist passed himself off as knowing what he did not really know,
so also did the Dialectician; as we know from the testimony of
Sokrates, the most consummate master of the art. The conflict of two
minds each taking advantage of the misconceptions, short-comings, and
blindness of the other, is the essential feature of Dialectic as
Aristotle conceives it; to which the eight books of his Topica are
adapted, with their multiplicity of distinctions and precepts both
for attack and defence. There cannot be a game of chess without
stratagems, nor a fencing-match without feints; the power of such
aggressive deception is one characteristic mark of a good player.
Those who teach or theorize on the game do not seek to exclude
stratagem, but furnish precautions to prevent it from succeeding.
Mastery of the art assumes skill in defence as well as in attack.
[Footnote 62: Topic. VIII. xi. p. 161, a. 24.]
[Footnote 63: Soph. El. iii. p. 165, b. 14.]
[Footnote 64: Compare Topic. I. ii. p. 101, a. 26-b. 4, with Soph.
El. xvi. p. 175, a. 5-16.]
[Footnote 65: Soph. El. ii. p. 165, a. 32; xxxiv. p. 183, b. 1.]
[Footnote 66: Plato, Apol. Sokrat. p. 23, A.
Compare this with Aristot. Soph. El. i. p. 165, a. 30.]
Doubtless there are rules that require to be observed in the
dialectical attack and defence, as there are rules for all other
matches such as chess or fencing. I should have been glad if
Aristotle had given a precise and tenable explanation what these
rules were. He describes the Sophist as one who plays the game
unfairly; but we have already seen that the ends pursued by the
Dialectician generally are hardly at all distinguishable from those
aimed at by the Sophist. If we look to the account of the means
employed by one and the other, we shall in like manner fail to see
how any real line can be drawn between them.
Thus, one proceeding declared to be characteristic of the Sophist
is--that he puts multiplied questions apparently at random, without
any visible bearing on the thesis; practising a sort of fishing
examination, in order to obtain some answer of which he may take
advantage.[67] But, when we turn to the Eighth Book of the Topica, we
find Aristotle expressly recommending the like manoeuvre to the
Dialectician; advising him to conceal as much as possible the scheme
and intended series of his questions--to begin as far as possible
apart from the thesis, to put the questions in a succession
designedly incoherent and unintelligible, and to obtain (what, if
obtained, ensured complete success) the full extent of premisses
necessary for his final refutative syllogism, without the respondent
being aware that he had conceded them.[68] The questioner is farther
advised to throw the respondent off his guard by affecting
indifference whether each question is answered affirmatively or
negatively, and by occasionally taking objection against himself, in
order that he may create the impression of a strictly honest
purpose.[69] If we compare the interrogative procedure which
Aristotle recommends to the Dialectician with that which he blames in
the Sophist, we shall find that the former is even a greater
refinement of deception than the latter.
[Footnote 67: Soph. El. xii. p. 172, b. 9-25.
Aristotle treats the Sophists as guilty of dishonourable proceeding
herein--[Greek: du/nantai de\ nu=n ê(=tton _katourgei=n_ dia\ tou/tôn
ê)\ pro/teron.] The very same charge was urged against the dialectic
of Sokrates by his opponents: Plato, Hippias Minor, p. 373--[Greek:
a)lla\ Sôkra/tês a)ei\ tara/ttei e)n toi=s lo/gois kai\ e)/oiken
ô(/sper kakourgou=nti.] Compare Plato, Gorgias, pp. 461, B., 482, E.,
483, A.]
[Footnote 68: Topic. VIII. i. p. 155, b. 1.-p. 155, b. 30; p. 156, a.
5-22. Compare Analyt. Priora, II. xix. p. 66, a. 33.]
[Footnote 69: Topic. VIII. i. p. 156, b. 3, 17. Compare VIII. i. pp.
155-156, with Soph. El. xv. p. 174, a. 28.]
The next trick which we find ascribed to the Sophist is--that he
conducts the train of interrogation in such manner as to bring it
upon a ground on which his memory is abundantly furnished with
topics. Aristotle adds that this may be done well and honourably, or
ill and dishonourably.[70] From his own admission we see that this
practice was not peculiar to Sophists, but was common also to those
whom he calls Dialecticians: like every other part of the procedure,
it might be done well or ill; but wherein this difference consisted
he does not further explain. Indeed, when we recollect that the
elaborate details and classification of the Topica are mainly
intended to furnish the memory with an abundant store of premisses
well-arranged and ready for interrogation,[71] we may be sure that
every Dialectician who had gone through the trouble of learning them
would be impatient to apply them; and would make an opportunity for
doing so, if none were spontaneously tendered to him. But, if the
answers obtained were totally irrelevant to his final purpose of
refuting the thesis, they would be nothing but embarrassment to
him.[72] We must, therefore, understand that the questions put would
be such as tended ultimately to introduce that refutative Syllogism
which the questioner was bound to conclude with. If they were not, he
was of course punished by failure.
[Footnote 70: Soph. El. xii. p. 172, b. 26. In Topic. III. i. p. 116,
a. 20, Aristotle prescribes the same procedure to the Dialectician.
See also Waitz's note on the passage.
Alexander (in Scholia, p. 267, b. 8) tells us that it was customary
for the Sophists to put questions lying away from the thesis, and he
shows this by mentioning the Platonic Protagoras, in which he says
that the Sophist Protagoras does so. But the illustration here
produced does not serve Alexander's purpose. The Sophist Protagoras
(in the Platonic dialogue so called) is represented, not as shifting
dialectic from one point to another, but as running away from it
altogether into long discourse and continuous rhetoric (Plato,
Protagor. pp. 333, 334, 335). In respect to the thesis started for
debate, the dialectic of Sokrates departs from it as widely as that
of Protagoras, and this is acknowledged at the close of the dialogue,
p. 361. Compare 'Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates', Vol.
II. pp. 53, 59, 70.]
[Footnote 71: Topic. I. v. p. 102, a. 13; I. xiii. p. 105, a. 22;
VIII. xiv. p. 163, a. 31-b. 2.]
[Footnote 72: Aristotle himself observes this, Topic. II. v. p. 112,
a. 14.]
A third manoeuvre treated as peculiar to the Sophist is--that he
takes account of the particular philosophical sect to which the
respondent belongs, and endeavours to bring out by interrogations
whatever there may be paradoxical in the tenets of that sect.[73] But
would not any expert Dialectician do just the same? What else would
be done by Sokrates, if cross-examining an Anaxagorean or a
Herakleitean? or by Aristotle himself, if interrogating a Platonist?
[Footnote 73: Soph. El. xii. p. 172, b. 29.]
Another proceeding treated as peculiar to the Sophist is--that he
seeks to drive the respondent into a paradox, by bringing out in
cross-examination certain well-known antitheses or contradictions
which subsist together in the opinions of mankind. Thus, men profess
in their public talk high principles of virtue; but secretly and at
the bottom of their hearts they desire to get wealth or power _per
fas et nefas_. Again, there are two kinds of justice: one, that which
is just by nature and in truth, such as wise men or philosophers
approve; the other, that which is just according to law or custom,
such as the multitude in this or in in some other society approve.
There is, also, conflict between the authority of a father, and that
of the wise; between justice and expediency; and as to whether it is
more eligible to suffer wrong or to do wrong.[74] All these
antitheses are presented to us in the Platonic Gorgias, to which
(_i.e._, to the speech of Kallikles therein) Aristotle here makes
reference; and he numbers it among the vices distinguishing the
Sophist from the genuine Dialectician--to dwell upon such antitheses
for the purpose of forcing the respondent into paradoxical answers.
But, surely, the antitheses here fastened upon that obnoxious name
are of a class utterly opposed to the class of _pseudo-probabilia_,
which he tells us are the peculiar game of the litigious Sophist,
though every man of ordinary intelligence detects them at first sight
as fallacies. They are all real and serious issues,[75] having
plausible arguments _pro_ and _con_, debateable without end, and
settled by every man for himself according to his own sentiment and
predisposition. They are exactly the subject-matter best fitted for
the acute Dialectician. No man would be allowed by Aristotle to
deserve that title, if he omitted to raise and argue them, the thesis
being supposed suitable.[76] Aristotle himself speaks often of the
equivocal sense of the term justice--of the distinction between what
is just by nature and what is just according to some local or
peculiar sentiment.[77] The manoeuvre which Aristotle imputes to the
Sophist being exactly the same as that which Kallikles imputes to
Sokrates in the Platonic Gorgias,[78] it is Sokrates, and not
Kallikles, who serves here as illustrating what Aristotle calls a
Sophist. Indeed, if we read the Gorgias, we shall find the Platonic
Sokrates there represented as neglecting the difference between what
is probable (conformable to received opinion) and what is
paradoxical. He admits that he stands alone in his opinion, against
all the world, and his opponents even imagine that he is bantering
them; but he confides in his own individual reason and consistency,
so as to be able to reduce all opponents dialectically to proved
contradiction with themselves.[79] Himself maintaining a paradox, he
constrains his respondent by acute dialectic to assent to it; which
is exactly what Aristotle imputes to the Sophists of his day as a
reproach.
[Footnote 74: Ibid. b. 36-p. 173, a. 30.]
[Footnote 75: Rhetoric. II. xxv. p. 1402, a. 33: [Greek: oi( me\n
ga\r sullogismoi\ e)k tô=n e)ndo/xôn, dokou=nta de\ polla\ e)nanti/a
a)llê/lois e)sti/n.]
A disputant who argued about these memorable ethical antitheses, must
be allowed [Greek: kata\ to\ pra=gma theôrei=n ta\ koina/], which is
the characteristic feature assigned by Aristotle to the Dialectician,
as contrasted with the Sophist (Soph. El. xi. p. 171, b. 5), in so
far us I can understand the words [Greek: kata\ to\ pra=gma]. See
note b p. 394 supra.]
[Footnote 76: Topic. I. iii. p. 101, a. 5-10. [Greek: e)k tô=n
e)ndechome/nôn poiei=n a(\ proairou/metha.]]
[Footnote 77: Topic. II. xi. p. 115, b. 25. Ethic. Nikom. V. x. p.
1134, b. 18; I. i. p. 1094, b. 15. Rhetoric. I. xiii. p. 1373,
b. 5.]
[Footnote 78: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 482-483. [Greek: o(\ dê\ kai\ su\]
(Sokrates) [Greek: tou=to to\ sopho\n katanenoêkô\s kakourgei=s e)n
toi=s lo/gois, e)a\n me/n tis kata\ no/mon le/gê|, kata\ phu/sin
u(perôtô=n, e)a\n de\ ta\ tê=s phu/seôs, ta\ tou= no/mou.]]
[Footnote 79: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 470, 472, 481, 482.]
Some predecessors of Aristotle had distinguished arguments or
discourses into two separate classes--those addressed to the name,
and those addressed to the thought.[80] This distinction Aristotle
disapproves, denying certainly its pertinence and almost its reality.
There can be no arguments addressed to the thought only, apart from
the name: all of them must be addressed to the name, and through it
to the thought.[81] Whether an argument is addressed to the thought
or not, depends not upon any thing in the argument itself, but upon
the meaning which one respondent or other may happen to attach to the
words: if the respondent understands it as the questioner intended,
it is addressed to the thought; if not, not.[82] To require that the
questioner shall distinguish accurately the sense in which he puts
the question, would, according to Aristotle, convert him into a
teacher--would confound the line between Dialectic and Didactic.[83]
And this may be granted; but not less, if Dialecticians are to
refrain from all those proceedings which Aristotle notes and condemns
as peculiar to the Sophist, must they be held to pass into the
attitude of teacher and learner; the questioner doing what he can,
not to embarrass but, to enlighten and assist the respondent. The
purpose of victory, and the stimulus of competition in the double
function of question and answer (while entirely absent from
Didactic), are quite as essential to the Dialectician as to the
Sophist. That the Sophist seeks victory unscrupulously and at all
cost, while the Dialectician respects certain rules and limits of the
procedure--is a difference well deserving to be noticed; yet not a
_differentia_ giving name and essence to a new species. The unfair
Dialectician is a Dialectician still; all his purposes remain the
same, though the means whereby he pursues them are altered. This
distinction of means between the two, Aristotle has taken very
insufficient pains to point out. Rude and provocative manner, either
on the part of questioner or respondent, and impudent assumption of
concessions which have neither been asked nor granted,--these are
justly enumerated as illustrations of unfair Dialectic.[84] But the
enumeration is most incompletely performed; because Aristotle, in his
anxiety to erect Sophistic into an art or procedure by itself,
distinct from and alongside of Dialectic, has transferred to it much
that belongs to fair and and admissible Dialectic. Hence the really
unfair and objectionable means are not often brought into the
foreground.
[Footnote 80: Soph. El. x. p. 170, b. 12: [Greek: ou)k e)/sti de\
diaphora\ tô=n _ê(\n le/gousi tines_, to\ ei)=nai tou\s me\n pro\s
tou)/noma lo/gous, e(te/rous de\ pro\s tê\n dia/noian.]
From this allusion (and other allusions also xvii. p. 176, a. 6; xx.
p. 177, b. 8; xxii. p. 178, b. 10) to the doctrines of predecessors,
we see that the assertion made by Aristotle (in the last chapter of
Sophistici Elenchi) of his own originality, and of the absence of
prior researches, must be taken with some indulgence.]
[Footnote 81: Soph. El. x. p. 170, b. 23.]
[Footnote 82: Ibid. b. 28: [Greek: ou) ga\r e)n tô=| lo/gô| e)/sti
to\ pro\s tê\n dia/noian ei)=nai, a)ll' e)n tô=| to\n a)pokrino/menon
e)/chein pôs pro\s ta\ dedome/na.]]
[Footnote 83: Ibid. p. 171, a. 28, seq.]
[Footnote 84: Soph. El. xv. p. 174, a. 22, b. 10.]
Though Aristotle speaks so contemptuously about Sophistic, he
nevertheless indicates _Loci_ (or general heads of subjects) to
assist the sophistical questioner in attacking, and precepts to the
sophistical respondent for warding off attack. On the whole, these
precepts are not materially different from those laid out in the
Topica for Dialectic; except that he gives greater prominence to
Solecism and Tautology, as thrusts practised by the sophistical
questioner. He insists upon the intellectual usefulness of practice
in sophistical debate, hardly less than in what he calls dialectical,
and, as was remarked, upon similar grounds.[85] He recommends it as
valuable not only for imparting readiness and abundance in argument,
but also for solitary meditation and for investigation of scientific
truths. Without it (he declares) we cannot become familiar with the
equivocations of terms and propositions, nor acquire the means of
escaping them. If we allow ourselves to be entangled in them, without
being aware of it, by others, we shall also be entangled in them when
we pursue reflections of our own.[86] It is not enough to see
generally that there _is_ a fallacy; we must farther learn to detect
at once the precise seat of the fallacy, and to point out rapidly how
it may be cleared up. This is the more difficult to do, because
fallacies that we are thoroughly aware of will often escape our
notice under inversion and substitution of words.[87] Unless we
acquire promptitude by frequent exercise in such debates, we shall
find ourselves always unprepared and behind-hand in each particular
case of confusion. If we complain and condemn such debates generally,
we shall appear to do so upon no better grounds than our own
stupidity and incompetence.[88]
[Footnote 85: Ibid. xvi. p. 175, a. 5-16. Compare Topica**, I. ii. p.
101, a. 30, seq.]
[Footnote 86: Soph. El. xvi. p. 175, a. 9: [Greek: deu/teron de\
pro\s ta\s kath' au(to\n zêtê/seis (chrê/simoi); o( ga\r u(ph'
e(te/rou r(a|diôs paralogizo/menos kai\ tou=to mê\ ai)sthano/menos
ka)\n au)to\s u(ph' au(tou= tou=to pa/thoi polla/kis.]]
[Footnote 87: Ibid. a. 20: [Greek: ou) tau)to\ d' e)sti\ labo/nta te
to\n lo/gon i)dei=n kai\ lu=sai tê\n mochthêri/an, kai\ e)rôtô/menon
a)panta=n du/nasthai tache/ôs. o(\ ga\r i)/smen, polla/kis
metatithe/menon a)gnoou=men.] Compare xxxiii. p. 182, b. 7.]
[Footnote 88: Soph. El. xvi. p. 175, a. 25: [Greek: ô(/ste, a)\n
dê=lon me\n ê(mi=n ê)=|, a)mele/têtoi d' ô)=men, u(sterou=men tô=n
kairô=n polla/kis.]]
Accordingly the Sophistici Elenchi contains precepts, at considerable
length,[89] to the respondent in a sophistical debate, how reply or
solution is to be given to the fallacies involved in the questions;
all the thirteen Fallacies, (the six _In Dictione_, and the seven
_Extra Dictionem_) being treated in succession. In conducting his
defensive procedure, the respondent must keep constantly in mind what
the Sophistical Refutation really is. He must treat it not as a real
or genuine refutation, but as a mere simulation of such; and he must
so arrange his reply as to bring into full evidence this fact of
simulation. What he has to guard against is, not the being really
refuted but, the seeming to be refuted.[90] The refutative syllogism
constructed by the sophistical questioner, including as it does
Equivocation, Amphiboly, or some other verbal fallacy, and therefore
yielding no valid conclusion, does not settle whether the respondent
is really refuted or not. If indeed the questioner, in putting his
interrogation, discriminates the double meaning of his words, where
they have a double meaning, the respondent ought to answer plainly
and briefly Yes, or No; either affirming or denying what is tendered.
But, if the questioner does not so discriminate, the respondent
cannot reply simply Yes, or No: he must himself discriminate the two
meanings, and affirm or deny accordingly.[91] Unless he guards
himself by such discrimination, he cannot avoid falling into a
contradiction, at least in appearance. The equivocal wording of the
question will be tantamount to the fallacy of putting two questions
as one.[92]
[Footnote 89: From xvi. p. 175, to xxxiii. p. 183, of Soph. El.]
[Footnote 90: Soph. El. xvii. p. 175, a. 33: [Greek: o(/lôs ga\r
pro\s tou\s e)ristikou\s machete/on, ou)k ô(s e)le/gchontas, a)ll'
ô(s phainome/nous; ou) ga/r phamen sullogi/zesthai/ ge au)tou/s,
ô(/ste pro\s to\ mê\ dokei=n diorthôte/on.]]
[Footnote 91: Ibid. b. 1-14. Compare Topica, VIII. vii. p. 160, a.
29.
Aristotle tells us that this demand for a reply brief and direct,
without any qualifying additions or distinctions, was advanced by
dialecticians in former days much more emphatically than in his
own--[Greek: o(/ t' e)pizêtou=si nu=n me\n ê(=tton pro/teron de\
ma=llon oi( e)ristikoi/, to\ ê)\ nai\ ê)\ ou)\ a)pokri/nesthai to\n
e)rôtô/menon, e)gi/net' a)/n.] I presume that he makes comparison
with the Platonic dialogues--Euthydemus, p. 295; Gorgias,
pp. 448-449; Protagoras, pp. 334-335.]
[Footnote 92: Soph. El. xvii. 175, b. 15-p. 176, a. 18.]
As the questioner may propound as refutation what seems to be such
but is not so in reality, so the respondent may meet it by what is an
apparent solution but no solution in reality, There occur various
cases, in sophistic or agonistic debate, wherein a simulated solution
of this kind is even preferable to a real one.[93] If the question is
plausible, the respondent may answer, "Be it so"; but, if it involves
any paradox in answering, he will answer by saying, "So it would
appear": he will thus not be supposed to have granted what amounts to
refutation or paradox.[94] Where the question put is such that, while
involving falsehood or paradox if answered in the affirmative, it is
at the same time closely or immediately connected with the thesis set
up,--the respondent may treat it as equivalent to a _Petitio
Principii_, and make answer in the negative. Also, where the
questioner, trying to establish an universal proposition by
Induction, puts the final question, not under an universal term but,
as the general result of the particulars conceded (and such
like),--the respondent may refuse to admit this last step, and may
say that his antecedent concessions have been misunderstood.[95]
[Footnote 93: Ibid. p. 176, a. 21.]
[Footnote 94: Ibid. a. 25.]
[Footnote 95: Ibid. a. 27-35.]
If a question is put in plain and appropriate language, answer must
be made plainly or with some clear distinction; but, where the
question is put obscurely and elliptically, leaving part of the
meaning unexpressed, the respondent must not concede it unreservedly.
If he does, fallacious refutation may very possibly be the
result:[96] he may appear to be refuted by that which is no real
refutation. If, of two propositions, the second follows upon the
first, but the first does not follow upon the second, the respondent,
where he has the choice, ought to grant the second only, and not the
first. He ought not to make a greater concession when he can escape
with a less;[97] _e.g._, he ought to concede the particular rather
than the universal.
[Footnote 96: Ibid. a. 38-b. 7.]