From Villa Franca to Castro is one continued ascent up Monte del

Cebrero for about fifteen miles, through one of the wildest, most

delightful, and most defensible countries in the world. The road is

a royal one, cut with great labour and expense in the side of the

mountain, and following all its windings; ... for some part of the

way it overhangs the river Valcarce, a rapid mountain stream, which

falls into the Burbia near the town, and afterwards joins the Sil,

to pass through the single outlet in the gorge of the Bierzo. Oaks,

alders, poplars, hazels, and chestnuts grow in the bottom, and far up

the side of the hills: the apple, pear, cherry, and mulberry are wild

in this country; the wild olive, also, is found here; and here are

the first vineyards which the traveller sees on his way from Coruña

into the heart of Spain. The mountains are cultivated in some parts

even to their summits, and trenches are cut along their sides, for

the purpose of irrigating them. Even those writers whose journals

were written during the horrors of such a flight noticed this scenery

with admiration. It was now covered with snow: ... there was neither

provision to sustain nature, nor shelter from the rain and snow, nor

fuel for fire, to keep the vital heat from total extinction, nor

place where the weary and foot-sore could rest for a single hour in

safety. All that had hitherto been suffered was but the prelude to

this consummate scene of horrors. It was still attempted to carry on

some of the sick and wounded: the beasts which drew them failed at

every step; and they were left in their waggons, to perish amid the

snow. “I looked round,” says an officer, “when we had hardly gained

the highest point of those slippery precipices, and saw the rear of

the army winding along the narrow road.... I saw their way marked by

the wretched people who lay on all sides expiring, from fatigue and

the severity of the cold: ... their bodies reddened in spots the white

surface of the ground.” The men were now desperate: excessive fatigue,

and the feeling of the disgrace there was in thus flying before the

enemy, excited in them a spirit which was almost mutinous: ... a few

hours’ pause was what they desired, an opportunity of facing the

French, the chance of an honourable and speedy death, the certainty of

sweetening their sufferings by taking vengeance upon their pursuers. A

Portugueze bullock-driver, who had faithfully served the English from

the first day of their march, was seen on his knees amid the snow, with

his hands clasped, dying in the attitude and act of prayer. He had at

least the comfort of religion in his passing hour. The soldiers who

threw themselves down to perish by the way-side gave utterance to far

different feelings with their dying breath: shame and strong anger were

their last sentiments; and their groans were mingled with imprecations

upon the Spaniards, by whom they fancied themselves betrayed, and upon

the generals, who chose rather to let them die like beasts than take

their chance in the field of battle. That no horror might be wanting,

women and children accompanied this wretched army: ... some were frozen

to death in the baggage-waggons, which were broken down, or left upon

the road for want of cattle; some died of fatigue and cold, while their

infants were pulling at the exhausted breast: ... one woman was taken

in labour upon the mountain; she lay down at the turning of an angle

rather more sheltered than the rest of the way from the icy sleet which

drifted along; ... there she was found dead, and two babes, which she

had brought forth, struggling in the snow: ... a blanket was thrown

over her, to cover her from sight, ... the only burial which could be

afforded, ... and the infants were given in charge to a woman who came

up in one of the bullock-carts, ... to take their chance for surviving

through such a journey.

♦TREASURE ABANDONED.♦

While the reserve were on this part of the road, they met between

thirty and forty waggons filled with arms, ammunition, shoes, and

clothing, from England, for Romana’s army. There was no means of

carrying them back; ... such things as could be made use of were

distributed to the soldiers as they passed, and the rest were

destroyed. Indeed, the baggage which was with the army could not be

carried on: nearly an hundred waggons, laden with shoes and clothes,

were abandoned upon this ascent. The dollars, too, could no longer be

dragged along: had the resolution of sacrificing them been determined

upon in time, they might have been distributed among the men: in this

manner, great part might have been saved from the enemy, and they who

escaped would have had some little compensation for the hardships

which they had undergone: ... they were now cast over the side of

the precipice, in hopes that the snow might conceal them from the

French: ... many men are supposed to have been lost, in consequence of

having dropped behind, for the hope of recovering some of this money.

Dreadful as this march appeared to those who beheld the wreck of the

army strewing its line of road, it was perhaps still more so for them

who performed it in a night stormy and dark, wading through sludge

and snow, stumbling over the bodies of beasts and men, and hearing,

whenever the wind abated, the groans of those whose sufferings were not

yet terminated by death.

From the summit of this mountain to Lugo is nearly twelve leagues.

There are several bridges upon the way, over glens and gills, which

might have impeded the pursuit, had they been destroyed. One, in

particular, between Nogales and Marillas, is the most remarkable work

of art between Coruña and Madrid. This bridge, which is called Puente

del Corzul, crosses a deep ravine: from its exceeding height, the

narrowness of its lofty arches, and its form, which, as usual with

the Spanish bridges, is straight, it might at a little distance be

mistaken for an aqueduct. Several of those officers who knew the road

relied much upon the strength of the ravine, and the impossibility

that the French could bring their guns over, if the bridge were

destroyed. Grievous as it was to think of destroying so grand a work,

its destruction was attempted; but, as in most other instances, to no

purpose; whether the pioneers performed their office too hastily, or

because their implements had been abandoned upon the way.

♦THE ARMY COLLECTS AT LUGO.♦

The different divisions had been ordered to halt and collect at Lugo.

Sir John Moore was now sensible of the impossibility of reaching

Vigo, ... the distance was double that to Coruña, the road was said

to be impracticable for artillery, and the place itself offered no

advantages for embarking in the face of an enemy. The brigades,

however, of Generals Craufurd and Alton had marched for that port; and

General Fraser, with his division, had been ordered to follow and join

them. A dispatch was sent to stop him: the dragoon who was entrusted

with it got drunk on the way, and lost the letter; and these troops, in

consequence, had proceeded a full day’s journey on their way towards

Vigo before the counter-order reached them, and they were marched back.

Thus, instead of having two days’ rest at Lugo, as had been designed,

they returned to that place excessively harassed, and with some

diminution of number, occasioned by fatigue. When the horses entered

Lugo, many of them fell dead in the streets, others were mercifully

shot; ... above four hundred carcasses were lying in the streets and

market places; ... there were none of the army who had strength to bury

them; the towns-people were under too painful a suspense to think of

performing work which it seemed hopeless to begin while the frequent

musket-shot indicated so many fresh slaughters; there therefore the

bodies lay, swelling with the rain, bursting, putrifying, and poisoning

the atmosphere, faster than the glutted dogs and carrion birds could

do their office. Here the retreating army might have rested, had the

destruction of the bridges been effected; but this attempt had been so

imperfectly executed, that the French came in sight on the 5th, and,

collecting in considerable strength, took up a good position opposite

our rear-guard, a valley dividing them.

♦SIR JOHN OFFERS BATTLE AT LUGO.

JAN. 6.♦

On the following day they attacked the outposts, opening upon them with

two Spanish pieces of ordnance, which they had taken on their march.

The attack was made with great spirit; but it was received, says an

officer, “with a steadiness which excited even our own wonder;” ...

for at the sight of the enemy, and the sound of battle, the English

recovered heart, and derived from their characteristic and invincible

courage a strength ♦JAN. 7.♦ which soon made them victorious. On the

7th another attack was made, and in like manner repelled. The prisoners

reported that Marshal Soult was come up with three divisions. Sir

John Moore, therefore, expecting a more formidable attempt, drew up

his whole force on the morning ♦JAN. 8.♦ of the 8th. It was his wish

now to bring the enemy to action; he had perfect confidence in the

valour of the troops, and perceived, also, that, unless he crippled

his pursuers, there was no hope of embarking unmolested. Order and

discipline were instantaneously restored by this resolution to fight,

and the men seemed at once to have recovered from their sufferings.

The French were not equally eager for battle; the trial which they had

made of their enemies on the two preceding days was not such as to

encourage them; and Soult was waiting for more troops to come up. The

country was intersected with inclosures, and his position was thought

too strong to be attacked by an inferior force. But, in reality,

the French at this time were less numerous than the English. Another

reason assigned for not attacking the enemy was, that the commissariat

had only provisions for two days: delay, therefore, was judged as

disadvantageous as retreat. It was afterwards known, that the French

expected to be attacked, that they had no confidence in the strength

of their position, and that their ablest officers apprehended their

advanced guard would have been cut off. They frequently spoke of this

to those English who were left in their power at Lugo, and exulted that

Sir John Moore had contented himself with offering battle, instead of

forcing them to an engagement. After waiting till the afternoon, during

a day of snow and storms, Sir John ordered large fires to be lighted

along the line, for the purpose of deceiving the enemy, and continued

his retreat during the night.

♦RETREAT TO CORUÑA.♦

Before the reserve left Lugo, the General once more endeavoured to

repress the irregularity of the march. He warned the soldiers that

their safety depended entirely upon their keeping their divisions, and

marching with their regiments; and that those who stopped in villages,

or straggled in the way, would inevitably be cut off by the French

cavalry, ... “who have hitherto,” said he, “shown little mercy even to

the feeble and infirm who have fallen into their hands. The army has

still eleven leagues to march; the soldiers must make an exertion to

accomplish this: the rear-guard cannot stop; and they who fall behind

must take their fate.” These representations were ineffectual: ... it

was, indeed, impossible to obey them: many of the men were exhausted

and foot-sore, and could not keep their ranks: ... others, who had

totally broke through all discipline, left them for the love of wine,

or for worse motives. So irresistible was the temptation of liquor to

men in their state, that it was deemed better to expose them to the

cold and rain of a severe night, than to the wine-houses of Betanzos,

the next town upon their march. When the Royals reached that place,

they only mustered, with the colours, nine officers, three serjeants,

and three privates: the rest had dropped on the road; and many of

those who joined did not come up for three days. There was a memorable

instance, in this part of the retreat, of what might have been

accomplished by discipline and presence of mind. A party of invalids,

between Lugo and Betanzos, were closely pressed by two squadrons of the

enemy’s cavalry. Serjeant Newman, of the 2d battalion 43d, was among

them: he made an effort to pass three or four hundred of these poor

men, then halted, rallied round him such as were capable of making any

resistance, and directed the others to proceed as they could. This

party he formed regularly into divisions, and commenced firing and

retiring in an orderly manner, till he effectually covered the retreat

of his disabled comrades, and made the cavalry give up the pursuit.

♦SIR JOHN IS ADVISED TO PROPOSE TERMS.♦

The partial actions at Lugo, and the risk to which he had been exposed

of a general one, checked Soult in his pursuit; and he was too sensible

of the danger which he had escaped, to trust himself again so near the

British, without a superior force. The British army, therefore, gained

twelve hours’ march upon him, and reached Coruña with little farther

molestation; they obtained implements from Coruña for destroying the

bridge over the Mero, and thus impeded ♦JAN. 11.♦ the enemy’s progress.

At Coruña, if the General had not represented the cause of Spain as

hopeless, they might have found reinforcements from England, which

would have enabled them to turn upon their pursuers, and take ample

vengeance for the sufferings and the shame which they had endured. But,

instead of reinforcements, he had directed that empty transports should

be sent; and, for want of due knowledge of the country, had ordered

them to Vigo, instead of Coruña. That order had been countermanded

as soon as the error was discovered; but contrary winds detained the

ships, ... happily for the honour of their country, for otherwise the

troops would have quitted Spain as fugitives. It was apparent now

that they could not escape unless they gained a battle. Coruña was a

bad position. Had they been numerous enough to have occupied a range

of hills about four miles from the town, they could have defended

themselves against very superior numbers, ... but these heights

required a larger force than the English army, of which not less than

a fourth part had been foundered by the way. Both flanks would have

been liable to be turned: it was therefore necessary to relinquish

them to the enemy, and be content with occupying a second and lower

range. Such, however, were the disadvantages of this situation, that

some of our general officers advised the Commander to propose terms to

Soult, for permitting the army to embark unmolested. In communicating

this to the Government, Sir John said he was averse to make any such

proposal, and exceedingly doubtful if it would be attended with any

good effect, ... but whatever he might resolve upon this head, the

Ministers might rest assured that he would accept no terms which were

in the least dishonourable to the army or to the country. Happily for

his own memory, upon farther consideration, he rejected the advice. It

is sufficiently disgraceful that such advice should have been given;

and deeply is England indebted to Sir John Moore for saving the army

from this last and utter ignominy, and giving it an opportunity of

displaying to the world that courage which had never forsaken it, and

retrieving the honour which, had this counsel been followed, would

irretrievably have been lost.

♦PREPARATION FOR BATTLE.♦

Arrangements, therefore, were made to give the enemy battle. One

division, under General Hope, occupied a hill on the left, commanding

the road to Betanzos: the height decreased gradually to the village of

Elvina, taking a curved direction. At this village General Baird’s

division commenced, and bent to the right: the whole formed nearly a

semicircle. On the right of Sir David Baird, the rifle corps formed a

chain across a valley, and communicated with General Fraser’s division,

which was drawn up about half a mile from Coruña, near the road to

Vigo. The reserve, under General Paget, occupied a village on the

Betanzos road, about half a mile in the rear of General Hope. On the

outside of the British posts was a magazine, containing 4000 barrels of

gunpowder, which had been brought from England, and left there, while

the Spanish armies were without ammunition! It was now necessary to

blow it up: ... the explosion shook the town like an earthquake; and a

village near the magazine was totally destroyed.

♦THE ARTILLERY EMBARKED.♦

The French made their appearance on the morning of the 12th, moving in

force on the opposite side of the river Mero. They took up a position

near the village of Perillo, on the left flank, and occupied the

houses along the river. Their force was continually increasing. On the

14th they commenced a cannonade, which was returned with such effect,

that they at last drew off their guns. In the evening of this day

the transports from Vigo hove in sight. Some slight skirmishes took

place the following morning. Preparations meantime were making for the

embarkation. Sir John finding that, from the nature of the ground, much

artillery could not be employed, placed seven six-pounders and one

howitzer along the line, and kept four Spanish guns as a reserve, to

be advanced to any point where they might be wanted: the rest of the

artillery was embarked. The sick and the dismounted cavalry were sent

on board with all possible expedition. A few horses also were embarked,

... but there was little time for this: most of them were completely

disabled; another slaughter, therefore, was made of them: and the beach

was covered with their bodies. Some of these animals, seeing their

fellows fall, were sensible of the fate intended for them: they became

wild with terror, and a few broke loose.

♦BATTLE OF CORUÑA.♦

The preparations for embarking were completed on the morning of the

16th, and the General gave notice, that he intended, if the French did

not move, to begin embarking the reserve at four in the afternoon.

This was about mid-day. He mounted his horse, and set off to visit the

outposts: before he had proceeded far, a messenger came to tell him

that the enemy’s line were getting under arms; and a deserter arriving

at the same moment, confirmed the intelligence. He spurred forward.

Their light troops were pouring rapidly down the hill on the right

wing of the British, and the advanced picquets were already beginning

to fire. Lord William Bentinck’s brigade, consisting of the 4th, 42d,

and 50th regiments, maintained this post. It was a bad position, and

yet, if the troops gave way on that point, the ruin of the army was

inevitable. The guards were in their rear. General Paget was ordered

to advance with the reserve, and support Lord William. The enemy

opened a cannonade from eleven heavy guns, advantageously planted on

the hills. Two strong columns, one advancing from a wood, the other

skirting its edge, directed their march towards the right wing. A third

column approached the centre: a fourth advanced slowly upon the left:

a fifth remained half way down the hill, in the same direction. Both

in number and weight of guns they had a decided superiority; and they

fired with such effect from the commanding situation which they had

chosen, that the balls in their bounding reached the British reserve,

and occasioned some loss there.

Sir David Baird had his arm shattered with a grape-shot as he was

leading on his division. The two lines of infantry advanced against

each other: they were separated by stone walls and hedges which

intersected the ground: but as they closed, it was perceived that the

French line extended beyond the right flank of the British, and a body

of the enemy was observed moving up the valley to turn it. Marshal

Soult’s intention was to force the right of the British, and thus to

interpose between Coruña and the army, and cut it off from the place

of embarkation. Failing in this attempt, he was now endeavouring to

out-flank it. Half of the 4th regiment was therefore ordered to fall

back, forming an obtuse angle with the other half. This manœuvre was

excellently performed, and they commenced a heavy flanking fire: Sir

John Moore called out to them, that this was exactly what he wanted

to be done, and rode on to the 50th, commanded by Majors Napier and

Stanhope. They got over an inclosure in their front, charged the enemy

most gallantly, and drove them out of the village of Elvina; but Major

Napier, advancing too far in the pursuit, received several wounds, and

was made prisoner, and Major Stanhope was[41] killed.

The General now proceeded to the 42d. “Highlanders,” said he, “remember

Egypt!” ... they rushed on, and drove the French before them, till they

were stopped by a wall: Sir John accompanied them in this charge. He

now sent Captain Hardinge to order up a battalion of guards to the left

flank of the 42d. The officer commanding the light infantry conceived,

at this, that they were to be relieved by the guards, because their

ammunition was nearly expended, and he began to fall back. The General,

discovering the mistake, said to them, “My brave 42d, join your

comrades: ammunition is coming, and you have your bayonets!” Upon this,

they instantly moved forward. Captain Hardinge returned, and pointed

out to the General where the guards were advancing. The enemy kept up

a hot fire, and their artillery played incessantly on the spot where

they were standing. A cannon-shot struck Sir John, and carried away his

left shoulder, and part of the collar-bone, leaving the arm hanging

by the flesh. He fell from his horse on his back, his countenance did

not change, neither did he betray the least sensation of pain. Captain

Hardinge, who dismounted, and took him by the hand, observed him

anxiously watching the 42d, which was warmly engaged, and told him they

were advancing; and upon that intelligence his countenance brightened.

Colonel Graham, who now came up to assist him, seeing the composure of

his features, began to hope that he was not wounded, till he perceived

the dreadful laceration. From the size of the wound, it was in vain to

make any attempt at stopping the blood; and Sir John consented to be

removed in a blanket to the rear. In raising him up, his sword, hanging

on the wounded side, touched his arm, and became entangled between his

legs: Captain Hardinge began to unbuckle it; but the General said,

in his usual tone and manner, and in a distinct voice, “It is as

well as it is; I had rather it should go out of the field with me.”

Six soldiers of the 42d and the guards bore him. Hardinge, observing

his composure, began to hope that the wound might not be mortal, and

said to him, he trusted he might be spared to the army, and recover.

Moore turned his head, and looking steadfastly at the wound for a few

seconds, replied, “No, Hardinge, I feel that to be impossible.”

As the soldiers were carrying him slowly along, he made them frequently

turn round, that he might see the field of battle, and listen to

the firing; and he was well pleased when the sound grew fainter. A

spring-waggon came up, bearing Colonel Wynch, who was wounded; the

Colonel asked who was in the blanket, and being told it was Sir John

Moore, wished him to be placed in the waggon. Sir John asked one of

the Highlanders whether he thought the waggon or the blanket was best?

and the man said the blanket would not shake him so much, as he and

the other soldiers would keep the step, and carry him easy. So they

proceeded with him to his quarters at Coruña, weeping as they went.

General Paget, meantime, hastened with the reserve to support the right

wing. Colonel Beckwith dashed on with the rifle corps, repelled the

enemy, and advanced so far as nearly to carry off one of their cannon;

but a corps greatly superior moved up the valley, and forced him to

retire. Paget, however, attacked this body of the enemy, repulsed it,

and pressed on, dispersing every thing before him, till the enemy,

perceiving their left wing was now quite exposed, drew it entirely

back. The French then advanced upon Generals Manningham and Leith, in

the centre, and there they were more easily repelled, the ground being

more elevated, and favourable for artillery. The position on the left

was strong, and their effort there was unavailing: but a body of them

took possession of a village on the road to Betanzos, and continued to

fire from it, till Lieutenant-Colonel Nicholls attacked it, and beat

them out. Night was now closing in, and the French had fallen back in

all parts of the field. The firing, however, was not discontinued till

it was dark.

Never was any battle gained under heavier disadvantages. The French

force exceeded 20,000 men; the British were not 15,000. The superiority

in artillery was equally great: ... the enemy had met English guns on

the way, sent off, thus late, to the patriotic armies, and these they

had turned back, and employed against the English. Our artillery was

embarked; and the Shrapnell shells, which contributed so materially to

the success at Vimeiro, were not used in this more perilous engagement.

If the moral and physical state of the two armies be considered, the

disadvantages under which our soldiers laboured were still greater:

... the French, equipped in the stores which they had overtaken upon

the road, elated with a pursuit wherein no man had been forced beyond

his strength, and hourly receiving reinforcements to their already

superior numbers; ... the English, in a state of misery, to which no

army, perhaps, had ever before been reduced till after a total defeat;

having lost their military chest, their stores, their baggage, their

horses, their women and children, their sick, their wounded, their

stragglers, every thing but their innate, excellent, unconquerable

courage. From 6000 to 7000 men had sunk under the fatigues of their

precipitate retreat. The loss in the battle did not amount to 800; that

of the [42]French is believed to have exceeded 2000. If such a victory

was gained by the British army under such circumstances, what might not

have been achieved by that army when unbroken, with all its means at

hand, in health and strength, in its pride, and in its height of hope!

The General lived to hear that the battle was won. “Are the French

beaten?” was the question which he repeated to every one who came into

his apartment; and he expressed how great a satisfaction it was to him

to know that they were defeated. “I hope,” he said, “the people of

England will be satisfied! I hope my country will do me justice.” Then,

addressing Colonel Anderson, who had been his friend and companion in

arms for one-and-twenty years, he said to him, “Anderson, you know that

I have always wished to die this way.... You will see my friends as

soon as you can: ... tell them every thing.... Say to my mother”--But

here his voice failed, he became excessively agitated, and did not

again venture to name her. Sometimes he asked to be placed in an

easier posture. “I feel myself so strong,” he said, “I fear I shall be

long dying. It is great uneasiness ... it is great pain.” But, after

a while, he pressed Anderson’s hand close to his body, and, in a few

minutes, died without a struggle. He fell, as it had ever been his wish

to do, in battle and in victory. No man was more beloved in private

life, nor was there any general in the British army so universally

respected. All men had thought him worthy of the chief command. Had he

been less circumspect, had he looked more ardently forward, and less

anxiously around him, and on all sides, and behind, ... had he been

more confident in himself and in his army, and impressed with less

respect for the French Generals, he would have been more equal to the

difficulties of his situation. Despondency was the radical weakness of

his mind. Personally he was as brave a man as ever met death in the

field; but he wanted faith in British courage, and it is faith by which

miracles are wrought in war as well as in religion. But let it ever

be remembered with gratitude, that, when some of his general officers

advised him to conclude the retreat by a capitulation, Sir John Moore

preserved the honour of England.

He had often said that, if he were killed in battle, he wished to be

buried where he fell. The body was removed at midnight to the citadel

of Coruña. A grave was dug for him on the rampart there, by a party of

the 9th regiment, the aides-du-camp attending by turns. No coffin could

be procured; and the officers of his staff wrapped the body, dressed as

it was, in a military cloak and blankets. The interment was hastened;

for, about eight in the morning, some firing was heard, and they feared

that, if a serious attack were made, they should be ordered away, and

not suffered to pay him their last duty. The officers of his family

bore him to the grave; the funeral service was read by the chaplain;

and the corpse was covered with earth.

Meantime, General Hope, on whom the command devolved, passed the night

in embarking the troops. At ten o’clock he ordered them to march from

the field by brigades, leaving strong picquets to guard the ground, and

give notice if the enemy approached. Major-General Beresford, with a

rear-guard of about 2000 men, to cover the embarkation, occupied the

lines in front of Coruña. Major-General Hill, with a corps of reserve,

was stationed on a promontory behind the town. Nearly the whole

army was embarked during the night: the picquets were withdrawn and

embarked also before day, little remaining ashore at daylight except

the rear-guard and the ♦JAN. 17.♦ reserve. The French, seeing this,

pushed on their light troops to the heights of St. Lucia, which command

the harbour, got up some cannon to a rising ground, and fired at the

transports. Several of the masters of these vessels were frightened,

and cut their cables: four of them ran a-ground. The men were put on

board other ships, and these were burnt. During the night of the 17th,

and the following morning, Beresford sent off all the sick and wounded

who were in a condition to bear removal: and lastly, the rear-guard

got into the boats, no attempt being made to interrupt them. Thus

terminated our first campaign in Spain.

END OF VOL. II.

LONDON:

PRINTED BY THOMAS DAVISON, WHITEFRIARS.

FOOTNOTES

[1] “Elle est sans defense et sans fortification,” said Colmenar,

writing a century ago, “fermée d’une simple muraille; _mais ce défaut

est reparé par la bravoure des habitans_.” After the proofs which the

inhabitants have given of their patriotism, this praise appears like

prophecy.

[2] The Spaniards, by a more curious corruption, call Syracuse,

Zaragoza de Sicilia.

[3] _Hist. Apparitionis Deiparæ supra Columnam, Beato Jacobo apud

Cæsaragustam prædicante. Ex cod. membraneo, qui in Archivo Sanctæ Maria

de Pilari asservatur._ Espana Sagrada, t. xxx. p. 426. Risco adds

to this account, the Collect, which, from time immemorial, has been

used in the Church of the Pillar. It may be added here as a curiosity

for those who are not accustomed to such things. _Omnipotens æterne

Deus, qui Sacratissimam Virginem matrem tuam inter choros Angelorum

super columna marmorea a te ab alto emissa venire, dum adhuc viveret,

dignatus est,_ _ut Basilica de Pilari in ejus honorem a Protomartyre

apostolorum Jacobo suisque sanctissimis discipulis ædificaretur; præsta

quæsumus ut ejus meritis et intercessione fiat impetrabile quod fida

mente poscimus. Qui vivas et regnas, &c._

The French, as may be supposed, ridicule this fable; but, it is worthy

of remark, that, in the early part of the last century, the Spanish

annalist, Ferreras, represented the story as of doubtful authority;

his book passed through the hands of the usual censors, and was

printed; and then Philip V. the first of the Bourbon dynasty in Spain,

a Frenchman by birth and education, personally interfered, commanded

Ferreras to cancel the heretical leaf, and sent the edict in which this

was decreed to Zaragoza, there to be deposited among the archives of

the Virgin’s church, in proof of his especial devotion to our Lady of

the Pillar.

[4] “Here,” says Mr. Townsend, “I forgot all the hardships and fatigues

which we had suffered in this long journey: nay, had I travelled all

the way on foot, I would have freely done it to enjoy the sight of

these cathedrals. That which is called _El Aseu_ is vast, gloomy,

and magnificent; it excites devotion, inspires awe, and inclines the

worshipper to fall prostrate, and to adore in silence the God who seems

to veil his glory. The other, called _El Pilar_, spacious, lofty,

light, elegant, and cheerful, inspires hope, confidence, complacency,

and makes the soul impatient to express its gratitude for benefits

received.”

[5] Laborde.

[6] In military language, you always describe the country by the

current of water, and speak as if you were looking down the stream. It

was requisite to explain this to the court upon Whitelocke’s trial, and

therefore the explanation cannot be thought unnecessary here.

[7] “On this simple foundation,” says Mr. Vaughan, “a regular

manufactory of gunpowder was formed after the siege, which produced 13

arrobas of Castille per day; that is, 325 lb. of 12 ounces.”

[8]

Martyrum nulli, remanente vitâ,

Contigit terris habitare nostris;

Sola tu morti propriæ superstes,

Vivis in orbe,

Vivis ac pœnæ seriem retexis,

Carnis et cæsæ spolium retentans,

Tetra quam sulcos habeant amaros,

Vulnera narras.

Prudentius Περι Στεφανων. Hym. 4.

The poet goes on describing her torments with his usual love of

live-anatomy ... I know not whether it be possible that any person

should have survived them; but that some may be found wicked enough

to inflict equal tortures under the pretext, and others conscientious

enough to endure them for the sake of religion, has been too often

proved, and in few places more frequently than in Zaragoza itself, from

which city many an inquisitor has gone to keep company with Dacianus.

St. Engracia is invoked in diseases of the heart and the liver, in

consequence of the circumstances of her martyrdom.

Vidimus partem jecoris revulsam,

Ungulis longe jacuisse pressis;

Mors habet pallens aliquid tuorum,

Te quoque vivâ.

[9] The Bollandists relate this miracle with a candid admission of

doubt, because the writer, in whom they found it related, spoke upon

the testimony of others, instead of boldly asserting it on his own

authority. There are, however, testimonies in abundance, and that of

M. Bourgoing will be admitted to be decisive. “The roof,” he says,

“though very low, is certainly not smoked. They invite those who are

doubtful of it, to put a piece of white paper over one of these lamps.

I tried this experiment, and I must confess, I saw, or thought I saw,

that my paper was not blackened. I had still my doubts, but I took care

to conceal them from my bigoted conductors. I was, however, tempted to

say to them, God has not thought proper to work any striking miracle to

accelerate the end of the French revolution, or to calm the passions

which it has roused; and do you think that he would condescend to

perform here a miracle as obscure as your cavern, and as useless as

your own existence?”

[10] _Quartel-general, Santa Engracia. La capitulation._

[11] _Quartel-general, Zaragoza. Guerra al cuchillo._

[12] It is asserted by the French, in their official account, that,

after many days fighting, they won possession of many cloisters which

had been fortified, three-fourths of the city, the arsenal, and all

the magazines; and that the peaceable inhabitants, encouraged by these

advantages, hoisted a white flag, and came forward to offer terms of

capitulation; but that they were murdered by the insurgents; for this

is the name which the French, and the tyrant whom they served, applied

to a people fighting in defence of their country, and of whatever could

be dear to them. Unquestionably, if any traitors had thus ventured to

show themselves in the heat of the contest, they would have been put to

death as certainly as they would have deserved it; and, if the thing

had occurred, it would be one fact more to be recorded in honour of

the Zaragozans; but there is no other authority for it than the French

official account, in which account the result of the siege is totally

suppressed. The circumstance, had it really taken place, would not have

been omitted in Mr. Vaughan’s Narrative, and in the accounts published

by the Spaniards.

[13] General Thiebault says, “_On attribua d’abord ce mouvement, si

brusque et si general, à des causes peu signifiantes, à des terreurs

paniques, &c.; mais on apprit depuis qu’il tenoit à des grands projets,

et on en eut la preuve, quand on sut que dans presque toutes les

provinces il avoit été tenté ce même jour avec plus ou moins d’audace

ou de succès; et que, s’il avoit manqué à Lisbonne, il avoit (et

toujours par le moyen des prêtres) eu tout son succès à Oporto, Braga,

Chaves, ou ce jour même, une insurrection générale avoit éclaté,

fait prendre les armes contre nous à tous les habitans des provinces

d’Oporto, du Tras-los-Montes, d’une partie du Beira, et fait arrêter ou

assassiner tous les Français isolés qui s’y trouvoient._”--Relation de

l’Expédition du Portugal, p. 124.

General Thiebault is certainly wrong. Had there been any combination

against the common enemy, the persons by whom it was concerted would

eagerly have pleaded it afterwards as a claim to honour if not to

reward. The Portugueze have preserved the most minute details of a

national insurrection so honourable to the nation, and the merit of

priority has been contested by different places: but from all that

has been published it appears, in direct contradiction to the French

general’s statement, that no combination existed, (indeed it was

impossible that it should exist,) and that no tumult broke out on

the day which he has specified as the commencement of a general and

concerted movement, except at a village of fishermen in Algarve.

[14] Baron Thiebault ascribes the success of the insurgents, and the

loss of Faro, to the news of Dupont’s surrender, and to the landing

of troops, arms, ammunition, and money, at Faro, from the English

squadron. Not a man nor a musket had been landed from that squadron,

and the surrender of Dupont did not take place till a month afterwards!

With so little accuracy do the French relate the circumstances of their

ill success, even where no military misconduct is imputable.

[15] Baron Thiebault represents this as a great exploit on the part of

his fellow-soldiers. He says, _Le Colonel Maransin auroit pu éviter

Beja, mais il crut devoir ramener, par un grand exemple, ce pays à

l’obeissance. Il forme ses colonnes en marchant, et sans artillerie

attaque cette ville, enceinte de hautes murailles, dont toutes les

portes étoient barricadées, dont les murs, les tours, étoient défendus

par des forces quintuples des siennes, et par des hommes qui, dans

leur fureur, defioient nos bataillons._ Who would suppose, from this

description, that these high walls and towers were in ruins, and that

they were defended by a mob of three or four thousand men, not a third

part of whom were armed with firelocks! After killing 1200 men in

action, and all who were found in arms after it, sacking the city, and

setting it on fire, it seems difficult to understand what the mercy

was which the surviving inhabitants are said to have sent to Lisbon

to solicit. According to Baron Thiebault, _un brave religieux_, after

the assault, moved all his auditors to tears, by representing to them

how much they had provoked their own misfortunes: he was consequently

deputed unanimously to implore Junot’s clemency. Junot received him

graciously, and rewarded him with a canonry; LA RECONNOISSANCE FUT

EXTREME, ... _et Beja n’en reprit pas moins les armes peu de jours

après_. In the bulletin published at Lisbon upon this occasion, and

signed by this same General Thiebault, it is said, the inhabitants

expressed their contrition by their deputy, acknowledged that they had

been justly punished, and confessed that they had been seduced by the

English!

[16] Two persons were left alive when the French thought their accursed

work was done. One of them lingered three days before he was relieved

by death. Feliz Lourenco, the surveyor of the high road, was the other.

“He,” says Neves, (writing in 1811,) “still lives ... but in what a

condition! With his body and face disfigured by the marks of powder,

and the scars of eight and twenty bayonet wounds; ... with his left

eye struck out by a ball, the bones of his right shoulder broken, the

tendons rendered useless, and the hand paralyzed. It is from himself

that I have received the details of this frightful transaction,

of which there exists no other witness, except the murderers

themselves.”--_Historia Geral da Invasam dos Francezes em Portugal_,

_t._ iv. _p._ 42.

[17] General Thiebault, by whom the bulletin was signed, gives a

different statement in his book (p. 155). The French loss is there

given at sixty men killed, and from 130 to 140 wounded; that of the

Portugueze as at least 4000 left upon the field.

[18] As another example of the arts used to impose upon the Portugueze

people by the intrusive government, the following extract from the

fifth bulletin of the army of Portugal may be read with feelings

very different from what the detail in the text must excite. “On the

10th of July forty English disembarked at the foot of the village of

the Costa, to take in water and provisions. That point was defended

by only five carabineers of the thirty-first regiment of light

infantry. Notwithstanding this disproportion of numbers, these five

men, in sight of all the inhabitants, attacked the forty English,

repulsed them, forced them to abandon upon the beach all that they had

purchased, and pursued them to the sea.” Yet even this is outdone in

the same bulletin. “Three conscript lads (it is farther said), of the

sixty-sixth regiment, occupied a small post on the sea-shore, in front

of Cascaes, when they saw a boat put off from the English squadron, and

make towards them. Immediately these three lads placed themselves in

ambush, to wait till the boat should draw near: as soon as it reached

the shore they rose from their ambush, fired upon the boat, killed

the pilot (who was the master of Admiral Cotton’s ship), obliged two

English officers, and six seamen or soldiers, who were in the said

boat, to come on shore, and lay down their arms upon the beach, and

then conducted them as prisoners of war to the quarters-general of

General Solignac at Cascaes. This fact discovers a presence of mind,

a degree of intelligence, and a vigour, which do honour to the three

lads.” To complete the story, it should have been added, that the three

lads ate the eight Englishmen.

[19] Neves relates that Kellermann demanded for his own use 50,000

cruzados from the prior of Alcobaça at this time, letting him know,

without circumlocution, that what the French generals wanted was money.

He accepted a hundred moidores after hard bargaining. Loison heard of

this on his arrival, and, being on bad terms with Kellermann, made

him refund the money, charging the prior, if any such extortion were

practised upon him in future, to complain to him, wherever he might be.

Kellermann, however, coming there again when Loison had marched to the

south, redemanded the money, and laid on ten per cent. for interest. T.

iv. p. 82, 88.

[20] General Thiebault says, there was an action at Montemor, in which

the Portugueze lost fifty men, and that Loison also took prisoners

there some hundred peasants, _que les lois de la guerre condamnoient à

la mort, mais qu’il se borna à desarmer et renvoya chez eux_.

[21] General Thiebault says, that after their defeat in the field the

Portugueze wished to capitulate, but that the Spaniards shot those

persons who by timely submission would have saved the town: whereas the

fact is, that immediately after the defeat the Spaniards made the best

of their way towards their own country. During the action, he says that

several men dropt down dead, owing to the excessive heat, the blood

gushing from their ears, nose, and mouth. He is mistaken in saying that

General Leite (whom he calls Loti) fell in this action.

[22] These facts are notorious in Portugal, and circumstantial

accounts, too horrible to be repeated, are published of them. General

Thiebault only says in his text, that there was a desperate conflict in

the streets, and that “all who were found in arms were exterminated.”

He annexes the following note: “_Si l’on ne put de suite arrêter ces

terribles représailles, si l’on ne put éviter le pillage de beaucoup

de maisons, les officiers-généraux, superieurs, et d’état-major,

parvinrent du moins à faire respecter les églises, où les femmes,

les vieillards, et les habitans paisibles s’étoient retirés, avec ce

qu’ils avoient de plus précieux; ils firent plus, ils allèrent rassurer

eux-mêmes tous ceux qui s’y trouvoient, et dès que l’ordre commença à

se rétablir, ils firent escorter les femmes jusques chez elles, afin de

les préserver de toute insulte._” P. 164.

That there were some men of honour and humanity, who protected the

inhabitants as far as they could, must be believed for the sake of

human nature. But the Revolution and the school of Buonaparte had done

all that was possible for eradicating both humanity and honour; and

I affirm, on the testimony of the Portugueze, and of those British

officers who have had full opportunities of ascertaining the truth,

that the conduct of the French in Evora was marked with deliberate and

sportive cruelty of the most flagitious kind. Concerning the conduct of

the general officers, as respects their sense of honour, I happen to

possess some rather curious information. Loison promised the Archbishop

that his property should not be touched. After this promise, Loison

himself, with some of his officers, entered the Archbishop’s library,

which was one of the finest in Portugal; they took down all the books,

in the hope of discovering valuables behind them, they broke off the

gold and silver clasps from the magnificent bindings of the rarest part

of the collection, and in their disappointment at finding so little

plunder, tore in pieces a whole pile of manuscripts. They took every

gold and silver coin from his cabinet of medals, and every jewel and

bit of the precious metals with which the relics were adorned, or which

decorated any thing in his oratory. Loison was even seen in noon-day

to take the Archbishop’s episcopal ring from the table and pocket it.

These circumstances are stated on the authority of the Archbishop

himself.

[23] Sir Arthur, upon the court of inquiry, begged leave, in justice

to the individuals composing this commissariat, to state, that he

did not intend to complain of want of zeal, nor of any deficiency of

exertion on their part. “The fact is,” said he, “that I wished to

draw the attention of the government to this important branch of the

service, which is but little understood in this country. The evils of

which I complained are probably to be attributed to the nature of our

political situation, which prevents us from undertaking great military

operations, in which the subsistence of armies becomes a subject of

serious consideration and difficulty, and these evils consisted in the

inexperience of almost every individual belonging to the commissariat,

of the mode of procuring, conveying, and distributing supplies.” He

requested that this explanation might stand upon the minutes.

[24] General Thiebault affirms, that they had only 1900 in the field.

An officer who was dying of his wounds informed Sir Arthur Wellesley

that their numbers were 6000. General Thiebault asserts also, that

in a charge made by General Brenier with two companies in front of

Azambugeira, the 29th regiment having lost its colonel, and many of its

officers and men, surrendered _tout-entier_: but that _par-malheur_

the firing did not cease, and the wreck of the regiment saved itself

by a spontaneous movement, leaving a major, eight officers, and fifty

men, in the hands of the French. There is an official test by which

the accuracy of this statement may be tried; and thereby it appears,

that only four officers were missing in this action, and that there was

no major among them. The loss of the English he states at more than

2000. The accuracy of our official lists of the killed and wounded is

among those things relating to Great Britain which a Frenchman cannot

understand.

[25] They were cast off cavalry, purchased in Ireland; and they were

described as old, blind, and lame: some of them, it was said, had

already at this time died of age, others of work, though they had been

carefully fed: nearly a sixth part had thus perished on the way, and

of the remainder a great number were not worth the forage which they

consumed. Nine years after these poor horses had been delivered over to

the dogs and wolves, a representation was made to me in their favour,

and I feel myself bound to notice it, were it only for the singularity

of the case. I am assured that the 300 horses (which Lord Castlereagh

good-naturedly called his countrymen) were selected with the greatest

care, as well as knowledge, in horseflesh, from 1050 of which the

corps was then composed; that they were in the very best condition and

working order; they were drafts from a collection made by purchase

in 1803, (that is, five years before, and therefore not young); or

from the best and most useful horses cast from dragoon regiments, as

unfit for dragoon service generally, (the inferior description of such

cast horses having been from time to time sold); that they had been

always carefully groomed and well fed, and were in excellent condition

for common draft, the service for which they were required. From the

manner in which this representation was made to me, I have no doubt of

its truth. The horses, when they began the campaign, had probably not

recovered from the voyage; they were not accustomed to the food of the

country, and were employed in much harder work than had ever fallen to

their lot before, and upon much worse roads. And so, peace to their

memory. I must not however omit to observe, that Captain Eliot, in his

Treatise on the Defence of Portugal, says, these artillery horses, in

the brigade to which he was attached, did their duty perfectly well at

the battle of Vimeiro.

[26] According to General Thiebault, ten guns and 1800 men; but to make

up the number of killed and wounded, he adds to the British loss, what

he takes off from the French, and says, we had more than 500 killed and

1200 wounded.

[27] _Weel, my bra’ lads, I can gang nae farther wi’ ye a-fighting; but

Deel ha’e my saul if ye sal want music_, were his words.

[28] They remained, according to General Thiebault, long enough to

dress 800 of their wounded upon the field, and send them all off for

Torres Vedras. The attitude of the grenadiers with which General

Kellermann had charged, the rapidity with which the infantry re-formed,

and the movements of four cavalry regiments under General Margaron, he

says, _concoururent efficacement à contenir l’ennemi. Nous restames

de cette manière, maîtres du champ de bataille, plus de trois heures

après la cessation de l’action._ It is melancholy to observe, that the

historical relations of this war which the French have published since

its termination, are, generally speaking, as little to be relied on as

their official accounts during its continuance.

[29] General Thiebault, who was present at this council, represents

the force against them, independent of Lisbon, of 30,000 British, and

17,000 Spaniards, at more than 80,000 men, _auxquels rien ne manquoit_!

In reality, every man in Portugal was their enemy; but except animosity

and individual courage, the Portugueze at that time wanted every thing.

[30] It is asserted by General Thiebault, that General Kellermann was

sent to feel his ground, under pretext of a conference relating to

the prisoners and wounded. Upon that General’s return he says, “_On

conçoit de quel interêt étoient les nouvelles qu’il rapportoit, et

combien elles parurent heureuses quand on sut à quel point il avoit

réalisé tout ce qu’on avoit pu esperer. Il avoit_ _été reçu avec la

plus grande distinction; il avoit eu le talent de faire prendre aux

Anglais l’initiative des propositions qu’il avoit à leur faire; sachant

parfaitement l’Anglais, il avoit suivi la partie la plus mysterieuse

de leurs conversations[31]; il s’étoit fortifié de la certitude que,

malgré l’énormité de leurs avantages, les Anglais, incertains de

l’époque de l’arrivée des renforts, qu’ils attendoient, n’étoient

pas tranquilles sur leur position: il étoit parvenu à traiter pour

la flotte Russe en même temps que pour l’armée Française, et cela

en faisant pressenter que les Russes alloient se joindre à nous: il

étoit arrivé de cette manière à demander même que nous émmenassions

la flotte Portuguese, non pour l’obtenir, mais afin d’avoir quelque

chose à céder, dans le cas où des articles d’une haute importance

seroient trop contestés; et c’est ainsi, que par autant d’habilité que

de fermeté et d’adresse, il parvint à conclure et à signer un traité

provisoire._” This statement is sent into the world with General

Kellermann’s sanction, Baron Thiebault’s _Relation_ having, as the

preface states, been read to him. General Kellermann was so successful

in this negotiation, that he can derive no additional credit from

these additions to the plain facts. With regard to the initiative, he

came declaredly to treat for an armistice preparatory to a convention

for evacuating Portugal, and he produced a paper containing the

wishes of the French Commander-in-chief; the deliberations upon his

proposal, which he is said to have overheard, were not carried on in

his presence, but in an inner room. (_Proceedings upon the Inquiry_, p.

57.) As to the demand that the French might carry away the Portugueze

fleet, the French are certainly bold askers; and in this negotiation,

as in many others, they proved that Fortune favours the bold; ... but

he must have been more than bold, who could have made such a proposal.

What was afterwards asked upon that score will appear hereafter.

[31] Voici quelques-unes des phrases qu’il recueillit: _Notre position

est delicate--Le corps de Sir John Moore n’est pas encore arrivé à

Figuières--La bonne intelligence des Russes et des Français doit nous

donner des inquietudes_, &c.

[32] LIST OF THE MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL JUNTA.

For Aragon D. Francisco Rebolledo de Palafox y Melzi, Gentleman

of the Bed-chamber, and Brigadier in the army;

D. Lorenzo Calvo de Rozas, Intendant of the army and

kingdom of Aragon.

Asturias D. Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos, Knight of the Order of

Alcantara, of the Royal Council of State, and formerly

Minister of Grace and Justice; Marques de Campo-Sagrado,

Lieutenant-General of the army, and Inspector-general

of the troops of Asturias.

The Canaries Marques de Villanueva del Prado.

Old Castille D. Lorenzo Bonifaz y Quintano, Prior of the holy

Church of Zamora; D. Francisco Xavier Caro, Professor

of Laws at Salamanca.

Catalonia Marques de Villel, Conde de Darnius, a Grandee, and

Gentleman of the Bed-chamber; Baron de Sabasona.

Cordoba Marques de la Puebla de los Infantes, a Grandee; D.

Juan de Dios Gutierrez Rabé.

Extremadura D. Martin de Garay, Intendant of Extremadura,

and Honorary Minister of the Council of War; D.

Felix Ovalle, Treasurer of the army of Extremadura.

Gallicia Conde de Gimonde; D. Antonio Aballe.

Granada D. Rodrigo Riquelme, Regent of the Chancery of

Granada; D. Luiz Funes y Salido, Canon of the

holy Church of Santiago.

Jaen D. Francisco Castanedo, Canon of the holy Church of

Jaen, Provisor and Vicar-general of that diocese; D.

Sebastian de Jocano, of his Majesty’s council, in the

_Tribunal de Contaduria Mayor_, and _Contador_ of the

province of Jaen.

Leon Frey D. Antonio Valdes, Bailey and Grand Cross of the

Order of S. Juan, Knight of the Golden Fleece, Gentleman

of the Bed-chamber, Captain-General of the

Fleet, Counsellor of State, formerly Minister of the

Marine, and acting Minister of the Indies; the Vizconde

de Quintanilla.

Madrid Conde de Altamira, Marques de Astorga, a Grandee,

Knight of the Golden Fleece, Grand Cross of the Order

of Charles III., First Equerry, and Gentleman of the

Bed-chamber; D. Pedro de Silva, Patriarch of the Indies,

Grand Cross of the Order of Charles III., and

formerly Camp-Marshal of the Royal Armies.

Majorca D. Tomas de Veri, Knight of the Order of S. Juan,

Lieutenant-Colonel of the Palma Volunteers; Conde de

Ayamans, Lieutenant-Colonel of the Palma Militia.

Murcia Conde de Florida-Blanca, Knight of the Golden Fleece,

Grand Cross of the Order of Charles III., Gentleman

of the Bed-chamber, and formerly First Secretary of

State, and acting Minister of Grace and Justice; Marques

del Villar.

Navarre D. Miguel de Balanza; D. Carlos de Amatria, Members

of the Deputation of the kingdom of Navarre.

Seville D. Juan de Vera y Delgado, Archbishop of Laodicea and

Coadjutor of Seville; Conde de Tilly.

Toledo D. Pedro de Ribero, Canon of the holy Church of Toledo;

D. José Garcia de la Torre, Advocate of the Royal

Councils.

Valencia Conde de Contamina, a Grandee, Gentleman of the

Bed-chamber; Principe Pio, a Grandee, Colonel of

Militia.

[33] Llorente, under his name of Nellerto, (vol. i. 155,) asserts,

that when Florida-Blanca was summoned to the central Junta he left

a writing, addressed to the municipality of the city of Murcia,

protesting that he acted under fear and compulsion, and in the full

knowledge that his country was going to destruction; and adding, that

he made this solemn declaration lest King Joseph should one day treat

him as a criminal. This infamous calumny, which by its own absurdity

confutes itself, is advanced by the ex-secretary of the Inquisition

upon no better authority than that of a Madrid journal, published

under the Intruder’s government. It is so palpably calumnious, that I

should not have thought it worthy of contradiction, if it had not been

doubtfully repeated by Col. Jones in his very able Account of the War.

[34] An account of them may be found in the notes to the Chronicle of

the Cid, pp. 141 and 418. Marshal Gouvion St. Cyr says of the present

Miquelets, that they are the best light troops in Europe (p. 54.) But

Cabañes argues that they cannot possibly be so efficient as they were

when war was carried on less scientifically, and he regrets that it was

not possible to raise regular regiments in their stead. P. i. 90.

[35] Aun vea el hora que vos _merezca dos_ tanto. V. 2348, p. 318. Mr.

Frere proposed to read _merezcades_.

[36] I give this remarkable story from that very meritorious journal,

‘The Plain Englishman,’ (vol. i. 294,) where it is related by the

editor on the authority of Sir Richard Keats himself.

[37] June 14. _Se sabe de oficio que ha muerto el 26 de Mayo el Rey de

Inglaterra; y que su sucessor ha mudado todo el ministerio eligiendo

sugetos decididos por la paz._

[38] M. Nellerto (Llorente) kills him twice. Once on the flight of the

Intruder from Madrid, preliminarily, (t. i. p. 143); and secondly and

definitively on this occasion. T. i. p. 159.

[39] This part of the bulletin was officially transmitted by Lord

Castlereagh to Sir John Moore, with the following instructions:--“His

Majesty cannot overlook this account, descriptive, according to the

obvious sense of it, of the murder of some unresisting stragglers of

his army, although his Majesty is disposed to disbelieve a transaction,

however sufficiently recorded, which is so utterly repugnant to the

usual laws of war, and to every principle of humanity. His Majesty

therefore desires that you will take the earliest means of ascertaining

the truth of the fact so recorded, and the circumstances under which it

was perpetrated, if perpetrated at all. If it shall upon investigation

appear to be founded, I am to desire you will cause a protest to be

made by you to the nearest head-quarters of the French army, and that

you will take such measures as shall appear to you most expedient

for the protection of the troops under your orders against conduct

so barbarous and so disgraceful.”--No such measures were taken, in

consequence of Sir John Moore’s retreat. This instruction, however,

exculpates the British government from any charge of indifference upon

the subject.

[40] The French historian of Marshal Soult’s Campaigns in 1808–9,

affirms that Sir John Moore had 37,000 effective men, and Romana had

from 25,000 to 30,000; their united force amounting thus to more than

60,000!

[41] He was shot through the heart, and died so instantaneously, that

the smile with which he was regarding the conduct of his men was fixed

upon his cheek. They buried him at the entrance of the bivouac which

he had occupied the preceding night; and as his brother leant forward

to look upon the body for the last time, a rifle-shot passed through

his cloak, and struck his side; its force was broken by the folds of

the cloak, otherwise the blow must have been fatal, and he would have

fallen into the grave upon his brother’s corpse.

[42] The historian of Marshal Soult’s campaigns in 1809 states the

loss of the French at 150 killed and 500 wounded. They were successful

on all points, he says; the victory was decided, and if the action

had begun earlier, and if the ground had permitted the cavalry to

charge, _c’en était fait de cette armée Anglaise_. These are modest

mis-statements in an author who asserts that, in the hope of impeding

the French in their pursuit, the English conceived the horrible

intention of blowing up the town of Betanzos, where the inhabitants had

received them as allies; and that for this purpose they deposited six

thousand weight of powder on the ground floor of the town-house and set

fire to the four quarters of the town!!

Transcriber’s Notes

Punctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant

preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not changed.

Simple typographical errors were corrected; two unbalanced quotation

marks were remedied.

Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained; occurrences of

inconsistent hyphenation have not been changed.

The source book used many Sidenotes, printed in italics. Most match

entries in the Table of Contents, but some are either dates or

citations. To preserve proximity with the original text, if they were

printed mid-paragraph, that is where they appear here. Depending on

the format in which you are reading this eBook, Sidenotes may be

distinguished from regular text by being shown in some combination

of italics, boldface, UPPER-CASE, enclosed in ♦DIAMOND SYMBOLS♦,

being offset into the left-margin, or in a rectangular area within

the regular text. Due to limitations of some eReaders, some sidenotes

may appear next to or below each other, depending on the width of the

screen.

The original Table of Contents used “ib.” when the page number was the

same as the one in the previous entry. This eBook uses the actual page

numbers.

Possible spelling and accent mark errors in non-English words have not

been changed, but, as with English words, when there is a predominant

spelling for a specific word or name, it is used in all cases.

All six volumes of this work are available at no cost at Project

Gutenberg. Some of these volumes reference each other, but some of the

references do not seem to match the text.

Volume I: Project Gutenberg eBook number 60386

Volume II: Project Gutenberg eBook number 60387

Volume III: Project Gutenberg eBook number 60388

Volume IV: Project Gutenberg eBook number 60389

Volume V: Project Gutenberg eBook number 60390

Volume VI: Project Gutenberg eBook number 60391

History of the Peninsular War, Volume 2 (of 6) · 第 10 / 10 章