such as salt, _et cetera_. That was quite natural, considering the
economic chaos in which we found Poland. We had to arrive at a “natural”
economic system, and supply the agricultural population with certain
products so that they in turn could supply food to the Polish town
populations. In this connection I wish to point out that I urged the
re-establishment of the Polish National Relief Organization under the
former Polish management, and that I asked for 9 million zloty to be
placed at its disposal also for motor vehicles, _et cetera_. In addition
to this I said that compulsory work must be replaced by normal
employment as soon as possible.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, the so-called “AB Action” plays a considerable
part in the Polish question. It is an abbreviation for “extraordinary
pacification action.” Since that might still have happened in your time,
I should like to ask if you know anything about it.
SEYSS-INQUART: This affair took place during the very last period of my
stay in Poland. With the beginning of the Norwegian campaign the
resistance movement in Poland became extremely active, and grew as a
result of the campaign in the West. The Security Police demanded the
severest countermeasures. Bühler really made the objection which he
stated here on this witness stand. I always understood the Governor
General’s words just as Bühler wanted them to be understood. But Bühler
was quite right in making the objection, because the Police might have
interpreted these words as giving them much greater powers than the
Governor General intended to give them.
Dr. Frank always opposed the sentences passed by these summary courts
martial, and he set up his own investigation commission. I was the
chairman of this commission as long as I was in Poland, and sometimes we
canceled as many as 50 percent of the sentences imposed.
DR. STEINBAUER: How long were you actually Deputy during your period of
office, when Dr. Frank was prevented from carrying out his duties?
SEYSS-INQUART: Ten days, I believe.
DR. STEINBAUER: Ten days. Well, then, I think I can rapidly wind up the
Polish question by asking: Did you introduce any measures which could
really be said to be in the interests of the Polish population?
SEYSS-INQUART: During the winter of 1939-40 there was a famine in Polish
towns. I myself intervened with State Secretary Backe, and on one
occasion, for instance, I obtained 6,000 tons of grain for the large
cities. I approached Reich Marshal Göring and the Führer too, and asked
for the town of Lodz to be left under the administration of the
Government General. I did the same for the coal district west of Kraków.
DR. STEINBAUER: I now come to the main part of the accusation held
against you, and that is the question of your activities in the
Netherlands.
My first question is this: How did you become Reich Commissioner for the
Netherlands?
SEYSS-INQUART: The Führer appointed me.
DR. STEINBAUER: And where were you at the time?
SEYSS-INQUART: I was on a service mission in the Government General, and
Dr. Lammers called me to headquarters.
DR. STEINBAUER: So you did not apply for this job?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, that did not even enter my mind. At that time I had
just asked the Führer for permission to join the Armed Forces.
DR. STEINBAUER: But did not your war injury prevent your joining the
Armed Forces?
SEYSS-INQUART: I had hoped that I might be useful somehow or other.
DR. STEINBAUER: And what were the instructions the Führer gave you with
regard to your new position?
SEYSS-INQUART: The instructions are described in Document 997-PS, which
was submitted by the Prosecution. That gives a fair picture of them.
DR. STEINBAUER: That is Exhibit RF-122.
SEYSS-INQUART: I was responsible for the civil administration, and,
within this administrative task, I had to look after the interests of
the Reich. Apart from this I had a political task. I was to see to it
that while Dutch independence was maintained, the Netherlands should be
persuaded to change their pro-British attitude for a pro-German one and
enter into a close economic collaboration.
I wish to draw your attention to Paragraph 3 of this document, in which
I pointed out the difficulties connected with these two tasks, and the
difficulties in co-ordinating them. I showed that one cannot co-ordinate
the two so easily. An occupational power, I said, demands the
suppression of all official activities and an awakening of a common
political will, but grants such freedom which in the end may lead the
Dutch to feel dependent on their own decisions. It was not my intention,
therefore, to force upon the Dutch people any definite political will.
DR. STEINBAUER: Was this order of the Führer ever altered later on?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, this order was never altered.
DR. STEINBAUER: How did you carry out this task from the political point
of view? Did you ask the existing parties in Holland to co-operate?
SEYSS-INQUART: With the exception of the Marxists I allowed all parties
to remain, and I gave them as much freedom to continue their activities
as was compatible with the interests of the occupying forces. I
particularly helped the National Socialist parties.
DR. STEINBAUER: The Prosecution make the accusation against you that in
your speeches you often describe things quite differently from the way
in which you carry them out. In this regard I refer to Document 3430-PS,
Exhibit USA-708.
It is asserted there that you tried to force National Socialism upon the
Dutch. That is Exhibit Seyss-Inquart-76, on Page 197 of my document
book.
SEYSS-INQUART: It is certainly correct that the goal which I had set for
myself, and which I proclaimed in my speeches, was not reached in
practice, nor could it have been. However, it may be possible that it
gave the Dutch the impression that I was trying to force National
Socialism upon them because, after all, later on I could admit only
National Socialist parties, whereas I had to dissolve the others. I
never used state methods of coercion to force any Dutchman to become a
National Socialist, nor did I make membership in the National Socialist
Party a condition for exercising the general rights and privileges to
which every Dutchman was entitled.
Incidentally, I referred to this quite clearly in my speech. I said:
“I shall always act as a National Socialist.... But that does
not mean that I shall force National Socialism on one single
person. National Socialism is a matter of inner conviction.
“There are two groups of organizations. There is the political,
in the case of which I attach importance to the demand that each
and every member be led to National Socialism—but these are
absolutely voluntary organizations.... Then there is the
vocational.... in which it is immaterial what political views
the individual has, as long as he fulfills his duties in his
particular profession.”
DR. STEINBAUER: Why and when did you dissolve the political parties in
Holland?
SEYSS-INQUART: That happened during the second half of 1941. With the
beginning of the Eastern campaign all the political parties, with the
exception of the National Socialists, adopted an actively hostile
attitude toward the occupational forces. In the interests of the
occupational forces that could no longer be tolerated.
I think it remarkable, to say the least, that for 1½ years I allowed
those parties to continue their work since, after all, they were no less
hostile to National Socialism than National Socialism is today with
regard to the democratic parties.
DR. STEINBAUER: Tell me, is it true or not that you showed partiality,
and gave preference to the NSB Party?
SEYSS-INQUART: That is quite true as far as the field of political
propaganda was concerned; it is untrue as far as state matters were
concerned.
The creation of a so-called National Political Secretariat has been held
up as an accusation against me. That was a National Socialist advisory
body for my administration, and it was not allowed to exercise any
influence on the Dutch administration. Any such attempts were strictly
prohibited by me.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you not, nevertheless, put individual members of the
NSB into state positions?
SEYSS-INQUART: That is true, and it seemed a matter of course to me,
because I had to find colleagues on whom I could rely. They were not
under Party orders, however; on the contrary, in most cases certain
differences developed between these people and the heads of the Party.
In the face of urgent remonstrances I did not create a National
Socialist government in the Netherlands—as was the case in Norway—and
chiefly because Certain Dutch gentlemen like General Secretary Van Damm,
President Van Lohn of the Supreme Court, and Professor Schneider who was
President of the Cultural Committee, urged me to realize how wrong it
would be to do so.
DR. STEINBAUER: President Vorrink, a witness who has been examined here,
talked about a policy of exploitation which you carried on. Is that
true?
SEYSS-INQUART: The use of the National Socialist parties for the benefit
of German policy did actually occur. I observed it, and I stated the
fact publicly. I regretted this occurrence, but I could not stop it. The
German occupational forces had to introduce a number of measures which
were oppressive for the Dutch people, and which discredited our Dutch
friends.
DR. STEINBAUER: What do you have to say to the accusation brought
against you that you had co-ordinated all the cultural institutions?
SEYSS-INQUART: Certainly this accusation is, so to speak, correct in
part. With the prohibition of the political parties, most of the
organizations of the free professions became impossible, since right
down to the chessplayers’ club everything in the Netherlands was
organized on a political basis. In the interests of the occupational
forces I had to create new supervisory bodies. Maybe it was due to lack
of imagination that these organizations were, in part at least, very
similar to their prototypes in the Reich. But I used these organizations
only for purposes of supervision, and never asked them to co-operate
politically. Not only did I refrain from making the exercise of a
profession dependent on co-operation, but I did not even insist upon
compulsory collection of membership fees.
I admit that we made two mistakes from two errors of judgment: First of
all, we had the mistaken impression that the order we imposed as
occupational authorities was necessarily the right one—at least the
better one; and secondly, that in an occupied country, an independent
political will can develop. It was there that our policy failed.
DR. STEINBAUER: What institution did you then set up?
SEYSS-INQUART: I created a cultural association (Kulturkammer), a
medical association (Ärztekammer), a chemists’ association
(Apothekerkammer), and a board of agriculture (Landstand). Then there
was a workers’ front, but that was a voluntary organization. Members
could leave it without any disadvantage to themselves whenever they
wished.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then another charge is brought against you, that of
“Germanization.” What do you say to that?
SEYSS-INQUART: First of all, I must get something quite clear. In
English, you say Germany, and in Russian you say Germanski. Both mean
German (Deutsch). And when we spoke of Germanization then, we did not
mean “making them into Germans”; We meant a political and cultural union
of the so-called Germanic peoples, with reciprocal equal rights. That we
did intervene in this way, I stated in a speech, Exhibit
Seyss-Inquart-103:
“Why do the Germans interfere with everything in the Netherlands?”
Then I went on to say that in this total warfare there would be moments
of tension...
THE PRESIDENT: What page is that on?
DR. STEINBAUER: It is still Exhibit USA-708, which has not been
translated. But the entire book has been presented.
THE PRESIDENT: Has it got a PS number?
DR. STEINBAUER: Its document number is 3430-PS. It has been made Exhibit
USA-708. It is a book entitled _Vier Jahre in den Niederlanden_, and it
contains a collection of speeches made by the witness, several of which
have been submitted by the Prosecution. The witness is now replying to
them.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
SEYSS-INQUART: There are moments of tension when there is no longer any
dividing line between what is important to the military war effort and
something which is private and a matter for civilians.
I was quite aware of the fact that all public activities might be used
for or against the occupational forces and that I had, therefore, to
exercise control over them.
DR. STEINBAUER: Were there any attempts on the part of the NSDAP in the
Reich to influence your administration for the interests of the Party?
SEYSS-INQUART: The Auslands-Organisation in the Netherlands made an
alteration in its set-up which permitted it to support the policy of the
Dutch National Socialist Party in every respect. It had, however, no
particular influence of its own.
DR. STEINBAUER: That is the important thing. Now, let us turn to the
administration proper. Who were the competent authorities in the
Netherlands?
SEYSS-INQUART: In the civilian sector there was the Reich Commissioner;
on a similar footing was the military commander and the Armed Forces,
and the Police had a sector of its own. The military commander had
special rights to intervene, and from July 1944 a part of the executive
powers was transferred to him.
The Police were merely placed at my disposal, but came under the Higher
SS and Police Leader, who was suggested by Himmler and appointed by the
Führer. I was never asked about this beforehand. The Police reserved the
right to investigate. That is to say, if I gave them an order they would
investigate to see whether the order was in line with the instructions
which Himmler had given directly to the Higher SS and Police Leader.
Then there were the Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor and
the Armament Minister, who carried out the orders for the Four Year
Plan.
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes; and as another Reich organization, there was
Rosenberg’s Einsatzstab too—and Speer, to complete the picture?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, Speer was the Minister for Armaments. Then there
were other smaller and separate assignments of a special nature.
DR. STEINBAUER: So that you were really nothing but a kind of executive
organ for the superior Reich offices?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, I was not an ordinary official. I bore the
responsibility for the Reich in the civilian sector. Perhaps during the
first few months departments in Berlin went straight ahead and ignored
me, but I then concentrated the administration in such a way in my own
hands that nothing occurred in the civilian sector to which I had not
previously given my consent. The Führer acknowledged this quite plainly
on one occasion, and I should like to remark that you must not draw any
conclusions from this with regard to other occupied territories. I am
completely convinced that in the Eastern Territories and in the
Government General the same centralization did not exist.
DR. STEINBAUER: What possibilities did you have, then, of setting up an
administration?
SEYSS-INQUART: The initiative for, and the extent of, the demands made
by the Reich came, of course, from the competent central offices in the
Reich. I investigated the demands with my colleagues in consultation
with the Dutch offices. We would then make counterproposals which seemed
to us reasonable for the Dutch. And if the Reich still demanded more,
then we made efforts not to exceed what could be expected. Until 1943
all demands were fulfilled by the Dutch authorities themselves. I gave
my officials no authority to make such demands until after this period.
Then the demands became so large, that I no longer expected the Dutch
authorities to supply them.
DR. STEINBAUER: I come back to the question of the Police for a moment,
which, as you said, stood directly under Himmler...
SEYSS-INQUART: You asked what possibilities I had?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes.
SEYSS-INQUART: I had two possibilities: with the Queen of the
Netherlands and the Government gone to England, I could have nominated a
new Dutch Government, as in Norway, or conducted the administration of
the country myself. I decided on the second solution.
DR. STEINBAUER: How did you organize the existing Dutch police force?
SEYSS-INQUART: Whereas the German Police were not in any way dependent
on me, the Dutch police were under my orders; but it was a matter of
course that I should transfer the supervision of the Dutch police to the
Higher SS and Police Leader as well—that is, in the capacity as my
Commissioner General for Security. The Dutch police were divided into
three or four different branches. I think that we can safely say we were
acting in the interests of the occupational power when we co-ordinated
them as regards organization.
DR. STEINBAUER: What was the Home Guard (Landwacht)?
SEYSS-INQUART: The Home Guard was a protection squad organized by the
Dutch National Socialists. In 1943 there were serious cases of terror
attacks on National Socialists—some very cruel murders. There was the
danger of the counterterror of which we had heard in Denmark and, in
fact, several unfortunate incidents did happen. Consequently I had this
Home Guard organized with orders to act as a regular disciplined
auxiliary police force, and to control street traffic at night, and
guard railways, _et cetera_. The result was that these acts of terror
ceased almost entirely, and until the middle of 1944 no further
difficulties arose.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, we now come to an exceptionally important
chapter.
SEYSS-INQUART: May I just for a moment refer to Exhibit
Seyss-Inquart-101? This document has been held against me by the
Prosecution...
THE PRESIDENT: Is 101 the right designation?
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, the speeches which the defendant is
quoting have been sent down by me to be mimeographed. Although they are
actually already before the Tribunal, the translation department did not
quite catch up, as they wanted to translate all the affidavits too. So
they are not here yet in the translation, but I hope to have them by
tomorrow morning.
THE PRESIDENT: Hasn’t it got a PS number, or any other designation?
DR. STEINBAUER: It is a book, Exhibit USA-708. The Prosecution have only
quoted individual passages from it.
THE PRESIDENT: I see.
SEYSS-INQUART: The Prosecution have quoted Page 167.
On 1 August 1943 I made a speech announcing special measures which would
bring difficulties and restrictions upon the Dutch, and the Prosecution
believe that the shootings which took place later are connected with it.
That is an error. The restrictions I spoke of in that speech concerned
only an order forbidding Dutch people to stay in places outside their
own provinces, so that bands of terrorists from the northwest could not
get to the east. As this happened just during the vacation time, it
really was a restriction for the Dutch.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now I come to the next question. Did you change and
possibly misuse the existing organization of the lower courts?
SEYSS-INQUART: I took over the organization of the Dutch courts
entirely. The administration of justice in the Netherlands was of a
commendably high standard. Only on two occasions did I supplement it.
The Dutch judges showed little understanding of the economic situation.
For instance, on one occasion a group of black market butchers, who had
killed large numbers of cattle and brought them to the black market,
were fined 200 guilders; so I installed special economic judges,
Dutchmen, who had more understanding of these economic necessities. But
the legal situation remained as it was. Of course, we also introduced
our German courts, as every occupational power does.
DR. STEINBAUER: So that we had Dutch courts, German courts for Germans
staying in the Netherlands, and the police courts?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, but also for the Dutch who violated the interests of
the German occupational forces.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now, it is alleged in the proceedings that through these
courts there were 4,000 executions, which have to be accounted for.
SEYSS-INQUART: That is completely false. If I take into account all the
death sentences which were pronounced and actually carried out by the
German courts, the police courts, and the military courts; and if I add
to them the cases where Dutchmen lost their lives in clashes with the
executive powers; then, according to a statement of the Higher SS and
Police Leader, up to the middle of 1944 there were less than 800 cases
in 4 years—that is to say, less than were caused by a bombing attack on
the town of Nijmegen. The shootings came afterwards.
DR. STEINBAUER: You also exercised the rights to reprieve, for which you
had a special reprieve department?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection I wish to refer to Document
Seyss-Inquart-75, Page 190 in the document book. This is the affidavit
of Rudolf Fritsch, who was a judge at the Prussian Supreme Court and
reprieve expert for the Reich Commissioner. I should like to quote two
paragraphs from this document, and I refer to the second paragraph on
Page 3:
“In exercising his right to reprieve, the Reich Commissioner
proceeded from the standpoint that this was one of the most
sacred rights of the head of a state, and that it was especially
calculated to create a friendly, confidential atmosphere between
the Germans and the Dutch. Therefore, in the beginning it was he
himself who made the decision in every case, on the basis of
case reports which were submitted to him together with a
suggestion for a reprieve from the reprieve department. After
about 2 to 3 months he delegated the exercise of the right to
reprieve within his own organization to the chief of the
Department for Reprieves. The latter was competent except in the
following cases: 1) the cancellation of proceedings; 2) decision
in case of death sentences; 3) decision in fundamental
questions; 4) decision in isolated cases without precedent...
“No sentence of death was carried out without there being an
official examination of the question of a reprieve, even when a
formal appeal for a reprieve was not submitted.”
Then I come to Page 5, the last paragraph:
“Since co-operation with authorities in the Dutch courts proved
that they could be trusted, the Reich Commissioner gradually
delegated in the main the right of reprieve to the Dutch
Minister of Justice. From the huge amount of mail which came in
... I repeatedly learned of police actions staged by the Gestapo
whereby regular jurisdiction was eliminated.... In such cases I
would collect material and use it to take action in order to
bring the persons involved before regular courts for judgment.
And I was actually successful with such action. This was proof
to me that the Reich Commissioner opposed the wild police
methods of the Gestapo and was an adherent of regular legal
procedure.”
I think that with this we can close this subject of justice and now come
to the question of finance.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, but the Führer’s order excluding courts is also very
important.
DR. STEINBAUER: Well, if you wish to add something else.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, it is decisive.
After the strike at Amsterdam, I proposed summary court-martial
procedure. That is not an invention of recent times; it is summary court
procedure for special emergencies, such as you can find in the
legislation of every country. The summary courts martial were subject to
special precautionary provisions. First of all, a proper judge had to be
there; secondly, the defense was allowed a counsel, who could be Dutch;
thirdly, evidence had to be given in the proper manner, and if the
question of guilt was not clearly determined, then the case had to be
transferred to the ordinary courts. This summary court-martial procedure
was only in force for 2 weeks at the time of the general strike in May
1943. The number of people shot later on cannot be traced back to these
summary courts martial. Also they had been provided for the special
emergency of the Netherlands again becoming a theatre of war.
In the meantime, however, a decree came from the Führer which had
already been made public in an order from the High Command of the Armed
Forces. I refer to 1155-PS—no, I beg your pardon, that is wrong—it is
Document 835-PS.
On 30 July 1944 the Führer ordered that all non-German civilians in
occupied territories who were guilty of sabotage or terror actions were
to be handed over to the Security Police. The Higher SS Leader and I
both objected to this order, as we clearly realized what damaging
effects it would have, especially in the Netherlands. Through such an
order the Dutch would only be driven into illegal organizations.
During a period of 4 to 6 weeks the Higher SS and Police Leader never
carried out the order. But he then received a severe reprimand from
Himmler, and from that time on he was obliged to deal with the Dutch who
had been arrested for sabotage or illegal activities, and had to judge
them according to his own jurisdiction, shooting them when necessary.
One can account in this way for the shootings on a larger scale, but I
do not believe that there were as many as 4,000. As often as I could, I
urged the Security Police to be most careful in carrying out this order,
but I never received any reports on the individual cases. I had the
impression that there were perhaps 600 to 700.
DR. STEINBAUER: If I understood you correctly, then this was a police
affair, which was directly...
SEYSS-INQUART: At all events it no longer came under my authority or
influence. But if, at that time, I gave the Security Police orders to
check up on an illegal movement somewhere, I nevertheless had to realize
that some Dutchman or other, who was discovered to be the leader of such
a movement, would be shot by the Police without the courts or myself
being able to investigate the case. But then I could not desist from
safeguarding the security of the occupational authorities, because the
Führer decree had been issued.
DR. STEINBAUER: I now come to the chapter of finance. A document has
been presented here where a certain Mr. Trip announces his resignation.
Who was this gentleman?
SEYSS-INQUART: Mr. Trip was the President of the Bank of the
Netherlands—that is to say, the bank of issue—and he was also the
General Secretary for Finance. I think he can readily be considered one
of the world’s leading banking experts. He is an outstanding personality
and one of the men described today as a Dutch patriot.
DR. STEINBAUER: He was also General Secretary for Finance, was he not?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. Until March 1941 he was the General Secretary for
Finance. In my first speech to the general secretaries I said that I
would not ask any general secretary to do anything that was contrary to
his conscience. If he thought that there was something he felt he could
not do, then he could resign without any harm to himself. I said that
all I asked was that he carry out my orders loyally as long as he
remained in office. Mr. Trip was in office until March 1941, and then he
resigned because there was something he refused to carry out. He did
this without the slightest disadvantage to himself.
DR. STEINBAUER: Who was his successor?
SEYSS-INQUART: I should like to say that what Mr. Trip carried out until
March 1941 is, in my opinion, justifiable in every respect. Otherwise he
most certainly would not have done it.
His successor was Mr. Rost van Tonningen. Rost van Tonningen was a
League of Nations Commissioner in Austria who there had had tasks
similar to those I gave him in the Netherlands.
DR. STEINBAUER: What about the costs of occupation?
SEYSS-INQUART: As far as the civilian administration was concerned, Mr.
Trip and I agreed that I receive 3 million guilders a month. Then there
was another 20 million in fines in addition to that. During the first 3
years I saved 60 million guilders, which remained in the Netherlands as
a special bequest.
As far as the cost of the military occupation was concerned, I had no
authority to check that. The Armed Forces put in their demands to the
Minister of Finance, and I then received orders to place the money at
their disposal. During 1941, the Reich exacted indirect occupation
costs. It took the point of view that not only the expenses which were
incurred directly in the Netherlands should be paid for, but that the
cost of preparations in the Reich should be borne too. Fifty million
marks per month were demanded—partly in gold. Later this contribution
was designated as voluntary assistance for the East...
THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean marks, or do you mean guilders?
SEYSS-INQUART: Marks, 50 million marks. Later on this contribution was
called voluntary assistance for the East, for political reasons, but of
course it was not so. Later on, the Reich demanded that this sum be
increased to 100 millions, but I refused.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. Trip retired as General Secretary for Finance
because the foreign currency embargo, which still existed at the time
between Germany and the Netherlands, was lifted?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, that is correct. I received a request by my
administration for the purpose of intensifying economic exchanges
between the Reich and the Netherlands—to lift the foreign currency
embargo so that, without having recourse to banks of issue, guilders
could be exchanged for marks, and vice versa. The fundamental
possibility of such exchanges had already been determined under Mr.
Trip, but it was subject to the control of the bank of issue, that is to
say, of the Netherlands Bank as well. Mr. Trip raised objections and I
passed the matter on to Berlin. Berlin decided that it was to be carried
out and Mr. Trip resigned. I appointed Mr. Rost van Tonningen, President
of the Bank of the Netherlands, and I published the decree.
I wish to say that the President of the Reichsbank, Herr Funk, was
against this procedure, and I can quote in explanation that at that time
the effects could not be foreseen as turning out as catastrophic as they
did later on. At that time the Netherlands were completely cut off, and
the Reich had reached the height of its power. It was to be expected
that the mark would become the leading currency in Europe, and that
thereby the guilder would have been given the same importance. In
February 1941, for instance, imports from the Reich into the Netherlands
were greater than the exports from the Netherlands into the Reich. Reich
Minister Funk always held the view that these were real debts, so that
in the event of a different outcome of the war such debts which amounted
to some 4½ billion would have had to be paid back to the Netherlands.
DR. STEINBAUER: If I understood you correctly, it was your General
Secretary for Finance, Dr. Fischböck, who suggested this matter contrary
to the wishes of Trip.
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not know whether the suggestion came from Fischböck
alone. I presume that he must have talked it over with other people; but
it was he who put the matter to me.
DR. STEINBAUER: You have also been accused of imposing collective
penalties in the form of fines, which is contrary to international law.
SEYSS-INQUART: Collective fines are prohibited under international law
only in case of individual offenses. The large collective fine of 18
million guilders was imposed in connection with the general strike in
Amsterdam, Arnhem, and Hilversum, in which the entire population took
part. Later, I had collective fines paid back whenever it was discovered
that definite individuals were responsible for the offense.
DR. STEINBAUER: Can you give us any example?
SEYSS-INQUART: I think witness Schwebel will be able to tell you that.
It was in towns in the south of Holland where it happened.
DR. STEINBAUER: You are also accused by the Prosecution of
responsibility for what happened in the hostage camp in Michelsgestel.
What have you to say to that?
SEYSS-INQUART: I can take full and absolute responsibility for what
happened in the hostage camp in St. Michelsgestel. It was not a hostage
camp in the actual sense of the word: I took Dutchmen into custody only
when they had shown themselves to be active in resistance movements. The
camp at St. Michelsgestel was not a prison. I visited it. The inmates of
the camp played golf. They were given leave, in the case of urgent
family affairs or business matters. Not a single one of them was ever
shot. I think the majority of the present Dutch Ministers were at St.
Michelsgestel. It was a sort of protective custody to temporarily hinder
them from continuing their anti-German activities.
DR. STEINBAUER: In addition to this you are said to have prohibited the
reading of pastoral letters, and to have put Catholic priests and
Lutheran ministers in concentration camps?
SEYSS-INQUART: It is true that I prohibited one pastoral letter, which
may happen in times of occupation—because it publicly opposed the
measures of the occupational power and incited people to disobedience.
That was an isolated case, and it never happened again—for the good
reason, too, that there were no more provocations of such a kind in the
pastoral letters. In fact, I even intervened and canceled the
prohibition issued by the Police, whenever it was a matter only of a
criticism toward the measures taken by the occupational powers, and
there was no incitement to resistance.
I myself never sent priests to concentration camps. On the contrary, at
the beginning of 1943 after having made repeated urgent requests, I
finally received a list from the Security Police with the names of the
priests who were shut up in concentration camps. There were 45 or 50 of
them altogether. Three or four were mentioned as having died in the
concentration camp. On the grounds of the facts of their case, I sought
out about a third of them and demanded their release; for the second
third I demanded investigation within the coming 6 months; and it was
only as far as the last third was concerned that it was impossible for
me to intervene without violating my own responsibility towards the
Reich.
Dutch hostages were also taken for purposes of reprisal. When the
Netherlands came into the war, the Germans in the Dutch East Indies were
put into prison and allegedly mistreated. The Reich demanded the arrest
of 3,000 Dutchmen. The Security Police arrested 800 and took them to
Buchenwald. When I heard that the mortality was high, I made such urgent
appeals that the hostages were finally returned. They were then
accommodated in such a way that one could no longer talk of a prison.
They were given leave, and when necessary I released them. In the end, I
had less than 100.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, you are said to have prohibited prayers in
church, and especially prayers for the Queen.
SEYSS-INQUART: That is incorrect. The prayers in Dutch churches were
obvious demonstrations. Prayers were made—as was quite natural—for the
Queen of the Netherlands, and for her happiness and prosperity, and the
fulfillment of her wishes. At the same time there were prayers for the
Reich Commissioner, for his enlightenment. I was severely reproached for
tolerating these demonstrations. But I found nothing wrong with these
prayers, and did not prohibit them. Perhaps, in some isolated cases a
subordinate authority would put in his say, but this was always
suppressed.
DR. STEINBAUER: That would not have been so bad; but it is said that you
were particularly cruel and had a large number of people shot without
legal proceedings. What have you to say to that?
SEYSS-INQUART: As far as I can remember, there was only one real case of
hostages being shot—that is, people were shot without there being any
causal connection with a crime. This occurred in August 1942, and the
case has already been brought up here. It was handled strictly according
to the so-called Hostage Law, which has been quoted here. It was in
connection with an attack on an army transport, and 50 or 25 hostages
were to be shot. It was, I think, the Higher SS and Police Leader who
made the demand through the Military Commander upon request of the High
Command of the Army.
My intervention consisted in reducing this figure to 5 and in looking
over the list which had been submitted to me by other departments, and
which has been read out here in court. I, too, noticed something
peculiar about it. The Higher SS and Police Leader had expressly
emphasized that the list had been drawn up strictly in keeping with the
directives, saying that the attack could be traced back to rightist
circles of resistance, not to those on the Left, so that no workers
could be shot. I only exercised my influence insofar as I caused the
Higher SS and Police Leader to cross off the list the names of fathers
with several children.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, what do you know, in detail, about the people
who were shot when the camp at Vught was evacuated?
SEYSS-INQUART: When the British and Canadians were advancing through
Belgium toward the south of Holland, I had so much to do to keep order
in my province that I could not pay any special attention to the camp at
Vught, which was under police direction. The Higher SS and Police Leader
informed me generally that the most seriously charged political
prisoners, numbering about 200, would be transferred to the Reich, that
the less seriously charged political prisoners would be set free, and
that ordinary criminals would be placed under the command of a Dutch
police officer and handed over to the Canadians. It was only here that I
heard some people had been shot, and the only way I can explain it is
that at the last minute the Reich forbade these people to be transported
into the Reich and gave orders for them to be shot. I do not believe
there were 600 of them, because from what the witness Kollpuss said
there seem to have been some 130 to 150. But even that is enough.
DR. STEINBAUER: What do you know about the shooting of hostages after
the attack on the SS and Police Leader Rauter?
SEYSS-INQUART: The attack on the Higher SS and Police Leader came from
the resistance movement, and was carried out with British weapons.
DR. STEINBAUER: What do you know about the Putten case?
SEYSS-INQUART: Excuse me, I have not finished my previous statement.
DR. STEINBAUER: Oh, you want to give a more exact...
SEYSS-INQUART: Himmler, at that time, gave orders for 500 hostages to be
shot. Rauter’s deputy Dr. Schöngarth refused, and informed me that there
were a number of Dutchmen in the prisons who were to be shot, in
accordance with the Führer’s order, because they had been convicted of
other acts of sabotage. He had hesitated, he said, since the number was
somewhat larger, but now he could not hesitate any longer. He did not
give me the actual figure. In this situation I could not, in my opinion,
prevent him from carrying out the order, because we had to suppress the
resistance movement by all means. The movement had been organized and
supplied with arms by the Dutch Government in London, and it presented a
serious danger to the German occupational forces.
Two hundred and thirty Dutchmen were supposed to be shot—amongst them
80 in Apeldoorn alone—and this seemed to me a lot. But Dr. Schöngarth
told me that in the north of Apeldoorn there was a center of the illegal
resistance movement.
DR. STEINBAUER: I want to ask you, last of all, what do you know about
the Putten case?
SEYSS-INQUART: In Putten there was an attack on German officers. Three
were murdered. The whole thing took place within the Armed Forces, the
SS, and the Police; and I knew that measures of reprisal were planned. I
myself, at that time, was concerned with the construction of defenses.
The Higher SS and Police Leader informed me that he had received the
order to burn the village of Putten, and to transfer the male population
to a concentration camp in the Reich. However, he had reduced the figure
to 40 percent, and later on he reported to me that there was a high
mortality rate in German concentration camps. Both he and I applied to
the military commander to have these men returned. The military
commander agreed. Whether this order could still be carried out I do not
know.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, perhaps at this point we could have a
short recess?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. STEINBAUER: Your Lordship, I should like to come back to the
question of the embargo on foreign currencies.
The Defendant Reich Marshal Göring has just informed me, during the
recess, that in this conflict, Fischböck, Trip, and Wohlthat on the one
hand, and on the other Funk, who was against it, and he himself, Göring,
as head of the Four Year Plan, made a decision to lift the embargo on
foreign currencies. And he writes me here, “I bear the responsibility.”
So it was a decision which was taken by Göring.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, it is not, of course, a regular way in
which to inform the Tribunal about anything, to tell them what one of
the defendants may have said to you during an adjournment.
DR. STEINBAUER: He wrote it.
THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid that doesn’t make it any better. You may ask
the witness any question about it.
DR. STEINBAUER: As regards the question of shooting without a court
sentence, I should like to refer to a very important document. Exhibit
Seyss-Inquart-77, Page 199. This is Document F-224 D, a report made by
Kriminalkommissar Mund. He says the following on Page 3:
“In my opinion it is very likely that General Christiansen
demanded the maximum number of victims to be executed.
Christiansen spoke of numerous measures of reprisal to Rauter,
who was an impulsive and tactless man, and he on his part
applied pressure to the Commander of the Security Police (Dr.
Schöngarth)...”
He reports further on Page 5:
“It was often a question of prisoners who had already been
sentenced to death by the Higher SS and Police Leader.
“Reprisals for punishable acts were a matter for the Police.
After August 1944, and in accordance with an order of the
Führer’s, these measures of reprisal were interpreted in such a
way that a number of Dutchmen were shot for acts of sabotage and
attempts at murder although they had been arrested for entirely
different reasons.”
SEYSS-INQUART: May I explain that briefly?
DR. STEINBAUER: Please do.
SEYSS-INQUART: For example, leading members of the resistance movement
were arrested, and on examination by the Higher SS and Police Leader it
was decided that they should be shot according to the Führer’s orders.
The Higher SS and Police Leader had called upon his court officer for
this examination. When later on an attempt to blow up a bridge was made,
instead of shooting hostages these men were taken and shot. That was the
exact opposite of the shooting of hostages—or at least, it was supposed
to be.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now, I come to Chapter IV-B, “Concentration Camps and
Prisons.” My first question: Who was competent in these matters?
SEYSS-INQUART: For concentration camps and for police detention prisons,
the Police were competent. For court detention prisons, and court
authorities, I myself was competent—that is, the court prisons were
under my charge.
DR. STEINBAUER: Were there concentration camps in the Netherlands, too?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, especially the big concentration camp of Putten near
Hertogenbosch. Then also a police transit camp near Amersfoort, and a
Jewish assembly camp in Westerborg. I have already spoken of St.
Michelsgestel; that was a protective custody camp. And then there might
be mentioned the camp at Ommen, which was neither a police nor a
concentration camp, but abuses occurred there.
DR. STEINBAUER: What can you tell me about the Hertogenbosch Camp?
SEYSS-INQUART: Hertogenbosch was originally meant as a Jewish assembly
camp, at the time when we intended to keep the Jews in the Netherlands.
But Reichsführer Himmler gave orders for it to be turned into a
concentration camp. After some reflection I was satisfied with this
idea. In consideration of the fact that I could not prevent Dutchmen
from being put into concentration camps, I preferred them to be in
concentration camps in the Netherlands, where I might still be able to
exert a certain influence.
DR. STEINBAUER: But there are supposed to have been excesses in these
concentration camps, too—for example, especially in the Vught Camp,
which you mentioned.
SEYSS-INQUART: That is quite true. There were excesses in prisons, as
well as in concentration camps. In wartime I consider this almost
unavoidable, because subordinates get unlimited power over others and it
cannot adequately be controlled. Whenever I heard of any excesses, I
took steps—the first time toward the end of 1940, or 1941, when the
president of my German court reported to me that a prisoner had been
brought up with injuries from blows on the head. I had the case
investigated, and the prison warden received disciplinary punishment and
was sent back to the Reich.
In the Vught Concentration Camp, soon after its opening, there was a
high mortality rate. Immediately I had an investigation started, using
the services of Dutch medical personnel. Every day—and later on every
week—I had the mortality figures reported to me, until they sank to
what was approximately a normal level. Of course, I do not know whether
the director of the camp reported the normal death cases only, or
whether he included the cases of shooting—I could not say.
In this camp there were excesses due to drinking parties and reveling;
brawls and fights were also heard now and then. The head of the camp was
removed and sent to the Reich. I noted that the Higher SS and Police
Leader had apparently himself tried to maintain order, although he was
not in charge of the camps; they were under Gruppenführer Pohl.
There was one very serious case which, in Document Number F-224 D, is
described under the title, “Women in Cell.” The head of the camp,
allegedly for disciplinary reasons, had a large number of women crowded
into a cell overnight, whereby three or four women were smothered to
death. When we heard of that, we demanded court action. The Central
Administration in Berlin refused, and we turned to Reichsführer SS
Himmler and did not give in. The head of the camp was put on trial and
received at least 4 years—I believe even a sentence of 8 years. That is
indicated, moreover, in the French report.
DR. STEINBAUER: What about the Amersfoort Camp?
SEYSS-INQUART: That was a police transit camp—that is, for police
prisoners who were to be turned over to the courts, or who were to be
sent to the Reich; or persons who refused labor service who were being
sent to the Reich. In general, they were not to be there more than 6 or
8 weeks. There were Dutch guards in this camp—not Dutch Police, but a
voluntary SS guard company, I believe.
Excesses did occur here. General Secretary Van Damm called my attention
to the fact that a Dutchman was supposed to have been beaten to death
there. I urged the Higher SS and Police Leader to bring this case to
light. He did this through his court officer, and sent the documents to
me. According to the documents, severe mistreatment occurred, but no one
was killed, and the persons responsible were punished.
I repeatedly called the attention of the Higher SS and Police Leader to
the fact that concentration camps and prisons in wartime actually
favored the perpetration of brutal excesses. If, here or there, not a
severe case but certain mistreatment was reported to me, I always called
his attention to it. He then reported to me either that the case had not
occurred, or that he had taken steps, and so forth.
In particular, I always had the food ration statistics of the
concentration camps and prisons reported to me. The food rations were
satisfactory. I believe that the Dutch in the concentration camps and
prisons, at the end of 1944 and in 1945, received more than the Dutch in
the western Netherlands. Of course, I do not want to give too much
importance to this fact, because the Dutch did suffer from hunger.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then there was the Westerborg Camp.
SEYSS-INQUART: The Dutch Government had already set up Westerborg as a
completely free camp for Jews who had fled from Germany. This was
enlarged into an assembly camp for Jews. In the camp itself there were
Jewish guards to maintain order. Dutch Police guarded the camp on the
outside. There was only a detail of the Security Police for supervision
in the camp. In all the files I found no report about excesses in the
camp itself. Every Sunday clergymen went to the camp, at least one
clergyman for the catholic Jews, and one for the so-called Christians.
They, too, never reported anything.
DR. STEINBAUER: We will speak about their removal later on.
Now I would like to speak about Ommen. There is a long report on that.
SEYSS-INQUART: Ommen was intended as a training camp for those Dutch who
voluntarily wanted to be employed in the economy in the Eastern
Territories. They were given instruction on the country, the people, and
their language. The head of the camp borrowed prisoners from a
neighboring Dutch prison for the work. Then I received reports that
these prisoners were being mistreated. The judges of Amsterdam turned to
me. I gave the Dutch judges of Amsterdam permission to personally
inspect the camp and speak to the prisoners. That was done, according to
Document F-224(d), on 5 March 1943. Thereupon the Amsterdam judges wrote
a long letter to the General Secretary for Justice. They complained
about the mistreatment of the prisoners, which they had noted, and about
the fact that Dutch prisoners were transferred to prisons in the Reich
for labor assignment. The complaints were justified, and I ordered that
the prisoners be sent back from the Ommen Camp to the Dutch penal
institution, and that Dutch prisoners be returned from German prisons to
Dutch prisons. This procedure was correct, and therefore I necessarily
took due steps to settle the matter.
DR. STEINBAUER: But now I have to ask you a certain question and
confront you with a charge. Document RF-931 shows that you removed
judges who made such complaints, namely, in Leeuwarden.
SEYSS-INQUART: In my eyes the procedure of the court of Leeuwarden was
incorrect. These judges did not consult me, but publicly asserted in a
verdict that the Dutch prisoners were being sent to German concentration
camps and shot. According to the facts, which lay before me, that was
false. I then informed them of the results obtained by the Amsterdam
judges. The Leeuwarden judges refused to pass further judgments. I asked
them to continue to officiate, but they refused. I then dismissed them
as persons who refused to work. Of course, I could have had them tried
by a German court with charges of making atrocity propaganda.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you receive complaints from the Red Cross about
conditions in the camps?
SEYSS-INQUART: In the Netherlands we had the arrangement that a
representative of the Dutch Red Cross, Mrs. Van Overeem, could visit all
concentration camps and prisons, especially for the purpose of verifying
whether the food packages were being delivered. Neither Mrs. Van Overeem
nor the heads of the Dutch Red Cross ever directed any complaint to me.
I should like to say that this circumstance was especially gratifying
for me, because the Dutch complained about everything, and if for a
change I received no complaints, then that was a certain relief for me.
I should like to remark that about the beginning of 1944, according to
the reports submitted to me, about 12,000 Dutch persons were in
concentration camps or prisons. That is the same as if today, in all of
Germany, 120,000 Germans were in prisons or camps. That occasioned my
setting up legal commissions which had to visit the camps and the
prisons in order to make investigations and determine what prisoners
could be released or placed on trial. Naturally, in cases where there
were orders for arrest from Berlin, I could do nothing.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, so you say that you waged a constant struggle
with the Police on this question?
SEYSS-INQUART: I would not like to call it a struggle.
DR. STEINBAUER: Do you believe that you were successful?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. I believe so, on the basis of certain definite
facts. I have followed the proceedings here very carefully, and—we have
heard most terrible things. The reports from the Netherlands, it seems
to me, are not that bad. I do not want to say that I disclaim every
excess. However, such reports as those about Breedonck in Belgium, do
not exist. The reports show beatings as the most serious charge. There
is only a single report here—that is Document F-677, the report of the
tax collector Bruder—which attains the level of the usual atrocity
reports. But I do not believe that this report should be accepted at its
face value, since Bruder does not even say who told him this. And the
information itself is not credible. He asserts, for example, that the
prisoners who were at work had to prostrate themselves before every SS
guard. I do not believe that the camp authorities would have permitted
that, because then the prisoners would not have been able to work.
It is hard for me to say, but I do not think that conditions in the
Netherlands were quite as bad as all that.
DR. STEINBAUER: I think that I can now conclude this chapter and turn to
Point V of the Indictment, which deals with the question of labor
commitment. What problems did you have in the Netherlands in the field
of labor commitment?
SEYSS-INQUART: In the field of labor commitment we must distinguish
between three or perhaps four different phases. When I came to the
Netherlands, there were about 500,000 unemployed: registered unemployed,
those who might become so due to demobilization of the Dutch land and
naval forces, part-time workers, and so forth. It was an urgent
problem—not only a social one—for me to reduce the number of
unemployed. For, in the first place, such an army of unemployed is
without doubt a good source of recruits for illegal activities. In the
second place, as the war continued, it was to be expected that the
material condition of the unemployed would steadily become worse.
At that time we instituted measures which I must, despite all charges,
call voluntary labor recruitment. That lasted until the middle of
1942—that is, about 2 years. During that period, I gave neither the
German nor the Dutch labor authorities full power to press any worker to
work abroad. Without doubt there was a certain economic pressure, but I
believe that always exists in this connection. The recruitment was
carried out by the Dutch labor offices, which were subordinate to the
Dutch General Secretary for Social Administration. There were German
inspectors in the labor offices. There were also private hiring
agencies; companies from the Reich sent their own agents over. On the
whole, about 530,000 Dutchmen were engaged to work in the Reich. In the
period which I call “voluntary,” 240,000 to 250,000 volunteers went to
the Reich and about 40,000 to France.
By the first half of 1942, this reservoir had been used up. The Reich
demanded more workers. We then considered introducing compulsory labor
service. I recall I did not receive instructions to this effect from
Sauckel, but from Bormann as a direct Führer order. Now, labor
commitment occurred predominantly, but not exclusively, in the following
way. Young and, as far as possible, unmarried Dutchmen were called to
the labor office, where they received certificates of conscription for
work in the Reich. The Dutch report itself says that only a few refused.
Of course, some of those who refused were arrested by the Police and
taken to the Reich. The Higher SS and Police Leader reported to me that
this totaled 2,600 people of about 250,000 to 260,000 labor conscripts,
and of the total engaged 530,000 persons. So this meant only 1 percent,
or even 0.5 percent. I believe that the figure resulting from compulsory
measures in the Reich was no lower—or higher.
At the beginning of 1943 the Reich demanded a large commitment of
workers, and I was advised to draft whole age groups to send to the
Reich. I call attention to the fact that all of these workers received
free labor contracts in the Reich and were not put into labor camps. I
decided to draft three young age groups—I believe 21 to 23 years of
age—in order to spare married men. The success was satisfactory in the
first group; in the second group it was moderate; and in the third it
was quite bad. I realized that I could draft further groups only by
sheer force. I refused to do so. But at that time I managed, due to
Minister Speer’s understanding, to arrange not to have the workers taken
to their work, but that the work be brought to the workers. Big orders
arrived in the Netherlands, and the industries charged with filling
these orders were declared “blocked” industries. Among them was the
Organization Todt.
Dutchmen who were needed in the Netherlands were exempted. Over a
million certificates of exemption were issued by the Dutch authorities.
It was clear that that was Dutch sabotage, but I did not want to take
steps against it. No woman was ever forced to work outside the
Netherlands, nor were young people under 18. Reich Minister Lammers has
confirmed here that at the beginning of 1944 he transmitted the Führer
order to me demanding that 250,000 workers be brought to the Reich. He
also confirmed that I refused it. At that time Gauleiter Sauckel came to
me and discussed this matter with me. I must state that he understood my
arguments surprisingly quickly, and did not insist on carrying out the
forced recruitment. By “forced recruitment,” I mean blocking off whole
districts and seizing the men.
In the course of 1944 labor recruitment ceased almost completely.
Instead of 250,000 I believe 12,000 were sent to the Reich. But
something entirely different took place in the fall of 1944. From
experience gathered in France and Belgium, the High Command of the Army
decided that able-bodied Dutchmen were to be drawn from Holland—that
is, the western Netherlands. That was because the Netherlands Government
in England had set up an illegal army. I had the organizational charter
in my hands. There was a complete General Staff and a complete War
Ministry. We estimated that there were about 50,000 illegal troops. If
an appeal was made and one more able-bodied Dutchman joined, the illegal
forces would have been more numerous than the German troops in Holland.
Moreover, they had received very good equipment from England. Full
shiploads of the most modern tommy guns were confiscated by us, but I am
convinced that the larger part of the weapons was not confiscated.
The High Command of the Army, through the military commanders, ordered
the removal of the able-bodied Dutchmen. The measure was entirely
carried out by the Armed Forces. A general who was sent for that very
purpose was entrusted with the task, with an operational staff of his
own. This measure was carried out by the local commandants. My local
authorities were informed of the action to be taken, sometimes at the
last moment and sometimes not at all. Of course I knew about the
measure. In view of these reasons I could not take the responsibility of
protesting against it. I only intervened when it was necessary to
protect civilian interests, and prevent the workers in the vital
industries from being removed also. I entrusted this to the
Plenipotentiary General for the Total War Effort, whom Dr. Goebbels had
sent to the Netherlands in the meantime. His task was to issue exemption
certificates. He issued 50,000 of them.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean Himmler?
SEYSS-INQUART: Goebbels, the Delegate for Total War Effort.
I admit that this measure led to conditions which were unbearable for
the Dutch. I am certain that, as for feeding, temporary lodging, and
transportation, the population in the bombed German territories did not
live under any better conditions. But one could not demand this from the
Dutch. Many Dutch people told me, at that time, that they would be
willing to agree to this labor commitment—by no means in order to aid
the German cause, but only in order to avoid these severe conditions—if
they would be drafted in orderly proceedings. I then did that. The
Plenipotentiary General for the Total War Effort issued the proclamation
which has been submitted to the Court. The people were called to the
labor offices, recorded on lists, sent home again to get clothes, and
ordered to report to the railroad stations. Not the Police but labor
officials took them to the Reich to be put to work under normal
conditions. The Dutch report, in its objectivity, recognizes this fact.
It speaks of the better transportation facilities for those mobilized
for labor. I am responsible for this labor mobilization for the reasons
which I have given.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, may I remark in this connection that my
Exhibit Seyss-Inquart-78, Document 1726-PS, Exhibit USA-195, Page 200,
excerpt from the Netherlands Government report, confirms the statement
of my client fully. I should like to read it briefly because it is
important. Page 2:
“...workers who refused—relatively few—were prosecuted by the
Security Service.”
Then, Page 3:
“...apart from that, the measure was not very successful.
Certain German authorities seem to have opposed its execution,
because many former members of the armed forces received
exemption; others went underground....
“The result was that in the last month of 1943, and in the
greater part of 1944, relatively few persons were deported....”
And then, Page 6:
“...until the end of 1944, the method of transportation for
deportees was bearable....
“Anyone who reported for the manpower mobilization in January
1945, enjoyed improved transportation facilities—that is,
almost the whole journey by rail, although only in freight
cars....”
SEYSS-INQUART: Even for our own use we had no other cars at that time.
I should like to refer to the fact that I also drafted Dutch workers in
order to carry out the construction work entrusted to me by the Führer
on the resistance lines east of the Ijssel. I used part of the
transports which came from Rotterdam, _et cetera_, for this purpose, and
thus I prevented these people from being sent to the Reich. I had no
influence on the treatment in the Reich; I only forbade further
transports into the Gau Essen, because it was reported to me that in the
Rees Camp the treatment was very poor, and that some Dutch people had
died.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now I come to the next count of the Indictment—that is,
to the Jewish question. The Netherlands Government report, Exhibit
USA-195, sums up all ordinances submitted by the Prosecution. I should
like to submit this Document 1726-PS to my client, so that it may remind
him of the laws. The Court already has it.
[_Turning to the defendant._] What did you, as Reich Commissioner, do
about the Jewish question?
SEYSS-INQUART: When I took over the functions of the Reich Commissioner,
I of course realized that I had to take a definite attitude, and would
have to take some steps with regard to the Jews in the Netherlands.
Amsterdam, in western Europe, is perhaps one of the best known and one
of the oldest seats of Jewish communities in western Europe. Moreover,
in the Netherlands there were a great many German Jewish emigrants.
I will say quite openly that since the first World War and the postwar
period, I was an anti-Semite and went to Holland as such. I need not go
into detail about that here. I have said all that in my speeches, and
would refer you to them. I had the impression, which will be confirmed
everywhere, that the Jews, of course, had to be against National
Socialist Germany. There was no discussion of the question of guilt as
far as I was concerned. As head of an occupied territory I had only to
deal with the facts. I had to realize that, particularly from the Jewish
circles, I had to reckon with resistance, defeatism, and so on.
I told Generaloberst Von Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chief of the Army,
that in the Netherlands I would remove Jews from leading posts in the
economy, the press, and the administration. The measures taken by me
from May 1940 to March 1941 were limited to that. The Jewish officials
were dismissed, but were given pensions. The Jewish firms were
registered, and the heads of the firms were dismissed. In the spring of
1941 Heydrich came to me in the Netherlands. He told me that we would
have to expect that the greatest resistance would come from Jewish
circles. He told me that the Jews would at least have to be treated like
other enemy aliens. The English, for instance, in the Netherlands, were
interned and their property confiscated. In view of the large number of
Jews—about 140,000—this was not so simple. I admit frankly that I did
not object to this argument of Heydrich’s. I also felt that this was
necessary in a war which I absolutely considered a life and death
struggle for the German people. For that reason, in March 1941 I ordered
that the Jews in the Netherlands be registered. And then things went on
step by step.
I will not say that the final results—as far as the Netherlands are
concerned—were intended thus from the beginning; but we decided on this
method. The regulations cited here, if they appeared in the Dutch Legal
Gazette, were mostly signed by me personally. At least, they were
published with my express assent. Individual measures mentioned here,
however, were not by me. For example, in February 1,000 Jews were
supposed to have been arrested and sent to Buchenwald and Mauthausen.
That much I know. In the Amsterdam ghetto...
THE PRESIDENT: February of what year?
SEYSS-INQUART: February 1941. In the Amsterdam ghetto, a National
Socialist was killed by Jews. Reichsführer Himmler thereupon ordered 400
young Jews sent to Mauthausen. I was not in the Netherlands at that
time. That was, by the way, the reason for the general strike in
Amsterdam in March 1941. After my return to the Netherlands, I protested
against this measure, and to my knowledge such a mass transfer to
Mauthausen did not occur again. Synagogues were also burned. Apparently
someone ambitiously tried to imitate the 8 November 1938. I immediately
intervened. Further incidents did not occur. On the other hand, the
Police wanted to tear down the old temple in Amsterdam. General
Secretary Van Damm called this to my attention, and I prevented it.
I indicated earlier that the motive for the measures is to be found in
the consideration to treat Jews like enemy aliens. Later, with other
measures, the original intention was certainly abandoned; they became
the same as those taken against the Jews in the Reich. Perhaps, in one
case or another, this was even exceeded, for I know that, for example,
in the Netherlands there was a drive to get the Jews sterilized.
Our goal was to keep the Jews in the Netherlands—namely, in two
districts of Amsterdam and then in the Westerborg Camp and in the Vught
Camp. We had also prepared to create the necessary opportunities for
work. I instructed the General Secretary for Education to withdraw as
much money from the Dutch budget for the education of the Jews as they
should have according to their proportion of the population. It is
certain that with this measure of concentrating the Jews in two
districts and two camps, harshness occurred which was perhaps
unavoidable, and which might even in some cases be considered as
excessive.
Finally, the Security Police demanded the introduction of the so-called
Jewish Star. A not inconsiderable number of Jews were not in the
confined areas, and the Security Police demanded that they be marked in
order that it might be ascertained whether the Jews adhered to the other
restrictions. In the eyes of Germans, this star was certainly considered
a stigma. The Dutch did not consider it as such. There was many a
Dutchman who, out of protest, wore such a star himself.
About 1942, I believe, Heydrich came along with further demands—this
time that the Jews be evacuated. He explained this by saying that
Holland would sooner or later be a theater of war, in which one could
not allow such a hostile population to remain. He pointed out that he
was responsible for the police security of the Reich, and that he could
not bear this responsibility if the Jews remained in Holland. I believe
that we in the Netherlands opposed this evacuation project for 3 or 4
months while attempting to find other ways out.
Finally, Heydrich had a Führer decree sent to me, according to which he
had unlimited powers to carry out all measures in the occupied
territories as well. I inquired of Bormann what this meant, and this
order was confirmed, whereupon the evacuation of the Jews was begun. At
that time I tried to ascertain the fate of the Jews, and it is rather
difficult for me to speak about it now because it sounds like mockery. I
was told that the Jews were to be sent to Auschwitz. I had people sent
from the Netherlands to Auschwitz. They came back with the report that
that was a camp for 80,000 people with sufficient space. The people were
comparatively well off there. For example, they had an orchestra of 100
men. A witness here, confirming that this orchestra played when victims
arrived at Auschwitz, made me think of that report.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, you probably won’t finish today.
DR. STEINBAUER: No.
THE PRESIDENT: How long do you think you are likely to be?
DR. STEINBAUER: I hope to be finished, at the latest, by noon tomorrow,
but perhaps it will take only an hour. I still have questions on
plundering, economic measures, and destruction. Then I will be finished.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 11 June 1946 at 1000 hours._]