BUONAPARTE ENTERS SPAIN. DEFEAT OF THE SPANISH ARMIES. SURRENDER OF
MADRID. THE SPANIARDS ENDEAVOUR TO RALLY AT CUENCA, AND ON THE
TAGUS.
♦1808. OCTOBER.♦
An old prophecy was at this time circulated in Paris, importing that
the disasters which would lead to the overthrow of the French empire
were to originate in Spain. It had probably been sent abroad in the
days of Louis XIV. when his designs upon that kingdom were first
manifested, and the resistance which they would provoke from the powers
of Europe was foreseen. The persons by whom it was now reproduced
apprehended ♦PASLEY ON THE MILITARY POLICY OF GREAT BRITAIN, P.
34.♦ that the English would land a strong force in the north of the
peninsula, so as to cut off the French armies from their communication
with Bayonne. Like all desponding or discontented politicians, they
overrated the wisdom and the power of the enemy. If indeed, when an
expedition was sent to Portugal, this had been done at the same time,
the issue can hardly be deemed doubtful. We had disciplined soldiers,
ships to transport them, and means of every kind in abundance; but
vigour was wanting in our councils, and in offensive war we had every
thing to learn. It was, however, intended that an army little short
of 40,000 men should take the field with the Spaniards; and had such
an army been in the field, under an able and enterprising commander,
subsequent events have given an Englishman right to affirm, that no
force which could have been brought against it in one point, would have
been able to defeat it. But this intention was frustrated as much by
the precipitance of the Spaniards as by the dilatoriness of the British
movements.
♦MOVEMENTS AGAINST BLAKE’S ARMY.♦
By the latter end of October not less than 100,000 troops had crossed
the Pyrenees from the side of Bayonne, to reinforce their countrymen.
The head-quarters were at Vitoria, where they had continued since
Joseph arrived there on his flight from Madrid. The left wing, under
Marshal Moncey, Duke of Cornegliano, was posted along the banks of
the Aragon and the Ebro, having its head-quarters at Tafalla; Marshal
Ney, Duke of Elchingen, had his head-quarters at Guardia; Marshal
Bessieres, Duke of Istria, at Miranda, with a garrison at Pancorbo;
Marshal Lefebvre, Duke of Dantzic, occupied the heights of Durango,
and defended the heights of Mondragon from the threatened attack of
the Spaniards. Blake had posted the main body of his army in front
of Lefebvre’s force, and occupied with the rest the debouches of
Villarcayo, Orduña, and Munguia. He hoped that the Asturian General,
Azevedo, would cut off the communication between Durango and Vitoria
by Ochandiano, and that, by possessing himself of the heights of
Mondragon, and thus getting in the rear of the enemy’s advanced guard,
he might be enabled to strike a great blow. The plan was good, if it
could have been executed in time; but Blake persisted in it after he
knew that the French had received strong reinforcements. Some trifling
advantages, and the confidence of the Spanish character, encouraged
him to this imprudence, by which he exposed himself to be entirely cut
off. It was Buonaparte’s intention to take the advantage which was thus
offered him; and Lefebvre therefore had been ordered to content himself
with keeping the Spaniards in check till the Emperor should arrive;
but his flanks were so much annoyed by Blake, that this delay became
inconvenient, and on the last day of October the French attacked him.
After a long and well-contested action of nine hours the Spaniards
retreated in good order by Bilbao and Valmaseda to Nava, without losing
colours or prisoners. No artillery had been used, the country being
too mountainous for it. The enemy entered Bilbao the next day; and the
corps of Marshal Victor, Duke of Belluno, arriving at this time, was
directed by Munguia and Amurrio to Valmaseda, to fall upon the flank of
the Galician army.
♦BLAKE FALLS BACK TO ESPINOSA.
1808. NOVEMBER.♦
Blake’s intention had been to fall back till he could concentrate his
whole force; but the second division, and a part of the Asturians under
Azevedo, had their communication cut off; and as the French were
strengthening themselves at Arancadiaga and Orrantia to prevent the
junction, he prepared to attack them. They retreated during the night
of the 4th; but on the following day a division of his army came up
with 7000 of the enemy near Valmaseda, and drove them from thence with
considerable loss. Having thus effected the junction, he attacked the
enemy again on the 7th at Gueñes, and turned their left wing, but his
own centre was unable to advance; and perceiving that the French had
received very considerable reinforcements that day from Bilbao, his own
men too being exhausted by hunger and fatigue, he deemed it prudent to
retire to Espinosa de los Monteros, where he hoped to refresh and feed
his men, and draw artillery and supplies from Reynosa. Seldom indeed
have any troops endured greater hardships. From the 23rd of October
they had been continually in the open air, among the mountains of
Biscay, during rainy nights and the most inclement weather: they were
all without hats, great part of them half clothed, and barefooted, and
they had been six days without bread, wine, or spirits; indeed, without
any other supply of food than the sheep and cattle which were to be
found among the mountains. There had been a considerable desertion
among the young recruits; but from those who remained not a murmur was
heard under all these privations: they manifested no other wish than
that the sacrifice of their lives might contribute to the destruction
of the enemy, and the deliverance of Spain.
♦BATTLE OF ESPINOSA.♦
The system of the French was to beat this army down, as their
increasing numbers enabled them to do, by repeated attacks. Blake
intended to remain some days at Espinosa, for the purpose of giving
his men some rest. But having arrived on the 9th, his rear-guard,
under the Conde de San Roman, one of the officers who had escaped
from the Baltic, was attacked on the following day, by a far superior
force. He immediately posted his army in front of the town; Azevedo,
with the Asturians and the first division, on a height to the left,
covering the road to S. Andero; the second division on a hill to the
right; the third and the reserve in the centre. The van-guard was
posted on a little hill close in the rear of the centre, with six
four-pounders. The enemy were successful in their first attack, and
drove the Spaniards from a wood which they had occupied; they returned,
however, to the charge, being reinforced with the third division, and
the action became general, except on the left of the Spanish position.
It continued for three hours, till evening closed in; and Blake thought
the advantage was on his side, though the enemy had gained possession
of a wood and ridge of hill in front of his centre and right. The
contest had been very severe, and a very great proportion of the
Spanish officers had fallen, San Roman among them, and the Galician
General Riquelme, both mortally wounded. The men lay on their arms
that night, and Victor, who commanded in this battle, brought up fresh
troops from his rear to the ridge. At daybreak, when the main attention
of the Spaniards was drawn towards this point, he made his great attack
upon their left, commencing it with a strong body of sharp-shooters;
they were twice repulsed; meantime one of their large columns, under
General Maison, came up and formed in line; the sharp-shooters, being
reinforced, returned to the charge, and General Ruffin, with his
division, attacked the centre. There the enemy were well resisted; but
on the left they succeeded, owing, in great part, it appears, to the
system which on this and the preceding day was practised, of marking
out the officers. Azevedo, and the two Asturian Generals who were next
in command, fell; this threw the men into confusion, and when they saw
themselves cut off from the road to S. Andero, and that the French
were advancing to occupy a height in rear of the town which commands
the road to Reynosa, they gave way, and nothing remained but to order
a general retreat. They had to retire by a bridge over the Trueba and
a defile; and instead of attempting to save the guns, which would
necessarily have impeded the retreat of the army, Blake thought it
better to employ them till the last moment; this was done with great
effect, and they were spiked when the enemy was close to them.
Blake was one of those men who would have been thought worthy of the
chief command if they had never been trusted with it. His talents
were considerable; he understood the theory of his profession well,
and could plan an action or a campaign with great ability; but he
was deficient in that promptitude and presence of mind which are
the first qualifications of a commander. His own game he could play
skilfully, but when the adversary disconcerted it by some unexpected
movement, he was incapable of forming new dispositions to meet
the altered circumstances. By persisting against a superior and
continually increasing force in operations which had been calculated
against an inferior one, he exposed himself to the imminent hazard
of being entirely cut off; and by advancing so far into a country
which had been stripped of its provisions, and with no commissariat
to follow him, he exhausted his men. Under every privation he indeed
set them an example of cheerfulness, and let them see that he fared
as hardly as themselves; but this could not counteract the effects
of inanition. They were in a state of famine when they arrived at
Espinosa, and would have found nothing there to relieve them if 250
mules, laden with biscuits, had not most opportunely arrived, sent by
Major-General Leith, who was forwarding partial supplies toward them
by every possible way. But men thus hungered, and enfeebled also by
long continued exposure to cold and rain, were ill fitted for close
action, in which much depended upon personal strength. Another and
more lamentable error was, that the troops from the Baltic, the only
thoroughly disciplined part of his force, were brought into action
after the first defeat, and exposed by single battalions to bear the
brunt of every conflict; and thus they were sacrificed in detail,
giving melancholy proof, by the devoted courage with which they stood
their ground, of what they could have effected, if, as a body, they had
been brought into some fair field of battle.
♦DISPERSION OF BLAKE’S ARMY AT REYNOSA.♦
Blake attempted with the remains of his army to make a stand at
Reynosa; his principal magazine and his park of artillery were there;
it is one of the strongest positions in that strong country, and
had it been occupied in time, the event of the campaign might have
been different. But the forlorn hope of collecting his scattered
forces there was soon defeated. Victor was pursuing him closely from
Espinosa; Lefebvre from the side of Villarcayo. And from the side of
Burgos, where a fatal blow had now been struck, Marshal Soult, Duke
of Dalmatia, marched upon Reynosa. No alternative was left him but to
retreat toward S. Andero, and the dispersion was so complete, that
there no longer remained any force on this side to oppose the enemy.
Yet in justice to this ill-fated army it should be said, that no men
ever behaved more gallantly, nor with more devoted patriotism. Without
cavalry, half clothed, almost without food, they fought battle after
battle against troops always superior in number, and whose losses were
always filled up with reinforcements. Nor did any circumstance of
disgrace attend their defeat; there was no capitulation, no surrender
of large bodies, or of strong places; the ground on which they fought
was won by the French, and that was all, as long as any body of the
Spaniards remained together. The magazines at Reynosa now fell into
their hands, and they entered S. Andero. ♦NOV. 16.♦ The Bishop saved
himself in an English ship, and General Riquelme expired as his men
were lifting him on board. They had borne him thither from Espinosa;
for, routed as they were, they would not leave him to die in the hands
of the enemy. Here, and in some of the smaller ports, the French found
a considerable booty of English goods.
♦BUONAPARTE ARRIVES IN SPAIN.♦
When Buonaparte arrived in Spain he was not pleased at finding that
Lefebvre had opened the campaign; his hope had been to march a strong
force in the rear of Blake’s army, and thus place it in a situation
where it must either have been destroyed or have laid down its arms.
In crossing the mountains near Mondragon he had nearly lost one of his
favourite Generals, Marshal Lasnes, Duke of Montebello; the ground was
covered with frozen snow, his horse fell with him, and in attempting to
rise fell on him. He was carried to Vitoria in a state of great danger,
his body covered with those discolorations which show that the small
vessels of the skin are ruptured, the abdomen swoln, the extremities
cold, suffering acute pain, and with all the symptoms of inflammation
in the intestines, from the shock and the pressure. M. Larrey, who
attended Buonaparte in all his campaigns, had learnt a remedy from the
savages of Newfoundland, applied by them to some sailors whose boat had
been broken to pieces and themselves dashed by the waves upon their
coast. A large sheep having been first stunned by a blow on the neck,
was immediately flayed, the reeking skin was sown round the Marshal’s
body, while his limbs were wrapped in warm flannels, and some cups of
weak tea were given him. He felt immediate relief, complaining only of
a painful sense of formication, and of the manner in which the skin
seemed to attract every part wherewith it was in contact. In the course
of ten minutes he was ♦LARREY, CAMPAGNES ET MEMOIRES, T. III. 243–246.♦
asleep. When he awoke, after two hours, the body was streaming with
perspiration, the dangerous symptoms were relieved, and on the fifth
day he was able to mount on horseback and follow the army.
♦DEFEAT OF THE EXTREMADURAN ARMY AT BURGOS.♦
Buonaparte reached the head-quarters at Vitoria on the 8th, and
immediately pushed forward a corps under Soult against the Extremaduran
army in his front. Bessieres commanded the cavalry, which had before
proved so fatal to the Spaniards at Rio Seco, and which had now been
greatly reinforced. This army, under the Conde de Belveder, had been
intended to support Blake, and keep up a communication between his
army and that of Castaños. It consisted of about 13,000 men; and their
Commander, a young man, although aware that a superior force was
advancing against him, waited for the attack in an open ♦NOV. 10.♦
position at Gamonal. He had with him some of the Walloon and Spanish
guards, and a few regiments of the line; the rest were new levies, and
among them a corps of students, volunteers from Salamanca and Leon.
These youths, the pride and the hope of many a generous family, were in
the advanced guard. They displayed that courage which might be looked
for in men of their condition, and at that time of life: twice they
repulsed the French infantry, and when Bessieres with the horse came
upon their flank, fell almost to a man where they had been stationed.
The loss in killed was estimated at 3000, nearly a fourth of this brave
army; the victorious cavalry entered Burgos with the fugitives, and
the city, which was entirely forsaken by its inhabitants, was given up
to be plundered. Bessieres pursued Count Belveder, while Soult turned
aside toward Reynosa, to complete the destruction of Blake’s army. One
corps of the French marched upon Palencia, another upon Lerma; from
the latter place the Count retreated to Aranda; there also Bessieres
pursued, and the wreck of the army collected at Segovia; the piquets
of the French were now upon the Douro, and their cavalry covered the
plains of Castille.
♦PROCLAMATION EXCLUDING CERTAIN SPANIARDS FROM PARDON.♦
On the second day after the defeat of the Extremaduran army Buonaparte
established his head-quarters at Burgos, and issued a proclamation,
granting, in the Intruder’s name, a pardon to all Spaniards who,
within one month after his arrival at Madrid, should lay down their
arms, and renounce all connexion with England. Neither the members
of the Juntas nor the general officers were excepted: but wishing,
he said, to mark those, who, after having sworn fidelity to Joseph
Buonaparte, had violated that oath; and who, instead of employing
their influence to enlighten the people, had only used it to mislead
them: wishing also that the punishment of great offenders might serve
as an example in future times to all those, who, being placed at the
head of nations, instead of directing them with wisdom and prudence,
should mislead them into disorders and popular tumults, and precipitate
them into misfortunes and war: for these reasons he excepted from
this amnesty the Dukes of Infantado, Hijar, Medina Celi, and Ossuna,
the Marques de Santa Cruz, Counts Fernan Nunez and Altamira, the
ex-Minister of State Cevallos, and the Bishop of S. Andero; declaring
them traitors to the two crowns of France and Spain, and decreeing
that they should be seized, brought before a military commission, and
shot. Those persons who had sworn homage to the Intruder, compulsory as
that homage was, had unquestionably exposed themselves to its possible
consequences: they had been forced into a situation in which the
only alternative was to become traitors to him, or traitors to their
country: but by what law or what logic were they traitors to France,
a country to which they owed no allegiance, and with which they had
contracted no obligation?
♦MOVEMENTS AGAINST CASTAÑOS.♦
From Burgos Marshals Ney and Victor were dispatched with their
divisions to act on the rear of Castaños, and cut off his retreat,
while Lasnes, with 30,000 men, should attack him in front. This last
remaining army of the Spaniards is represented by the French as
consisting of 80,000 men, of whom three-fourths were armed. But the
nominal force of the conjoined armies under Castaños and Palafox was
only 65,000, and the effective soldiers hardly more than half that
amount. Many of the Andalusian troops had returned to their homes
after the first success, and many more had remained at Madrid, so that
though some thousands (mostly from Valencia) had joined Castaños, his
force was little more numerous than it had been at Baylen. His own
opinion was decidedly against risking an action in which there could
be no reasonable hope of advantage; but the commissioner, D. Francisco
Palafox, to whom the power of overruling the General had been madly
entrusted by the Central Junta, determined that a battle should be
fought, and Castaños therefore was compelled to fight, lest he should
be stigmatized as a traitor, and murdered by his own men, or torn to
pieces by a mob. Already the Conde de Montijo, who left the army at
this time, was every where accusing him of treachery, because he had
warmly opposed a determination, the fatal consequences of which he
certainly foresaw.
♦BATTLE OF TUDELA.♦
The plan of the French against this army was the same as that which
they had practised against Blake’s; they meant to rout it by a
powerful attack in front, and to destroy the fugitives by intercepting
them with a second force in their flight. Their destruction was
considered to be as certain as their defeat, but Ney was less
expeditious in his movements than had been calculated; and Castaños
hearing on the 21st that this corps was advancing upon Soria, while
Lasnes and Moncey approached from the side of Logroño and Lodosa,
abandoned Calahorra and fell back upon Tudela. On the 22d Lasnes
entered Calahorra and Alfaro, and at daybreak on the following morning
he found the Spaniards drawn up in seven divisions, with their right
before Tudela, and their left extending along a line of from four
to five miles upon a range of easy heights. The Aragonese, who had
joined only a few hours before by forced marches, were on the right,
the Valencians and the troops of New Castille in the centre, the
Andalusians on the left. Their line was covered by forty pieces of
artillery. Situations were chosen by the enemy for planting sixty
pieces against them; but upon seeing their own relative strength, and
the confusion which was observable among the Spaniards, they preferred
a more summary mode of attack. General Maurice Mathieu, with a division
of infantry, forced the Spanish centre; and General Lefebvre, with the
cavalry, passing through, wheeled to the left, and coming in the rear
of the Aragonese, at a time when that wing, having withstood an attack,
supposed itself victorious, the fate of the battle was decided. At the
same time Lagrange, with his division, attacked the left; a brave,
and in some part a successful resistance was opposed; and the action,
which began in the morning, was prolonged on this side till darkness
enabled Lapeña’s division to fall back from Cascante to Tarazona,
where the first and third divisions were stationed, and had not been
engaged. There too the second division arrived, which had been ordered
to support Lapeña; but though it received these orders at noon, and
the distance which it had to march was only two leagues, either from
incapacity in the leaders, or want of order, it did not arrive till
night, after the action was decided.
♦RETREAT OF THE DEFEATED ARMY.♦
According to the French 4000 Spaniards fell in this battle, 3000 men,
300 officers, and thirty pieces of cannon were taken, their own loss
not amounting to 500. The right wing, dispersing and escaping how it
could, assembled again at Zaragoza, with some of the central division
also, there to prove that their failure in the field had not been for
want of courage. As soon as the wreck of the left had collected at
Tarazona, Castaños ordered them to begin their march by way of Borja to
Calatayud. It was midnight, and at the moment when they were setting
forward a chapel, which served as a magazine, blew up. Many shells went
off after the explosion; this occasioned an opinion that an enemy’s
battery might be playing upon them, and the Royal Carabineers, in the
midst of the confusion, fancying that the chapel was occupied by the
French, presented themselves sword in hand to charge it. Presently
a cry of treason was set up; it spread rapidly; misfortune in such
times is always deemed a proof of treachery; those troops who had
not been engaged could not understand wherefore they were ordered to
retreat, and at such an hour; a general distrust prevailed; some corps
dispersed, and they who remained together were in a fearful state
of insubordination. They retreated however through Borja and Ricla,
without stopping in either place, and on the night of the 25th reached
Calatayud.
♦THEIR DEPLORABLE CONDITION AT CALATAYUD.♦
On that same day Maurice Mathieu entered Borja in pursuit, ... too
late to make any prisoners. Ney arrived on the day following. He had
been ordered to reach Agreda on the 23d, which, if he had done, the
wreck of this army must have been destroyed; but he found a pretext
for delay in the fatigue of his men, and a cause in the pillage of
Soria. The people of that city, unmindful of the example which the
Numantines had set them upon that very ground, opened their gates to
the enemy. This did not save them from being plundered. Their church,
and their rich wool-factors, afforded good spoil to the French; and
for the sake of this booty, and that he might extort all he could
from the inhabitants, Ney remained there three days, not because his
men had been over-marched. But this delay enabled Castaños to reach
Calatayud. He had thus escaped the danger of immediate pursuit, and men
and officers had leisure now to feel the whole wretchedness of their
situation. There were neither magazines nor stores here; the system of
supplying the troops, which before had been miserably incomplete, was
at an end, and the military chest, containing two million _reales_,
had been conveyed to Zaragoza. Desperate with hunger, the men broke
through all restraint, and the inhabitants fled from their houses,
hardly less dismayed at the temper of their own soldiers than at the
vicinity of the French. The muleteers attached to the baggage and
artillery could obtain no payment, nor food either for their animals
or themselves; such as could find opportunity threw away the baggage,
mounted their beasts, and rode away; others abandoned them altogether,
cursing their ill fortune, and yet glad to escape with their lives. The
soldiers, having nothing else to stay the cravings of hunger, devoured
cabbage leaves, or whatever crude vegetables they could find, and many
literally dropped for want.
♦THEY ARE ORDERED TO APPROACH MADRID.♦
Here Palafox and the Aragonese army expected that Castaños would
have rallied, have made a stand, and, acting on the offensive as
circumstances permitted, have saved Zaragoza from a second siege, or
at least have delayed its evil day. They who formed this expectation
did not reckon upon the activity of the enemy, and imputed to their own
government a promptitude and power which it was far from possessing.
Had the defeat of the central army been apprehended in time, and
measures taken for supporting it, one of the first objects would have
been to have strengthened this point. There had been no such foresight.
The French were in pursuit, and orders arrived from Morla, who was one
of the council of war, requiring Castaños to hasten with his army to
the defence of the capital. He consulted accordingly with the chiefs
of division, and they resolved to march by way of Siguenza; from
whence they might either repair to Somosierra, if that strong position
should still be retained, or to Madrid, if such a movement should be
more advisable. In that direction, therefore, they recommenced their
retreat, after one day’s rest.
♦MEASURES OF THE CENTRAL JUNTA.♦
The Central Junta, mean while, was occupying itself with measures ill
adapted to such times. While Blake’s army was fighting, day after day,
without clothing, without food, and without reinforcements to recruit
its ranks, they passed a decree for the establishment of a special
tribunal, to try all persons accused of treason; its object being not
more to bring such as were guilty to deserved punishment, than to
rescue from suspicion and danger those who were unjustly suspected;
for, under the existing circumstances of Spain, they said, the people
having suffered so much from treachery, would naturally suspect all
those whose conduct it did not fully comprehend. The tribunal, which
was composed of members from each of the great councils of state, was
to have a jurisdiction over persons of all ranks: but not to carry
into execution any sentence of death, confiscation, or dismissal from
office, till they laid the whole case before the Supreme Junta. A
certain number of its members might carry on the ordinary business, but
a writ for the arrest of any person, or the sequestration of his goods,
must be issued by the whole. Especial provisions were made to prevent
secret arrest, or long confinement; and the papers of the accused were
not to be detained, as soon as it was ascertained that they contained
no relation to the matter with which he was charged. No proceedings
were to take place upon anonymous information, nor was any informer
to be admitted, who would not consent to let his name be known. The
humanity of these provisions is in such direct opposition to the
practice of the holy office, that it seems to have been the intention
of the framers of this tribunal to render their state inquisition as
unlike as possible to that curse and disgrace of their country. The
tribunal was particularly charged to inquire into the conduct of those
persons who had gone as deputies to Bayonne, or who had submitted to
the Intruder at Madrid; endeavouring carefully to distinguish between
what was compulsory and what was their own act and deed; and proceeding
with the caution and prudence required, where, on the one hand, the
public safety was at stake, and, on the other, the reputation of
many good and honourable citizens. And when their investigations had
established the innocence of any one, they were to consult with the
Supreme Junta upon the means of restoring to him all the credit and
respectability which he had formerly enjoyed.
By another decree, dated on the day when Castaños was defeated at
Tudela, they resolved that honorary militias should be formed in
all towns which were not in the scene of war, in order to prevent
disorders, and to arrest robbers, deserters, and ill-disposed persons.
A more remarkable measure related to the Ex-Jesuits: their banishment
was repealed, and they were permitted to return to any part of Spain,
and there enjoy their pensions. The reason assigned was, that it was
a miserable thing for them to be expatriated, to live far from their
friends and kin, and be abandoned to the mercy of strangers; that it
was now become difficult to furnish them with the pensions assigned
to them by the crown; and that the sums thus allotted were so much
withdrawn from the circulating specie of the kingdom, to increase that
of foreign and even of hostile countries. This late act of humanity to
the poor survivors of an injured community, is not at any time to be
censured; but it is extraordinary that at such a time it should have
occupied the attention of the Junta.
Of these measures, all would have been unexceptionable, and even
praise-worthy, had they been well-timed; but the Central Junta still
pursued the fatal system of deceiving the people as to the extent
and imminence of their danger. They addressed a proclamation to the
inhabitants of Madrid, saying, that they had taken all the measures in
their power for defeating the enemy, ♦NOV. 21.♦ who, continuing his
attacks, had advanced to the neighbourhood of Somosierra; and that the
number of the French there hardly amounted to 8000 men. The enthusiasm
with which the soldiers were preparing to beat the enemies of their
country, they said, and their confidence in their valour, was not to be
expressed; and the English were ready to march from the Escurial, to
reinforce the position chosen by the able general whom the Junta had
appointed, and to support the operations of the van, who, by that time,
were already engaged with the slaves of the tyrant.
With such representations did the government endeavour to deceive the
people of Madrid, and lull them into a feeling of security, when its
duty was, to have told them the whole extent of their danger, and
manfully roused them to those exertions which the emergency required.
But they themselves still in some degree partook the delusion which
they inspired. Their confidence in the Spanish character was too well
founded ever to be shaken; and they relied, with little reflection,
upon the natural strength of the country. Their present hope was upon
the pass of the Somosierra. D. Benito San Juan, a judicious and able
officer, of high reputation, was stationed there with the remains
of the Extremaduran army, which had with great promptitude been
reinforced. The Junta did not call to mind with how little difficulty
Vedel had forced the stronger passes of the Sierra Morena.
♦PASS OF THE SOMOSIERRA FORCED.♦
Buonaparte continued at Aranda till the 29th, when his head-quarters
were removed to Bocaguillas, a village upon the skirts of the
Somosierra. There he learnt that about 6000 men were entrenched upon
the heights of Sepulveda, and that a stronger body occupied the pass.
The advanced guard was attacked without the success which the French
expected; but the Spaniards, instead of being encouraged by this
advantage, forsook their entrenchments and dispersed. On the following
morning the enemy, under M. ♦NOV. 30.♦ Victor, attempted the pass.
Sixteen pieces of cannon had been well placed to flank the ascent, and
some attempts had been made to break up the road; but this easy means
of defence had been so imperfectly performed, that the pass was won
by a charge of Polish lancers. They were favoured in their approach
by a thick fog; but the Spaniards must have strangely neglected the
advantage of the ground, when they suffered a strong mountain defile
to be taken by a charge of light horse. The men, fancying themselves
betrayed, betrayed themselves by their own fears; they threw away their
arms, and dispersed among the hills, leaving all the artillery and
baggage to the enemy. And now the way to Madrid was open.
During the series of disasters which thus rapidly succeeded each
other, there had been no time for the Junta to think of removing
their residence to the capital, still less for them to take into
consideration, on the appointed day, the plan for forming a Regency,
and convoking the ♦THE CENTRAL JUNTA RETIRE FROM ARANJUEZ.♦ Cortes.
They began now to feel themselves insecure at Aranjuez; ... already
advanced parties of the French had approached the Tagus; wherever they
went there was no armed force to oppose them; they had appeared at
Villarejo on the 28th, on the 30th at Mostoles; and if at this time two
or three hundred horse, with a few infantry, had pushed on to Aranjuez,
they might with perfect ease have surprised the Junta, and by depriving
Spain of its government, have inflicted ♦JOVELLANOS’S MEMORIAL, P. II.
§ 44.♦ upon it a more dangerous injury than all which it had hitherto
suffered in the field. This opportunity was overlooked by Buonaparte;
and the Junta, sensible of their danger when the consequences of the
defeat at Tudela and the rout at Somosierra were known, deliberated
whither to retire. Florida-Blanca, who was sinking under the burthen
of years and the anxieties of his situation, was for removing at once
to Cadiz, and a few others agreed with him. Jovellanos, who added to
his other virtues that of perfect calmness and intrepidity under any
danger, represented that this would be sacrificing too much for safety;
and that the honour of the government, as well as the public service,
required that it should establish itself as near as possible to the
theatre of war. Toledo was named, and rejected, ♦1808. DECEMBER.♦ as
having nothing but its situation to defend it. Cordoba and Seville were
proposed, but liable to the same objection; and Badajoz, which was the
place that Jovellanos advised, was chosen: the provinces every where
were open to the enemy, but Badajoz was a strong place, from whence
the Junta might correspond with the British army, and with that which
Romana was now re-forming in the northern provinces from the dispersed
troops of Blake and the Conde de Belveder. There they could take
measures for raising new armies in Extremadura and Andalusia; and if
the French should overrun those provinces, which there was now nothing
to prevent them from doing, they might thence pass through Portugal to
those northern parts where the founders of the Spanish monarchy had
found an asylum from the Moors; and where its restorers, animated with
the same spirit, might, in like manner, Jovellanos thought, maintain
the independence of their country. They were to halt at Toledo on the
way, and there take such measures as circumstances might require.
♦STATE OF MADRID.♦
Two days before the passage of the Somosierra orders had been given
to arm and embody the people of Madrid. The people were ready and
willing, but this measure had been too long delayed; nevertheless a
permanent Junta was formed, to maintain order, and provide for the
defence of the capital; and the latter object was especially entrusted
to Morla and to the Marques de Castelar. Now indeed was the time for
that city to have emulated Zaragoza, and the spirit was not wanting in
the inhabitants, had there been one commanding mind to have directed
them. Priests and regulars came forward to bear arms, and old men, and
women, and boys offered themselves for the service of their country;
... for this purpose leaving their houses open, and their property
to take its chance, they employed themselves in opening trenches,
erecting batteries, and barricading the streets. The pavements were
torn up, and women and children carried the stones to the tops of the
houses, to be used from thence against the enemy. Parapets were made
on the houses, and the doors stopped with mattresses. Whatever arms
were in the possession of individuals were brought forth, and about
8000 muskets were distributed. The troops who were in the city, and
the armed inhabitants, were now assembled in the Prado, that they
might be distributed to their appointed stations; the first step for
establishing that order without which all efforts in defence of the
city would be ineffectual. Great confusion prevailed, and when the
people called out for cartridges, Morla coolly replied, that there
were none. Happy had it been for Morla, if the indignation which
this proof of negligence excited had been directed against himself;
had he then perished under the hands of the mob, the treachery which
he was preparing would never have been known on earth, and he would
have escaped perpetual infamy. But his character stood so high, that
no ♦MARQUES DE PERALES MURDERED BY THE POPULACE.♦ suspicion pointed
towards him. It happened that among those cartridges which had been
delivered in the morning some were found containing sand instead of
gunpowder; they had probably been made by some dishonest workman, or
mischievous lad; but in such a time of feverish irritation and imminent
danger, the fact was of course imputed to a deep-laid scheme of
treason, and the Marques de Perales was the person upon whom the crime
was laid. The Duque del Infantado was informed that a mob was hastening
toward the house of this unfortunate nobleman, and that he and his
family were in the greatest peril. Infantado himself seems to have
thought there was guilt somewhere; he repaired instantly to the spot,
meaning to deliver over the suspected persons to a proper tribunal, by
which they might be tried; but before he arrived Perales[38] had been
pierced with wounds, and his dead body dragged upon a mat through the
streets, the rabble accompanying it, and exulting in what they believed
his deserved punishment.
♦THE DUQUE DEL INFANTADO SENT TO THE CENTRAL ARMY.♦
The permanent Junta, who held their sittings at the post-office, as
the most central point, taking into consideration the proximity of
their danger, thought that more reliance was to be placed upon succour
from without, than on any exertions of the inhabitants. These persons
were in truth unequal to the arduous situation in which they were
placed; even the example of Zaragoza had not taught them what wonders
might be effected in a civic defence; and they did not consider, that
as the first insurrection, and the consequent massacre at Madrid, had
roused all Spain to arms, a greater impulse would now be given if
the capital opposed a determined resistance. They agreed therefore
to content themselves with such efforts as might prevent the enemy
from instantly forcing the town, and induce him to grant terms of
capitulation. If by this means time could be gained for a diversion to
be effected, or a successful attempt made in their favour, it would be
well; but if not, their minds were subdued to this. They counted upon
succour from San Juan’s troops, many of whom were now arriving, and
they dispatched Infantado to meet the remains of the central army, and
bring it ♦MANIFESTO DEL DUQUE DEL INFANTADO, I. 10.♦ with all speed to
the relief of Madrid. On the 2d of December, therefore, early in the
morning, the Duke set out on this forlorn commission, accompanied by
the Duque de Albuquerque and a small escort.
♦MADRID SUMMONED TO SURRENDER.♦
Only an hour or two after their departure, Bessieres, with the
French cavalry, came within sight of Madrid, and took possession of
the heights. Buonaparte arrived at noon on the same day, being the
anniversary of his coronation. There were not more than 6000 troops in
the city, but there were ten times as many men ready to lay down their
lives in its defence; and the sight of the enemy excited indignation,
not dismay. It was apparent that there was a total want of order among
the people, but that they were in a state of feeling which might render
them truly formidable: the bells of all the churches and convents were
sounding, and from time to time the shouts of the multitude were heard,
and the beat of drums. Preparations had been made which evinced at once
the zeal and the ignorance of those by whom they were directed; the
batteries were so low, that it was easy for the French to plant their
guns where they could completely command them; and they were so near
the wall, that there was scarcely room to work them, and the men would
suffer more by the broken stones than the direct effect ♦INFANTADO,
P. 4.♦ of the enemy’s shot. Buonaparte thought it easier to force the
city than he would have found it; but though insensible to any humane
considerations, policy made him desirous of avoiding that extremity.
Such a catastrophe might inflame the continent as well as Spain, by
proclaiming to all Europe how utterly the Spaniards abhorred the yoke
under which he had undertaken to subject them. An aide-de-camp of
Marshal Bessieres was therefore sent to summon the town in form; he
was seized by the people, and would have been torn to pieces if the
soldiers had not protected him. No communication could be opened that
day with those who wished to deliver up the capital. In the evening the
French infantry came up; arrangements for an attack in the morning
were made by moonlight; and at midnight a Spanish Colonel, who had been
taken at Somosierra, was sent with a letter from M. Berthier, Prince
of Neufchatel, to the Marques de Castelar, exhorting him not to expose
Madrid to the horrors of an assault. Castelar replied, that he must
consult the constituted authorities, and ascertain also how the people
were affected by their present circumstances before he could give an
answer; and he requested a suspension of arms for the ensuing day.
♦MORLA TREATS FOR A CAPITULATION.♦
This reply was sent on the morning of the 3rd. Before it arrived an
attack had been commenced upon the Buen Retiro, the favourite palace
of Philip IV. which had been fortified with some care, as a point
from whence the city might be commanded. Thirty pieces of cannon
soon made a breach in the walls, and the place was carried, after
a thousand Spaniards had fallen in defending it. The other outlets
which had been fortified were won also, but the French were repulsed
from the gates of Fuencarral and Segovia. Some shells were thrown,
in the hope of intimidating the inhabitants. In the forenoon of the
ensuing day Berthier sent in a second summons. “Immense batteries,”
said he, “are mounted, mines are prepared to blow up your principal
buildings, columns of troops are at the entrances of the town, of
which some companies of sharp-shooters have made themselves masters.
But the Emperor, always generous in the course of his victories,
suspends the attack till two o’clock. To defend Madrid is contrary to
the principles of war, and inhuman towards the inhabitants. The town
ought to seek protection for its peaceable inhabitants, and oblivion
for the past.” The firing ceased, and at five in the afternoon Morla
and D. Bernardo Yriarte came out to Berthier’s tent. They assured
him that Madrid was without resources, and that it would be the
height of madness to continue its defence, but that the populace
and the volunteers from the country were determined to persevere in
defending it. They themselves were convinced that this was hopeless,
and requested a pause of a few hours, that they might make the people
understand their real situation.... Hopeless, and without resources,
when threescore thousand men were ready to defend their streets, and
doors, and chambers! This would not have been said if Palafox had been
in Madrid.
♦SPEECH OF BUONAPARTE TO THE DEPUTIES.♦
These unworthy deputies were introduced to Buonaparte, and one of
those theatrical displays ensued in which he delighted to exhibit
himself. “You use the name of the people to no purpose,” said he; “if
you cannot appease them, and restore tranquillity, it is because you
have inflamed them, and led them astray by propagating falsehoods. Call
together the clergy, the heads of convents, the Alcaldes, the men of
property and influence, and let the city capitulate before six in the
morning, or it shall cease to exist. I will not withdraw my troops,
nor ought I to withdraw them. You have murdered the unfortunate
French prisoners who fell into your hands; and only a few days ago
you suffered two persons in the suite of the Russian Ambassador to be
dragged through the streets, and killed, because they were Frenchmen.
The incapacity and the cowardice of a General put into your power
troops who capitulated on the field of battle, and that capitulation
has been violated. You, M. Morla, what sort of an epistle did you write
to that General? Perhaps it becomes you, Sir, to talk of pillage;
you, who, when you entered Roussillon, carried off all the women, and
distributed them as booty among your soldiers. Besides, what right had
you to use such language? the capitulation precluded you from it. See
what has been the conduct of the English, who are yet far from piquing
themselves on being strict observers of the law of nations. They cried
out against the convention of Portugal, but they have fulfilled it.
To violate military treaties is to renounce all civilization; it is
placing generals on a footing with the Bedouins of the desert. How dare
you then presume to solicit a capitulation, you who violated that of
Baylen? See how injustice and ill faith always recoil upon the guilty!
I had a fleet at Cadiz, it was in alliance with Spain, and yet you
directed against it the mortars of the city where you commanded. I had
a Spanish army in my ranks; and rather than disarm it, I would have
seen it embark on board the English ships, and be forced to precipitate
it afterwards down the rocks at Espinosa. I would rather have seven
thousand more enemies to fight than be wanting in honour and good
faith. Return to Madrid. I give you till six o’clock in the morning;
come back at that hour, if you have to announce the submission of the
people; otherwise you and your troops shall be all put to the sword.”
Had there been a Spaniard present to have replied as became him in
behalf of his country, Buonaparte would have trembled at the reply,
like Felix before the Apostle.
♦SURRENDER OF MADRID.♦
The enemy had now been three days before Madrid, and the ardour of
the people was deadened by delay and distrust. Deserted and betrayed
as they were, they knew not in whom to confide, and therefore began
to feel that it behoved every one to provide for his own safety.
During the night the strangers who had come to assist in the defence
of the capital, and such of the inhabitants as had been most zealous
in the national cause, left a scene where they were not allowed to
exert themselves; and at ten o’clock on the morning of the 5th the
French General Belliard took the command of the city. Morla’s first
stipulation was, that the catholic apostolic Roman religion should be
preserved, and no other legally tolerated. No person was to be molested
for his political opinions, or writings, nor for what he had done in
obedience to the former government, nor the people, for the efforts
which they had made in their defence. It was as easy for the tyrant to
grant this, as to break it whenever he might think proper. The fifth
article required that no contributions should be exacted beyond the
ordinary ones. This was granted till the realm should definitely be
organized; and, with the same qualifying reserve, it was agreed, that
the laws, customs, and courts of justice should be preserved. Another
article required, that the French officers and troops should not be
quartered in private houses nor in convents. This was granted with
a proviso, that the troops should have quarters and tents furnished
conformably to military regulations, ... regulations which placed
houses and convents at their mercy. The Spanish troops were to march
out with the honours of war, but without their arms and cannon: the
armed peasantry to leave their weapons, and return to their abodes.
They who had enlisted among the troops of the line within the last four
months were discharged from their engagements, and might return home;
the rest should be prisoners of war till an exchange took place, which,
it was added, should immediately commence between equal numbers, rank
for rank. It was asked that the public debts and engagements should
be faithfully discharged; but this, it was replied, being a political
object, belonged to the cognizance of the assembly of the realm, and
depended on the general administration. The last article stipulated,
that those generals who might wish to continue in Madrid should
preserve their rank, and such as were desirous of quitting it, should
be at liberty so to do. This was granted; but their pay was only to
continue till the kingdom received its ultimate organization.
♦DECREES ISSUED BY BUONAPARTE.♦
Notwithstanding the formality with which the soldiers were included
in this capitulation, very few of them remained to be subject to its
conditions. Castelar and all the military officers of rank refused to
enter into any terms, and, with the main body of the troops and sixteen
guns, marched out of the city on the night of the 4th, and effected
their retreat. The Council of Castille, which had already suffered the
just reproaches of their country, had now to endure the censure of
the tyrant whom they had supported while his power was predominant,
and disowned when the tide turned against him. He issued a decree,
whereby, considering that that Council had shown, in the exercise of
its functions, as much falsehood as weakness, and that, after having
published the renunciation of the Bourbons, and acknowledged the
right of Joseph Buonaparte to the throne, it had had the baseness to
declare that it had signed those documents with secret reservations, he
displaced them, as cowards, unworthy to be the magistrates of a brave
and generous nation. Care, however, was taken to except those who had
been cautious enough not to sign the recantation. At the same time
another decree was passed, abolishing the Inquisition, as incompatible
with the sovereign power, and with the civil authority. Its property
was to be united to the domains of Spain, as a guarantee for the public
debt. A third decree reduced the number of existing convents to
one-third. This was to be effected by uniting the members of several
convents in one; and no novice was to be admitted or professed till the
number of religioners of either sex should be reduced to one-third of
their present amount. All novices were ordered to quit their respective
convents within a fortnight; and those who, having professed, wished
to change their mode of life, and to live as secular ecclesiastics,
were permitted so to do, and a pension secured to them, to be regulated
by their age, but neither exceeding 4000 reales, nor falling short of
3000. From the possessions of the suppressed convents, a sum was to
be set apart sufficient for increasing the proportion of the parish
priests, so that the lowest salary should amount to 2400 reales; the
surplus of this property should be united to the national domains;
half of it appropriated to guarantee the public debt, the other to
reimburse the provinces and cities the expenses occasioned by supplying
the armies, and to indemnify the losses caused by the war. Provincial
custom-houses were abolished, and all seignorial courts of justice;
no other jurisdiction being permitted to exist than the royal courts;
and another decree, premising that one of the greatest abuses in the
finances of Spain arose from the alienation of different branches of
the imposts, which were, in their nature, unalienable, enacted, that
every individual in possession, either by grant, sale, or any other
means, of any portion of the civil or ecclesiastical imposts, should
cease to receive them.
♦PROCLAMATION TO THE SPANIARDS.♦
Buonaparte now addressed a proclamation to the Spaniards. What possible
result, he asked them, could attend even the success of some campaigns?
Nothing but an endless war upon their own soil. It had cost him only a
few marches to defeat their armies, and he would soon drive the English
from the peninsula. Thus, to the rights which had been ceded him by
the princes of the last dynasty, he had added the right of conquest:
that, however, should not make any alteration in his intentions. His
wish was to be their regenerator. All that obstructed their prosperity
and their greatness, he had destroyed; he had broken the chains which
bore the people down; and, instead of an absolute monarchy, had given
them a limited one, with a free constitution. The conclusion of this
proclamation was in a spirit of blasphemy, hitherto confined to the
barbarous countries of Africa or the East. “Should all my efforts,”
said he, “prove fruitless, and should you not merit my confidence,
nothing will remain for me but to treat you as conquered provinces, and
to place my brother upon another throne. I shall then set the crown of
Spain upon my own head, and cause it to be respected by the guilty;
_for God has given me power and inclination to surmount all obstacles_.”
But though Buonaparte had thus easily dispersed the Spanish armies, and
made himself master of Madrid, his triumph was not without alloy. He
now perceived with what utter ignorance ♦CHANGE IN BUONAPARTE’S VIEWS
CONCERNING SPAIN.♦ of the national character he had formed the scheme
of this usurpation, and he complained of having been deceived, when,
in reality, he had turned a deaf ear to all who would have dissuaded
him from his purpose. Till he arrived at Madrid, ♦DE PRADT, 180.♦ the
people, as well as the armies, had disappeared before him; the towns
and cities were abandoned ♦ROCCA, 24, 55.♦ as his troops approached.
Twelve months before there was no other country wherein his exploits
were regarded with such unmingled admiration; they had a character of
exaggerated greatness which suited the Spanish mind, and as he had
always been the ally of Spain, no feeling of hostility or humiliation
existed to abate this sentiment: now, it was not to be disguised from
himself that he was universally detested there as a perfidious tyrant.
But policy, as well as pride, withheld him from receding; unless he
went through with what he had begun, he must confess himself fallible,
and let the world see that his power was not equal to his will, and
then the talisman of his fortune would have been broken. He had
committed the crime and incurred the odium; wherefore then should he
not reap the benefit, and secure the prize, not for a brother, whom he
began to regard with contempt as the mere puppet of his pleasure, but
for himself? This was a feeling which he did not conceal from those who
possessed his confidence; and Joseph, and the unworthy ministers who
had abased themselves to serve him, were made to perceive it, by the
manner in which Napoleon, regardless even of appearances, issued edicts
in his own name, as in a kingdom of his ♦DE PRADT, 222, 225.♦ own. The
obstinacy of the Spaniards in refusing to acknowledge his brother, he
thought, would give him ere long a pretext for treating the country as
his own by right of conquest. Meantime no interval was to be allowed
them for collecting the wreck of their forces to make another stand.
♦RETREAT OF THE CENTRAL ARMY.♦
Three days before the battle of Somosierra, Castaños, with his broken
army, recommenced their retreat from Calatayud. Some ten miles west of
that city, near the village of Buvierca, the high road to Madrid passes
through a narrow gorge, where the river Xalon has forced or found
its way between two great mountain ridges. When D. Francisco Xavier
Venegas, with the rear-guard, consisting of 5000 men, reached this
place, he found instructions from the Commander-in-chief, requesting
him to suspend his march, and take measures for defending the pass,
on which, he said, the safety of the other divisions depended; and
he desired him to place the troops whom he selected for this purpose
under such officers as would volunteer their services, promising to
reward them in proportion to the importance and danger of the duty.
Venegas was too well aware of its importance to trust the command to
any but himself, and he replied, that he would halt there till the
rest of the army was beyond the reach of pursuit. Early on the 29th
the French came up, 8000 in number, under Mathieu. They commenced an
attack at eight o’clock, which continued for eight hours: the Spaniards
suffered severely; but they maintained the pass, and they effectually
disabled this part of the French army from pursuing. On the evening
of the following day the army reached Siguenza with all the artillery
which they took with them from Tarazona, notwithstanding the bad state
of the roads and the fatigue of the men, who had been allowed no rest
upon this last march. Here Castaños received a summons from the Central
Junta, and resigned the command to Don Manuel de Lapeña.
♦LAPEÑA SUCCEEDS TO THE COMMAND.♦
The situation to which this general succeeded was deplorable. The
artillery had indeed been saved, and the pass of Buvierca most
gallantly maintained; nevertheless the army had suffered during its
retreat from all the accumulated evils of disorder, insubordination,
nakedness, and cold, and hunger, and fatigue. Sometimes when the
rear-guard had been on the point of taking food, the enemy came in
sight, and the ready meal was abandoned to the pursuers; this, though
it was the effect as much of panic in the soldiers as of any want of
conduct in their commanders, gave new cause for dissatisfaction and
distrust. The men themselves were ready to fly at sight of the French,
because they suspected their leaders, yet they accused their leaders of
treachery for not always turning and making head against the enemy,
... not reflecting, that the officers in like manner, though from a
different motive, could place no confidence in their men. Many dropped
on the way, overmarched, or foundered for want of shoes; others turned
aside because they considered the army as entirely broken up: they were
ready to die for their country, but it was folly, they thought, to
squander their lives, and, under the present circumstances, their duty
was to preserve themselves, and recover strength for future service.
The loss at Buvierca, too, had been considerable. Before they reached
Siguenza the four divisions had thus been wasted down to 8000 men.
♦THEY ARRIVE AT GUADALAXARA.♦
It was on the evening of the last day of November that they reached
this point. Here message after message arrived, requiring them to
hasten with all possible speed to Somosierra. They set forward again
the following day, the infantry by Atienza and Jadraque, the horse and
artillery by Guadalaxara, in order to avoid the bad roads, leaving
the river Henares on their right. This plan was soon changed; advices
reached them in the middle of the night at Jadraque, that the pass of
Somosierra had been lost. It was now determined that the whole army
should march for Guadalaxara, for the defence of Madrid; information
of this movement was dispatched to the Marques de Castelar, in that
city; and persons were sent, some to ascertain the position of the
enemy, others to learn whither San Juan had retreated, in order that
some operations might be concerted with him. ♦DEC. 2.♦ The next day,
when the foremost troops entered Guadalaxara, they found some detached
parties of the enemy in the town, whom they drove out: the first and
fourth divisions, the horse and the artillery, arrived there that
night; here the news was, that Madrid was attacked, and the continual
firing which was heard confirmed it. Poor as the numbers were which
they could carry to the capital, they were eager to be there; and if
Madrid had been protected, as it might have been, by a British army,
or defended as the inhabitants, had it not been for treachery, would
have defended it, 8000 men, who stood by their colours under so many
hopeless circumstances, would have brought an important succour. The
inhabitants relied with great confidence upon this reinforcement; ...
they expected hourly that these brave men would appear, and take post
beside them at their gates, and in their streets; and one of the most
successful artifices by which the traitors who made the capitulation
depressed their zeal, was by reporting that a second battle had been
fought, in which the army of the centre had been entirely defeated by
Marshal Ney, so that no possible succour could be expected from it. At
the very time when this falsehood was reported, a part of this brave
army was only nine leagues from Madrid, impatient to proceed to its
assistance. They were, however, compelled to remain inactive the whole
of the next day, waiting for the second and third divisions and the
van, which did not come up till the day following.
♦THE DUQUE DEL INFANTADO JOINS THEM.♦
On that day the Duque del Infantado joined them, having passed safely
through the advanced posts of the French by favour of a thick fog.
A council of war was held; the urgent danger of the capital was
represented by the Duke, and low as his hopes had fallen, when he saw
the deplorable state to which the remains of the army were reduced
by fatigue and hunger, it was nevertheless determined that an effort
should be made, not to attack the besiegers, for this would have
been madness, but to collect as large a convoy of provisions as they
could, and endeavour to enter with it under cover of the night by the
Atocha gate. The Duke, however, knew but too well the situation of
the metropolis; and at his suggestion a letter was sent to the French
General who commanded before the walls, reminding him that a great
number of French were in the hands of the Spaniards, and would be held
responsible with their lives for any ill treatment which might be
offered to the inhabitants of Madrid. Both the officer and the trumpet
were detained prisoners by Buonaparte’s orders.
♦CONDITION OF THE TROOPS.
DEC. 4.♦
The troops were now mustered, and it was then perceived what they had
lost in number, and how severely they had suffered during this fearful
retreat. From 6000 to 7000 infantry, and about 1500 cavalry, were all
that could be brought together; men and horses alike exhausted by
fatigue and hunger; many indeed had fallen and perished by the way.
Here for the first time they found something like relief, great numbers
not having tasted bread for eight days: they had now sufficient food,
and there was cloth enough in the manufactory there to supply every man
with a _poncho_, the rude garment of the Indians about Buenos Ayres,
which the Spaniards have adopted for its simplicity and convenience.
Meantime the French were collecting in their neighbourhood; they
occupied Alcala and the adjoining villages, and some skirmishes took
place at Meca. Buonaparte had been informed of their movements, and as
soon as Madrid capitulated, Bessieres was dispatched to Guadalaxara
with a considerable force of horse, and Victor followed with infantry.
The first business of Lapeña was to disencumber himself of his
superfluous artillery, for they had brought off no fewer than sixty
pieces of cannon. Forty of these, to preserve them from the enemy,
were sent across the Tagus at Sacedon, and these were safely forwarded
to Carthagena. The van, under Venegas, which had saved the army at
Buvierca, arrived on the night of the 4th. Its losses had been replaced
by drafts; the post of honour and of danger had been assigned it during
the whole of this retreat, and it continued to cover the movements
of the other divisions. Two of them were leaving Guadalaxara when it
arrived, the second and third followed the next noon, in two columns,
proceeding by two roads to Santorcaz: this division began to follow
them, but before it was out of one gate, the advanced guard of the
enemy entered at another.
♦THEY RETIRE TOWARDS THE TAGUS.♦
Venegas perceived the importance of a position to the south of the
city, lying directly between the two roads to Santorcaz, and he
immediately, occupied it. The battalions (_tercios_) of Ledesma and
Salamanca, which formed the rear of the third division, perceived his
intention, and turned back and joined him; their commanding officers,
D. Luis de Lacy and D. Alexandre de Hore, being ambitious of bearing
part in the action which they expected. The French were in great force
opposite on the right bank of the Henares; some of their detachments
forded both on the right and left of the Spaniards’ position; but
light troops had been stationed on both the flanks, who skirmished
with them, and repelled them till night. The position was judged too
formidable in front to be attacked, and the main body of the French
halted during the whole evening, not choosing to cross the river.
Having thus obtained time for the army to perform its march, which was
all he hoped or wanted, Venegas broke up three hours after the darkness
had closed, and continued his retreat in good order without the loss
of a single man. The Commander now took up a position at Santorcaz, a
little village about two leagues east of Alcala, between the rivers
Henares and Tajuna. There he learnt the fate of Madrid. The French now
evacuated Alcala, and extended themselves along the heights at the back
of Meca, and along the banks of the Jarama, pushing their advanced
parties to Arganda, Morata, and other places in that neighbourhood.
The plan of Lapeña and his officers under these circumstances was, to
cross the Tagus at Aranjuez, and take shelter, if necessary, among the
mountains of Toledo. With this intent they marched to Villarejo de
Salvanes. A few poor soldiers, who dropped behind at Nuevo-Bastan, were
sabred by the French with that cruelty which at this time so frequently
characterised and disgraced their armies.
♦PASSAGE OF THE TAGUS.♦
On the 6th, when they were about to proceed to Aranjuez, tidings
came that the French were in possession of that place, and this was
confirmed by an express from General Llamas, who had vainly attempted
to resist the enemy there with a few armed peasantry, and a few
soldiers who had escaped from Madrid. New difficulties now presented
themselves to the remnant of this harassed army. To look towards Toledo
was become hopeless: it was equally hopeless to make for Andalusia,
for the French General, Ruffin, as soon as he had obtained possession
of Aranjuez, crossed the Tagus, and, pushing on as far as Ocaña, cut
off their retreat in that direction. Nothing remained but to cross
the Tagus by boats at Villamanrique, Fuenteduenas, Estramera, and
other places where there were ferries, and make for the Sierras of
Cuenca. There it was hoped they might be able to rest, rally the
stragglers, and again unite in numbers sufficient to take vengeance
for all their sufferings. Hazardous as it was to cross the river in
this manner, with an enemy so near at hand, it was effected with rare
good fortune; the French had not foreseen the attempt, and not a man
nor a gun was lost. Having gained the left bank of the river, they
hastened on their retreat, and head-quarters were established on the
7th at Belinchon. The second division, under General Grimanest, which
crossed at Villamanrique, was the only one which was endangered. This
having effected the passage, took up a position at Santa Cruz, between
Aranjuez and Ucles, where it was attacked on the night of the 8th
by a corps of Bessieres’ division, under General Montbrun. Finding
themselves unable to maintain the position against a force which was
superior to their own, they abandoned it before they sustained any loss.
♦SOME OF THE TROOPS MUTINY.♦
The first and fourth divisions mutinied on their march to Yedra,
where they were to be stationed. This was ascribed to the intrigues
of some traitorous agents, as well as to the unprincipled ambition of
a few officers, desirous, in these times of insubordination, to exalt
themselves by flattering the soldiers and slandering their commanders.
It was easy to inflame the men, who imputed all their misfortunes to
treason, and were already in a state of great insubordination. They
insisted upon marching to Madrid, that they might attack the enemy
there; an artillery officer was at their head; and the guns were
planted to prevent the troops from proceeding in the direction where
they had been ordered. A difference of opinion among themselves
prevented the execution of this mad purpose; some were for hastening to
Despeñaperros, to take their post in the passes of the Sierra Morena
for the defence of Andalusia. This afforded opportunity for the General
to reason with them, and pacify them for a while. In consequence of
this circumstance, the difficulty which daily increased of subsisting
the troops, their increasing wants, and the rapid desertions which were
naturally occasioned by privations, want of hope, and total relaxation
of discipline, Lapeña assembled his general officers at Alcazar de
Huete. The Duque del Infantado, and Llamas, who had joined them at
Villarejo, were present at this council, and it was determined, on
Lapeña’s proposal, that the ♦INFANTADO CHOSEN COMMANDER. DEC. 9.♦
Duque should take the command. One reason for appointing him was, that
he was president of the Council of Castille, and in that character
was entitled to require provisions and all things necessary from the
people, ... such being the respect paid to the old authorities and
established forms, even at a time when necessity might have superseded
all laws, as paramount to all.
♦THEY RETIRE TO CUENCA.♦
No command was ever accepted under more painful and disheartening
circumstances. The troops were in a state of mutiny: the enemy within
three leagues, preparing to complete their destruction; they had
neither stores, supplies, nor treasure, nor other means of obtaining
any than by the obedience which the people might pay to his authority;
and upon any panic which might seize the soldiers, or any suspicion
that should arise among them, the General would be the first victim; it
had too fatally been proved, that no character, however unimpeached, no
services, however eminent, afforded any protection against the ferocity
of a deluded multitude. With a full sense of these dangers, the Duke
accepted a command which it might have been even more dangerous to
refuse. His rank, his affable manners, the part which he had taken
against the Prince of the Peace, and the share which he was supposed
to have had in bringing about the downfall of that worthless minion,
had made him one of the most popular persons in Spain; and though he
had lost something by accompanying Ferdinand on his miserable journey
to Bayonne, still he stood high in the opinion of the nation. The new
appointment was announced to the army in a short proclamation; and the
Central Junta ratified it afterwards, approving Lapeña’s resignation,
and dispensing with an informality, which the dangerous and peculiar
state of things rendered prudent. The immediate good which had been
expected from this measure was produced; for the soldiers confided in
their untried General, and order was re-established among them. On
the 10th they entered Cuenca, there concluding a retreat of nearly
four hundred and fifty miles. The position of that city enabled them
to receive supplies from La Mancha, Valencia, and Murcia; there they
rested for a while, discipline was restored, and three persons,
who had been most active in the mutiny, were brought to trial and
executed. The troops were clothed, funds were raised for paying and
supporting them, and hospitals established. The stragglers having
recovered that strength, for want of which they had fallen behind,
rejoined their corps; new levies were raised; and it was manifest that,
notwithstanding all their disasters, notwithstanding the mighty power
of the enemy, the treachery of some leaders, and the misconduct of
others, which had been hardly less injurious, the spirit of patriotism
was still unimpaired, and the people, by whom alone a country is to be
saved, had not abated one jot of heart or hope.
♦ARRIVAL OF THE CONDE DE ALACHE’S CORPS.♦
Five days after their arrival they were joined by a corps which it was
supposed had been cut off among the mountains of Rioja. The history
of its escape is equally honourable to the men and to the Conde de
Alache D. Miguel Lili, who conducted them. They formed originally a
part of the army of Old Castille, under the Conde de Cartaojal, which
had been broken up after the position of Logroño was lost. At the
end of October, Castaños stationed it along the skirts of the Sierra
de Cameros, extending from in front of Logroño to Lodosa; the last
division of this force, which formed the left flank of the army, was
posted at Nalda under Lili. During the first three weeks of November,
this division sustained repeated and almost daily attacks; varying its
position as circumstances required, and having, like Blake’s army, to
endure the severest privations; nevertheless it carried off fourteen
pieces of artillery, from Nalda to Ausejo and Calahorra, in sight of
the French, and by roads which had been thought impracticable. On the
night of the 21st, Lili received intelligence that a considerable force
of the enemy had moved from Logroño towards Ausejo; the next day he
learnt that the Spaniards, who were stationed there and at Tudelilla,
had fallen back upon their right, and that 5000 French infantry and
1000 horse had moved from Najara, giving out that they were going
for Calahorra. He was thus in imminent danger of being surrounded.
Immediately he left the banks of the Iregua, and fell back to Venta de
Codes, four leagues in the rear of Nalda, where, in the course of the
night, a messenger from Cartaojal reached him with instructions written
at Tudelilla, on the 21st, saying, that the French were in great force
at Ausejo, and that Castaños ordered him to retreat by the Sierra to
Agreda, whither Cartaojal himself was going with all his troops to
oppose the French on the side of Almazan.
♦NOV. 23.♦
For Agreda, therefore, Lili began his march at daybreak. By two in the
afternoon he had reached Villar del Rio, five leagues from the place
which he had left, eight from that to which he was bound; but here
he met intelligence of fresh disasters and new dangers. Agreda, it
was said, had already been abandoned by the Spaniards; 1200 French
cavalry, with a small body of foot, were on their way to that town from
Soria, which had opened its gates to the enemy; other columns from
Soria and from Almazan were to follow in the same direction. Fugitives
now arrived every hour, with tidings that the enemy were sacking one
place, or approaching another, all their parties tending to the one
point of Agreda. Lili perceived, that if Cartaojal had not already
retired from that town, he inevitably must, and that for himself,
if he continued his march, it would be to run into the midst of his
enemies. He did not hesitate, therefore, to disobey orders which would
have involved him in certain destruction; and, acting upon his own
judgement, he marched the next morning in a contrary direction, to
Lumbreras, and the day afterwards to Montenegro, thinking that a more
defensible point, and for the sake of receiving certain intelligence
from the side of Agreda. The report that that town had been evacuated
on the 23d was premature; and Lili received a letter from Cartaojal,
written from thence on the 24th, and regretting that he had fallen
back to Lumbreras upon erroneous information; to have joined him at
Agreda, he said, was the proper movement, and almost the only means of
safety; but it was no time to consider what might have been done, and,
as things were, he must now follow his own discretion, with that zeal
which it was not doubted he possessed. Whatever regret Lili might have
felt at receiving this reproof, was effectually counteracted by the
report of the messenger who brought it; for at the very moment when
Cartaojal dispatched him, news arrived that the enemy were beginning to
attack the town. In fact, he was compelled speedily to abandon it, and,
marching by way of Borja to Calatayud, joined the wreck of the army of
the centre, and accompanied them in their retreat.
Perilous as Lili’s situation now was, he had yet to receive
intelligence of events which rendered it more desperate. On the 27th he
learned at Salas de los Infantes, by some stragglers who had escaped
from the action at Burgos, that that capital was now in the hands of
the French. His spies brought him information, that the Intruder was
with a great force at Aranda; that the enemy occupied all the bridges
and fords of the Duero; and that the Somosierra was threatened:
finally, to crown the distressing news of the day, a full account
reached him of the battle of Tudela. On every side he was surrounded;
to move in any direction seemed equally perilous, and he was utterly
ignorant what course had been taken by the relics of the army which
he wished to join. In these difficulties his first measure was to
march to Canales, four leagues from Salas, where, in the very centre
of the mountains, he might hope to remain concealed from the enemy,
or resist them to the best advantage if he were attacked. There, amid
those difficult and inclement heights, from whence the Arlanza flows
toward Lerma, the Duero toward the plains of Castille, the Tiron, the
Najerilla, and the Iregua toward Rioja, he remained six days. During
this time he obtained sufficient intelligence of the movements of the
French to direct his own, and then proceeded towards New Castille, in
search of Castaños’s broken army. On the 5th he reached Quintanar de
la Sierra, on the 6th San Leonardo. His men travelled the whole of the
following day and night, and crossed the Duero at Berlanja. On the 9th
they entered Atienza, and here the information which they found served
only to occasion new perplexity; for here Lili learned that the central
army had passed through, and been pursued by the French; that they
had afterwards abandoned Guadalaxara and the heights of Santorcaz: of
their farther movements nothing was known. Lili, however, considering
all circumstances, was convinced that they must have retreated upon
Cuenca, and he directed his march towards the same point. On the 11th,
at daybreak, he crossed the great road from Zaragoza to Madrid, at
an opportune and happy hour, passing between the last division of
the French and their rear-guard, then on the way from Calatayud; and
on the day that the Duke del Infantado reached Cuenca, he arrived at
Villar de Domingo Garcia, from whence, on the 16th, he passed to the
head-quarters of the Commander. During this whole retreat, which was
over a tract of nearly four hundred miles, through the most difficult
and untravelled ways, this corps had constantly been surrounded by the
enemy, who were seldom more than ten or twelve miles distant from
them. Food they had none, but what they could procure upon the way;
most of the men were barefoot, many of them nearly naked, but their
spirits never failed.
♦RETREAT OF THE CENTRAL JUNTA FROM ARANJUEZ.♦
If ever during the contest there was a time when Spain might have
been irretrievably subjected, it was now, if a dissolution of the
government had taken place. The Central Junta had been slow in
perceiving the danger, but when it came upon them they acted with
promptitude and wisdom. Before they left Aranjuez a commission of
six members was appointed to transact business during their journey,
and official intelligence of their removal was communicated to the
foreign ministers. Their escort was so insufficient, that a small
body of cavalry might have surprised them; they travelled in parties,
but assembled at Talavera; three members were left there to collect
and re-organize the soldiers who were coming in great numbers to that
point. From thence proceeding to Truxillo, there they again met,
dispatched orders to the provinces, and sent some of their own members
to those places where they might be most useful. That city afforded an
opportunity of reconsidering where they should fix their abode, whether
at Badajoz, as had been determined, or at Cordoba, the road to either
place being open: Seville was preferred to either, and they assembled
there on the 17th of December. Before this removal it had been
concerted by Jovellanos, with some members of the Royal Council and of
the Council of the Indies, that eleven members of the former, and nine
of the latter, including their presidents, should follow the Central
Junta, and with two members from each of the other tribunals, form a
_Consejo reunido_, or united Council. The other members were commanded
to leave Madrid, and retire either to their own places of abode in the
provinces, or whither they would, there to receive their salaries,
assist the government with their advice and services when called upon,
and promote by all means in their power the national cause. Too many of
these persons were found wanting in the hour of trial, some in weakness
submitting to the Intruder rather than endure the ills of honourable
poverty, others taking an active and infamous part in his service.
The proposed Council was formed of those who repaired to Seville; and
those who, from whatever cause, arrived at a later time, found from
the Junta an indulgence which would not have been granted them by the
people, less charitable, and perhaps less just; they were received with
respect, and their salaries continued to them.
♦THEIR ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF MADRID.♦
The agents of the Intruder knowing how desirable for their views it
would be to bring the national government into disrepute, reported
that the Junta had sanctioned and approved the capitulation of the
capital. This the Junta contradicted in a manly proclamation, and they
exhorted the inhabitants of Madrid to bear in mind that the temporary
occupation of their buildings by the enemy was of little moment, while
he was not master of their hearts. “Continue to resist him,” said
they, “in the very bosom of your families; place no confidence in the
promises of the French; remember that they have promised happiness to
every people, and have made every people miserable. Keep alive your
hope, retain your fortitude, and your deliverance will be glorious in
proportion to the greatness of the danger which you have encountered.”
They made no attempt to conceal the extent of their disasters; but
they attributed them to the inexperience of their troops, and denied
that the monarchy was comprehended within the narrow precincts of
the metropolis. “Were you to believe the enemy,” said they, “our
armies have vanished like the smoke of the battle, and Spain has
neither forces wherewith to oppose her invaders, nor authority to
regulate her councils, nor resources to save her from destruction.
All this is false. The government which has been chosen by the people
never attracted more respect, never felt more strongly the strong
principle of union, and never found more ardour in the public cause.
The provinces have redoubled their exertions at its voice, and new
enlistments, new contributions, and new sacrifices have already filled
the void occasioned by our losses.” A splendid instance of patriotism
in one of the nobles was at this time made public; the Duke of Medina
Sidonia, whose property had just been confiscated in Madrid by the
intrusive government, had from the commencement of the struggle made a
free gift every month of 2500 dollars, in addition to his share of the
public burthens, and to various donations of necessaries for the army.
While the Junta was making exertions which were well seconded by the
zeal of the people, the whole of those extensive plains, which form
the centre or table-land of Spain, lay at the mercy of the invaders.
On the 11th of December Victor had his detachments in Aranjuez and
in Ocaña; ♦THE FRENCH ENTER TOLEDO.♦ on the 19th he occupied Toledo.
The surrender of this ancient and famous city, after its professions
of determined patriotism, was one of those circumstances for which
the Spaniards were reproached, by those who had depreciated their
exertions, and despaired of their cause. Yet if the Toledans did not
signalize themselves by heroic sacrifices, like the Zaragozans, there
was no want of a right spirit, nor had they been deficient in their
duty. In the spring of the preceding year Dupont and Vedel entered that
city with their divisions, and raised a most oppressive contribution.
But no sooner had they proceeded on their way to Andalusia, than a
Junta was formed, consisting of the most respectable citizens: they
could not raise forces themselves, being surrounded by the enemy, and
having no military means; but they ordered as many of the districts in
that kingdom as could exert themselves to act under the instructions
of the Junta of Badajoz; they contributed large sums of money; and
they refused obedience to four successive orders which enjoined them
to proclaim the Intruder, though it was announced, that, if they
continued in their disobedience, 5000 French would come, and perform
the ceremony sword in hand. The evacuation of Madrid relieved them
from this danger. And when the victorious army of Castaños was on its
way to the capital, Toledo supported 10,000 men of that army for three
weeks, made a donation of 300,000 reales to them on their departure,
equipped many of their officers, and clothed a great proportion of
the men. This was not all. In two months it raised and equipped two
regiments of infantry, and a corps of 700 horse; for which funds
were raised by a subscription, all persons, from the archbishop to
the poorest peasant, contributing according to their means. The
university also raised a corps of students; and after the siege of
Zaragoza the pectoral of the archbishop, valued at 150,000 reales,
was converted into money to relieve the inhabitants of that heroic
city. After the defeat at Burgos, the Toledans applied to government
for arms to defend their walls. This was the mode of warfare to which
the Junta, if they had rightly understood the nature of their own
strength, should have resorted; and this system of defence was advised
by the English ambassador, Mr. Frere, than whom no man judged more
generously, nor more wisely, of the Spanish character and the Spanish
cause. But this essential precaution had been neglected; and when the
Toledans applied for artillery and ammunition, disaster followed so
close upon disaster, that there was no leisure for attending to their
request, urgent as it was. What then could be done? They sent off
their moveable property to Seville; 12,000 swords also were dispatched
to the same place, from that fabric which for so many centuries has
been famous, and which probably owes its original celebrity to workmen
from Damascus. The Junta, the legitimate authorities, and all the most
distinguished inhabitants, left the city; neither the threats nor
promises of the Intruder could induce them to return: they retired
to the free part of the peninsula, submitting to poverty with that
dignified composure which resulted from the consciousness of having
discharged their duty. This was the fate of the parents, while their
sons, in the corps of students, fought and bled for the independence
of Spain. It is plain, therefore, that though the gates of Toledo were
opened to the enemy, that same spirit still existed within its walls
which, during the war of the Commons of Castille, rendered it the last
hold of Spanish liberty.
♦DEFENCE OF VILLACAÑAS.♦
From Toledo, from Aranjuez, and from Ocaña, parties of French
cavalry overran the open and defenceless plains of lower La Mancha,
foraging and plundering the towns and villages with impunity as far
as Manzanares. The La Manchans, relying, like the government, too
confidently upon the resistance which regular armies and the modes
of regular warfare could oppose to such a military power as that of
France, had made no preparations for defending themselves; some places
were deserted by the inhabitants; all left open to the enemy, who
scoured the country at their pleasure. The little townlet of Villacañas
afforded a single and honourable exception. A party of 60 horse entered
it on the night of the 20th of December, being a detachment from a
much larger force which had quartered itself in Tembleque. The people
caught up such arms as they could find, and drove the invaders out;
they began immediately to dig trenches and throw up barricadoes, ...
the adjoining peasantry came to their assistance, ... a few persons of
high quality fled; but, with these few exceptions, the utmost zeal and
alacrity were displayed by all ranks, and ready obedience was paid to
some old soldiers, who took upon themselves the command. During five
successive days the French renewed their attacks, and were constantly
repulsed; their plundering parties had no artillery with them, and the
means of defence, therefore, as long as the Spaniards took care not
to expose themselves to a charge of horse in the open country, were
equal to those of attack. Weary at length of repeated failures, and
unwilling to incur farther loss in an object of no other value than
what the plunder of the place might be worth, the French desisted from
any farther attempts, and Villacañas remained safe and uninjured,
while all the country round was ransacked. The example was deservedly
thought of such importance, that the whole details of this little
siege were published by the government in an extraordinary gazette.
Whatever contributions were due to the state by the inhabitants of this
townlet were remitted to them, and those persons who had taken the lead
were rewarded by other privileges. “This,” said the government, “is
the kind of war which our perfidious enemy feareth most, and which is
the most advantageous for ourselves. Let the people of every village
arm themselves, entrench themselves in their very houses, break up
the roads, lay ambushes upon every height and pass, intercept his
provisions, cut off his communications, and make him perceive that
at every step he will find the most obstinate resistance. Thus we
shall waste his forces; thus we shall show to the world that a great
and generous nation is not to be insulted with impunity, not to be
conquered when it fights for its king, for its liberty, and for its
religion.”
♦PREPARATIONS FOR DEFENDING THE SIERRA MORENA.♦
Meantime the Juntas of Ciudad Real, (the capital of Upper La Mancha,)
and of the four kingdoms of Jaen, Granada, Cordoba, and Seville, which
compose the province of Andalusia, formed a Central Assembly in La
Carolina, where two deputies from each province met to consult upon
speedy measures for fortifying the gorge of Despeñaperros, this pass
of the Sierra Morena being considered as the Thermopylæ, where the
progress of this new barbarian might be withstood. Here an army was
necessary, and there was none: the Marques de Palacio was sent by the
Supreme Junta to form one under his command. The Juntas of Andalusia
and La Mancha raised new levies; and officers and men who had deserted
from the central army, many of them scattering alarm and sedition
where they fled, re-entered into this new establishment. The marine
battalions and brigades of artillery were ordered hither from Cadiz,
leaving only 300 men in that city, besides the volunteers. Fourteen
pieces of cannon had been fortunately stopped at Manzanares, on their
way to Madrid. These were now mounted upon the works which were thrown
up to defend this important position. Another road also, by which the
enemy might have passed the Sierra, was occupied by a detachment of
500 men. Before the middle of December, 6000 foot and 300 horse had
assembled at La Carolina, and their number increased daily. But it
was not towards the Sierra Morena that Buonaparte was looking; his
attention was chiefly fixed upon the English army, and the road by
which he thought to reach Andalusia was through Extremadura, hoping
to overtake the Supreme Junta in their flight; having reached them at
Truxillo, his armies might divide, one marching to take possession of
Lisbon, the other to take vengeance for Dupont at Seville and Cadiz.
♦MURDER OF SAN JUAN AT TALAVERA.♦
There was no force in Extremadura which could oppose any obstacle
to this plan. When the pass of Somosierra was lost, San Juan, who
commanded there, cut his way sword in hand through a squadron of Poles,
and by by-roads reached Segovia, where he found the troops who had
retired from Sepulveda. From thence he marched to Guadarrama, united
with the Extremaduran troops under General Heredia, and descended to
the Escurial, because he was without provisions in the pass. There
they received orders to hasten to Madrid, and enter that city by the
gate of Segovia. On the way exaggerated reports were spread of the
strength of the enemy; suspicion increased the insubordination of the
soldiers; the artillery and baggage-men forsook their charge and fled,
and several corps broke up. The whole of Heredia’s van-guard dispersed
in this manner, in spite of all San Juan’s efforts to detain them;
they would rally, they said, at Talavera: this word went through the
army, and served as a pretext for every one who chose to fly. The two
generals had only a handful of men with them when they approached
Madrid, and then they discovered that the city had been betrayed. No
other course remained for them than to repair to Talavera, in the hope
of rallying what would still form a considerable force. The rabble of
the army, sufficiently faithful to their appointment, bent their way
to that city, plundering as they went along; and there San Juan met
them, unhappily for himself. The wretches who had been foremost in
subverting discipline, and instigating the troops to break up, began to
apprehend punishment if the army should again assume a regular form;
and this was likely to be the case immediately, for many thousands
(many having escaped from Madrid) were now collected there, and the
government had already begun to take measures for re-equipping them. It
was easy for these villains to raise a cry against San Juan: all men
knew the importance of the position at Somosierra; but there were few
who knew with what insufficient means the general had been supplied.
Mobs never reason, least of all when they are under the influence of
fear; and the Spanish troops had suffered so much from incapacity,
that when any person was denounced as a traitor, it seemed like a
relief to themselves, and an act of justice to their country, to vent
their vengeance upon him. The cry against San Juan became general: a
friar went at the head of a party to the convent of the Augustines,
where he had taken up his quarters, and they cried out that they were
come to put ♦DEC. 7.♦ Benito San Juan to death. San Juan attempted to
expostulate, but in vain. He drew his sword to defend himself, and
immediately he was pierced with their bullets. The rabble dragged the
body to a gibbet, and hung it there; next they sought for Heredia,
that they might kill him also; but he eluded their search. As soon
as their fury was allayed, the instigators of these excesses secured
themselves by flight; and the troops, who had been misled, perceived
the consequences of their lawless conduct. If San Juan had indeed been
a traitor, they felt that they ought to have delivered him up to the
proper tribunal; ... by taking vengeance into their own hands they had
made themselves obnoxious to the laws. Whom too could they trust, whom
were they to obey? Instead, therefore, of forming a new army, as they
had designed, at Talavera, they dispersed again, not having now any
rallying place appointed, but each man going whither he thought best.
Some took the road to Andalusia, some to Avila: the Extremadurans, who
were the most numerous, went to their homes.
♦EDICT AGAINST DESERTERS.♦
The dispersion of the soldiers called forth a severe edict. It began
by stating, that the martial laws of Spain had affixed no punishment
for officers who deserted their colours or stations, it never having
been supposed that men of such rank could possibly be guilty of such
a crime. But now it had unhappily been seen that many officers,
forgetful of all honour and duty, had fled, scattering disorder and
terror wherever they went, and pretending treason in their generals
as an excuse for their own conduct; whereas they themselves had been
the worst enemies of their country, by abandoning their generals in
the most critical moments. The Junta, therefore, pronounced sentence
of death against every officer who absented himself from his colours
without permission, and confiscation of his property for the relief of
the widows and orphans of soldiers in his parish. Soldiers were made
liable to the like penalty; any person who harboured a deserter was to
be punished by confiscation of his property, and the same penalty was
denounced against all magistrates who suffered deserters to remain
within their jurisdiction. But all who, within fifteen days, should
present themselves to the nearest authority in order to rejoin the
army, were exempted from the pains in this decree.
♦A FEW ENGLISH STRAGGLERS BUTCHERED BY THE FRENCH CAVALRY.♦
Four days after the murder of San Juan, and the dispersion of his army,
two divisions of French cavalry, under Milhaud and Lasalle, entered
Talavera. They found the body of the Spanish General still on the
gibbet, and this murder furnished Buonaparte with a new subject of
invective against the Spaniards; though this, and the thousand deaths,
and all the untold crimes, and all the unutterable miseries with which
the peninsula was filled, were the consequences of his own single
conduct, the fruits of his individual wickedness. Lasalle fell in
with sixteen Englishmen upon the road, stragglers from General Hope’s
detachment, and it was related in the bulletins[39] of Buonaparte, as
an exploit worthy of remembrance and commendation, that a division of
French cavalry, falling in with sixteen Englishmen who had lost their
way, put them to the sword. This was but a small part of the force
which was destined to proceed in this direction. As soon as Madrid had
been delivered up, Lefebvre was ordered to advance from Valladolid
towards Lisbon. First he advanced to Segovia, which he entered
unresisted. The people were dispirited by the panic and flight of their
armies; but it should not be forgotten for their exculpation, that the
more generous and heroic spirits, having flocked to their country’s
standard among the foremost levies, had already received their crown
of martyrdom, or were clinging to the wreck of the two great armies of
the north and the centre, or were consummating the sacrifice of duty
in Zaragoza. In one place only between Valladolid and the capital did
this part of the French army experience any opposition. The pass of
Guadarrama was open to them: General Hope had been stationed there,
but was recalled by Sir John Moore, and there were no native troops
to supply his place. But when the enemy descended ♦THE FRENCH TAKE
POSSESSION OF THE ESCURIAL.♦ upon the Escurial, and proceeded to take
possession of that palace, the magnificent monument of a victory which
Spain had achieved over France in open, honourable war, and in a fair
field, they found the peasantry assembled to defend the seat and
sepulchres of their kings. Undisciplined as they were, ill-armed, and
with none to direct their efforts, they stood their ground till they
were overpowered by practised troops, superior in numbers as well as
in arms; and the French, after the slaughter of these brave peasants
before the gates, took up their quarters in the palace of the Philips.
He who founded that stately pile, could he then have beheld from his
grave what was passing around him, would have seen the consequences of
that despotic system which he and his father established upon the ruins
of the old free constitution of Spain.
It was a noble feeling which led these peasants to sacrifice themselves
in defence of the Escurial, and the action did not pass unnoticed by
those able and enlightened Spaniards whose patriotic writings at this
time did honour to themselves and to their country. “Nothing,” said Don
Isidro de Antillon, “is more worthy of public interest, and nothing
will more excite the admiration of posterity, than a deed like this.
If indeed we had only armies to oppose to Buonaparte, infallibly we
should become his slaves; the victory would be the usurper’s beyond all
resource. But it is the collective strength of our inhabited places,
the defence of our walls, the obstinate and repeated resistance of
the people in the streets and gateways, along the roads and upon the
heights, wherever they can cut off or annoy the detachments of the
enemy, ... the universal spirit of insurrection, now become as it
were the very element of our existence; this it is which disconcerts
his plans, which renders his victories useless, and after a thousand
vicissitudes and disasters, will finally establish the independence and
the glory of Spain.”
♦EXCESSES OF THE FRENCH.♦
Lefebvre entered Madrid on the 8th of December. Buonaparte reviewed his
division in the Prado, and dispatched it to Toledo, while Sebastiani
with another division marched for Talavera. In that city, by the 19th,
about 25,000 French were assembled, including 5000 cavalry. The wiser
inhabitants fled before their arrival, preferring the miseries of
emigration to the insults and atrocities which they must otherwise
have endured: for the exaction of heavy contributions, which reduced
half the people to beggary, was the least evil those towns endured
that fell under the yoke of the French. Every where the soldiers were
permitted to plunder; no asylum could secure the women from their
unrestrained brutality; churches and convents were profaned with as
little compunction as dwelling-houses were broken open; and in many
instances, the victims were exposed naked in the streets. The Spanish
government exclaimed loudly against these enormities. “In other times,”
they said, “war was carried on between army and army, soldier and
soldier; their fury spent itself upon the field of battle; and when
courage, combined with fortune, had decided the victory, the conquerors
behaved to the conquered like men of honour, and the defenceless people
were respected. The progress of civilization had tempered the evils of
hostility, till a nation which so lately boasted that it was the most
polished in the world, renewed, in the 19th century, the cruelty of the
worst savages, and all the horrors which make us tremble in perusing
the history of the irruptions of the barbarians of old. Like tygers,
these enemies make no distinction in their carnage, ... the aged, the
infants, the women, ... all are alike to them, wherever they can find
blood to shed.”
This appeal could be of no avail against a tyrant who, in the very
origin of the war, had shown himself dead to all sense of justice,
humanity, and even of honour, which sometimes supplies their place;
nor against generals and officers who could serve him in such a cause.
Such men could be taught humanity only by the severest retaliation. The
language which the government addressed to their own subjects might be
more effectual. “What resource have you,” said they, “in submission
and in cowardice? If by this abasement you could purchase a miserable
existence, that perhaps with base minds might exculpate you. But you
fly to your houses to perish in them, or to be idle spectators of
the horrors which these ruffian soldiers are preparing for you! Yes!
wait for them there, and they will not tarry long ere they come and
shed before your eyes the blood of the innocent victims whom you will
not defend. Old fathers, wretched mothers, prepare to receive your
daughters released from the arms of an hundred barbarians only when
they are in the act of death! or if they recover life, to curse it in
the bitterness of unextinguishable shame; tell them to reproach those
cowardly husbands, those base lovers, who are content to live, and see
them plunged in this abominable infamy. But they will not be suffered
to live; hand-cuffed and haltered, they will be dragged out of their
country; they will be made soldiers by force, though they would not
become so from honour and a sense of duty; there they will be exposed
in the foremost ranks to the fire of the enemy; there they will not be
able to fly; ... the toil, the danger, and death will be theirs; the
glory and the spoil will be their conquerors’, and the crowns which
they win will be for the tyrant, the cause of all this misery.”
♦GALLUZO COLLECTS THE FUGITIVES IN EXTREMADURA.♦
It had been happy for Spain if the government had always acted as
energetically as it wrote; but it should be remembered in justice to
the Spaniards, that the dispersion of the troops was in many instances
an act of self-preservation, so utterly were they left without supplies
of food or clothing, by the inexperience and incompetence of every
military department. Even against the testimony and the reproaches of
its own government, the Spanish nation stands acquitted. Never did
men suffer more patiently, or fight more bravely, than Blake’s army.
There was no want of courage at Tudela; and of the remains of the army
which fought there, a large proportion was at this very time defending
Zaragoza with a heroism unexampled in modern times, upon any other
soil. Wherever, indeed, a new army was to be collected, soldiers were
not wanting. After San Juan’s death, Galluzo was appointed to the
command; he took his post at the bridge of Almaraz to defend the left
bank of the Tagus; and in a few days had collected about 8000 soldiers,
... many of them were without arms, ... most of them barefooted,
and now unhappily accustomed to flight and desertion. Nevertheless
they assembled; for every man felt individually brave, and it was
only the want of discipline, which, by preventing them from feeling
confidence collectively, made panic contagious in the moment of danger.
The province of Extremadura immediately provided money for these
troops; this province, though the least populous in the peninsula,
had particularly distinguished itself by its exertions; it had raised
and equipped, wholly at its own expense, 24,000 men, and had supplied
ammunition and arms of every kind from Badajoz to the other provinces.
♦HE PREPARES FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE TAGUS.♦
There are four bridges between Talavera and the confluence of the
Tietar with the Tagus; the Puente del Arzobispo, or the Archbishop’s,
the Puente del Conde, or the Count’s, the bridge of Almaraz, and the
Puente del Cardinal, or the Cardinal’s. With his present feeble and
inefficient force Galluzo had no other means of protecting Extremadura
than by breaking down, or defending these bridges; if he could effect
this, the province would be secure from an attack on the side of
Talavera. Almaraz was the most important of these points; here he
planted ten pieces of cannon and two mortars, and stationed 5000
men. The more surely to prevent the enemy from winning the passage
he mined the bridge; but so firmly had this noble pile been built,
that when the mine was fired, the explosion only served to injure it
without rendering it impassable. Don Francisco Trias was sent with
850 men to the Puente del Arzobispo; on his way he met the engineer,
who had previously been dispatched to break it down, but who had been
prevented from attempting it by the enemy, so that this bridge was
already in their power. Trias, therefore, took his position with the
view of checking the incursions of the French on this side, and ordered
Don Antonio Puig, with such assistants as he could procure from the
magistrates of Talavera la Vieja, to destroy the Puente del Conde, and
provide for the defence of that point, and of three fords upon the same
part of the river. When this officer arrived he had neither a single
soldier under his command, nor arms for the peasantry; the latter
want was soon supplied; the peasantry were zealous, and some of the
stragglers joined him.
The bridge of the Cardinal was assigned to the keeping of a battalion
of Walloon Guards and a squadron of the volunteers of Extremadura,
under Brigadier Don Francisco Durasmiel. Galluzo also stationed his
reserve at Jaraicejo, under Brigadier Don Josef Vlazquez Somosa, and
sent another field officer to Truxillo to collect and organize the
stragglers who might either voluntarily join him, or be detained by
the patroles. While the General was making these dispositions for
the defence of the province, the Junta of Badajoz made the greatest
exertions to supply the wants of this new army, and its efforts were
well seconded by the Extremaduran people. Half a million of reales
was raised in loans and free gifts within a week; all the cloth of
Torremocha and of other clothing towns was applied to the use of the
army, ... no other work was carried on in the monastery of Guadalupe
than that of making earthen vessels for their cookery; and commissaries
were sent to the sixteen villages nearest the bridge of Almaraz to see
that rations of bread for 5000 men were daily delivered there. These
measures were so effectual, that the troops were soon comfortably
clothed, and after the first day they had no want of any thing.
♦THE FRENCH CROSS THE RIVER.♦
It was, however, scarcely to be hoped that so small and ill-compacted
a force could maintain its ground, in a country which offered them no
advantages for defence against such an army as the French had assembled
in Talavera. After some skirmishes with the advanced guard at Almaraz,
and some slight attacks upon the Puente del Conde, which were designed
chiefly to keep the Spaniards on the alarm, and divert their attention
from the side where the real attack was intended, Sebastiani crossed
the Puente del Arzobispo on the 24th of December, and attacked Trias
in front and on his right flank with superior numbers. The Spaniards
did not yield till after a vigorous resistance; and then retreated by
the Sierra to Castanar de Ibor. On the same day, about two hours after
noon, the Puente del Conde was attacked, and the fords. The bridge was
bravely defended by Don Pablo Murillo, whose distinguished talents
were now first displayed. Puig guarded the fords, and they repelled
the enemy every where till night; when, being informed of the defeat
of Trias, and that Sebastiani had proceeded by Peralera de Garbin and
Bohonal towards Almaraz, Puig perceiving that he must be taken in the
rear if he continued in his present position, retreated to Peralera de
Garbin behind the French, and from thence to Castanar de Ibor.
♦GALLUZO RETREATS TO JARAICEJO.♦
The news of these disasters reached Galluzo at night. Immediately
he apprehended that the object of the enemy, who were marching by
Valdecasa, Valdecañas, and other points, to Romangordo and Miravete,
was to cut off the retreat of his whole division. To prevent this he
ordered all the artillery, except four pieces, which formed a battery
on the left of the bridge, to retire with the main force to Jaraicejo,
for which place he himself set off at midnight with his Aide-de-camps
and the cavalry, leaving three companies in charge of the remaining
battery under Captain Don Xavier de Hore. This officer was attacked
on the following morning by the French; the battery was ill-placed,
and Hore perceived that the ammunition-carts were within reach of the
enemy’s fire. He ordered them to be removed behind a bank which would
shelter them; ... the muleteers were no sooner out of his sight, than
they cut the traces, and fled with their beasts, imitating the conduct
of some infantry who took to flight. The enemy soon made themselves
masters of the bridge and the battery, and secured some prisoners, ...
though but few; for before the French could lay planks over the broken
bridge, and pass in sufficient number, most of the Spaniards effected
their escape, and afterwards rejoined the General at Miajadas.
♦DISPERSION OF HIS ARMY.♦
Galluzo’s first thought was to make a stand at Jaraicejo, and with this
intent he dispatched orders to General Henestrosa to join him from
Truxillo with all the troops which he had collected, and requested
the Junta to supply him with as large a force of armed peasantry as
possible. But no sooner did he learn that the bridge of Almaraz had
been forced, than he gave up this purpose, and resolved to fall back
upon Truxillo, apprehending that the enemy might intercept his retreat.
His apprehension degenerated into panic, when false intelligence was
brought him that the French had entered Deleitosa, a village something
less than eight miles to the south-east. This intelligence was followed
by other reports equally false and more alarming, which the knavish
and the traitorous invented, and the fearful and the suspicious easily
believed. The retreat had been begun in perfect order, but the army,
before it reached Truxillo, was in a state of total disorganization.
Galluzo, confounded at the first approach of danger, (for if he had
deliberately resolved to attempt resistance, the pass of Miravete would
have been the place which he would have chosen, after the bridge was
forced,) called a council of war; it was agreed that the defence of
Extremadura was no longer possible, and that he should retreat into
Andalusia. A chapel, which had been converted into a powder magazine,
was now blown up, that it might not fall into the hands of the enemy.
The explosion, and the preparations which were made for further flight,
excited the utmost terror in the inhabitants of Truxillo, and their
lamentations increased the confusion and alarm of the soldiers. It now
became a rout; ... most of the troops deserted, plundering the towns
and villages through which they passed. Those who still followed the
General were no longer under any restraint; they went through Miajadas,
Medellin, and Quintania, and in four days reached Zalamea, above an
hundred miles from Jaraicejo. Here it had been appointed to halt, and
here Galluzo found himself with not more than a thousand men. Nothing
could be worse than the conduct of the men during their flight; ...
some sold their muskets, ... some threw them away, ... houses were
broken open, and upon one individual a piece of church plate was found,
... a species of robbery which excites peculiar horror in Spain. The
officers, instead of endeavouring to restrain these excesses, were some
of them active themselves in pillage; it is probable, indeed, that had
they done their duty, the men would have discharged theirs; for those
officers to whom the more difficult task of bringing off the artillery
had been entrusted, and who were therefore picked men, effected their
object: though without an escort, they lost only two pieces of cannon,
and carried seventeen to Miajadas, ... from whence part were sent to
Badajoz, the rest followed Galluzo to Zalamea. Trias also effected a
far more dangerous retreat than his commander in good order. He set
forward from Castanar for Fresnedoso, and when within a mile of the
place, learnt that the French were there, having won the bridge of
Almaraz. He had now to tread back his steps, and endeavour to reach
Jaraicejo. After a day’s march he found that the French were there
also, and making for Truxillo, again discovered the enemy in possession
of the place to which he was bound. Nevertheless he preserved
discipline in his little troop, and that preserved confidence; instead
of losing his men by desertion, he collected stragglers as he went, and
arrived at Zalamea with a larger force than Galluzo himself had brought
there.
♦GALLUZO IS SUPERSEDED BY CUESTA.♦
Before the incapacity of Galluzo was thus decidedly manifested, it had
been in agitation to remove him from the command, and appoint Cuesta
in his place. This General, as an arrested person, followed the Junta
on their retreat from Aranjuez. It so happened, that while he was at
Merida, some soldiers belonging to the scattered army of Extremadura
gathered together in that city, and the owner of the house in which
Cuesta lodged persuaded them to demand him for their leader, as it were
by acclamation. The Junta of Merida upon this sent up a representation
to the Central Junta, requesting that Cuesta might be appointed to
the command. It was replied, that this ought not to be done without
the approbation of the Junta of Badajoz, which had made such signal
exertions in the patriotic cause, and was not willing to supersede
Galluzo, whom it had appointed. But now, after this disorderly flight,
he was immediately deprived of the command, and put under arrest, and
Cuesta was nominated to succeed him. Cuesta’s errors were overlooked,
because no doubt of his motives was entertained; and at a time when
the cry of treachery once raised against a commander was sufficient to
break up an army, it was an object of considerable importance to find
a leader in whom the men would confide. At this moment the whole of
Extremadura to the very walls of Badajoz was open to the enemy, and the
Junta trembled for Seville. Brigadier Don Josef Serrano Valdenebro was
sent with as many men as he could collect to guard Santa Olaya and El
Ronquillo, in the western passes of the Sierra Morena, and co-operate
with Cuesta in covering Andalusia on that side. These means of defence
would have been as ineffectual as they were feeble, if Buonaparte had
not thought it of more importance at this time to drive the English out
of Spain, than to pursue his victories in the south.