I want to ask you, Witness, do you still remember the time and the
conditions after 1927?
SEYSS-INQUART: On account of the economic situation which you have just
described, the League powers again and again forced Austria to make
so-called voluntary declarations renouncing the Anschluss. This had
repercussions in Austrian domestic politics. The Austrians, who in 1918
had been resolved to have a democratic parliamentary form of government,
turned to radical ideas of an authoritarian character.
DR. STEINBAUER: At that time a new party was formed. Which one was that?
SEYSS-INQUART: Then there occurred the so-called Palace of Justice fire,
an uprising of the Marxists, which brought in its wake the creation of
the anti-Marxists Home Guard, a militant organization. Thus uniforms
were introduced into the political life of Austria. The controversy
between the Marxists and the anti-Marxists became ever more marked. The
only nonpartisan organization at that time was the German-Austrian
Volksbund, and the Anschluss idea was the only political objective which
still held all parties together. Around the year 1930—at least then it
was first noticeable—the National Socialist German Workers Party made
its appearance.
DR. STEINBAUER: What impression did that Party make on you, particularly
with reference to the seizure of power in the Reich?
SEYSS-INQUART: I want to say quite openly that amidst Austrian
conditions the Party appeared somewhat strange. Uniforms had, of course,
already been introduced into politics by the Republican Guard of the
Marxists and the Home Guard, but in the NSDAP even the actual political
leaders wore uniforms and marched in close formation. And also the kind
of political intransigence which they displayed was not in keeping with
our customary political thinking.
DR. STEINBAUER: But what then were the reasons for that?
SEYSS-INQUART: Well, let me say that the NSDAP did not recognize any
value in any other party and was never prepared to co-operate with any
other.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then, what positive successes did you think the Party
had gained in the Reich?
SEYSS-INQUART: I think that the influence of the Party in
Austria—undoubtedly very great as time went on—was due to its
unqualified determination to attain the Anschluss. I am of the opinion
that the radicalism is to be attributed, for instance, to the negation
of the customs union by the Hague decision, to please the democratic
party leaders.
DR. STEINBAUER: In addition, were there not economic reasons which
brought success to the NSDAP?
SEYSS-INQUART: What was discussed in the Reich, and what we heard from
the Reich...
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, I suppose you are hearing the words spoken by
Dr. Steinbauer direct, and you are answering them without any pause,
which gives the interpreter no chance.
SEYSS-INQUART: We in Austria observed after 1933 the removal of the
discriminations imposed by the Versailles Treaty and above all, the
elimination of unemployment in the Reich. In Austria, too, about 10
percent of the population were unemployed at that time. Especially the
Austrian workers, therefore, were hoping that the Anschluss would put an
end to their unemployment; and Austrian farmers were greatly interested
in the Reich Food Estate and in the German market control.
DR. STEINBAUER: If I understand you correctly, then, it was the
Anschluss idea which brought you, too, in contact with the Party? I do
not want to speak of the Party program, which has been discussed here
again and again; but I just want to ask you briefly: When did you join
the Party?
SEYSS-INQUART: Officially, I became a member of the Party on 13 May
1938, and my membership number is above 7 million.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you have any contact with Dr. Dollfuss?
SEYSS-INQUART: I met Dr. Dollfuss in the period after the war. I knew
that he wanted to take me into his Ministry in 1933; and a week before
25 July 1934, at his invitation, I had a discussion with him.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you participate in any way in the murder of Federal
Chancellor Dr. Dollfuss on 25 July 1934?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, in no way. Dr. Dollfuss planned to have another
discussion with me. He was interested in my view regarding the calming
of the very radical situation of that time. I told Dr. Dollfuss already
at that time that there were no more nationalists in Austria but only
National Socialists, and that the National Socialists were acting only
on Hitler’s orders.
DR. STEINBAUER: But, I must remind you, Doctor, that the Prosecution
have submitted a photograph which shows the murder of Dollfuss being
extolled.
SEYSS-INQUART: That is the so-called Annual Commemoration in the year
1938. During that celebration nobody thought of Dollfuss; it was a
Commemoration by the Party in honor of the seven SS men who had been
hanged in connection with the Putsch attempt at that time. None of us
referred to that death as murder.
DR. STEINBAUER: Well, Dr. Schuschnigg succeeded Dollfuss as Federal
Chancellor, and I want to ask you: What conclusions were drawn by the
NSDAP from this event, as far as you could gather?
SEYSS-INQUART: The NSDAP itself was completely broken up and
disorganized, and a small circle of men was formed at that time; I also
found my way to those men, and we drew the following conclusions from
the events of 25 July:
First, that they represented a considerable danger. I recall the meeting
of statesmen in Stresa and their resolutions against Germany. And even
though we were never worried about Italy, one had nevertheless to
realize that in this very troubled atmosphere anything could easily lead
to war. We all agreed that the main task of German policy must be to
avoid war.
DR. STEINBAUER: We are now in the year...
SEYSS-INQUART: I should like to add that, with regard to domestic
policy, the events on 25 July were the worst that could possibly have
happened to the prospect of the Anschluss. We reflected on what might be
done and came to the conclusion that the Party in the Reich should cease
its interference in the Austrian National Socialist Party, the existence
of which anticipated the Anschluss; but in return, the National
Socialists in Austria should once more receive permission to be active,
and especially, there should be elections to ascertain the proportional
strength of the parties.
DR. STEINBAUER: What I am interested in is the question whether you had
any connections with authorities in the Reich at that time, that is, in
1936?
SEYSS-INQUART: I had no connections with authorities in the Reich.
DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you. Did you...
SEYSS-INQUART: Only, as Reich Marshal Göring has already testified, when
I became a State Councillor, did I, for the first time, meet a leading
German politician.
DR. STEINBAUER: When was that?
SEYSS-INQUART: That was in June or July 1937.
DR. STEINBAUER: What was your attitude toward the NSDAP in Austria at
that time, when you were State Councillor?
SEYSS-INQUART: When the agreement of 11 July 1936 was reached—without
my having taken any part in it—Dr. Schuschnigg, through Minister Klees
asked me for my political co-operation. At that time I had particularly
close connections with Zernatto, the General Secretary of the Fatherland
Front. At the suggestion of Zernatto and his friends I became an
Austrian State Councillor and Dr. Schuschnigg gave me the task, in
writing, of examining the conditions under which the national opposition
could be enlisted to collaborate politically. In order to fulfill that
task I did, of course, have to contact the National Socialists, because
the national opposition consisted only of National Socialists.
DR. STEINBAUER: Who was the head of the NSDAP in Austria?
SEYSS-INQUART: The Party in Austria had reorganized illegally; Captain
Leopold was the head.
DR. STEINBAUER: Were you on friendly terms with him?
SEYSS-INQUART: I could not come to an agreement with Captain Leopold; he
did not understand my policy, but thought that on the basis of the
agreement of 11 July Dr. Schuschnigg had to allow the NSDAP again in its
earlier form. I think I talked to Leopold only twice, or at most three
times, throughout that time. He demanded that I be subordinate to him;
that I refused.
DR. STEINBAUER: May I in this connection draw attention to the following
documents without reading from them?
Exhibit Number Seyss-Inquart-44, on Page 103 of the document book, an
excerpt from the Document Number 3471-PS, Exhibit Number USA-583,
already submitted to the Court.
Exhibit Seyss-Inquart-45, on Page 105, Document Number 3473-PS, Exhibit
Number USA-581.
And Document Number Seyss-Inquart-97, on Page 109, in which Zernatto
expressly states that Seyss-Inquart did not fall in with Leopold’s aims
and efforts.
My client has been accused by the Prosecution of having played a double
game. As counterevidence, I applied for permission to hear the former
Gauleiter Siegfried Uiberreither. He was interrogated here, and I want
to quote from the interrogatory, which is Document Number
Seyss-Inquart-59, from the counterquestions put by the Prosecution on
Page 140:
“Question: ‘Was not the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, before the time
when the Nazi Party was legalized, that is, before it was
declared legal in February 1938, was he not in constant contact
with the illegal Nazi Party of Austria?’
“Answer: ‘No. I personally did not know Seyss-Inquart until his
visit to Graz. In Nazi circles he was considered a non-Party
member. I think—I do not know with certainty—that he joined
the NSDAP only when it was legalized. For this reason, he
personally encountered a strong opposition in illegal Nazi
circles.’”
On Page 6 of the same document it says:
“Question: ‘Did not the Defendant Seyss-Inquart play a double
game: On one side his legal position in Schuschnigg’s Cabinet
and on the other side his co-operation with the formerly illegal
Nazi Party, whose activity was then legalized to a certain
extent through the efforts of the defendant at Berchtesgaden in
February 1938?’
“Answer: ‘I do not know to what extent he was in touch with the
illegal Nazi circles before 12 February. I do not know about it,
because I was not in Vienna. But from 18 February his contact
with the Nazi Party was not duplicity but his duty. Schuschnigg
himself had discussions with Leopold, the leader of the Nazis at
that time—before Klausner it was Leopold.’”
[_Turning to the defendant._] This brings us to 1938. At the beginning
of that year you were State Councillor in the Austrian Government. What
did you think of the political situation at that time?
SEYSS-INQUART: In many conversations with Dr. Schuschnigg but most of
all in continual discussions with Zernatto, I suggested, in line with
the conclusions I had drawn from the events of 25 July 1934, that the
Reich, and particularly Hitler, be asked to refrain from any
interference in Austrian politics through the medium of the Austrian
National Socialist Party. I proposed that instead the Austrian National
Socialists should receive permission to resume activities. That did not
mean at all that I would give up the Anschluss, but I was completely
convinced that a lawful and responsible policy of the Austrian National
Socialists in Austria would in the course of time win for them the
support of a clear majority of the Austrian nation—I mean of the
Germans in Austria; and that the demonstration of such a clear majority
would no longer be challenged by the powers of the League of Nations.
One had to attempt to make Adolf Hitler agree to such a policy by
enlisting the support of the autonomous and independent state of Austria
for the Führer’s policy and the demand for equal rights of the German
people. It was in the interests of these ideas that I talked to Field
Marshal Göring and Herr Hess. I reported the outcome of these
conversations to Dr. Schuschnigg and to Zernatto and I recommended the
formation of a coalition government by taking National Socialist
ministers into the cabinet, on condition that Adolf Hitler offer
adequate guarantees. My suggestions made no headway with either of the
two parties, but were not directly turned down. Meanwhile, the Austrian
National Socialists continued to be active illegally; the police
intervened and made arrests; three Austrian concentration camps were set
up; in short, the events of that time foreshadowed today’s
denazification system.
DR. STEINBAUER: Were you at the Obersalzberg on 12 February 1938?
SEYSS-INQUART: No. But I want to describe how that meeting came about.
First of all, a renewed Party radicalism set in. At the beginning of
1938, legitimist tendencies were being promoted in Austria, the laws
regarding the return of the Hapsburg property were discussed in the
State Council. For the moment my own position, therefore, became
untenable; I retired and informed Zernatto and State Secretary Keppler
who had been officially nominated by the Reich Government to conduct the
political affairs relating to Austria. I felt that in view of my task it
was my duty to inform Keppler also. I myself accepted an invitation from
the Reich Sports Leader Tschammer-Osten and went to
Garmisch-Partenkirchen. There, without previous appointment, I met Herr
Von Papen. Each of us poured out his troubles to the other, and came to
the conclusion that both parties, that is to say, Hitler as well as the
Austrian Government—that is, Dr. Schuschnigg—should be made aware of
the fact that a clear decision on the lines of my proposal was
necessary. At that time, participation of the National Socialists in the
government was certainly discussed. Perhaps the Ministry of the Interior
was also a subject of discussion, but my name was definitely not
mentioned though it was the obvious one. I received no report on the
discussions which Herr Von Papen had with Hitler, but I informed
Zernatto of my conversation with Herr Von Papen. Zernatto at that time
met me half-way on some questions, in particular with regard to the
expansion of those sections dealing with national policy which were
concerned with the National Socialists; and for this purpose he also
placed means at my disposal. It was on 10 February, I think, when I
heard through the group of my colleagues that Hitler had invited Dr.
Schuschnigg to Berchtesgaden. Among the members of my circle were Dr.
Reiner, Dr. Jury, Dr. Kaltenbrunner, Langot, and several others.
DR. STEINBAUER: Were you informed of the outcome of the discussions at
the Obersalzberg?
SEYSS-INQUART: I was informed of the outcome of this conference only by
Zernatto. On the evening of the 11th, before Dr. Schuschnigg left for
Berchtesgaden, I had a detailed discussion with him and Zernatto. We
agreed to a large extent regarding the appointment of National
Socialists—for instance, Jury, Reinthaller, and Fischböck—to certain
public functions but not to ministerial positions. I did not broach the
subject of a ministerial post, because I did not know how Adolf Hitler
reacted to the suggestion which I made to Herr Von Papen. On 13 February
Zernatto asked me to see him, and he then told me of the results and
contents of the Berchtesgaden conference, which were known to him.
DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection, I want to refer to Document Number
Seyss-Inquart-48, Page 111, in which Zernatto states, “I had the
definite impression that he”—Seyss-Inquart—“did not until then know
anything about the result of the discussion and the contents of the
agreement”—of 12 February.
Witness, on the basis of that agreement, you became Minister of the
Interior and Police, did you not?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, on 17 February.
DR. STEINBAUER: On 17 February 1938, with the assignment of establishing
connections between Austria and the Reich, or rather of improving them.
Did you also have a discussion with Hitler himself?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. The agreement at Berchtesgaden on 12 February
contained a definite stipulation to the effect that I was to be liaison
man between the Austrian Government and the Austrian National Socialists
on one side, and the German Reich on the other. The contents of the
protocol appeared to me unsatisfactory and even dangerous. There was no
doubt at all that my appointment to the Ministry of the Interior and
Security served as a notification, if not a signal, for the Austrian
National Socialists that they might expect an early realization of their
political objectives. In addition they received permission to profess
their beliefs; they could wear the swastika and salute with the raised
hand. What was not permitted, however, was their organization; that
means, my National Socialist friends in Austria had no possibility of
getting in touch with the National Socialists in a legal way. This
agreement opened the gates without providing for a regular procedure
thereafter. Hence, I myself resolved to see Adolf Hitler in order to
make sure whether my plan had his approval. I went with Dr.
Schuschnigg’s assent and with an Austrian diplomatic passport.
DR. STEINBAUER: And when did you talk then to Hitler?
SEYSS-INQUART: I mentioned an incorrect date just now; it was on 16
February that I became Minister and I went to Berlin on the 17th. I
talked with Adolf Hitler alone for more than 2 hours.
It was pointed out here by the Prosecution that I saluted Adolf Hitler
with the raised-hand greeting. That was permissible under the agreement.
But I would ask the Prosecution to admit that during every one of my
interrogations I stated that I had emphasized to Adolf Hitler at once
that I was an Austrian Minister and as such responsible to Austria. I
made some shorthand notes on this discussion on the back of a letter,
and a few weeks later I dictated those notes to my secretary. I now want
to relate the contents of my talk with Hitler on the basis of those
notes. My statements...
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, will you kindly be as brief as possible; can
you do it in headings, perhaps?
SEYSS-INQUART: But this is the most important point with regard to my
whole responsibility.
“A condition of Federal Chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg is that I
adhere to an autonomous and independent Austria, that I support
the Constitution, that is, further development, including the
Anschluss, must be based on this. The formation of public
opinion in Austria must proceed independently and in accordance
with present constitutional possibilities; I must be an active
guarantor for Dr. Schuschnigg of the revolutionary way, in the
meaning of these statements (Yes), no Trojan horse. The Party
and Movement must not adopt a militant attitude against
prevailing cultural conceptions. (Yes). No totalitarianism of
the Party and Movement; that is, National Socialist ideology to
be realized with due appreciation and regard for conditions in
Austria; not to be imposed on others by force. The Party as such
is not simply to disappear, but to exist as an organization of
individuals; no illegal activity, no efforts inimical to the
State, everything to be done in a legal fashion, anyone failing
to do this, to be locked up.”
In the main, Adolf Hitler agreed, and he told me:
“It is not a question of the 25 points. One cannot proclaim a
dogma; one must arrive from the pan-German and the national
German conception to a National Socialist one.”
That was the gist of my conference with Adolf Hitler on 17 February,
from 12 to 2:10 o’clock.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you...
MR. DODD: Mr. President, I understood the witness to say that he made
his notes on the meeting with Hitler and later dictated them to his
secretary. It is not clear to me whether he was reading from those
notes. Furthermore, we have never seen such notes and I think it should
be made clear on the record.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, has the defendant got the notes?
DR. STEINBAUER: The original was taken from him when he was arrested.
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you heard the question I asked; have you got
the notes?
SEYSS-INQUART: The original of these notes was among my files in Vienna.
I made an application to have these files of mine, which were found,
searched for the notes. I handed a copy of the notes to the Prosecution
during one of my first interrogations; it is in the files of the
Prosecution. I have only copies here; I do not have the original.
THE PRESIDENT: The copy would be just as good for the purposes.
SEYSS-INQUART: I have placed a copy at the disposal of the Defense.
DR. STEINBAUER: But I gave it back to you.
SEYSS-INQUART: Then you can submit this one.
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, would you hand it over?
[_The document was submitted to the Tribunal._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you give it an exhibit number, Dr. Steinbauer?
DR. STEINBAUER: Number Seyss-Inquart-61, otherwise it would be confused
with the others.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. DODD: Mr. President, I am confused about this; I still do not
understand, and I am sure that my colleagues do not. We have never
received any copy of any notes that this defendant has claimed he made
soon after, or at the time of, his conference with Hitler. We have no
such copy in our files. And I would like to have understood myself
whether or not he is now claiming that this copy which is offered to the
Tribunal is a copy of this original that he claims he gave to us.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that what you say, Defendant, that the document which
you have just handed to your counsel is a copy of the document which you
say you produced during your interrogations, which was from the
shorthand notes you made at that time?
SEYSS-INQUART: Mr. President, the original notes I made on the afternoon
of 17 February. A few weeks later I dictated these notes, which I made
in shorthand, to my secretary, who took them down on a typewriter. I had
several copies, one of which I presented to the Prosecution during one
of my interrogations last summer. I have now given a second copy to my
defense counsel. These are copies made from the original notes a few
weeks after the conference. The original was in my secret flies in
Vienna.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. DODD: I wonder if we could learn just who it was to whom this
defendant gave these notes? Mr. President, I would like to have some
search made for them, and some effort made to find them.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you know who was the interrogating counsel?
SEYSS-INQUART: Mr. Dodd himself.
MR. DODD: We do not have it.
SEYSS-INQUART: I think I am right in saying that it was handed over.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, the main points of the contents coincide
with the voluntary statement, which the defendant...
MR. DODD: I think this is important enough at this point, Mr. President,
to clear up. I have the interrogation that I first conducted on this
defendant, and it clearly shows that he referred to the notes; but he
clearly said at the time that he did not have them, that he left them in
a black leather case with other documents in Mondorf, and he asked me if
I would make an effort to get them; and I said that I would, and we
never have been able to find them, and that is the transcript of the
interrogation.
SEYSS-INQUART: May I say that I received them. The black leather case
was brought to me here in Court and the notes were in it. I submitted
the copy at one of the subsequent interrogations.
[_There was a short pause._]
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Steinbauer.
DR. STEINBAUER: May I say that Document Number Seyss-Inquart-49, Page
113, is substantially of the same content. The defendant, the present
witness, informed Schuschnigg of the substance of that talk; that is
evident from Document Number 3271-PS, Exhibit Number Seyss-Inquart-65,
on Page 158.
Witness, I want to ask you now whether Hitler approved of your
proposals?
SEYSS-INQUART: He clearly said “yes” to a number of things, but on other
points he expressed doubts as to whether the Austrian Government would
agree; the principal impression was, however, that this policy seemed
feasible.
DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection it has also been alleged that as
Minister of the Interior and Police you brought executive power under
the control of the Nazis.
SEYSS-INQUART: I should like to leave the main explanation of this
matter to my witness, Dr. Skubl. After Dollfuss’ death Dr. Skubl was a
special confidant of the Austrian Government and was placed at my side
as State Secretary and Inspector General for Security Matters—clearly
also to act as a kind of check. I had no objection at all to that and
was very pleased to have such an expert at my disposal.
I should just like to mention briefly that all orders of the entire
executive came from Skubl. I myself never gave a direct order to the
Austrian police. Skubl was given instructions by Dr. Schuschnigg,
particularly on 10 and 11 March. I myself did not bring a single
National Socialist into the Austrian police.
DR. STEINBAUER: All right, that is sufficient.
SEYSS-INQUART: Perhaps I might refer briefly to the public appeal...
DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection I want to refer to two documents,
Numbers Seyss-Inquart-51 and 52, on Pages 117 and 119 respectively. We
have now reached Document Book Number 2. The first is a speech by the
defendant as Minister, addressed to his police officials, and the second
speech is a radio talk which he gave at Linz.
We now come to the critical days in March. Were you informed of the
plebiscite plan of Schuschnigg, and by whom?
SEYSS-INQUART: The day before Dr. Schuschnigg announced in Innsbruck the
plan for the plebiscite he called me in and informed me of his plan. I
asked him at that time whether the decision was unalterable, and he
affirmed that. I expressed my concern that this might lead to
difficulties; but I promised him that I would help him wherever I could,
either to make the best of this plebiscite or to bring about a suitable
outcome—suitable, that is to say, even for the National Socialists. Of
course, I had continual contact with the Austrian National Socialists,
since I was the liaison man. I spoke at several meetings—Zernatto and
Dr. Schuschnigg were informed of that—and recounted what I had
discussed with Adolf Hitler or what I had proposed to him. I avoided all
possibilities of demonstrations, and as Minister of the Interior also
banned such demonstrations. In that connection may I refer to the
general ban on public meetings, imposed by me among others, and to the
specific prohibition of a demonstration at Graz, evident from the
interrogatory of the witness Uiberreither.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did Schuschnigg give you any promises?
SEYSS-INQUART: No. I want to say that on the same evening I was also
approached by Dr. Jury who in some way had already heard of the plan for
the plebiscite. I did not tell him that I had given my assent to Dr.
Schuschnigg, though on account of my function as liaison man as laid
down in the agreement of 12 February, I should not have allowed silence
to be imposed on me; yet, I did keep silent.
DR. STEINBAUER: I think, Mr. President, this might be a suitable moment
for the recess.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. We will break off now.
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. STEINBAUER: We got as far as the plebiscite which Schuschnigg had
planned and which then became known. We come now to 11 March. What did
you do in the forenoon on that day?
SEYSS-INQUART: I must say first that a day or two before, after
consultation with Austrian National Socialists, I wrote a letter to Dr.
Schuschnigg in which I commented on the plebiscite in an unfavorable
way. The reasons were primarily that a real plebiscite result was not
guaranteed, because it was not a proper plebiscite within the meaning of
the national laws. For example, the plebiscite was not decided on by the
Council of Ministers but by the Fatherland Front, that is, by the party;
and it was to have been carried out by that party.
It was suggested that the plebiscite be postponed and a proper election
with all its legal requisites be held. On the evening of 10 March, in
the presence of Foreign Minister Schmidt, I had another detailed
conversation with Dr. Schuschnigg; and we agreed that the Government—as
well as the provincial governments, and so forth—should include
National Socialists, that, in effect, a coalition government should be
formed; and in that case the National Socialists would also vote “yes.”
Only with reference to the license of the Party, the activities of the
Party, were there still differences of opinion. I reported this to the
Austrian National Socialists but they were not much interested, because
news had come from Berlin that Hitler had rejected the plebiscite. I was
told that on the next day I would receive a letter from Hitler.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you receive a letter?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. I received a letter from Hitler by courier. I am
almost certain that the letter also contained the draft of a telegram
for a march into Austria, but I cannot recall whether the draft of a
radio speech was also included in it.
DR. STEINBAUER: What did you do in the morning, after receiving this
letter?
SEYSS-INQUART: After receiving this letter I went with Minister Glaise
to Dr. Schuschnigg. We were at the Federal Chancellor’s office at 10
o’clock, and I informed Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg of the entire
contents of this letter without reservation. In particular, I pointed
out that in case of a refusal Adolf Hitler expected unrest among the
Austrian National Socialists and that he was ready, if disturbances
occurred, to answer an appeal for help by marching in. In other words, I
expressly called Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg’s attention to the
possibility of this development.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you ask for an answer from him?
SEYSS-INQUART: The letter set a deadline, 12 o’clock. As our talk lasted
until about 11:30, I asked Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg to give me an
answer by 2 o’clock. I know that in the meantime, and also on the
previous day, he had taken security measures through Dr. Skubl, of which
I had approved. A number of age groups of the Austrian Federal Army were
called up, the police everywhere received instructions, and a curfew was
imposed in the evening.
DR. STEINBAUER: What happened in the afternoon of 11 March?
SEYSS-INQUART: At 2 o’clock I went to the Federal Chancellor’s office
with Minister Glaise. We had a talk with Dr. Schuschnigg; he rejected a
postponement. At that moment I was called to the telephone; Field
Marshal Göring was on the phone, and the conversation between us is
reproduced here under the Exhibit Number USA-76, Document Number
2949-PS.
And then followed demands and concessions. When I told Field Marshal
Göring that Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg rejected the postponement, he
declared, in the name of the Reich, that he had to ask for Schuschnigg’s
resignation, because he had broken the agreement of 12 February and the
Reich had no confidence in him. Dr. Schuschnigg was then ready to
adjourn, but not to resign. Thereupon Field Marshal Göring demanded not
only Schuschnigg’s resignation, but my appointment as Federal
Chancellor. During a conference with Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg at
3:30 in the afternoon, the Chancellor said that he would hand to the
Federal President the resignation of the whole Cabinet. When I was
informed of this, I left the Federal Chancellor’s office, because I
considered my function as a middleman concluded in the meaning of the
agreement of 12 February; and I did not want in any way to advocate or
promote my own appointment as Federal Chancellor.
DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection may I refer to my Exhibit Number
Seyss-Inquart-58, Page 134 (Document Number 2949-PS). This is an excerpt
from the telephone conversations of Göring; Göring is listening to
reports, and Seyss-Inquart is speaking of the relationship between
Germany and Austria. It says here: “Yes, he means that Austrian
independence will be preserved....”
Now, that was on 11 March, in the late afternoon?
SEYSS-INQUART: In these telephone conversations it was also suggested
that the Party formation, the emigrant Legion, should come to Austria.
From the same telephone conversation it is obvious that I opposed this
and wanted rather an election or a plebiscite held before the entry of
any formation into Austria.
In the course of that afternoon State Secretary Keppler came to Vienna
and requested information from me. And so I again went to the Federal
Chancellor’s office. Berlin repeatedly asked me to intervene with the
Federal President in order to effect my own appointment as Federal
Chancellor. I always refused to do that.
DR. STEINBAUER: And what did the Austrian NSDAP do at that time?
SEYSS-INQUART: The Party in Austria began demonstrations. Party members
left their houses, filled the streets, and as Party members or
sympathizers took part in a demonstration against the system and for the
National Socialists, a demonstration which assumed enormous proportions.
DR. STEINBAUER: What was the feeling in the Federal provinces?
SEYSS-INQUART: I had no contact with the Federal provinces but learned
quite late during that night or on the next day that there, even on a
larger scale than in Vienna, big demonstrations of very large crowds had
taken place against the Fatherland Front and for the National
Socialists.
DR. STEINBAUER: What attempts did Federal President Miklas make to solve
this situation?
SEYSS-INQUART: I cannot say anything about that from my own observation,
for until 8 o’clock in the evening no one at all approached me on these
matters. No one spoke to me about the Federal Chancellorship; no other
possibility of a solution was discussed with me. I heard that the
Federal President wanted to make Dr. Ender, of Vorarlberg, Chancellor
and me Vice Chancellor. I believe that suggestion would have been
completely practicable. But I could not discuss it—least of all with
Berlin—because no one had said anything to me about it.
DR. STEINBAUER: And when events reached a climax and Schuschnigg offered
his resignation, did you compile a Cabinet list?
SEYSS-INQUART: In the course of the evening it became clear that Federal
Chancellor Schuschnigg would resign and that the Reich would not
tolerate any other than a National Socialist Government. Therefore, in
order to avoid being taken by surprise, I considered it my task to study
whom I should take into a Cabinet. The suggestions mentioned in the
telephone conversations were not transmitted by me at all. I chose my
colleagues quite independently—naturally after consultations with
Austrian National Socialists—and they included also people with strong
Catholic ties, such as Professor Mengin, Dr. Wolf, and others.
I asked Foreign Minister Schmidt to enter the Cabinet. He asked me for a
reason, and I told him: I want to keep Austria autonomous and
independent, and I need a foreign minister who has connections with the
Western Powers. Schmidt refused, remarking that Federal Chancellor
Schuschnigg had introduced him into polities and that he would remain
loyal to him.
DR. STEINBAUER: I should like to submit some documents now: Document
Number Seyss-Inquart-50, Page 115, from Zernatto’s book on
Seyss-Inquart’s position; then, on Page 125, Document Number
Seyss-Inquart-54, also from Zernatto’s book, where it says:
“...he”—Seyss-Inquart—“no longer has developments in his hands.”
Then Document Number Seyss-Inquart-62, Page 149, in which Zernatto
quotes from a conversation with Dr. Seyss-Inquart:
“He says that there are two main points on which he will not
compromise. The first is Austria’s independence and the second,
the possibility for the conservative Catholic element to develop
its own life.”
[_Turning to the defendant._] Now we come to a very important question.
You then made a radio speech in which you called yourself a Minister,
although Schuschnigg had already resigned.
SEYSS-INQUART: The situation was as follows: The resignation of the
whole Cabinet was not accepted by the Federal President; and we,
including myself, remained Ministers. When Dr. Schuschnigg made his
farewell speech, he did not speak of the resignation of the whole
Cabinet. He only said, “We yield to force.” Dr. Schuschnigg and Federal
President Miklas had agreed at that time that I would not actually be
appointed Federal Chancellor, but that with the entry of German troops
executive power should be passed to me. Therefore, in my opinion, I was
_de facto_ Minister of the Interior and Foreign Minister.
DR. STEINBAUER: The Prosecution assert that you yourself exerted
pressure on Federal President Miklas to appoint you Chancellor.
SEYSS-INQUART: I did not see Federal President Miklas at all until 9 or
10 o’clock in the evening, after Schuschnigg’s speech “We yield to
force.”
DR. STEINBAUER: I should like to submit to the Court this speech of
Chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg of 11 March under Document Number
Seyss-Inquart-53, Page 122; in it he says:
“The Federal President has commissioned me to inform the
Austrian people that we are yielding to force. Since we are at
all costs determined not to spill German blood, even in this
grave hour, we have given orders to our Armed Forces to withdraw
without resistance, if the invasion of Austria is carried out,
and to await the decision within the next hours.”
The Prosecution, Witness, sees evidence of this pressure also in the
fact that SS units were called to the Federal Chancellor’s office at
that time. What can you say to that?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe it was after Schuschnigg’s farewell speech,
when I saw in the anterooms 10 or 15 young men in black trousers and
white shirts, that was the SS. I had the impression that they were doing
messenger and orderly duty for State Secretary Keppler and the others.
As they approached the rooms in which Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg and
President Miklas were, I ordered guards of the Austrian Guard Battalion
to be placed at their doors. I may mention that these were selected men
of the Austrian Army who according to Austrian standards were very well
armed, while these SS men—40 at most—possibly carried pistols.
Moreover, 50 steps from the Federal Chancellor’s office were the
barracks of the Guard Battalion, with a few hundred picked and
well-armed men. If Federal President Miklas and Federal Chancellor
Schuschnigg had not been concerned with things other than those which
happened in the Federal Chancellor’s office and on the street outside
it, they could easily have put an end to this situation by calling out
the Guard Battalion.
DR. STEINBAUER: The Prosecution has submitted an affidavit of the
Gauleiter of Upper Austria, Eigruber, which states that even before you
became a Federal Chancellor, you ordered the seizure of power in the
various Austrian Federal provinces.
SEYSS-INQUART: That is completely incorrect, and the Gauleiter of Upper
Austria also does not claim to have talked to me. I believe he says that
he had received a telegram signed by me. I did not send a telegram, and
I did not give oral instructions to any Gauleiter or to anyone else for
the seizure of power.
Later I heard from Globocznik that he had carried out the seizure of
power. He told me of that in these words: “You know, I seized power for
you and acted as the government; but I did not tell you anything about
it, because you would have been against it.”
DR. STEINBAUER: You say you would have been against it. Was the
population against it, too, against the marching in, which had meanwhile
taken place, that is, the invasion as described by the Defendant Göring?
SEYSS-INQUART: One cannot call it an invasion; it was a stormy, loudly
cheered entry of German troops. There were no villages—even those with
an orthodox Catholic population—and no workers’ districts which did not
burst out in stormy jubilation. Moreover, both Dr. Schuschnigg and I
were completely clear about this; once in 1937 he had agreed with me
when I said that the entry of German troops into Austria could not be
impeded by anything but the ovations of the population.
DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection I should like to refer to a Document
Number Seyss-Inquart-37, Page 86. This is a quotation from the book by
Sumner Welles, _The Time for Decision_, describing a conversation
between him and the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, and it says:
“Before the occupation of Austria, Dr. Schuschnigg came to Rome.
He admitted to me frankly that, if Germany occupied Austria, the
majority of Austrians would support the occupation and, if Italy
sent troops into Austria to prevent the occupation, the
Austrians as one man would join with the Germans to fight
Italy.”
Now, Witness, we come to the next day, to 12 March. Did you not at that
time have a telephone conversation with Hitler?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes; I called the Führer in connection with the entry of
troops. I should like to repeat and explain that on the day before, at
about 7 o’clock, the negotiations suddenly came to a stop. Everybody
waited. At half past 7 State Secretary Skubl came with the news that the
entry of German troops had actually begun, according to a report from
one of the frontier posts; indeed Field Marshal Göring had repeatedly
said that it would take place. Thinking that the entry was actually in
progress, Schuschnigg then made his farewell speech. And with that the
government of the Fatherland Front had resigned from office. And I state
expressly, up to this moment I did nothing which in any way furthered
the taking over of control in Austria or to express it more correctly,
which intentionally furthered the establishment of the National
Socialists and the seizure of power. I only acted as an intermediary
within the meaning of the Treaty of 12 February. But from the moment
when the system of the Fatherland Front came to an end, I considered it
my responsibility to take action. First I made a radio speech, but not
the one which had been prescribed for me in the morning. For I did not
speak of a provisional government, but referred to myself as Minister of
the Interior. Only then did I call on the SA and the SS to act as
auxiliary police; and like Schuschnigg, I gave the order to offer no
resistance to the entry of German troops. Subsequently I was appointed
Federal Chancellor, and my Cabinet was approved. On the same night I
drove Dr. Schuschnigg home in my car, because I was afraid something
might happen to him at the hands of provocateurs; and I asked Dr.
Keppler to call up the Führer and ask him not to give the order for the
entry of troops. Reich Marshal Göring spoke about that here. In the
morning I called up again; then I met the Führer at the airport in Linz,
and, as the entry of the troops was in full progress, I asked him
whether it would not be possible to have Austrian troops march into the
German Reich, so that, symbolically at least, equal rights would be
maintained. The Führer agreed; and Austrian troops actually marched into
Munich, Berlin, and other cities, in Austrian uniform.
DR. STEINBAUER: How, in your capacity as newly appointed Federal
Chancellor, did you envisage the further development of the situation?
SEYSS-INQUART: Since the system of the Fatherland Front had broken down,
I could no longer entertain my idea of a coalition government. It was
clear to me that a National Socialist government with a very strong
Catholic tendency would control developments not in the form of an
immediate Anschluss but rather—by carrying out appropriate elections
and a plebiscite—in the form of an economic and possibly a military
union with the German Reich.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, in this connection, I should like to
submit an extremely important document, which shows in an entirely new
way how the Anschluss Law came about. It is a sworn statement of the
former State Secretary of the Interior, Dr. Stuckart, who is imprisoned
here. I submit it to the Court and should like to establish the
following from this testimony...
THE PRESIDENT: Where is the document?
DR. STEINBAUER: It is not in the document book because I received it
later. The translation of it has not yet been completed. I will read
from the witness’ testimony only briefly to establish the connection—I
have submitted the original to the Court...
THE PRESIDENT: You are giving it a number, are you?
DR. STEINBAUER: Document Number Seyss-Inquart-92. The witness says in it
that Hitler would probably have incorporated the presidency of Austria
in his own person, that he, the witness, was told by Frick to draft a
law to that effect, but that he was then suddenly ordered to Linz...
THE PRESIDENT: Wait just a minute, Dr. Steinbauer.
DR. STEINBAUER: In the Dutch matter also, there are a few affidavits
which have not yet arrived or which have just come in. Perhaps it would
be more expedient to submit these documents when they have been
translated.
THE PRESIDENT: The Prosecution will have the affidavit, I suppose?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, the Prosecution already have the affidavits.
If I may continue, he says that to his surprise he was told by Hitler in
Linz to draft a law providing for the direct, total Anschluss, that is,
providing for Austria’s status as a province, a Land, of the German
Reich, like Bavaria and the other German Länder. He worked out this law,
as he had been instructed to do, flew to Vienna, and submitted it for
approval to the ministers who were assembled there.
I should like to establish in three documents the impression which the
Anschluss made on the population. First, Document Number
Seyss-Inquart-30. This is the celebration at which the Viennese welcomed
the Führer in the biggest square in Vienna, the Heldenplatz. On that
occasion, on 15 March, the witness welcomed the Führer and said:
“The goal for which centuries of German history have battled,
for which untold millions of the best Germans have bled and
died, which has been the final aim of fierce struggle, the last
consolation in the bitterest hours—has today been reached.
Austria has come home.”
Hitler now ordered that this Anschluss Law subsequently be sanctioned by
a plebiscite of the Austrian population. Documents showing the results
of this plebiscite have already been submitted to the Court. I should
just like to point out, in addition, the attitude of the Catholic
bishops toward the plebiscite—that is Document Number Seyss-Inquart-32,
Page 73—and the attitude at that time of the present Federal President,
Dr. Karl Renner—that is Document Number Seyss-Inquart-33, Page 76. On
the attitude of the other powers to the Anschluss question I shall quote
from testimony of the witness Schmidt, who as the then Foreign Minister
was the qualified man; but I should like to submit one document on it,
namely Document Number Seyss-Inquart-38, Page 89. That is the House of
Commons speech of Chamberlain, who was Prime Minister at the time. In
reply to a question regarding the Anschluss he said: “...nothing could
have stopped this action by Germany unless we and others had been ready
to use force to prevent it.”
[_Turning to the defendant._] Now Austria has been incorporated, it is a
part of the Greater German Reich, with Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor. Did
you remain Federal Chancellor or did you receive another state function
after the seizure of power?
SEYSS-INQUART: On the 13th during the night, I reported on the Anschluss
Law to the Führer; and I took the opportunity of discussing three
questions with him immediately. That was, however, not at all easy, for
the Führer was deeply moved and wept.
First, I asked that the Austrian Party might retain relative
independence and be headed by an Austrian as the provincial leader;
second, that Austria as a state might also enjoy a certain degree of
independence. To the first request the Führer said, “Possibly”; to the
second he said, “Yes”; Austria would receive her own governor, a
Reichsstatthalter. I then rose and asked the Führer that I be allowed to
return to my private practice as a lawyer. As a third request, I asked
that the unjust exchange rate of 2 schillings to 1 mark be altered to
1.50. The Führer agreed to that also.
On 15 March, on the occasion of the celebration which has already been
mentioned here, the Führer told the radio announcer, “Announce that
Reichsstatthalter Seyss-Inquart will now speak.” That to me was actually
the first news of my appointment as Reichsstatthalter. I held that post
until the end of April 1939.
DR. STEINBAUER: Who really directed policy in Austria after the
Anschluss?
SEYSS-INQUART: Bürckel was sent to Austria immediately with the task of
reorganizing the Party and preparing the plebiscite. The interference of
Bürckel and his collaborators, and various plans somewhat strange and
adverse to Austrian conceptions, caused me, on 8 April, in Bürckel’s
presence, to call the Führer’s attention to this sort of co-ordination
and in my hearing the Führer said to Bürckel: “Bürckel, you must not do
that, otherwise the enthusiasm of the Austrians for the Anschluss will
change to dissatisfaction with the Reich.”
Nevertheless, a few weeks later he made Bürckel Reich Commissioner for
the Reunion. He controlled the Party and politics and propaganda,
including church policy, and he had the right to give me instructions in
state matters.
DR. STEINBAUER: You know that the Prosecution make charges against you
in connection with the policy in Austria shortly after the Anschluss.
The first charge is with regard to the Jewish question, namely, that you
participated in this grievous treatment of the Jewish population, or
that you were responsible for it.
What can you say to that?
SEYSS-INQUART: I cannot at all deny it; for certainly, as chief of the
civil administration, I issued orders along that line in my field of
authority, though Bürckel claimed that the Jewish question, as such was
part of his field; and in a document which has been submitted here, he
called the Jewish question a matter arising as a consequence of the
Anschluss.
DR. STEINBAUER: May I, in this connection, refer to two documents. One
is Document Number Seyss-Inquart-64, a decree on Page 154. It is the
decree of the Führer on the appointment of Bürckel as Reich Commissioner
for the Reunion of Austria with the Reich. I emphasize here especially
Article 4, which gives Bürckel the detailed authority to issue orders to
the witness. The second document is Exhibit Number Seyss-lnquart-67,
Page 163; the Court already has it; it is Document Number 2237-PS. With
this long document, I only want to demonstrate that the entire solution
of the Jewish problem, particularly in November 1938, was a matter with
which the defendant had nothing to do.
The defendant’s own attitude I should like to show by submitting an
affidavit which came to me unsolicited from Australia. This is Document
Number Seyss-Inquart-70, Page 175. I am fully aware of the Tribunal’s
view that it is not very weighty evidence that some defendants have
submitted letters from Jews; “One swallow does not make a summer,” as
the proverb says. The reason for my submitting this document is
Paragraph 12 on Page 4, in which the witness, Dr. Walter Stricker, who
comes from a highly respected Jewish family in Linz, says the following:
“After my departure from Austria, I heard of other cases in
which Dr. Seyss gave similar help to Jews and that in May 1938,
when persecutions of Jews became particularly severe, he
protested to the Gauleiter Bürckel.”
It is therefore quite clear that the defendant did not participate but
rejected this radical policy.
Witness, you know from the trial brief that you are charged with having
played a double game. What was the attitude of the Party toward you
after the Anschluss?
SEYSS-INQUART: I know that this charge is made against me and has been
made against me before. Radical circles of the Party made the same
accusation against me, and I will admit openly that I can understand why
it was made. I attempted to bring together two groups which, as history
has shown, simply could not be brought together; and since this could
not be anticipated at the time, the radical elements of both groups must
have come to the conclusion that the man who attempted it was not honest
in his attempt. But more important is something else. The final solution
of the Austrian question was not my solution at all, but the solution of
the radical elements in the Party. I myself, however, from 11 March at 8
o’clock in the evening, participated in that solution. As a result, it
is easy for people to say that I participated in it beforehand and
prepared for it; but that is not true. Only at 8 o’clock in the evening,
after Schuschnigg and the Fatherland Government had resigned, did I too
adopt this point of view, because under the given political conditions
there was no other possibility. For there was no political power in
Austria other than that of the National Socialists; the alternative was
civil war.
I myself welcomed the Anschluss Law, and my decision also determined
that of my colleagues. On 13 March, of course, I welcomed the opportune
moment. At most, there might have been some sort of hesitation as to
whether the Anschluss should actually then be carried through. I
considered that, but as I saw it, there was no need for misgivings from
the foreign political point of view, because, according to all reports,
everything would pass quietly. Domestically, there had never been so
much enthusiasm in Austria. I felt that no Austrian statesman, no man in
a position of responsibility, ever had the whole population behind him
as much as I. But the Anschluss Law was valuable and useful, insofar as
in any case the Reich would in reality have had the authority, and thus
it was certainly better it had full responsibility outwardly too.
DR. STEINBAUER: The Defendant Kaltenbrunner told me that he and you were
at this time very closely shadowed by Heydrich. Is that correct?
SEYSS-INQUART: Heydrich in particular was among those who distrusted us,
and “us” includes Kaltenbrunner. At the end of 1937 Heydrich wrote a
secret report, which I later received. In this report he said that the
solution of the Austrian question in favor of the Party was inescapable,
that the policy of State Councillor Seyss-Inquart might, however, prove
to be the only obstacle, for he would be in a position to produce
something like Austrian National Socialism. After the Anschluss a
so-called “escort” detail was attached to me with the sole task of
sending to Heydrich constant reports on what I was doing. I had as
little objection to this as to the fact that, as Austrian Minister of
Security, my telephone conversations were intercepted.
DR. STEINBAUER: After you had allegedly played the main role in this
affair, what reward did you receive for your activity? Were you given an
estate or a gratuity of several hundred thousand marks? Did you ever
receive anything like that?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, and there was no question of anything like that. My
reward was the knowledge of having worked for the formation of Greater
Germany.
DR. STEINBAUER: I would still like to ask you: Did you ever receive
anything?
SEYSS-INQUART: No. On my fiftieth birthday...
DR. STEINBAUER: But you received a title, did you not?
SEYSS-INQUART: Do you mean the title of Gruppenführer of the SS? On 15
March I was named Gruppenführer of the SS, as an honorary rank. I must
add that I did not try to obtain it and that I went through no
examinations or other such things. As a rule an honorary rank in the SS
does not entail membership in the general SS; it does not bestow on the
holder either command or disciplinary powers. I myself learned that when
I complained to Himmler about Bürckel and demanded proceedings—that
letter has been submitted here. Himmler told me then that he had no
disciplinary powers over Bürckel, who held only an honorary rank. I
myself, as regards the SS...
DR. STEINBAUER: I think that is sufficient.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, as I understood it, the defendant said
that he received a secondary post to furnish reports to Heydrich. What
was that secondary post? Is that what you said?
SEYSS-INQUART: Heydrich wrote a secret report against me. No, I am
sorry, Heydrich sent an “escort” detail...
THE PRESIDENT: You said in 1937 Heydrich issued a secret report about
Austria, and then said that the solution was unavoidable except for the
policy of Seyss-Inquart. That was the substance of it, was it not?
SEYSS-INQUART: I did not quite understand that.
THE PRESIDENT: And after that, I understood you to say you received a
secondary post to furnish reports to Heydrich.
SEYSS-INQUART: No, Heydrich sent four or five of his men to accompany me
as a kind of guard escort, and these men had orders to report my
movements to him.
THE PRESIDENT: I see; I must have misunderstood the translation.
DR. STEINBAUER: To sum up, I can say that apart from your appointment as
SS Gruppenführer you received no awards, with the exception of a promise
that you would become Reich Minister within a year? Is that correct?
SEYSS-INQUART: This promise was given at the end of April 1938. I refer
to a question in the cross-examination of the Reich Marshal. Before 13
March 1938 I did not receive the slightest promise from the Reich on
anything and was not in any way under obligation to anyone or bound to
obey anyone in the Reich.
DR. STEINBAUER: And with that I can close the chapter on Austria and
briefly discuss the Czechoslovakian question.
You are accused, on the basis of a congratulatory letter sent to the
Führer by Henlein, of having taken an active part in the annexation of
Czechoslovakia.
SEYSS-INQUART: In the affairs of September 1938 I had no other part at
all than that of receiving, as Reichsstatthalter in Austria, the
refugees from the border areas, lodging, and caring for them in Austria.
Henlein, and a few other leaders, I knew personally but did not
interfere in their politics and was not well acquainted with their
relations to the Reich.
DR. STEINBAUER: What can you say about Slovakia?
SEYSS-INQUART: The relations between Vienna and Bratislava were very
good even at the time of the old Austrian Monarchy. I myself had
relatives in Bratislava. Hence the Slovaks and the Germans knew each
other well. We knew in particular the complaint of the Slovaks that the
promise of Pittsburgh had not been kept, that they had not received full
autonomy of Slovakia. Father Hlinka was in favor of complete autonomy;
he was venerated in Slovakia as a saint, and at least three-quarters of
the Slovakian people were behind him; he advocated independence from the
Parliament in Prague and the adoption of Slovakian as the official
language. After March 1938—to be exact, after September 1938—I met a
few Slovakian politicians, Sidor, Dr. Tiso, Dr. Churchansky, and perhaps
one or two others. The Führer himself once asked me to inform him and to
send him a report on Slovakian conditions; and I commissioned two of my
colleagues, who had very good personal connections in Slovakia, to
obtain the desired information. In March 1939 I talked to Sidor and Dr.
Tiso, because they wanted to confer with me on possible Berlin-Prague
developments and their consequences for Slovakia; at least, so I was
told by my colleagues who had invited me. Mention was made in these
discussions of the possibility of a Berlin-Prague clash and of the
concern for the integrity of Slovakia, because there was the danger that
the Hungarians, and the Poles too, might take advantage of the occasion
by occupying Slovakian territory. The Slovakian gentlemen wanted
assurances on what Berlin intended to do and what they could do to
preserve the integrity of their country. I spoke very openly with these
gentlemen; but I did not ask them to declare their independence, for
they themselves had to make that decision. We discussed rather the
question of whether differences between Slovakian and German interests
existed, and we established that they did not exist.
DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection I should like to refer to two
documents. One is Document Number Seyss-Inquart-71, Page 181. This is
the reference to the Pittsburgh Treaty. The second document is Exhibit
Number Seyss-Inquart-72 (Document Number D-751), Page 183, submitted by
the Prosecution as Exhibit Number USA-112, as proof that the defendant
was in unlawful contact with the Slovakians.
You are, of course, acquainted with this document, Witness. It is a
report of Viscount Halifax, of 21 March 1939. Who was in Bratislava with
you at that time? Or were you there at all?
SEYSS-INQUART: State Secretary Keppler was at that time sent from Berlin
to Vienna with the task of putting certain questions to the Slovakian
Government. Both Bürckel and I had refused to take over such an
assignment; that was one of the few instances in which I agreed with
Bürckel. As chief of territorial administration it fell to me to make
preparations for the visit to Bratislava, and it was agreed that State
Secretary Keppler would go to Bratislava in my car. Bürckel and I
accompanied Keppler. No generals or other representatives of the
Wehrmacht were present. The record of the conversations may be
considered accurate.
DR. STEINBAUER: It says in the document “and five German generals.”
SEYSS-INQUART: That is wrong.
I should like to call the Court’s attention to the fact that both the
Slovakian Minister Sidor and Monsignor Tiso, who later became President,
declare in this document that they negotiated only with Bürckel; the
name Seyss-Inquart does not appear at all.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then, to sum up, can I say that you did not engage in
the activity with which the Prosecution charge you in connection with
Czechoslovakia or Slovakia? Is that correct?
SEYSS-INQUART: At any rate, I do not think that, in pursuing the
interests of the Reich, I overstepped those limits which in such
negotiations must be conceded to someone charged with representing
legitimate interests. I did not participate when on 12 March Dr. Tiso
through Bürckel—I did not overstep the limits justified in representing
legitimate interests of the German Reich.
DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you, that is sufficient.
Then in 1939, on 1 May 1939, you became Minister without Portfolio. Is
that correct?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you ever take part in a Cabinet session, or a
session of the Secret Defense Council?
SEYSS-INQUART: It no longer existed.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you have influence in any way on the decision to
make war on Poland?
SEYSS-INQUART: In no way whatever.
DR. STEINBAUER: When the war with Poland had actually begun, did you
express your opinion on it to Hitler?
SEYSS-INQUART: In the second week of September I wrote a letter to
Hitler. I hope that this letter too is among my Vienna files. I read a
copy of it about a year and a half ago, and I remember the contents
well. I called Hitler’s attention to the fact that among the German
people there was no enthusiasm at all; but, on the contrary, the gravest
concern that it would be a life-and-death struggle. I expressed my
opinion that the war would not end by a military solution but would have
to be solved politically and that the basis for such a political
solution would be the alliance with the Soviets, which should perhaps be
extended to a military alliance. Consideration should be given to the
fact that the Soviets, like Czarist Russia, would never abandon their
interests in the Balkans and that Pan-Slavism would also play a role;
consequently, Russia would have to be reckoned with in the
Czechoslovakian and Polish questions. I said that it was necessary at
all costs to maintain the belt of neutral states. Then the war on the
narrow Western Front would run its course. The Italian policy, however,
should not become a burden for Germany; but an agreement should be
reached with Greece and Turkey. England could not be defeated through
the air or by U-boats; one had to attack her position in the
Mediterranean to force her to make peace.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you receive an answer to this letter from the
Führer?
SEYSS-INQUART: I received no direct answer, but once in a conversation
he made a remark which showed clearly that he had read the letter. He
said to me, “I do not want to destroy the British Empire at all,”
whereby, however, he implied that he had misunderstood my letter.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, if the Tribunal agree, I think this would
be a suitable time to adjourn.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
DR. STEINBAUER: We last spoke about your attitude with regard to the
question of Czechoslovakia. You talked about your position as Reich
Governor in Vienna, and described your intolerable relations with
Bürckel, which was the reason why you changed your work and went to
Poland. What were your functions in Poland?
SEYSS-INQUART: First of all, I was appointed administrative chief for
Southern Poland, which position actually came within the organization of
the Armed Forces. This administrative post, however, was never set up,
since the Government General was created forthwith and I became the
Deputy of the Governor General. My sphere of influence was legally
defined but depended, of course, upon the different cases in which the
Governor General needed me as his deputy. On 19 January 1940, he
determined this at a conference.
DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection I should like to refer to Document
Seyss-Inquart-73, on Page 185, which is an extract from Dr. Frank’s
diary. On Page 14 of this diary he describes the functions of
Seyss-Inquart, and then on Page 30 he says something which he repeated
to me in person, namely, that he bore the responsibility for what
happened there.
Now, you became the deputy of the Governor General—although by rank as
a Reich Minister you were actually placed higher—and you exercised
certain functions there which, as we have heard, consisted primarily of
making out reports. Under Document Number 2278-PS is a report which you
yourself wrote, in which there are certain things for which you are
accused. Will you please tell us what you have to say about this report
on your official travels.
SEYSS-INQUART: My secretary wrote that report. I have read it, of
course.
DR. STEINBAUER: It is Exhibit USA-706.
SEYSS-INQUART: It is brought against me, among other things, that the
Governor of Lublin had suggested that the Jews be transferred from
Lublin to the district of Cycow and then decimated. The Prosecution
itself has stated that this is an insertion made by the writer. In any
case this was not an official report at a meeting.
Cycow itself was a settlement occupied by a group of Germans, and by
employing Jews in that area I could hardly be suspected of wanting to
exterminate the Jews in that district because of the climatic
conditions. I knew, however, that it was the Governor’s wish to have the
very large Jewish population of Lublin removed from the town. I remember
nothing of any specific intention expressed by the word “decimating”—in
the sense of annihilating. The Governor of Radom reported to me that
desperate criminals there had been shot. It is true, he did tell me
that. I was under the impression that this had been done by the summary
courts martial, which still functioned at the time. But there are
several passages in this same report where I always point out that
German courts must be introduced, and that no sentence must be carried
out without proper court procedure. I think that quite probably I said
the same thing at the time I was at Radom—only this is not mentioned in
the report.