3. The document is not an affidavit, although according to the last
paragraph General Österreich set it down in his own handwriting; and,
therefore, it could have been certified as a statement under oath.
Because of the severity of the accusation which this document brings
forward against the administration of the prisoner-of-war system, it is
necessary in my opinion to order this general to appear here in person.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes; go on.
DR. NELTE: Those are the reasons for my request. In conclusion I should
just like to point out that General Von Graevenitz is no longer alive.
At all events, he cannot be located. I tried to find him as a witness on
behalf of Defendant Keitel.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it a fact that this document was offered in evidence
as long ago as February or March?
DR. NELTE: I do not remember that, nor—and I know this for certain—was
it issued to us through the Document Division. I am seeing this document
for the first time now. But perhaps Colonel Pokrovsky can give some
information about it.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider your request.
DR. NELTE: May I also call the attention of the Tribunal to the fact
that the document is dated 28 December 1945, and it is to be assumed
that General Österreich can also be produced by the people who took his
testimony at that time.
COL. POKROVSKY: Mr. President, I believe that I can give some
information about this document. It was submitted by the Soviet
Delegation on 12 February 1946, when it was accepted as evidence by the
Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, just a moment. Was it translated into
German then or was it read in Court?
COL. POKROVSKY: I have just received a memorandum from our document
room. The document was submitted on 13 February, at the time when I was
presenting documentary evidence with regard to the subject of prisoners
of war. It is all I have on the matter.
I personally assume that the document was translated into German as a
matter of course at that time. I have almost no doubt about it. However,
we can easily make sure.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any other defendants’ counsel wish to re-examine the
defendant?
DR. EXNER: First of all, I should like to put one question which came up
again during the interrogation by the Defense Counsel. It was a point
which seems to me in need of clarification.
One of the Defense Counsel reminded you of the photographs which were
shown us here depicting atrocities in the occupied countries, and you
said that the pictures were genuine.
What do you mean by that?
JODL: I meant to say that it was not trick photography, at which the
Russian propagandists were past masters, according to my experience. I
meant that they were pictures of actual events. But I also meant to say
that the pictures offered no proof of whether it was a matter of
atrocities at all, nor did they show who committed them. The fact that
they were found in the possession of Germans would even lead us to
assume that they were pictures of things which had been perpetrated by
the enemy, by the forces of Tito or perhaps the Ustashi. Generally one
does not take a picture of one’s own acts of cruelty if any were ever
committed.
DR. EXNER: Very well. The English Prosecutor has submitted a new
document, 754-PS, dealing with the destructions during the retreat in
Norway. Why in this purely military Führer Decree did you write: “The
Führer had agreed to the proposals of the Reich Commissioner for the
occupied Norwegian territories, and has given his orders
accordingly....” and so on? Why did you deliberately put in “to the
proposals,” and so forth?
JODL: In issuing orders I had a kind of secret code for the
commanders-in-chief. If an order was the result of an agreement between
the OKW and the Führer, then I started with the words “The Führer has
decreed....”
If a decree originated from the Führer himself, I started the decree
with a preamble which gave the Führer’s reasons and the arguments in
favor. Then, after the preamble, I wrote “The Führer, therefore, has
decreed....”
If the Führer was prompted by the proposal of a nonmilitary agency to
issue a decree, then, as a matter of basic principle, I added, “The
Führer, on the proposal of this or that civil authority, has
decided....” In this way the commanders-in-chief knew what it was all
about.
DR. EXNER: Did you draft this decree—Document Number 754-PS—without
objection or resistance?
JODL: This decree originated in much the same manner as the Commando
Order. One of the Führer’s civilian adjutants advised me that Terboven
wished to speak to the Führer. He had had trouble with the Wehrmacht in
Norway because of the evacuation of the civilian population from
northern Norway. The civilian adjutant said he wanted to advise me first
before he established connections with Terboven by telephone. Thereupon
I at once had inquiries made through my staff of the commander in
Norway-Finland. I was told that the Wehrmacht—the commander of the
Wehrmacht in Norway had rejected Terboven’s proposals and did not
consider them possible on such a large scale. In the meantime Terboven
had spoken with the Führer. I then remonstrated with the Führer and told
him that, in the first place, the decree and Terboven’s intention were
not practicable on such a scale, and secondly, that there was no
necessity for it on such a large scale. I said that it would be better
to leave it to the discretion of Generaloberst Rendulic to decide what
he wanted or had to destroy for military reasons. The Führer however,
incited by Terboven, insisted on the decree’s being issued on the
grounds of these arguments which I had to set down. But it was certainly
not carried out to this extent. This is also shown by the report of the
Norwegian Government, and it can also be seen from personal discussions
between me and my brother.
DR. EXNER: Now let us turn to something else. When there were drafts and
proposals to be submitted to the Führer, you often voiced objections and
presented arguments. It seems remarkable that when matters contrary to
international law were contemplated you raised no objections on the
grounds of international law or on moral grounds, but you mostly voiced
objections of a practical nature or from considerations of opportunity.
Can you tell us briefly why you acted in this manner?
JODL: I already told you that when I gave my reasons for the formulation
of the proposal not to renounce the Geneva Convention.
DR. EXNER: Namely?
JODL: This form had to be chosen to meet with any success with the
Führer.
DR. EXNER: Yes, that is sufficient. Now, you said yesterday...
MR. ROBERTS: Your Lordship, I object to this merely in the interest of
time, because it is exactly the same evidence which was given yesterday;
and, in my submission, it is pure repetition.
DR. EXNER: This discussion at Reichenhall was mentioned today. Please
tell us briefly how it came about that you made such statements in
Reichenhall or how such directives as you described today were decided
upon in Reichenhall?
JODL: I have already testified about the conversation with the Führer.
DR. EXNER: Yes, it was only a question of provisions...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, the defendant has just told us that he has
given evidence about this already.
DR. EXNER: Yes, about the conversation which preceded it, but you did
not testify about the actual conversation at Reichenhall.
JODL: No, I have not yet spoken of the actual conversation at
Reichenhall.
DR. EXNER: Please be brief.
JODL: In regard to this conversation at Reichenhall—that is, the
orientation of the three officers of my staff—Warlimont’s description
is somewhat different from mine. He is confusing here the earlier events
with the later ones, which is not surprising, because from 20 July until
the time he was arrested, he was ill at home with severe concussion of
the brain and complete loss of memory. Up to the time he was captured he
was no longer fit for service. That my description is the right one may
be readily seen from the notes in the War Diary of the Naval Operations
Staff. It is stated there that these divisions would be transferred to
the East only to prevent Russia from taking the Romanian oil fields.
DR. EXNER: I should like to correct one point which, it seems to me, was
presented erroneously by the Russian prosecutor. He said that Göring and
Keitel did not consider the war against Russia to be a preventive war.
On Page 5956 of the record (Volume IX, Page 344) it states that Göring,
too, considered the war to be a preventive one and that he only differed
in opinion from the Führer insofar as he would have chosen a different
period of time for this preventive war. Keitel was, in general, of the
same opinion.
Furthermore, the Russian prosecutor submitted a document, Number 683-PS.
I do not know what exhibit number he gave. I cannot quite see how this
document is to be connected with Jodl; and I have the idea that may be a
matter of signature, for the document is signed “Joel,” who is not at
all identical with the Defendant Jodl. I just wanted to draw attention
to this point. Perhaps there is simply a mistake in the names.
Further, the Prosecution said that the defendant made a remark about
partisans being hanged upside down, and so on.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, you have simply made a statement, which you
are not entitled to do, about this document. If you want to prove it by
evidence you should ask the witness about it. You have told us that this
document has nothing to do with Jodl, and that the signature on it is
somebody else’s. Why didn’t you ask the witness?
I am told just now that it has already been proved that it isn’t Jodl’s
document.
DR. EXNER: The translations this morning were bad; I do not remember
having heard that. I do not know whether it is permissible for me now in
this connection to read something from a questionnaire? It is only one
question and an answer in connection with this remark about the hanging
of prisoners, and so on. Is that permissible?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, if it arises out of the cross-examination.
DR. EXNER: Yes; the Russian prosecutor brought up the question of
whether the defendant made this remark during the discussions about the
prisoners, in connection with the guerrilla directive—that members of
guerrilla bands could also be quartered during combat.
There it says:
“Question: Is it true or not...?”
Oh yes, I must say that is my Document Number Jodl-60, Exhibit Number
AJ-7. Page 189 of Volume III of my document book. It is an interrogatory
of General Buhle, which was made in America.
Then it says:
“Question: ‘According to a stenographic transcript, you also
took part in a report on the military situation on the evening
of 1 December 1942, which resulted in a lengthy discussion
between the Führer and Jodl as to combating partisans in the
East. Is that correct?’
“Answer: ‘I took part in this discussion, but I no longer
remember the exact date.’”
THE PRESIDENT: What page did you say, Dr. Exner?
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, it is the third page of the third book—or the
third document in the third book.
DR. EXNER: It is Page 189. I have just read Question 4. Now I come to
Question 5:
“Question: ‘Is it or is it not correct that on this occasion
Jodl asked the Führer to return the directive which had been
drawn up in his office relative to the combating of partisans?’
“Answer: ‘That is correct.’
“Question 6: ‘Is it or is it not correct that in this draft the
burning of villages was expressly prohibited?’
“Question 7: ‘Is it or is it not correct that the Führer wanted
to have this prohibition rescinded?’
“Answer: ‘Since I never had the draft of the directive in my
hands, I do not know for certain if the burning of villages was
expressly prohibited. However this is to be assumed, because I
remember that the Führer protested against individual provisions
of the directive and demanded the burning down of villages.’
“Question 8: ‘Is it or is it not correct that the Führer also
had misgivings about the draft because he did not want any
restrictions to be placed on soldiers who were directly engaged
in combating the partisans?’”
According to the minutes Jodl stated in reply:
“This is out of the question here. During the fighting they can
do whatever they like, they can hang them, hang them upside down
or quarter them; it says nothing about that. The only limitation
applies to reprisals after the fighting in those areas in which
the partisans were active....
“Answer: ‘It is correct that the Führer had fundamental
misgivings about these restrictions. Jodl’s remark is correct as
far as its contents are concerned. I can no longer recall his
exact words.’
“Question 9: ‘Is it or is it not correct that following this
remark all those present’—Führer, Keitel, Kranke, and you
yourself—‘including the Führer, laughed and the Führer
abandoned his standpoint?’
“Answer: ‘It is probable that all of us laughed on account of
Jodl’s remark. Whether after this the Führer really abandoned
his standpoint I do not know for certain. However, it seems
probable to me.’
“Question 10: ‘Then how were the expressions “hang, hang upside
down, quartered,” interpreted?’
“Answer: ‘The expressions, “hang,” “hang upside down,”
“quartered,” could in this connection only be interpreted as an
ironical remark and be understood to mean that in accordance
with the directive no further restrictions were to be placed on
the soldiers in combat.’
“Question 11: ‘Could you perhaps say something about Jodl’s
fundamental attitude towards the obligation of the Wehrmacht to
observe the provisions of international law in wartime?’
“Answer: ‘I do not know Jodl’s fundamental attitude. I only know
that Keitel, who was Jodl’s and my own immediate superior,
always endeavored to observe the provisions of international
law...’
“Question 12: ‘Did you ever have the experience yourself that
Jodl influenced the Führer to issue an order which violated
international law?’
“Answer: ‘No.’”
THE PRESIDENT: None of that last part arises out of the
cross-examination.
DR. EXNER: Did you have anything to do with prisoners of war?
JODL: I had nothing at all to do with prisoners of war. It was the
general Armed Forces Department which dealt with them.
DR. EXNER: Now, one last question.
It is alleged by the Prosecution, and during yesterday’s examination it
was reaffirmed, that there was or had been a conspiracy between
political and military leaders for the waging of aggressive wars and
that you were a member of that conspiracy. Can you say anything else
about that before we finish?
JODL: There was no conspiracy...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, the Tribunal does not think that that really
arises out of the cross-examination. Anyhow, he said it already; he said
that he was not a member of a conspiracy. There is no use repeating his
evidence.
DR. EXNER: It was again said yesterday that there was a very close
connection with the Party and the members of the Party and, of course,
that is connected with the conspiracy. That is why I should have thought
the question permissible.
THE PRESIDENT: He said already that he was not a member of the
conspiracy.
DR. EXNER: In that case, I have no further questions.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I merely wish to join in the objection
which Dr. Nelte has raised to the written statement of Lieutenant
General Von Österreich. I refer to the reasons which he has given. That
is all.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Defendant Jodl, you spoke—I think it was the
day before yesterday—about the number of SS divisions at the end of the
war. Do you remember that?
JODL: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I think you said there were 35 at the end of
the war. Is that right, 35 about?
JODL: If I remember rightly, I said between 35 and 38.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Right. Now, what I want to be clear about is
this. You were referring only to Waffen-SS divisions, were you not? Only
the Waffen-SS?
JODL: Yes, only the Waffen-SS. It is true they were...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Were they completely co-ordinated into the
Army and under the command of the Army?
JODL: For tactical operations they came under the Wehrmacht commanders,
but not for disciplinary matters. As regards the latter their superior
was, and remained, Himmler, even when they were fighting.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Was discipline the only thing that brought
them under Himmler’s jurisdiction?
JODL: He was also looked upon as their commander for all practical
purposes. That is seen from the fact that the condition of the
divisions, their equipment, and their losses were frequently or almost
exclusively reported to the Führer by Himmler himself.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): When had they been co-ordinated into the
Army? When? What year?
JODL: They were co-ordinated into the Wehrmacht at the beginning of the
war, at the moment when the Polish campaign began.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, only one other question, about Russia; I
want to see if I understood your point of view clearly. You feared an
invasion of Germany by Russia; is that right?
JODL: I expected, at a certain moment, either political blackmail on the
strength of the large troop concentration or an attack.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, please, Defendant, I asked you if you
did not fear an attack by Russia. You did at one time, did you not?
JODL: Yes, I was afraid of that.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): All right. When was that? When?
JODL: It began through...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): When did you fear it? When did you first fear
that attack?
JODL: I had that fear for the first time during the summer of 1940; it
arose from the first talks with the Führer at the Berghof on 29 July.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Then from the military point of view, from
that moment on, it was necessary for you to attack first, was it not?
JODL: After the political clarification, only then; up to then it had
only been a conjecture.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): How could you afford to wait for the
political clarifying work if you were afraid of an immediate attack?
JODL: For that reason we increased our defensive measures to begin with,
until the spring of 1941. Up to then we only took measures for defense.
It was not until February 1941 we began concentrating troops for an
attack.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, then, just one other question. I am not
at all clear on this. During that attack did you then advise that
Germany attack first, or did you advise that Germany should not attack?
What was your advice? You saw this danger; what did you do about it?
JODL: That problem, too, like most of the others, was the subject of a
written statement I made to the Führer in which I drew his attention to
the tremendous military effects of such a decision. One knew of course
how the campaign would begin, but no human being could imagine how it
would end...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): We have heard all that. I did not want to go
into that. What I wanted to get at is this: You were afraid that Russia
was going to attack. If that was true, why didn’t you advise Germany to
attack at once? You were afraid Russia would attack, and yet you say you
advised against moving into Russia. I do not understand.
JODL: That is not the case. I did not advise against marching into
Russia; I merely said that if there were no other possibility and if
there was really no political way of avoiding the danger, then I, too,
could only see the possibility of a preventive attack.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is all. Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant can return to the dock.
[_The defendant left the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner?
DR. EXNER: I have four witnesses to bring before the Tribunal, but I
should like to begin by making a request. In consideration of my lame
leg may I leave it to my colleague Jahrreis to question these four
witnesses?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly, Dr. Exner.
Dr. Exner, the Tribunal wishes me to say that we allow another counsel
to examine the witnesses as an exception to our general rule that only
one counsel may appear in court and in the presentation of the case on
behalf of the defendant. We will make this exception in your favor.
PROFESSOR DR. HERMANN JAHRREISS (Counsel for Defendant Jodl): In that
case, with the permission of the Tribunal, I will call the first
witness, General Horst Freiherr von Buttlar-Brandenfels.
[_The witness Von Buttlar-Brandenfels took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your name, please?
GENERAL HORST FREIHERR VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS (Witness): Horst Freiherr
von Buttlar-Brandenfels.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat the oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The witness repeated the oath._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, were you in the Wehrmacht Operations Staff
during the war?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: During what period?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I was a member of the Wehrmacht Operations
Staff from 1 January 1942 until 15 November 1944.
DR. JAHRREISS: What was your position on the staff?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I was first General Staff officer of the Army,
and in my capacity as department chief I was in charge of the Operations
Department of the Army.
DR. JAHRREISS: I am going to have a document shown you, Document Number
823-PS, Exhibit Number RF-359. It is in document book Jodl, second
volume, Page 158. Will you please be good enough to have a look at it.
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Do you want me to read the whole document?
DR. JAHRREISS: I want you to glance through it. Who is the author of the
document?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: It is written by the Wehrmacht Operations
Staff, Department QU, Administration Group.
DR. JAHRREISS: By whom is it signed?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: It is signed by me.
DR. JAHRREISS: By you. To what extent is that document connected with
the Defendant Jodl?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: The document has nothing at all to do with the
Defendant Jodl.
DR. JAHRREISS: Then please will you look at the signatures at the upper
right-hand corner on the first page; there is an initial which can be
read as a “J.”
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: That must be a mistake. The initial is exactly
the same as the one which appears below in the signature to the written
note, and this initial is that of the Chief of the Quartermaster
Department, Colonel Polleck.
DR. JAHRREISS: Colonel Polleck?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: If you will look at Page 2, you will see two
signatures at the bottom. The first must be that of the expert. I cannot
recognize it for certain. I take it for the signature of the Senior
Administrative Counsellor Niehments.
DR. JAHRREISS: You mean the initial behind which there are the Numbers 4
or 9 for the date?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I mean the top one.
DR. JAHRREISS: The top one?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: The top one. The bottom initial is the
signature, the initials of Colonel Polleck. When the document had been
submitted to the Chief of the OKW it was returned to me. Then I
initialed it again at the top, and marked it for the Quartermaster
Department, that is the “QU” underlined at the top. Then it was again
initialed by the “QU” chief, and after that it is marked “Administrative
Group” and initialed again by the man who dealt with it. In addition I
should like to point out that all this relates to prisoners of war, and
that was a field of work with which Jodl actually had nothing to do. In
the quartermaster and organizational branches of the Armed Forces
Operations Staff we had several fields of work which, although they came
from his staff...
DR. JAHRREISS: Just a minute, Witness. I do not mind your giving us a
lecture, but I should like to get to the point. There are remarks in the
margin of this document, do you see them?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: Is any one of them written by Jodl?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: No, they are initialed with a “K” for Field
Marshal Keitel.
DR. JAHRREISS: But the French Prosecution assert that these are comments
made by Jodl on the prisoner-of-war question; and if I understood you
correctly, you mean to say that this was not possible at all for reasons
of competency?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Apart from the fact that there is not a mark on
the document made by Jodl, it is unlikely that Jodl had any knowledge of
the affair at all, because of the way in which it had to be dealt with.
DR. JAHRREISS: But is it not correct, Witness, that Department “QU” came
under Jodl?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Actually, it is correct, but in “QU”
Department, just as in “Org.” Department there were several fields of
work which the Generaloberst had given up and which were dealt with
either directly by the head of the department, or through the deputy
chief, with the Chief of the OKW.
DR. JAHRREISS: You say prisoner-of-war questions were among those, is
that true?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Among other things also the question of
prisoners of war.
DR. JAHRREISS: What other work did this Department “QU” have?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: As its main task or in its first department,
“QU-1,” Department “QU” looked after nothing but supplies and also
supervised the provisioning of the various theaters of war, which came
directly under the OKW. The second department was occupied mainly with
military administration, and the third department dealt with general
questions, such as the prisoner-of-war system—for example, questions
concerning international law and so on.
DR. JAHRREISS: Then I have just one more question about these
organizational matters. Were all the departments of the Armed Forces
Operations Staff in the Führer’s headquarters?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: No; for example we had the “Org.” Department,
an organizational department, which was not located at headquarters but
in the neighborhood of Berlin.
DR. JAHRREISS: If I have understood you correctly, the affairs of
Department “QU” by-passed Jodl, so to speak, and were handled with the
Chief of OKW?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Not in every case, but in a certain number of
cases.
DR. JAHRREISS: At all events the question of prisoners of war?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Certainly, the question of prisoners of war.
DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you. Witness, what position did you have at the
beginning of the war?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: At the beginning of the war I was the second
General Staff officer in the Central Department of the General Staff of
the Army.
DR. JAHRREISS: Would you speak a little more slowly. And what were your
duties there?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: My department dealt with the filling of
positions in the higher command offices for mobilization.
DR. JAHRREISS: Those of the General Staff officers of the OKW too?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes, those, too.
DR. JAHRREISS: General, do you know who was meant to be Chief of the
Armed Forces Operations Staff in the event of mobilization from 1
October 1939 on?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes, General Von Sodenstern was meant to hold
this position for the next mobilization year.
DR. JAHRREISS: Am I to understand that if the war had broken out after 1
October—let us say on 5 or 6—then Jodl would not have been Chief of
the Armed Forces Operations Staff at all?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I am not sure of the date on which the new
mobilization year of 1939 to 1940 began. From that time on...
MR. ROBERTS: I submit this testimony is not relevant to any issue in
this case at all, and it may be somewhat interesting to know the answers
that are submitted have no relevancy at all.
THE PRESIDENT: I don’t quite understand what the relevancy of the
evidence at the moment is.
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, if the Prosecution are right that the
Defendant Jodl belonged to a group of conspirators aiming at world
conquest and if, as the Prosecution say, that group of conspirators
obtained use of the German state machine to achieve their aims, then it
must be a somewhat peculiar state system when conspirators are changed
periodically. To that extent I believe the case must be presented to the
Tribunal for consideration.
THE PRESIDENT: Has he been given the dates of his exchanges, without any
cross-examination? He went to Vienna at a certain date, he came back at
another date, and we have no challenge of that.
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, that is a different question. The
Defendant Jodl has said that if mobilization was decreed before 1
October he was Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff and had to
leave Vienna for Berlin. Now the witness says that this was only up to
the new mobilization year and that then the other would have come along
if the war had broken out 14 days later. I think...
THE PRESIDENT: Surely that is extraordinarily remote, Dr. Jahrreiss. You
show us a matter of surmise about what would have happened if something
else would have happened. That does not help us very much.
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, the testimony of the witness is not a mere
conjecture. He only said that the person who held this important
position was disposed of in a routine manner according to date. That was
the only thing to be shown.
May I continue, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT: No, in the interest of time and an expeditious trial, the
Tribunal rules you may not go into that.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, if I now ask you about a certain field of
activity which you just mentioned, it is because I assume that you have
particularly expert knowledge of it. Is it true that you were officially
connected with the suppression of partisans?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes. The chief authority for combating
guerrillas was turned over to my department toward the end of the summer
of 1942, and the tactical basis for combating guerrillas was dealt with
by my department from that date on.
DR. JAHRREISS: Are you familiar with the pamphlet on the suppression of
partisans, issued in May 1944?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes, the leaflet was drawn up in my department.
DR. JAHRREISS: Was that the first one, or had there been a previous
regulation concerning guerrilla warfare?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes. In the autumn of 1942 a short and
incomplete directive had been issued on the subject of combating
guerrillas. At that time we were still comparatively inexperienced; and
since guerrilla fighting had not been anticipated in peacetime, we first
had to get further experience.
DR. JAHRREISS: In this connection I am interested particularly in the
guerrilla fighting in the East and Southeast, on the subject of which
the Prosecution have shown that they have a very definite idea. Is it
correct to speak of a “guerrilla war,” as has been done here several
times?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: It is correct according to the extent and
danger which guerrilla fighting assumed, given its limitations in regard
to time and space.
DR. JAHRREISS: Does that mean that the characteristics of this fighting
went beyond the general conception of the _franc-tireur_ system?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: In extent, yes. In the methods, no.
DR. JAHRREISS: What do you mean by “extent”?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I mean by “extent” the dimensions of the area
affected by guerrilla fighting.
DR. JAHRREISS: Was it therefore unusual with regard to territory or with
regard to people involved?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: The guerrilla fighting was certainly unusual
both in regard to its territorial extent and the people who took part in
it.
DR. JAHRREISS: Do you know, Witness, whether there were many Jews in
these guerrilla groups in the East and Southeast?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I do not remember that among the hundreds of
reports I received on guerrilla fighting, there was never any mention of
Jews. If there were Jews in these groups it can only have been to a very
limited extent.
DR. JAHRREISS: But it has been asserted here that this anti-guerrilla
warfare was carried on for the purpose of exterminating the Jews; is
that true?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I never heard anything about that.
DR. JAHRREISS: Or the extermination of the Slavs?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: There again, I never heard so much as a hint of
such a thing. Such an interpretation would have been quite contrary to
the intentions of the military leaders.
DR. JAHRREISS: Why?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: The military command had a very definite
interest in seeing a peaceful country and a productive population behind
every front; and every measure which aimed at this was always welcomed
by the military authorities. Every soldier we had to use in guerrilla
fighting was urgently needed at the front.
DR. JAHRREISS: Was the policy in the East carried out as the Wehrmacht
command wished for their purposes?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Without any doubt that was not the case,
because the Wehrmacht would have been glad to see a different policy in
the East for the very sake of its volunteer units. We ourselves, with
our own methods, made attempts to reach a bloodless pacification of the
country even among the guerrillas. Big propaganda campaigns were
undertaken there to induce the guerrillas to stop fighting. In certain
cases there were special negotiations with individual groups; and,
although they were limited to certain occasions and periods, these were
most successful.
DR. JAHRREISS: Do you know General Von Pannewitz?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes. General Von Pannewitz was the Commander of
the 1st Cossack Division.
DR. JAHRREISS: When, please?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: It must have been during 1943.
DR. JAHRREISS: Is it correct that this General, as Commander of the 1st
Cossack Division, this volunteer division, once complained to the OKW
about the difficulties he was having in his division?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes. General Von Pannewitz is a friend of mine
from my old regiment. He came to see me at headquarters and on that
occasion—in the summer of 1943 or maybe during the autumn—talked to me
in detail about the state of affairs in recruiting his troops and the
difficulties he was experiencing with the morale of his unit,
particularly because of the Government’s policy in the East. At that
time he complained particularly about the fact that the Government’s
policy held up no national aim for his division; and he made other
complaints about the difficulties incurred by the members of his
division at that time who were partly on the road and had to be settled.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did Jodl take care of the affair?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes. After the visit I reported the subject of
our conversation to the Generaloberst and asked him to use his influence
in the interests of our volunteer units.
DR. JAHRREISS: Influence on whom do you mean?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Influence on the Führer.
DR. JAHRREISS: But you told me that Jodl was not competent for this?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Generaloberst Jodl...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Jahrreiss, what is the relevancy of this, about some
general who commanded a Cossack Division and that he had difficulties
with morale? What has that got to do with this case?
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, that was a preparatory question. I am now
coming to the real question. It is the question of the dividing up of
competency and responsibility. I was just about to ask the witness the
decisive question.
[_Turning to the witness._] General...
THE PRESIDENT: What relevancy have the preparatory questions got to do
with the decisive question? How can a visit of this general have
anything to do with it? What is the decisive question?
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, if I am to give the reason for that, then
I will have to tell the witness what I want him to tell me. Then my
question will become a leading one.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, that is not an unusual thing in this Court.
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes, but I did not want to make that mistake.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, go on, Dr. Jahrreiss. The Tribunal hopes that you
won’t take up too much time over these preliminary questions which are
leading to decisive ones.
DR. JAHRREISS: I am sorry, but I did not understand.
THE PRESIDENT: I said, the Tribunal hopes that you will not take up too
much time with these preparatory questions before the decisive one.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I can abbreviate the examination of the
witness a great deal because I am in possession of an affidavit by this
witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, why are you at the microphone?
DR. LATERNSER: I thought, My Lord, that Dr. Jahrreiss had finished with
his interrogation, that he had no more questions to put to the witness.
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, there is a misunderstanding. The witness
has, in fact, already answered my question.
THE PRESIDENT: He has answered it, has he?
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes, he has answered it. I merely wanted to enlarge on it
a little further but...
THE PRESIDENT: Then you have finished, have you, Dr. Jahrreiss?
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes. I now have no further questions to put to the
witness.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I can shorten the examination considerably
because I have an affidavit from the witness which he made on 20 May
1946. If it is my turn, I propose to submit this affidavit to the
Tribunal. But so that I may not be reproached for not having ascertained
the facts when the witness was available in the courtroom, I will now
ask the witness whether the contents of the affidavit of 20 May 1946,
are correct.
[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, are the contents of the affidavit
which was given me, dated 20 May 1946, correct?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: They are correct.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, do you know General Heusinger?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes, I know General Heusinger.
DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution in their case against the General Staff
submitted Affidavit Number 20, Document Number 3717-PS, Exhibit Number
USA-564; and on Page 2, Figure 4, this general makes the following
statement. I quote:
“It has always been my personal view that the treatment of the
civilian population in operational areas and the methods of
guerrilla fighting in the operational zone offered a welcome
opportunity for the supreme political and military leadership to
carry out their aims, that is to say, to bring about the
systematic reduction of Slavs and Jews.”
I want to ask you now, can you explain how General Heusinger could have
arrived at that view?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I worked closely with General Heusinger and
very often I talked to him about questions concerning anti-guerrilla
warfare.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes.
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: He never said anything to me which might
express this view and I cannot explain this statement of his, because it
is entirely contrary to the basic views of the military leaders in
regard to the conduct of anti-guerrilla warfare.
DR. LATERNSER: Thank you. Why was the general command over
anti-guerrilla fighting in the East in 1943, as well as in Italy at the
end of 1943 and the beginning of 1944, transferred to Himmler by the
Führer’s order?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: The Führer always held the view that
anti-guerrilla warfare was predominantly a task for the Police and that
police forces were more suited to carrying it out than the partly
over-aged security forces of the Army which we could detail for these
tasks. Just how far Himmler wanted to obtain a new increase of power in
this connection I do not know, nor how far he might have suggested it to
the Führer.
DR. LATERNSER: What was the attitude of the OKW and especially of the
Armed Forces Operations Staff to this decree of Hitler’s?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: It must be emphasized first of all in this
connection that, so far as operational areas were concerned, there was
no change. The operational area remained until the end, in the case of
guerrilla warfare too, under the orders of the commanding generals. In
the remaining areas the Armed Forces Operations Staff did not altogether
disagree with this arrangement, because we hoped that in these zones the
Reichsführer SS would be in a position to use some of his reserves,
which were, mostly unknown to us; and we should then have some forces
released for the front.
DR. LATERNSER: Do you remember, Witness, that the Commander, Southwest
made an urgent request to be excepted from this measure, that is, from
transferring his authority in anti-guerrilla warfare to Himmler?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: These cases were discussed with General
Westphal several times over the telephone, and I consider it possible
that he might have made such a suggestion at that time.
DR. LATERNSER: You yourself did not discuss it with the Commander,
Southwest?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: With the chief?
DR. LATERNSER: With the chief, yes. As you have just said, before the
war you were in the Central Department of the General Staff of the Army;
and, as I know, the filling of the higher command positions was handled
there, too. Now I want to ask you on what principles they based their
selection of commanding generals of army groups and armies?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: These appointments were made according to
ability and length of service, and the peacetime appointments formed the
framework for filling positions at the time of mobilization.
DR. LATERNSER: Were these appointments of the higher commanders carried
out strictly from a military standpoint?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: These nominations took place entirely on the
strength of military considerations; and retired officers, some of whom
I am convinced left because of political pressure, were again placed in
responsible positions in the event of mobilization. I should like to
cite as examples General Von Leeb, General Von Kressenstein, General Von
Kleist, Generaloberst Von Hammerstein.
DR. LATERNSER: And these officers you have just mentioned had already
retired before the outbreak of the war but were meant to take over
higher positions of command in the event of a mobilization?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: Did the Central Department, which had to fill these
positions, ever learn that the military leaders had formed a group with
the aim of carrying out aggressive wars and of disregarding
international law in these wars of aggression?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: In the Central Department we knew nothing of
the formation of such a group. Perhaps I may state in this connection
that during the years 1937 to 1939 quite a number of General Staff
officers came to see Lieutenant Colonel Von Zielberg and me, as
personnel administrators of the General Staff officers, and talked to
us. The majority of these officers were chiefs of army corps, army, and
army group general staffs; and they were, therefore, the confidential
and responsible advisers of the commanding generals and commanders.
These officers, just like their commanding generals, had fought in the
first World War; and the opinion they always expressed to us was only
that the German nation should be spared a second war. In spite of every
positive attitude to the Führer’s successes, there was a certain anxiety
about his policy and particularly about the rapid rearmament of the
forces, which made careful work difficult.
After the Munich negotiations confidence increased a great deal and it
was the general opinion of the officers that the Führer would continue
to be successful in maintaining peace.
DR. LATERNSER: What was the attitude of the higher commanders towards
Hitler after the Munich Agreement?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: After the Munich Agreement I concluded from my
talks with General Staff officers that there was a general conviction
among them that, thanks to his policy, the Führer would continue to
preserve peace. I remember that as late as 25 or 26 August I saw the
Führer, at headquarters in Zossen, having a conversation with Lieutenant
Colonel Von Zielberg and several other officers. At that time these
officers were still of the opinion that a war would not occur and that
to render the Führer’s political aims feasible it was only necessary to
keep the troops firmly under control so that no political catastrophe
should be produced by the laying down of arms.
DR. LATERNSER: I think that is enough as far as this question is
concerned. Now, regarding the Ardennes Offensive in December 1944, at
what time were the preparations for that offensive begun?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: So far as I can remember...
THE PRESIDENT: How can that have any relevance after about 5 years of
war?
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, for my next question I should like to ask
the witness who of the commanding generals were informed of this
offensive and when. It is important to ascertain what co-operation there
was among the group. I beg you to allow me to put this question. It is
the last but one. The one I just mentioned is the last.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, go on.
DR. LATERNSER: When were the preparations for the Ardennes Offensive
begun?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: As far as I can remember, the first
preparations were begun in about September 1944.
DR. LATERNSER: When were the commanding generals informed of these
intentions and were commanding generals who did not take part in the
offensive informed before it began?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: To the last question I can answer, “no.” The
first question I cannot answer as far as the date is concerned: but I do
know that in the zone which was proposed for the offensive there had
already been troop movements ordered by the supreme command before the
Commander, West, who was responsible, was informed and that he therefore
made frequent inquiries of us asking for an explanation of these
movements.
DR. LATERNSER: The Commander, West, who later on had to direct the
offensive, was not previously informed about the movements and transfer
of divisions for the offensive, all of which took place in his very
territory?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes. Later on, of course, he was informed.
DR. LATERNSER: Thank you. I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 8 June 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTIETH DAY
Saturday, 8 June 1946
_Morning Session_
[_The witness Von Buttlar-Brandenfels resumed the stand._]
MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, the report is made that the
Defendants Hess and Raeder are absent.
THE PRESIDENT: With reference to the applications for witnesses and
documents that were made the other day in Court, I will take them in the
order in which they were dealt with in Court.
The first application is the application of Kaltenbrunner, and the three
witnesses which he asks for are allowed: Tiefenbacher, Kandruth, and
Strupp.
The application of the Defendant Schirach is rejected.
The applications of the Defendants Hess and Frank for General Donovan
are rejected.
The applications of the Defendants Speer and Keitel are granted, and the
application of the Defendant Jodl for an affidavit I think was granted
yesterday.
The application for the Defendant Göring for two witnesses, Stuckart and
Burmath is granted, but on the condition that three witnesses only may
be called upon the subject concerned.
With reference to the application of the Defendant Hess, the Tribunal
order as follows:
The affidavit of the former Ambassador Gaus of the 17th of May 1946 is
rejected on the ground that it is not in accordance with the permission
given on May 14, 1946, but purports to incorporate not merely the
substance but also the form of the secret treaties, and the form
embraced in the affidavit is not identified as being correct either by a
person who made the copies or by one who compared them with the
originals. Such copies cannot be received in evidence, and the Tribunal
have twice ruled to this effect. The matter of importance to the issues
before the Tribunal is not the form of the treaties, but their contents,
and evidence of their contents is already before the Tribunal by the
testimony of three witnesses. The admission of this affidavit would add
nothing to the proof before the Tribunal. The same is true of the
proposal to call Gaus as a witness, who would only support evidence as
to the contents of the treaties which has not been contradicted. The
motion of the 23d of May 1946 to reconsider the Tribunal’s former
decision and the motion of the 24th of May 1946 to call Gaus as a
witness are accordingly denied.
There is one other matter with which the Tribunal propose to deal, and
it is this: In the future, counsel for the organizations which the
Prosecution have asked the Tribunal to declare to be criminal will not
be permitted to examine or to cross-examine any witnesses other than the
defendants in this Court. If they wish to examine or to cross-examine
those witnesses, they must call them before the commissions which are
now sitting for the taking of evidence oh the questions with which the
organizations are concerned.
That is all.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to voice a further request for the case of
Von Papen. I already submitted a written request on 6 June. This was
discussed with the Prosecution, and the General Secretary has instructed
me to bring this matter to the attention of the Court.
Prince Erbach-Schönberg has filled out an interrogatory. His answers,
however, are partially incomplete and sometimes misleading, and it is
therefore necessary to supplement them. I suggest that Prince Erbach,
who is in Gmunden in the American-occupied zone of Austria, be brought
here and interrogated—outside of this Court but in the presence of the
Prosecution—to supplement this interrogatory.
My associate received a letter some days ago from Count Pfeil, who is
living in Bad Ischl, which is also in the American-occupied zone of
Austria, not far from Gmunden, the residence of Prince Erbach. In this
letter he has made detailed statements about the contacts which the
Defendant Von Papen had with the circle of conspirators involved in the
attempted assassination of 20 July. Since this question was raised by
the witness Gisevius, the Defense feel themselves bound to discuss it in
the presentation of evidence, although they attach no great importance
to it. This evidence can probably be produced by means of an affidavit.
I ask that Count Pfeil be brought here with Prince Erbach at the same
time so that he can depose an affidavit in the presence of the
Prosecution. It is absolutely essential to bring both of these witnesses
here, because the case of Von Papen is imminent, and we could not take
care of these matters by correspondence.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, will you draw our attention to the
particular points in which you say that the interrogatory of Prince
Erbach-Schönberg is incomplete or misleading?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In connection with one of the preceding questions of this
interrogatory, Prince Erbach answered that the Defendant Von Papen had
desired to achieve his assignment by peaceful means rather than by the
use of force. The witness answered a later question as to whether the
Defendant Von Papen acted in accordance with these political principles
as follows:
“As long as I was there I had the impression that the Defendant
Von Papen acted in accordance with these principles—that is,
the establishment of relations by peaceful means rather than by
the use of force.”
This last statement contradicts the first half of the answer. Moreover,
this latter phrasing scarcely corresponds to the facts.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you saying that that answer is incomplete or
contradictory?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: There is a contradiction. “Rather than by force”
contradicts the first half of his reply, that he acted according to
these principles. These questions...
THE PRESIDENT: The answer that I have got is:
“As long as I was there I had the impression that the Defendant
Von Papen acted according to this policy of establishing
relations through peaceful means rather than force.”
There is nothing contradictory in that, in English.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In the German text it says, “rather than with force.” The
word “rather” disturbs me, and is a contradiction. It does not mean the
same thing—namely, that he wanted to bring about connections in a
peaceful manner only and not by force.
THE PRESIDENT: It means the same thing. It means that he wanted to
establish the relations by peaceful means rather than with forceful
means. “Not by force” he means.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: This version might lead to the assumption that the
Defendant Von Papen may even have considered non-peaceful means. We want
to prove, in accordance with the foregoing answer, that he rejected all
means other than peaceful means from the beginning, and never introduced
them into his discussions. However, if the High Tribunal interpret the
interrogatory in the manner which has just been stated, then I have no
further reason to supplement it.
THE PRESIDENT: It couldn’t mean anything else in English. I don’t know
what it could mean in German.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In the German version it is translated, “I would prefer
peaceful means to force; as a last resort, other than peaceful means
might have to be considered.” That would be the interpretation placed on
the German translation.
We want to establish clearly the fact that none other than peaceful
methods were ever considered.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: To save any trouble, I should like to assure the
Tribunal that the Prosecution accepted the answer in the sense which
Your Lordship has just put. We shouldn’t suggest for a moment that
Prince Erbach would make any other answer than in the sense the Tribunal
have accepted it.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps a way of meeting the difficulty would be if you
would agree to read the words in the sense “and not by force.”
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Then, of course, I quite agree. And I should like to have
the Tribunal’s decision as to whether Count Pfeil is to be brought here
to depose an affidavit.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean the other witness?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The second witness, Count Pfeil, who wrote the letter
which we wish to submit to the High Tribunal in the form of an
affidavit.
THE PRESIDENT: We will consider that when we have heard Sir David.
Are there any other inconsistencies or contradictions which you wish to
draw our attention to in the Prince’s interrogatory?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: No.
THE PRESIDENT: Has the letter of Count Pfeil been translated?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: No, it has not as yet been translated. But it is simply a
letter, the identity of which we cannot prove, and that is why we wanted
the affidavit in the proper form.
THE PRESIDENT: Would the letter itself be sufficient if the Prosecution
were prepared to admit the letter?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes, it would suffice, for we could certainly prove
nothing more with the affidavit than what is contained in the letter.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have no objection to admitting the letter, My
Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Thank you, Sir David.
Then the interrogatories of Prince Erbach-Schönberg will be amended in
the way that we have indicated, and the letter of Count Friedrich Karl
von Pfeil will be admitted.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I wonder if Your Lordship will allow me to
mention one point that arose on Tuesday.
Your Lordship may remember that the Defendant Jodl said that he had not
been permitted by the Prosecution to mention a document. My Lord, a
misunderstanding arose in this way. Your Lordship may remember that at
an early stage in dealing with witnesses and applications, I objected to
general evidence of shackling because I said that the Prosecution had
not made the evidence as to shackling by the Germans a part of their
case, and therefore it did not seem to me an issue that need be pursued.
I put that forward, and Mr. Roberts, who was dealing with the later
stages, adopted the same line.
Apparently that was understood as including an objection to the
Wehrmacht order which the Defendant Jodl mentioned, and which he wanted
to use as an answer to a broadcast of the British War Office. This, I
think, is a further remark which could be made. I certainly didn’t wish
to object to the Defendant Jodl clarifying a Wehrmacht order that was
part of the preparations for the Commando Order, and I said so at the
time.
I should not like the Tribunal to think that I was making any reflection
on the learned professors who are conducting the Defendant Jodl’s case,
or putting forward that they had made a basic accusation against me. I
thought, therefore, the Tribunal would allow me just a moment to explain
that it was a misunderstanding, and that neither of us feels that we
have been injured in any way by the other by what has been said.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there anything further that needs to be done with
reference to the admission or introduction of this?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Not at all, because I waived any objection to
it, and the Defendant Jodl was permitted, in giving his evidence, to
make a full explanation concerning it. I only wanted it understood how
the misunderstanding had arisen, and that I did not feel that Professor
Exner or Professor Jahrreiss had made any baseless charges against me in
so doing.
THE PRESIDENT: All right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you very much.
DR. NELTE: I should like to put one question to the witness.
Witness, the charge has been made against the Defendant Field Marshal
Keitel that—and I quote—“rather than back up his subordinate officers
and protect them, he threatened them; yes, he threatened to turn them
over to the Gestapo.”
Can you give us facts about this charge which prove that this was not
the case?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I can testify that Field Marshal Keitel, as
superior, was always very well-disposed toward the officers of the Armed
Forces Operations Staff. For instance, the relations between himself and
Colonel Moench, who was closely connected with him in his military
capacity of Chief of the Organization Division, were almost that of
father and son; and he deeply lamented his death in action on the
Eastern Front.
I can also say that I myself, along with Lieutenant Colonel Ziehrvogel,
the A-1 man on my staff, on the basis of factual disagreement with the
staff of the Reichsführer SS, was in 1944 accused in a letter to Field
Marshal Keitel of sabotaging the co-operation between OKW and
Reichsführer SS and the conduct of the war. In his reply, which I saw
myself, Field Marshal Keitel defended us in every way, and said that he
would take entire responsibility for everything done by his subordinate
officers.
DR. NELTE: Thank you very much. I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any cross-examination?
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I do not propose to cross-examine. That, of
course, will not be taken that the Prosecution is accepting the truth of
this evidence at all. But the whole question of atrocities in the East
has been so thoroughly covered by evidence and by document, My Lord, I
think it would be wrong and repetitious if I cross-examined.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Mr. Roberts.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, there was one other point. Dr. Laternser, in the
interests of saving time, produced an affidavit of this witness dated
the 20th of May 1946.
My Lord, of course, we are most anxious to assist Dr. Laternser in any
effort on his part to save time, and we do not put any objection to this
affidavit. But I am not quite certain as to what the affidavit is, and
as to whether it has been put in as an exhibit—in which case it should
be given a number—or whether it should go to the commission.
THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think it necessary for it to be given an exhibit
number. It was put to the witness, and he says the evidence was correct.
That enables Dr. Laternser to refer to it hereafter.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, My Lord. Then I propose the Prosecution should get
copies. Could that be conveniently arranged?
THE PRESIDENT: Of course.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, Mr. Dodd is pointing out that we have not seen
this affidavit; we do not know what it contains. But we will get a copy,
and if we have any further application to make, we can make it.
THE PRESIDENT: When an affidavit is used in this way and put to a
witness who is in the witness box, of course the affidavit ought to be
supplied to the Prosecution in order that they may see what is in it,
and so be able to cross-examine if they wish to do so.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: That has not been done in this case. The best course
would be for the affidavit to be supplied to the Prosecution, and they
may, if they wish, apply to examine on it before the commission.
Do you think it is necessary? Perhaps you could see the affidavit soon
and decide whether it is necessary to keep the witness here.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I respectfully agree.
THE PRESIDENT: And we shall hold the witness in Nuremberg?
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, we accept the invitation to examine the affidavit
over the week end, and then, if necessary, we could make an application
on Monday.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes; that is quite all right. Then, the witness can
retire.
[_The witness left the stand._]
Yes, Dr. Jahrreiss, will you call the next witness?
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes, if it is the Tribunal’s wish. With the permission of
the Tribunal, I wish to call Major Büchs as my next witness. Major
Büchs.
[_The witness Büchs took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
HERBERT BÜCHS (Witness): Herbert Büchs.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold nothing and add nothing.
[_The witness repeated the oath in German._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, what position did you have in the last years of
the war?
BÜCHS: From November 1943 I was a General Staff officer of the Air Force
serving with the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff; and in that
capacity I was second adjutant to General Jodl.
DR. JAHRREISS: And were you in this position until the end of the war?
BÜCHS: I remained in this position until the end, until our arrest on 23
May 1945.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, during this time in which you were in the
Führer’s headquarters, were you in the various compounds of these
headquarters?
BÜCHS: Yes. I was in the headquarters in East Prussia, and in addition
to that I was in the headquarters in Berlin, and in 1944 also in
Berchtesgaden.
DR. JAHRREISS: It has been said that there was a Party clique at the
Führer’s headquarters. Do you know anything about that?
BÜCHS: If I am to understand by that a circle of people, I would name
Fegelein, Bormann, and Burgdorf.
DR. JAHRREISS: You would say that that was a clique?
BÜCHS: These were three gentlemen who were in very close personal and
official contact, and who made that impression on outsiders.
DR. JAHRREISS: Was this very close official and personal relationship
between themselves or with others?
BÜCHS: They not only had very close relations among themselves, but I
also observed that these three gentlemen had very strong influence on
Adolf Hitler himself.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Jahrreiss, would you ascertain the names of the three
again? They did not come to us quite clearly.
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes.
[_Turning to the witness._] Major, will you please pronounce slowly the
names of these three gentlemen you just mentioned?
BÜCHS: There is Fegelein, Himmler’s liaison officer to Adolf Hitler;
then Bormann, the head of the Party Chancellery and the representative
of the Party; and General Burgdorf, who had a dual position as Chief of
the Army Personnel Office and at the same time Chief Adjutant of the
Armed Forces with the Führer.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did General Jodl have official relations with each of
these three gentlemen?
BÜCHS: If I may start with Fegelein: Fegelein as liaison officer to
Himmler was, as far as the Führer was concerned, the man to whom he
turned in all questions of material and personal equipment of the
Waffen-SS divisions whenever these questions arose during the situation
discussions in connection with putting these divisions into operation.
In this connection, points which fell within Fegelein’s sphere were
frequently raised during situation reports. But the official connection
between Jodl and Fegelein was otherwise very distant.
DR. JAHRREISS: And how about Bormann?
BÜCHS: In dealing with Bormann as Deputy of the Party, General Jodl
always strictly defined his own sphere of military tasks. He always
rejected complaints or unjustifiable accusations or possible attacks
against the Armed Forces. I witnessed this especially while the war was
fought on German soil and there was often friction with the Gauleiter
who had been appointed Reich Defense Commissars. For instance, I saw
that General Jodl on receiving complaints or letters from Bormann simply
returned the originals with rather abrupt marginal notes of his views.
If that had no effect, he did not hesitate to express his views to the
Führer in every possible way in order to obtain his decision as to the
dispute in question.
DR. JAHRREISS: And the third of these gentlemen, Burgdorf?
BÜCHS: To my recollection Generaloberst Jodl had very little official
contact with General Burgdorf, although it was Burgdorf who discussed
the important questions of the appointment of the commanders and higher
officers with the Führer. It was in just such a case that I saw General
Burgdorf first of all discuss these matters with the Führer alone, so
that General Jodl had comparatively little influence in that direction.
DR. JAHRREISS: Now I should like to hear from you, Witness, what
personal relations existed between Generaloberst Jodl and each of these
three gentlemen.
BÜCHS: Jodl disliked Fegelein, because—I believe—he discerned the
defects of his character at a very early stage. I have known him on
several occasions to call Fegelein to account and reprimand him.
As for Bormann, I should say General Jodl had no connection with him at
all. I also have never noticed any personal or informal relations
between them. What I have said about Fegelein also applies to his
relations with General Burgdorf, whom General Jodl probably also
disliked personally.
DR. JAHRREISS: Now I turn to a different point. Witness, do you know
anything about the fact that in the last phase of the war the
possibility of exposing a certain category of captured enemy airmen to
the popular rage was under consideration? Did you hear about that?
BÜCHS: Yes. I recall that in the spring of 1944, at Berchtesgaden, the
Führer vehemently demanded that Allied fliers who made emergency
landings in Germany no longer be protected by the Armed Forces against
the enraged populace. This demand was based on reports alleging that a
Kreisleiter of the Party and an officer of the Air Force had protected
an Allied airman. At that time the Führer made this demand in a very
sharp and pointed manner. He demanded that the Armed Forces issue the
appropriate orders to put a stop to this once and for all.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did Hitler also make this demand of General Jodl?
BÜCHS: This demand was made at a situation conference attended by these
gentlemen and Jodl himself; but I do not think that General Jodl had any
direct connection with the handling of the whole question, as it was not
directly connected with military matters.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did the General make no comment at all on the matter?
BÜCHS: General Jodl, like all the other gentlemen, rejected this demand
and, on his part, did everything he could to try to dissuade the Führer
from this demand. He began immediately by adopting a critical attitude,
which expressed itself later in details he gave of four cases of
violation of international law on the part of Allied airmen.
DR. JAHRREISS: I really do not need to ask you about this, for we have
documentary proof of it. If Hitler was so enraged and demanded a decree
with the urgency you have described, was it possible to pursue a
delaying action?