CAMPAIGN OF THE BRITISH ARMY UNDER SIR JOHN MOORE.
♦1808.♦
♦BUONAPARTE REPROACHES AND INSULTS THE ENGLISH.♦
In all the bulletins and proclamations of Buonaparte the English were
held up to the Spaniards for indignation and contempt: they were a
people, he said, who fomented war every where, and distributed arms
like poison, ♦14TH BULLETIN.♦ but who shed their own blood only
for their own direct interest. At this time it is probable that he
sincerely despised the English as a military nation. ♦GAZETA DE MADRID,
DEC. 18.♦ Can any thing be more ridiculous, it was asked, than that
England should pretend to struggle with her land forces against France?
♦DO. DEC. 24.♦ she will realize the fable of the frog swelling itself
to rival the ox, till it burst. “The day,” said Buonaparte, “wherein
we succeed in seeing these English will be a day of jubilee for the
French army. Oh, that they may dye with their blood this continent,
which they have desolated with their intrigues, their monopolies, and
their frightful selfishness! Oh, that they might be met with to the
number of 80,000 or 100,000 men instead of 20,000! that English mothers
might feel the evils of war, and the English government cease to sport
with the ♦14TH BULLETIN. 12TH BULLETIN.♦ lives and blood of the
continental nations. All the evils, all the plagues, which can afflict
the human race, come from London.” He represented the Spaniards as
complaining that the English had given them arms, powder, and clothing,
but had sent troops only to excite ♦14TH BULLETIN.♦ them, lead them
astray, and forsake them in the hour of danger, when 40,000 British at
Espinosa or Tudela might have balanced the fortune of the war.... That
number of British troops would at either place have turned it.
Great Britain possessed at that time men, means, and generals equal to
any service; but the nation did not yet understand its own strength,
nor had the government yet learnt either to direct it wisely, or to
make exertions commensurate to the end whereat they aimed. The lessons
which books and history might teach had been neglected, and experience
therefore was to be purchased at a heavy price.
♦THE BRITISH ARMY FROM PORTUGAL ENTERS SPAIN.♦
As soon as the campaign in Portugal was ended, Sir Hew Dalrymple began
to prepare for entering Spain: on the 6th of October Sir John Moore
received his appointment to the command; the preparations meantime had
not been relaxed, and in eight days afterward part of the troops were
in motion. Difficulties and doubts had occurred at the very outset.
The infantry were to go either by sea or land at the Commander’s
discretion; the voyage at that season was thought too precarious; and
the Junta represented, that if they went by sea, half the army would
be unable to leave the coast for want of necessaries, there being
scarcely means at Coruña for forwarding 10,000 men who were to land
there under Sir David Baird, and join the Commander wherever he should
appoint. The land-journey therefore having been chosen, the Spanish
Commissary-General was consulted concerning the means of subsisting
the army on the great road by Elvas; but the quantity of meat which
was required astonished him; and he computed that in three months all
the oxen in the country would be consumed, and very few hogs left.
There was no want of food in the north of Portugal, but it was said
that artillery could not be transported across the mountains. British
officers were sent to examine the roads, and they confirmed this
assertion of the natives. It was ascertained when too late, that bad
as the ways were, they were practicable for cannon; but in consequence
of this error, it was deemed necessary to divide the army, and this
led to serious evils. General Hope, with the artillery, cavalry, and
four regiments of foot, was to go by the Madrid road; General Paget,
with two brigades, by Elvas and Alcantara. The rest of the army moved
through Almeida; two brigades, under General Beresford, by way of
Coimbra; three, under General Fraser, by Abrantes, crossing the Tagus
there, and recrossing at Villa Velha, ... a point which, in former
wars, has been considered the key to Lisbon. These were to unite at
Salamanca, and General Hope and Sir David Baird to join them either
there or at Valladolid.
If the people of England had been required to name the general who
should be employed on this important occasion, Sir John Moore would
certainly have been their choice, so generally was he respected as
an officer and as a man. ♦FORMER SERVICES OF SIR JOHN MOORE.♦ He was
born at Glasgow in 1760. From the eighteenth to the twenty-third year
of his age he was on the continent with his father (a physician and a
distinguished man of letters, then travelling with the young Duke of
Hamilton), and soon afterwards rose to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel
in the army. He served with distinction in Corsica, the West Indies,
the Helder expedition, and in Egypt; had often been wounded, and
given proofs of professional skill as well as of personal gallantry,
for he was fond of his profession, and had studied it well. But the
constitution of his mind led him to look at the dark rather than
the hopeful aspect of things; and it was his farther misfortune to
have imbibed that exaggerated opinion of the French as a military
people, the ability of their Generals, and the consummate wisdom of
their Emperor, which the enemies of government in England were always
labouring to produce, for the purpose of humbling the spirit of their
country.
♦HIS CARE TO MAINTAIN DISCIPLINE.♦
Before the troops began their march Sir John Moore warned them in
his general orders that the Spaniards were a grave, orderly people,
extremely sober, but generous, and easily offended by any insult
or disrespect; he exhorted them to accommodate themselves to these
manners, to meet with equal kindness the cordiality wherewith they
would be received, and not shock by their intemperance a people worthy
of their attachment, whose efforts they were come to support in the
most glorious cause. His resolution to maintain order and proper
discipline was farther evinced by punishing a marauder upon the march
with death: the offender was one whose character gave no hope of
amendment, and the General took that opportunity of declaring his
determination to show no mercy to plunderers or marauders, in other
words, to thieves and villains. Farther to gratify the Spaniards, the
army, upon entering Spain, were ordered to wear the red cockade in
addition to their own.
♦ILL PROSPECT OF AFFAIRS WHEN HE ARRIVES AT SALAMANCA.♦
On Nov. 13, Sir John arrived with his advanced guard at Salamanca.
Before he entered the city, he learnt the defeat of the Extremaduran
army at Burgos, and on the second night after his arrival, was awakened
by an express, with news that the French had possession of Valladolid,
... twenty leagues distant. He had only three brigades of infantry
with him, and not a single gun. His first thought was to fall back
upon Ciudad Rodrigo; but he soon learnt that the French had retired to
Palencia, and that none of their infantry had advanced beyond Burgos:
he therefore sent orders to Generals Baird and Hope, to concentrate
their divisions, and join him with all speed. Every day now brought
with it intelligence of new disasters. Blake’s army was dispersed,
and Buonaparte might either turn his force against Castaños, or march
against the English, to prevent their junction. He, meantime, placed
nearly in the centre, between two divisions of his army, which were
approaching from different points, was compelled to remain inactive.
Perceiving what he thought the supineness of the Spanish government,
and indignant at discovering the weakness of the Spaniards, he began to
despair of their cause. He saw nothing around him but an inactivity,
which he mistook for torpor and indifference. They had not, he said,
shown themselves a wise or a provident people; their wisdom was not a
wisdom of action. Yet still he felt that they were a fine people; that
they had a character of their own, quite distinct from that of any
other nation; and much, he thought, might have been done with them. He
erred in thinking that they would not do much for themselves.
♦SIR DAVID BAIRD ARRIVES AT ASTORGA.♦
Sir David Baird had formed a like opinion. The expedition under his
command reached Coruña on the 13th of October; and such were the
idle forms and the negligence of the Spanish authorities, that the
troops were kept on ship-board till an order for their landing could
be received from the Central Junta. This General had been accustomed
to an Indian army, with its train of slaves and sutlers, elephants
and palanquins; he had now to march through a country where it is not
without difficulty that a party of travellers can obtain food, and
which had already been drained by its own troops; and his commissaries
were not only inexperienced in the business of their department, but
ignorant of the language of the people. Dividing his army into small
detachments, which followed each other at considerable distance,
he arrived at Astorga, Nov. 19th, and there learning the defeat of
Blake’s army, and anticipating that of Castaños’s, he consulted with
his general officers, and informed Sir John Moore of their unanimous
opinion, that he ought not to advance till his whole force was
assembled there, which would not be before the 4th of December. Sir
John Moore’s opinion of the hopelessness of affairs was thus confirmed
by Sir David Baird. “I see my situation,” he said in his journal, “as
clearly as any one, that nothing can be worse; yet I am determined
to form the junction of the army, and to try our fortune. We have no
business here as things are; but, being here, it would never do to
abandon the Spaniards without a struggle.”
♦SIR JOHN MOORE RESOLVES TO RETREAT UPON PORTUGAL, AND EMBARK FROM
LISBON.♦
It was not long before intelligence arrived that Castaños was defeated,
and his army dispersed. ♦NOV. 28.♦ This event the British Commander had
expected; it had always been his opinion that the south of Spain ought
to have been the scene of action; that Cadiz, not Coruña, should have
been chosen for the disembarkation of the English army, and Seville or
Cordoba the place of their junction. He now determined to retreat upon
Portugal.... “Thus,” he said, in a letter to the English ambassador,
Mr. Frere, “he should fall back upon his resources, cover a country
where there was a British interest, act as a diversion in favour of
Spain, if the French detached a force against him, and be ready to
return to the assistance of the Spaniards, should circumstances again
render it eligible. That such circumstances would occur he had no
expectation. The French, he thought, would have little more to do to
subdue the country than to march over it, though, after the conquest,
they might have troublesome subjects.” And, in his letter to Sir David
Baird, ordering him to fall back upon Coruña, and sail from thence for
the Tagus, he directed him to write immediately to England, and order
that transports might be sent to Lisbon; “they will be wanted,” said
he; “for when the French have Spain, Portugal cannot be defended.” He
had written a few days before this to Lord Castlereagh, saying, that
he had ordered a depôt of provisions, for a short consumption, to
be formed at Almeida, and perhaps the same should be done at Elvas;
in that case, the progress of the enemy might be checked, while the
stores were embarking at Lisbon, and arrangements made for taking off
the army. Beyond this, the defence of Lisbon or of Portugal should
not be thought of. In communicating his resolution of retiring to the
British government, he wrote in the same spirit of utter despondency.
“If the French,” said he, “succeed in Spain, it will be vain to attempt
to resist them in Portugal. Portugal could not be defended against a
superior enemy; the Spaniards, however, might rally in the south, and
the English might still be of use, if they were landed at Cadiz. But
it was impossible to be very sanguine on this subject, after what had
been seen.”
♦HE ASKS THE OPINION OF THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR.♦
When this intention of retreating was made known to the army at
Salamanca, murmurs against it were heard in every quarter, and from
men of all ranks. Even the staff officers lamented the resolution of
their Commander. In his letter to Mr. Frere, written before the defeat
of Castaños was known, Sir John Moore had proposed as a question, what
the British army should do, in case of that event; whether he should
retreat upon Portugal, or march upon Madrid, and throw himself into
the heart of Spain, thus to run all risks, and share the fortunes of
the Spanish nation? “This movement,” he said, “would be one of great
hazard, as his retreat to Cadiz or Gibraltar must be very uncertain,
and he should be entirely in the power of the Spaniards; but perhaps it
was worthy of risk, if the government and people of Spain were thought
to have still sufficient energy, and the means to recover from their
defeats.” “The question,” said Sir John Moore to Mr. Frere, “is not
purely a military one. It belongs at least as much to you as to me
to decide upon it. Your communications with the Spanish government,
and the opportunities you have had of judging of the general state of
the country, enable you to form as just an estimate of the resistance
that is likely to be offered. You are perhaps better acquainted with
the views of the British cabinet; and the question is, what would
that cabinet direct, were they upon the spot to determine? It is
of much importance that this should be thoroughly considered; it is
comparatively of very little, on whom shall rest the greatest share
of responsibility. I am willing to take the whole, or a part; but I
am very anxious to know your opinion.” Mr. Frere knew that what the
Spanish government most deprecated was, a retreat of the English upon
Lisbon. It would sink the hearts of the whole country, and would make
them believe that England, after an ineffectual effort, had relapsed
into the old limited system of protecting Portugal. If, therefore,
a retreat were determined upon, as absolutely necessary, he thought
the army should fall back upon Galicia, and the strong country about
Astorga. But he said, in his reply to the General, that Leon and the
two Castilles (with the exception of La Mancha and the city of Madrid)
were the provinces least distinguished for a military, patriotic, or
provincial spirit in all Spain: the people had been passive during
the late events, and had seen their country successively occupied by
the strongest party. It was difficult to blame them: living in open
villages, in vast plains, without arms and without horses, they had
neither the means of defence or escape. That country must necessarily
belong to the party which was superior in cavalry; ... yet even there
there was no want of a right feeling; the towns were abandoned at the
approach of the enemy; not a single magistrate had been brought over to
take the oath of allegiance to the Intruder, nor had the French been
able to enlist a single soldier. The other provinces were possessed
by the most ardent and determined spirit. There was no doubt of the
people. The government was new, and had hitherto been too numerous to
be very active; but there was hope that that inconvenience would soon
be remedied. “They are resolute,” said Mr. Frere, “and I believe every
man of them determined to perish with the country. They will not at
least set the example, which the ruling powers and higher orders of
other countries have exhibited, of weakness and timidity.”
♦MR. FRERE WISHES HIM TO ADVANCE FOR THE DEFENCE OF MADRID.♦
Great advantages, the ambassador thought, would result from advancing
speedily to cover Madrid. It was a point of great moment for effect
in Spain, and still more in France, and in the west of Europe. The
people of the town were full of resolution, and determined to defend
it, in spite of its situation; and nothing could be more unfavourable
to the claim of the Intruder than a siege of the capital. The first
object of the English, therefore, he thought, should be to march
there, and collect a force capable of resisting the French, before
farther reinforcements arrived from France. There were reports that the
resistance to the conscription had been much more obstinate than usual,
and a pastoral letter of the Bishop of Carcassone seemed to prove that
these reports were not wholly without foundation. An advantage obtained
over the French now would be doubly valuable, inasmuch as it would
render a conscription, for a third attempt upon Spain, infinitely
difficult, if not impracticable. But if, with their present forces,
they were allowed to retain their present advantages, and to wait the
completion of the conscription, they would pour in forces, which would
give them immediate possession of the capital and central provinces,
and the war would then be reduced to an absolute competition between
the two countries, which could stand out longest against the waste of
population.
If, however, Mr. Frere said, this view of the subject should not appear
sufficiently clear or conclusive to the Commander-in-chief, to induce
him to take this step, which he, the Ambassador, was well convinced
would meet with the approbation of his Majesty’s government, he would
venture to recommend retaining the position of Astorga. A retreat
from thence to Coruña (as far, said he, as an unmilitary man may be
allowed to judge of a country which he has travelled over) would be
less difficult than through Portugal to Lisbon; and we ought in that
position to wait for the reinforcements of cavalry from England: the
army would thus be enabled to act in the flat country, which opens
immediately from that point, and extends through the whole of Leon and
Old Castille.... Before this letter arrived, the General’s resolution
had been taken, in consequence of the news of Castaños’s defeat. It
was not shaken by the reasoning of the Ambassador, whose opinion he
had asked, and he waited only for the junction of General Hope, to
commence his retreat on Portugal.
♦1808. DECEMBER.
TWO SPANISH GENERALS SENT TO CONFER WITH SIR JOHN MOORE.♦
The Junta had wished it had been possible for Sir John Moore to have
conferred personally with them at Aranjuez, or with the military
council at Madrid, and he himself had formed the same wish, believing
that unless prompt and efficacious measures were taken, the defeat
of the Spanish armies and the ruin of their cause were inevitable.
But as this could not be, the Captain-General of Granada, with
another officer, selected for his reputation and military experience,
were deputed to consult with him at Salamanca. These Generals, in
representing the resources of the Spaniards, enumerated the force under
San Juan, and relied upon the pass of Somosierra; but Colonel Graham
had just arrived before them with news that the pass had been won; and
Sir John considered them personally as weak old men, and officially
as having no information upon which any plan could be concerted.
Mistaking, as he did, the spirit of the nation, and undervaluing its
strength, he gave no ear to their urgent desire that he would form
a junction with Romana, and thereby draw off the enemy from Madrid,
nor to their declaration that his retreat, if he persisted in that
intention, would immediately occasion the destruction of Spain.
♦MORLA AND THE MILITARY JUNTA URGE HIM TO ADVANCE.♦
On the 5th of December, a dispatch arrived from Castelfranco and Morla,
informing him that about 25,000 men, of the central army, were falling
back on Madrid; that 10,000 from Somosierra were coming thither; and
that nearly 40,000 would join them. With that number of troops, the
French army, which had presented itself, was not to be feared. But
the Junta, apprehending an increase of the hostile forces, hoped he
would be able to unite with their army, or fall on the rear of the
enemy; and they did not doubt that the rapidity of his movements would
be such as the interests of both countries required. This letter was
written on the second, and the men who signed it had then determined
to betray their country, ... but though they might have wished and
designed to draw on the British army to its destruction, the proposal
that it should advance came not from them alone, but from the civil
and military Junta also, and was such as true Spaniards would have
given. While Sir John was considering this letter, Colonel Charmilly,
a French emigrant in the British service, and denizened in England,
arrived, with dispatches from Mr. Frere. Colonel Charmilly was in
Madrid on the night of the first, when the inhabitants were working by
torch-light at the trenches, breaking up the streets, and barricading
the houses. He had seen the Duque del Infantado, who told him there
were provisions and ammunition in Madrid; that more than 30,000 men had
that day enlisted themselves as volunteers; and that it was of material
importance to the common cause that the British commander should make
a diversion, which would compel the French to divide their forces, and
thus afford some relief to Madrid. This he requested Charmilly to
communicate to Sir John Moore, as he himself had been an eye-witness of
the spirit of the people, and the preparations which they were making
for resistance. By another Grandee he was requested to say to Sir John
Moore, that he must make use of this moment to save Spain, by making
conditions with the Junta for a better government; but especially that
he should require the Spanish army to be put under the orders of the
British Commander-in-chief for the time being, as it had been under
Lord Peterborough.
♦COL. CHARMILLY SENT TO SIR JOHN MOORE BY THE DUQUE DEL INFANTADO AND
MR. FRERE.♦
When Charmilly reached Talavera, on his way, he found that Mr. Frere
had just arrived there, following the Central Junta, who were retiring
from Aranjuez to Badajoz. To him he communicated what had passed
with the Duque del Infantado; and the Ambassador requested him, as a
colonel in the British service, to take charge of a letter to Sir John
Moore, urging him to suspend his retreat, as a measure which would
have the worst effect upon the Spanish cause, and be of the greatest
injury both to Spain and England. But thinking that, having begun the
retreat, Sir John might suppose himself engaged to go on with it, Mr.
Frere entrusted Colonel Charmilly with a second letter, to be delivered
in case the General persisted in his determination. The purport of
this letter was to request that the bearer might be examined before a
council of war; and the reason for this measure was, that the decision
of a council of war would exonerate the Commander-in-chief from the
responsibility by which he might otherwise feel himself fettered.
Charmilly reached Salamanca while Sir John was deliberating upon the
dispatch from Morla and Castelfranco. He delivered the Ambassador’s
first letter. The state of Madrid, Mr. Frere said, so much exceeded
every thing which he had ventured to say of the spirit and resolution
of the people, that he could not forbear representing to the General,
in the strongest manner, the propriety, not to say the necessity,
of supporting the Spanish people by all the means which had been
entrusted to him for that purpose. “I have no hesitation,” he added,
“in taking upon myself any degree of responsibility which may attach
itself to this advice, as I consider the fate of Spain as depending
absolutely, for the present, upon the decision which you may adopt.
I say, for the present; for such is the spirit and character of the
country, that, even if abandoned by the British, I should by no means
despair of their ultimate success.” Having read this letter, and
heard Charmilly’s communication, Sir John Moore gave him no reason to
suppose that the intention of retreating would be given up. He retired,
however, to reflect upon what he had heard. His instructions directed
him to receive the representations both of the Spanish government and
the British Ambassador with the utmost deference and attention: ...
both deprecated his retreat. Charmilly had been an eye-witness of
the preparations which were making in Madrid, and accounts confirming
his report came from various quarters. He was persuaded that a great
improvement in the public affairs had taken place, and that it was not
becoming him to fly at such a time; and he wrote, that night, to Sir
David Baird, telling him to suspend his retrograde march till he heard
again, and to make arrangements for returning to Astorga, should it be
necessary.
♦SIR JOHN MOORE RESOLVES TO ADVANCE.♦
Still the rooted feeling of his heart was despondency. In this very
letter he expressed his fear that the spirit of resistance had arisen
too late, and that the French were now too strong to be resisted in
that manner. All this, he said, appeared to him very strange and
unsteady; yet if the spirit of enthusiasm did arise, and the people
would be martyrs, there was no saying, in that case, what a British
force might do. In the morning he wrote a second letter, ordering Sir
David to return to Astorga. “We must be at hand,” said he, “to aid and
take advantage of whatever happens. The wishes of our country and our
duty demand this of us, with whatever risk it may be attended.” But he
added, “I mean to proceed bridle in hand; for if the bubble bursts, and
Madrid falls, we shall have a run for it.” These were ominous words.
It was apparent that he had no confidence in the patriotism of the
Spaniards, nor in his own means of resisting the French, however strong
the country; it was apparent also, that, while these impressions
weighed upon him, he looked on with apprehension to the opinion of
the English public, and that in deference to that opinion he was
sacrificing his own.
While Sir John was dispatching these instructions, it was not known at
Salamanca that he had changed his intention of retreating: officers
and men alike were delivering their opinions loudly, and speaking
of another investigation. Charmilly hearing this, and being equally
ignorant of the determination which had been formed, supposed that his
second letter was necessary, and accordingly delivered it. The General,
not perceiving the intent for which it was written, and feeling like a
high-spirited officer who thought himself injured, tore the letter in
pieces, and gave vent to his indignation in violent language. Part of
his anger fell upon Charmilly, and, on the following day, he ordered
him to quit Salamanca. Charmilly respectfully represented that he had
not deserved such treatment. The General replied that he did not mean
to give him the smallest offence; but he repeated the order, and it was
obeyed. Sir John Moore, in his resentment for what he conceived the
improper interference of the Ambassador, soon, however, recollected
what was due to him as the King’s minister. He told Mr. Frere,
therefore, that he should abstain from any remarks on the two letters
delivered by Colonel Charmilly, or on the message which accompanied
them. “I certainly,” said he, “did feel and express much indignation
at a person like him being made the channel of a communication of that
sort from you to me. Those feelings are at an end, and I dare say
they never will be excited towards you again. If M. Charmilly is your
friend, it was, perhaps, natural for you to employ him; but I have
prejudices against all that class, and it is impossible for me to put
any trust in him.” He informed the Minister that every thing should be
done, for the assistance of Madrid and the Spanish cause, that could
be expected from such an army as he commanded, ... but he could not
make a direct movement on Madrid, because the passes of Guadarrama and
Somosierra were in the hands of the French, and, besides, he was much
too weak, until joined by Sir David Baird.
♦NEWS OF THE SURRENDER OF MADRID.
DEC. 7.♦
On the following day, Sir John received a letter from the Junta of
Toledo, telling him they intended to re-unite the dispersed armies
there, and defend the city to the last. He replied, that if the
Spaniards acted up to such sentiments, there could be no doubt of their
ultimate success, whatever temporary advantages the French might gain;
and he sent a British officer to reside at Toledo, and concert measures
for its defence. On the 8th, he informed Sir David Baird that he should
move a corps on the 10th to Zamora and Toro, and ordered him to push
on his troops, by brigades, to Benevente. But, on the 9th, Colonel
Graham, whom he had dispatched to Morla and Castelfranco, returned from
Talavera, with tidings that these men had surrendered Madrid. The
number of the French there was computed at between 20,000 and 30,000
men, and it was said that they remained at the Retiro, not having
taken possession of the city, in consequence of the temper of the
inhabitants. Another part of the French army was engaged in besieging
Zaragoza. From Toledo the news was equally discouraging: Victor no
sooner approached than it was surrendered to him. These circumstances
did not induce the British General to alter his plan: his object was to
threaten the French communications, draw their attention from Madrid
and Zaragoza, and thus favour any movements which might be projected
by the armies forming on the south of the Tagus. If no advantage was
taken of it, and no efforts made, he saw that the French might turn
against him what portion of their force they pleased. That they would
be able to do this he expected; and he believed that nothing which
his army could effect would be attended with any other advantage than
the character which might be won for the British arms. He looked,
therefore, to a retreat, as an event which would soon be unavoidable;
in his dispatches home, dissuaded the government from sending out
reinforcements, and desired that transports might be ready, at Lisbon,
and at Vigo, to receive the troops; being fully persuaded that the
efforts of England could be of no avail, and that it would be necessary
to evacuate the peninsula.
♦CORRESPONDENCE WITH ROMANA.♦
Having determined, in this inauspicious state of mind, upon advancing,
he wrote to Romana, who was then at Leon, collecting and refitting
the remains of Blake’s army. Sir John complained to him that he had
been put in no communication with any of the Spanish armies, had been
kept perfectly in the dark with respect to their movements, the plans
of their generals and their government, and that while his army was
on the march to assemble and unite itself, he had been left exposed,
without the least support. Therefore, though his wish had always been
to co-operate with the Spaniards, it became necessary for him, finding
that he was left to himself, to think of himself alone. Under that
feeling he had ordered the corps at Astorga to fall back on Coruña,
and meant himself to retire upon Portugal, there to be ready for the
assistance of Spain whenever their affairs were better managed, and an
opportunity offered for doing them any good. Perhaps this opportunity
had now occurred; and as his retreat had been reluctant, so he had
stopped it the moment a chance of acting to advantage presented itself.
His wish now was to unite with the Marques, for whose character he
had the highest respect, and who would always find him ready to
undertake whatever was practicable for the service of the Spanish
nation. The account which Romana gave of his army in reply was far from
encouraging. He had 20,000 men under arms, but they were almost all
without haversacks, cartridge boxes, and shoes, and at least two-thirds
were without clothing, from head to foot. Their spirits however
were good, and if they were well fed they would do their duty. Their
dispersion in Biscay had been wholly owing to the want of subsistence.
He should not doubt of uniting with Sir John, and concerting a decisive
attack upon the troops which surrounded Madrid, were it not for a
division of 8000 or 10,000 men, extending from Sahagun to Almanza,
whose apparent object was to check his army. As long as they remained
in that position, he could not abandon his, because it would leave them
a free way into Asturias; they would take possession of the country
from whence he drew large supplies, and they would threaten the passage
into Galicia. A combined movement with Sir David Baird might oblige
them to fall back upon Reynosa, and then it would not be difficult to
form a junction.
♦FIRST SKIRMISH AT RUEDA.♦
From the beginning Sir John Moore had thought so poorly of the
Spaniards, that this account of the force with which he was to
co-operate could make no alteration in his views. It was perfectly
understood by him that he must stand, or fall, by his own means. He
left Salamanca on the 12th. On the same day, Lord Paget, with the
principal part of the cavalry, marched from Toro to Tordesillas; and
General Stuart surprised and cut off a party of French who were posted
at Rueda. This was the first encounter between the British and French
in Spain; and the prisoners declared it was universally believed
that the English army had retreated. On the 14th, when Sir John was
at Alaejos, a packet of letters, from the head-quarters of the French
army, was brought to him. Some peasantry had killed the officer who
had them in charge. Among them was a letter from Berthier to Marshal
Soult, directing him to take possession of Leon, drive the enemy into
Galicia, and make himself master of Benevente and Zamora. He would have
no English in front, it was said; for every thing evinced that they
were in full retreat. A movement had been made to Talavera, on the
road to Badajoz, which must compel them to hasten to Lisbon, if they
were not already gone; and when they had retired, the Emperor thought
Soult could do whatever he pleased. It appeared from this letter, that
Soult had two divisions with him at Saldaña; that Junot was collecting
another at Burgos; and that another, under Mortier (Duke of Treviso),
had been ordered to march against Zaragoza.
♦HEAD-QUARTERS REMOVED TO TORO.♦
Sir John had intended to march to Valladolid, but seeing that Soult
was stronger than had been represented, he thought it better to move
to Toro, and unite his army there, Sir David Baird doing the same at
Benevente, from whence the two corps might be joined, either by a
forward or flank movement, and strike a blow against Soult, before
that General should be reinforced. While the head-quarters were at
Toro, a member of the Junta arrived there with Mr. Stuart. After the
manner in which Colonel Charmilly had been dismissed, Mr. Frere had
little reason to hope that any thing would induce Sir John Moore to
alter his determination of retiring from the country in despair. The
Spanish Government ♦THE COMMAND OF THE SPANISH ARMIES OFFERED TO SIR
J. MOORE.♦ had, however, pressed him to make one effort more: if that
determination were persisted in, they said, it would bring on the most
dreadful consequences. The measures which alone could save Portugal
and Spain would be completely disconcerted, and England would have
afforded them succour only to make them rely on an effective aid, and
then to withdraw it at the critical moment when it was most needed. In
reality, the enemy at this moment exposed himself to ruin by dividing
his army to cover such an extended line. Romana would join Sir John
Moore with 14,000 men, and the Junta had taken such measures that
within a month 30,000 would be raised in Leon, Galicia, and Asturias.
Mr. Frere inclosed this note to the British Commander, and reminding
him of the immense responsibility with which he charged himself in
adopting a measure which must be followed by immediate if not final
ruin to our ally, and by indelible disgrace to the country with whose
resources he was entrusted, expressed a hope that Mr. Stuart, who was
personally esteemed by the General, would by that advantage be enabled
to urge this argument with the warmth of regard. “I am unwilling,”
he pursued, “to enlarge upon a subject in which my feelings must be
stifled, or expressed at the risk of offence; which, with such an
interest at stake, I should feel unwilling to excite. But this much I
must say, that if the British army had been sent abroad for the express
purpose of doing the utmost possible mischief to the Spanish cause,
with the single exception of not firing a shot against their troops,
they would, according to the measures now announced as about to be
pursued, have completely fulfilled their purpose.... That the defence
of Galicia should be abandoned, must appear incredible.”... This letter
arrived too late to have any influence upon Sir John’s movements; he
had advanced, but it was with a heavy heart: and when the Deputy from
the Junta, D. Francisco Xavier Caro, at this time offered him the
command in chief of the Spanish armies, he refused it. He would not
have done this if he had had any hope of acting with success against
the enemy, or any intention of making a stand against them: for at this
time he learnt that Romana was beginning to retire on Galicia, and felt
how inconvenient it was that the army which was to co-operate with
him should be independent of him. He therefore wrote to the Marques,
saying, he had looked for the assistance of such part of his corps as
was fit to move; and had expected also that the road to Coruña would
have been left open for the British army, as that by which it must
receive its supplies, and the only one by which it must retreat, if
compelled so to do. Romana replied, that he should have had no thought
of retreating had it not been for the intelligence which he received
from Sir D. Baird; that he was ready to act with Sir John; and that
this was the moment, not for retreating, but for trying what could be
done against the enemy, and drawing him from the capital.
♦JUNCTION WITH SIR D. BAIRD FORMED.♦
The junction with Sir D. Baird was formed at Mayorga on the 20th; the
united force amounting to something more than 28,000 men, of whom
2450 were cavalry, with 50 pieces of artillery. The cavalry under
Lord Paget were pushed forward, and having learned that some of the
enemy’s cavalry were posted at Sahagun, Lord Paget endeavoured to
cut them off. The alarm was given, and they had time to form in a
favourable position; but they were out-manœuvred, charged, overthrown
in a moment, and dispersed in every direction, with the loss of many
killed, and 157 prisoners, including two Lieutenant-Colonels. In this
affair about 400 of the 15th Hussars encountered nearly 700 French;
and the British felt and proved their own exceeding great superiority.
Head-quarters were advanced to Sahagun on the 21st. The weather was
severe; the roads bad, and covered with snow; and as the troops had
suffered from forced marches, they halted there for a day, and there a
co-operation with Romana was finally concerted, the Marques engaging to
move with from 9000[40] to 10,000 men, being that part of his force
which was sufficiently clothed and armed to take the field. Pitiable
as their condition appeared when they were compared to troops so
admirably equipped as the English, it was, nevertheless, evident, even
to a desponding observer, that they might be brought into action as
auxiliaries, to occupy part of the enemy’s force, and to complete his
destruction in case of victory.
♦THEY ADVANCE AGAINST M. SOULT.♦
According to the information which Romana could obtain, Soult’s corps
consisted of about 9000 infantry and 1000 horse; but that General,
apprehending that some attempt would be made against him, had applied
for reinforcements, and without waiting for them, called to his
assistance the nearest troops; he had thus brought together about
18,000 men, who were posted behind the river Carrion. Every arrangement
was made for attacking him, and orders were issued accordingly, ...
never more welcome to a British army. The convents in Sahagun were
prepared for the reception of the wounded; and the soldiers confidently
anticipated a glorious victory. Their general was less sanguine. “The
movement I am making,” he said to Mr. Frere, “is of the most dangerous
kind. I not only risk to be surrounded every moment by superior
forces, but to have my communication with Galicia intercepted. I wish
it to be apparent to the whole world, as it is to every individual of
the army, that we have done every thing in our power in support of
the Spanish cause, and that we do not abandon it until long after
the Spaniards had abandoned us.” The truth is, that nothing had
been done; but he was disgusted with the Spanish Government, and he
had no faith in the people: his own judgement would have led him to
fall back from Salamanca; and he only advanced because he knew what
would be the feelings of the English nation, if its army had retired
without attempting any thing. Offended with Mr. Frere, for having
given his opinion, when he himself had asked it, he did not deem the
suggestion of that Minister, as to making a stand at Astorga, worthy
of consideration. It was at once rejected, as futile; and he advanced
against this detachment of the French, “bridle in hand,” as he himself
said, and expecting to “have a run for it,” ... not thinking that any
possible benefit could result from a victory, but seeking a reason
which might appear valid to the people of England for abandoning the
peninsula, and for leaving Spain and Portugal to their fate.... “It
was necessary to risk this army,” he said, “to convince the people of
England, as well as the rest of Europe, that the Spaniards had neither
the power nor the inclination to make any efforts for themselves.
With respect to the cause, it will probably have no effect. Even if I
beat Marshal Soult, it will be attended with no other effect than the
character it will attach to the British arms.”
At the hour appointed, the whole force was under arms; the right column
had begun its march, and the rest were in high spirits, expecting
the word of command: ... just at this time came a letter from Romana,
with intelligence ♦THE FRENCH ENDEAVOUR TO SURROUND THE BRITISH ARMY.♦
that the French were advancing from Madrid, either to Valladolid or
Salamanca; and information to the same purport was received by other
messengers, and also, that considerable reinforcements ♦DEC. 23.♦ had
arrived at Carrion from Palencia. Orders were immediately issued that
the troops should go back to their quarters, and by daybreak next
morning be again under arms. “In my life,” says one who was present,
“I never witnessed such an instantaneously-withering effect upon any
body of living creatures! A few murmurs only were heard, but every
countenance was changed, and they who, the minute before, were full of
that confidence which ensures victory, were at once deprived of all
heart and ♦SIR J. MOORE BEGINS HIS RETREAT.♦ hope.” The next morning
General Hope fell back to Mayorga, on the road to Benevente, with his
own division and with General Fraser’s. Sir David Baird was ordered
to pass the river Ezla at Valencia de San Juan: on Christmas-day the
Commander-in-chief followed General Hope, with the reserve and the
light brigades; and the cavalry, under Lord Paget, followed the reserve
on the 26th. When Sir John Moore apprized Romana that he should fall
back, he told him that if he were pursued he should stop and offer
battle: and in a second communication from Sahagun he said, that if he
were pressed after crossing the Ezla, he should have no objection to
try an action. But he had made up his mind to lose some of his baggage,
and not to fight, if he could avoid it. Astorga was to be his rallying
point: there he informed Romana he should stand, as his retreat from
thence, if necessary, would be secure, and he should be in the way to
receive the supplies and the reinforcements which he expected from
England. At the worst, he could defend himself, and, with Romana’s
aid, defend Galicia. “You may rest assured,” he added, “that I shall
not retreat a foot beyond what is necessary to secure my supplies from
being intercepted.... You will find no inclination in me to abandon
the Spanish cause.” But his dispatches from Benevente, on the 28th,
show that this intention, if it had ever been seriously entertained,
was soon abandoned; and as for the reinforcements, he had already
countermanded them in his feeling of despair. His force, he said, when
he reached Astorga, would be about 27,000; Romana could not have above
8000. The troops moving against him he estimated at not less than
50,000; and it was said that Buonaparte himself was coming, with 10,000
of his guards. His real purpose was not to stop longer at Astorga
than to secure the stores, and then retreat to Villa Franca, where he
had been told there was a position. Romana had intimated to him, some
time ago, his intention of retiring into Galicia by this route, but
Sir John begged it might be left open to the English, being the only
communication they had for their retreat or supplies.
From the 22d to the 24th, Soult received such reinforcements as made
his army superior to the British. Junot, with the army which had been
transported from Portugal to France, had advanced to Palencia, and
threatened their right flank. Buonaparte was hastening from Madrid,
with his imperial cavalry, and all the disposable force in that
quarter. The force under Lefebvre was counter-ordered from the road
to Badajoz, and directed toward Salamanca. The retreat of the British
upon Portugal was thus cut off. Of the numbers advancing against him
Sir John Moore was not informed; and so little idea was there of flying
when he began his retreat, that it was determined to carry off the
prisoners; and they were accordingly stowed in covered waggons. A thaw
came on the day when they first fell back; on the following it rained
without intermission: the soil in that part of the country is a heavy
loam, and the roads were above a foot deep in clay. The proclamations
of the French travelled faster than the British army: these were, as
usual, full of promises which would not be fulfilled, and menaces which
would. They were come, they said, to deliver Spain; to emancipate the
people from the yoke of a tyrannical nobility and a fanatic priesthood.
All persons who remained quiet in their houses, or who, having forsaken
them, speedily returned, should receive no injury; but otherwise,
whatsoever belonged to them should be confiscated. Unhappily, the
conduct of our people now began to give effect to these hand-bills.
The soldiers were indignant ♦ILL CONDUCT OF THE TROOPS.♦ with the
Spaniards for their apparent supineness; they were exasperated by the
conduct of some poor wretches, whose carts had been pressed to carry
the sick and wounded, and who, as many of them as could, had taken
their mules, and run away in the night, because the movements of a
retreating army exposed themselves to imminent danger, and their beasts
to certain destruction. Weary and disheartened, in want of rest and
food, disappointed in their confident hopes of victory, and indignant
at turning their backs upon an enemy whom they would so eagerly have
met in the field, it was a relief for them to vent these feelings,
in the shape of anger, upon the only objects within their reach. In
this temper they began to plunder and commit havoc wherever they went;
and the officers, many of whom already murmured at the rapidity of
the retreat, and were discontented with the total silence which the
Commander-in-chief maintained respecting his future measures, did not
exert themselves as they ought to have done, to prevent these excesses.
♦PASSAGE OF THE EZLA.
DEC. 26.♦
Sir David Baird, who took the shorter line to Astorga, by way of
Valencia de S. Juan, effected his march without molestation. The sick
and wounded, following the same track, halted at the latter place, to
pass the night. Hardly had they been provided with the necessary food,
and laid to rest, before the alarm was sounded, and they were again
hurried into the waggons. The night was cold, misty, and exceeding
dark, and the Ezla was to be crossed some little distance from the
town. They were not provided with pontoons. The ford is dangerous,
because of the rapidity of the stream, occasioned by two narrow banks
of shingles, which form an angle in the middle; and at this time the
river was fast rising, from the melting of the snow upon the mountains.
A serjeant’s guard had been left by Sir David on the opposite bank, to
assist the waggons in passing, and skuttle two ferry-boats, when they
had effected their passage. They kindled a fire with grass and rushes,
for the sake of its light, but the materials were wet, and the wind
soon extinguished it. A Spanish muleteer attempted to guide them over
the ford: his mule tripped in the mid stream, he was thrown, and saved
by a soldier, when just in the act of sinking. Perilous, however, as
the ford was, the passage was accomplished, without other loss than
that of some baggage-waggons, which broke down.
♦GENERAL ORDERS ISSUED AT BENEVENTE.♦
Sir John Moore, meantime, with the other division of the army, reached
Benevente, and there found it necessary to issue general orders,
♦DEC. 27.♦ which reflected severely upon the conduct both of his men
and officers. “The misbehaviour of the column which had marched by
Valderas exceeded,” he said, “what he could have believed of British
soldiers. He could feel no mercy towards officers who neglected, in
times like these, essential duties, nor towards soldiers who disgraced
their country, by acts of villany towards the people whom they were
sent to protect.” Alluding then to the discontent which was manifested
at the hurry of the retreat, and the mystery which was thrown over
their proceedings, he said, “it was impossible for the General to
explain to his army the motives of the movements which he directed;
he could, however, assure them, that he had made none since he left
Salamanca which he did not foresee, and was not prepared for; and, as
far as he was a judge, they had answered the purposes for which they
were intended. When it was proper to fight a battle he would do it,
and he would choose the time and place which he thought most fit. In
the meantime, he begged the officers and men to attend diligently to
discharge _their_ parts, and leave to _him_, with the general officers,
the decision of measures which belonged to them alone.” Strong as this
language was, it had no effect, and the havoc which had been committed
at Valderas was renewed at Benevente. The castle there is one of the
finest monuments of the age of chivalry; we have nothing in England
which approaches to its grandeur: Berkley, Raby, even Warwick and
Windsor are poor fabrics in comparison. With Gothic grandeur, it has
the richness of Moorish decoration; open galleries, where Saracenic
arches are supported by pillars of porphyry and granite; cloisters,
with fountains playing in their courts; jasper columns and tesselated
floors, niches, alcoves, and seats in the walls, over-arched in various
forms, and enriched with every grotesque adornment of gold and silver,
and colours which are hardly less gorgeous. It belonged to the Duke
of Ossuna; and the splendour of old times was still continued there.
The extent of this magnificent structure may be estimated from this
circumstance, that two regiments, besides artillery, were quartered
within its walls. They proved the most destructive enemies that had
ever entered them: their indignant feelings broke out again in acts of
wanton mischief; and the officers, who felt and admired the beauties
of this venerable pile, attempted in vain to save it from devastation.
Every thing combustible was seized, fires were lighted against the
fine walls, and pictures of unknown value, the works, perhaps, of the
greatest Spanish masters, and of those other great painters who left
so many of their finest productions in Spain, were heaped together as
fuel. The archives of the family fortunately escaped.
♦AFFAIR OF CAVALRY ON THE EZLA.♦
The soldiers had, however, here an opportunity of displaying a spirit
more becoming them as ♦DEC. 28.♦ Englishmen. Soon after the rear of
the army had marched into the town, an alarm was given that the enemy
were on the opposite heights. In an instant all was on the alert;
every man hastened to his place of rendezvous; the cavalry poured
out of the gates: ... the plain in the opposite direction was covered
with fugitives, and the streets were filled with women bewailing their
fate, and calling upon the Saints and the Virgin for protection. The
French, seeing with what alacrity they would be encountered, looked
at our men from the heights, and retired. It was ♦DEC. 29.♦ towards
evening, and as the enemy were so near, orders were given to destroy
the bridge. This was effected about daybreak the following morning;
and it was supposed that their progress was for a while impeded. The
troops again continued their retreat, and the whole of the infantry
and heavy artillery had departed, when intelligence arrived that the
French were again appearing, and that their cavalry were in the act
of passing the Ezla: ... they had found a ford about three hundred
yards below the bridge. Lord Paget and General Stewart were still in
the town. The picquets of the night, under Lieutenant-Colonel Otway
and Major Bagwell, were sent down; the cavalry were ordered to repair
to their alarm posts; and many volunteers came forward. Lord Paget
hastened to the spot: he found four squadrons of imperial guards
already formed and skirmishing with the picquets; other cavalry were
in the act of passing. The 10th Hussars were sent for: as soon as they
arrived, General Stewart placed himself at the head of the picquets,
and charged the enemy. The French gave way, and repassed the ford
more expeditiously than they had crossed it. They formed again on the
other side, and threatened a second attempt; but three pieces of
horse artillery, which now came up, were stationed near the bridge,
and opened a fire upon them, that did considerable execution. About
seventy prisoners were taken; among them General Lefebvre Desnouettes,
Commander of the imperial guard of cavalry. The loss of the enemy could
not be ascertained: it was variously guessed, from 60 to 200. Ours was
about 50 in killed and wounded. It was reported that Buonaparte was on
the heights during this action.
♦SIR JOHN MOORE REACHES ASTORGA.♦
The ardour of the French was manifestly damped by this fresh proof of
British valour; and they continued their pursuit at such respectful
distance, that the rear of the army, which had been engaged with
them, reached Bañeza ♦DEC. 30.♦ that night unmolested. The next day
the Commander-in-chief reached Astorga. This was the rallying point,
and here they found about 5000 men of Romana’s army. That army was
literally half naked and half starved; a malignant typhus fever
was raging among them, and sixty or seventy were sent daily to the
hospitals. About this number, however, were fit for service. Romana
arrived there the same day. The first intimation that the French were
advancing to interpose between Portugal and the British army had
been received from him; but it was his opinion that that information
ought to have produced no change in Sir John Moore’s intentions. The
intended attack, he thought, ought still to have been made; Soult
might have been beaten in time to fall upon the corps which was
coming to reinforce him, and by the success which prompt and vigorous
measures would have ensured, they should have become masters of Leon
and Castille. To his utter astonishment he now found that there was
no intention of making a stand at Astorga, part of the British army
being already on the way to Villa Franca, and a regiment of cavalry all
that was left on the side of Bañeza. He went therefore to the British
Commander, and represented to him the propriety of facing the enemy
where they were, a point from whence they had always a secure retreat
by the passes of Manzanal and Foncebadon, ... passes so strong that a
small force might maintain them against any numbers. He represented
to him also, that the park of artillery was at Ponferrada, where also
the hospitals were established, and there were magazines of corn; that
in Villa Franca there were more than 2000 sick, with hospital stores
and depôts of arms, and therefore it was of the utmost consequence to
defend the Bierzo. But Sir John Moore replied, that he had determined
upon retiring into Galicia, because his troops required rest. He
desired that the high road of Manzanal might be left to him, saying,
he would defend that and the principal entrance to Galicia by Villa
Franca; and that Romana might take the Foncebadon pass, and enter by
way of the Val de Orras and Puebla ♦HONOURABLE CONDUCT OF ROMANA AND
HIS ARMY.♦ de Sanabria. And here a proof of Spanish magnanimity was
given by these half armed, half naked, and half famished men, for such
they literally were. A malignant fever was raging among them, and
long fatigue, privations, and disease, made them appear more like an
ambulatory hospital than an army. Under such circumstances it might
have been supposed they would have sought to secure their retreat under
protection of the British to Coruña and Ferrol. But Romana and his
forlorn band were too high-minded to attach themselves as a burden upon
those allies with whom they had so lately expected to co-operate in
honourable and hopeful enterprise; and they assented without hesitation
to the British General’s desire. Romana only requested that the British
troops might no longer be permitted to commit disorders which even in
an enemy’s country ought never to be allowed; it must have been painful
indeed for Sir John Moore to have heard of such excesses, and still
more painful to feel, that in a retreat so hasty as this was intended
to be, it was impossible to prevent them.
♦SIR JOHN MOORE PURSUES HIS RETREAT.♦
The troops had been assured, at Benevente, that they were not falling
back upon Coruña, but that their march was only to secure a more
favourable position: ... no affirmations could make the soldiery
believe this: and when Sir John Moore reached Astorga, and issued
his orders, it was too manifest that they were not retreating, but
flying, before the enemy. Ammunition waggons were burnt here, and
an entire depôt of entrenching tools abandoned, so that the army
was thus deprived of a most important means of impeding the enemy’s
progress. The position at Villa Franca, which the Commander-in-chief
had formerly mentioned in his dispatches, was no longer thought of.
Two brigades under General Craufurd, were detached, by way of Orense,
to Vigo, to which port Sir John had ordered empty transports to be
sent for him, supposing it to be the best point of embarkation. This
detachment preceded Romana in the line which he expected was to have
been left for him; and when he and his forlorn band, after halting
only one night, took their way toward Orense, they found the country
stripped of the means of subsistence upon which they had reckoned.
General Fraser and his division were immediately sent forward, with
orders to proceed to Lugo; he was followed by General Hope and Sir
David Baird, and their instructions were to make forced marches to the
coast. “With respect to me and the British troops,” said the Commander,
in his official letter, “it has come to that point which I have long
foreseen.... From a desire to do what I could, I made the movement
against Soult: as a diversion, it has answered completely; but as there
is nothing to take advantage of it, I have risked the loss of the army
for no purpose. I have no option now but to fall down to the coast
as fast as I am able.... We must all make forced marches, from the
scarcity of provisions, and to be before the enemy, who, by roads upon
our flanks, may otherwise intercept us.”
It appears evident, from these expressions, that Sir John Moore was
not well informed of the nature of the country through which he was
about to retreat. Westward of Astorga, two great ♦THE BIERZO.♦ ranges
of mountains trend from north to south: Puerto del Rabanal, Cruz de
Ferro, and Foncebadon, are those of the eastern branch; those of the
western are the Puerto del Cebrero, Puerto del Courel, and Puerto
del Aguiar; they meet, on the south, with the Sierra de Sanabria,
the Sierra de Cabrera, and the Montes Aquilianos. The tract which
these mountains enclose is called the Bierzo: from summit to summit
it is about sixteen leagues from north to south, and about fourteen
from east to west. The whole waters of this amphitheatre have but one
opening; they are collected into the river Sil, and pass, through a
narrow gorge, into the Val de Orras, in Galicia.... The centre is a
plain of about four square leagues. There is scarcely in Europe a more
lovely tract of country, certainly no where a more defensible one. The
main road, one of the finest in Europe, is that of Manzanal; that of
Foncebadon also leads into the Bierzo; there is no third ingress, and
from Villa Franca toward Coruña the only way is that of the Puerto
Cebrero; both the former passes lead along defiles, where, as Romana
observed three months before this miserable retreat, a thousand men
might stop the march of twenty times their number: and beyond Villa
Franca there is no lateral road. Sir David Baird’s army had travelled
this road; they supposed that it could not possibly be intended to
fall back beyond that point. But the Commander saw no security till
he should reach the coast; there he hoped to find transports ready,
or to take up some defensible position till they arrived. The same
difficulties which affected him must affect his pursuers. It was not
probable that all the numbers which were now marching against him
would follow him the whole way; and once on the coast, it was his
determination not to be molested by any thing like an equal force: ...
“it is only while retreating,” said he, “that we are vulnerable.” His
sole object now was to bring off the army, ... to effect this he had
already destroyed great part of the ammunition and military stores, and
now left behind many of the sick.
♦DISORDERS COMMITTED BY THE TROOPS.♦
The mountain-tops were covered with heavy clouds, and the roads
knee-deep in snow. Provisions, in a country where the natives are not
rich enough at any time to lay by a store, can never be abundant, and
what there were, had already been exhausted by the repeated march
of troops, English and Spaniards. The little order with which such
food as could be found was issued out, occasioned waste, and thereby
increased the evil. The men, half famished, half frozen, and altogether
desperate, were no longer in any subordination. They forced their way
into the houses where their rations should have been served, seized
it by force, frequently spilling the wine, and destroying more than
they could carry away. This was not all: ... pillage could not be
prevented. Houses and villages were burning in all directions; but when
they thus acted as enemies, they were treated as such; and many of them
were put to death by the peasantry, in revenge, or in self-defence.
♦BUONAPARTE STOPS AT ASTORGA.♦
Buonaparte pursued in person no farther than Astorga: he left Marshal
Ney with 18,000 men to keep that part of the country in subjection; and
assigned to Marshal Soult, with 23,000, what he called the “glorious
mission of destroying the English army, ... pursuing them to their
point of embarkation, and driving them into the sea.” Marshal Soult’s
was an easy task: he had only to follow the English just close enough
to keep them at the pace at which they set out, and not come near
enough to make them turn and stand at bay; fatigue would do his work
more surely than the sword. From Astorga to Villa Franca del Bierzo
is fifteen leagues, about sixty English miles; the road for the first
four leagues is up the mountain, but through an open country. Having
reached the summit of Foncebadon, you enter into some of the strongest
passes in Europe. It would scarcely be possible for an invading army to
force their way here, against a body of determined men. These passes
continue between two and three leagues, nearly to the village of Torre;
from thence, through Benvibre and Ponferrada, nothing can be finer than
the country, and the circle of mountains which binds it in. But never,
in the most melancholy ages of Spanish history, had a more miserable
scene ♦1809. JANUARY.♦ been represented, than was now to be witnessed
here. The horses of the retreating army began to fail, and this, in
great measure, for want of shoes and shoe-nails. There was no want of
iron to hammer new ones: there are iron-works near Villa Franca, and
enough might have been procured, had there been time allowed. As soon
as these noble animals foundered, they were shot, lest the enemy should
profit by them. The rain continued pouring, ... the baggage was to be
dragged, and the soldiers were to wade through half-melted snows, ...
the feet of the men as well as of the beasts began to fail, ... more
waggons were left behind, ... more ammunition destroyed along the way;
and when the troops reached Villa Franca, they were in such a state,
that several experienced officers predicted, if this march against time
were persevered in, a fourth of the army would be left in the ditches,
before it was ♦JAN. 2.♦ accomplished. More magazines and carriages
were here destroyed. Some of the men abandoning themselves now, as
knowing that if they proceeded they must die of cold, hunger, and
weariness; they got into the wine cellars, and, giving way to desperate
excess, were found dead when the French entered the town. When the
General marched with the reserve from Benvibre, he left a detachment
to cover the town, while parties were sent to warn the stragglers of
their danger, and drive them out of the houses, ... for the place
was filled with them, near a thousand men of the preceding divisions
having remained there, all abandoned to despair, and most of them to
drunkenness. A few were prevailed upon to move on; the greater number
were deaf to threats, and insensible to danger, till the rear-guard was
compelled to march. A small detachment of cavalry still covered them,
and did not quit the town till the enemy approached, and then the road
was filled with stragglers, armed and unarmed, mules, carts, women, and
children.... Four or five squadrons of French cavalry compelled the
detachment in the rear to retire, and pursued them closely for several
miles, till General Paget, with the reserve, repulsed the pursuers. As
the French dragoons galloped through the long line of these wretched
stragglers, they slashed them with their swords to the right and left,
... the men being so insensible with liquor that they neither attempted
to resist nor get out of the road. Some of these men having found their
way to the army, mangled as they were, were paraded through the ranks,
to show their comrades the miserable consequence of drunkenness at such
a time.
♦SKIRMISH AT CACABELOS.♦
The Spaniards at Villa Franca would not believe that the French were
advancing; through so strong a country, and in so severe a season, they
thought it was impossible. Sir John Moore, however, well knew that he
was pursued, and he was afraid of halting, lest the enemy should get in
his rear, and intercept him at Lugo; an apprehension which could not
have been entertained, had he been acquainted with the country. The
troops, therefore, were hurried on: the artillery and head-quarters
went foremost; General Baird’s column, and the cavalry, under Lord
Paget, covered the rear. The advanced guard of the enemy, under General
Colbert, were close at their heels: Merle’s division joined them on
♦JAN. 3.♦ the 3d, and on the afternoon of that day they ventured to
attack the rear-guard at Cacabelos. They were repulsed by the dragoons
and riflemen. General Colbert received a ball in his forehead, and
fell; he was an officer of great promise, and of so fine a person, that
Canova is said to have called him the modern Antinous. Having thus once
more shown the enemy what they could do in battle, the rear of the
army, reluctantly and almost broken-hearted, continued their retreat.
♦RETREAT CONTINUED FROM VILLA FRANCA.♦