diary. This entry I made personally, because Keitel told me that during
lunch Reichenau and Sperrle had carried on warlike conversations, that
they had talked about the new rearmament of Germany.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now, in March—I think this is common
ground—you signed or initialed one or two orders for the “Operation
Otto.”
JODL: Yes; but at that time it was not called Otto but “For the March
into Austria.”
MR. ROBERTS: Hitler, when he heard that Schuschnigg was going to obtain
the opinion of the people by plebiscite, decided to invade at once, did
he not?
JODL: Yes, I was told, when he heard that there was to be a grotesque
violation of public opinion through the trick of a plebiscite, he said
that he would certainly not tolerate this under any circumstances. This
is what I was told.
MR. ROBERTS: He would not tolerate public opinion being ascertained?
JODL: No; he would not tolerate public opinion being abused through this
trick. That is how it was told to me.
MR. ROBERTS: So the Armed Forces of Germany then marched into Austria?
That is right?
JODL: That is right; the Wehrmacht marched in.
MR. ROBERTS: And Austria, from that day, received all the benefits of
National Socialism, is that right?
JODL: That is a political question. At any rate it could perhaps have
become the happiest country on earth.
MR. ROBERTS: I wasn’t asking what it could have become, but what it
received. It received the SS, the Gestapo, the concentration camps, the
suppression of opponents, and the persecution of Jews, didn’t it?
JODL: Those are questions with which I did not concern myself. Those
questions you have to put to the competent authorities. In addition it
received me as artillery commander; and they loved me; I only want to
confirm that.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. You say the people appeared pleased to see you?
JODL: The people who were under my jurisdiction were very happy about
this officer; I can say that.
MR. ROBERTS: They had to appear to be, whether they were or not, didn’t
they?
JODL: No, they did not have to be. At any rate, after I had been away
for a long time, they certainly did not have to write enthusiastic
letters to me, letters which I received throughout the war from these
Austrians to whom my heart belonged.
MR. ROBERTS: There was one man who was not pleased to see you, wasn’t
there?
JODL: I know no such person.
MR. ROBERTS: Don’t you?
JODL: No.
MR. ROBERTS: What about Schuschnigg?
JODL: I never saw Schuschnigg. He doesn’t know me and I do not know him.
I don’t know...
MR. ROBERTS: He wasn’t pleased to see you come in, was he?
JODL: I cannot say that.
MR. ROBERTS: What happened to him?
THE PRESIDENT: We know that, Mr. Roberts.
MR. ROBERTS: I quite realize that. I can’t imagine my question is not
admissible, but if you don’t want me to put it—it is one of a series of
questions—I won’t.
Schuschnigg was put in a concentration camp, wasn’t he?
JODL: I was told that the Führer had decided: “I do not want a martyr,
under any circumstances, but I cannot liberate him; I must put him in
honorary custody.” That was the impression I had during the entire war.
MR. ROBERTS: Honorary custody?
JODL: It was called honorary custody.
MR. ROBERTS: What? Was he an honorary member of Dachau?
JODL: That I do not know. Those are not questions that you can put to
me, for I was a soldier and not the commandant of a concentration camp.
MR. ROBERTS: That is an honor that one would be glad to dispense with,
isn’t it?
JODL: I would gladly dispense with much that took place during these
years.
DR. EXNER: Please, I must protest against questions like that, purely
political and based purely on legal questions and on matters which the
defendant cannot at all answer through his own knowledge. It is not a
fact whether Schuschnigg was happy.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, in my respectful submission, these questions are
perfectly proper; they are questions the like of which have been put by
every counsel who has cross-examined both for the Prosecution and the
Defense.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Roberts, the Tribunal thinks that the
cross-examination is proper.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I am passing from that point. I am grateful to
you.
[_Turning to the defendant._] The only question I ask in conclusion is
that Schuschnigg was kept in prison or kept in confinement for several
years without any charge and any trial. That is right, isn’t it?
JODL: It may be, I do not know.
MR. ROBERTS: You knew, did you not, when you signed those orders for the
march into Austria, that Germany had given an assurance in May 1935 to
respect the territorial integrity of the state of Austria and that on
the 11th of July 1936 there had been entered into by your Government and
the Austrian Government an agreement by Germany to recognize the full
sovereignty of the Federal State of Austria? Did you know of these
things?
JODL: At that moment I did not know that; in my position as a colonel in
the General Staff that did not concern me in the least. What would that
have led to?
MR. ROBERTS: I am passing from Austria with this one last question: Is
there an entry in your diary—it is a passage in L-172, the basis for
the draft of your speech—that after the Anschluss Czechoslovakia was
enclosed by pincers and was bound to fall a victim? My Lord, that is
Page 290 of Book 7. Do you remember that passage?
JODL: In the first draft which I made for my Gauleiter speech it was put
down exactly what strategic improvements had taken place through the
various actions of the Führer, in retrospect, but only these strategic
results....
MR. ROBERTS: Well, but—again I do not want to stop you, but did you say
that—something to this effect—and I will give you the document if you
like—that Czechoslovakia was enclosed by pincers and was bound to fall
a victim?
JODL: In the first draft I set down that through the taking
over—through the Anschluss of Austria—the strategic situation of
Czechoslovakia had become so hopeless that at any time it must fall a
victim to a pincers attack; a strategic retrospect about facts,
indisputable facts.
MR. ROBERTS: I accept that, Witness. Now I go very shortly to the case
of Czechoslovakia. I only want to deal really with a couple of
documents. I want to deal with item 17, which the Tribunal will find on
Page 29 of Book 7. And it is marked—if you’ll hand it up—and I have
flagged that for you, Witness, item 17.
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: You are familiar with that?
JODL: Yes, I know that.
MR. ROBERTS: And I do not propose to read it again, because it was read
very recently; but you agree, do you not, you said yesterday, the
problem was this: First of all, you must have a surprise attack; if you
were going to attack at all, you must have a surprise attack.
JODL: On the basis of the stipulations made by the Führer; yes.
MR. ROBERTS: You must have a surprise attack first, and your troops
would take 4 days to get into their battle position.
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: And therefore you must know the time, the incident which is
going to be the cause of the attack; you must know the time when the
incident is going to take place.
JODL: Yes, I said that one would either have to predetermine the time or
one must know it in advance; otherwise the demands could not be carried
out.
MR. ROBERTS: And, therefore, you must create the incident yourself.
JODL: I testified to that at length yesterday. Either one of the many
had to be exploited or perhaps one would have to help the situation
along a bit; but, as I said, those are General Staff considerations
which, when we capture them from the French, you consider entirely
irrelevant.
MR. ROBERTS: It is set down at the end of the document on Page 30 that
either the Wehrmacht or the counterintelligence section would be charged
with the manufacture of the incident in the last paragraph.
JODL: Yes, I therefore wrote: “In case the counterintelligence service
is not charged with the organization of an incident _aside from
that_”—“in case.” These are all theoretical deliberations of the
General Staff in a situation, which I depicted quite accurately
yesterday, where such incidents already occurred every day.
MR. ROBERTS: I know. Then, if this had taken place, the world would have
been told that because of that incident Germany had been compelled to go
to war?
JODL: I do not believe that this would have been reported to the world.
Rather, I believe the true reason would have been told the world, which,
furthermore, was made known constantly through the press, that 3½
million Germans cannot be used as slaves by another people permanently.
That was the issue.
MR. ROBERTS: If the world is going to be told the truth, what is the
earthly good of manufacturing an incident?
JODL: I testified as to that yesterday—I can only repeat what I said
yesterday at length: I knew the history of war too well not to know that
in every war things like that happen—the question as to who fired the
first shot. And Czechoslovakia at that time had already fired thousands
of shots which had fallen on this territory.
MR. ROBERTS: Now, I say, Witness, subject to correction, that you are
not answering the question at all. The question was a very short one and
you make a long speech about something quite different. The question is,
if the truth was sufficient to justify your going to war, why should you
want to manufacture an incident? If you can’t answer it, say so.
JODL: Well, it isn’t at all confirmed that I wanted to bring about an
incident. I wrote, “in case ... not.” We never prepared one and that is
surely the essential thing.
MR. ROBERTS: I won’t argue any further with you. I have put my point and
will leave it. But now I want, on quite another point, to refer to the
last paragraph on Page 29, the same document:
“Even a warning of the diplomatic representatives in Prague is
impossible before the first air attack, although the consequence
could be very grave in the event of their becoming victims of
such an attack.”
Perhaps you would read this paragraph, known already to the Tribunal.
“...death of representatives of friendly or confirmed neutral
powers.”
That means an air raid before there has been any declaration of war or
any warning to the civilian population, doesn’t it?
JODL: That meant that I called the attention of the Führer, through this
document, to the fact that on the basis of his decree that result could
or would come about.
MR. ROBERTS: Would you call that a terror attack? A terror attack?
JODL: It cannot be said under what conditions such an action would be
launched. These are all theoretical tasks for our General Staff. How and
if that was translated into practice, that no one can say, whether with
justice or injustice; that depended on the political decision.
MR. ROBERTS: I will show you later how those thoughts were carried into
practice in the case of other countries. So we will leave that document
altogether now and I will leave the case of Czechoslovakia. Now you were
recalled to the OKW on the 23d of August 1939, from your artillery
employment. We know that, don’t we?
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: That was a great compliment to the opinion that the Führer
had of you, wasn’t it?
JODL: The Führer was not responsible for my being called back. I do not
know whether he knew about it at all. I do not believe so.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. On a very small point, Witness, you told the
Court yesterday or the day before that you never had a conference with
the Führer, I think, until September 1939; but your diary, on the 10th
of August 1938—it is Page 136 of Book 7—your diary said you attended a
conference at the Berghof with the Army chiefs and the Air Force groups.
Didn’t you meet the Führer then?
JODL: That which you asserted in your first sentence, I did not say.
What I said was, word for word:
“On 3 September I was introduced to the Führer by Field Marshal
Keitel, and on this occasion, at any rate, I spoke with him for
the first time.”
That is what I testified to, word for word, yesterday. I had seen the
Führer a dozen times before then and I had heard him when he delivered
his big speeches, after he was Reich Chancellor and Supreme Commander.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, I accept that. It is quite likely that I was wrong.
Now, with regard to the Polish campaign, did I hear you right when you
said that Warsaw was only bombed after leaflets had been dropped?
JODL: That applies to the period of the siege of Warsaw. The terror
attack, I might say, which was to hit the entire city through artillery
bombardment, that took place after two previous warnings.
MR. ROBERTS: It is a matter of history, is it not, that Warsaw was
bombed, with many other Polish towns, in the early hours of the 1st of
September 1939 before any declaration of war? Isn’t that a matter of
history?
JODL: As far as this historical fact is concerned, Field Marshal
Kesselring, who is very well informed about this, testified to that here
in detail. He said—and also Reich Marshal Göring—that on this date the
militarily important objectives throughout Poland were attacked but not
the population of Warsaw.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. You are quite right, now Kesselring—If the
Tribunal wants the reference, he gave evidence as to the bombing of
Warsaw, the English transcript, Page 5731 (Volume IX, Page 175).
[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, I suppose the result of the Polish
campaign was naturally a source of satisfaction to all of you?
JODL: The military development of the Polish campaign, from the military
point of view, was extremely satisfactory to us. Of course things happen
in life that would give more satisfaction than a military action.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, now, I want you to look at a letter. This is—My
Lord, this is a new exhibit, D-885, and it is GB-484.
That letter is in your writing, is it not? Is it in your writing?
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now, it is written to Police President Dr. Karl
Schwabe, Brünn, Moravia, Police Presidency, dated October 28, 1939:
“My dear Police President: For your enthusiastic letter of 22
September, I thank you heartily. I was quite particularly
pleased about it. This wonderful campaign in Poland was a grand
opening for this hard and decisive struggle and has brought
about for us an unusually favorable point of departure
politically as well as militarily. The difficult part for the
people as well as the Armed Forces is still ahead.”—I propose
to read it without comments and comment afterward.
“But the Führer and his associates are full of the greatest
confidence; for the sanctimonious British will not succeed in
throttling our economy, and militarily we are without worry.
Decisive is the will of the people to stick it out, and this the
many strong-willed and devoted men who are today at the head of
the districts and in other responsible posts will take care of.
This time we will show that we have better nerves and greater
unity. That you, Police President, will contribute your weighty
share to keeping the Czechs at it and not let them perk up, of
this I am convinced.”
Then he is very pleased about the high recognition granted to the
troops:
“Thanking you heartily once more for your words of appreciation
which exceed my modest contribution in the shadow of the
powerful personality of our Führer. I am with a Heil Hitler.”
Why did you call the British sanctimonious? Because they keep treaties
and don’t have concentration camps and don’t persecute Jews? Is that why
you thought we were sanctimonious, because we don’t break treaties?
JODL: No, that was not the reason. The reason was that the political
situation generally was represented that way, and that I was actually of
that opinion at the time.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now you deal with:
“Decisive is the will of the people to stick it out, and this
the many strong-willed and devoted men who are at the head of
the districts and in other responsible posts will take care of.”
Who were these strong-willed and devoted men? Is that the SS and the
Gestapo?
JODL: No, these are the Gauleiter.
MR. ROBERTS: The Gauleiter?
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, but I mean we have one or two Gauleiter here,
Gauleiter Sauckel, for instance; in a large area like Thuringia, he
couldn’t do much by himself, could he? He would have to have some SS or
Gestapo, wouldn’t he?
JODL: We are not at all concerned with that here. The fact is that these
Gauleiter actually directed the organization of the State and the
administration in this war in a noteworthy way. Despite the catastrophe
the people were much better taken care of than in the years 1914-18.
That is uncontested and it is to the credit of these people.
MR. ROBERTS: They were better taken care of?
JODL: Even in the most terrible conditions at the end every man in
Berlin received his normal rations. It was a model of organization, I
can only say that.
MR. ROBERTS: And a model of organization because no opposition to the
government or the Party was allowed, was it?
JODL: Certainly, it made it easier on one hand, and on the other hand,
led to terrible catastrophes about which, of course, I only heard here
for the first time.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Well, the letter speaks for itself, and I will
go along. May I just ask you about this last sentence:
“That you, Police President, will contribute your weighty share
to keeping the Czechs at it and to not let them perk up...”
What did you mean by that?
JODL: Since he was Police President in Brünn, it was his task to see
that quiet and order were maintained in Brünn and not to tolerate a
Czech uprising at our backs while we were at war. That is a matter of
course. I did not say that he was to murder or germanize the Czechs at
all, but he had to keep them in order.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. I pass from that now and I want to go to the
various campaigns in the West. Now, with regard to Norway, of course you
knew that your country had given its solemn word repeatedly to respect
the integrity of Norway and Denmark, did you not?
JODL: I said yesterday, with reference to the two declarations of...
MR. ROBERTS: Please answer my question, it is such a simple one.
JODL: Yes, I believe, I recalled that at the time. I am quite sure.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good; and we know there was an assurance at the
beginning of the war to reassure all these western neutrals, and there
was another assurance on the 6th of October; and you say that in
November Hitler decided to invade Denmark and Norway?
JODL: Yes. I testified as to that at length yesterday.
MR. ROBERTS: I know you did. Please don’t always say that. I have got to
ask you to go over the same ground from the other angle, you see.
“Norway,” as your speech said—and I am quoting from Page 291 of Book
7—perhaps you had better give it to him—Page 11 of your notes...
[_Turning to the Tribunal._] It is in the middle, My Lord, under
Paragraph 8:
“In the meantime we were confronted by a new and urgent problem:
The occupation of Norway and Denmark....
“In the first place there was danger that England would seize
Scandinavia and thereby, besides effecting a strategic
encirclement from the north, would stop the import of iron and
nickel which was of such importance to us for war purposes.
Secondly, it was with the realization of our own maritime
necessities”—“Notwendigkeiten”—that is the word, isn’t
it—“Notwendigkeiten”...
My Lord, that ought to be “necessary” and not
“imperative”—“erforderten.”
“...which made it necessary for us to secure free access to the
Atlantic by a number of air and naval bases.”
[_Turning to the defendant._] You wanted air bases and U-boat bases,
didn’t you?
JODL: Militarily they were tremendously important to us, there is no
doubt about that; but the prerequisites to taking them, those were the
reports which we had, the threat to Norway.
MR. ROBERTS: What I suggest to you, you see, is this: In this, like the
case of the other three Low Countries—in this case, you simply made an
excuse. You thought England might do something, although she had not
done it for months, and you breached Norway’s neutrality at your own
chosen time. Is that right?
JODL: In order to answer that question “yes” or “no,” one would have to
undertake a very thorough study of all the historical documents on both
our own and the other side. Then one can say if it is correct or not.
Before that has been decided, only a subjective opinion exists. I have
mine, and you have another.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes. And I point out to you that it was Germany on every
occasion who violated the neutrality. The other countries, the Allies,
did not.
JODL: In the case of Norway, the English did that first in the case of
the _Altmark_ by laying mines and by firing upon German ships in
Norwegian territorial waters. That has been proved indisputably. There
is no doubt about that.
MR. ROBERTS: The _Altmark_, as you very well know, Witness, was not an
occupation at all; it was merely the act of the British Navy in taking
British prisoners from a German prison ship, and I imagine your Navy
would have done the same if they had had the chance. What is the good of
talking about the _Altmark_? It was not an occupation at all.
JODL: But it was a violation of international law as far as Norwegian
sovereignty was concerned. You could only request that Norway do that,
but you yourselves could not carry out a combative action in Norwegian
waters. I know the regulations in this connection exactly.
MR. ROBERTS: Why should you break your word to Norway and cause untold
suffering and misery to the inhabitants of that country because the
British went into the territorial waters and took out a few hundred
prisoners? What is the logic of it? Why should the Norwegians suffer for
it?
JODL: You are just quoting one small example from the tremendously real
picture of England’s occupation, but there are hundreds of them.
MR. ROBERTS: It is the example you quoted, Witness, not I. I did not
quote it.
JODL: I can only say that we were under the definite subjective
impression that we carried through an enterprise, in the last second,
for which British troops were already embarked. If you can prove to me
that is not true, I shall be extremely grateful to you.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, now I am going to call your attention to the only
outside evidence that you have produced about that, because it was read
rather hurriedly—quite rightly, yesterday.
[_Turning to the Tribunal._] My Lord, it is in Jodl’s Document Book 2,
and it is Page 174. Well, My Lord, it begins at Page 174. My Lord, that
is on the left-hand top corner. Page 174 says that Albrecht Soltmann was
an expert specialist, that he evaluated files from the British landing
brigade, and that he examined diaries. That is on the second page, and
the bottom of Page 175:
“The documents and statements by prisoners showed that a short
time before our landing in Norway the British invasion troops
had been embarked on destroyers. On the following day they were
again disembarked and remained in the vicinity of the port of
embarkation. They were then reembarked after the German invasion
of Norway for the second time and transported to Norway. What
intention the English pursued in the embarkation of their troops
before our landings could not be determined from the documents
and from the statements of prisoners. Whether they intended to
occupy Norway before our invasion could at that time only be
conjectured, because the prisoners did not make any exact
statements in this respect. The conjectures are based on the
special equipment of these British troops. Insofar as I could
evaluate the documents and statements furnished by prisoners
they did not contain proof of the English plans with regard to
Norway.”
And this is the next question:
“Have not the results of all documents and statements furnished
by prisoners been to the effect that in the invasion of Norway
we arrived only just ahead of the English?
“Answer: ‘Yes, the information in the documents and the
statements furnished by prisoners could be interpreted to mean
that in our invasion we were just ahead of the English. However,
whether this was considered unmistakable evidence I cannot
judge.’”
And then they deal with French documents captured in a railway train.
The witness does not know anything about them.
[_Turning to the defendant._] That is pretty poor evidence, isn’t it, on
which Norway was to be invaded, contrary to all the treaties and all the
assurances?
JODL: I quite agree with you on that; you are quite correct. But that is
only because Soltmann was unfortunately not the expert in this field. He
was not even an officer of the General Staff. I had forgotten that. We
had further and quite different evidence which lay before me on my desk;
namely, all the commands carried by the English landing brigade. They
confirmed our assumptions absolutely and definitely.
MR. ROBERTS: An invasion without any warning or any declaration of war?
JODL: That is a political question.
MR. ROBERTS: You have told the Court yesterday what a stickler you were
about international law, how keen you were to see that international law
was observed. You knew that was against international law, didn’t you?
JODL: These matters were not in our regulations, but only the provisions
which applied to the Wehrmacht. The concept of an aggressive war was not
found in any regulation. We went only by the Geneva Convention and the
Hague Land Warfare Regulations.
MR. ROBERTS: I mean if an honorable German gives his word he keeps it,
does he not? He does not break his word without saying that he is going
to depart from it, does he, an honorable German?
JODL: That seems to be a practice which is generally observed all over
the world when human beings work together, but not in the sphere of
politics.
MR. ROBERTS: If that is your code of honor, why is it not grossly
dishonorable for Germany to break her word over and over and ever again?
Or would you rather not answer that question?
JODL: No, you would do better to put that question to the people who
were responsible for German politics.
MR. ROBERTS: Very well, I will leave that. Now I want to come to the
invasion of Holland, Belgium, and the Netherlands. I beg your pardon,
the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg.
You have no doubt at all, have you, on the documents that in the event
of war in the West, it was always Hitler’s intention to violate the
neutrality of those three small countries?
JODL: From the beginning, in his orders for the attacks in the West, he
had the intention to go through Belgium; but he had reservations with
regard to Holland for a long time, which were only rescinded later—I
believe in the middle of November. Regarding Holland his intentions were
not specific. Regarding Belgium his intentions in that direction were
known comparatively early, that is, about the middle or the early part
of October.
MR. ROBERTS: You could not, of course—I mean Germany naturally wanted
to wage an offensive war and an offensive war in somebody else’s
country. That is the ambition, naturally, isn’t it?
JODL: The German objective in this war was to win, at that time.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes. You couldn’t attack in the West unless you attacked
through Belgium, could you?
JODL: In any event, any other attack was tremendously difficult and was
highly doubtful. I have already said that.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes. That is why, of course, France built the Maginot Line,
so that you couldn’t attack her frontally.
Well, now, if you secured the coast of Belgium and Holland, you secured
air bases from which you could annihilate England or Great Britain. That
is what you hoped, wasn’t it?
JODL: No doubt the strategic position of Germany in the battle against
England improved through our having the coast; that is true.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes. May I just remind you of a few documents which the
Tribunal know already. I do not intend to read them, but the first
document in order of date is 375-PS, USA-84, dated 25 August 1938. It is
during the Fall Grün time. That was the Air Force appreciation which, in
the last paragraph of the document, Page 11, I think, it says:
“Belgium and the Netherlands in German hands would represent an
extraordinary advantage in the air war against Great
Britain....”
And the Army is asked to say how long it would take.
That was at the time of the Czechoslovakian crisis, wasn’t it?
JODL: Yes, but this document, I believe, has already been characterized
as a ridiculous piece of paper, being the work of an insignificant
captain.
MR. ROBERTS: He seems to have been a very good judge, at any rate,
judging what happened afterwards.
Well now, the next document—I know you were in Austria, but no doubt
you heard about it from Keitel—was the Chancellery meeting the 23d of
May 1939. That is L-79, it is Book Number 7, Page 275. Do you remember
there that the Führer said:
“The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be militarily occupied.
Declarations of neutrality must be ignored....
“In this matter, considerations of right and wrong or treaties
have no significance....
“The Army will have to take positions essential to the Navy and
the Air Force. If Belgium and the Netherlands are successfully
occupied and held, if France is also defeated, then fundamental
conditions for a successful war against England will have been
secured....
“Daily attacks by the German Air Force and Navy will cut her
life lines.”
There wasn’t any doubt as to the policy of the Führer in May 1939, was
there?
JODL: It was in Court here that I first heard about this conference and
about the things which were purportedly discussed at that time; and I am
not able to judge whether it is correct, for I did not hear it, not even
from Keitel, not even later.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Did you hear about the speech made by the Führer
on the 22d of August 1939?
[_Turning to the Tribunal._] I do not know if the Court has got this. It
is not in the Document Book; 798-PS, in Document Book Number 4. There
are some loose copies, My Lord.
[_Turning to the defendant._]
“Those countries”—Holland, Belgium—“and Scandinavia will
defend their neutrality by all available means. England and
France will not violate their neutrality.”
You always thought Hitler was a good prophet, didn’t you? You thought
Hitler was a good judge.
JODL: Very often, yes, very often.
MR. ROBERTS: And he was a good judge that England and France would keep
their word, whereas Germany would break hers.
Now, then, that is August. Now then I want to...
JODL: But that I don’t know.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now, I want to come to the document which you
put in yesterday.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, wait a minute. Defendant, what do you mean by
saying you don’t know that? Do you mean that you did not know the
document? You said, “I don’t know that.”
JODL: I do not know what the Führer actually said in his conference on
the 22d of August. I did not even know that a discussion had taken
place, for I was in Vienna. I only know what is ostensibly in documents
which have been submitted here.
MR. ROBERTS: Now I want to put the whole Document L-52. Dr. Exner, quite
properly of course, read some extracts; but I want to read some more.
Have you got copies for the Tribunal?
Now, L-52 was Hitler’s memorandum on the 9th of October 1939. May I
point out that the 9th of October 1939 was 3 days after his renewed
assurances to the western neutrals.
I want to refer—certain passages you have read; I want to refer to
others.
[_Turning to the Tribunal._] My Lord, what I am now reading from,
starting with the outside page, is the 5th page. It is Page 27 of the
original, which appears in the bottom right-hand corner.
[_Turning to the defendant._] I read the paragraph on Page 25 of your
original, Witness.
“Germany’s military means of waging a lengthy war are, as far as
our main enemy is concerned, the Air Force and the U-boat arm.
“The U-boat can even today, if ruthlessly employed, become an
extraordinary threat to England. The weaknesses of German U-boat
warfare lie in the great distance of approach to the scene of
their activity, in the extraordinary danger attached to these
approaches, and in the continual threat to their home bases.
That England has not, for the moment, laid the great mine fields
as in World War I, between Norway and the Shetland Islands, is
possibly connected—provided the will to wage war exists at
all—with a shortage of necessary blockade materials. But if the
War lasts long an increasing difficulty to our U-boats must be
reckoned with in the use of these only remaining inward and
outward routes. Every creation of U-boat bases outside these
constricted home bases would lead to an enormous increase in the
striking power of this arm.”
Is that a covert reference to the Norwegian bases, do you think, giving
access to the Atlantic?
JODL: I do not believe so. I believe it is a general correct naval
strategic consideration and can apply just as well to a base at Murmansk
which, for instance, we already had at that time, or in Spain, or in
some other state that was neutral at the time; but it is not a reference
to Norway, for I have declared under oath that at the time, the Führer
never gave a thought to Norway, not the slightest thought, before he
received the report from Quisling.
MR. ROBERTS: I have your answer. Now, may I go on reading?
“The German Air Force: It can only succeed in effective
operations against the industrial center of England and her
south and southwest ports, which are gaining in importance
during the war, when it is no longer compelled to operate
offensively from our present small North Sea coast by
tremendously devious routes involving long flights. If the
Dutch-Belgian area were to fall into the hands of the English
and French, then the enemy air forces, in order to strike at the
industrial heart of Germany, would need to cover barely a sixth
of the distance required by the German bomber to reach really
important targets. If we were in possession of Holland, Belgium,
or even the Straits of Dover as jumping-off bases for German air
attacks, then, without a doubt, Great Britain could be struck a
mortal blow, even if the strongest reprisals were attempted.
“Such a shortening of the air approaches would be all the more
important to Germany because of our greater difficulties in fuel
supply. Every 1000 kilograms of fuel saved is not only an asset
to our national economy, but means that 1000 kilograms more of
explosive can be carried in the aircraft; that is, 1000
kilograms of fuel would become 1000 kilograms of bombs. This
also leads to economy in aircraft, in mechanical wear and tear,
and above all, in the precious blood of soldiers.”
Then I ask you to turn to your Page 41.
My Lord, it is two pages on, and Your Lordship will see “41” nearly at
the top of the page, with an asterisk, and the heading, “The German
Attack.” Has Your Lordship got it?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: “The German Attack. The German attack is to be
launched with the fundamental object of destroying the French
Army, but in any case it must create a favorable initial
situation which is a prerequisite for a successful continuation
of the war. Under these circumstances the only possible area of
attack is the sector between Luxembourg in the south and
Nijmegen in the north, excluding the fortress of Liège. The
object ... is to attempt to penetrate the area
Luxembourg-Belgium, and Holland in the shortest possible time
and to engage and defeat the opposing Belgian-French-English
forces.”
I suppose I can’t ask you to say what is your opinion of the honesty of
giving those western neutrals a guarantee on the 6th of October and
saying that is the only possible means of attack in that memorandum of
the 9th. I suppose that is a question of politics, is it?
JODL: That is a political question, but the declarations were always
made only on the condition of the strictest neutrality of these
countries. But this neutrality was not kept, for British fliers flew
over this area by day and by night.
MR. ROBERTS: Why should the wretched people of the Netherlands and
Belgium be destroyed and mutilated because British airmen fly over their
territory—destroyed and mutilated by the German Army? What is the logic
of your remark at all?
[_Turning to the Tribunal._] My Lord, there was one more passage from
that document I should like to read. If Your Lordship is thinking of
adjourning, perhaps I might read it, and then I will have finished with
the document. My Lord, it is the next page, and it is toward the end of
the page. It is against the lettering—the number L-52. It is just
above, “Time of Attack.”
[_Turning to the defendant._] It is on your Page 52, Witness, at the
very beginning, or just at the end of Page 51:
“All the leaders must keep firmly fixed in their minds the fact
that the destruction of the Anglo-French Army is the main
objective, the attainment of which will make possible the
prerequisite conditions for later and successful employment of
the German Air Force against other objectives. The brutal
employment of the German Air Force against the heart of the
British will to resist can and will follow at the given moment.”
Did that mean terror attacks against the civilian population?
JODL: You are asking me continually about a document which from the
first to the last word was written by the Führer, as I have already told
you. You are producing a rather interesting picture of the Führer as a
strategist and as a military leader, and it is of interest to the world;
but I cannot see how this concerns me. These are the thoughts which the
Führer put down as military commander and are of great interest for all
soldiers in the world. But what does it have to do with me? That I do
not understand.
MR. ROBERTS: But may I point out, Witness, that your own counsel
produced it and you relied on certain parts of it. That is how it
concerns you; you relied on it.
JODL: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
MR. ROBERTS: Witness, I only have two other questions on the alleged
aggression against the Low Countries. Will you look at your diary,
1809-PS, for the 8th of May 1940. It is Page 141 in Document Book 7, and
it is Page 115 in the German book. The actual quotation is Page 143 in
the Document Book 7; at the top of the page: “8 May. Alarming news from
Holland, canceling of furloughs, evacuations, road blocks, other
mobilization measures.”
Were you afraid that the Dutch might actually take some steps to defend
themselves against your invasion?
JODL: I was sure that the Dutch would defend themselves against Germany.
MR. ROBERTS: Was it alarming you because you thought the Dutch might
have suspected you were going to break your treaties and assurances?
JODL: I did not understand the question.
MR. ROBERTS: I will go on:
“According to the intelligence reports the British are said to
have asked for permission to march in, but the Dutch refused.
According to reports, measures of the Dutch partly directed
against the coast and partly against us. Not possible to obtain
a clear picture whether the Dutch do not work hand in hand with
the English or whether they really want to defend their
neutrality against the first attacker.”
It is clear from that, is it not, that you had no information at all
that Dutch neutrality was going to be broken?
JODL: That is not clear from the entry; it is only a brief argument on
the basis of masses of reports which we received from Canaris on that
day or on the previous day. If they were to be followed up accurately,
the reports immediately preceding this entry would have to be at hand;
the entry refers to the latest reports, and not to the many thousands
which had come in before.
MR. ROBERTS: Now, on the 10th of May without any declaration of war
these three countries, small countries, were invaded with all of the
armed might of Germany, were they not?
JODL: The attack began on the 10th of May along the whole front.
MR. ROBERTS: What had those countries done at all to deserve the horrors
of invasion and the misery of German occupation?
JODL: That, again, is a historical question. I have already said that
according to my personal point of view England and France in fact forced
them to give up their strictly neutral attitude. That was my impression.
MR. ROBERTS: Their only fault, was it not, was that they stood in the
way of your air bases and U-boat bases?
JODL: They were not only in the way, but by tolerating actions
incompatible with neutrality, they helped England in the war against us.
That was my subjective impression.
MR. ROBERTS: Now, I have only got—with the permission of the Tribunal,
there was one question I should have asked on Norway; only one; and if I
might go back to that, I want to ask you about your diary entry,
1809-PS, Page 143 in Document Book 7. I have not got a reference to the
German but it is about at that place. I will read it slowly: “13 March:
Führer does not give order yet for ‘W’”—Weser—“He is still looking for
an excuse”—or “justification”—to use your word. And the next day: “14
March: Führer has not yet decided what reason to give for Weser
Exercise.”
If you had a good reason for breaking Norwegian neutrality, why should
the Führer be unable to find one?
JODL: Because for this operation the Führer considered it absolutely
necessary to have some documentary proof. So far, there had only been
very strong indications which came near to a proof, but we had as yet no
documentary evidence.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. I leave that part of the case, and I now go to
Yugoslavia, and I have only two or three questions on Yugoslavia.
I want you to look at Document 1746-PS, Page 127 in Document Book 7;
German book, 112.
Before we deal with the document, Witness, Yugoslavia had also received
assurances from Hitler. That is so, is it not, or do you not know?
JODL: Yes. Not only did Yugoslavia receive assurances from Hitler, but
we also received them from the Yugoslav Government, which had concluded
a treaty with us on the previous day.
MR. ROBERTS: Now, you will find the document I am going to refer to—it
has got a piece of paper headed with the German word for “discussion,”
“Besprechung.” Have you found it? It should be a piece of paper with the
word “Besprechung.”
JODL: “Discussion on the Situation in Yugoslavia”; yes.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, that is right.
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: Dated 27 March 1941?
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: Now if you turn to—I think it is Page 2:
“The Führer is determined, without waiting for declarations of
good faith from the new government, to make all preparations to
destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a national unit. No
diplomatic inquiries will be made; no ultimatum presented.
Assurances of the Yugoslav Government, which cannot be trusted
for the future, will be taken note of. The attack will start as
soon as the means and the troops suitable are ready. It is
important that action be taken as fast as possible.”
Now I go to Page 3, Witness:
“Politically it is especially important that the blow against
Yugoslavia is carried out with unmerciful harshness and military
destruction is done in a lightning-like undertaking.”
Now I go to Page 5, Witness:
“The main task of the Air Force is to start as early as possible
with the destruction of the Yugoslav Air Force ground
installation, and to destroy its capital, Belgrade, in waves of
attacks.”
The Führer was not going to give the civilian population even half an
hour’s warning, was he?
JODL: I do not know what preparations for warning the Yugoslav
Government had been made, but at the moment of the Putsch it immediately
made military preparations and deployed its forces along our border.
MR. ROBERTS: May I ask you this? Do you approve, as an honorable
soldier, of attacking a city crowded with civilians without a
declaration of war or even half an hour’s warning?
JODL: I do not hold that view. I have already said that I, personally,
and half an hour or an hour later the Reich Foreign Minister, suggested
an ultimatum.
MR. ROBERTS: When you lost air superiority and people were able to hit
back, you Germans made a great deal of fuss then about terror attacks,
did you not?
JODL: This city was at the same time the center of a Putsch government
which had annulled a treaty concluded with Germany, and which from that
moment on had made preparations along the whole front for war with
Germany.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, I am going to leave the incident. Do you remember how
you referred to it in the notes for your lecture? It appears on Page
127—no, My Lord, it does—I beg your pardon, it appears on 292 of Book
7 and at 304 of the German. You refer to it as “an interlude.” Do you
remember? The German word is “Zwischenspiel,” “interlude.” Is that your
idea of an interlude?
JODL: To be juridically exact, you mean the first draft of my lecture
and not my lecture which you do not know. However, even in this first
draft I cannot recall mentioning an interlude.
MR. ROBERTS: How many civilians, how many thousands, do you think were
killed in the first movement of that “interlude”—in the bombing of
Belgrade without warning?
JODL: I cannot say, but surely only a tenth of the number killed in
Dresden, for example, when you had already won the war.
MR. ROBERTS: Now I come to the alleged aggression against the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics. Hitler decided to attack the Soviet Republic
in July of 1940, did he not?
JODL: In July of 1940 he had not yet reached that decision.
MR. ROBERTS: But at any rate—I do not want to waste time—we know that
on the 22d of June 1941 Germany invaded the Soviet Union contrary to her
nonaggression pact. That is history, is it not?
JODL: Yes. The surprise attack on 22 June 1941 is a historical fact
which took place because the politicians were of the opinion that the
Soviet Union had not kept the pact.
MR. ROBERTS: Now, Witness, I am going to pass from this part of the case
altogether. I want to put one last question: Do you not think that this
record of broken pledges will dishonor the name of Germany for centuries
to come?
JODL: It might, if historical research after exact investigation of
Russian documents delivers clear proof that Russia had no intention of
strangling us politically or of attacking us. In that case, yes;
otherwise, no.
MR. ROBERTS: I now want to ask—to come to quite a different part of the
case under Count Three and Count Four. The documents have been put to
you so often. I do not want to put them again.
But, you remember the “Barbarossa” order. That is C-50, in Document Book
7, Page 187; and German book, 146. That was circulated by your office,
was it not, Wehrmachtführungsstab, L?
JODL: It was dealt with in the Quartermaster Section of the
Wehrmachtführungsstab.
MR. ROBERTS: Well now, would you agree that that was a shameful order to
have to issue?
JODL: I agree. I have already said that there was no soldier who was not
opposed to this order; they all did so.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now we know that on the 17th of July—and this
is Document C-51, which is in Document Book 7, at Page 190, German Page
150—we know that from the same office, the WFSt, L, there was issued an
order that the previous order was to be destroyed, but its validity was
not to be affected, destroyed below corps level. What was the object of
the destruction of that order?
JODL: Unfortunately I cannot tell you; I do not recall this order. I do
not believe I ever saw it, at least not before this Trial.
MR. ROBERTS: Perhaps you would look at it, Witness, C-51, Page 190, Book
7; 150, German book. Now, that comes from WFSt—that is,
Wehrmachtführungsstab—Department “L”; and then “Q” for “Quartermaster,”
in brackets. That is your office, is it not?
JODL: That is a part of the Wehrmachtführungsstab.
MR. ROBERTS: It is signed Keitel.
JODL: Yes. But I do not know this order; it was shown to me for the
first time here in Nuremberg; I had never seen it before. I do not know
what it is about or what order is being rescinded. I have already said
that these questions of military legal jurisdiction were dealt with by
Field Marshal Keitel, and that he used my Quartermaster Section as a
working staff without my having any part in these matters. I do not know
this order.
MR. ROBERTS: And you cannot suggest any reason why it had to be
destroyed?
JODL: No; I cannot give you any information about it.
MR. ROBERTS: Now then, I want C-52, which has not yet been put in. Your
Lordships will find it on Page 191 of Book 7. I offer it as GB-485, and
it is in the German book on Page 153.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, this is another Keitel order. It
comes from Wehrmachtführungsstab, L; then, in brackets, “I Op.” Is that
your department?
JODL: That is the section which worked with me on all operational
questions.
MR. ROBERTS: Do you remember that order?
JODL: Yes, I remember the order.
MR. ROBERTS: Now—I think you took part in drafting it; did you not?
JODL: Certainly, because it is an operational order which supplements a
directive.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, well, will you look at Paragraphs 6 and 7? Paragraph
6:
“In view of the vast size of the occupied areas in the East,
forces available for establishing security will be sufficient
only if all resistance is punished not by legal prosecution of
the guilty, but by the occupation forces spreading such terror
as is alone appropriate to eradicate every inclination to
resist.
“The respective commanders, together with the troops at their
disposal, are to be held responsible for maintaining peace in
their respective areas. The commanders must find the means of
keeping order within the regions where security is their
responsibility, not by demanding more forces, but by applying
suitable Draconian measures.”
That is a terrible order, is it not?
JODL: No, it is not at all terrible for it is established by
international law that the inhabitants of an occupied territory must
follow the orders and instructions of the occupying power, and any
uprising, any resistance against the army occupying the country is
forbidden; it is, in fact, partisan warfare, and international law does
not lay down means of combating partisans. The principle of such warfare
is an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth, and this is not even a
German principle.
MR. ROBERTS: Is it not the tooth and the eye of the innocent?
JODL: It is not a question of the innocent. It expressly states, “to
eradicate every inclination to resist.” It is a question of those who
resist, that is, by partisan warfare.
MR. ROBERTS: I will not argue about it, Witness. I gather you approve of
the order.
JODL: I approve it as a justified measure conforming to international
law and directed against a widespread resistance movement which employed
unscrupulous methods. Of that we had evidence.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now I want to come to something quite different.
I want to come to the Commando Order, and I desire to put in two
documents which have not yet been put in, to trace the history of the
making of this order, because I suggest it was drawn up in your office
under your jurisdiction.
Will you give the witness, please, 1266-PS, which I offer, My Lord, as
GB-486.
Now, this is the first document, dated the 8th of October. That is a
memorandum from the “Q” branch of the Wehrmachtführungsstab; that is
right, is it not?
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: And it was—that is the wireless order that you mentioned?
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: First it deals with the “tying up,” My Lord, which is not
important. Secondly, the wireless announcement of the 7th of October
1942, which reads as follows:
“All terror and sabotage detachments of the British and their
accomplices who do not behave like soldiers but like bandits
will in future be treated as such by German troops and will be
ruthlessly slain in battle wherever they make their appearance.”
[_Turning to the defendant._] Well, of course, that order does not mean
very much, does it? It assumes that the enemy are not behaving like
soldiers, but like bandits, and says they may be slain in battle.
But then the second paragraph:
“The Deputy Chief of the Operations Staff...”
That was Warlimont, was it not, Witness?
JODL: Yes, that was Warlimont.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes.
“...has given the following urgent task to ‘Q’:
“1) Drafting of the order.”
Look at Number 2:
“Like the Barbarossa order issued at the time this order must
also be drawn up—in conjunction with the Armed Forces Legal
Department and Counterintelligence—with great thought and care.
Distribution down to armies only, from there forward only
orally. To be destroyed after having been taken cognizance of.”
What was the nature of that order that was drawn up with so much care by
your staff and the Legal Department and Counterintelligence?
JODL: I believe that was Document C-50, which you mentioned earlier. The
Barbarossa order is not a clear term.
MR. ROBERTS: “The following must be borne in mind regarding the
contents of the order:
“In cases where captives are temporarily taken into custody for
our own purposes, the persons concerned are to be handed over to
the SD by Counterintelligence after a thorough examination in
which the SD is also to take part.
“Not to be lodged in prisoner-of-war camps under any
circumstances.
“This order is to take effect subsequently with regard to the
people from Norway.”
The people from Norway were some English Commandos who had blown up a
power station in Norway; is not that so?
JODL: That is possible, but I do not know. I have never seen this.
MR. ROBERTS: I think I will be able to remind you later about it.
The next document I do not read. It is from somebody called “Dr. Hülle,”
whom I do not know, and I do not think it adds anything to it.
Then the next document—the third in Your Lordship’s bundle—is dated 9
October and is signed “Warlimont.” Is it dated 9 October, Witness?
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: Signed Warlimont?
JODL: Signed by Warlimont.
MR. ROBERTS: It sets out the first facts in the first two paragraphs
that we know:
“The Führer wishes an order to be issued laying down the proper
behavior of the Armed Forces.
“At the instance of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, the Armed
Forces Legal Department has drawn up the draft attached hereto.
“You are requested to co-operate in a thorough examination, if
necessary, calling in the Reichsführer SS.
“We refer to the discussion between Chief of Counterintelligence
and the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff.”
Then the next document is the draft order prepared by the Legal
Department:
“Members of terror and sabotage detachments of the British Armed
Forces who demonstrably break the rules of an honorable way of
fighting will be treated as bandits: To be exterminated
mercilessly in battle or in flight. If in case of military
necessity they should be temporarily arrested, or if they fall
into German hands outside combat actions, they are to be brought
before an officer immediately for interrogation and are then to
be handed over to the SD.
“Holding them in a prisoner-of-war camp is forbidden.
“This order may be distributed only down to armies. From there
to the front it must be transmitted only verbally.”
And did you—do you remember having a conversation on the telephone with
the head of the Legal Department about this order?
JODL: No, I do not remember.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, will you look at the next document; it is dated 14
October. It is in the same bundle, the next page of it—I beg your
pardon, it is a memorandum. Now you notice the heading, the original
heading was: “Reprisal Actions—Prisoners of War.” Somebody struck that
out and put instead: “Combating of Enemy Sabotage Detachments.”
“Memorandum. (Telephone discussion with the Chief of the Armed
Forces Legal Department).
“The Chief of the Armed Forces Legal Department has spoken with
the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff by telephone.”
That is you, is it not?
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: “The latter”—that is you—“said that the Führer’s
aim in this action was to prevent this manner of waging war
(dropping small detachments who do great damage by demolitions
and then surrender).”
That was the object of the order, was it not?
JODL: Yes, but by using methods contrary to international law.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, that is a matter perhaps neither for you nor me to
discuss. But if I might be allowed to ask you this question: Do you draw
any distinction between a British airman who bombs a power station from
the air and a British parachutist in uniform who is landed and blows it
up with an explosive? Do you draw any distinction in international law?
JODL: No. As such, the destruction of an objective by a demolition troop
I consider completely admissible under international law; but I do not
consider it admissible during such an operation for civilian clothes to
be worn under the uniform and armpit pistols to be carried which start
firing as soon as the arms are raised in the act of surrender.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, there are two things there, you see, and one answer
and I am not going to argue at all with you; but when you consider the
case you will find many, many cases where these persons were executed
and there is no suggestion they had anything but a uniform at all.
JODL: I believe that these cases were quite rare, that at least these
people were mixed with those who wore civilian clothes.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, I am not going to argue with you because there are
other documents and they will have to be, perhaps, summarized sometime.
But would you agree that a parachutist in uniform, with no civilian
clothes, acting like that, if he is killed, shot by the SD, would you
agree that that would be murder? Or would you rather not answer that?
JODL: I have already said that if a soldier in full uniform only blows
up or destroys an objective, I do not consider it an action contrary to
international law; and for that reason I opposed the Commando Order in
this form almost to the last moment...
MR. ROBERTS: I hear your answer and I will not pursue that matter. Then
the document goes on—I do not want to read it all:
“The Chief of the Armed Forces Legal Department spoke to the
effect that under these circumstances one should consider
issuing an order fit for publication. Article 23c of the Hague
Land Warfare Regulations, which forbids the killing or wounding
of an enemy who lays down his arms or is unarmed, if he
surrenders unconditionally, had to be explained; when the Land
Warfare Regulations were concluded this manner of waging war was
not yet known and the regulation therefore could not apply to
this.”
Well now, that was the first bundle. Now I want to put you a...
JODL: I should like to make a brief comment on this document. I have not
seen any of these papers before; I am now seeing them for the first
time; but they prove, word for word, what I said here the day before
yesterday under oath, that on their own initiative, the members of my
staff, as they heard that the Führer had demanded an executive order,
began preparatory work for the draft of such an order with the Legal
Department and with the Foreign Department, but that I did not accept
and did not submit any order to the Führer.
MR. ROBERTS: Well now, I want to put to you another document, 1265-PS.
My Lord, I offer it as GB-487.
Now the first document in the bundle is a teletype dated 13 October and
it is signed by Canaris. Is that right, Witness?
JODL: Yes, a teletype message from Canaris.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, and it is a teletype to the OPS Staff. The subject is
“Treatment of Prisoners of War.”
“Regarding discussions and measures in pursuance of OKW’s
announcement of 17 October 1942 the following general attitude
is taken:”
Number 1 does not matter; it is about chaining. Number 2 is the
important one:
“Treatment of Sabotage Units: Sabotage units in uniform are
soldiers and have the right to be treated as prisoners of war.
Sabotage units in civilian clothes or German uniform have no
claim to treatment as prisoners of war (_francs-tireurs_).”
You agree, of course, with the correctness of that, do you not? The rest
of that document does not matter. You agree, do you not, with that
opinion in Paragraph 2, as a man who knows international law?
JODL: Yes, I agree with Paragraph 2; it corresponds entirely with my
opinion; it agrees completely with my point of view.
MR. ROBERTS: And now the next document.
If you go to the—if the Tribunal would kindly go to the last document
of the three; and would you go to the document which is headed,
“Telephone call; Reference: Letter Ausland Abwehr of 13. 10. 42.” My
Lord, that is the one I have just read.
“Opinion of the Armed Forces Legal Department”—Paragraph 2,
that is referring to Canaris’ opinion—“Fundamentally in
agreement.
“It may, however, be possible to support the following train of
thought with regard to special cases:
“Fighting methods such as exist now and such as it is intended
to prevent came about long after the creation of the Hague
Regulations for Land Warfare, in particular as a result of war
in the air. Special attention is drawn to the mass use of
parachutists for purposes of sabotage. Anyone who commits acts
of sabotage as a soldier with the intention of surrendering
after the act of sabotage without fighting does not act like an
honest fighter. He misuses Article 23c of the Hague Regulations
for Land Warfare during the formulation of which no such methods
were contemplated. The misuse lies in the speculation on
surrender without fighting after successful completion of the
act of sabotage.
“This view regarding the inadmissibility of sabotage Commandos
can be backed up without reservation provided we also apply it
to ourselves.”
That document has your initial on the top, Witness? Is that right?
JODL: I have read this document. It contains a statement on
international law by the Armed Forces Legal Department, which on this
point agrees with the Führer’s opinion. It actually confirms the
possibility that a misuse of international law may be committed by
surrendering immediately after an action and thus securing for oneself
complete absence of danger in the conduct of a war operation. That
interpretation is disputable; I do not fully approve of it, but it was
the view of the highest legal authority at that time.
MR. ROBERTS: Many, many brave soldiers, when they are outnumbered,
surrender, do they not? Many Germans surrendered at Bizerte and Tunis,
thousands of them. How did that put them outside the pale of
international law or the protection of it?
JODL: But they were soldiers captured in the normal manner of war, which
the Führer always recognized. This is a disputable case and very
doubtful under international law, but, as I said, it is not an idea of
mine and has nothing to do with me; I only took note of it.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. My Lord, the intermediate document is a letter
signed “Lehmann,” who was head of the Legal Department. It merely
confirms the telephone conversation which I have read, and I do not
think it is necessary to read it again. It is before the defendant.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Well now, the last of these documents
before the order was finally drawn up and issued, the Court has already
seen, because it was put in.
It is 1263-PS, RF-365, My Lord, it was in Jodl’s Document Book Number 2,
Page 104.
Will you look at the original, please.
There is an unfortunate omission from Page 110 in Dr. Exner’s book,
which I am perfectly certain is quite inadvertent. Will you look at the
document dated 15 October 1942?
My Lord, I think that is the first in your bundle. It is Page 110. It is
first in the single documents. It is Page 110 of Dr. Exner’s book, and I
apologize to him because I have just seen the marginal writing. It was
covered over before, and I had not seen it. I apologize.
My Lord, the...
It is a note, is it not, Witness, signed Warlimont, your deputy, 15
October. I think you will find it the second document in your file. I do
not want to read it all again because it has been read, but you see:
“The Proposal of the Amt Ausland Abwehr will be submitted as Appendix
1.”
The Tribunal will find Appendix 1, in which he says—in which it is
suggested, under letter “A,” that sabotage troops who do not wear
uniforms should be court-martialed. You have said “no.” You have given
your reasons. I will not worry you about that any more. And then “B”;
members of sabotage units, who are in uniform but are guilty of
dishonorable activities are after capture to be put into special
confinement. Do you say that that does not go either?
And then, if you will go back to 15 October, just the second paragraph
down:
“The Chief of WR”—that is the Legal Department—“has made a
statement to the effect that the order was to be drawn up in
such a way that it will take into account our own interests...”
Is it “our own interests,” Witness? “Take into account our own
interests”?
JODL: Yes, “our own interests.”
MR. ROBERTS: “...our own interests while considering the future
conduct of the war. In this way he wanted to avoid repercussions
which would run counter to our further intentions. Sabotage is
an essential part of conducting war in time of total warfare; we
ourselves have strongly developed this method of fighting.”
And you write against that, do you, “But the English make much more use
of it”?
JODL: Yes, it is an undeniable fact that at that time of the war the
English made much more use of it than we.
MR. ROBERTS: Is that a reason for making a law, an order of this kind,
to try and discourage the English from using sabotage detachments?
JODL: No, that is certainly not a reason. It is only a denial of the
statement that we had strongly developed this method of fighting; hence
my remark, “Yes, but the English to a much greater extent than we.”
That, of course, has nothing at all to do with the reason for the order.
MR. ROBERTS: Then I am not going to take more time on that particular
document, except—have you got a document dated 14 October with 1, 2, 3,
4 at the end? I think it is on a separate page, the 1, 2, 3, 4.
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: It says:
“With the view in mind—to prevent the enemy’s fighting the war
by using sabotage troops—following questions have to be
clarified before formulating an order:
“1) Have we ourselves the intention of dropping sabotage Units
in the zone of rear echelons of the enemy, or also far back in
the interior?
“2) Who will drop more sabotage troops, the enemy or we?
“3) Can we establish the principle: Sabotage troops do not
conduct legal war; they are to be exterminated in the fighting
without mercy?
“4) Do we attach importance to first arresting the single
members of this group for interrogation by Counterintelligence
and not killing them immediately?”
These were the considerations which were discussed in your office before
the orders were drawn up.
JODL: These were questions—not points of view—questions which were
raised in the Armed Forces Operations Staff as a result of the Armed
Forces communiqué. Fortunately, the submission of all these documents
proves the complete correctness of everything I said here 2 days ago.
The staff, the Legal Department, and the Ausland department racked their
brains and pondered how they could draw up the executive order
implementing the Führer’s additions to the Wehrmacht communiqué. Neither
they nor I came to any conclusion, and no proposal was made to the
Führer; nothing was done. That is what I stated here the day before
yesterday, and that is what, fortunately, you yourself have proved by
submitting these documents.
MR. ROBERTS: You have said, I think, that part of the Führer’s order
disgusted you?
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: And you have said in your interrogation that circulating
this order was one of the things which went against your inner
conscience—one of the few things. “Your inner convictions”—to use your
actual words.
JODL: In the preliminary interrogation I said that it was one of the
few—or the only—order I received from the Führer which I, in my own
mind, completely rejected.
MR. ROBERTS: You rejected it, but these young men went on being shot,
did they not?
JODL: I have already described exactly how the commanding generals at
the front, vigorously supported by me, interpreted this order in the
mildest imaginable way in practice; actually, only very few such
incidents occurred, and I believe that most—at any rate, nearly all
that came to my knowledge—were highly justified, because the fighting
methods of those people were not methods of honest soldiers.
MR. ROBERTS: You see, you talk about your “inner convictions.” I think
Keitel spoke about his “inner conscience.” But should we have heard
anything about these convictions and this conscience if Germany had not
lost the war?
JODL: No, but then we might have heard of the strangled at Dieppe in a
similar trial.
MR. ROBERTS: It is very late and—now, I just want to deal with a few
examples, very very quickly, of the order being carried out, as you said
it was only carried out a few times. I just, first of all, want to refer
to UK-57, which is Page 309 of Document Book 7, the German copy Page
33—German copy Page 344. I am sorry, I had given you the wrong number.
I can read this out. It is a report which is initialed by Keitel.
“On 16 September 1942”—mark the date, that is more than a month
before the Commando Order came into force—“10 Englishmen and 2
Norwegians landed on the Norwegian coast, dressed in the uniform
of the British Mountain Rifle Regiment, heavily armed and
equipped with explosives of every description. After negotiating
difficult mountain country, they blew up important installations
in the power station Glomfjord on 21 September. A German sentry
was shot during the incident. Norwegian workmen were threatened
that they would be chloroformed if they resisted. For this
purpose the Englishmen were equipped with morphium syringes.
Seven of the participants have been arrested. The others escaped
into Sweden.”
Then follow seven names, which I read out to this Court, I think, in
January. They were shot on 30 October 1942. That would be, shot as a
result of the order which you circulated, although it was not in
existence when those men blew up that power station. You told me some
little time ago that that power station was a proper military target.
These men were in uniform. Can you begin to justify that?
JODL: No, I cannot justify that, and I will not justify it. I consider
it completely illegal, because this order could certainly not have been
retroactive; but I did not learn of this affair at the time. Of UK-57 I
read the first and second parts here for the first time; the third part
I read in April 1944.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, now, there are other exhibits dealing with this
matter which I am not going to put to you. They have been referred to
before, and I do not want to be cumulative. I would like you—or perhaps
I will ask you one question first.
I think it was laid down, was it not, that every action taken under this
Führer Order was to be reported in the Wehrmacht report?
JODL: Yes, that was ordered.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, I just want to give you an example of the Wehrmacht
report.
526-PS, USA-502, My Lord, it is 7a, Page 15. It is dated 10 May 1943,
German Page 21 of the small book.
[_Turning to the defendant._] It is a notice from the “Q” branch of your
staff.
“On 30 March 1943 in Toftefjord an enemy cutter was sighted.
Cutter was blown up by enemy. Crew: 2 dead men, 10 prisoners.
“Cutter was sent from Scalloway (Shetlands) by the Norwegian
Navy.
“Arms: Two Colt machine guns, two mounted machine guns, a small
transmitter ... 1,000 kilograms of explosives....
“Purpose: Forming an organization for sabotaging strong-points,
battery positions, staff and troop billets, and bridges....
“Führer order executed by the SD.
“Wehrmacht report of 6 April announces the following:
“In northern Norway an enemy sabotage unit was engaged and
destroyed on approaching the coast.”
That was false, was it not?
JODL: I confirmed this communiqué of 6 April which included the
contribution from the commander in Norway as I received it on 6 April;
this brief formulation always originated with the commander at the
front. But what actually happened is set down in this note of 10 May
which, most unfortunately, I never saw, because on 10 May 1943 I
traveled by train to Bad Gastein to begin a cure for a severe case of
lumbago; and so, unfortunately, I saw this document for the first time
here in Nuremberg. I am sorry, because this would have been one of the
few cases in which I might have been able to intervene.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, but, Witness—keep it in front of you—because you see
the action was not taken on 10 May; it was taken before, or on 6 April.
Look at the last paragraph:
“Wehrmacht report of 6 April announces the following:
“...enemy sabotage unit engaged and destroyed on approaching the
coast.”
Whereas, in fact, they had been taken prisoner and then shot like dogs
by the SD.
JODL: Yes, I have just said that. Before this contribution of 6 April, I
heard nothing about the whole matter, but only on the 10th of May did it
come to our knowledge, and then the Armed Forces Operations Staff drew
up this note. The whole investigation into these events was made by the
Intelligence Service, the office of Canaris, together with its Security
Police; it was not the SD; that is wrong; it was the Security Police.
Unfortunately I did not know of these details; the Intelligence Service
knew them. I was concerned with the whole question only because I had to
edit the Armed Forces communiqué; otherwise I would never have dealt
with the Commando Order; I was quite innocent of it.
MR. ROBERTS: Now I just want to show you one more instance. It is
2610-PS.
It is, My Lord, in small Document Book 7a, Page 23, the German small
book Page 41.
Now, I want you to notice, Witness, this is the only document which I
rely on, which is not one of your own captured contemporaneous German
documents. This is a report from the Judge Advocate General’s
Department, United States Army. It concerns 15 United States personnel
who were shot under this order. If you look at the second page:
“On the night of 22 March 1944, 2 officers and 13 enlisted men
of the Special Reconnaissance Battalion of the Army of the
United States disembarked from some United States Navy boats and
landed on the Italian coast near Stazione di Framura. All 15 men
were members of the United States Army and were in the military
service of the United States. When they landed they were all
properly dressed in the field uniform of the United States Army
and they had no civilian clothes. Their mission was to demolish
a railroad tunnel on the main line between La Spezia and Genoa.
That rail line was being used by the German Forces to supply
their fighting forces on the Cassino and Anzio Beachhead
fronts.”
That was a good military target, that tunnel, was it not?
JODL: Yes, a military target, absolutely.
MR. ROBERTS: And all 15 men were shot because of the order that you
circulated...
JODL: I did not understand. The order which—which I circulated; yes.
MR. ROBERTS: Which you circulated on the 19th of October. You circulated
a supplementary order to the Führer Order, the last paragraph of which,
I think, disgusted you. That is 503-PS.
JODL: It would be more correct to say “which you had to circulate.”
MR. ROBERTS: I will take that question up in a moment. I do not agree. I
must not argue with you, but I must put some questions.
General Dostler, who ordered the shooting of those men, he himself, you
see, was also shot by sentence of this court martial.