DR. HORN: Generaloberst, is it true that the Foreign Office from the
very outbreak of the Russian war was completely eliminated from Eastern
questions, that Ribbentrop complained personally and through his liaison
man, Ambassador Ritter, and that he had no success with his suggestions
to the Führer?
JODL: I know that Ambassador Ritter, who came to see me very often,
repeatedly complained in private talks about having such a large part of
its field of activity taken away from the Foreign Office, and I must
assume that that was not only the opinion of Ambassador Ritter but also
the opinion of the whole Foreign Office as well as of the Foreign
Minister.
DR. HORN: In your testimony you have already mentioned the fact that the
Wehrmacht was against Hitler’s intention to renounce the Geneva
Convention. Do you know that Ribbentrop also energetically opposed
Hitler’s intention, and that after the objections of the Wehrmacht had
been rejected at the beginning, Ribbentrop then succeeded in inducing
Hitler to give up his intention?
JODL: Put that way, I cannot confirm it fully. One thing I know for
certain: the Foreign Office informed me in writing of its unfavorable
attitude toward this suggestion or idea of the Führer. For me that was
conclusive proof that the Reich Foreign Minister held this point of
view. I recorded this unfavorable attitude of the Foreign
Office—together with the unfavorable attitude of the Army, Navy, and
Luftwaffe—in a short memorandum, and submitted it to the Führer. To
what extent the Reich Foreign Minister personally remonstrated with the
Führer about the matter, I cannot say with certainty.
DR. HORN: Is it true that Von Ribbentrop spoke against the chaining of
English prisoners of war as reprisal for the chaining of German
prisoners of war, and in agreement with the OKW induced Hitler to
discontinue this measure?
JODL: That is true. The Reich Foreign Minister, the Foreign Office,
repeatedly remonstrated with the Führer to withdraw the order concerning
the chaining of Canadian prisoners, and it must be assumed that these
many objections, which were also supported by the OKW, finally succeeded
in having the order withdrawn.
HERR BÖHM: In the Tuesday afternoon session you discussed the question
of terror-fliers. In this connection you stated that by making inquiries
and observations you wanted to prevent the ‘cause’ for the decision
regarding the intended treatment of this question. The Prosecution
submitted two documents on this question. One was the record of an
alleged talk between Ribbentrop, Göring, and Himmler at Klessheim, the
other an opinion by Ambassador Ritter, who has already been mentioned. I
would like to hear from you as to whether you know anything about
Ribbentrop’s attitude toward the handling of the question of
terror-fliers, especially whether Ribbentrop advocated that this
question be dealt with according to the Geneva Convention, and whether
he thought that it was possible to deviate from this Convention only if
decisive military necessities demanded it, and even in that case only by
expressly indicating beforehand to the protective powers that it
intended to depart from the Geneva Convention?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, can’t you put that question more shortly; what
does he know about it?
DR. HORN: Is it true, Generaloberst, with regard to the question of
terror-fliers, that Von Ribbentrop, in the same way as the Wehrmacht,
was against departing from the Geneva Convention, and he put this view
to Hitler?
JODL: To this I can say—again from talks with Ambassador Ritter—that I
knew that the Reich Foreign Minister advocated official procedure, that
is, official notice that we could no longer consider certain acts of
terror as belonging to regular warfare. That was the original point of
view of the Foreign Office. To this I said at the time that the Führer
would probably not be interested as I had concluded from his oral
instructions. As it turned out, the suggestion, such as the Reich
Foreign Minister intended to make, was never put forward, or at least I
never saw it.
DR. HORN: Do you know anything of a peace feeler by English officers on
behalf of General Alexander, backed up by the English Government, in
1943?
JODL: I know very well that at that time, in Athens, an Englishman—I
believe it was an English captain—established contact with us. This
captain said that he came from English headquarters in the southeastern
area. I was present when the Reich Foreign Minister reported to the
Führer about this matter, and I know he suggested that this contact be
tried to see what results it might bring. That was done; the Führer
agreed; but I heard nothing more about the matter, and apparently
nothing came of it.
DR. HORN: Do you know anything about any further peace attempts of
Ribbentrop, especially after the Polish campaign, after Dunkirk and
1943?
JODL: I only knew of the attempts and intentions after the Western
campaign. At that time the Führer spoke quite openly and frankly with
everyone. I myself, as well as the Reich Foreign Minister, heard the
Führer agree that peace would be concluded with England at any time only
if part of our former colonies were given back to us.
DR. HORN: Is it true that the Defendant Von Ribbentrop suggested to
Hitler that Hungarian Jews, insofar as they wished to do so, be
permitted to emigrate?
JODL: I recall that too. Shortly after the occupation of Hungary by our
troops, at about the beginning of May 1944, there was a conference at
the Berghof, at which a decision was to be reached. The Führer wanted to
hear our views as to whether the Hungarian Army should be dissolved, or
whether it should be left as it was. At the end of this discussion,
which was of a purely military nature, the Reich Foreign Minister said
to the Führer, “Can we not send all the Hungarian Jews by ship to some
neutral country?” The Führer answered, “That is easier said than done.
Do you think that is possible? No one would take them. Besides, it is
technically impossible.” That is my recollection of this talk.
DR. HORN: You spoke yesterday of the expulsion of the Danish Jews, and
you said that this expulsion took place on Himmler’s orders. An
affidavit by a Colonel Mildner has been submitted to me, in which it is
asserted that this expulsion took place on the orders of the Reich
Foreign Minister. Is that statement true?
JODL: Before this Himmler-Führer conference, which caused me to send my
teletype message to the Wehrmacht Commander in Denmark, I never heard a
word about the Jews being deported from Denmark, and I never heard that
the Foreign Office had any part in it.
DR. HORN: Did you ever get to know anything about the basic attitude of
the Defendant Von Ribbentrop toward the Jewish question?
JODL: Apart from this suggestion about the Hungarian Jews, I do not
recall any talk by the Reich Foreign Minister, at which I was present,
in which there was any mention of Jews.
DR. HORN: Thank you. I have no further questions.
DR. KRAUS: Did I understand you correctly, Generaloberst, when you
testified yesterday that in 1935 it was decided to set up 36 divisions?
JODL: That is true, yes.
DR. KRAUS: I am interested to know how many divisions were ready by 1
April 1938? I am interested in this key date because on that day the
financial aid of the Reichsbank stopped. Can you tell me how many
divisions were ready on 1 April 1938?
JODL: At that time there were about 27 or 28 divisions actually
ready—that is, as regards personnel and materiel.
DR. KRAUS: Can you tell me, Generaloberst, how they were made up?
JODL: I cannot say with certainty.
DR. KRAUS: Approximately?
JODL: I do know that only one Panzer division was ready at that time,
one cavalry division, one mountain division, and the rest were probably
infantry divisions. The other Panzer divisions were not yet equipped,
and they existed only as skeleton formations.
DR. KRAUS: I would like to know to what extent this armament was
increased between that date and the outbreak of the war on 1 September
1939—that is, increased from 27 divisions?
JODL: From the autumn of 1938 on, the picture became much more favorable
because the preparations in the armament industry were now producing
results, and plenty of equipment was being delivered for the divisions;
also, because from this time on, the trained age groups were beginning
to come in. Therefore, in the late autumn of 1938, we were in a position
to set up approximately 55 divisions—including reserve divisions—even
though some of them may have been only poorly equipped. In 1939—as I
said before, according to my recollection—there were between 73 and 75
divisions.
DR. KRAUS: Therefore, the number of divisions set up after March or
April of 1938, after President Schacht left the Reichsbank, increased by
200 percent in 15 or 16 months, whereas it took more than 3 years to set
up 27 divisions?
JODL: That is true, except that these 55 divisions, or rather these 75,
were still very short of equipment in the same way as the small number
in the spring of 1938, or in April 1938, which I mentioned. But the fact
that from that time on armament went much faster was due—as I have
said—to the very nature of things.
DR. KRAUS: Thank you, I have no further questions.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Witness, you testified yesterday that the Intelligence
Service during Kaltenbrunner’s time was better organized than before.
Please tell me, what position did Kaltenbrunner hold during your time in
the OKW?
JODL: I met Kaltenbrunner when...
THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment. Dr. Kauffmann, you have asked a general
question. We have had all of Kaltenbrunner’s positions given to us more
than once. What is it you want to know?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, Kaltenbrunner only testified quite
generally to the fact that his intelligence service was connected with
the military Intelligence Service. This witness can tell us what this
connection of the military Intelligence Service with the other
intelligence service amounted to, especially as regards its scope and
its influence on policy as a whole.
THE PRESIDENT: I didn’t understand you to ask him anything about the
Intelligence Service. You asked him a quite general question about what
relations he had had with the OKW during the time that the defendant was
connected with the OKW, in perfectly general terms. It might have
involved an answer which would take about an hour.
DR. KAUFFMANN: May I restate the question which apparently did not come
through properly?
Witness, you testified yesterday that in Kaltenbrunner’s time the whole
Intelligence Service was better organized than before that time—that
is, under Canaris. Now, I ask you what position did Kaltenbrunner have
within the Intelligence Service?
JODL: Kaltenbrunner...
THE PRESIDENT: What is the particular question that you want to ask? The
Tribunal do not think that you ought to ask general questions of this
nature. If you have got anything particular that you want to know about,
you can ask it.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What did Kaltenbrunner do during the situation
discussions which took place daily?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, it is scarcely possible to imagine any
more general question than that with reference to Kaltenbrunner: What
was his activity over a number of years?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, I said, during the situation report, that
is, the daily military conferences—how did Kaltenbrunner conduct
himself? What did he do? What did he say? Did he report? What did his
reports consist of? That, in my opinion, is a concrete question.
THE PRESIDENT: What time are you asking about?
DR. KAUFFMANN: I am asking about the time after his appointment as Chief
of the Reich Security Main Office, the time from 1943 on. That is the
only time which is in question.
THE PRESIDENT: You can ask him with reference to particular conferences,
certainly. Why not ask him with reference to particular conferences, if
you know any?
DR. KAUFFMANN: That was my intention.
Witness, do you understand what the question is? Will you please tell
me?
JODL: As far as I recall, until the spring of 1945 when the headquarters
were finally moved to the Reich Chancellery in Berlin, Kaltenbrunner did
not take part in any situation discussions. I cannot recall ever seeing
him at a discussion in the Führer’s headquarters.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Excuse me, do you mean 1944 or 1945?
JODL: 1945. From the spring of 1945—that is, from the end of January, I
frequently met Kaltenbrunner in the Reich Chancellery. Before that time
he came to the Führer’s headquarters, from time to time, and talked to
me there—especially about taking over the Canaris Intelligence
Service—but he was not present at the situation conferences of the
Führer.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did he submit written military situation reports?
JODL: Before he took over the Intelligence Service from Canaris—he took
it over on 1 May 1944—before he took over the Intelligence Service, he
sent me from time to time very good reports from the southeastern area,
and these reports first called my attention to his experience in the
Intelligence Service. He then took over the Intelligence Service, and
although I was against it at first, after I had expressed my views to
him I even supported him, for I had the impression that the man knew his
business. After that, of course, I constantly received reports from
Kaltenbrunner as I previously had received them from Canaris. Not only
did I receive the daily reports from agents, but from time to time he
sent what I should call a political survey on the basis of the
individual agent’s reports. These comprehensive situation reports about
the political situation everywhere abroad attracted my special attention
because they summed up our whole military situation with a frankness,
soberness, and seriousness which had not been at all noticeable in
Canaris’ reports.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Witness, you also testified yesterday that after the
daily military situation conference was ended, Hitler gathered around
him his trusted confidants and his political men. I ask you now: Was
Kaltenbrunner in this circle of confidants?
JODL: I never heard of Kaltenbrunner being in this private circle of the
Führer, and I never saw him there. What I saw was a purely official
attitude.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Thank you, I have no more questions.
FLOTTENRICHTER OTTO KRANZBÜHLER (Counsel for Defendant Dönitz):
Generaloberst, Grossadmiral Dönitz is accused of calling on the Navy to
continue to fight in the spring of 1945. Did you yourself, as a
responsible military adviser, advise the Führer at that time to
capitulate?
JODL: I did not advise him to capitulate at that time. That was
completely out of the question. No soldier would have done that. It
would have been of no use.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Not even after the failure of the Ardennes
Offensive in February 1945?
JODL: Not even after the failure of the Ardennes Offensive. The Führer
realized the situation, as a whole, as well as we did, and probably much
sooner than we did. Therefore, we did not need to say anything to him in
this connection.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What were the reasons for not doing this?
JODL: In the winter of 1944 there were many reasons for not doing this,
apart from the fact that the question of capitulation or discontinuing
resistance concerns only the Supreme Commander. The reasons against it
were, primarily, that we had no doubt there could be only unconditional
surrender, for the other countries left us in no doubt on that score;
and even if we had had any doubt as to what faced us, it was completely
removed by the fact that we captured the English “Eclipse”—the
gentlemen of the British Delegation will know what that is. It was exact
instructions about what the occupying power was to do in Germany after
the capitulation. Now, unconditional surrender meant that the troops
would cease to fight where they stood on all the fronts, and be captured
by the enemy facing them. The same thing would happen as happened in the
winter of 1941 at Vyazma. Millions of prisoners would suddenly have to
camp in the middle of winter in the open. Death would have taken an
enormous toll.
Above all, the men still on the Eastern Front, who numbered about 3½
million, would have fallen into the hands of the enemy in the East. It
was our endeavor to save as many people as possible by sending them into
the western area. That could only be done by drawing the two fronts
closer together. Those were the purely military opinions which we held
in the last stages of the war. I believe that in years to come there
will be more to say about this than I can say or wish to say today.
DR. NELTE: Generaloberst, how long have you known Field Marshal Keitel?
JODL: I believe I met him in 1932 when he was chief of the
organizational department of the Army.
DR. NELTE: And from that time, except for the time you were in Vienna,
you always worked with him?
JODL: There was a time when Field Marshal Keitel was not in the War
Ministry but in the field. I believe that was in 1934-35. I then lost
sight of him. Otherwise I was with him all the time.
DR. NELTE: Was your work with him only official, or did you have
personal relations with him?
JODL: In the course of the years, as a result of all we went through
together, these relations became very personal.
DR. NELTE: The Prosecution have characterized Field Marshal Keitel as
one of the most powerful officers of the Wehrmacht. They charge him with
using this position to influence Hitler. Other circles represented here
called Keitel, weak, and accused him of not being able to achieve his
purpose in his position.
I do not want to ask any questions which have previously been asked and
answered; but there are questions which have been previously answered in
various ways—as you have heard—and only a person like you can answer
them, a person who worked with the Field Marshal for more than a decade.
Therefore, please tell me briefly—making your sentences short—what the
official relations were between Keitel and Hitler.
JODL: The official relations between the Führer and Field Marshal Keitel
were exactly the same as between the Führer and me, but on a somewhat
different level. They were purely official, especially in the beginning.
They were interspersed, just as in the case of all other higher
officers, by constant clashes between a revolutionary and a Prussian
officer bound by tradition.
DR. NELTE: Then, these clashes, the result of differing opinions, were a
daily occurrence?
JODL: They were a daily occurrence and in effect led to extremely
unpleasant scenes, such scenes as made one ashamed, as a senior officer,
to have to listen to such things in the presence of young adjutants. The
entry in my diary proves that on 19 April 1940, for instance, Field
Marshal Keitel threw his portfolio on the table and left the room. That
is a fact.
DR. NELTE: May I ask what the reason was?
THE PRESIDENT: No, Dr. Nelte. If you want him to confirm the evidence
which the Defendant Keitel has given, why don’t you ask him whether he
confirms it?
DR. NELTE: These are questions, Mr. President, which I have not
submitted to Field Marshal Keitel. My line of questioning became
necessary because between the questioning of the defendant...
THE PRESIDENT: The question you put to him was: What were his relations
with the Führer? You could not have put it any wider than that, and you
certainly covered that with the Defendant Keitel.
DR. NELTE: I discussed it with Keitel.
THE PRESIDENT: You have put the question to Keitel, and Keitel answered
it at great length.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, after Keitel was questioned, a witness
appeared here who would discredit the statement of Field Marshal Keitel,
if what he says is true. Therefore, in order to clarify, I must...
THE PRESIDENT: That is the very reason why I asked you whether you
wanted this witness to confirm what the Defendant Keitel said, and—if
you did—why you didn’t ask him whether he did confirm the evidence of
Keitel.
DR. NELTE: Generaloberst, you have heard that we can simplify the
question on this matter. I submit to you that which the witness Gisevius
said here, in this room, about Field Marshal Keitel. It was, for the
main part, in contradiction to what Field Marshal Keitel, and the other
witnesses questioned about Keitel, had said. I point out that Gisevius
did not speak from his own knowledge, but that he was given information
from the OKW. If you want to consider that, please answer the question
now: According to your knowledge of these things, is it true what Field
Marshal Keitel said under oath—and which was confirmed by others, with
the exception of Gisevius—or is it true what Gisevius said?
JODL: Only that is true which Field Marshal Keitel said. I experienced
it on thousands of days. What the witness Gisevius said in this
connection are general figures of speech. Apart from Hitler, there was
no powerful man; there was and could be no influential man next to him.
DR. NELTE: The witness Gisevius mentioned an example to prove that
Keitel prevented certain reports from being presented to Hitler. Since
you had a part in this document, I should like to have this one document
presented to you, and ask you to comment on it. It is Document 790-PS.
This document is not an actual set of minutes, but a note for the files,
as you see. It is about the _White Book_ which was prepared on the
alleged Belgian and Dutch violations of neutrality. And in this
connection, the witness Gisevius said:
“I believe that I should cite two more examples which I consider
especially significant. First of all, every means was tried to
incite Keitel to warn Hitler before the invasion of Belgium and
Holland, and to tell him—that is, Hitler—that the information
which had been submitted by Keitel regarding the alleged
violation of neutrality by the Dutch and Belgians was wrong.
Counterintelligence”—that is Canaris—“was to produce these
reports which would incriminate the Dutch and Belgians. Admiral
Canaris, at that time, refused to sign these reports.... He told
Keitel repeatedly that these reports, which were supposedly
produced by the OKW, were wrong.
“That is one instance when Keitel did not transmit to Hitler
that which he should have.”
Generaloberst, I ask you to confirm, after you have looked over this
document, that these notes show that Field Marshal Keitel and you were
expected to cover false reports, and that on the basis of the Canaris
report—contained in Part A—the OKW refused to cover this _White Book_.
Is that true?
[_There was no response._]
THE PRESIDENT: Well, if you understand the question, will you answer it?
JODL: I understand the question, and I should like to establish the
facts here briefly, and tell how it really was as far as I can without
being choked with disgust.
I was present when Canaris came to the Reich Chancellery with this
report to Field Marshal Keitel, and submitted to him the draft of the
_White Book_ of the Foreign Office. Field Marshal Keitel then looked
through this book and listened carefully to the essential remarks which
Canaris made, at the wish of the Foreign Office, to the effect that the
intelligence needed perhaps some improvement, that he was to confirm
that military action against Holland and Belgium was absolutely
necessary, and that, as it says here, a final really flagrant violation
of neutrality was still lacking. Before Canaris had said another word,
Field Marshal Keitel threw the book on the table, and said, “I will not
stand for that. How could I assume responsibility for a political
decision? In this _White Book_ are, word for word, the reports which you
yourself—Canaris—gave me.”
Whereupon Canaris said, “I am of exactly the same opinion. In my
opinion, it is completely superfluous to have this document signed by
the Wehrmacht, and the reports which we have here, as a whole, are quite
sufficient to substantiate the breaches of neutrality which have taken
place in Holland and in Belgium.” And he advised Field Marshal Keitel
against signing it.
That is what took place. The Field Marshal took the book with him, and I
do not know what happened after that. But one thing is certain, that the
imaginary reports of this Herr Gisevius turn everything upside down. All
these reports about the violations of neutrality came from these people
who now assert that we had signed them falsely. This is one of the most
despicable incidents of world history.
DR. NELTE: Generaloberst, Admiral Canaris played a part in this case.
Gisevius said, “It was not possible for Admiral Canaris to submit an
urgent report to Hitler on his own initiative.” He asserts that Canaris
gave reports to Field Marshal Keitel who did not submit them. I ask you,
is that true?
JODL: Of course, I did not follow up every document that came to Field
Marshal Keitel; but Field Marshal Keitel submitted everything which was
considered necessary for the Führer to know about. I have already said
that if Canaris had not been satisfied in this connection, he could have
gone to the Führer directly. He had only to go into the next office and
inform the Führer’s chief adjutant, or he had only to tell me.
THE PRESIDENT: If you don’t know, why don’t you say so? If you don’t
know whether he gave it to the Führer or not, say so.
DR. NELTE: I only asked whether the testimony is true, that Admiral
Canaris could not go to Hitler. I wanted you to answer that question.
JODL: In fact, he went to the Führer dozens of times.
DR. NELTE: If he wanted it, he had access at any time?
JODL: Absolutely, at any time.
THE PRESIDENT: Now, will you tell me what page in the shorthand notes
this evidence is of Gisevius?
DR. NELTE: The evidence about Keitel is in the transcript of the session
of 26 April 1946 (Volume XII, Pages 265 to 271).
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. NELTE: I now want to show you two affidavits which you signed
together with Field Marshal Keitel, which have also been submitted to
the Tribunal. These are the Affidavit Number Keitel-9, High Command of
the Wehrmacht and General Staff, and the Affidavit Number Keitel-13,
Development of the Conditions in France, 1940 to 1945, and the military
competencies.
You remember that you signed these affidavits?
JODL: I did so, yes.
DR. NELTE: And if you are sure of that, do you remember the contents?
JODL: Yes.
DR. NELTE: You confirm the accuracy of your affidavit?
JODL: I confirm this statement.
DR. NELTE: I will not read these affidavits or parts of them. On the
subject of rearmament—that is, regarding General Thomas, who was also
given here as a source of information—I should like to ask you a few
questions.
You know that the Prosecution submitted a voluminous book here, Document
2353-PS, which is a description of the rearmament, written by General
Thomas. As General Thomas was also given by the witness Gisevius here as
a source of information, I must question you about Thomas. In his
affidavit, which is attached to Document 2353-PS, he said that on 1
February 1943 he was released from the OKW. Do you know whether that is
true or not?
JODL: As far as I can recall, he was assigned to the group of officers
for special employment by the High Command of the Wehrmacht. He was
therefore at the disposal of Field Marshal Keitel.
DR. NELTE: Did he not have a special assignment when he was made
available for special employment?
JODL: He took over several assignments after that, I believe.
DR. NELTE: I only wanted to ascertain that also after 1 February 1943,
General Thomas was still given assignments by the OKW, especially that
of writing this book which has been submitted here, is that true?
JODL: That is true, that he was engaged in writing what might be called
the “History of Rearmament.”
DR. NELTE: What was his relation to Field Marshal Keitel?
JODL: I know of that from the time when the two men worked
together—that was only before the war and at the very beginning of the
war, and the relations were good.
DR. NELTE: Do you know the reports of General Thomas concerning
rearmament?
JODL: I have no exact recollection of any reports about our own
rearmament. I can only recall reports about the war potential of our
enemies. I remember those.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, are you going to be much longer, because it is
10 minutes past 5, and if you are not going to conclude tonight we had
better adjourn.
DR. NELTE: I will need a quarter of an hour yet.
THE PRESIDENT: Then we will adjourn at this time.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 6 June 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-EIGHTH DAY
Thursday, 6 June 1946
_Morning Session_
[_The Defendant Jodl resumed the stand._]
DR. NELTE: General, yesterday in answer to my last question about
General Thomas you said that he regularly made reports on the war
potential of enemy powers to you and Field Marshal Keitel. Were these
important reports always submitted to Hitler?
JODL: These reports, with detailed graphic descriptions, sketches, and
drawings, were regularly submitted to the Führer and often occasioned
violent disputes, because the Führer considered this representation of
the enemy potential as greatly exaggerated.
DR. NELTE: Did you and Field Marshal Keitel hold the point of view that
the representations of General Thomas were well-founded?
JODL: Field Marshal Keitel and I were both of the opinion that, after a
very careful study of enemy achievements in armament production, these
statements of Thomas were doubtless on the whole completely accurate.
DR. NELTE: You heard the witness Gisevius say that Thomas was supposed
to have been an opponent of Hitler’s war leadership. In the course of
years and in the reports made, did you ever realize this fact?
JODL: I did not observe this. The only thing that I observed was that he
objected to this exaggerated optimism in which the Führer habitually
indulged, and that perhaps in his basic attitude he was of a pessimistic
rather than an optimistic nature.
DR. NELTE: Was General Thomas dismissed from his position as head of the
Economic Armament Office of the OKW through Keitel’s efforts?
JODL: No, at the time he retired from active service General Thomas was
under Minister Speer, but Minister Speer no longer cared to work with
him and requested the Führer that he be dismissed from the armament
office which Minister Speer had taken over. And that was done by the
Field Marshal on the order of the Führer.
DR. NELTE: I can therefore establish...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, how is the evidence about General Thomas
relevant to the case of Keitel—how is the question of whether General
Thomas was acting against the supposed interests of Germany or not
relevant to the cases of either Keitel or Jodl? The evidence of Gisevius
was relevant to the case of the Defendant Schacht. It seems to me—and I
think, to the Tribunal—to be entirely irrelevant to the case of either
the defendant whom you represent or the case of the Defendant Jodl. What
does it matter to us whether General Thomas was acting in order to try
and overthrow Hitler or not?
DR. NELTE: The question which concerns the Defendant Keitel is whether
Field Marshal Keitel submitted and supported the reports handed in by
Thomas. The witness Gisevius said here, referring to Thomas as a source
of information, that these reports of Thomas were kept from Hitler.
Therefore this evidence...
THE PRESIDENT: We went into that yesterday and now the Defendant Jodl
has said that the reports of Thomas were submitted to the Führer. But
what I was pointing out to you was that the question whether Thomas was
making his reports honestly or not is a matter which is entirely
irrelevant.
DR. NELTE: Not as to the credibility of Gisevius’ sources of
information, in my opinion; but I will withdraw this question. However,
in this connection I must ask one more question with regard to the other
source of information, Canaris.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Canaris was a regular and frequent guest
in the Führer’s headquarters and a guest of yours. What were the
relations of Field Marshal Keitel to his oldest office chief?
JODL: The relations between Field Marshal Keitel and Canaris from the
first day to the last were remarkably friendly, and unfortunately one of
too much blind confidence.
DR. NELTE: May I ask what the relations were after the 20th of July?
JODL: I know that even after the 20th of July Field Marshal Keitel did
not believe the charges against Canaris and that after the arrest of
Canaris he supported his family with money.
DR. NELTE: How were the relations between Canaris and Heydrich?
JODL: I mentioned that once before. Canaris always tried to maintain
especially good relations with Himmler and Heydrich so that they would
not distrust him.
DR. NELTE: What can you say about the attitude of Field Marshal Keitel
to Hitler’s plan in October 1939, the plan to attack in the West?
JODL: I know that Field Marshal Keitel was apparently strongly impressed
by the attitude of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the General
Staff of the Army and also raised a warning voice against this attack in
the West. I know it, although I did not experience it personally; but
Schmundt told me about it later—I know that during this time he also
had a controversy with the Führer which led to the first request to
resign. This is what I can report according to what Schmundt told me; I
did not witness it myself, nor did Field Marshal Keitel tell me about it
personally then.
DR. NELTE: In Document 447-PS, which the Prosecution submitted—these
are the guiding principles for special tasks issued with Directive
Number 21—under I, 2b, is the now famous paragraph according to which,
in the operational area of the Army, the Reichsführer SS is given
special tasks on behalf of the Führer in connection with the preparation
of a political administration, resulting from the inevitable conflict
between two opposing political systems. So much for the brief citation.
I will not hand the document to you since you are certainly well
acquainted with it, and to make the matter brief I will only ask you to
tell the Court how Field Marshal Keitel reacted to the issuing of this
order.
JODL: The claim of the Führer to infringe upon the sovereignty of the
Army in its operational area with Himmler and the Police led to days of
bitter disputes with the Führer. The same disputes had already taken
place when Terboven was appointed in Norway. One need only read my
entries in my diary, 1780-PS. Of course I know today why the Führer
insisted on this point of view under all circumstances and why he forced
the Police, under Himmler, into the operational area. It was against all
our rules. It was against all previous agreements with the Police and
with Himmler, but in the end the Führer put this measure through in
spite of resistance all along the line.
DR. NELTE: The Prosecution asserted here that in 1940 Field Marshal
Keitel gave the order to kill General Weygand, at that time Chief of the
General Staff of the French Army. This statement is based essentially on
testimony of the witness General Lahousen. I have a few brief questions
to put to you on this matter. Was Field Marshal Keitel competent to
order the killing of a general?
JODL: No. Any death sentence at all had to be confirmed by the Führer.
DR. NELTE: Well, I naturally do not mean a death sentence—in this
connection.
JODL: Well. No one at all has the authority to order murder to be
committed.
DR. NELTE: I ask this because Lahousen’s testimony made it appear as if
this order had been given by Field Marshal Keitel to Admiral Canaris. If
we assume that such an order was issued by Hitler, this would have been
a politically highly important act considering the importance of
Weygand.
JODL: Undoubtedly.
DR. NELTE: Would it not also have been a foolish act in terms of policy?
JODL: It would first of all have been a crime...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, this is all argument, and you are putting your
questions in an entirely leading form. The real objection to it is that
it is argumentative. Go on.
DR. NELTE: If such an order had been given, could it have remained
unknown to you?
JODL: I cannot imagine that Field Marshal Keitel, charged with the
ordering of the murder, would not have spoken about it to me.
DR. NELTE: What exactly did you hear about the Weygand case?
JODL: I never heard a single word about the Weygand case. I heard only
one thing when Himmler reported to the Führer in my presence: “I have
given Weygand a very nice villa in Baden. He is completely provided for
there in such a way that he can be satisfied.” That is the only thing I
ever heard in which the name of Weygand figured.
DR. NELTE: The witness Lahousen was also heard in the case of General
Giraud. Did you also know anything of this case of Giraud which
attracted much attention?
JODL: I heard a little more about the Giraud case. Shortly after the
successful flight of Giraud, Field Marshal Keitel told me once in a
conversation that he was having Giraud watched by Canaris so that he
would not, as the Führer always feared, go to North Africa and there
direct the formation of the Colonial Army against us or, so that he
could be arrested in the event that he should rejoin his family in the
territory actually occupied. That is what he told me. Several months
later he said to me again, “I have now withdrawn this assignment to
Canaris because the Führer has given it to Himmler. If two agencies are
concerned with it there will only be difficulties and differences.” The
third time I heard about the Giraud case was when Field Marshal Keitel
told me that a deputy of Giraud—I believe it was about the end of 1943
or in the spring of 1944—approached the counterintelligence service and
said that Giraud, who could not agree with De Gaulle in North Africa,
asked whether he might not return to France. I told Field Marshal Keitel
then that we absolutely must agree to that immediately because that was
extremely favorable for us politically. That is the only thing I ever
heard about the Giraud case. Nothing else.
DR. NELTE: The day before yesterday you spoke about the talks in the
Führer’s train in September 1939, at which General Lahousen was also
present. In this connection you said, “I have no objections to
Lahousen’s statement.” But to avoid misunderstandings, I should like you
to say whether you mean by that that all the testimony of Lahousen,
which also referred to Giraud and Weygand, is credible and correct, or
only the part regarding your presence in the Führer’s train?
JODL: Of course, I meant only those statements of Lahousen which he made
about me. As for the other statements which were made here, I have my
own opinion, but perhaps that is not appropriate here.
DR. NELTE: Yesterday, in answer to a question by Dr. Stahmer, you spoke
about the dispute on the occasion of the 80 RAF officers who escaped. In
order to clarify this question, which weighs heavily against Field
Marshal Keitel, I should like to know the following: Did you hear that
Keitel objected violently because the recaptured RAF officers were
turned over to Himmler, that is, to the Gestapo?
JODL: When I stood at the curtain for those 1 or 2 minutes, I heard the
Führer say first of all:
“That is unheard of. That is the tenth time that dozens of
officer prisoners have escaped. These officers are an enormous
danger. You don’t realize”—meaning Keitel—“that in view of the
6 million foreign people who are prisoners and workers in
Germany, they are the leaders who could organize an uprising.
That is the result of this careless attitude of the commandants.
These escaped Air Force officers are to be turned over to
Himmler immediately.”
And then I heard Field Marshal Keitel answer:
“My Führer, some of them have already been put back into the
camp. They are prisoners of war again. I cannot turn them over.”
And the Führer said, “Very well, then they can stay there.” That is what
I heard with my own ears at that moment, until a telephone conversation
called me away again.
DR. NELTE: Afterwards did you speak again with Field Marshal Keitel
about this incident?
JODL: We drove back to Berchtesgaden together from the Berghof. Field
Marshal Keitel was beside himself, for on the way up he had told me that
he would not report the escape of these fliers to the Führer. He hoped
that on the next day he would have them all back. He was furious with
Himmler, who had immediately reported it to the Führer. I told him that
if the Führer, in view of the total situation in Germany, saw such a
great danger in the escape of foreign officers, then England should be
notified so that the order might be rescinded—all officers who were
prisoners had to make an attempt to escape.
I must say openly that at this moment neither of us had any thought that
these recaptured fliers might be shot. For they had done nothing except
escape from a camp, which German officers had also done dozens of times.
I imagined that he wanted to remove them from the disciplinary action of
the Army, which certainly, in his opinion, would be far too lenient, and
wanted to have them work as punishment for some time in a concentration
camp under Himmler. That is what I imagined.
DR. NELTE: In any case, in your presence and in your hearing, Hitler’s
orders to Himmler to shoot these officers were not issued?
JODL: I know that with absolute certainty for I know how I felt when I
suddenly received the news that they had been shot.
DR. NELTE: Now I should like to ask you a few brief concluding
questions.
The Tribunal asked the Defendant Keitel on the witness stand whether he
had submitted written applications asking for his resignation. You were
present. What can you tell the Court about Keitel’s efforts to resign
from his position?
JODL: The first case that I mentioned a while ago must have been in the
spring of 1940, because of the Western campaign. Schmundt told me about
it, but I did not see it myself. The second case about which I know
exactly, was in 1941, November, when there was an enormous controversy
between the Führer and Field Marshal Keitel, and the Führer chose to use
the expression, “I am only dealing with blockheads.”
THE PRESIDENT: We do not want the details. I mean, if he can tell us
when Keitel attempted to resign...
JODL: This second case was in the fall of 1941. After the controversy,
Field Marshal Keitel wrote his request for his resignation. When I
entered the room his pistol lay before him on his desk, and I personally
took it away from him.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, I have told you that the Tribunal does not
want the details, and now we are being told about details about the
resignation, about the way in which it was made.
DR. NELTE: Can it be of no importance to the Court to know how serious
the matter was to the Defendant Keitel that he even wanted to use his
pistol?
THE PRESIDENT: He is going into details about the particular desk on
which the document was put, or something of that sort. He made his
efforts to resign in writing. That is of importance.
DR. NELTE: You can testify about this case when Field Marshal Keitel
handed in his resignation in writing?
JODL: I myself saw him writing it, and I read the introduction.
DR. NELTE: If things like this occurred frequently, as you have stated
in the course of your testimony, and went as far as the pistol incident
indicates, how did it happen that Keitel always remained?
JODL: Because the Führer would not separate from him under any
circumstances. He absolutely refused to let him go. I believe that
various attempts were made in this direction from other sources, too;
but the Führer did not let him go. In the second place, of course our
mutual attitude was that we were, after all, engaged in a war for
existence in which an officer, in the long run, could not stay at home
and knit stockings. Over and over again it was the sense of duty that
won the upper hand and caused us to bear all the difficulties.
DR. NELTE: You will understand that one must hold up to the generals
“loyalty unto loyalty” and that duty can only go to the point where it
does not injure human dignity. Have you ever thought of that?
JODL: I have thought a lot about it.
THE PRESIDENT: Surely that is not a question for counsel to put. It is
an argument, is it not? It is argument, not evidence. It is not a proper
question to put.
DR. NELTE: I have finished.
DR. THOMA: Witness, is it true that Rosenberg, in the middle of January
1943, gave you and General Zeitzler the draft of a proclamation to the
peoples of eastern Europe?
JODL: That is true. It was after the discussion on the situation.
Rosenberg was present in headquarters. He asked me and Zeitzler to step
into the next room for a moment and said that he wanted to report to the
Führer a proclamation to the Eastern peoples and that he would like to
submit it to us first. I recall that.
DR. THOMA: Do you still recall the contents?
JODL: It was a very extensive concession in regard to the sovereignty of
these individual eastern states. It was an outspoken attempt, through a
policy of reconciliation, to combat unrest and antagonism to the German
system.
DR. THOMA: Did you express to Rosenberg your pleasure at this
proclamation?
JODL: We said then that this had always been our idea, but that we had
doubts whether it was not already too late.
DR. THOMA: What was the success of this memorandum?
JODL: As Rosenberg told me after the conference, the Führer, as he often
did, pigeonholed the matter; that is, he did not reject it, but he said,
“Put it aside.”
DR. THOMA: Did you have the impression that Rosenberg’s suggestions
arose from concern about the dangers caused by Koch’s methods?
JODL: Undoubtedly it was an attempt to counteract these methods which
were gradually used by Himmler and particularly by Koch.
DR. THOMA: Thank you, I have no more questions.
DR. CARL HAENSEL (Counsel for SS): Was the strategic assignment of the
divisions of the Waffen-SS under you?
JODL: The divisions of the Waffen-SS, in regard to assignment, were
generally treated like the divisions of the Army.
DR. HAENSEL: How many Waffen-SS divisions were there, according to your
recollection? Please mention the number of Wehrmacht divisions also so
that we have a means of comparison.
JODL: At the beginning of the war, I believe, we began with three SS
divisions. The number increased until the end of the war to an estimated
35 to 37 divisions, as against a number of Army divisions which varied,
but which one can give approximately as about 280, 290, 300.
DR. HAENSEL: What was the procedure in setting up new divisions? Who
decided whether such a new division would be a Waffen-SS division or a
Wehrmacht division?
JODL: As soon as the Führer had ordered the establishment of a new
series of divisions he said, after consulting Himmler, that so-and-so
many divisions were to be set up and so-and-so many Waffen-SS divisions.
He determined the number.
DR. HAENSEL: Was there a certain standard, or was that done arbitrarily?
JODL: I had the impression that in setting up the SS divisions, the
Führer wanted to go as far as he absolutely could.
DR. HAENSEL: And what do you consider—when you say “could,” what do you
consider the limit?
JODL: The limit was in the fact that the soldiers of these Waffen-SS
divisions were to be volunteers; and the time came very soon when
Himmler had to report, “I do not get any more replacements for the
divisions;” and from that time on the situation arose that, when the men
came for military duty, the cream of the crop was taken by the SS, and
these people, even if they were strict Catholic peasants’ sons, were
drafted into the SS divisions. I myself received bitter letters from
peasants’ wives about this.
DR. HAENSEL: In connection with this drafting into the Waffen-SS that
you have just described, were political viewpoints taken into account?
Was a recruit first questioned politically in some way before he was
turned over to the Waffen-SS, or was no consideration taken of this?
JODL: No, the decisive thing was that the fellow was big, looked
healthy, and promised to become a good soldier. That was the decisive
thing.
DR. HAENSEL: You said yesterday that in the drafting of recruits no
consideration was given to whether a man belonged to the SA or not. Is
the same thing true of membership in the General SS? I mean in this
sense, was no consideration given to whether the recruit belonged to the
General SS, either in drafting, in training, or in promotion?
JODL: Not to such a pronounced extent as in the case of the SA. I
believe that the majority of the men in the General SS came to the
Waffen-SS and volunteered. But I also know that very many did not do
that and were drafted in the normal way by the Army, so that they were
treated in the Army just like any other German.
DR. HAENSEL: If I understand you correctly then, there were many members
of the General SS on the one hand who served in the Army; and on the
other hand, there were many who belonged neither to the Party nor to the
SS but served in the Waffen-SS?
JODL: That is true; it does not apply to the very beginning of the war,
but it is absolutely true for the second half of the war.
DR. HAENSEL: And this second half of the war contained the greater
number?
JODL: Undoubtedly, that—the second half—I always call that part after
the big losses in the first Russian campaign of 1941.
DR. HAENSEL: How strong was the total Waffen-SS at the end of the war,
approximately?
JODL: About 480,000 men.
DR. HAENSEL: And the losses, that is the dead and captured, would be
added to this number?
JODL: Yes, they would be added.
DR. HAENSEL: And do you have any figures in mind about that?
JODL: It is hard to give an estimate in regard to the SS.
MR. ROBERTS: Witness, you told the Tribunal 2 days ago that you had
soldiering in the blood, is that right?
JODL: Yes, this is true.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. And you said yesterday that you were here to
represent the honor of the German soldier, is that right?
JODL: Yes, I do that to a high degree.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good, yes. And you put yourself forward as an
honorable soldier.
JODL: With full consciousness, yes.
MR. ROBERTS: And you put yourself forward as a truthful man.
JODL: I represented myself as such a man, and I am.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Because of the things you say you have been made
to do in the last 6 or 7 years, do you think your honor has become at
all soiled?
JODL: My honor was certainly not soiled, for I guarded it personally.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good, you say your honor is not soiled.
Have you—during the last 6 or 7 years, when causing to be said the
things which you say you had to circulate—has your truthfulness
remained at the same high standard?
[_There was no response._]
Can’t you answer that question?
JODL: I believe I am too dull for that question.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good, then if you are too dull, I won’t persist in it;
I will go on. I will leave the question and I will go on.
In 1935 you were lieutenant colonel at the head of the Home Defense
Department of the Wehrmacht, is that right?
JODL: Absolutely right.
MR. ROBERTS: That is Department L, Landesverteidigung, is that right?
JODL: Yes, that is correct.
MR. ROBERTS: And was Field Marshal Von Blomberg your superior?
JODL: Field Marshal Von Blomberg was not my direct superior, but one of
my superiors.
MR. ROBERTS: Did you work a good deal with Field Marshal Von Blomberg?
JODL: On various occasions I reported to him personally, of course not
nearly so much as the Chief of the Armed Forces Department.
MR. ROBERTS: Did you attend staff talks with him?
JODL: I did not attend large conferences with Blomberg. I believe that
there were seldom more persons than General Keitel and I and perhaps one
other chief of a department.
MR. ROBERTS: And would they be called staff talks?
JODL: No, those conferences took place in the Office of the Chief of the
Armed Forces Department.
MR. ROBERTS: Did you go to staff talks?
JODL: Of course, since I belonged to the staff.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good; I thought that.
Now, will you please look at the Document C-139, Exhibit USA-53. First
look at the signature, will you. That is signed by Blomberg, is it not?
JODL: That is signed by Blomberg, yes.
MR. ROBERTS: Now, that is dealing with “Operation Schulung.” Do you
remember what Operation Schulung was?
[_There was no response._]
That is the reoccupation of the Rhineland, isn’t it?
[_There was no response._]
Can’t you answer me?
JODL: I can answer you as soon as I have read that.
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, the question was whether you remember what
Operation Schulung was. It isn’t necessary to read the document in order
to answer that question.
JODL: According to my recollection—I do not know whether it comes from
studying the documents here in Nuremberg—the term Schulung meant
preparations for the occupation of the Rhineland after evacuation of the
West Rhine territories in the case of French sanctions...
MR. ROBERTS: Very good, I agree.
JODL: But—there is more to be said in that connection.
MR. ROBERTS: Now, wait a moment. That is then dealing with the
reoccupation of the Rhineland; do you agree with that?
JODL: No, that does not deal with the reoccupation of the Rhineland.
That is absolutely false, but it...
MR. ROBERTS: Now, just let us look at this document together and see
what it says. Now, first of all, it is dated the 2d of May 1935.
“For the operation...” I am reading it to you if you will follow it, and
might I make this point first: It is apparently so secret that it
couldn’t be entrusted to a stenographer, isn’t it? The whole document is
written in manuscript, handwriting, isn’t it?
[_There was no response._]
MR. ROBERTS: You can answer that question surely. Can’t you see whether
it is in handwriting or not?
JODL: It is in handwriting, yes.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, why not say so?
Now then, let’s just look at the document. It is from the Reich Minister
of Defense; that is Von Blomberg, isn’t it? It is the second copy, “By
hand only.” It is, to the Chief of the High Command, Chief of the Naval
High Command, and the Reich Minister for Air.
“For the operation suggested in the last staff talks”—that is
why I asked you whether you went to staff talks, you see—“of
the Armed Forces, I lay down the code name, ‘Schulung.’”
Then, may I just refer briefly to the contents:
“This is a joint undertaking of the three branches of the
Wehrmacht... The operation must be executed”—and this is a
phrase we have become familiar with later—“by a surprise blow
at lightning speed.
“Strictest secrecy is necessary ... only peacetime strength....”
And Number 3:
“Every improvement of our armaments will make possible a greater
measure of preparedness....”
And then:
“The High Command of the Army is asked: How many divisions ready
for action?”
Not one token battalion as you said yesterday.
“Reinforcement of the necessarily inadequate forces there”—that
is in the West—“by the East Prussian divisions which will be
brought here at once by rail or sea transport... High Command of
the Navy to look after the safe transport of the East Prussian
troops by sea, in case the overland route is closed.”
What could that refer to, that secret instruction—so secret it had to
be in manuscript—if it wasn’t the reoccupation of the Rhineland?
JODL: If you will permit me to make quite a brief explanation, then the
Tribunal will be saved a tremendous lot of time.
MR. ROBERTS: Please, Witness, answer my question first and then make an
explanation after, if it is brief. The question is, what could it refer
to except the reoccupation of the Rhineland?
JODL: I am not here as a clairvoyant; I do not know the document; I have
never read it; at this time I was not in the Armed Forces
Department—that has entirely different signatures—I was in the
operations section of the Army. I neither saw nor ever heard of this
paper. If you look at the date, 2 May 1935, it is proven there in
writing, for I entered the Armed Forces Department only in the middle of
June 1935. Thus, only on the basis of my general staff training can I
give you some assumptions; but the Court do not want assumptions.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good, if that is your answer. And are you saying that
you, who heard General Field Marshal Von Blomberg’s staff talk, cannot
help the Court at all as to what that secret operation order is about?
JODL: It was before my time. I was not with Von Blomberg then.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now, will you look, please at EC-405. Now—let
him see the German book, Page 277.
My Lord, that is Page 26. Hasn’t he a German book?
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you did say, did you not, that you remember
that the Operation Schulung was the preparation for the occupation of
the Rhineland?
JODL: No, I said the contrary. I said that I heard the word, Schulung,
for the first time here in the Court; and then I wondered what that
could have been.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Court will be able to judge as to what you said
by the shorthand notes. You say, do you, that you did not say Schulung
meant the preparation for the occupation of the Rhineland? Is that
right?
JODL: I mean, that as General Staff officer of the operations section at
that time I had to know what military preparations were made.
THE PRESIDENT: But, that is not what I asked you. What I want to know is
what you said just now when you were asked if you remembered what
Operation Schulung meant. What did you say? It is suggested that it may
have come through wrongly to us in the translation. What did you say?
JODL: I said, “I believe I recall, but I am not certain whether
this recollection did not result from studying the documents
here or earlier, that the word, Schulung, meant the preparations
for the evacuation of the western Rhine territory and occupation
of the Rhine boundary in case of French sanctions, for that was
the only thing with which we were concerned at that time.”
All the evacuation measures which I later mentioned anyway in Document
EC-405 were part of that.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, you remember the date of that first document, 2d of
May 1935. Now I refer to EC-405 which is in the big Document Book 7,
Page 261, and it is on Page 277 of the German book, 277. Now this,
Witness, is a meeting—I want you to look, please, at Pages 43 and 44 of
the original which you have. Have you got 43 and 44?
JODL: 43 and 44, yes.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Well, now, you see there—it is a meeting of the
working committee of the Reich Defense Council. It is dated the 26th of
June 1935 and at letter “F:” “Lieutenant Colonel Jodl ... about
‘participation in Mobilization Preparations,’” and the first three
paragraphs deal with general mobilization; and I do not want to read
them, but the fourth paragraph reads:
“Demilitarized zone requires special treatment. In his speech of
21 May 1935 and other utterances the Führer has stated that the
stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles and the Locarno Pact
regarding the demilitarized zone are being observed. To the
_aide-mémoire_ of the French Chargé d’Affaires of 17 June 1935
on ‘Recruiting Offices in the Demilitarized Zone,’ the German
Reich Government has replied that neither civilian recruiting
authorities nor other offices in the demilitarized zone have
been entrusted with mobilization tasks such as the raising,
equipping, and arming of any kind of formations for the event of
war or in preparation thereof.”
Now, if Von Blomberg’s handwritten letter of the 2d of May 1935 did
refer to preparations for reoccupying the Rhineland by surprise, it was
highly dishonest of the Führer, 19 days later on the 21st of May, to say
that the Locarno and Versailles treaties were being observed, wasn’t it?
JODL: No, it wasn’t dishonest, for if it is true at all that the term,
Schulung...
THE PRESIDENT: I think that is a matter of comment, if you please.
MR. ROBERTS: I shall, of course, My Lord, have to make certain comments
on the witness as I proceed. No doubt Your Lordship will realize that I
am not endeavoring to depart from this particular ruling which is only
for this particular question, presumably.
THE PRESIDENT: I think—the Tribunal think that you ought not to make
comments but you ought to confine yourself as far as possible to
cross-examination about the facts.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, My Lord I—about your Lordship’s ruling—I have had,
of course, a very extensive experience in cross-examination in many
courts, and I bow entirely to Your Lordship’s ruling; but it is very
difficult for a cross-examiner to confine himself entirely to the facts.
But I shall do the very best I can.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Then I shall read on:
“Since political entanglements abroad must be avoided at present
under all circumstances, only those preparatory measures that
are urgently necessary may be carried out in the demilitarized
zone. The existence of such preparations or the intention of
making them must be kept strictly secret in the zone itself as
well as in the rest of the Reich....
“Weapons, equipment, insignia, field-gray uniforms, and other
items stored for mobilization purposes must be kept from sight.”
And now I want to refer to the last paragraph:
“Commitment to writing of directives for mobilization purposes
is permissible only insofar as it is absolutely necessary to the
smooth execution of the measures provided for the demilitarized
zone. Without exception such material must be kept in safes.”
You were collecting weapons and uniforms in the demilitarized zone, were
you?
JODL: They were weapons and items of equipment of the Landespolizei, the
Order Police, and the Gendarmerie. There were no troops there.
Consequently, there were no weapons there for them.
MR. ROBERTS: Did the Police wear field-gray uniforms?
JODL: To my knowledge the Police wore a gray-green uniform or a green
uniform.
MR. ROBERTS: Then what was the need of this great secrecy if this was
only police equipment?
JODL: It was the equipment in addition for the reinforced border
guards—the customs inspectors—about which I have already said that it
was intended...
MR. ROBERTS: My question, Witness, was what was the need for secrecy?
What was the need for secrecy if you were not breaking the Treaty of
Versailles? Can’t you answer that?
JODL: I have already testified to the reasons for keeping all these
measures secret in detail during my direct examination, and I confirm
that in all these preparations it was a question—in case of an
occupation of the western Rhenish territory by France—of setting up a
blockade along the line with the aid of the Police, the Gendarmerie, and
the reinforced border guards. That was the intention at that time, only
for this eventuality. I have already testified under oath that I learned
about the occupation of the Rhineland only 6 or 8 days beforehand.
MR. ROBERTS: I know you have, you see, and I am suggesting to you that
your evidence was quite untrue on that point; and I am going to suggest
it is quite untrue on many points. Now then, will you please go back to
the first paragraph that I read. You say:
“To the _aide-mémoire_ of the French Chargé d’Affaires ... the
German Reich Government has replied that neither civilian
recruiting authorities nor other offices ... have been entrusted
with mobilization tasks such as the raising, equipping, and
arming of any kind of formations for the event of war....”
Doesn’t that subsequent paragraph about the weapons, equipment,
insignia, and field-gray uniforms show that the truth was not told to
the French Chargé d’Affaires?
JODL: I only repeat the answer that was given to the French Chargé
d’Affaires. I believe that that was essentially true: No mobilization
tasks, such as disposition, equipment, and arming of formations for the
event of war. There was no thought of war, no one mentioned it with even
one word.
MR. ROBERTS: I will not repeat the point, I submitted—may I just remind
you—and I think there are copies for the Tribunal too—of Article 43 of
the Versailles Treaty.
Article 42 defines the area, the left bank of the Rhine and the right
bank to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometers to the east. Article 43:
“In the area defined above the maintenance and the assembly of
armed forces, either permanently of temporarily, and military
maneuvers of any kind; as well as the upkeep of all permanent
works for mobilization, are in the same way forbidden.”
I suggest to you the step you were taking—mentioning at that
meeting—was a clear breach of Versailles. Do you agree, or don’t you?
JODL: No, I do not agree to that. They were taken in the event that the
enemy should not abide by the treaty and should attack us again, as that
time in the Ruhr district.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now I propose to refer to you a document which
has been described as your speech, L-172, from time to time—and I want
to make it quite clear first as to what you say the document is, because
you wouldn’t say one thing one day and the opposite the next, would you,
Witness? That document has your writing in places, has it not? I can
refer you to the pages if you like. If you look at page...
JODL: That is unnecessary. It contains many handwritten corrections and
notations by me. But I have...
MR. ROBERTS: Thank you, Witness, for saving me that trouble then. And is
that a speech—the notes of a speech—which you delivered at Munich to
the Gauleiter in 1943?
JODL: I have already clearly said that this was the rough draft, not the
speech that I made but parts of the first draft and most of the contents
consist of notes by my staff, which they sent me for the preparation of
this speech. I crossed out whole pages and sent the whole rough draft
back again and only then did I make my speech.
MR. ROBERTS: Well now, I want to examine that, because you said quite
differently, did you not, when you were interrogated by one American
officer on two separate occasions? You said quite differently, did you
not?
[_There was no response._]
Were you interrogated on this matter on the 8th of October last year by
Colonel Thomas Hinkel? Do you remember that? Perhaps you would not
remember the date.
JODL: No. Oh, we spoke about this matter a few times.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, and you were sworn when you gave your answers to the
interrogators?
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: Well now, may I read, to refresh your memory, a copy from
the shorthand notes of the interrogation?
“I show you a photostatic reproduction of a number of pages of a
lecture, which was purported to have been given by you on the
7th of November 1943, and ask you if those pages represent the
lecture that was delivered. For the record, that is identified
as L-172.”
Then you answer:
“Yes. A number of things are not contained therein, which I
explained with the map.
“Question: ‘You interpolated the remarks that do not appear in
the written part; is that correct?’
“Answer: ‘Yes, many particulars I set forth just with the map at
hand.’
“Question: ‘Is that your handwriting appearing on the cover
page?’
“Answer: ‘No, it is not mine.’
“But the remaining sheets you identify as the written version of
a lecture at Munich?
“Answer: ‘I cannot say whether it was actually my lecture as it
was, because I see the signature of Buttlar. It isn’t the
lecture itself. That is the materials of the brochures which had
been furnished to me.’”
Then:
“Do you identify...”
Just follow this, will you, Witness?
“Do you identify the first 29 pages as constituting the lecture
that you delivered?
“Answer (after examining the document): ‘Yes, that is my
lecture.’”
Do you want to alter that sworn answer now? Do you?
JODL: I have not read the transcript of the notes which were taken here.
I do not know the translation. I made several other statements in that
regard. I observed in the second interrogation that that was not
actually my speech, and that...
MR. ROBERTS: I will read the second one, Witness. I have that for you.
This was on the 16th...
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, had you finished what you wanted to say?
JODL: No, I had not finished. I was interrupted.
THE PRESIDENT: Then finish what you want to say.
JODL: I wanted to say that before I had looked over the whole document,
at the first moment, of course, I had the impression that that was the
copy from which I delivered my speech. However, when I looked at it more
carefully in the course of the interrogations, I noticed that it was
only the material collected for this speech, and I said clearly and
distinctly:
“It contains the first draft, the outline and the conclusion by
me. The whole middle part is only material furnished by my
staff, and the whole thing is not at all the speech which I
gave.”
That is word for word what I told Colonel Hinkel.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes. Let me read now what I was going to read, the second
interrogation. This is the 16th of November 1945, 4 days before the
Trial:
“This document is identified for the record as L-172. I show you
the photostatic reproduction in order to refresh your
recollection concerning it.
“As I remember your previous testimony, it was to the effect
that the first part of the document is the speech that you wrote
for delivery to that meeting. The second part consists of
various thoughts on the basis of which this speech was prepared;
is that right?
“Answer: ‘One moment, please. This is not my real lecture. This
is a conglomeration of the pieces of writings which are partly
drafts of my own, that is, the introduction; but all the
appendices are the basis of my lecture furnished me by my staff.
“‘The photostats appended to the original lecture—it was a
photographed copy—and also a number of maps which were drawn up
were included.
“‘This is not my lecture as such; and the annotations made here,
in this calligraphic manner, were not mine. I made them in my
own handwriting.
“‘I do not know the origin of this copy. Most likely it was
furnished me by the OKW for the purpose of my giving this
lecture. It is altogether a conglomeration of various pieces of
writing, and it is usable only with limitations. However...’”
And just listen to this, will you?
“‘...as to the broad lines of it, this is what I have used as a
lecture.’”
Then the next question was:
“I believe you stated before that the written speech that you
had was not given as set forth in the text because you
interpolated various remarks in the course of the speech,
particularly whenever you referred to one of the maps that you
placed before the audience, in order to follow the campaigns
which you discussed. Isn’t that correct?”
Now listen to this:
“What I have written down I have actually spoken and I followed
this text written down by myself. But in regard to the momentary
situation on the various fronts”—and that is Part 3 and 4,
where you will find a note “delivered extemporaneously”—“I had
that so clearly in mind that I did not need to base my speech on
any written statements. Also, I referred to the maps freely.”
Then the last question on this point:
“Is it not true, however, that the document before you
represents, in general, the speech that you gave at Munich in
November 1943 to this meeting?”
The answer is:
“Yes; much, without doubt, is the same. All the appendices with
regard to these various theaters of war and other appendices I
had not used during my speech. I had returned them.”
Do you agree with your answer to that interrogation?
JODL: On the whole, you have confirmed just what I said. However, I do
not know why we have to talk so long about it. The case is completely
clear. It is...
MR. ROBERTS: Well, please do not worry yourself. I know I am stopping
you; but I apprehend that I am stopping you from saying something quite
irrelevant, and in the interest of time I regard it as my duty to stop
you. Please do not worry about why I should do something.
I want to know whether that document roughly represents what you said in
the speech. It is quite a different thing to being in a wastepaper
basket.
JODL: The introduction and the conclusion, as contained here in the
first draft were, of course, basically retained in the speech in this
form. However, the whole speech was only finally worked out on the basis
of this first draft; it was shortened, changed, parts were crossed out,
and mistakes were eliminated. And only then came the main part of the
speech for which only the material is here. There is no proof, and I am
not in a position to say whether I actually spoke even one sentence of
those which are here in the form in which it is found in the first
draft.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good; I will accept that.
JODL: If you give me a copy of my actual speech I will recognize it.
MR. ROBERTS: That is all we can give you, Witness, because that is all
we found.
THE PRESIDENT: I think we might as well adjourn now.
MR. ROBERTS: If Your Lordship please.
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. EXNER: Mr. President, I should like to call attention to the
following: When my client was interrogated here, he was heard through an
interpreter, since he does not understand the English language. On the
basis of this testimony the minutes were, as I have just heard, set down
in the English language. These minutes he never saw and he did not sign
them. And now these minutes, which were compiled in English, are
submitted to him in a German translation. In my opinion it is quite
impossible under such circumstances to tie the defendant down to
specific words which are contained in the minutes. He abides by what he
said, but he cannot recognize everything that is in those minutes
when...
THE PRESIDENT: That is true. We will keep these facts in mind. The
Tribunal will keep these facts in mind, if you will draw them to their
attention.
MR. ROBERTS: If it please the Tribunal, I am passing from that point.
The witness, I think, said the document was the basis of his speech; and
I accept that answer and I pass to another point.
Would you please give the witness his diary, 1780-PS, German C-113. And
it is Page 133 in the large document book, Page 133.
Witness, I think you have seen this entry. My Lord, it is the 5th of
November 1937 I am dealing with:
“Führer develops his ideas about intentions for future course
and conduct of policy....”
Page 133 of the large book.
THE PRESIDENT: When you say, large book, you mean Number 7?
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, Number 7; I am sorry. I should have given it a number.
[_Turning to the defendant._] 5th of November 1937:
“Führer develops his ideas about intentions for future course
and conduct of policy to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces...”—_et cetera_.
There is a divergence in the recording of his ideas as made by the chief
of Armed Forces and by the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.
“...the intention of L...”—does that mean your department,
Landesverteidigung—its intention to have these thoughts put on paper?
[_There was no response._]
MR. ROBERTS: Please answer my question, Witness.
JODL: “Intention of L,” that means the intention of the Department of
National Defense (Landesverteidigung) to have these thoughts put down on
paper and transmitted to the branches of the Wehrmacht.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now, the meeting that you were talking about was
what we have called the Hossbach Conference, was it not, which is
386-PS? The Tribunal is very familiar with it. You remember the
conference, do you not? You have read it many times here?
JODL: Yes, but I was not present at this conference. I do recall the
things that were read here.
MR. ROBERTS: I know you were not present. But presumably you, as head of
the Home Defense Department, were told of what was said at the
conference?
JODL: I have already stated with regard to that that the report which I
received was in no way sensational. The directives for the preparations
after this time are available to the Court in writing; what we prepared
and worked out at the time is proved thereby. We have the orders of 20
May and of 14 June; they are available.
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you were only asked whether you were told what
happened at the conference. It was not necessary to make a long
statement about that.
MR. ROBERTS: You see, I try to put simple questions, and I am asking for
simple answers. The last thing I want is to interrupt you.
Were you told that at that conference Hitler said that Germany’s problem
was a question of space?
JODL: No, not one word.
MR. ROBERTS: Were you told that Hitler said that the German question
could only be solved by force?
JODL: No.
MR. ROBERTS: And were you told that Hitler said that German rearmament
was practically complete?
JODL: No.
MR. ROBERTS: And the last question I will ask you: Were you told that
Hitler said that the first aim in the event of war would be Austria and
Czechoslovakia?
JODL: The report about the more active preparations for the march
against Czechoslovakia was, I believe, contained in these statements.
But I can only say that the details which I received from Field Marshal
Keitel are not in my recollection at present. I recall only one thing,
that it was no surprise or sensation for me, and only small corrections
of the directives which had been given out up to that point were
necessary.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Thank you. Now then, you were not present at
Obersalzberg when Keitel was there with Schuschnigg the following
February, were you?
JODL: No, I was not present.
MR. ROBERTS: But Keitel later told you what had happened?
JODL: He made a few brief remarks about that in narrative form, for
after all, I had no further concern in this matter.
MR. ROBERTS: Did you make that entry in your diary; that is, the next
entry to the one I was referring to, Page 133, Book 7, the same page,
under 11th of February 1938:
“Evening 12 February General Keitel, with General Reichenau, and
Sperrle at Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg and Schmidt were again put
under severest political and military pressure.”
Did Keitel tell you that?