rage made such demands, it was impossible for the gentlemen to whom the
demand was put to oppose him at the moment, let alone flatly refuse to
carry out the order. There was nothing else for them to do—General Jodl
used these tactics frequently—but to try by obtaining data, arguments
pro and con, and asking for comments and opinions from all the offices
concerned—to collect the material and at a quiet opportune moment
approach the Führer on the matter again and try to dissuade him from his
extravagant demand. Outwardly, this resulted in a lengthy
correspondence, in which the files of the various departments involved
were sent back and forth, all with the intent of delaying the matter to
the utmost and, if possible, shelving it completely. My impression, as
far as the treatment of the terror-fliers was concerned, was that in
this case we really succeeded even though the Führer’s attention was
repeatedly called to this question through new reports and statements
and he demanded that a decree be put into execution.
DR. JAHRREISS: Then was no such order issued?
BÜCHS: I know of no such order.
DR. JAHRREISS: Can you cite an incident which shows clearly that no such
decree was issued?
BÜCHS: On one occasion in August 1944 I personally was called to account
by the Führer rather sharply. After an air raid on Munich, Fegelein had
described low-level attacks to Hitler rather crudely and reported the
incident where a plane was shot down by antiaircraft artillery, and two
Allied airmen had made an emergency parachute landing. When they were
captured and brought off by a Wachtmeister of the antiaircraft
artillery, he himself said that he had called this man to account, and
had asked him why he had not shot the two fliers. The man replied,
“because I had no orders to do so.” At that moment I interpolated on my
own account that no such order existed. And then the Führer reproached
me in the most violent manner because the leading men of the Armed
Forces had not issued a decree like that. Then, of course, he again
demanded that the order be carried out.
DR. JAHRREISS: Was it carried out then?
BÜCHS: No, for that was the period after 20 July, and the time of the
campaign in the West when there were more urgent questions in the
foreground. And because of all of these questions that of the treatment
of terror-fliers was again put aside.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, do you know about an incident in Berlin—I
believe in March 1945—which is supposed to have taken place in the
Reich Chancellery, where the Führer again complained that in spite of
his demand this decree had not been issued?
BÜCHS: I recall that in March 1945 the Führer again expressed himself
very heatedly on this problem to General Koller, who was then Chief of
the General Staff of the Air Force. I myself was not present at the
beginning of this conversation. I was called in, however, and heard the
Führer say something to the effect that on the basis of the attitude
taken by the Armed Forces, and especially by the Air Force, it had been
impossible for him to counteract the terror of the Allied fliers over
Germany by means of a corresponding counterterror...
DR. JAHRREISS: Just a moment, Witness. You said that you had not been
present at the entire discussion.
Mr. President, we have an interrogatory which we want to submit to the
Tribunal. It is in our document book, Volume II, Page 178, and is the
testimony of General of the Air Force, Koller. This testimony under
Number 5, which is on Page 180 of the document book, contains all the
details worth preserving of this extremely important conference in
Berlin. Only part of this conversation took place in the Führer’s room.
Another part took place in the anterooms—as, for instance, that with
Kaltenbrunner—while the conversation with Göring was carried on by
telephone. In order to save time and to avoid splitting up the matter, I
should like to have the Tribunal’s permission to present it as a whole,
even though the witness heard only a part.
With regard to Jodl, the last sentence says, as a whole—I believe, Mr.
President, we can save time if I may present it now.
First of all, I must read the first question put to General Koller,
which is to be found on Page 179. Here the witness was asked:
“How long have you been Chief of the General Staff of the Air
Force?” The answer is on the next page and is:
“From 1 September 1943 to 3 September 1944 I was Chief of the
Air Force Operations Staff; from 23 November 1944, Chief of the
General Staff of the Air Force.”
Question 5—and that is the question which concerns us—is on Page 179:
“Do you recall that about March 1945, in the bunker of the Reich
Chancellery, the Führer censured you and the Air Force because
such an order was not given?”
Answer, Page 180:
“Yes, I remember exactly. A notice taken from the Allied press
reporter survey between the beginning and the middle of March
1945 was laid before the Führer by Bormann during the situation
discussion. In brief it read somewhat to this effect:
“‘An American combat air crew, shot down over Germany a short
time previously, was overtaken by advancing American troops.
They had declared that they were ill-treated by enraged members
of the population, threatened with death, and probably would
have been killed if German soldiers had not released them and
taken them under their protection.’
“Bormann further pointed out to the Führer in a few words that
this confirmed that soldiers in such cases intervene against the
population.
“b) Hitler turned angrily to me and said excitedly:
“‘I have already issued one order that bomber crews which bail
out are not to be protected against the population. These people
only murder German women and children. It is unheard of that
German soldiers should take measures to protect them against our
own population, which is acting on motives of justifiable hate.
Why are my orders not carried out?’
“Surprised by this attack I replied something like this:
“‘I know nothing about any such order; and it would in any case
be a practical impossibility.’
“Hitler turned to me and said very loudly and sharply:
“‘The reason why my orders are not carried out is only the
cowardice of the Air Force, because the gentlemen of the Air
Force are cowards, and are afraid that something might happen to
them too. The whole thing is nothing more than a cowardly pact
between the Air Force and the British and American airmen.’
“Hitler then turned also to Kaltenbrunner, who happened to be
present in the background, and went on, addressing him but
sometimes not looking at him:
“‘I hereby order that all bomber crews who bailed out in the
last few months, as well as all bomber crews bailing out in
future, are to be turned over immediately by the Air Force to
the SD, and are to be liquidated by the SD. Anyone failing to
carry out my orders, or taking action against the population, is
liable to the death penalty and is to be shot.’
“Hitler then further expressed in general terms his indignation
and his views on the matter. The assembled officers gave the
impression of general surprise and disapproval.
“c) After the situation discussion with the Führer I requested
an interview with Kaltenbrunner in the side passageway.
Essential points:
“Koller: ‘It is impossible to carry out those orders. The Air
Force will have nothing more to do with them, nor I myself in
any way whatsoever—and I can say as much for the Reich Marshal.
It is entirely out of the question that the Air Force will agree
to this in any way, shape, or form.’
“Kaltenbrunner: ‘The Führer has completely mistaken ideas. The
duties of the SD are also constantly misunderstood. Those things
are no concern of the SD. Moreover, no German soldier does what
the Führer demands. That is not in the German soldier’s line. He
does not kill prisoners. If individual fanatical Party followers
of Herr Bormann try to do so, the German soldier intervenes. The
Führer has a completely false idea of the views held by our
soldiers. Moreover, I myself will do nothing in the matter
either. I have no intention of doing anything. We must just take
care that we get out of it again, otherwise we will be the first
to get shot. We must gain time. I am again leaving Berlin at
once for a fairly long time anyway.’
“Koller: ‘Then we are agreed on the main point. Your leaving
Berlin is favorable. But we must have another way out as far as
the Führer is concerned, for it is possible that he may again
refer to his order tomorrow. Later on if it becomes extreme, we
will have to see how we can put a stop to the business, or what
is going to happen to us?’
“The following was decided at my suggestion:
“No order along the lines decreed by the Führer will be issued
by the Air Force or the SD.
“Surrenders to the SD—none.
“In case the Führer should refer to his order again, then, first
of all, prevent further action through explanations of the
following kind: All members of air crews previously captured,
not in the hands of the Air Force but dispersed under the
control of the Replacement Army Commander (BdE). Time of capture
not known to a central office. Therefore a lengthy and difficult
process to determine the number of air personnel captured during
the last few months.
“Also, preparations must be made in detail for getting them out
without attracting attention. The newly captured crews go
automatically to interrogation centers. These are in process of
transfer owing to operations. Communications are bad.
“Detailed discussions and agreements with the SD necessary. In
order to preserve the appearance of discussion, the I-c officer
of the High Command of the Air Force (I-c of OKL) should go to a
delegate of Kaltenbrunner who, however, would first have to be
appointed.
“d) After the situation discussion with the Führer, I spoke to
Field Marshal Keitel at the entrance of the air-raid shelter,
and said:
“‘The Führer’s order is insane.’—Keitel affirmed, ‘It certainly
is’—‘The Air Force must keep its escutcheon clean. The order
cannot be carried out. I am convinced that the Reich Marshal is
entirely of my opinion. To issue such an order—and
verbally—and moreover with such threats of punishment. He must
sign an order of this kind with his own name. It may or may not
be carried out—but not by the Air Force. Nor by the SD, either;
I have spoken to Kaltenbrunner.’
“Field Marshal Keitel: ‘He will not sign such orders then, and
everything is always placed on the shoulders of the OKW. But
I’ll be damned if I issue such an order.’
“Koller: ‘The Air Force cannot join in this in any
circumstances. We will not assume such a responsibility.’
“Field Marshal Keitel: ‘You are right; neither can I. I must
think over what I can do about it, and how I can do it.’
“The conversation was interrupted because Keitel was called to
the telephone. Keitel was very indignant and annoyed about the
Führer’s order.
“e) After refreshments in a side room of the air-raid shelter, I
had to cross the antechamber of the conference room again to
reach the cloakroom and exit. Hitler happened to come out of the
room to give an order to an orderly, and he called me as I was
passing. The door leading to the conference room was open, and
Ley was sitting at the table. Hitler said to me:
“‘I must come back to my order once more. You must all help me,
for matters cannot go on like this any longer. The Air Force—or
at least defense of the Reich—has failed. What am I to do
against the frightful bombing terror which is murdering German
women and children?’
“Koller: ‘The Air Defense and our crews do what they can and
what is humanly possible. Our neglect of air armament and the
enemy’s present technical and numerical superiority cannot be
eliminated or remedied overnight. When the searchlight units get
stronger, the air situation over Germany will be more in our
favor.’
“Hitler: ‘I cannot wait for that. I can no longer be responsible
to the German people for the continuation of this situation in
the air. If those fliers realize that they will be liquidated as
terrorists, they will think twice about flying here.’
“Koller: ‘That will certainly not improve the situation in the
air. On the contrary, it will make it worse.’
“Hitler: ‘No; the Japanese method is the best.’
“Hitler’s manner was now calm again, in comparison with what it
had been at the situation discussion. He appeared more
approachable. Experience had shown that it was better to talk to
him alone than in the presence of others. I thought it was a
good opportunity to attack the whole problem and stated:
“‘If I may state my point of view, I think that this will not
do. Measures of this kind are in such crass opposition to the
education, feelings, and way of thinking of all soldiers, that
they cannot be carried out. One cannot train soldiers on the
regulations governing warfare and decent conduct, and then order
actions which are repulsive to everyone. You must not forget, my
Führer, that enemy airmen also carry out orders, and do their
duty just as ours do. If they are shot down or make forced
landings, they are defenseless and unarmed prisoners. What would
the world think of us? And the first thing the enemy would do
would be to treat our air crews in the same way. That is
something for which we cannot answer to our men and their
relatives. All their willingness to serve and their discipline
would collapse at one blow.’
“Up to that point the Führer had not interrupted me. After his
first glance at me he looked away again and seemed to be lost in
thought. He had been listening, however, and at that point he
interrupted me and said quietly and earnestly:
“‘So the Air Force is afraid after all. That is all very well.
But I am responsible for the protection of the German people and
have no other means except this.’
“Hitler turned away, and went back into the conference room.
“f) After my arrival at the Air Force headquarters (Kurfürst) I
told Colonel Von Brauchitsch what had happened, and ordered him
to report it to the Reich Marshal as soon as possible. I myself
could not contact the Reich Marshal at the moment. During our
conversation Brauchitsch also expressed disapproval of the
Führer’s order.
“g) An hour or two later the Reich Marshal called me, and began
with the following words, ‘Tell me, has he gone quite mad now?’
“It was quite clear who was meant. I myself reported the
principal happenings and the conversation with Kaltenbrunner to
the Reich Marshal again, and added:
“‘I will not carry out this order or anything connected with it.
I will endeavor to handle the situation so as to gain time now,
in any case, and will do everything in my power to protect any
of us from disastrous consequences. Perhaps after the last
conference the Führer will not refer to his order again. If he
does, however, a very difficult situation will arise, and you
will have to go to the Führer yourself. What the Führer has
ordered must in no case be allowed to happen.’
“The Reich Marshal expressed strong disapproval of Hitler’s
attitude and agreed with me in every point. He ordered me to act
as I had suggested, to inform him immediately when necessary,
and ended the interview with these words, ‘This is all insane
and cannot be done.’
“h) Measures against Allied airmen on the basis of the
above-mentioned Führer’s order were taken neither by the Air
Force nor by the SD. This order did not become known, in my
opinion, to the Replacement Army Command (BdE), or its offices,
as the Replacement Army Command was not present at the Führer’s
meeting, and the order was not transmitted by the Armed Forces
High Command (OKW).
“Hitler made no further reference to his order, either to the
Reich Marshal or to myself or my representative or, I think, to
Kaltenbrunner. To be sure, I never spoke to the latter again
about this matter.
“I cannot judge whether Hitler deliberately let the matter drop
or whether he forgot about it under the pressure of events.
“i) I know that about two or three weeks later an OKW directive
was issued—I think a teletype—in which, as I recall, mention
was made of the correspondent’s report that occasioned it. It
disclosed the fact that the Führer had expressed his displeasure
that German soldiers had taken action against their own people.
“No mention was made of the main point of Hitler’s order. If I
remember correctly, the directive was signed by Keitel, and must
be regarded as an attempt to cover himself as far as the Führer
was concerned.
“In my opinion, General Jodl had nothing to do with the affair
at all.”
Witness, as far as you were present at this meeting, is the picture
presented by General Koller correct?
BÜCHS: I remember personally something like the following formulation by
the Führer, “This results from the fact that in the Air Force war is
based on a mutual life insurance policy of, ‘Don’t hurt me; I won’t hurt
you.’” That was the sentence which impressed me most strongly, which
emphasizes what was said...
DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you. Then I need not ask you any further questions
on this point.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Jahrreiss, we will adjourn now.
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, I assume that you can still recollect how the
offices of the Führer’s headquarters were furnished.
BÜCHS: Yes, I can still remember.
DR. JAHRREISS: In the offices occupied by the Führer, the Field Marshal,
the General, and yourself, were there maps on the wall?
BÜCHS: Yes, and also in East Prussia—particularly the headquarters—the
Führer had a topographic map of Germany, as well as a political map of
Europe, and there were similar maps in the various other rooms.
DR. JAHRREISS: Were maps of Germany hanging there, too?
BÜCHS: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: And the neighboring territories on which concentration
camps and penal institutions were indicated with a red or blue ring?
BÜCHS: No. Neither in the headquarters in East Prussia nor in the Reich
Chancellery in Berlin, nor at the Berghof in Berchtesgaden, have I ever
seen such a map.
DR. JAHRREISS: At 1230 hours on 11 May 1946, the Munich radio station
broadcast a letter from a painter asserting that he had seen maps in the
Führer’s headquarters which could only be intended to show the location
of concentration camps. Is that possible?
BÜCHS: That is quite out of the question.
DR. JAHRREISS: Was there any more detailed statement about...?
THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think we need go into the broadcast from Munich.
We have no evidence of a broadcast from Munich.
DR. JAHRREISS: I am afraid I was misunderstood. I did not ask him
whether he heard it, but I wanted to illustrate how the public had come
to believe that there were such maps. Thank you, I have no further
questions.
THE PRESIDENT: What I was pointing out was that it ought not be referred
to, as it is not in evidence. The fact which you alleged, that there was
a broadcast, ought not to be referred to.
DR. STAHMER: Major Büchs, during the time you spent as commanding
officer attached to Führer headquarters, were you regularly present at
the daily discussions of the situation?
BÜCHS: Yes, I participated in the daily military situation discussions.
DR. STAHMER: Do you still remember whether you attended the situation
discussion of 27 January 1945, at which the fate of the 10,000 air force
officers imprisoned in the Sagan Camp was discussed?
BÜCHS: I can remember something like this: Fegelein must have raised the
question of evacuating that camp on the approach of the Russian troops.
These captured officers were asked whether they wished to remain in the
camp and be handed over to the Russian Army, or whether they wanted to
be taken away in the course of the evacuation of Silesia. As far as I
remember, they definitely decided on the latter alternative—that is to
say, to be taken away; and I believe that the only question still to be
decided was how their transport was to be arranged.
DR. STAHMER: Can you still remember the suggestions that were made
regarding that transport, and who made them?
BÜCHS: No. I believe, at that time, the Führer only said in general
terms that these imprisoned officers could not receive better treatment
than our own people. It was just at the time of the evacuation of
Silesia, and our traffic situation did not permit the transport of even
our own people by means of railway trains or in large columns, and the
population had to tramp along the roads even in winter. And I think I
remember that, at the time, the Führer said, “If these officers wish to
be taken along on a transport, they will have to march just like the
German civilian population.”
DR. STAHMER: May I, Mr. President, in connection with this statement,
refer to an error, in the record. During the cross-examination of the
Defendant Göring on 20 March 1946, Document 3786-PS, Exhibit USA-787 was
presented. In the German record, Page 6249, after a discussion of how
they should be transported, there is a statement that the Führer said,
“They will have to go even if they march in ‘Dreck’ (mud).” The actual
text is, “They will have to go even if they trek (Treck) on foot.” That
is quite a different thing. I do not know how the word is translated in
the English text; but that, of course, would give it a very different
and entirely wrong meaning. As the witness has just said, the Führer
said, “They have got to go even if they have to trek”—that is to march
in a column, on foot.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Now, the Tribunal think that the best way to deal
with these questions of translation is to take it up with the General
Secretary, and get it submitted to the Translation Division.
DR. STAHMER: I merely wanted to establish the fact.
[_Turning to the witness._] A remark is supposed to have been made in
the course of that conference, during the discussion on transport, “Take
off their boots and trousers so that they cannot walk in the snow.” Do
you remember who made that remark?
BÜCHS: No, I cannot remember; and I think it is quite impossible.
DR. STAHMER: You do not remember any such remark, or by whom it was
made?
BÜCHS: It is perfectly possible that Fegelein made such a suggestion in
some connection or other; I do not know.
DR. STAHMER: According to the record, Reich Marshal Göring is supposed
to have made such a remark.
BÜCHS: I think that is quite out of the question.
In this connection may I just mention that it was extremely difficult to
take notes of the proceedings. Four to six people frequently spoke at
once during these conferences—and much more rapidly than usual. The
stenographers could only take down what they heard. They could neither
look up nor make certain who actually made such and such a remark at
such and such a moment. There was a table around which there were often
some 30 people standing; and that interfered with the work of the
stenographers.
DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, at this point of the Trial I feel obliged
to make a statement. I wanted to ask this witness some important
questions, but I am not in a position to do so because of the decision
announced by the Tribunal today. I state that through that decision I...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, you will have full opportunity to put the
questions to the witness before the Commission.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, may I please complete my statement.
I have explained that as a result of the decision announced today, I am
not in a position to put my questions, and that I must submit to that
decision. I wish to state, however, that I consider this decision...
THE PRESIDENT: But it is inaccurate to say you are not in a position to
put your questions. You are not able to put your questions now to the
witness, but it is not true to say that you are not in a position to put
your questions without further qualification. You are in a position to
put your questions to the witness before the Commission.
DR. LATERNSER: Nevertheless, Mr. President, I feel there is an
impediment for the defense, constituted by the fact that the defense of
the organizations is thus not in a position to present its evidence
directly.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has announced its decision.
DR. LATERNSER: I only regret, Mr. President, that that decision was
announced without the Defense having first been notified.
DR. MARTIN LÖFFLER (Counsel for the SA): I should like to add in
connection with the statements of my colleague Laternser that I must
emphasize them because...
THE PRESIDENT: On what point, Dr. Löffler?
DR. LÖFFLER: On the point that the witnesses called today cannot be
questioned by defense counsel for the organizations, as has been the
custom until now, and that is, therefore, a disadvantage to the defense
because for all practical purposes we lose these witnesses altogether.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Löffler, you and Dr. Laternser seem not to have read
Article 9 of the Charter, which provides that the Tribunal may direct in
what manner the applicants shall be represented and heard. That is with
reference to the organizations. The Tribunal, after very great trouble,
have brought to Nuremberg a very large number of witnesses and have set
up commissions for the purpose of examining those witnesses, and they
are going to hear some witnesses from among those witnesses at a future
date in this Court.
The Tribunal have given the matter full consideration, and it doesn’t
desire to hear any further arguments from you or from any other of the
counsel for the organizations.
DR. LÖFFLER: Mr. President, we appreciate the Tribunal’s grounds, but we
feel obliged to point out from the point of view of the defense that
these reasons are justified in theory, but entail in practice the loss
of that witness.
I ask permission, therefore, to give you a very brief explanation so
that the Tribunal will understand why we lose those witnesses. You, Mr.
President, have said that the witnesses can be heard before this
Commission. These witnesses cannot be heard before the Commission
because the number...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Löffler, the Tribunal, as I have told you, have
already considered this matter, and it may be that they will consider it
further, but they don’t desire to hear any further argument about it. It
is a matter entirely within their discretion, and they have been at very
great pains to provide that the applicants who wish to be heard in
respect to these organizations shall be fully and thoroughly heard.
The Tribunal will not hear you further at this stage.
DR. LÖFFLER: May I give one explanation...
THE PRESIDENT: Did you hear what I said? I said the Tribunal will not
hear you further at this stage.
DR. LÖFFLER: Very well.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I have only a few questions.
[_Turning to the witness._] Your memory of that conference doesn’t seem
to be entirely clear.
BÜCHS: May I ask which conference?
MR. ROBERTS: The conference that you last mentioned, with regard to the
evacuation of the prisoners of Sagan.
BÜCHS: I am not aware that it was incorrect in any point.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, but you say that you don’t remember any mention being
made of the prisoners having to walk through the snow without their
boots on.
BÜCHS: Yes, that is what I said.
MR. ROBERTS: And you know that it is—I can’t find the actual place; I
had no idea this exhibit was going to be referred to—but you know that
that is in the actual stenographer’s notes, do you not?
BÜCHS: So it was said.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes. And you would agree with me that the stenographer
could hardly put that remark down unless it was said?
BÜCHS: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: But you didn’t hear the remark; therefore, you don’t know
who said it?
BÜCHS: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: That is all I ask on that.
I just ask on one other matter: In April of 1945 did Fegelein attain the
status of Hitler’s brother-in-law, when Hitler got married?
BÜCHS: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: And two days afterwards, was Fegelein shot on the orders of
his new-found brother-in-law?
BÜCHS: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: That is all.
DR. JAHRREISS: I have no further question to put to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire.
[_The witness left the stand._]
DR. JAHRREISS: With the permission of the Tribunal, I now call the
witness Professor Dr. Schramm.
[_The witness Schramm took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
PERCY ERNST SCHRAMM (Witness): Percy Ernst Schramm.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The witness repeated the oath in German._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, were you working in the Armed Forces Operations
Staff during the war?
SCHRAMM: Yes. From March 1943 onwards, I was working in the Armed Forces
Operations Staff.
DR. JAHRREISS: Until the end?
SCHRAMM: Until the end—that is to say, the beginning of May 1945.
DR. JAHRREISS: What functions did you have in the Armed Forces
Operations Staff?
SCHRAMM: During my entire time in the Armed Forces Operations Staff I
kept the War Diary of that staff.
DR. JAHRREISS: Was there a special reason why you received that task?
SCHRAMM: My appointment to the Armed Forces Operations Staff was due to
the fact that my civilian profession is professor of history at the
University of Göttingen. At that time an expert was sought whose name
would constitute a guarantee for expert work. General Jodl appointed me
to the position at the suggestion of the deputy chief.
DR. JAHRREISS: If you were to write a war diary in the way a historian
would wish to do, you would require an insight into all the events
connected with that staff, would you not?
SCHRAMM: Yes. I did not attend the Führer’s situation discussions or the
internal conferences; but I did participate every day in the situation
discussions of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, and every important
document passed through my office during those two years.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, considering that you had perhaps more insight
into the activities of the Armed Forces Operations Staff than anyone
else, I should like you to tell us here what you know of the range of
General Jodl’s activities.
SCHRAMM: It is impossible to overestimate the range of the General’s
activities. As proof of this, I may say that in 1944 alone, according to
information which I received from a competent officer, 60,000 teleprint
messages went through the teleprint department of the Armed Forces
Operations Staff. There was also a large courier correspondence which,
of course, was even larger. Then there was internal correspondence
between individual departments. The bulk of that correspondence appeared
on the General’s desk at some time or other. To look at it from another
angle, the General was responsible for four theaters of war: North
Finland and Norway; West Holland, Belgium, France; then the Southwest,
in the first place Africa and Italy; and then the Southeast.
DR. JAHRREISS: Please speak more slowly.
SCHRAMM: It was the General’s task not only to have up-to-date
information based on incoming reports, but also to act as operational
adviser to the Führer.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did I understand you correctly as saying that the four
theaters you have just mentioned were the so-called OKW main theaters of
war?
SCHRAMM: Precisely. The East was under the General Staff of the Army,
and the General was concerned only insofar as the main difficulty always
lay in co-ordinating the interests of the other theaters of war with
those of the Eastern Front.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did I understand you correctly as mentioning 60,000
teleprint messages in a year?
SCHRAMM: Yes, 60,000. I remember the exact figure. And I remember it
exactly, because my clerk calculated that 120 volumes of files passed
through the War Diary office, and that they were so [_demonstrating_]
thick. Therefore, about 12 yards of material passed constantly through
my office. That represents 10,000 sheets of paper, if not 100,000.
DR. JAHRREISS: Perhaps you may be able to help us with a question which
has been repeatedly touched upon here, but to which no precise answer
has ever been given. Do you know anything about an order from Hitler
saying that generals must not resign?
SCHRAMM: Yes, I remember that very exactly from an order which appeared
in the middle of 1944, repeating with great strictness an order already
issued before my time—that must have been during 1940 or 1941. That
order was about 1½ typewritten pages in length and most forcefully
worded. Its contents are still clear in my mind, because I discussed it
afterwards with several of my comrades. The order stated that every
commanding officer—and the departments under him correspondingly—was
entitled to mention any objections he might have to the measures of the
Supreme Command, but that he would then have to obey unconditionally the
order once it was given him by higher quarters—that is to say, he would
have to do something which meant acting contrary to his intentions. It
added that it was impossible for a commander to resign in consequence of
this. The reason stated was that the sergeants in the trench could not
tell their company commander that they wanted to resign when they were
not in agreement with his orders.
I repeat, it was so emphatically worded that we talked about it a great
deal. From that time on, the commanders had even less chance of evading
an order from the Supreme Command.
DR. JAHRREISS: Professor Schramm, might I ask you to speak just a little
more slowly?
This order—the contents of which you have just described to us, and by
means of which you have established the date of the final and most
stringent formulation—did this order also apply to a man like General
Jodl?
SCHRAMM: If it applied to the commanders, it naturally applied all the
more to General Jodl.
DR. JAHRREISS: I now turn to another question.
General Jodl has been described as a political general. You are a
civilian and a professor; and I assume, therefore, that you possess the
detachment required to enable you to make up your mind on the matter and
to supply the Tribunal with facts which will permit it to form its
decision. Can you give us facts which would of necessity form a basis
for judgment for or against?
SCHRAMM: If the question aims at establishing whether or not the General
was a Party general, then I deny it most emphatically. It was utterly
immaterial to the General whether the members of his staff were Party
members or not. Although I was on that staff for 2 years, I personally
could not tell you which of the officers were Party members. That was
completely unimportant. As to whether the General tried to exercise
political influence, I must again draw your attention to the tremendous
amount of work for which he was responsible. He would not have had time
for it; and with regard to my documents I can only tell you that I do
not remember any papers from which such a conclusion might be drawn.
What the General committed to paper—and these papers, as I have seen
myself, run into thousands—was always strictly confined to military
matters, and in no way encroached upon the sphere of politics. To be
more exact, I do not remember in the course of those 2 years ever having
seen in my files any document of a political nature inspired by the
Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff or written by himself.
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes; but perhaps he was fond of the limelight and had
great ambitions; and perhaps, and outside of the files...
SCHRAMM: I can answer that question with a definite “no,” because I know
from his associates, and from conversations with him, that all
diplomatic procedure was repugnant to him and that he disliked it
because it had nothing to do with soldiers. I did not notice any
ambition, because if the General was ambitious he certainly had chosen
the least suitable position for such a purpose, since he thus exposed
himself to criticism from those below him—from people who did not know
the underlying reasons. From that time on he was criticized a good deal,
and he did not receive from higher quarters the recognition he deserved.
I always thought it peculiar, and even grotesque, that the General, at
the time of Adolf Hitler’s, death, had scarcely more German war
decorations than I had myself, as a mere major in the reserve. I did not
see whether he had foreign decorations. I never saw him wearing a
foreign order. At any rate, there were no indications of ambition or of
political aspirations.
DR. JAHRREISS: During this Trial there has been frequent mention of a
speech made by the General during the winter of 1943-44 addressed to the
Gauleiter. I do not know whether you know anything about that speech.
SCHRAMM: Yes, I remember it exactly.
DR. JAHRREISS: What do you remember exactly?
SCHRAMM: First of all, let me tell you that the reason why I remember it
exactly is because I received the material on which the speech was
based. After it was no longer needed, it was given to me for my War
Diary. It was like this:
That was a speech for which material was collected in the various
departments. For this purpose an enormous map was needed, which was
difficult to prepare because it was larger than the offices in which we
were working. The speech was made at this annual meeting in Munich on 8
or 9 November. The particular reason for the General making a speech
outside the usual military circle was the following: Italy’s dropping
out of the war in September 1943 had led to a break in the Southern
Front extending from Marseilles to Athens, a distance of 4,000 km. We
had succeeded in filling the gap again, but a good deal of uneasiness
was felt by all those who understood the situation.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I object to long reasons being given for the
speech being made. The speech is in evidence and, in my submission, the
reasons for the speech are entirely immaterial.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal upholds the objection.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, please go on telling us about the attack.
SCHRAMM: This was the one reason...
THE PRESIDENT: No, no, I said that the Tribunal upheld Mr. Roberts’
objection as to what the witness must say. That’s a mistranslation.
DR. JAHRREISS: It was a misunderstanding. I am sorry. It was wrongly
translated.
[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, I want to show you a document which
was submitted to the Tribunal by the Prosecution 2 days ago, Document
1808-PS. Perhaps you will just look through the whole of the document
first.
[_The document was submitted to the witness._]
THE PRESIDENT: Is it among the Jodl documents?
DR. JAHRREISS: No, it is a document which the Prosecution submitted in
the course of the cross-examination 2 days ago.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, that document was handed up separately by me
during the cross-examination, and I am afraid it is not in the book. It
is one of those documents which received a new GB number, and was handed
up loose towards the end of the cross-examination, Document 1808-PS.
DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you. May I go on?
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Jahrreiss.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, does your signature appear at the foot of the
second last page, on the right?
SCHRAMM: Yes. This is a file which I started after the attempt of 20
July 1944, in order to have a permanent record of what was being done in
the Armed Forces Operations Staff. I want to add in this connection that
the Armed Forces Operations Staff was in no way involved in that
conspiracy. This copy presumably comes from the war archives. The
signature and the corrections are partly mine, and partly those of my
clerk.
DR. JAHRREISS: I want to draw your attention to Number 5 in this file of
documents.
SCHRAMM: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: It is dated 25 July. Do you have it?
SCHRAMM: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did you draw it up?
SCHRAMM: Yes, I drew it up myself.
DR. JAHRREISS: Please, will you tell us what the basis for this work of
yours was?
SCHRAMM: The officers of the staff were called to our mess hall at short
notice. We were told that the General wanted to address his staff. As
not all the officers were able to attend, I was ordered to take notes,
so that the other officers could be informed of what the General had
said. I remember clearly that I jotted down a few key words, still
standing, so this is not a shorthand record. I cannot write shorthand.
There was no time to find a stenographer.
DR. JAHRREISS: Well, did you base this on your notes?
SCHRAMM: Yes. Afterwards, probably on the following day, I reconstructed
the General’s speech as far as possible from my notes. I am not certain,
of course, if all the details are quite accurate, because the notes
which I had taken standing up were much too sketchy for that. And, of
course, I am particularly doubtful about the accuracy of the actual
words spoken. I now see that there are 4½ pages. The speech was, of
course, very much longer than that. It is therefore a compressed
account.
DR. JAHRREISS: A compressed account only...
SCHRAMM: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: Now, I should like to know more about the circumstances
in which the General made that speech, the actual words of which we do
not possess. That was...
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, it is my respectful submission—again in the
interests of saving time—to mention that these matters are all very
irrelevant. We know that an attempt was made on Hitler’s life, and that
Jodl addressed his staff. It is my submission that the circumstances are
not relevant at all.
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President...
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal hope you’ll do it briefly.
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes; thank you.
[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, will you please be very brief and
quote the personal circumstances?
SCHRAMM: The General appeared on the scene with white bandages around
his head. We were all most surprised that he should have recovered so
quickly from the attempt considering that he had been standing right
next to the explosion. I must say that, at that time, we were deeply
impressed by the concentrated energy with which he reappeared before his
staff and by his moral attitude to such an attempt.
DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you, Mr. President. I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Do other defendants’ counsel want to ask any questions?
[_There was no response._]
Does the Prosecution want to?
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I have no questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
DR. JAHRREISS: I have no further questions. May I now call the next
witness, General Winter?
[_The witness Winter took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please.
AUGUST WINTER (Witness): August Winter.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The witness repeated the oath in German._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you sit down.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, did you take part in the beginning of the
Russian campaign?
WINTER: Yes, I took part as the first general staff officer of Field
Marshal Von Rundstedt’s army group.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, may I point out to you that I want you to allow
a small pause after my question and to speak in general more slowly than
you have just been doing.
WINTER: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: Can you tell me—since you had a very responsible
position—what was officially said to be Hitler’s reason, at that time,
for the German attack on the Soviet Union?
WINTER: The official reason, given to me at the time by my commander and
my chief, was that an attack from Soviet Russia was to be expected
shortly, and that this was therefore a preventive measure.
DR. JAHRREISS: And then you experienced the first battles on the
frontier, did you not?
WINTER: Yes, in this staff.
DR. JAHRREISS: That was toward the south?
WINTER: It was in the Ukraine, Army Group South.
DR. JAHRREISS: Even after those first battles, you had a certain amount
of experiences and certain impressions of the opponent, did you not?
WINTER: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: Were they, General, such impressions as to confirm the
official reason given, that of a preventive war?
WINTER: It was the uniform impression of the command of the army
group—including the commander, the chief, and the operations department
under my command—that the reason given for the campaign was the true
one. Our own impression at the time was that we had hit on active
preparations for an offensive campaign.
DR. JAHRREISS: But did you have the facts on which to base this
impression?
WINTER: We had a number of facts which confirmed that impression,
according to our ideas. I may state them briefly. First of all, there
was the strength of the troops we encountered which, although I cannot
give you figures now, was greater than the figures mentioned in our
marching orders. Then there was the extraordinary deployment of troops,
so near and like a front, which struck us, with unusual large
proportions of armored troops far exceeding anything we had expected,
and the deployment of a comparatively strong group opposite the
Hungarian border which we could not explain to ourselves as a defensive
force. One point is particularly significant; the fact that during the
first week we found that captured enemy staffs were equipped with maps
which covered a large area of German or ex-Austrian territory which,
again, did not seem in keeping with purely defensive considerations. In
addition we observed a number of smaller things, not very important in
themselves.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, just now you spoke of evidence which, in your
opinion, was particularly significant—namely, the finding of these maps
which you described a few minutes ago. Why is that particularly
significant—more significant than the other things you have mentioned?
WINTER: It is particularly noticeable that the units on the Russian
Front were equipped with maps covering much more than the area which
would normally be included in a defensive reconnaissance area—even
allowing for the fact that at the beginning of a campaign such
reconnaissance might go beyond the enemy’s frontier.
DR. JAHRREISS: There has been mentioned in this courtroom the fact that
after marching into the Ukraine, our troops found themselves faced with
exceptional circumstances and difficulties in certain Ukrainian cities.
Have you any idea of what I mean?
WINTER: Yes, that is obvious. We encountered an enormous number of these
difficulties when we approached the Dnieper. I imagine that you are
referring to the matter of remote-controlled explosions, or
delayed-action explosions, which were carried out, as it seemed, on a
very large scale in our fighting zone in the Kiev-Kharkov-Poltava area.
They caused us a great deal of trouble, and they forced us to adopt
extensive countermeasures at the time.
DR. JAHRREISS: Do you know whether that applies to Odessa?
WINTER: I heard that things were blown up in Odessa, but I cannot give
you details.
DR. JAHRREISS: Do you know the details about Kharkov?
WINTER: I know about Kharkov indeed, because something happened there
which caused us to adopt certain security measures. In the battles along
the west border of Kharkov which were rather long and serious, a
divisional staff with all its main material—I cannot remember its
number—was destroyed by a delayed-action explosion of this kind. This
caused orders to be issued for the carrying out of special security
searches in all buildings which had to be used for accommodation of
staffs and other authorities from that time on.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did you, Witness, actually handle a Russian map, or see
one, which indicated plans for such blowing-up operations?
WINTER: No, I cannot remember seeing such a map.
DR. JAHRREISS: Now, another point. You said a few moments ago that Field
Marshal Von Rundstedt was your commanding officer. Who was your chief?
WINTER: Infantry General Von Sodenstern.
DR. JAHRREISS: Now, another subject. If I remember correctly, Field
Marshal Von Rundstedt retired at that time or was dismissed; is that
right?
WINTER: When the attack on Rostock failed in November 1941 and
permission to withdraw his leading units had been refused by the OKH,
Field Marshal Von Rundstedt sent a report to the OKH, to the army to
which we were subordinated, in which he said that if the necessary
confidence was not felt in his leadership, he must ask the Führer to
nominate a new commander for that army group. I have a painfully
accurate recollection of this incident, because I myself drafted the
telegram and the Field Marshal made that addition with his own hand.
The telegram was dispatched in the evening, and Hitler’s answer,
relieving him of his post, arrived in the course of the same night.
DR. JAHRREISS: So that his application was granted?
WINTER: The application was granted. But perhaps I may tell you that
there were repercussions later with Hitler. A few days afterwards Hitler
himself flew to Mariupol in order to obtain information about the actual
situation on the spot. On his homeward flight, he visited Field Marshal
Von Rundstedt’s Poltava headquarters and had a discussion with him. In
the course of this discussion, Hitler—I cannot tell you for certain
whether I witnessed this scene myself, or whether the Chief Adjutant
Oberst Schmundt told me about it immediately afterwards—I repeat, there
was a personal discussion in the course of which Hitler again reproached
the Field Marshal for having put that alternative question, and said to
him:
“In the future I do not intend to tolerate any such applications
to resign. When I have once made a decision the responsibility
is transferred to me. I myself am not in a position to go to my
superior, for instance, God Almighty, and to say to him, ‘I am
not going on with it, because I don’t want to take the
responsibility.’”
We considered, at the time, that that scene was of basic importance, and
I may add that, to judge from the orders later given on that point, our
impression was correct.
DR. JAHRREISS: Do you know, Witness, whether Hitler, at some later date,
altered his decision not to allow that in the future?
WINTER: No, he certainly did not alter his decision. Because, as I know,
there were two occasions, I believe, on which orders to that effect were
issued, forbidding resignations on the part of a commander, or an
officer in a leading position, on grounds of unwillingness to assume
responsibility.
DR. JAHRREISS: I now come to another point. If I am properly informed,
you were in the Armed Forces Operations Staff during the later stages of
the war, were you not?
WINTER: On 15 November 1944 I was called there to succeed General
Warlimont who had fallen ill; and I took over his functions on 15
November 1944. My appointment was dated from 1 December 1944.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, did you regularly attend the situation
discussions with the Führer?
WINTER: Yes, I was there on an average of 5 days out of 7 during the
week.
DR. JAHRREISS: There has been a great deal of discussion about these
situation conferences in this courtroom, and a great many events took
place at them which are of importance for this Trial; but up to now, no
real picture has yet been presented to us of what those situation
discussions really were. Can you explain the procedure of such a
situation discussion with reference to its length and the number of
people present?
WINTER: The situation discussion was a permanent part of the afternoon’s
program, and was attended by a fairly large number of people, while
there was a second situation discussion at 2 o’clock in the morning, of
no importance to us here. In it, reports were made only by the junior
General Staff officers of the OKH for the Eastern Front and of the
Operations Staff of the OKW for the Western Front.
MR. ROBERTS: Mr. President, I have a submission again in the interest of
time. The Defendant Jodl gave evidence as to these conferences, and no
one put one word of cross-examination to suggest that his evidence was
not accepted. Therefore, I would like to submit that this is pure
repetition on a point which is not disputed.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal do not wish to hear anything of a general or
detailed nature about these conferences unless there is something in
particular that you want to prove about them.
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, so as to clarify matters, may I ask at
this time whether the objection raised by Mr. Roberts means that in this
case the rule applies that something which has not been touched upon in
cross-examination can be considered proved? I am not sure whether I have
made myself understood. The objection from the prosecutor apparently is
based on the supposition that something has been heard...
THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think you need lay down any hard and fast rules,
but General Jodl gave general evidence about the nature of these
“situation conferences,” and he was not cross-examined on it. It doesn’t
seem at all necessary to go into the general nature of these conferences
with any other witness.
DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you.
[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, it is possible in military life for
an officer to receive an order with which he does not agree, is it not?
WINTER: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: In that case, is it possible for him to put his divergent
opinion on record?
WINTER: In the German Army, if I remember rightly, such a possibility
existed from the time of Moltke. An order from Hitler which came out in
1938—I think, in winter 1938-39—removed such a possibility once and
for all. An order was issued at the time prohibiting even chiefs of
general staffs and command authorities from putting their divergent
opinions on record.
DR. JAHRREISS: In order to avoid creating difficulties for the
interpretation, will you please explain the word “Aktenkundig”?
WINTER: According to that it was not possible to include in the official
files or in the war diaries of events kept by command staffs any
comments to the effect that the chief was not in agreement with the
decision or order of his superior.
DR. JAHRREISS: It was canceled?
WINTER: These possibilities existed previously, but since 1938 they no
longer existed as they were done away with.
DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you, General, I am now going to have a document
shown to you, Document D-606, a document which the Prosecution also
submitted during cross-examination 3 days ago. I am afraid I do not know
the exhibit number. Perhaps it is...
MR. ROBERTS: Well, that’s the Number 3606. It’s Exhibit GB-292, My Lord.
I put it in separately in cross-examination, in their book...
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Jahrreiss.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, do you know this document?
WINTER: I am acquainted with the document. It has my file reference
number on it.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did you write it yourself?
WINTER: No, General Jodl wrote it personally. But I can see a blank
space under Figure 11. I do not know whether it is complete. The
document consists of a preliminary draft, which is not contained here;
but now that I have looked at it, I can see that it is dealt with in the
file copy from my quartermaster’s department. The third copy must have
been sealed and attached to the same records.
Immediately after the attacks on Dresden, when Hitler had raised the
question of leaving the Geneva Convention, this preliminary draft was
drawn up at my headquarters under the responsibility of General Jodl,
and the order stated that all angles should be worked on which would
prevent the Führer from coming to such a decision—that is, of leaving
the Geneva Convention. This document was carefully worked out from the
point of view of international law and from the point of view of the
psychological effect on the enemy troops, as well as on our own at home.
I myself did it. The following day, my chief, General Jodl, received me.
He had this document, the contents of which I have not checked now, and
he told me that he was completely in agreement with this negative
treatment, but that he had felt obliged to work on the draft in more
detail, and bring it into line with the information he had from the Navy
and so formulate it tactically in such a way that would guarantee its
success with Hitler under all circumstances—for his idea must not be
allowed to be put into practice.
DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you, Mr. President. I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Any other defendant’s counsel want to ask questions?
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, may I ask whether the prohibition
regarding interrogation applies to this witness? And I want to point out
that this witness is a member of the indicted group of the General Staff
and of the OKW.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not know whether he is or not, but it does not
matter whether he is or not. You can question him before the Commission.
I mean, you can call him yourself before the Commission.
DR. LATERNSER: I merely wanted to clarify the matter by means of this
question.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, thanks. Dr. Laternser, if there is any witness who
is not residing in Nuremberg, you can have him kept for the purpose of
having him examined before the Commission if you want to do so.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I only want to ask one question.
[_Turning to the witness._] You have told us that Germany attacked the
Soviet Union in breach of their Nonaggression Pact, because Germany
feared an attack from the Soviet Union.
WINTER: May I be more precise by saying that we, as General Staff
officers in the high command of an army group that was deployed in the
Ukraine, were given that reason by our commanding officer. Whether
politically...
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. We know now from the evidence in this Court that
Hitler decided, in July 1940, to attack the Soviet Union; that on 18
December 1940—446-PS, it is Page 53 of Book 7—that on 18 December
Hitler stated that the Armed Forces must be prepared to overthrow Soviet
Russia in a single attack of lightning-like speed. We know that the
attack was not until 22 June. It does not look as though the leaders of
Germany were very much frightened, does it, of Russia, or should we say
the Soviet Union, breaking the Nonaggression Pact.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Witness, you had to take retaliation measures
in the Ukraine, did you not?
WINTER: We did not undertake any reprisals—as far as the troops were
concerned—in the operational zone of the Ukraine; at least, I have no
recollection now of any such instances.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What measures did you take against the
resistance of the population?
WINTER: During the entire campaign in which Army Group South was
involved, there was no resistance by the population in the operational
zone in the Ukraine. Only in rear areas were there fights, at that time,
with struggling Russian troop units. A resistance on the part of the
population did not occur—as far as I know—until later when the
operational zone had already been limited in the rear, and then there
was resistance against political Reich commissioners.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Very well. You were not there at that time?
WINTER: The command to which I belonged was withdrawn from the front at
the end of January, or in the early days of February 1943. The rear area
lines were at the Dnieper at that time.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
DR. EXNER: Mr. President, in conclusion I have only two interrogatories
to submit to the Tribunal; and I want to read a few lines from one of
them—something which was forgotten.
To begin with, the interrogatory, Exhibit AJ-8, Document Jodl-61, an
interrogatory of Waizenegger, which I herewith submit and beg the
Tribunal to take judicial notice of its contents. And then there is
Exhibit AJ-6, Document Jodl-59, an interrogatory of Brudermüller, with
reference to which I wish to make a similar request. Then, from the last
to be submitted, Exhibit AJ-12, Document Jodl-65, General Greiffenberg’s
statement, I should like to quote the important parts. It is a question
of the attack against Yugoslavia and the question of whether or not,
after the Simovic Putsch, Yugoslavia had already taken up a position
against us. This is in the third volume of my document book on Page 211.
The Simovic Putsch was over, and the question was whether there was an
immediate threat from Yugoslavia at the time.
“Question: Is it a fact that Yugoslavia, immediately after the
_coup d’état_ of the army, started to deploy her armies on all
her borders?
“Answer: I know only the front which was opposite the German
Twelfth Army, located at the Bulgarian border. Here the
Yugoslavs had deployed their armies at the border.
“Question: Is it a fact that the Army ‘List,’ of which you were
the commander at the time, had the order, before the _coup
d’état_ in Yugoslavia, to respect strictly the neutrality of
Yugoslavia during the pending attacks on Greece, and that not
even supply trains should be dispatched through Yugoslavian
territory?
“Answer: I can testify that the strictest order had been given
to respect Yugoslavia’s neutrality.
“Question: Did you hear of any violations of this order?
“Answer: No.”
Gentlemen of the Tribunal, a number of interrogatories have not yet come
in. Whether we are going to get them or not, I do not know. At any rate,
I shall have to reserve to myself the right to submit them later. Apart
from that, I have completed my case.
THE PRESIDENT: On Monday the Tribunal will hear the case of the
Defendant Seyss-Inquart, will it not?
Very well, the Tribunal may adjourn.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 10 June 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIRST DAY
Monday, 10 June 1946
_Morning Session_
THE PRESIDENT: I call on counsel for the Defendant Seyss-Inquart.
DR. STEINBAUER: Your Lordship, High Tribunal, I open the defense case
with the last words spoken by Dr. Schuschnigg as he resigned from the
Austrian Chancellorship on 11 March 1938: “God protect Austria.”
It is a coincidence in history that at a time when the question of the
Anschluss is being discussed here with reference to the person of
Seyss-Inquart, the four Foreign Ministers are preparing the peace
treaties on the basis of the same events. May I, therefore, draw the
Tribunal’s attention to my documents on this matter and ask that I be
permitted to quote from them at somewhat greater length than I had
originally intended?
Now, with the permission of the Tribunal, may I begin with the
examination of the defendant as witness in his own defense.
[_The defendant took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
ARTHUR SEYSS-INQUART (Defendant): Arthur Seyss-Inquart.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The defendant repeated the oath in German._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, when and where were you born?
SEYSS-INQUART: I was born in 1892 in Iglau, situated in what was up to
now a German-speaking enclave in Moravia. Moravia, at that time, was a
crown province of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. There and in the
German-speaking enclave Olmütz, also in Moravia, I lived until the age
of 15, when with my parents I moved into the vicinity of Vienna where I
completed my studies at the Gymnasium and the legal faculty of the
University of Vienna. In August 1914 I enlisted in the Army.
DR. STEINBAUER: Were you in the Army during the whole of the war?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. I served with the Tyrolean Kaiserjäger and saw
fighting in Russia, Romania, and in Italy. On a furlough during the war
I passed my final examinations, and in 1917 I received my doctor’s
degree. I was wounded once, decorated several times, three times for
bravery in the face of the enemy.
DR. STEINBAUER: What impressions of importance for your later life did
you retain from the time of your youth?
SEYSS-INQUART: Relevant to my case is, I think, only the experience of
the struggle between the nationalities in Moravia, between the Germans
and the Czechs. The Germans in those days were in favor of a unified
Austrian state, while the Czechs pursued a predominantly nationalistic
policy. It is, however, not without significance that a language
compromise was agreed upon in Moravia.
DR. STEINBAUER: What lasting impressions did you retain from your
service in the war?
SEYSS-INQUART: Apart from the experience of comradeship at the front, I
remember especially the discussion toward the end of the war on the
Fourteen Points of President Wilson.
DR. STEINBAUER: Their essential content being the people’s right of
self-determination?
SEYSS-INQUART: It was clear to us that the realization of those Fourteen
Points would mean the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. We
Germans regarded it as at least a compensation that in pursuance of this
right of self-determination the German Erblande (the domain of the Holy
Roman Emperors) would be able to return to the Reich from which they had
been separated just 50 years before, in 1866. Yes, these territories had
been created by the German Reich and had been part of it for 950 out of
the 1,000 years of their existence.
DR. STEINBAUER: What did you do after your return from the war?
SEYSS-INQUART: I devoted myself to my legal profession. In 1921 I set up
my own practice, which in time grew into a very successful one.
DR. STEINBAUER: What of your political attitude? Were you a member of
any political party?
SEYSS-INQUART: I was not a member of any political party, because I did
not want to tie myself to partisan politics. I had good friends in all
parties, including the Christian Social and Social Democratic Parties;
but the party programs seemed to me rather one-sided, too much designed
for individual groups of the community.
DR. STEINBAUER: Were you a member of any political clubs, for instance,
the Austro-German Volksbund?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, I was a member of the executive of the Austro-German
Volksbund, because the only political idea to which I adhered after 1918
was Austria’s Anschluss with the German Reich. I witnessed 12 November
1918, when the Provisional National Assembly, in fulfillment of the
right of self-determination, decided that “Austria is a part of the
German Republic.” Furthermore, the Constitutional National Assembly
repeated the decision 6 months later. But the Treaty of St. Germain
forbade the Anschluss. Thereupon the various districts tried to hold
plebiscites; in Salzburg and the Tyrol 98 percent of those entitled to
the vote were in favor of the Anschluss. Dr. Schuschnigg describes these
events in his book, _Three Times Austria_.
The answer was a serious attempt to divide Austria among its non-German
neighbors; but they could not agree on the booty.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, may I at this point submit to the
Tribunal and refer briefly to several documents of my document book? The
first document, to which I have given the Document Number
Seyss-Inquart-1, is on Page 2 of the document book and contains the
proclamation of the German-Austrian deputies after the collapse of the
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy on 21 October 1918. There the second sentence
reads:
“The German-Austrian State claims the territorial jurisdiction
over the entire territory of German settlement areas, especially
in the Sudetenland. The German-Austrian State will fight any
annexation by other nations of territories which are inhabited
by German farmers, workers, and citizens.”
Then, as Document Number Seyss-Inquart-2, I should like to submit—it is
on Page 4 of the document book—the resolution which the witness has
already mentioned, passed by the Provisional Austrian National Assembly
on 12 November 1918, which says:
“German-Austria is a democratic republic. All public authorities
are installed by the people. German-Austria is a part of the
German Republic.”
The leader of the biggest national party of the time, Dr. Karl Renner,
explained the reasons for this law on 12 November and said the
following, which appears on Page 6 as Document Number Seyss-Inquart-3:
“Our great people is in distress and misery, the people whose
pride it has always been to be called the people of poets and
thinkers, our German people of humanism, our German people which
loves all mankind is deeply bowed in misery. But it is just in
this hour in which it would be so easy and convenient and
perhaps also tempting to settle one’s account separately and
perhaps to snatch advantages from the enemy’s ruse, in this hour
our people in all provinces wish to proclaim: We are one family
and one people living under a common fate.”
Then I come to Document Number Seyss-Inquart-4, which is on Page 18...
THE PRESIDENT: Page 8, is it not?
DR. STEINBAUER: Page 18. I beg your pardon, yes, Page 8.
That refers to the plebiscite on 24 April 1921 in the Tyrol, when
145,302 voted for the Anschluss and 1,805 against it. On 18 May 1921,
there were 98,546 votes for the Anschluss in the district of Salzburg,
and 877 votes against it.
Your Honors, while submitting the document, I said that I maintain there
were three component factors leading to the Anschluss: First, the
economic emergency which runs as a recurring theme through the entire
history of the period. Second, the disunity among the democratic
parties, resulting therefrom. Third, the attitude of the rest of the
world, particularly the big powers, toward our small country.
Those thoughts are laid down in my document book, and I should like now
with reference to the economic emergency of that time to submit as my
next exhibit the speech of Prelate Hauser, President of the Austrian
Parliament. The speech, made on 6 September 1919, appears on Page 14 of
my document book. As President of the Parliament he suggested the
acceptance of the Peace Treaty of St. Germain, giving the following
reason:
“The National Assembly has no choice. Country and people need
lasting peace which will open the world to them again morally
and economically and which can once again procure work for the
masses of our people at home and abroad....”
Then in the second paragraph he says:
“It also has no other choice because our country depends on the
big powers for its supply of food, coal, and industrial raw
materials as well as in the re-establishment of its credit and
its currency.”
The same point of view was expressed by the two statesmen Seipel and
Schober. In Document Number Seyss-Inquart-17, Seipel, regarded as the
greatest Austrian statesman, said at that time:
“But we will never believe that the Central European question is
solved as long as the great state which virtually makes up
Central Europe, the German Reich, is not a party to the
solution.”