JODL: May I say something else about this document?
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, anything you like.
JODL: This incident never came to my knowledge; at least, I have no
recollection of it. As far as I know, it never appeared in the Armed
Forces communiqué, because General Dostler did not report the incident
to his commanding officer, Kesselring, who might have been able to take,
and might have taken, a different course in this affair.
MR. ROBERTS: Why do you say that you had to circulate this order? No man
can compel another to circulate an order for murder, unless he does it.
JODL: I have explained at length that this order could not simply be
interpreted as an order to murder, but that very serious and justified
doubts and considerations could arise with regard to international law
and with regard to the justness of this order. In any case, you should
have complete appreciation of such a delicate situation, because even
now, in my position here, I cannot say or do as I like, and that exactly
is what I experienced during these last 5½ years.
MR. ROBERTS: You could have refused. You could have said, and the other
generals could have said, could you not: “We are all honorable soldiers.
We will not publish and issue those orders”?
JODL: Certainly under other circumstances it might have been possible,
first, if at the time I had not had that conflict with the Führer, and
secondly, if the British Ministry of War had made my task a little
easier. However, these events and the statement made by the British on
the 2d of September put the Führer into a rage against which I was
powerless. How much I tried to resist, for that the document itself is
the best proof, because the threat of punishment and detailed
justification for it were directed against me personally.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Roberts, would that be a convenient time to break
off?
[_A recess was taken._]
MR. ROBERTS: I want to ask you a few questions about the deportation of
the Jews from Denmark. Will you look, please, at a new exhibit, D-547,
which I offer as GB-488. Now, that is the OKW Operational Staff from the
commander, Denmark, dated 20 September 1943. That is before the teletype
which has been put in, 2 days before:
“The Führer has agreed in principle with Dr. Best’s telegram
that the Jewish question in Denmark be solved very soon by
deportation.
“Execution of this measure should take place while the state of
military emergency still exists. It is not certain if sufficient
police forces can be provided for the arrest of the Jews and
their families, about 6,000 persons, most of whom live in
Copenhagen. The Army would be heavily burdened....
“I believe that the results of the deportation will be
serious....
“The armament industry deliveries will be prejudiced.
Considerable disturbances will have to be reckoned with.”
And you made a note on the back of it:
“I know nothing of this. If a political measure is to be carried
out by the commander of Denmark the OKW must be notified by the
Foreign Office.”
Is that right?
JODL: Yes. I would not have recalled this document, but I certainly
wrote the note. It proves that I did not remember until now that
obviously this question had been discussed in Denmark some days before
and that the commander in Denmark had been making objections.
Consequently I wrote, I know nothing of this. This is a political
measure, and if a political measure is to be carried out in Denmark,
then the Foreign Office should kindly notify us.
MR. ROBERTS: I omit one or two unimportant documents. Will you go to
document dated 1 October 1943—the fifth or sixth document of Your
Lordship’s file, Number D-547, dated 1 October 1943. It is to the OKW
from Denmark, and quotes as follows:
“The Reich Plenipotentiary in Denmark has given the following
report to the Minister for Foreign Affairs:
“1) The arrest of the Jews will take place on the night of 1-2
October. Transportation from Zealand will be carried out by
ship....
“2) Should I receive no contrary instruction, I do not intend
allowing the Jewish action to be mentioned, either on the radio
or in the press”—and then
“3) ...I intend leaving the possessions of the evacuated Jews
undisturbed in order that the seizure of these possessions
cannot be imputed to be the reason or one of the reasons for the
action.”
Then you deal with the disadvantages—the writer does—and there is a
question: “Does the Reichsführer SS know?” The answer:
“The Reichsführer SS knows, is in agreement,” and then a pencil note in
Jodl’s handwriting, “The Führer agrees.” Is that in your writing?
JODL: Yes, that is my handwriting, but that refers only to the
announcement of the release of the interned Danish soldiers.
MR. ROBERTS: I see.
JODL: Then it is important to note in this document that the commander
in Denmark said that he did not intend having the property of the
evacuated Jews disturbed. He said:
“...I intend leaving the possessions of the evacuated Jews
undisturbed....”
He had the executive power at that time.
MR. ROBERTS: Have you got the next document in the same bundle, 2d of
October 1943, to OKW Operations Staff, from Denmark? I quote:
“Jewish action carried out in the night of the 1-2 October by
the German Police without incidents.”
And then the last document, dated 3 October 1943, to the OKW Operations
Staff:
“According to the statement of the Reich Plenipotentiary, the
Reichsführer SS has ordered that the Reichsführer SS alone as
the person ordering the Jewish action is to receive the exact
figures on arrests.
“The Plenipotentiary has, therefore, given no figures to the
commander of the German troops in Denmark. 232 Jews have been
handed in by the Police via the collecting points set up by the
Watch Battalion, Copenhagen.”
What was the Watch Battalion?
JODL: I cannot say that at the moment; I do not know how it was
composed. It might have been a unit of the Police; it might have been
part of the Army; I cannot say with certainty. At any rate it was a unit
which was used only for guard duties. But it is interesting that I wrote
the remark: “Is a matter of complete indifference to us,” which proves
that I was not interested in the affair, and refused to have any part in
it.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, I wonder. First of all, you said that the Watch
Battalion might have been a part of the Wehrmacht. Were you...
JODL: That is not certain. I do not wish to dispute it definitely. There
were also watch battalions of the Army, but it might equally well have
been a watch unit of the Police. I cannot say it with certainty, but
General Von Hannecken should have information about it.
MR. ROBERTS: But were your “decent German soldiers,” whom you mentioned
yesterday, were they called upon to round up Jews who managed to get
through the SS net?
JODL: No, it says here, “...it was carried through by the Police,” and I
do not believe that any unit of the Wehrmacht concerned itself with
deportation of Jews. I do not believe it; the Wehrmacht rejected that.
MR. ROBERTS: Dirty work, was it not?
JODL: I do not believe that it happened; I do not believe it.
MR. ROBERTS: Then your note: “...is a matter of complete indifference to
us”—it was a matter of complete indifference to you how many Jews were
deported, you did not care?
JODL: The note does not imply that, but it does prove that the matter
was a political one, and with political matters I was not concerned. My
attitude to the Jewish question has, I believe, been made clear already.
MR. ROBERTS: Where did the Jews go to, Auschwitz?
JODL: No. The French Prosecution read it here; these Jews of whom we are
speaking now were taken to Theresienstadt; a few of the older people
died there, but all of them were treated well, and received clothing and
food. I had the same information, and this document of the Danish
Government confirms it.
MR. ROBERTS: You believe that, do you?
JODL: Yes, I believe that, because the Danish Government confirms it
here; it was confirmed in this court by the Prosecution itself.
MR. ROBERTS: Now I want to deal with one other topic, the topic of
forced labor. Did you say in your speech—will you look at your notes of
your speech, Pages 38 and 39, and it is Page 298 of Document Book 7, the
big one, the paragraph, which begins on Page 38 in the witness’ copy. It
has got a frame; I think it is a piece of paper headed “38.” I wonder if
you can find it for him.
“This dilemma of manpower shortage has led to the idea of making
more thorough use of the manpower reserves in the territories
dominated by us. Right thinking and wrong thinking are mixed up
together. I believe that insofar as concerns labor, everything
has been done that could be done. Where this has not yet been
achieved, it appeared to be more favorable politically to
refrain from measures of compulsion, and secure in turn order
and economic aid. In my opinion, however, the time has now come
to take steps with remorseless vigor and resolution in Denmark,
Holland, France, and Belgium to compel thousands of idlers to
carry out the fortification work which is more important than
any other work. The necessary orders for this have already been
given.” (Document Number L-172, Exhibit Number USA-34.)
Do you remember them?
JODL: There is no doubt that I drafted this once.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes?
JODL: But that does not prove that I said it.
MR. ROBERTS: But had the necessary orders been given for the civilians
in the occupied territories to work on the German fortification?
JODL: A compulsory labor order was issued in most countries, but I—you
may not know it—I state under my oath that in Denmark and Holland, and
also in Belgium, local firms, which recruited their own labor under the
labor order, worked on these fortifications and that the populations of
these areas were particularly glad about this, because the stronger
their coast was fortified, the more certain were they that the invasion
would not take place in their neighborhood. And, of course, they were
greatly interested in preventing an invasion, which they knew would
destroy everything. Though it sounds incredible, the local inhabitants
did work on these fortifications, some of them with the greatest
enthusiasm. That is a fact.
MR. ROBERTS: No, I did not stop you. But had the necessary orders been
given—that is in the last sentence—to compel these people who did not
want to, to compel them to work on fortification? I am not talking about
the people who did want it, but the people who did not.
JODL: I understand. I did not know details of the procedure, as I did
not concern myself with it, but I did know that compulsory labor orders
had been issued in the occupied countries.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. I will leave that, if you have said all you want
to say. Will you look now, please, at a new document, Number 1383-PS,
which I offer as GB-489. This is a report of a discussion of the current
military situation, 12 December 1942, Pages 65 and 66, Jodl speaking:
“The military commander of France reports: The number of French
workers deported into the Reich since 1 June has now passed
220,000. There are in round figures 100,000 skilled laborers in
Berlin.”
How many of these 220,000 were volunteers, did you find out?
JODL: I cannot say that; I only quoted from a report which was appended
to the situation report from France. That a large-scale exchange between
prisoners of war and workers had been in progress has already been
stated in detail by Sauckel.
MR. ROBERTS: I will leave that. I ask only two questions now on Sagan,
Stalag Luft III.
You said yesterday that after the incident of the Sagan shooting, you
thought Hitler was no longer “humane.” Did you say that?
JODL: I said yesterday, I had the impression then that he was disavowing
all humane conceptions of right.
MR. ROBERTS: Had you thought that he was humane up to March of 1944?
JODL: Before this time, I personally knew of no action of his which
could not be justified legally, at least under international law. All
his previous orders, so far as I knew, could still be justified in some
way. They were reprisals. But this act was not a reprisal.
MR. ROBERTS: This was—would you agree with me—the word is not too
strong—that this was sheer murder of these 50 airmen?
JODL: I completely agree with you: I consider it sheer murder.
MR. ROBERTS: How could you honorable generals go on serving a murderer
with unabated loyalty?
JODL: I did not serve with unabated loyalty after this event, but I did
everything in my power to avoid further injustice.
MR. ROBERTS: Now I come to something else, the question of destruction
in Norway. The document is 754-PS. It has not yet been exhibited. I
offer it as GB-490. This document is signed by you, is it not?
JODL: I have known this document for a long time; it is signed by me.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes. Perhaps I might just read parts of it to the Tribunal.
Dated 28 October 1944. It is from your staff, and the distribution is to
the Army supreme command; commander-in-chief, Norway; to the Reich
Commissioner, Norway; and the Navy.
“Because of the unwillingness of the northern Norwegian
population to evacuate voluntarily the Führer has agreed to the
proposals of the Reich Commissioner and has ordered that the
entire Norwegian population east of the Fjord of Lyngen be
evacuated by force in the interest of their own security, and
that all homes are to be burned to the ground or destroyed.
“The commander, Northern Finland, is responsible that the
Führer’s orders be carried out without consideration. Only by
this method can the Russians with strong forces, aided by these
homesteads and the population familiar with the terrain, be
prevented from following our withdrawal operations during the
winter and shortly appearing in front of our position in Lyngen.
This is not the place for sympathy for the civilian population.”
Lyngen is in the very north of Norway, is it not, on the west coast?
JODL: No, on the northern coast, where Finland is closest to the coast
of the polar region and very near Norway.
MR. ROBERTS: Now, that order was carried out, according to the Norwegian
report, UK-79, which the Tribunal will find as the last document in the
small book, 7A, Page 26 of the Norwegian report, at the bottom of the
page, Page 26:
“As a result of the advance of the Russian troops and the
retreat of the German Army in Finnmark, October-November 1944,
the Germans practiced the ‘scorched earth’ policy for the first
time in Norway. Orders were issued that the civilian population
was to evacuate, and that all houses, transport, and stores were
to be destroyed. As a result of this, about 30,000 houses were
damaged apart from 12,000 items of damage to chattels amounting
to 176 million kroner.”
And then, for photographs will the Tribunal turn to Pages 62 and 63; 62
is a copy of the German order, and 63 is a photograph of the ruins of a
fishing village.
That was a cruel order, was it not, Witness?
JODL: No, not exactly. I should like to make a few explanatory remarks
about it. Typically, as I have always said, this order was urged upon
the Führer by the Reich Commissioner Terboven; not by the soldiers but
much against their will.
Secondly, this order was not carried out, because otherwise the cities
of Kirkenes, Hammerfest, and Alta would today no longer exist. All these
cities are east of the Lyngen Fjord. In practice this order was
moderated by our forces in agreement with me, and in conversations I had
with my brother, who was the commanding general in that region—and whom
I wanted to call as a witness since I expected this document to be
produced—it was moderated to such an extent that, in fact, only what
was necessary from a military point of view and could be justified under
Article 23 of the Hague Regulations on Land Warfare was destroyed.
Otherwise no city or house would be left today in northern Norway; and
if you were to travel there, you would see that these cities are still
standing, not destroyed.
The Armed Forces commander in Norway strongly protested against this
attitude of Terboven, and I repeated these objections to the Führer in
similarly strong terms, but nevertheless he demanded that this order be
issued. We who retained our humanitarian sentiments carried out the
order only insofar as it was absolutely necessary for military reasons.
These are the facts.
MR. ROBERTS: I think you said, when you were interrogated, that your
brother complained of this order, did he not?
JODL: Yes, quite, he was enraged by this decree.
MR. ROBERTS: Very well. I am now going to turn to two documents with
regard to the treatment of the Norwegian civilian population.
They are in your Document Book 1, Pages 99 and 100—well, it begins at
Page 98. These are regulations on the conduct during the occupation of
Denmark and Norway. And there are instructions to the troops to treat
the inhabitants politely and well and to behave themselves with due
decorum. That is right, is it not?
JODL: Yes, that is correct.
MR. ROBERTS: And they must be told that they are entering Norway for the
protection of the country and the safety of its inhabitants. That
appears on Page 99. That is rather a euphemistic description of a sudden
invasion with no declaration of war, is it not?
JODL: Yes, but at first it was carried out in a fairly peaceful manner
on the whole.
MR. ROBERTS: From your point of view?
JODL: No, from the point of view of the Norwegians as well. The most
extraordinary things...
MR. ROBERTS: Well, you know, we have seen—we can see in the Norwegian
Government’s report photograph after photograph of these towns and
villages bombed to ruins. Is that your idea of an orderly occupation?
JODL: What was bombed on the day of the landing is hardly worth
mentioning; just a few coastal batteries and a few fortifications, but
no cities. Villages were destroyed only later in the battle with the
English brigade at Dombass and at Lillehammer, but nothing was destroyed
when the country was first occupied. Then the Norwegians only stood at
the quays, hands in their pockets, and looked on with great interest.
MR. ROBERTS: And naturally, Witness, if you could have landed without
opposition and occupied the country without opposition, so much the
better for you? That is obvious, is it not?
JODL: Yes, undoubtedly; that would have been even better; and the
Norwegians would certainly have fared very well during the occupation if
Terboven had not come.
MR. ROBERTS: Now, I want you to look at a part of that document which,
quite properly, of course, was not read.
It is Appendix 5 which will be part, My Lord, I assume, of Exhibit
AJ-14, the number which this document was given when it was put in in
the examination-in-chief. But I am handing the Tribunal copies of
Appendix 5, because it does not appear in the Jodl document book.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Well, now, Appendix 5, I can describe as
the sting in the tail of this document:
“Guiding Principles for the Attitude of Troops in Occupied
Areas.
“Only”—I do not read the first few paragraphs—“Only in the
event of the civil population’s putting up a resistance or
behaving rebelliously can the following decisions be carried
out:
“1) If the civilian population offers resistance or if attacks
are to be feared, the arrest of hostages should, on principle,
be resorted to. Hostages should only be arrested on orders of
the commander of a regiment or a commander of equivalent rank.
“When accommodating and feeding hostages it should be borne in
mind that they are not imprisoned because of crimes. Hostages
and population are to be informed that the hostages will be shot
at any sign of hostile action. Previous sanction of the shooting
by the divisional commander must be obtained....”
Then:
“Armed resistance by the civilian population is to be crushed by
force of arms.”
The last sentence on that page:
“The death penalty will be imposed for violence of any kind
against the German Armed Forces. Immediate trials will be held
by a field court martial. The regimental commander can appoint
the summary court, composed of one captain, one sergeant, one
corporal, hear witnesses, draw up the sentence in writing. The
verdict will be the death penalty if guilty, otherwise
acquittal. The sentence will be executed immediately after
confirmation by the regimental commander.
“The following are to be considered as acts of violence:
Sabotage, destruction of our lines of communications, cutting of
telephone wires, demolitions, _et cetera_.” (Document Number
Jodl-37, Exhibit Number AJ-14.)
A little drastic, that, was it not? Only the death penalty?
JODL: These instructions are, word for word, in complete accord with our
directives which, in times of peace, were laid down by the group of
experts on international law in co-operation with the Foreign Office and
with German professors of international law. It would have been well, if
only these, our military precepts, our military court procedure laid
down before we went to war, had been followed consistently everywhere.
Our official directives laid down the question of hostages from the
point of view of international law, and there is no doubt that under
international law as applicable in the year 1939, the taking of hostages
was admissible.
MR. ROBERTS: I suggest to you, as you raise that point, that nowhere in
international law will you find the shooting of hostages legalized at
all.
JODL: Then it is not with certainty prohibited anywhere in international
law. I believe it is an open question. In our directives, even in the
_Handbook on Tactics_, the concept of taking hostages had been laid down
for years.
MR. ROBERTS: That may be so, and I do not want to argue with you about
it. I suggest to you that the Hague Regulations protect the lives of
civilians in occupied countries, unless they commit crimes, of course,
and also prohibit collective punishment of the innocent.
If you do not want to say any more on that—I do not want to stop you if
you do.
JODL: I can only summarize and say that every word here is in accord
with the directives applicable in the German Army, and these directives
were not illegal. But one would have to argue this problem with experts
on international law.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now, will you look at one other document dealing
with Norway? It is D-582.
My Lord, it is a new document, and I offer it as GB-491.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Is that a document which comes from your
office?
JODL: Yes. It originated with the Armed Forces Operations Staff,
Quartermaster Section.
MR. ROBERTS: Do you know of it or not?
JODL: I cannot recall it, but there are some notes of mine on it, and so
I undoubtedly saw the document.
MR. ROBERTS: Oh, yes. Where are the notes, Witness?
JODL: They are on the back page of the last teleprint message.
MR. ROBERTS: Oh, I see what you mean, yes. Well, will you take first of
all—I had forgotten that you were getting more than one document. Will
you take first of all the document dated the 2d of February 1945? I
think it is the top one.
JODL: There are no remarks of mine on that document, so I cannot say
with certainty whether I have seen it.
MR. ROBERTS: Just have a look at it and tell me whether you have seen
it.
JODL: I do not think I have seen this. I do not—I have no recollection
of having ever read it.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, then, I do not think it would be right to
cross-examine you on that document.
My Lord, in that case, I would ask to withdraw it, and I will not put it
in as an exhibit.
THE PRESIDENT: I think the defendant said that it was from his office.
MR. ROBERTS: Very well, then. I will—he did that.
[_Turning to the defendant._] You see what the document says, Defendant.
It is dated 2 April 1945; it deals with...
JODL: The 2d of February.
MR. ROBERTS: It is the 2d of February. It deals with Reich Commissioner
Terboven’s report to the Führer. It says:
“Those responsible for attempts to murder and to carry out
sabotage are the illegal elements within Norway with a
bourgeois-national majority and a communist minority, as well as
individual groups which came direct from England or Sweden....
“The bourgeois-national majority was opposed to the communist
minority in conception of sabotage and murder, and in particular
with regard to their extent and nature. This resistance has ...
become progressively weaker during the course of the past year.
“Official departments of the exile government, as for instance
the Crown Prince Olaf, as so-called Commander-in-Chief of the
Norwegian Armed Forces, and various others, have called upon the
population in speeches and orders to carry out sabotage. As a
result, there is a particularly good possibility here of
stamping every supporter of the exile government as an
intellectual instigator or accomplice.
“The aim of the coming measures must therefore be: a) to
strengthen the power and will to turn once more against sabotage
by threatening the very influential class of leaders in the
bourgeois camp; b) thereby to exacerbate more and more
antagonism between the bourgeois and Communists....”
And then, “Suggestions.” These are suggestions from your office,
apparently:
“1. Particularly influential representatives of the explicitly
anti-German and anti-National Socialist class of industrialists
to be shot without trial on the accusation that they are
intellectual instigators or accomplices and stating that they
were convicted within the framework of police investigations.
“2. Similar men from the same circle to be sent to Germany to
work on fortifications.
“3. In cases where the circumstances are particularly suitable,
proceedings to be taken before the SS and Police Court, with the
execution of the sentence of death and suitable publicity.”
There are other suggestions which I need not read. And then the last
paragraph but one:
“The Führer has agreed to these proposals only in part.
Especially in connection with efforts at protection against acts
of sabotage he has rejected taking hostages. He has rejected the
shooting of influential Norwegian representatives without
trial”—which is underlined in blue pencil.
Is that your blue pencil?
JODL: No, it is not mine.
MR. ROBERTS: You see, it is a remarkable document, Witness, because that
is one instance where your department is suggesting a course of what I
submit is brutal action, which for once the Führer rejects.
JODL: I believe, Mr. Roberts, you are somewhat mistaken. No proposal at
all is being made here, but the Armed Forces Operations Staff is
advising the military commander in Norway of what Reich Commissioner
Terboven has told the Führer. He reported to the Führer first about the
general situation and then be made the proposals mentioned here; and the
Armed Forces Operations Staff which obviously had a representative at
this meeting—I was not there—immediately advised the military
commander of the handsome proposals of his friend Terboven.
That is what happened and these proposals went beyond—they were too
much even for the Führer. But they were not our proposals.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good, Witness, I hear your answer, and the Court will
consider it. It may be accepted. The document speaks for itself.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you read the first—the subject description
“Orientation about Reich Commissioner Terboven’s Report to the Führer”?
MR. ROBERTS: Yes. That is the first—that is the subject, is it not,
beginning, Witness, “Orientation about Reich Commissioner Terboven’s
Report”? Whose orientation? Your department’s?
JODL: Orientation of the Mountain Army, that is, of General Böhm.
General Böhm as commanding general of the Mountain Army, High Command
20, is advised of the report made to the Führer by Reich Commissioner
Terboven, so that he would know what his friend Terboven was proposing.
It is no more than information on what Terboven said to the Führer. I
cannot tell you who was present; I was not there. The entire thing did
not originate with me; I have never seen it.
MR. ROBERTS: Well now, the second document, this is from Terboven to
Bormann on the 28th of October 1944. That is with regard to the
evacuation east of Lyngen. I do not think I need read that. Then, the
next document, maybe the second document, it is a teleprint of the 6th
of April 1945, from Oberführer Fehlis, SS Oberführer to the Operations
Staff, and it says:
“In accordance with the instructions of the OKW (WFSt) ... dated
29 March 1945, members of the Norwegian resistance movement who
appear in organized units and who are easily recognizable as
combatants by arm bands or other insignia are to be treated as
prisoners of war.”
And then the SS Oberführer says:
“I consider this order completely intolerable. I explained this
clearly to Lieutenant Colonel Hass and Major Benze from the
Armed Forces Operations Staff, who stayed here. There have been
isolated appearances of uniformed groups in Norway, but there
has been no fighting as yet. Inquiries were made at the defense
headquarters in London as to whether armed resistance should be
offered in case of German or Norwegian police action. As yet no
partisan or other fighting in Norway. On one occasion, captured
members of the military organization in uniform claimed the
right to be treated as prisoners of war. If this demand were met
at the present moment, the result would be that active fighting
on the part of the military organization would be set going.
Please obtain cancellation of the order of the Armed Forces
Operations Staff.”
And you, you voted for the exemption being removed, did you not?
“The objection is justified. Norway has a government in its own
country. Whoever fights against it in the country is a rebel. It
is another question in the case of Norwegian troops who were
taken to England and from there brought into the struggle under
England’s order.”
That is your note?
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: And you stick to that, do you? I mean you—that is your
opinion today?
JODL: Yes, indeed. I am of the opinion, from the point of view of
international law, that members of a resistance movement against their
own Norwegian government are certainly not to be considered as normal
troops but as constituting an uprising, a rebellion. But if Norwegian
troops come to Norway from England, then they are regular soldiers. And
that, today, is still my opinion on the basis of international law.
MR. ROBERTS: What do you call their own Norwegian government, the puppet
government which was set up by the Germans?
JODL: In any event, there was the government of Quisling at the time;
and in any event, speaking now from the point of view of international
law, we were occupying the country, and therefore, according to
international law, were justified in issuing laws and enforcing them.
That is accepted under international law, and resistance against it has
been considered all over the world as rebellion. The same applies to us
in Germany today.
MR. ROBERTS: Now, I want to deal quite shortly with three other matters,
and then I have finished. I want to deal first of all with what you have
said with regard to Hitler’s suggestion to revoke the Geneva Convention.
You say you were instrumental in preventing him from renouncing that
Convention?
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: Would you look at a document which has already been put in,
C-158, which is GB-209. I think you have loose copies for it; it is not
in a document book. This was put in with regard to the case against
Dönitz. It is headed, “Extracts from Minutes of the Hitler Conference on
the 19th of February 1945...”:
“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy was present on 19 February
1945.
“The Führer is considering whether or not Germany should
renounce the Geneva Convention. As not only the Russians but
also the Western Powers are violating international law by their
actions against the defenseless population and the residential
districts, it appears expedient to adopt the same course in
order to show the enemy that we are determined to fight with
every means for our existence, and also to urge our people to
resist to the utmost. The Führer orders the Commander-in-Chief
of the Navy to consider the pros and cons and to state his own
opinion.”
Then, further down, My Lord—Commander-in-Chief of the Navy on the
Hitler conference of the 20th of February:
“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy informed Generaloberst Jodl,
Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, and the
representative of the Foreign Office at the Führer’s
headquarters, Ambassador Hewel, of his views with regard to
Germany’s possible renunciation of the Geneva Convention. From a
military standpoint there are no grounds for this step as far as
the conduct of the war at sea is concerned. On the contrary, the
disadvantages outweigh the advantages; even from a general
standpoint it appears to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy that
this measure would bring no advantages. It would be better to
carry out the measures considered necessary without warning and
at all costs to save face with the world. The Chief of the Armed
Forces Operations Staff and Ambassador Hewel are in full
agreement.”
You were saying there, were you not, that you agreed with Raeder when he
said, “Break the Geneva Convention, but do not tell the world that we
are doing so.”
JODL: Grossadmiral Dönitz.
MR. ROBERTS: Dönitz, right. I beg your pardon. That is what you were
saying, is it not?
JODL: No. The whole thing, as I have said, is a notice of Admiral Wagner
on a conference from which one can gather only that Grossadmiral Dönitz
disapproved, and that he is supposed to have made this remark at the
end. I can hardly account for that remark today, because the only reason
given to us by the Führer at that time was that the tremendous number of
German soldiers in the West must be prevented from deserting as a
consequence of enemy propaganda about good treatment. I cannot explain
this remark, and in my written draft which I submitted to the Führer and
which contains the attitude of the Navy that sentence was not included,
but only advantages and disadvantages were compared. The disadvantages
were overwhelming; the whole thing was completely impracticable and
impossible, and so it was not carried out. More I cannot say. Witnesses
will confirm my statement.
MR. ROBERTS: I am now going to put to you your own Document D-606.
My Lord, that has not yet been exhibited. I offer it as 492-GB. GB-492.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Now that is signed by you, is it not? It
deals with the subject of the breach of the Geneva Convention. If you
would say first if it is signed by you? Is it signed by you? Please
answer my question: Is it signed by you?
JODL: Yes; my signature is at the end.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, that is where one usually finds the signature. Now,
it is dated 21 February 1945, and it is written on your letterhead
notepaper. And then, “Notes on report submitted to the Führer on 23
February through the Chief of the Operations Staff. The following
questions were to be examined.”
My Lord, I do not propose to read it all, or anything like that. If the
witness would follow me, I will read anything he wants. But it is a
discussion as to the various advantages and disadvantages of repudiating
the various international agreements, and I think I am not doing the
witness an injustice if I say from a utilitarian rather than a moral
point of view.
JODL: Yes, quite correct. For my only aim was to succeed with the
Führer, and this document was worded accordingly.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, now, I want to read the last paragraph.
My Lord, it is the last page but one of Your Lordship’s document, right
at the bottom:
“C. Proposal of the OKW:
“At the present moment the disadvantages of repudiating the
agreements which have been kept up to now in any case outweigh
the advantages by far.
“Just as it was a mistake in 1914 that we ourselves solemnly
declared war on all the states which had for a long time wanted
to wage war on us, and through this took the whole guilt of the
war on our shoulders before the outside world, and just as it
was a mistake to admit that the necessary”—note the word
“necessary”—“passage through Belgium in 1914 was our own fault,
so it would be a mistake now to repudiate openly the obligations
of international law which we accepted and thereby to stand
again as the guilty party before the outside world.
“Adherence to the accepted obligations does not demand in any
way that we should have to impose on ourselves any limitations
which will interfere with the conduct of the war. For instance,
if the British sink a hospital ship, this must be used for
propaganda purposes, as has been done to date. That, of course,
in no way prevents our sinking an English hospital ship at once
as a reprisal and then expressing our regret that it was a
mistake in the same manner as the British do.”
That is not very honorable, is it?
JODL: I can only say in reply that this was the sole method which
achieved success with the Führer, and by its use success was, in fact,
achieved. If I had come to him with moral or purely legal arguments, he
would have said, “Leave me alone with this foolish talk,” and he would
have proceeded with the renunciation of the Convention; but these things
compelled him to reconsider the step and, in consequence, he did not
carry it through.
You must after all grant me that at the end of 5½ years I knew best how
to achieve good results with him and avoid bad ones. My aim was to
achieve success, and I achieved it.
MR. ROBERTS: But, you see, you were deploring it there, the fact that
you told the world the truth in 1914. In 1914 you said that you regarded
treaties only as a scrap of paper. You are saying now, “What a pity we
told the world the truth in 1914. We ought to have told them something
untrue, and then we should have, possibly, had a better world
reputation.”
JODL: That was an argument which the Führer used frequently. If one
repeated his arguments in that form again and again he was more inclined
to read and accept one’s suggestions. One had to prevent his flinging
our proposals to the ground in a fit of rage and immediately decreeing
renunciation. That was the approach one had to follow. If one cannot do
good openly, it is better to do it in a roundabout way than not at all.
MR. ROBERTS: I am now coming to quite another point: Were you an admirer
of the principles of the Nazi Party?
JODL: No.
MR. ROBERTS: Were you of the opinion that there was a successful fusion
between the Nazi Party and the Wehrmacht, which brought about the
rejuvenation, the resurrection of Germany after 1933?
JODL: It would have happened, and I hoped for a long time that it would
happen; indeed, on the whole the relationship improved somewhat in the
course of the years and especially during the war. At first, it was
poor, very poor.
MR. ROBERTS: You wrote—please, I am reading now from your speech,
L-172. It is Page 290 of Document Book 7, and it is Page 6 of your
lecture notes, Page 290 of Document Book 7 and 203 of the German:
“The fact that the National Socialist movement in its struggle
for internal power was the preparatory stage to the outer
liberation from the shackles of the dictate of Versailles I need
not enlarge upon in this circle. I should like, however, to
mention how clearly all thoughtful regular soldiers realize what
an important part has been played by the National Socialist
movement in reawakening the will to fight, in nurturing fighting
strength, and in rearming the German people. Despite all its
inherent virtues this small Reichswehr could never have been
able to cope with this task, if only because of its restricted
radius of action. Indeed, what the Führer aimed at and has
luckily been successful in bringing about was a fusion of these
two forces.”
Did that represent your honest opinion or not?
JODL: Yes, that is historical truth, indisputable historical truth. The
Movement did bring that about; that is certain.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Then, I now want to put to you the last document
but one that I put in.
My Lord, it has not been exhibited. It is 1808-PS. I offer it as GB-493.
[_Turning to the defendant._] You made a speech, did you not, after the
attempt on Hitler’s life, to your staff? And are these the notes of your
speech on 24 July?
JODL: I have never seen this document before; I am seeing it for the
first time now. I did not know that any notes were made about the
speech.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, let us go by stages. Did you make a speech to your
staff shortly after the attempt on Hitler’s life—on 24 July 1944?
JODL: Yes, even while my head was still bandaged.
MR. ROBERTS: Secondly, is that document which you have in front of you,
is that a document which comes from your files? Look at the cover, if
necessary.
JODL: I assume so. It is headed: “Armed Forces Operations Staff War
Diary.” Most likely these are notes of Major Schramm.
MR. ROBERTS: Let me begin at the beginning of those notes. Just see if
you can remember what you said. Did you begin by saying: “The 20th of
July was the blackest day which German history has seen as yet, and will
probably remain so for all times”?
JODL: Yes, that is quite possible.
MR. ROBERTS: Why was it such a black day for Germany? Because somebody
tried to assassinate a man whom you now admit was a murderer?
JODL: Should I—at a moment when I am to be blown up in a cowardly,
insidious manner by one of my own comrades, together with many opponents
of the regime—should I perhaps approve of it all? That was to me the
worst thing that happened. If the man with a pistol in his hand had shot
the Führer and had then given himself up, it would have been entirely
different. But these tactics I considered most repulsive to any officer.
I spoke under the impression of those events, which are actually among
the worst I know, and I maintain today what I said then.
MR. ROBERTS: I do not want to argue with you, but do you think it is any
more dastardly than shooting those 50 American soldiers who landed in
the north of Italy to destroy a military target, shooting them like
dogs?
JODL: That also was murder, undoubtedly. But it is not the task of a
soldier to be the judge of his commander-in-chief. May history or the
Almighty do that.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. I have only about three more questions to ask
you.
My Lord, I am going to read from Page 2 of that document, about 10 lines
from the top. It begins, “The Führer...”
[_Turning to the defendant._] If I read this slowly, perhaps see if you
can recognize it.
“The Führer ignored this and other things, and now the would-be
assassins wished to do away with him, as a ‘despot’.”
Do you remember saying that or something like that? Can you find the
place?
“The Führer ignored this and other things, and now the would-be
assassins wished to eliminate him as a ‘despot’.”
Do you remember that?
“And yet, they themselves experienced how the Führer did not
come to power by force, but borne up by the love of the German
people.”
Do you remember saying that?
JODL: Yes, and that is true. He came to power, borne up by the love of
the German people. I had tremendous experiences in that respect. He was
almost overwhelmed by this love of the people and of the soldiers.
MR. ROBERTS: Borne up by—I beg your pardon, have you finished? I did
not mean to interrupt you.
JODL: Yes, I have dealt with that point.
MR. ROBERTS: Borne up by the love of the German people. You have
forgotten the SS, the Gestapo, and the concentration camps for political
opponents, have you not?
JODL: I have told you how unfortunately little I knew of all these
things, almost nothing. Of course, with a knowledge of these things, all
this takes a different aspect.
MR. ROBERTS: I take your answer, and I put my last document to you.
My Lord, this is a new document, 1776-PS; I offer it as GB-494.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Just have a look; see if it is signed by
you, will you?
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: So it is signed by you. Now, you have told this Court that
you were opposed to terror attacks. Just see what this document says.
Now, note the date first, the 30th of June 1940. That is just after the
temporary fall of France?
“Chief WFA.
“The Continuation of the War against England.
“If political means are without results, England’s will to
resist must be broken by force:
“a) by making war against the English mother country.
“b) by extending the war on the periphery.
“Regarding Point a) there are three possibilities:
“1) Siege....
“2) Terror attacks against English centers of population.
“3) Landing of troops....”
And now I read this as an example of historical prophesy:
“Germany’s final victory also over England is only a question of
time.”
Then I go down several paragraphs:
“Together with propaganda and temporary terror attacks—declared
to be reprisal actions—this increasing weakening of English
food supply will paralyze the will of her people to resist and
finally break and thus force its government to
capitulate....”—Signed—“Jodl.”
“Terror attacks against English centers of population”—would you like
to say anything to justify that sentence?
JODL: Yes, a few remarks. This proposal, which actually is only a
compilation of notes, proves three things:
First of all, that on 30 June 1940 I did not know of any intention or of
the possibility of entering into a war with Russia, otherwise I would
not have written: “Germany’s final victory over England is only a
question of time.”
Secondly, I admit having voiced a thought which was later carried into
practice with such perfection by the Anglo-American Air Force.
Thirdly, this thought came to me only after the attack on the civilian
population had been started and continued by the English Air Force,
despite months of efforts and repeated warnings on the part of the
Führer.
It is a historical fact, confirmed by many documents, that the Führer
tried to the utmost to avoid this form of aerial war against the
population. But it was already clear at that time, that he would not be
able to succeed.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, now, I have finished, Witness. You will notice that
of all the documents I have put, except for that one American report,
they were all German documents, originating at the time of these events
about which I have been cross-examining.
In the face of those documents, do you still say that you are an
honorable soldier and a truthful man?
JODL: Not only do I still affirm that, but I also think that the
submission of these documents has actually and quite specifically proved
it.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 7 June 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-NINTH DAY
Friday, 7 June 1946
_Morning Session_
[_The Defendant Jodl resumed the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn this afternoon at 4 o’clock to
sit in closed session. The Tribunal will sit tomorrow in open session
from 1000 to 1300.
COLONEL Y. V. POKROVSKY (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): You
have testified that you were the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations
Staff. That was the chief department of the OKW, was it not?
JODL: I did not quite understand the last part of your question.
COL. POKROVSKY: Was the Armed Forces Operations Staff the chief
department of the OKW?
JODL: Because of the significance of the activity, one can certainly say
that the Armed Forces Operations Staff was one of the most important
departments of the OKW.
COL. POKROVSKY: Is that the reason why you deputized for Keitel in his
absence?
JODL: In the majority of cases I was the deputy only in operational
matters. As for war ministerial questions, it was the senior chief, as a
rule, Admiral Canaris, who deputized.
COL. POKROVSKY: Do you deny that you were Keitel’s deputy?
JODL: When Keitel was not at headquarters, then, as a matter of course,
whenever the Führer had anything to say to the OKW, he talked first with
me, as I was the next officer by seniority.
COL. POKROVSKY: Do you remember the testimony of the witness Wagner to
the effect that either you or Keitel usually represented the OKW at all
important staff meetings at which this witness, Admiral Wagner, was also
present? Do you remember that testimony?
JODL: I did not quite understand that question on account of translation
difficulties.
COL. POKROVSKY: That is possible. I shall repeat it. On the 13th of May,
appeared the witness Wagner here before the Tribunal. Do you remember,
or not?
JODL: I remember the witness Wagner. He testified that Field Marshal
Keitel and I were present at every situation report, and I do not
dispute it.
COL. POKROVSKY: He said either Field Marshal Keitel or Generaloberst
Jodl was present. Is that correct? Do you catch the difference in the
way this question is phrased?
JODL: In 99 percent of all cases, both of us were present at the
situation conferences.
COL. POKROVSKY: So that if we forget for one minute such formal
considerations, such formal circumstances, would it be right to conclude
that it was precisely you, Jodl, who actually was Keitel’s acting deputy
in the eyes of Hitler, of the whole cadre of officers, and of the entire
military machinery of the German Reich? Would that be correct, or not?
JODL: In individual cases, when the Field Marshal was not there, and in
unimportant things, yes; but when it came to important things I could
reach him by telephone, at any time, and so it hardly ever happened that
I deputized. He was never ill, and was never away on leave. When he was
away he was in Berlin at headquarters.
COL. POKROVSKY: In that case I would like to remind you of one such
fact, which you yourself confirmed here on the 6th of June, while
testifying to the Tribunal about the motives which caused you to sign
Document UK-56, Exhibit RF-1438. You said that the document had had no
connection with your sphere of activity. It concerned the deportation of
Jews from Denmark and, you signed the document even though it actually
had no connection with the operations staff work. You signed it because
Keitel was away at the time. Was it not so? Is it true?
JODL: That is absolutely correct. It was an urgent matter and had to be
signed immediately.
COL. POKROVSKY: Good. We can find a great many documents of that type;
but I do not consider it necessary to waste any more time on the further
elucidation of this point. Tell me, would it be correct to say that you
were well aware of the entire work carried out by the OKW—that you well
knew what important problems were occupying the OKW at that time?
JODL: Only to a limited extent—in individual matters. I was not at all
aware of everything that took place in the numerous offices in Berlin.
That was quite impossible. It did not concern me. I have testified
already that my time was so fully taken up that I had much more to do
than I had time for.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well, you force me to revert to a question which I
really wanted to have done with. Will you please now look at our new
Document USSR-476. This document consists of excerpts from Keitel’s
testimony of 9 November 1945. It is stated there:
“Question: ‘Would it have been possible for General Jodl,
without your knowledge to call such a meeting?’”
We are talking, My Lord, of the conference in Reichenhall.
Reply of Field Marshal Keitel:
“Yes, it was quite possible, as I was frequently on official
journeys; and General Jodl had authority to call a meeting
because he represented me in my absence.”
Have you found the passage? Have you read it?
JODL: Colonel Pokrovsky, of course, it is very difficult for you to
follow these military matters. It is ridiculous. Surely I may question
my staff officers. I do not need to call a meeting for that. These were
my General Staff officers with whom I worked in Reichenhall. Surely I
could go to them. That was my office and my duty.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think it is necessary for you to raise your
voice in that way.
COL. POKROVSKY: It seems to me that you have still not answered two of
my questions. First, have you read this document?
Please tell me: Have you, or have you not, read the passage which I have
just read into the record on Page 1?
JODL: Yes. Here, Field Marshal Keitel says, “...since I was very often
away on official journeys...”
COL. POKROVSKY: You do not have to read it a second time. I have read it
already. I merely want you to tell me whether you have read that
passage?
JODL: Yes, I read that, and it says here, “...to ask Generaloberst
Jodl.”
COL. POKROVSKY: No, you are reading beyond the passage which interests
me at this moment. As for the words “...to ask Generaloberst
Jodl.”—rest assured, we shall get to that passage. But is it true that
Keitel was often away, and that you deputized for him? I do not hear any
answer.
[_There was no response._]