“The primary objective of the operation is the occupation of the
Aegean coast and the Salonika Basin. The continuation of the
attack by way of Larissa and the Isthmus of Corinth may prove
necessary.”
It is quite obvious from these conditional orders that the occupation of
the whole of Greece was intended only if we should be forced to take
this measure by the landing of English troops, which at that time was
not yet the case.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. EXNER: You said we had planned to leave Yugoslavia neutral. Now this
plan was apparently changed by the Simovic Putsch. Why did this event
alter our policy toward Yugoslavia?
JODL: This Putsch against a legal government, by officers meddling in
politics, immediately after Yugoslavia had joined the Tripartite Pact
had necessarily an anti-German tendency. We stood directly on the verge
of the campaign against Greece, against the whole of Greece, for in the
meantime English divisions had landed there, and this campaign could
only be waged with a safely neutral Yugoslavia behind us.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, various other members of the
defendants—Defendants Göring and Keitel—have dealt with the political
aspects of the entry of Germany into Yugoslavia. Unless there is
anything new for this defendant to give evidence about it seems to be
entirely cumulative.
DR. EXNER: Then kindly just tell us, if you have anything new to
add—some documents, _et cetera_.
JODL: I have something to add which concerns myself personally.
THE PRESIDENT: Nothing is coming through—the English was not coming
through. Please, try it again. Repeat what you said.
JODL: I have something else to add which concerns me personally with
regard to the Yugoslav problem...
THE PRESIDENT: No. There is nothing coming through to us. Go on then,
Defendant. You were asked if there is anything new to say.
JODL: Yes, I have something personal to add.
DR. EXNER: Yes, do so.
JODL: On this morning when the Führer spontaneously ordered the
immediate preparation of an attack on Yugoslavia, I proposed to him, or
at least I mentioned to him, that after concentrating our troops we
ought first to clarify the real situation, the political situation, by
an ultimatum. He refused to do so. He said, “That will not be of any
use.” Field Marshal Keitel has already confirmed this.
DR. EXNER: Tell me, was that on 27 March?
JODL: Yes, that was on the 27th. May I give proof of this. On the
evening of the 27th the order was issued...
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think it is necessary if the Defendant Keitel
said it, and you say it, and there is no cross-examination about it.
DR. EXNER: But I feel that there is something important.
JODL: A document was submitted, Document 1746-PS, Exhibit GB-120, on
Page 70 of the document book.
DR. EXNER: Page 71.
JODL: Yes, the text is on Page 71. If the Court will compare this
sentence on Page 71, Paragraph 1, with the sentence on Page 69 of the
document book a difference will be noticed. Page 69 contains the order
signed by the Führer, and it begins with this sentence which I shall
quote:
“The military Putsch in Yugoslavia has altered the political
situation in the Balkans. Even if she makes a declaration of
loyalty, Yugoslavia must be considered as an enemy and therefore
beaten as quickly as possible.”
This, as appears from the date, was issued on 27 March. I worked that
whole night at the Reich Chancellery, which is another proof of the
sudden nature of the whole case. At 4 o’clock on the morning of the
28th, as stated on Page 71, I put the following _aide-mémoire_, this
operational _aide-mémoire_, into the hand of General Von Rintelen, our
liaison officer with the Italian High Command. In it I had written—I
quote:
“Should political developments call for armed intervention
against Yugoslavia, it is the German intention...” _et cetera_.
I must admit that, in this instance, I ventured a little into the
political field, but in so doing I thought that if Germany did not
clarify the political situation beyond any doubt, Italy perhaps might do
it.
DR. EXNER: The next document is also evidence of the suddenness of this
decision, and I have had it printed on Page 73, Volume 1. That is the
order issued by the High Command of the Army on the basis of these
directives—the order for deployment of troops for the operation. That
is Document R-95, Exhibit GB-127, Page 73, of Volume I, as I have
already stated, and it says there:
“As a result of the change in the political situation...” _et
cetera_—and then—“there will be concentrated...”—and then the
last paragraph states—“The operation will be given the code
name ‘Project 25.’”