“There is no question but that these facts must have been known
to the leading officers in the Armed Forces Operations Staff and
in the General Staff of the Army. It was also known that it was
Hitler’s view that in the fight against partisans only the use
of cruel, intimidating punishment could be successful.”
Is Rittmeister Scheidt’s statement correct, namely, that the leading
officers of the Armed Forces Operations Staff and the General Staff of
the Army knew of the cruelty employed by both sides in the partisan
fighting?
JODL: What we knew about the conduct of partisan warfare has already
been submitted to this Tribunal. I refer to the instructions which I
signed regarding the combating of partisans in Document F-665, Exhibit
RF-411. It begins with a lengthy discourse on how the partisans
conducted this war. Of course, we did not invent this. This was
extracted from hundreds of reports. That troops in such a fight, seeing
the methods employed by the enemy, would on their part not be exactly
mild can readily be imagined. In spite of that the directives which we
issued never contained a word to the effect that no prisoners were to be
taken in these partisan fights. On the contrary, all reports showed that
the number taken prisoner was larger by far than the number killed. That
it was the Führer’s view that in their fight against the partisans the
troops should in no way be restricted is authentically proved by the
many arguments which I, as well as the General Staff of the Army, had
with the Führer on this subject.
DR. LATERNSER: What if the commanding generals received reports about
cruelties committed by their own soldiers?
JODL: Then they would be court-martialed. That again is established in
the documents. I remind you of an order, issued by the Führer, which
begins with the sentence, “It has been reported to me that individual
soldiers of the Armed Forces have been dealt with by court martial
because of their behavior when fighting partisans.”
DR. LATERNSER: And that was the only thing the commanding general could
do in a case like that?
JODL: There was no other way open. And even on these orders, he always
acted in accordance with his own legal judgment. Who could stop him from
doing that?
DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution have also submitted Affidavit Number 15,
by General Röttiger, Document 5713-PS which is numbered Exhibit USA-559.
In this affidavit General Röttiger states, in the middle of Page 1:
“Only now, on the strength of documents put before me, do I
realize that in issuing the order to employ the severest
measures to combat partisans, the highest levels might possibly
have had in mind the final aim of using this combating of
partisans by the Army to achieve the relentless extermination of
Jewry and other undesirable elements.”
Did the military leadership at the highest level hold any such point of
view, and was that their final aim?
JODL: No. Of course, one is wise after the event. I too have learned
many things today which I did not know before. However, this knowledge
does not apply at all here, because there were next to no Jews among the
partisans. In the main, these partisans were fanatical Russian
fighters—mostly White Russians—and were as hard as steel. And, to a
question put by my counsel, even the witness Bach-Zelewski had to admit
that there were just about no Jews among these partisans.
As regards the extermination of Slavs, I can only say that the Slavs who
were killed in the partisan fighting amounted to no more than
one-twentieth or one-thirtieth of the numbers which in the normal,
large-scale battles with the Soviet Russian armies the Russians lost in
dead or wounded. As far as figures are concerned, that carries no weight
at all. Therefore that is a completely erroneous view.
DR. LATERNSER: A further Affidavit, Number 16, by the same General
Röttiger, was submitted by the Prosecution under Document 5714-PS,
Exhibit Number USA-560. In the last sentence General Röttiger states the
following, and I quote:
“Although generally speaking one knew what the special tasks of
the SD units were, and although this apparently happened with
the knowledge of the highest leaders of the Armed Forces, we
opposed these methods as far as possible since it meant
endangering our own troops.”
In other words, General Röttiger, in his affidavit, maintains that the
special tasks of the SD units were apparently carried out with the
knowledge of the highest military leaders. If that is correct, then,
you, Generaloberst, must have known about the tasks and these questions
you have already...
JODL: Yes, I have already answered. I have never spoken to a single
officer who had knowledge of these matters and told me about them.
DR. LATERNSER: Also, in the case against the General Staff and the OKW,
the Prosecution have submitted Affidavit 17, Document 3715-PS, Exhibit
Number USA-562. This affidavit comes from SS Leader Rode. Rode states,
at the top of Page 2:
“As proof, one can quote the OKW and OKH order which stated that
all members of partisan groups who had been captured, such as
Jews, agents, and political commissars, were to be handed over
by the troops to the SD for ‘special treatment’ without delay.
Apart from that, this order contained instructions that in
guerrilla fighting no prisoners, apart from the above-mentioned,
were to be taken.”
Generaloberst, was there such an order that in guerrilla fighting no
prisoners were to be taken?
JODL: Such an order never existed. I have never seen such an order. It
was not contained in the instructions regarding guerrilla fighting.
Apart from that, practically every word in that statement is untrue.
There never was an order from the OKW-OKH—that is, an order which came
from both departments. Jews among the guerrillas. I have already dealt
with that. Agents among the guerrillas. Agents—that is a chapter by
itself. Political commissars. That is quite another point. They were
never handed over to the SD for special treatment—if they were handed
over at all—because the task of the SD was an entirely different one.
They may have been handed over to the Security Police. In other words,
every word is untrue.
DR. LATERNSER: There is an Affidavit Number IS, by the same SS Leader
Rode, which the Prosecution have submitted under Document 3716-PS,
Exhibit Number USA-563. Rode states as follows in this affidavit:
“As far as is known to me, the SD special task groups, attached
to the various army groups, were under the jurisdiction of the
latter in every way—that is to say, tactically, as well as in
every other way. For that reason, the tasks and methods of these
units were fully known to the commanding generals. They approved
of the tasks and methods, since apparently, they never raised
any decisive objections to them.”
Do you know SS Leader Rode?
JODL: No, I do not know him. I do not think it is necessary to say much
about this, because the General of the Police Schellenberg, who led such
a special task group himself, and who really must know, has stated quite
clearly on this witness stand what jurisdiction he was under and from
whom he received his orders.
DR. LATERNSER: That was not the witness Schellenberg; that was
Ohlendorf.
JODL: Ohlendorf? Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: Now, I have a few questions about the Commissar Order.
Were you present at the conference when Hitler gave the Commissar Order
orally to the commanding generals?
JODL: As far as I remember, right at the beginning he spoke only to the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army, or the Chief of the General Staff and a
few officers of the OKW, about this Commissar Order. As far as I
recollect he referred to that order of his at a later date when
addressing the commanding generals. I believe that it was during that
second conference that he used the words, “I cannot expect that my
generals understand my orders, but I must demand that they obey them.”
DR. LATERNSER: Do you know any commanding generals who resisted that
order?
JODL: Later on someone told me—I do not know whether it is true—that
Field Marshal Rommel had burned this order. But...
DR. LATERNSER: Does not that recollection of yours refer to the Commando
Order? General Field Marshal Rommel was...
JODL: Oh, yes, that was the Commando Order. You are talking about the
Commissar Order, are you not?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, that is right.
JODL: I remember that there were constant objections from the High
Command of the Army which, unfortunately, had to carry out this order,
and these went on for a long time. Officers of the General Staff told me
confidentially that for the most part it was not being carried out. I
know of one official application made to the Führer to have this order
officially withdrawn. That was done, although I cannot remember when.
DR. LATERNSER: Who made that application?
JODL: The High Command of the Army. Whether it was the Chief of the
General Staff or the Commander-in-Chief, I cannot say.
DR. LATERNSER: When was this application made?
JODL: I believe it was in the spring of 1942.
DR. LATERNSER: The spring of 1942? And to that application...
JODL: I know for certain, the order was withdrawn.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you talk to any commanding general who approved of
that order?
JODL: No. All the officers to whom I spoke considered, first, that the
order should be turned down from the humane point of view and, secondly,
that it was wrong from the practical point of view.
DR. LATERNSER: When Hitler gave his reasons for this order orally—and
you have already told us some of them—he is supposed to have mentioned
additional reasons for making it. I should like you to tell us what they
were so that we may get this matter quite clear.
JODL: He gave a lengthy explanation—as he always did when he felt it
necessary to convince somebody.
DR. LATERNSER: Did he state...
THE PRESIDENT: Have not these reasons already been given?
DR. LATERNSER: As far as I am informed, Mr. President, they have not yet
all been given.
[_Turning to the defendant._] During that conference did Hitler state...
THE PRESIDENT: One moment. Haven’t you already given the reasons which,
you say, Hitler gave for this order?
JODL: I have not given some very important reasons, which the Führer
also pointed out. They were...
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute.
Dr. Laternser, I have already had to ask you to be more brief on many
occasions in which you have examined witnesses, and really you have
spent over an hour already on this High Command Staff. Every witness who
comes to the box you take a very long time over, and the Tribunal think
that a great deal of their time has been wasted by you. Now, this
witness can give any further reasons, but I do not want any argument
about it. He can give his explanation now.
JODL: I have only to add that the Führer said on that occasion: “If you
do not believe what I am telling you, then read the reports from
Counterintelligence which we have received regarding the behavior of the
Russian commissars in the occupied Baltic states. Then you will get a
picture of what can be expected from these commissars.”
He also stated that.
DR. LATERNSER: I should like to put a question to you about the report
in Document 884-PS, submitted under Exhibit USSR-351.
THE PRESIDENT: Repeat the number please.
DR. LATERNSER: Number 884-PS, it is a document submitted by the Russian
Prosecution on 13 February, and it is on Page 151 of the second document
book for General Jodl. Under Number II of this report, Page 153, there
is the following statement. I quote, “To this, Reichsleiter Rosenberg in
Memorandum 3 suggests...” I do not want to read further. The next is a
suggestion.
I would like to ask you for what reason this Number II was brought out
in this report.
JODL: I can only guess because I did not write it. But I have no
doubt...
THE PRESIDENT: We do not want his guesses, you know. If he can only
guess, then he had better not guess. We want evidence, not guesses.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, I will dispense with this question. I assumed that
the witness would have personal knowledge about that.
Witness, you said yesterday that the Commando Order of 18 October 1942
had been changed—that is, partially revoked by application of the
Commander, West. Who was that Commander, West who had applied for that
change?
JODL: General Field Marshal Von Rundstedt, and he applied to have the
entire order withdrawn.
DR. LATERNSER: You know the order by General Von Reichenau which the
Russian Prosecution submitted on 13 February as Document USSR-12? It is
dated 10 October 1941. Do you know the reasons this order was issued?
JODL: Yes. Reichenau, at that time, was commanding general of the 6th
Army, and in his army sector was the town of Kiev. This morning I
already started to describe events that took place in Kiev at the end of
September, and that was the reason for this order.
DR. LATERNSER: How did the commanding generals exercise their
jurisdiction—strictly, or not so strictly?
JODL: I know this because Dr. Lehmann...
THE PRESIDENT: That has nothing to do with the charge against the High
Command. There is no charge against the High Command for having arranged
courts martial or administering their courts martial improperly.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I believe I am of a different opinion on
this point. If the commanding generals heard of any breaches of
discipline or atrocities...
THE PRESIDENT: Do you know of anything in the Indictment, or anything in
the evidence, which charges the High Command, or any member of the High
Command, with improper behavior at a court martial, or in connection
with a court martial?
DR. LATERNSER: No. I merely want to discover the typical attitude of the
High Command.
[_Turning to the defendant._] What do you know about the reasons for the
mass deaths which occurred among Russian prisoners of war during the
winter of 1941?
JODL: I am informed on this subject because several adjutants of the
Führer were sent there personally, and they reported to the Führer in my
presence. We were mostly concerned with the mass deaths after the last
great battle for the Vyazma pocket. The reason for the mass deaths was
described by the Führer’s adjutants as follows: The half-famished
encircled Russian armies had put up fanatical resistance during the last
8 or 10 days. They literally lived on the bark of trees and roots
because they had retreated to impenetrable wooded country, and when they
fell into our hands they were in such a condition that they could hardly
move. It was impossible to transport them. The situation as regards
supplies was critical, because the railway system had been destroyed, so
that it was impossible to take them all away. There were no
accommodations nearby. Only immediate careful hospital treatment could
have saved the majority of them. Soon afterwards the rain started, and
then the cold set in, and that is the reason why such a large number of
those prisoners—particularly these prisoners of Vyazma—died.
That is the report of the Führer’s adjutants who had been sent there to
investigate. Similar reports came from the Quartermaster General of the
Army.
DR. LATERNSER: What do you know about the shelling of Leningrad by
German artillery? You remember that a witness has been examined here on
that point?
JODL: I was present during two conferences which the Führer himself had
with the German artillery commander who was in charge of the artillery
before Leningrad. He brought along the exact target chart, and it showed
a very carefully worked-out system, according to which only key plants
in Leningrad were marked as necessary targets, so as to cripple the
power of resistance of the fortress. They were mostly factories which
were still producing munitions. The ammunition for this heavy artillery,
only a small portion of which could reach the center of Leningrad, was
so scarce that one had to be extremely economical in its use. They were
mostly captured guns from France, and we only had as much ammunition as
we had captured.
DR. LATERNSER: You know that the witness has asserted that in his
opinion the artillery deliberately destroyed the castles in Leningrad.
You have seen the target chart for this artillery?
JODL: Yes; I myself had the artillery target chart in my brief case for
many weeks. Only the armament industry was marked on it. It would have
been insane to shoot at anything else. Of course, every artilleryman
knows that through dispersion the shots can fall elsewhere.
DR. LATERNSER: What do you know about the order from Hitler and the OKH
to destroy dwellings and fireplaces during the retreat in the winter of
1941? What was the reason for that order?
JODL: The reasons are that...
DR. LATERNSER: I refer to the Order USSR-130. Unfortunately, I have not
been able to ascertain on what day the Prosecution presented this order.
I shall ascertain it later and have the Tribunal informed.
JODL: During that frightful winter battle, with a temperature of 48
degrees of frost, the commanders at the front reported to the Führer in
his headquarters that this battle was exclusively a battle for warm
shelter. Those who did not have some sort of heating arrangement—that
is to say, a village with serviceable stoves—could not hold out and
would not be able to fight the following day. One could say it was
really a fight for stoves. And when, because of this, we were forced to
retreat, the Führer then ordered that those fireplaces must be
destroyed—not only the houses but also the fireplaces were to be blown
up—because in such a critical situation that alone would prevent the
Russians from pursuing. Since, in accordance with the Hague Regulations
for Land Warfare, every type of destruction is permissible which is
absolutely necessary from the military point of view, I believe that for
this type of winter warfare—and it happened only during the
winter—that order can be justified.
DR. LATERNSER: What do you know about the case of Katyn?
JODL: Regarding the finding of these mass graves, I received the first
report through my propaganda department, which was informed through its
propaganda company attached to the army group. I heard that the Reich
Police Criminal Department had been given the task of investigating the
whole affair, and I then sent an officer from my propaganda department
to the exhumation to check the findings of the foreign experts. I
received a report which, in general, tallies with the report which is
contained in the _White Book_ issued, I think, by the Foreign Office. I
have never heard anyone raise any doubts as to the facts as they were
presented.
DR. LATERNSER: You have also seen the film which the Russian Prosecution
have shown in this courtroom, and which showed atrocities committed in
the Yugoslav theater of war. Can you explain any of the pictures which
you perhaps still recollect?
JODL: I believe that every picture shown in this courtroom is, and was,
perfectly truthful as a picture. These were captured photographs. But it
has never been said what the photographs represented. It was not clear
from the film whether the dog that was mauling a human being was not
photographed in an army dog training center.
THE PRESIDENT: That is mere argument.
DR. LATERNSER: I was about to stop him.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: I was thinking of certain photographs which you might be
able to clarify with a statement as: “I remember one photograph of a
police dog jumping at a human being or a dummy.” Can you say...
THE PRESIDENT: You asked him about these photographs, and he says that
they were all true—in his opinion—true pictures; and he didn’t take
them. He doesn’t know anything about them, and anything that he can say
upon them appears to us to be argument.
DR. LATERNSER: I will withdraw that question.
Generaloberst, was Louvain captured in the manner as testified by the
witness Van der Essen? The witness Van der Essen said that Louvain was
taken without fighting.
JODL: I have ascertained that the Armed Forces communiqué of, I think,
18 May contains the sentence, “Louvain taken after heavy fighting.” But
I do not believe...
THE PRESIDENT: What was the place that you are asking about?
DR. LATERNSER: I asked the witness in what way Louvain was captured:
whether it was only evacuated by the enemy, and then occupied, or
whether the town had to be fought for. The witness has stated that there
was no fighting for Louvain, and that therefore it was a particularly
despicable act.
THE PRESIDENT: How did it affect the General Staff?
DR. LATERNSER: Well, in that case, Mr. President, I do not know who
should be blamed for this event. I cannot see any connection with any
one of the defendants; and if nobody can be blamed for it, we must
strike out the whole event.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it one of the events which is charged in the
Indictment?
DR. LATERNSER: No, the Indictment does not refer to it.
THE PRESIDENT: And the evidence, did the evidence deal with it?
DR. LATERNSER: There is no reference to it in the Indictment; but in the
evidence, a witness was produced who stated that the University of
Louvain was willfully destroyed by the German artillery although there
was no reason to fire on the town.
THE PRESIDENT: I didn’t catch the place—but go on.
JODL: I know that the Armed Forces communiqué of 18 May 1940 contained
the sentence, “Louvain captured after heavy fighting.” Even though the
German Armed Forces communiqué was silent on some things, it certainly
never stated deliberate untruths. I can say that because I edited it.
DR. LATERNSER: You already spoke yesterday about the case of Oradour. I
merely wanted to ask you what Field Marshal Von Rundstedt did about this
event when it was reported to him.
JODL: Many weeks afterwards I learned that an investigation had been
started by Field Marshal Von Rundstedt, and that there was
correspondence about the case of Oradour between Field Marshal Keitel,
the Armistice Commission, and Field Marshal Von Rundstedt.
DR. LATERNSER: Did the Commander, West begin court-martial proceedings?
JODL: He must have done so, because I read a statement of an SS court in
connection with this event.
DR. LATERNSER: What was the outcome of those proceedings?
JODL: I cannot say.
DR. LATERNSER: Then I come to the last points. How many conferences were
there before the Ardennes Offensive in December 1944?
JODL: There were four conferences about the Ardennes Offensive.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you attend all of them?
JODL: I took part in all of them.
DR. LATERNSER: Was there ever any request for an order, or was an order
ever issued at one of these conferences to shoot prisoners during this
offensive?
JODL: No. And I can also add that not once during any one of those
conferences was a single word mentioned which did not deal with purely
operational considerations. There was no talk at all about the conduct
of the troops.
DR. LATERNSER: Generaloberst, would you have known if such an order had
been issued by—let us assume—Field Marshal Von Rundstedt?
JODL: There can be no question of such an order. It never could have
been issued through the military channels. It could have been issued
only through the Police—that is to say, Himmler or the SS.
PR. LATERNSER: But then it would not have been binding on the units of
the Armed Forces—that is, of the Army?
JODL: It is quite out of the question that any commanding general of the
Army would even have accepted such an order; and I know of no order of
the Führer which was directed against ordinary prisoners in this way.
DR. LATERNSER: I merely put that question because the witness Van der
Essen also stated in this courtroom that, judging by the way the
prisoners were treated, he had to draw the conclusion that it was the
result of an order from a higher level. That is why I asked that
question.
Do you know the case—the Commando case?
THE PRESIDENT: I thought you had put your last question. You said that
was your last question.
DR. LATERNSER: The last questions. Mr. President, I shall be through in
about 5 minutes. I ask you to take into consideration the fact that
Generaloberst Jodl is a member of the indicted group, and that he is the
officer who is best informed, and that an hour and a half for such an
examination is not an excessive amount of time.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Do you know the Commando case in which the
son of the British Field Marshal Alexander was a participant?
JODL: Yes, I know the case.
DR. LATERNSER: Please tell us about it.
JODL: I heard about this affair through a report—I cannot quite
remember whom it came from. I discussed it with Field Marshal Keitel,
and I expressed the view that it was not necessary to take court
proceedings against a lieutenant just because he was wearing a German
cap during an action of this kind. Court proceedings were in progress
against him, and Field Marshal Keitel gave the order that these
proceedings be discontinued.
DR. LATERNSER: And the proceedings were discontinued?
JODL: Yes, they were.
DR. LATERNSER: Well now, regarding the extent of the group, two more
questions: What was the jurisdiction of the Deputy Chief of the Armed
Forces Operations Staff?
JODL: The Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff—I would
say—directed, in practice, the general staff work of my entire staff,
from which, of course, I was separated to a certain extent because I was
in the so-called Security Circle Number 1, and my staff was in Security
Circle Number 2—that is to say, outside; and the whole of this general
staff work within the inner staff was directed by him, and if necessary,
he acted, of course, as my deputy.
DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution have stated that the Deputy Chief of the
Armed Forces Operations Staff was responsible for strategic planning. Is
that correct?
JODL: No. I was primarily responsible.
DR. LATERNSER: Is the significance of the position of this Deputy Chief
of the Armed Forces Operations Staff equal to the significance of the
other positions which are comprised in the indicted group?
JODL: No, it is far below that. He did not have the position of a
commanding general of an army, nor the position of a General Staff
chief.
DR. LATERNSER: Thank you very much; I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other defendant’s counsel want to ask any
questions.
DR. STAHMER: Were you present, Generaloberst, when toward the end of
March 1944 Himmler reported to Hitler, during the situation conference,
that about 80 Royal Air Force officers had escaped from the camp, Stalag
III, at Sagan?
JODL: At the moment when Himmler reported this fact, I was not in the
big hall of the Berghof. I was in the next room telephoning. Hearing a
very loud discussion, I went over to the curtain to hear what was going
on. I heard that they were talking about the escape of the English
airmen from the Sagan Camp.
DR. STAHMER: Was Reich Marshal Göring present at this situation
conference?
JODL: The Reich Marshal was not present at this situation conference. I
am absolutely certain about that.
DR. STAHMER: In later talks with the Reich Marshal, did you find out
what he thought of the shooting of some of the escaped officers?
JODL: From talks with the Chief of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe, I
learned that the Reich Marshal was indignant at this shooting, and I
knew that particularly in situations such as these the former officer in
him who did not approve of such incredible acts came to the surface. One
must give him his due. There were repeated arguments over this between
him and the Führer, which I witnessed personally.
DR. STAHMER: I have no more questions.
HERR GEORG BÖHM (Counsel for SA): With the permission of the Court, I
will ask the witness a few questions.
Witness, you were Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, and the
units at your disposal were known to you. The Prosecution assert that
you expected to find in the SA a fighting unit in the first days of
aggressive war on the basis of the so-called Commando unit
(Kommandotruppe). Now I should like to ask you if the term Commando unit
is known to you in connection with the use of the SA by the Wehrmacht.
JODL: No, that is not known to me. I heard the word Commando unit for
the first time in connection with the undertakings of the English Ranger
battalions. We never used this term.
HERR BÖHM: There can be no question then that the SA was used as a
Commando unit behind the regular troops in the entry into Austria or in
the occupation of the Sudetenland?
JODL: I know of no case where formations of the SA co-operated in the
occupation of another country—with the exception of the Henlein Free
Corps; but that, however, consisted primarily of Sudeten-German
refugees. In the Henlein Free Corps there were, I believe, a few SA
leaders who had formerly been officers.
HERR BÖHM: Was the Feldherrnhalle Regiment used as an SA unit or as a
Wehrmacht regiment in the war?
JODL: The Feldherrnhalle Regiment was definitely a Wehrmacht regiment. I
should like to say that it embodied the traditions of the SA, and it was
recruited primarily from the SA, but it had nothing whatever to do with
the Supreme SA Command. It was a Wehrmacht regiment in every sense of
the word.
HERR BÖHM: Do you know anything about the fact that in 25 group schools,
and in 3 Reich leader schools of the SA, 22,000 to 25,000 leaders and
assistant leaders were trained annually for the front, and that these
22,000 to 25,000 leaders and assistant leaders were used as such in the
Wehrmacht?
JODL: I know nothing about this, and I consider it impossible that the
Wehrmacht had its leaders and assistant leaders trained by anyone else
than by its own personnel.
HERR BÖHM: Would not the position be that all the SA members were
drafted into the Wehrmacht as ordinary soldiers, and had to rise from
the ranks in the same way as any Wehrmacht soldier?
JODL: The SA were drafted into the Wehrmacht the same as any other
German. I know of many cases where high SA leaders started their service
in the Wehrmacht in the very lowest positions as soldiers or as
noncommissioned officers.
HERR BÖHM: Then, the Prosecution also assert that after 1934 the SA
trained not only 22,000 to 25,000 leaders and assistant leaders, but
that 25,000 officers, commissioned and noncommissioned, were trained by
the SA for the Wehrmacht. Do you know anything about this?
JODL: What I said before about assistant leaders is true to an even much
greater extent among the officers. The officers were trained only in the
military schools of the Army and nowhere else.
HERR BÖHM: The Prosecution assert further—and I ask whether you know
anything about this—that in the course of extending the war effort, 86
percent of the professional leadership corps were made available.
JODL: I cannot give a binding answer to that. I do not know about that.
HERR BÖHM: And the Prosecution assert further that the SA sent 70
percent of its millions of members straight to the Wehrmacht. It may be
that 70 percent of the SA members did their military service. I want to
ask you whether these 70 percent were taken straight from the SA or
whether they were called up in the ordinary groups which applied to the
able-bodied male population?
JODL: No importance whatsoever was attached to the SA when men were
drafted into the Army. The SA man was drafted like any other German who
was called up for military service. Whether or not a man had been in the
SA previously, did not matter in the slightest.
HERR BÖHM: Did the Wehrmacht ever take SA signal units (Stürme),
engineer units, or cavalry units, or medical units, and use them in
action inside or outside a division of the Wehrmacht?
JODL: I personally knew of no case where any SA unit appeared in action
outside Germany during the war.
HERR BÖHM: Did the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff have a
liaison man with the SA?
JODL: No. From time to time an officer came to me from the Supreme SA
Command, and he generally inquired as to the fate and well-being of the
Feldherrnhalle Regiment, which had come primarily from the SA, or was
composed mainly of members of the SA, and later, about a Panzer
formation which also continued the tradition of the Feldherrnhalle of
the SA.
HERR BÖHM: The Prosecution have submitted a newspaper which shows that
on the occasion of the mustering of SA members, Field Marshal
Brauchitsch was present. They want to show from this the close
connection between the training of the SA and the Wehrmacht. Can you
explain this photograph?
JODL: I believe it can be explained by the fact that Field Marshal Von
Brauchitsch accompanied the Chief of Staff Lutze once when the latter
inspected an ordinary SA unit, and he was accompanied by Field Marshal
Von Brauchitsch because, as I have already said, after the Röhm Putsch
we no longer had any cause for conflict with the SA. At the outbreak of
war the SA placed all their equipment, including all tent squares, at
the disposal of the Wehrmacht. I remember very clearly.
HERR BÖHM: Could this visit of Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch, when he
inspected the SA members, be part of the official activity of the Field
Marshal?
JODL: No, in my opinion that was an act of courtesy.
HERR BÖHM: From the point of view of conspiracy with which the SA is
charged here, do you know that it was said to have always been the task
of the SA, especially in the years 1933 to 1939, to prepare Germany, and
especially the youth, for a difficult war of conquest by instilling,
increasing, and maintaining a warlike spirit in Germany, especially
among the youth? Do you know anything in this connection from personal
observations?
JODL: I do not know anything about that. That the SA, as a branch of the
Party, also endeavored to foster the patriotic spirit within its ranks,
to carry on physical training, is a matter of course. As to preparing
for wars of aggression, no one ever did that.
HERR BÖHM: But that was asserted here in regard to the SA. You are of
the opinion that it is not true?
JODL: I have no reason to think that it is true.
HERR BÖHM: I have no more questions.
DR. MARTIN HORN (Counsel for Defendant Von Ribbentrop): Generaloberst,
the 26th of August 1939 was fixed as X-Day for the attack on Poland. Is
it true that on 25 August the order to attack was withdrawn upon the
urgent request of Ribbentrop because, according to the communication
which reached the Foreign Office, Great Britain had ratified the Treaty
of Alliance concluded with Poland on 6 April 1939, and Ribbentrop told
the Führer that the advance of German troops would therefore mean war
with Great Britain?
JODL: I cannot answer the whole of your question, but I do know
something about it. When, on the 25th, to our great surprise we received
the order, “The attack fixed for the 26th will not take place,” I
telephoned to the then Major Schmundt—Field Marshal Keitel was not
there—and asked him what was the matter. He told me that shortly before
the Reich Foreign Minister had reported to the Führer that Britain had
concluded a pact—a mutual assistance pact—with Poland, and for that
reason he could expect British intervention in the war with Poland. For
this reason the Führer had withdrawn the order for attack. That is what
I learned at that time.
DR. HORN: In the spring of 1941, after the Simovic Putsch, the Führer
held a conference with the Commanders-in-Chief of the branches of the
Wehrmacht and the Defendant Von Ribbentrop was called in to this
conference later. Is it true that at this conference Von Ribbentrop
represented the point of view that before military action was taken, an
attempt should be made to settle the differences with Yugoslavia by
diplomatic means? How did Hitler react to this suggestion?
JODL: I recall this incident especially well because about 1 hour before
I had said the same thing to the Führer, that we should clear up the
situation with an ultimatum. An hour later, without knowing about this,
the Reich Foreign Minister made the same remark, and he fared
considerably worse than I did. The Führer said:
“Is that how you size up the situation? The Yugoslavs would
swear black is white. Of course, they say they have no warlike
intentions, and when we march into Greece they will stab us in
the back.”