JODL: The order issued was not until 3 April...
DR. EXNER: No, 30 March.
JODL: ...30 March.
DR. EXNER: Did the operation receive the code name “Project 25”?
JODL: A code name for this operation was ordered for the first time 3
days after the Putsch, which proves that it had not been planned in 1937
as was once stated here.
DR. EXNER: And now, just one last question on this Balkan matter. Was
Greek neutrality still being maintained on 24 March 1941 when we gave
permission for the Luftwaffe attack on her territory of Crete? In this
connection I refer to Document C-60, Exhibit AJ-13. It is an order of 24
March 1941 which, as I have just stated, sanctioned air attacks on Crete
and also on Greek shipping. Now, what about Greek neutrality on 24 March
1941?
JODL: From the point of view of international law it no longer existed
at that date. The English had in the meantime landed on Crete and at
Piraeus, and we had already learned about this on 5 or 6 March. The
order, therefore, was in accordance with all the principles of
international law. But to conclude the Yugoslav problem I may add that
the allegation made by the Prosecution, that the plan to attack
Yugoslavia emanated from Jodl’s office, is a statement which has not
been and cannot be substantiated by anything.
THE PRESIDENT: What was that document that you were referring to?
24-March 1941? You said 360, which did not indicate anything to us.
DR. EXNER: 24 March, which is Document C-60, Exhibit AJ-13.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. What page?
DR. EXNER: Page 76, Volume I.
[_Turning to the defendant._] We now come to the question of the Soviet
Union. How many troops did we have in the East during the Western
campaign?
JODL: At first it was 10 divisions, which in the course of the Western
campaign were reduced to 6 or 5 divisions.
DR. EXNER: What prompted us to send troops to the East after the Western
campaign?
JODL: The notification from the commander in the East that with such
weak forces he could neither keep Poland quiet nor guard the demarcation
line.
DR. EXNER: In your diary—the so-called diary—Document 1809-PS, Volume
I of my document book, Page 83, you write on 24 May: “Situation in the
East becomes precarious due to the Russian menace against Bessarabia.”
That is on 24 May 1940. That is what you wrote in your diary. How did
you come to this conclusion?
JODL: The reason was a dispatch from Canaris reporting the concentration
of 30 Russian divisions against Bessarabia. Whether the note expressing
anxiety originated with me, or whether it was an idea of the Führer’s
which I jotted down, I can no longer say today.
DR. EXNER: Well, on 6 September 1940 you signed an order stating that
the regrouping should not give the impression of an offensive
preparation. How should that be understood?
JODL: This order signed by me was interpreted as the first attempt to
conceal the impending attack on Russia.
DR. EXNER: One moment. I want to point out the order in question to the
Tribunal. It is Page 78, Volume I, Document 1229-PS, Exhibit USA-130. It
is an order by Jodl, addressed to the Foreign Intelligence Service, and
it says there:
“The Eastern area will be manned by stronger forces in the
coming weeks. By the end of October, the status indicated on the
enclosed map ought to have been reached.”
And now, Your Honors, I am sorry to have to point out an omission in the
English and French translations. The next paragraph is missing, and this
is very important for the understanding of the entire document. It says,
namely, “For the work of our own Intelligence Service, as well as for
answering questions asked by the Russian Intelligence Service...”
THE PRESIDENT: It does not appear to be in our document. What paragraph
are you reading?
DR. EXNER: It is Paragraph 2 in my document book, Page 78.
THE PRESIDENT: It has not been translated.
DR. EXNER: That is just what I said. That is the error. Therefore I will
dictate it now, or read it slowly.
THE PRESIDENT: You want it to be translated?
DR. EXNER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: You see, Paragraph 2 is not translated at all. There is
nothing here.
DR. EXNER: These three lines were not translated at all, but they are
very important.
THE PRESIDENT: Just read it through the earphones, then. Read the
passage.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, the full document is in the British Document Book
7, Page 102.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. Go on.
DR. EXNER: “For the work of our own Intelligence Service, as
well as for answering questions asked by the Russian
Intelligence Service, the following guiding principles apply...”
And now explain the subject further.
JODL: Instructions such as these to Canaris’ office were issued by me
every 6 weeks. They formed the basis for the so-called counterespionage
work, which I do not wish to discuss in detail here. In this case what
matters to me was that the weak forces which we kept in the East at this
time should be made to appear actually stronger. That, for instance, can
be clearly seen from Paragraph 3 which says, and I quote:
“In statements on the equipment situation of the forces,
especially of the armored divisions, it is advisable to
exaggerate if necessary.”
I also pointed out in the next paragraph that antiaircraft defenses
should be exaggerated. All this was done because at that time anxiety
had already arisen that possibly a Russian operation against Romania
might develop. The purpose of this order was to deter them from that,
and it was intended for the intelligence only. If on 6 September, I had
already known of any aggressive intention against Russia I would have
said exactly the contrary; for with this order, as I had issued it, I
would have been working in the interests of Gisevius and his
friends—namely, I would have been informing the Russians that we were
beginning to deploy our troops.
DR. EXNER: Now, when did you first hear of the Führer’s fears that
Russia might prove hostile to us?
JODL: For the first time, on 29 July 1940, at the Berghof near
Berchtesgaden.
DR. EXNER: In what connection?
JODL: The Führer kept me back alone after a discussion on the situation
and said to me, most unexpectedly, that he was worried that Russia might
occupy still more territory in Romania before the winter and that the
Romanian oil region, which was the _conditio sine qua non_ for our war
strategy, would thus be taken from us. He asked me whether we could not
deploy our troops immediately, so that we would be ready by autumn to
oppose with strong forces any such Russian intention. These are almost
the exact words which he used, and all other versions are false.
DR. EXNER: You have just mentioned Hitler’s concern about the seizure of
the Romanian oil fields. Did the Führer do anything on account of this
apprehension?
JODL: It was precisely on the basis of this conversation—when I
protested that it was quite impossible to carry out a troop deployment
at that time for it would take 4 months—that the Führer ordered that
these deployment arrangements were to be improved. Two orders were then
issued immediately. One, I believe, is of 9 August. It was called
“Reconstruction East” and included all measures to improve the
deployment arrangements in the eastern area. The second order was issued
on 27 August. We do not have it here, but it has been recorded in the
War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff.
DR. EXNER: Yes, that is Page 85, Volume I of my document book. There is
an entry, right at the end of the page, in the Diary of the Naval
Operations Staff:
“Transfer of 10 divisions and 2 armored divisions to the
Government General, in case prompt intervention should prove
necessary for the protection of the Romanian oil fields.”
That is an excerpt from Document C-170, Exhibit USA-136.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, you seem to be reading from Page 85. Were you?
DR. EXNER: Yes, from Page 85. It is Page 85 of the German version.
Perhaps the numbering of the pages does not quite tally with the
numbering of the English version. It is the entry: “Transfer of 10
divisions and 2 armored divisions to the Government General.”
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see.
JODL: This entry is a proof of the Führer’s intentions at that time with
regard to this reinforcement in the East.
DR. EXNER: Well, when was the Führer’s order issued to prepare for
attack?
JODL: The first order for deliberation concerning an attack, or for the
discussion of any aggressive operation at all, was issued in writing by
the Armed Forces Operations Staff and submitted to the Führer on 12
November. It is Document 444-PS...
DR. EXNER: It is on Page 66, Volume I of my document book.
JODL: ...and it is already known to the Tribunal. But this first order,
which is known to me, had to be preceded by oral instructions from the
Führer to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army.
DR. EXNER: That can be gathered from the document itself, namely from
Page 67 which reads:
“Irrespective of the result of these discussions, all
preparations for the East which have already been verbally
ordered are to be carried out.”
This is proof, therefore, that oral orders and preparation had preceded.
JODL: I am not in a position to say, however, when these oral
instructions had been given to the Army.
DR. EXNER: Tell me, in these statements, which Hitler made to you, was
there ever any mention made of such things as the extension of the
“Lebensraum,” and of the food basis as a reason for a war of conquest,
and so on?
JODL: In my presence the Führer never even hinted at any other reason
than a purely strategic and operational one. For months on end, one
might say, he incessantly repeated:
“No further doubt is possible. England is hoping for this final
sword-thrust against us on the continent, else she would have
stopped the war after Dunkirk. Private or secret agreements have
certainly already been made. The Russian deployment is
unmistakable. One day we shall suddenly become the victim of
cold-blooded political extortion, or we shall be attacked.”
But otherwise, though one might talk about it for weeks on end, no word
was mentioned to me of any other than purely strategical reasons of this
kind.
DR. EXNER: According to the reports received, how did the military
situation develop in the East after the Polish campaign?
JODL: When we first contacted the Russians in the Polish campaign,
relations were rather cool. We were carefully prevented from gaining any
information about their troops or equipment. There were constantly
unpleasant incidents on the San. The Russians shot at everything, at
fleeing Poles or at German soldiers, and there were wounded and dead;
and the demarcation line was flown over in numerous cases. The unusually
strong forces employed, by Russia for the occupation of the Baltic
states, of Poland and Bessarabia struck us from the very beginning.
DR. EXNER: Did the reports which you received contain indications of
military reinforcements for the Red Army?
JODL: From maps which were submitted every few days, which were based on
intelligence reports and information from the radio interception
section, the following picture was formed: In the summer of 1940 there
were about 100 Russian divisions along the border. In January 1941,
there were already 150 divisions; and these were indicated by number,
consequently the reports were reliable. In comparison with this
strength, I may add that the English-American-French forces operating
from France against Germany never, to my knowledge, amounted to 100
divisions.
DR. EXNER: Did Hitler attempt to clear up the political situation by
diplomatic means?
JODL: He attempted to do so by the well-known conference with Molotov;
and I must say that I placed great hopes on this conference, for the
military situation for us soldiers was as follows: With a definitely
neutral Russia in our rear—a Russia which in addition sent us
supplies—we could not lose the war. An invasion, such as took place on
6 June 1944, would have been entirely out of the question if we had had
at our disposal all the forces we had used and lost in this immense
struggle in Russia. And it never for a single moment entered my mind
that a statesman, who after all was also a strategist, would needlessly
let such an opportunity go. And it is a fact that he struggled for
months with himself about this decision, being certainly influenced by
the many contrary ideas suggested to him by the Reich Marshal, the
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, as well as the Minister for Foreign
Affairs.
DR. EXNER: On the basis of the reports which you received, what did the
further military situation on both sides look like?
JODL: The Intelligence Service was put to work as from January 1941. The
divisions on our borders and also along the Romanian frontier grew
rapidly. On 3 February 1941 the Chief of the General Staff of the Army
informed the Führer of the operations which he himself intended to carry
out. At the same time he presented a map showing the Russian troop
deployment. This map indicated—and this has been proved by
documents—that there were 100 infantry divisions, 25 cavalry
divisions...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, do we need all these strategic details of
plans which were drawn up by the German General Staff?
DR. EXNER: It is of very great importance to establish the picture
facing the General Staff at that time. If an overwhelming concentration
of Russian troops had not...
THE PRESIDENT: But that is not what he tells about. He is telling us
about February 1941. The OKW had produced plans to show the deployment
of German troops.
DR. EXNER: That is a plan which was developed by...
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think it is necessary to go into such details as
to tell us how many cavalry regiments they had there.
DR. EXNER: [_Turning to the defendant._] Please tell us on general lines
how Halder pictured the situation to you after the February 1941
reports. One figure only: how many divisions were deployed?
JODL: I have already said that 150 Russian divisions were deployed
against us in February.
THE PRESIDENT: He said that already.
DR. EXNER: And how many were there on our side?
JODL: I should like to say in reply that at this same time our
deployment, as reported by General Halder, had only just begun. And
furthermore, I should like to point out that according to Document C-39,
Exhibit USA-138, Page 92 of the first document book, it is clear from a
study of this document book—it is the timetable for the
deployment—that it was not until 1 June that the actual attack
formations, consisting of 14 armored divisions and 12 motorized infantry
divisions, were brought up. In fact they were not actually moved until
10 June. I mention this so that it cannot be said that the German
intention to attack was already obvious in February 1941. Such was not
the case.
DR. EXNER: The Prosecution has especially emphasized that this plan for
the attack on Soviet Russia had been drawn up long before then. Can you
perhaps say anything more about that?
JODL: I will explain the matter in a few words. We had to use 10,000
trains for this deployment. If one could have run 100 a day it would
have taken 100 days; but we never reached that figure. So for purely
technical reasons this deployment had already taken 4 months.
DR. EXNER: Did events in Yugoslavia have any influence on the Führer’s
decision?
JODL: They gave it the final impetus. Until that time the Führer still
had doubts. On 1 April, not earlier, he decided to attack; and on 1
April he ordered the attack to be made ready for about 22 June. The
order for the attack itself—that is, the real opening of the
campaign—was issued only on 17 June, which is likewise proved by
documents.
DR. EXNER: Then, in your opinion, the Führer waged a preventive war. Did
later experiences prove that this was a military necessity?
JODL: It was undeniably a purely preventive war. What we found out later
on was the certainty of enormous Russian military preparations opposite
our frontiers. I will dispense with details, but I can only say that
although we succeeded in a tactical surprise as to the day and the hour,
it was no strategic surprise. Russia was fully prepared for war.
DR. EXNER: As an example, could you perhaps tell the Tribunal the number
of new airfields which were discovered in the Russian-Polish area?
JODL: I recall approximately that there had been about 20 airfields in
eastern Poland, and that in the meantime these had been increased to
more than a hundred.
DR. EXNER: Quite briefly, under these conditions what would have been
the result of Russia’s having forestalled us?
JODL: I do not want to go into the strategic principles, into the
operations behind the front; but I can state briefly that we were never
strong enough to defend ourselves in the East, as has been proved by the
events since 1942. That may sound grotesque, but in order to occupy this
front of over 2,000 kilometers we needed 300 divisions at least; and we
never had them. If we had waited until the invasion, and a Russian
attack had caught us in a pincer movement, simultaneously, we certainly
would have been lost. If, therefore, the political premise was correct,
namely that we were threatened by this attack, then from a military
point of view also the preventive attack was justified. The political
situation was presented to us soldiers in this light, consequently we
based our military work accordingly.
DR. EXNER: Now, a few questions concerning Japan. What significance did
Directive 24 of 5 March 1941 have for co-operation with Japan? It has
already been mentioned, but the matter is not quite clear. That is Page
94, Volume I of our document book, which is Document C-75, Exhibit
USA-151. Grossadmiral Raeder, in the witness stand, has already said
something about this directive. Can you tell me anything new?
JODL: The document is very important. First, I must make a confession.
So far I have been accused of merely having received this document. But
it emanated from me; I authorized it. It was worked out by my staff in
the Navy group. Consequently, I knew this document better than anybody
else. It is not an operational order, it is a guide for German officers.
DR. EXNER: What does that mean?
JODL: All German officers who officially or unofficially came into
contact with Japanese officers were to be told exactly what the aims of
German policy were, namely, to attack England even in the Far East and
precisely thereby to keep America out of the war.
DR. EXNER: In Paragraph 3, Subparagraph a, of this directive we read:
“It must be emphasized that the common aim in this war is to
crush England as soon as possible and thereby keep the United
States out of the war.”
JODL: Such a directive was necessary in order that careless statements
on the part of German officers should not be used by officers of the
Japanese Army and Navy for their own political purposes. For this reason
the Foreign Office also received a copy, as is shown in the distribution
list on the bottom of Page 96. This would never have happened in the
case of an operational order. Also that is why the Führer did not sign
it.
DR. EXNER: The objectives of the German Navy are also stated on the top
of Page 96. They read as follows:
“Moreover, attacks on other British bases—on American naval
forces only if the entry of the United States into the war
cannot be prevented—are capable of shattering enemy forces in
those places.”
And so we again find the endeavor to prevent the entry of the United
States into the war and to attack them only if nothing else should prove
possible.
JODL: I should like to add that the purpose of this document was not to
exert influence on Japan, as that would have been a political action; it
was merely a directive for all officers telling them what to say in such
a case.
DR. EXNER: Grossadmiral Raeder has already told us by what naval orders
he had endeavored to keep the United States out of the war. Have you
anything to add to that?
JODL: Only one point, which the Grossadmiral did not mention. It comes
from Document C-119 and Exhibit Jodl-37. It can be read on Page 98 of
Document Book Number 1.
DR. EXNER: Page 98 of Volume I, Exhibit Jodl-37, which we submit. There
we find: “Special regulations on deportment during the occupation of
Denmark and Norway.” And then...
JODL: Only the last sentence need be read.
DR. EXNER: Please read it.
JODL: “All warships and merchant vessels under the U.S.A. flag,
as well as aircraft, are excepted from the prohibition to sail
or take off.”
DR. EXNER: And that is the last sentence at the bottom of Page 98. The
paragraph speaks of prohibiting warships, merchant vessels, aircraft,
_et cetera_, from leaving port, with the exception of the Americans.
JODL: And so, in all the war measures of the Naval Operations Staff,
America was granted an exceptional position for a long time.
DR. EXNER: Before Japan’s attack on America, did you have any official
dealings with Japanese officers?
JODL: No, not before.
DR. EXNER: None at all?
JODL: No.
DR. EXNER: Did you expect the attack on Pearl Harbor?
JODL: The attack came as a complete surprise. It was a complete surprise
to me, and I had the feeling it was also a surprise for the Führer; for
he came, in the middle of the night, to my map room in order to give the
news to Field Marshal Keitel and myself. He was completely surprised.
DR. EXNER: Now, I should like you to clear up an erroneous
interpretation of this letter of Falkenstein’s. It is Page 81, Volume I,
of our document book. A letter, Document 376-PS, Exhibit USA-161, can be
found there. There is a letter from Falkenstein to yourself, I believe?
JODL: No, no.
DR. EXNER: No?
JODL: No, to General Von Waldau, of the Air Force Operations Staff.
DR. EXNER: It states:
“With a view to a future war against America, the Führer is
considering the question of the occupation of the Atlantic
islands.”
That can be interpreted to mean that he intended to attack America:
“With a view to a future war against America, the Führer is
considering...” What is meant by that, and how did you interpret it?
JODL: That is perfectly obvious. At that time consideration was actually
being given to the occupation of the Atlantic islands, a thing the
Führer had always wanted to do.
DR. EXNER: For what purpose?
JODL: As a certain security base, thus an outpost in case of American
intervention; and so we had to take this idea into consideration.
Although the Navy as well as the Armed Forces Operations Staff and the
Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces definitely rejected it, we
had to consider these matters in theory at least; and this is what he
tells General Von Waldau in this letter.
Furthermore, the same thing was then written in a document, later in an
order, Document 444-PS, exactly as written here.
DR. EXNER: Did we have any interest at all in extending the war?
JODL: I, personally, none. I can only say that the expanse from the
North Cape to Tobruk, and from Brest to Rostov-on-the-Don was too great
for my liking.
DR. EXNER: And were we interested in having Japan at war with America?
JODL: No, we would have much preferred a new and powerful ally without a
new and powerful enemy.
DR. EXNER: Did we drag Italy into the war?
JODL: I do not know what was done politically; but after the collapse of
France, when Italy also wished to take an active part in the war, we
tried to prevent this, we soldiers in the OKW. But we only succeeded in
delaying her intervention by 4 to 6 days; the Führer could not refuse
altogether. But during the whole of the war Italy was of no help to us,
rather only a burden; and this will be confirmed by subsequent histories
of the war.
DR. EXNER: As to all the accusations concerning Crimes Against Peace, I
should like to refer to the relevant documents which have been submitted
by Göring, Ribbentrop, Raeder, and Dönitz. I do not know whether such a
reference is at all necessary according to the rules of procedure.
Now one final question. The Prosecution has represented this whole
series of campaigns as a long premeditated and concerted plan of
conquest which you, as a conspirator, both instigated and carried out.
What have you to say to this?
JODL: I believe I have already corrected this completely distorted
picture by my testimony. The war against Poland broke out without my
having taken any part in its preparation. It developed into a World War
contrary to the hopes of all soldiers. Everything had to be improvised
for this war. There was nothing ready except the plan of attack against
Poland. There were neither enough bombs nor enough ammunition. At that
time not a single soldier thought about Norway, Belgium, Holland,
Yugoslavia, Greece, or even Russia. No military agreements had been
reached with Italy or with Japan.
I acknowledge the statement of the American Chief of General Staff,
General Marshall, to be absolutely correct in almost every point.
DR. EXNER: Mr. President, I have no further questions to ask.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel want to ask any
questions?
DR. HANS LATERNSER (Counsel for the General Staff and High Command of
the German Armed Forces): General, as Chief of the Armed Forces
Operations Staff, you were for many years the leading General Staff
officer of the German Armed Forces?
JODL: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: In the course of your military activity you were also for
a fairly long time a teacher at the War Academy?
JODL: Not exactly at the War Academy but at the General Staff courses
which preceded the War Academy and which at that time were held at the
individual district headquarters.
DR. LATERNSER: As all our higher military leaders came from the
professional class of General Staff officers, I ask you to tell us
briefly how these officers were trained at the War Academy. Please
confine yourself exclusively to the following points:
How was, or rather how much time was allotted to instruction on attack;
then for propaganda for wars of aggression; and the attitude toward
international law and politics?
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think this question is completely
irrelevant.
DR. LATERNSER: If the Court considers these questions to be irrelevant,
I will dispense with the answers to these questions.
Generaloberst, you know the standpoint of the Prosecution, that the
military leaders are supposed to have formed a group with the aim of
unleashing wars of aggression and, in the course of these wars,
committing crimes against military law and the laws of humanity. Please
explain to the Tribunal your attitude toward this point, particularly as
to whether the higher military leaders ever actually formed such a
group.
JODL: I never understood the idea of such a group, and I never shall
understand it. It is just as if the passengers of a passenger ship were
to meet on an ocean liner and there form a unit—or be obliged to form a
unit—under the authority of the captain. This so-called group of
high-ranking officers might possibly have existed in imperial times as
an absolute entity, but not entirely even then. But here, after the
National Socialist revolution, these groups broke up completely in all
spheres of life, politically, philosophically, and ideologically. The
goal that united them was the military profession and the necessary
obedience.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better adjourn at this time.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]_
_Afternoon Session_
DR. LATERNSER: Generaloberst, before the occupation of Czechoslovakia
there was a meeting on 10 August 1938 at the Berghof between Hitler and
the military leaders, at which you were also present. Up to now that
conference has not yet been discussed here, and I want to ask you what
was the subject of that conference.
JODL: During that conference, the Führer spoke to General Staff officers
only, and gave them a talk that lasted for about two and a half hours on
the whole military and political situation. In particular, he dealt with
the Sudeten-German problem, and said that it would have to be solved no
matter what happened. He described the various possibilities and, in
particular, made it clear that he intended to solve the question without
interference from France and England and was confident he would succeed.
DR. LATERNSER: That was the subject of that conference?
JODL: Yes, that in the main was the subject.
DR. LATERNSER: Do you know for what reason the Commanders-in-Chief of
the three branches of the Armed Forces and their chiefs were not there?
JODL: I know the reason because the Chief Adjutant, Major Schmundt,
informed me of it before the conference. He told me that it was the
Führer’s intention to speak directly to the senior General Staff
officers at a time when they would not be under the influence of their
too-critical Commanders-in-Chief and thus not inclined to balk or
criticize.
DR. LATERNSER: But then, during that conference there was, nevertheless,
considerable criticism on the part of those officers, was there not?
JODL: I could not say that there was criticism; but one of the generals
believed that he could or should draw the Führer’s attention to the
possibility that France and England might interfere after all, if he did
something against Czechoslovakia. That was General Von Wietersheim.
DR. LATERNSER: Did Hitler later on again follow the principle of
excluding the highest military leaders from such conferences?
JODL: The Führer did that quite often. I would say that he did it on
principle. For instance, after our unsuccessful attack on the bridgehead
at Nettuno, southwest of Rome, he ordered the junior officers, who were
taking part in these battles, from the regimental commanders down to the
company commanders, to come to the Führer’s headquarters. For days he
personally interrogated each one of them alone without their superiors
being present. He did the same thing very, very often with Air Force
officers, whom he interrogated without the Commander-in-Chief of the Air
Force present.
DR. LATERNSER: Generaloberst, you were present during most of the Hitler
conferences on the situation. Could the commanding generals present at
the Führer’s headquarters at the time take part in such conferences
without difficulties?
JODL: As long as during these orientation conferences on the situation
only things which had already happened were discussed, the Führer was
very generous about who took part in them; but as soon as something was
discussed which dealt with future operations—for instance, the attack
on Russia in 1942—commanding generals of an army group from the Western
Front could not take part; nor was it possible the other way round, so
that so far as his intentions were concerned, he would only initiate
such officers as had to be informed for official reasons.
DR. LATERNSER: In such cases then, the so-called “smallest circle” was
summoned to a situation conference?
JODL: That is right. And so it was that the chief adjutant would
announce, on behalf of the Führer, that a discussion among the smallest
circle would now take place in which only such and such officers could
take part.
DR. LATERNSER: During such situation discussions, did you often hear
energetic remonstrances on the part of the commanding generals of an
army group? Who made these remonstrances, and on what occasion? Please
limit yourself to the most important instances.
JODL: I can only give you a very short answer to that question;
otherwise, I would have to speak about it for an hour. I can say that
not a single conference took place without the old traditional
conceptions, if I may call them so, regarding operations coming into
conflict with the revolutionary conceptions of the Führer. Therefore,
apart perhaps from single operations during the first part of the war, I
can state that whenever such a report was made by a commanding general
of an army group, there was a clash of opinions. I could mention the
names of all the commanding generals of army groups who ever held a
post. I know of none to whom this would not apply.
DR. LATERNSER: Of course, you knew all the commanding generals of army
groups, did you not?
JODL: During the first half of the war I knew all the commanding
generals down to, and including, commanding generals of army groups.
During the second half of the war, there were commanding generals of
army groups in the East whom I did not know. For the most part they did
not come from the General Staff, but were line officers, so that I did
not know some of them.
DR. LATERNSER: Generaloberst, could, for instance, a commanding general
of an army group report for a discussion with Hitler without
difficulties?
JODL: The commanding general of an army group could not do that. The
commanding general of an army group would, first of all, have to ask the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army as long as there was one. When the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army no longer existed, the commanding
generals of army groups then applied to the military adjutant’s office,
or they applied to the Chief of the General Staff of the Army for
permission to make a report, which the commanding generals could not do
themselves.
DR. LATERNSER: So that, if a commanding general of an army group
intended to protest against some measure which he did not consider
right, then he had to go to the commander-in-chief of his army group,
who in turn would have to go to the commander-in-chief of the particular
branch of the Armed Forces; so that this was practically the only
channel through which objections could be made to Hitler in the normal
official way?
JODL: That is perfectly correct. All military departments did that, and
it had been done for a number of years.
DR. LATERNSER: What do you know about Himmler’s attempt to set Hitler
against the generals? When I say “generals” I mean the ones who are of
the “group.”
JODL: I have perhaps already answered that in part when I complained
that we were not in a position to prevent military reports and news of
irresponsible sources from reaching the Führer. It was a standing rule
that police circles particularly continually used the opportunity
through Himmler to criticize the traditional, or—as they called it—the
reactionary, humanitarian, chivalrous attitude of the higher military
leaders, so that the severe orders of the Führer for brutal action—as
he called it—might be stayed. This was a constant state of affairs. All
of them were by no means involved and it was not directed against all
the commanding generals, but it was against quite a few.
DR. LATERNSER: Generaloberst, you still have not quite answered my
question. I asked you whether you knew anything about Himmler’s attempt
to make Hitler hostile, for reasons which I hope you will tell me.
JODL: Well, the outcome of what I have just described was that Himmler
went to the Führer and reported to him, privately of course. He
complained about certain commanding generals, all of them of the Army;
and we knew about it, because the following day the Führer suddenly
began to raise some objections to some commanding general without our
knowing why, and would cause bad feeling.
DR. LATERNSER: How were the relations between the OKW and the OKH?
JODL: Before the war and during the first part of the war the
relationship between the High Command of the Armed Forces and the High
Command of the Army was made difficult by considerable tension. The
reason, however, was exclusively an internal military one. Because in
the creation of the High Command of the Armed Forces a general staff
group had come into being which was outside the jurisdiction of the
Chief of the General Staff of the Army, and which was, I should say,
even above the General Staff of the Army and gave orders to them. This
constellation was, of course, regarded with a great deal of distrust by
the General Staff of the Army. I might add, however, that Field Marshal
Keitel and I, and many reasonable officers, succeeded in completely
overcoming this tension as the war went on.
DR. LATERNSER: I think, Generaloberst, that that is enough on that
point.
The military leaders are accused of having delayed the end of a hopeless
war unnecessarily. What do you know about the efforts of Field Marshal
Von Rundstedt and Rommel after the invasion had succeeded?
JODL: I remember a conference with these two commanding generals when
the Führer and I flew to the headquarters which had been prepared north
of Reims. That was about July 1944. During that conference, both Field
Marshal Von Rundstedt and particularly Rommel described in an
unmistakable manner the seriousness of the entire situation in France,
characterized by the tremendous superiority of the Anglo-Saxon Air
Force, against which ground operations were powerless. I remember quite
clearly that Field Marshal Rommel asked the Führer at the end, “My
Führer, what do you really think about the further development of the
war?” The Führer was rather angry at this remark, and he answered
curtly, “That is a question which is no part of your duty. You will have
to leave that to me.”
DR. LATERNSER: Did you read the letter which Field Marshal Von Kluge
wrote to Hitler shortly before he died?
JODL: I stood next to the Führer when he received this letter. He opened
the envelope, read the letter, and then gave it to me to read. It said
exactly the opposite of what I had expected. Field Marshal Von Kluge
began his letter with fulsome praise for the Führer’s personality and
steadfastness in the conduct of the war. He said that he was much more
in sympathy with his ideals than the Führer assumed. He had begun his
task in the West full of confidence. But as the promised support of our
own Air Force had not been given he was now convinced that the situation
was hopeless, and his dying counsel was to make peace now. That briefly,
was what the letter contained.
DR. LATERNSER: Generaloberst, can you give further examples regarding
the efforts of the commanding generals to end the hopeless war?
JODL: No commanding general could touch upon the political question,
because the ending of a war is not a military but a political decision.
But indirectly I must say that there was not one officer in a
responsible position who did not tell the Führer soberly, honestly, and
openly what the military situation was and describe it as hopeless—as
indeed it turned out to be at the end. I, myself, too, expressed this
view in writing in a memorandum to the Führer.
DR. LATERNSER: I have a few questions regarding the various campaigns.
What was the attitude of the High Command of the Army, particularly
Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch, regarding the Austrian campaign?
JODL: The evening before the march into Austria, at about 2 o’clock in
the morning, I was with Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch. I found him in a
dejected mood. I saw no reason for it; but apparently he was convinced
that this march into Austria might possibly lead to a military conflict
either with Italy or with Czechoslovakia. Or perhaps from a political
point of view he was not quite pleased about this impending increase of
the south German element in the Reich. I do not know. But at any rate he
was most dejected.
DR. LATERNSER: What were the reasons for the tension which existed
between Hitler on the one hand and the military leaders on the other
after the Polish campaign?
JODL: The conflict was particularly serious at that time because the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army and many of the higher generals held the
view I described this morning—namely, that we should remain quiet in
the West to end the war. As this again was a political argument, which
they could not use, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army presented a
military argument to the Führer at that time. This argument was that
considering the conditions in which our Army was at the time, it would
not be in a position to defeat the French Army, strengthened by the
British Army, in an offensive. That made the Führer extremely bitter,
and this bitterness expressed itself repeatedly in every speech to the
commanding generals. The entire speech of 23 November, the entire
memorandum which he wrote on 10 October can only be explained in the
light of that conflict.
DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution, as a basis for the Indictment of the
group, have presented a number of affidavits. I should like to ask you
to state your views in connection with Affidavit Number 12, Document
3710-PS, Exhibit USA-557, which was made by Walter Schellenberg. There
on Page 1 Schellenberg testifies that in the front zone the SD special
task groups were entirely under the command of the armies—that is to
say, tactically, technically, and from the point of view of troop
service, as he says in his affidavit. Is that true, Generaloberst?
JODL: It is only true to a very limited extent. I must start my answer
by saying I was not familiar with the idea of the Einsatzgruppe and
Einsatzkommando until I came here to Nuremberg. I must say that quite
openly, even at the risk of being called a “Parsifal,” but it is a fact.
I only knew about the Police. The operational territory of the Army was
divided into three sectors. The front line was called the fighting zone,
and that went back approximately as far as the enemy artillery could
fire. In that sector everything, that was anything at all, was in all
respects subordinate to the Army. But in that sector there was no
Police—except the Secret Field Police, who were in any case completely
under the jurisdiction of the Army.
DR. LATERNSER: The Secret Field Police were actually a part of the
division, were they not?
JODL: Yes, they were divisional troops which carried out police work
among the troops. Then came the rear area of the armies which was under
the commanding generals of the armies, and behind that were the lines of
communication of the Army which comprised all the supply units and
services of the Quartermaster General of the Army. In this main
sector—which was by far the largest sector as it comprised 97 percent
of the entire operational area—the entire Police and everything which
did not belong to the Army organically was not under the command of the
Army, as far as tasks were concerned, but under the Police, under the
Reichsführer SS Himmler. Only from the standpoint of servicing the
troops—that is, with regard to their supplies or movements during
advance or retreat—did the Army, of course, have the right to give
orders to the troops regarding their movements and their accommodation.
DR. LATERNSER: Schellenberg states that in the rear operational areas
and in the rear areas of the Army these special task groups came under
the Army only as far as supplies were concerned; and as far as orders
and tasks were concerned, under the Reich Security Main Office. Is that
correct?
JODL: That is correct. The entire Police received orders about what they
were to do from Himmler only.
DR. LATERNSER: Schellenberg also states further in his Affidavit Number
12, Document 3710-PS, Exhibit USA-557, that this subordination as
regards troop servicing also included the question of discipline. Is
that true?
JODL: That is wrong. An officer of the Army could never punish a member
of the Police or the SS.
DR. LATERNSER: As has been established, the chief task of these special
task groups was to carry out mass extermination of Jews and Communists.
Schellenberg states in his Affidavit Number 12 that he was convinced
that the commanding generals of the army groups and armies had been
clearly informed of these tasks through official channels. Since
Schellenberg has stated his conviction in this affidavit I ask you to
give us yours, because I think I am right in assuming that you were with
the best informed officers of the Armed Forces.
JODL: I cannot, of course, judge exactly what the commanding generals
actually experienced while they were together at the front; but I can
say with absolute certainty that I have never seen an order which
revealed that these police units had been sent into the operational zone
for any other purpose than that of maintaining quiet and order, from the
police point of view, and uncovering revolts and partisan activities. I
have never seen a report or an order which contained anything other than
that.
DR. LATERNSER: Do you believe, Generaloberst, that the commanding
generals of the armies or army groups would have tolerated those
conditions without protest?
JODL: I consider that out of the question, because even in the case of
much smaller incidents they raised the most violent protests. Hundreds
of documents which have been offered by the Prosecution here show how
the troops at the front had objected to measures which they considered
inadmissible from a humane point of view or dangerous to peace and order
in the occupied territories. I have only to remind you of Blaskowitz’
memorandum, which was one of the first.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you read that memorandum?
JODL: No, I did not read it. I only heard about it.
DR. LATERNSER: Furthermore, the Prosecution have submitted Affidavit
Number 13 from Rittmeister Wilhelm Scheidt. It is Document 3711-PS,
Exhibit USA-558. Scheidt says in this affidavit, and I quote from Page
2: “It was a generally known fact that the partisan fights were
conducted with cruelty on both sides.”