One sentence in the paragraph now under consideration deserves special

notice. It is this. "But if we admit that there can be some thing

uncaused, there is no reason to assume a cause for anything." This

"assumes" the truth of a major premise all _things_ are substantially

alike. If the word "thing" is restricted to its exact limits,--objects

of sense,--then the sentence pertains wholly to the Sense and

Understanding, and is true. But if, as it would seem, the implication is

meant that there are no other entities which can be object to the mind

except such "things," then it is a clear _petitio principii_. For the

very question at issue is, whether, in fact, there is not one

entity--"thing"--which so differs in kind from all others, that it is

uncaused, _i. e._ self-existent; and whether the admission that that

entity is uncaused does not, because of this seen difference, satisfy

the mind, and furnish a reasonable ground on which to account for the

subordinate causes which we observe by the Sense.

In speaking of the First Cause as "independent," he says, "but it can

have no necessary relation within itself. There can be nothing in it

which determines change, and yet nothing which prevents change. For if

it contains something which imposes such necessities or restraints, this

something must be a cause higher than the First Cause, which is absurd.

Thus, the First Cause must be in every sense perfect, complete, total,

including within itself all power, and transcending all law." We cannot

criticize this better, and mark how curiously truth and error are mixed

in it, than by so parodying it that only truth shall be stated. The

First Cause possesses within himself all possible relations as belonging

to his necessary ideals. Hence, change, in the exact sense of that term,

is impossible to him, for there is nothing for him to _change to_. This

is not invalidated by his passing from inaction to action; for creation

involves no change in God's nature or attributes, and so no real or

essential change, which is here meant. But he is the permanent, through

whom all changes become. He is not, then, a _simple_ unit, but is an

organized Being, who is ground for, and comprehends in a unity, all

possible laws, forms, and relations, as necessary elements of his

necessary existence,--as endowments which necessarily belong to him, and

are conditional of his pure independence. Hence, these restraints are

not "imposed" upon him, except as his existence is imposed upon him.

They belong to his Self, and are conditional of his being. So, then,

instead of "transcending all law," he is the embodiment of all law; and

his perfection is, that possessing this endowment, he accords his

conduct thereto. A being who should "transcend all law" would have no

reason why he should act, and no form how he should act, neither would

he be an organism, but would be pure lawlessness or pure chaos. Pure

chaos cannot organize order; pure lawlessness cannot establish law; and

so could not be the First Cause. As Mr. Spencer truly says, "we have no

alternative but to regard this First Cause as Infinite and Absolute."

And now having learned, by a true diagnosis of the mental activities,

that the positions we have gained are fixed, final, irrevocable; and

further, that they are not the "results" of "reasonings," but that first

there was a seeing, and then an analysis of what was seen, and that the

seeing is _true_, though every other experience be false; we _know_ that

our position is not "illusive," but that we stand on the rock; and that

what we have seen is no "symbolic conception of the illegitimate order,"

but is pure truth.

For the further consideration of this subject, the reader is referred

back to our remarks on that passage in Mr. Mansel's work, which Mr.

Spencer has quoted.

A few remarks upon his summing up, p. 43 _et seq._, will complete the

review of this chapter. "Passing over the consideration of credibility,

and confining ourselves to that of" consistency, we would find in any

rigorous analysis, that Atheism and Pantheism are self-contradictory;

but we _have found_ that Theism, "when rigorously analyzed," presents an

absolutely consistent system, in which all the difficulties of the

Understanding are explained to the person by the Reason, and is entirely

thinkable. Such a system, based upon the necessary convictions of man,

and justly commanding that these shall be the fixed standard, in

accordance with which all doubts and queries shall be dissolved and

decided, gives a rational satisfaction to man, and discloses to him his

eternal REST.

In proceeding to his final fact, which he derives as the permanent in

all religions, Mr. Spencer overlooks another equally permanent, equally

common, and incomparably more important fact, viz: that Fetishism,

Polytheism, Pantheism, and Monotheism,--all religions alike assert _that

a god created the Universe_. In other words, the great common element,

in all the popular modes of accounting for the vast system of things in

which we live is, _that it is the product of an agency external to

itself, and that the external agency is personal_. Take the case of the

rude aboriginal, who "assumes a separate personality behind every

phenomenon." He does not attempt to account for all objects. His mind is

too infantile, and he is too degraded to suspect that those material

objects which appear permanent need to be accounted for. It is only the

changes which seem to him to need a reason. Behind each change he

imagines a sort of personal power, superior to it and man, which

produces it, and this satisfies him. He inquires no further; yet he

looks in the same direction as the Monotheist. In this crude form of

belief, which is named Fetishism, we see that essential idea which can

be readily traced through all forms of religion, that some _personal_

being, external, and superior to the things that be, produced them. Nor

is Atheism a proper exception to this law. For Atheism is not a

religion, but the denial of all religion. It is not a doctrine of God,

but is a denial that there is any God; and what is most in point, it

never was a _popular_ belief, but is only a philosophical Sahara over

which a few caravans of speculative doubters and negatists wander.

Neither can Hindu pantheism be quoted against the position taken: for

Brahm is not the Universe; neither are Brahma, Vishnu, and Siva. Brahm

does not lose his individuality because the Universe is evolved from

him. _Now_ he is thought of as one, and the Universe as another,

although the Universe is thought to be a part of his essence, and

hereafter to be reabsorbed by him. _Now_, this part of his essence which

was _produced_ through Brahma, Vishnu, and Siva, is _individualized_;

and so is one, while he is another. Thus, here also, the idea of a

proper external agency is preserved. The facts, then, are decisively in

favor of the proposition above laid down. "_Our_ investigation"

discloses "a fundamental verity in each religion." And the facts and the

verity find no consistent ground except in a pure Theism, and there they

do find perfect consistency and harmony.

It is required, finally, in closing the discussion of this chapter, to

account for the fact that, upon a single idea so many theories of God

have fastened themselves; or better, perhaps, that a single idea has

developed itself in so many forms. This cannot better be done than in

the language of that metaphysician, not second to Plato, the apostle

Paul. In his Epistle to the Romans, beginning at the 19th verse of the

1st chapter, he says: "Because that which may be known of God is

manifest to them; for God hath shewed it unto them. For the invisible

things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being

understood by the things which are made, even his eternal power and

Godhead, so that they are without excuse. Because that, when they knew

God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful; but became

vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened:

professing themselves to be wise they became fools, and changed the

glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible

man, and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things." This

passage, which would be worthy the admiring study of ages, did it

possess no claim to be the teaching of that Being whom Mr. Spencer

asserts it is _impossible for us to know_, gives us in a popular form

the truth. Man, having organic in his mind the idea of God, and having

in the Universe an ample manifestation to the Sense, of the eternal

power and Godhead of the Creator of that Universe, corresponding to that

idea, perverted the manifestation to the Sense, and degraded the idea in

the Reason, to the service of base passion. By this degradation and

perversion the organic idea became so bedizened with the finery of

fancy formed in the Understanding, under the direction of the animal

nature, as to be lost to the popular mind,--the trappings only being

seen. When once the truth was thus lost sight of, and with it all that

restraint which a knowledge of the true God would impose, men became

vain in their imaginations; their fancy ran riot in all directions.

Cutting loose from all law, they plunged into every excess which could

be invented; and out of such a stimulated and teeming brain all manner

of vagaries were devised. This was the first stage; and of it we find

some historic hints in the biblical account of the times, during and

previous to the life of Abraham. Where secular history begins the human

race had passed into the second stage. Crystallization had begun.

Students were commencing the search for truth. Religion was taking upon

itself more distinct forms. The organic idea, which could not be wholly

obliterated, formed itself distinctly in the consciousness of some

gifted individuals, and philosophy began. Philosophy in its purest form,

as taught by Socrates and Plato, presented again the lost idea of pure

Theism. But the spirituality which enabled them to see the truth, lifted

them so far above the common people, that they could affect only a few.

And what was most disheartening, that same degradation which originally

lost to man the truth, now prevented him from receiving it. Thus it was

that by a binding of the Reason to the wheels of Passion, and discursing

through the world with the Understanding at the beck of the Sense, the

many forms of religion became.

"ULTIMATE SCIENTIFIC IDEAS."

On a former page we have already attempted a positive answer to the

question, "What are Space and Time," with which Mr. Spencer opens this

chapter. It was there found that, in general terms, they are _a priori_

conditions of created being; and, moreover, that they possess

characteristics suitable to what they condition, just as the _a priori_

conditions of the spiritual person possess characteristics suitable to

what they condition. It was further found that this general law is, from

the necessity of the case, realized both within the mind and without it;

that it is, must be, the form of thought for the perceiving subject,

corresponding to the condition of existence for the perceived object. It

also appeared that the Universe as object, and the Sense and

Understanding as faculties in the subject, thus corresponded; and

further, that these faculties could never transcend and comprehend Space

and Time, because these were the very conditions of their being;

moreover, that by them all spaces and times must be considered with

reference to the Universe, and apart from it could not be examined by

them at all. Yet it was further found that the Universe might in the

presence of the Reason be abstracted; and that, then, pure Space and

Time still remained as pure _a priori_ conditions, the one as _room_,

the other as _opportunity_, for the coming of created being. Space and

Time being such conditions, _and nothing more_, are entities only in the

same sense that the multiplication table and the moral law are entities.

They are _conditions_ suited to what they condition. In the light of

this result let us examine Mr. Spencer's teachings respecting them.

Strictly speaking, Space and Time do not "exist." If they exist (ex

sto), they must stand out somewhere and when. This of course involves

the being of a where and a when in which they can stand out; and that

where and when must needs be accounted for, and so on _ad infinitum_.

Again, Mr. Spencer would seem to speak, in his usual style, as if they,

in existing "objectively," had a _formal_ objective existence. Yet this,

in the very statement of it, appears absurd. The mind apprehends many

objects, which do not "exist." They only are. Thus, as has just been

said, Space and Time, as conditions of created being, _are_. They are

entities but not existences. They are _a priori_ entities, and so are

_necessarily_. By this they stand in the same category with all pure

laws, all first principles.

"Moreover, to deny that Space and Time are things, and so by implication

to call them nothings, involves the absurdity that there are two kinds

of nothings." This sentence "involves the absurdity" of assuming that

"nothing" is an entity. If I say that Space is nothing, I say that it

presents no content for a concept, and cannot, because there is no

content to be presented. It is then _blank_. Just so of Time. As

nothings they are, then, both equally blank, and destitute of meaning.

Now if Mr. Spencer wishes to hold that nothing represented by one word,

differs from nothing represented by another, we would not lay a straw in

his way, but yet would be much surprised if he led a large company.

Again, having decided that they are neither "nonentities nor the

attributes of entities, we have no choice but to consider them as

entities." But he then goes on to speak of them as "things," evidently

using the word in the same sense as if applying it to a material object,

as an apple or stone; thereby implying that entity and thing in that

sense are synonymous terms. Upon this leap in the dark, this blunder in

the use of language, he proceeds to build up a mountain of difficulties.

But once take away this foundation, once cease attempting "to represent

them in thought as things," and his difficulties vanish. Space is a

condition. Perhaps receptivity, indivisibility, and illimitability are

attributes. If so, it has attributes, for these certainly belong to it.

But whether these shall be called attributes or not, it is certain that

Space is, is a pure condition, is thus a positive object to the Reason,

is qualified by the characteristics named above; and all this without

any contradiction or other insuperable difficulty arising thereby. On

the ground now established, we learn that extension and Space are _not_

"convertible terms." Extension is an attribute of matter. Space is a

condition of phenomena. It is only all _physical_ "entities which we

actually know as such" that "are limited." From our standpoint, that

Space is _no_ thing, such remarks as "We find ourselves totally unable

to form any mental image of unbounded Space," appear painfully absurd.

"We find ourselves" just as "totally unable to form any mental image of

unbounded" love. Such phrases as "mental image" have _no relevancy_ to

either Space or Time. In criticizing Kant's doctrine, which we have

found _true_ as far as it goes, Mr. Spencer evinces a surprising lack of

knowledge of the facts in question. "In the first place," he says, "to

assert that Space and Time, as we are conscious of them, are subjective

conditions, is by implication to assert that they are not objective

realities." But the conclusion does not follow. If the reader will take

the trouble to construct the syllogism on which this is based, he will

at once perceive the absurdity of the logic. It may be said in general

that all conditions of a thinking being are both subjective and

objective: they are conditions of his being--subjective; and they are

objects of his examination and cognizance--objective. Is not the

multiplication table an objective reality, _i. e._, would it not remain

if he be destroyed? And yet is it not also a subjective law; and so was

it not originally discovered by introspection and reflection? Again he

says, "for that consciousness of Space and Time which we cannot rid

ourselves of, is the consciousness of them as existing objectively." Now

the fact is, that primarily we do not have _any_ consciousness of Space

and Time. _Consciousness has to do with phenomena._ When examining the

material Universe, the _objects_, and the objects as at a distance from

each other and as during, are what we are conscious of. For instance, I

view the planets Jupiter and Saturn. They appear as objects in my

consciousness. There is a distance between them; but this distance _is_

not, except as they _are_. If they are not, the word distance has no

meaning with reference to them. Take them away, and I have no

consciousness of distance as remaining. These planets continue in

existence. They endure. This endurance we call time, but if they should

cease, one could not think of endurance in connection with them as

remaining. Here we most freely and willingly agree with Mr. Spencer that

"the question is, What does consciousness directly testify?" but he will

find that consciousness on this side of the water testifies very

differently from his consciousness: as for instance in the two articles

in the "North American Review," heretofore alluded to. Here, "the direct

testimony of consciousness is," that spaces and times within the

Universe are without the mind; that Space and Time, as _a priori_

conditions for the possibility of formal object and during event, are

also without the mind; but the "testimony" is none the less clear and

"direct" that Space and Time are laws of thought in the mind

corresponding to the actualities without the mind. And the question may

be asked, it is believed with great force, If this last were not so, how

could the mind take any cognizance of the actuality? Again, most truly,

Space and Time "cannot be conceived to become non-existent even were the

mind to become non-existent." Much more strongly than this should the

truth be uttered. They could not become non-existent if the Universe

with every sentient being, yea, even--to make an impossible

supposition--if the Deity himself, should cease to be. In this they

differ no whit from the laws of Mathematics, of Logic, and of Morals.

These too would remain as well. Thus is again enforced the truth, which

has been stated heretofore, that Space and Time, as _a priori_

conditions of the Universe, stand in precisely the same relation to

material object and during event that the multiplication table does to

intellect, or the moral law to a spiritual person. It will now be

doubtless plain that Mr. Spencer's remarks sprang directly from the

lower faculties. The Sense in its very organization possesses Space and

Time as void forms into which objects may come. So also the

Understanding possesses the notional as connecting into a totality.

These faculties cannot be in a living man without acting. Activity is

their law. Hence images are ever arising and _must_ arise in the Sense,

and be connected in the Understanding, and all this in the forms and

conditions of Space and Time. He who thinks continually in these

conditions will always _imagine_ that Space and Time are only without

him--because he will be thinking only in the iron prison-house of the

imagining faculty--and so cannot transcend the conditions it imposes.

Now how shall one see these conditions? They do "exist objectively"; or,

to phrase it better, they have a true being independent of our minds. In

this sense, as we have seen, every _a priori_ condition must be

objective to the mind. What is objective to the Sense is not Space but a

space, _i. e._ a part of Space limited by matter; and, after all, it is

the boundaries which are the true object rather than the space, which

cannot be "conceived" of if the boundaries be removed. Without further

argument, is it not evident that there Space, like all other _a priori_

conditions, is object only to the Reason, and that as a condition of

material existence?

At the bottom of page 49 we have another of Mr. Spencer's psychological

errors:--"For if Space and Time are forms of thought, they can never be

thought of; since it is impossible for anything to be at once the _form_

of thought and the matter of thought." Although this topic has been

amply discussed elsewhere, it may not be uninstructive to recur to it

again. Exactly the opposite of Mr. Spencer's remark is the truth. The

question at issue here is one of those profound and subtile ones which

cannot be approached by argument, but can be decided only by a _seeing_.

It is a psychological question pertaining to the profoundest depths of

our being. If one says, "I see the forms of thought," and another, "I

cannot see them," neither impeaches the other. All that is left is to

stimulate the dull faculty of the one until he can see. The following

reflections may help us to see. Mr. Spencer's remark implies that we

have no higher faculty than the Sense and the Understanding. It implies,

also, that we can never have any _self_-knowledge, in the fundamental

signification of that phrase. We can observe the conduct of the mind,

and study and classify the results; but the laws, the constitution of

the activity itself must forever remain closed to us. As was said, when

speaking of this subject under a different phase, the eye cannot see and

study itself. It is a mechanical organism, capable only of reaction as

acted upon, capable only of seeing results, but never able to penetrate

to the hidden springs which underlie the event. Just so is it with the

Sense and Understanding. They are mere mechanical faculties capable of

acting as they are acted upon, but never able to go behind the

appearance to its final source. On such a hypothesis as this all science

is impossible, but most of all a science of the human mind. If man is

enclosed by such walls, no knowledge of his central self can be gained.

He may know what he _does_; but what he _is_, is as inscrutable to him

as what God is. As such a being, he is only a higher order of brute. He

has some dim perceptions, some vague feelings, but he has no

_knowledge_; he is _sure_ of nothing. He can reach no ground which is

ultimate, no _Rock_ which he knows is _immutable_. Is man such a being?

The longings and aspirations of the ages roll back an unceasing NO! He

is capable of placing himself before himself, of analyzing that self to

the very groundwork of his being. All the laws of his constitution, all

the forms of his activity, he can clearly and amply place before himself

and know them. And how is this? It is because God has endowed him with

an EYE like unto His own, which enables man to be self-comprehending, as

He is self-comprehending,--the Reason, with which man may read himself

as a child reads a book; that man can make "the _form_ of thought the

_matter_ of thought." True, the Understanding is shut out from any

consideration of the forms of thought; but man is not simply or mainly

an Understanding. He is, in his highest being, a spiritual person, whom

God has endowed with the faculty of VISION; and the great organic evil,

which the fall wrought into the world, was this very denial of the

spiritual light, and this crowding down and out of sight, of the

spiritual person beneath the animal nature, this denial of the essential

faculties of such person, and this elevation of the lower faculties of

the animal nature, the Sense and Understanding, into the highest place,

which is involved in all such teachings as we are criticizing.

Mr. Spencer's remarks upon "Matter" are no nearer the truth. In almost

his first sentence there is a grievous logical _faux pas_. He says:

"Matter is either infinitely divisible or it is not; no third

possibility can be named." Yet we will name one, as follows: _The

divisibility of matter has no relation to infinity_. And this _third_

supposition happens to be the truth. But it will be said that the

question should be stated thus: Either there is a limit to the

divisibility of matter, or there is no limit. This statement is

exhaustive, because limitation belongs to matter. Of these alternatives

there can be no hesitation which one to choose. There is a limit to the

divisibility of matter. This answer cannot be given by the physical

sense; for no one questions but what it is incapable of finding a limit.

The mental sense could not give it, because it is a question of actual

substance and not of ideal forms. The Reason gives the answer. Matter is

limited at both extremes. Its amount is definite, as are its final

elements. These "ultimate parts" have "an under and an upper surface, a

right and a left side." When, then, one of these parts shall be broken,

what results? Not _pieces_, as the materialist, thinking only in the

Sense, would have us believe. When a final "part" shall be broken, there

will remain _no matter_,--to the sense nothing. To it, the result would

be annihilation. But the Reason declares that there would be left _God's

power_ in its simplicity,--that final Unit out of which all diversity

becomes.

The subsequent difficulties raised respecting the solidity of Matter may

be explained thus. And for convenience sake, we will limit the term

Matter to such substances as are object to the physical sense, like

granite, while Force shall be used to comprise those finer substances,

like the Ether, which are impalpable to the physical sense. Matter is

composed of very minute ultimate particles which do not touch, but which

are held together by Force. The space between the atoms, which would

otherwise be _in vacuo_, is _full_ of Force. We might be more exhaustive

in our analysis, and say--which would be true--that a space-filling

force composes the Universe; and that Matter is only Force in one of its

modifications. But without this the other statement is sufficient. When,

then, a portion of matter is compressed, the force which holds the

ultimate particles in their places is overcome by an external force, and

these particles are brought nearer together. Now, how is it with the

moving body and the collision? Bisect a line and see the truth.

C

A--------B

1

A body with a mass of 4 is moving with a velocity of 4 along the line

from A to B. At C it meets another body with a mass of 4 at rest. From

thence the two move on towards B with a velocity of 2. What has

happened? In the body there was a certain amount of force, which set it

in motion and kept it in motion. And just here let us make a point. _No

force is ever lost or destroyed. It is only transferred._ When a bullet

is fired from a gun, it possesses at one _point_ a maximum of force.

From that point this force is steadily _transferred_ to the air and

other substances, until all that it received from the powder is spent.

But at any one point in its flight, the sum of the force which has been

transferred since the maximum, and of the force yet to be transferred,

will always equal the maximum. Now, how is it respecting the question

raised by Mr. Spencer? The instant of contact is a point in time, _not a

period_, and the transfer of force is instantaneous. C, then, is a

_point_, not a period, and the velocity on the one side is 4 and the

other side 2, while the momentum or force is exactly equal throughout

the line. If it is said that this proves that a body can pass from one

velocity to another without passing through the intermediate velocities,

we cannot help it. The above are the facts, and they give the truth. The

following sentence of Mr. Spencer is, at least, careless. "For when, of

two such units, one moving at velocity 4 strikes another at rest, the

striking unit must have its velocity 4 instantaneously reduced to

velocity 2; must pass from velocity 4 to velocity 2 without any lapse of

time, and without passing through intermediate velocities; must be

moving with velocities 4 and 2 at the same instant, which is

impossible." If there is any sense in the remark, "instantaneously" must

mean a _point_ of time _without period_. For, if any period is allowed,

the sentence has no meaning, since during that period "the striking

unit" passes through all "intermediate velocities." But if by

instantaneously he means _without period_, then the last clause of the

sentence is illogical, since instant there evidently means a period. For

if it means point, then it contradicts the first clause. There, it is

asserted that 4 was "_reduced_" to 2, _i. e._ that at one point the

velocity was 4, and at the next point it was 2, and that there was _no

time_ between. If 4 was instantaneously reduced to 2, then the velocity

2 was next after the velocity 4, and not coeval with it. Thus it appears

that these two clauses which were meant to be synonymous are

contradictory.

Bearing in mind what we have heretofore learned respecting atoms, we

shall not be troubled by the objections to the Newtonian theory which

follow. In reply to the question, "What is the constitution of these

units?" the answer, "We have no alternative but to regard each of them

as a small piece of matter," would be true if the Sense was the only

faculty which could examine them. But even upon this theory Mr.

Spencer's remarks "respecting the parts of which each atom consists,"

are entirely out of place; for the hypothesis that it is an ultimate

atom excludes the supposition of "parts," since that phrase has no

meaning except it refers to a final, indivisible, material unit. All

that the Sense could say, would be, "What this atom is I know not, but

that it is, and _is not divisible_, I believe." But when we see by the

Reason that the ultimate atom, when dissolved, becomes God's power, all

difficulty in the question vanishes. Having thus answered the above

objections, it is unnecessary to notice the similar ones raised against

Boscovich's theory, which is a modification of that of Newton.

Mr. Spencer next examines certain phenomena of motion. The fact that he

seeks for absolute motion by the _physical sense_, a faculty which was

only given us to perceive relative--phenomenal--motion, and is, _in its

kind_, incapable of finding the absolute motion, (for if it should see

it, it could not _know_ it,) is sufficient to condemn all that he has

said on this subject. For the presentations which he has made of the

phenomena given us by the Sense does not exhaust the subject. The

perplexities therein developed are all resolvable, as will appear

further on. The phenomena adduced on page 55 are, then, merely

_appearances_ in the physical sense; and the motion is merely relative.

In the first instance, the captain walks East with reference to the ship

and globe. In the second, he walks East with reference to the ship; the

ship sails West with reference to the globe; while the resultant motion

is, that he is _stationary_ with reference to this larger object. What,

then, can the Sense give us? Only resultant motion, at the most. So we

see that "our ideas of Motion" are not "illusive," but _deficient_. The

motion is just what it appears, measured from a given object. It is

_relative_, and this is all the Sense _can_ give. Our author

acknowledges that "we tacitly assume that there are real motions"; that

"we take for granted that there are fixed points in space, with respect

to which all motions are absolute; and we find it impossible to rid

ourselves of this idea." A question instantly arises, and it seems to be

one which he is bound to entertain, viz: How comes this idea to be? We

press this question upon Mr. Spencer, being persuaded that he will find

it much more perplexing than those he has entertained. Undoubtedly,

"absolute motion cannot even be imagined." _No_ motion can be imagined,

though the moving body may be. But by no means does it follow, "much

less known." This involves that the knowing faculty is inferior to, and

more circumscribed than, the imagining faculty, when the very opposite

is the fact. Neither does it follow from what is said in the paragraph

beginning with, "For motion is change of place," that "while we are

obliged to think that there is absolute motion, we find absolute motion

incomprehensible." The Universe is limited and bounded, and is a sphere.

We _may_ assume that the centre of the sphere is at rest. Instantly

absolute motion becomes comprehensible, for it is motion measured from

that point. Surely there can be no harm in the _supposition_. The Reason

shows us that the supposition is the truth; and that that centre is the

throne of the eternal God. In this view not only is motion, apart from

the "limitations of space," totally unthinkable, but it is absolutely

impossible. Motion _cannot_ be, except as a formal body is. Hence, to

speak of motion in "unlimited space" is simply absurd. Formal object

_cannot_ be, except as _thereby_ a limit is established in Space. Hence

it is evident that "absolute motion" is not motion with reference to

"unlimited Space," which would be the same as motion without a moving;

but is motion with reference to that point fixed in Space, around which

all things revolve, but which is itself at perfect rest.

"Another insuperable difficulty presents itself, when we contemplate the

transfer of Motion." Motion is simply the moving of a body, and _cannot

be transferred_. The _force_ which causes the motion is what is

transferred. All that can be said of motion is, that it is, that it

increases, that it diminishes, that it ceases. If the moving body

impinges upon another moving body, and causes it to move, it is not

motion that is transferred, but the force which causes the motion. The

motion in the impinging body is diminished, and a new motion is begun in

the body which was at rest. Again it is asked: "In what respect does a

body after impact differ from itself before impact?" And further on:

"The motion you say has been communicated. But how? What has been

communicated? The striking body has not transferred a _thing_ to the

body struck; and it is equally out of the question to say that it has

transferred an _attribute_." Observe now that a somewhat is

unquestionably communicated; and the question is:--What is it? Query.

Does Mr Spencer mean to comprehend the Universe in "thing" and

"attribute"? He would seem to. If he does, he gives a decision by

assertion without explanation or proof, which involves the very question

at issue, which is, Is the somewhat transferred a "thing" or an

"attribute"; and a decision directly contrary to the acknowledgment that

a somewhat has been communicated? On the above-named hypothesis his

statement should be as follows: A somewhat has been communicated.

"Thing" and "attribute" comprise all the Universe. Neither a thing, nor

an attribute has been communicated, _i. e._ no somewhat has been

communicated; which contradicts the evidence and the acknowledgment. If

on the other hand Mr. Spencer means that "thing" and "attribute"

comprise only a part of the Universe, then the question is not fairly

met. It may be more convenient for the moment to conclude the Universe

in the two terms thing and attribute; and then, as attribute is

essential to the object it qualifies, and so cannot be communicated, it

will follow that a thing has been communicated. This thing we call

force. It is not in hand now to inquire what force is. It is manifest to

the Sense that the body is in a different state after impact, than it

was before. Something has been put into the body, which, though not

directly appreciable to the Sense, is indirectly appreciable by the

results, and which is as real an addition as water is to a bowl, when

poured in. Before the impact the body was destitute of that kind of

force--motor force would be a convenient term--which tended to move it.

After the impact a sufficiency of that force was present to produce the

motion. It may be asked, where does this force go to when the motion

diminishes till the body stops. It passes into the substances which

cause the diminution until there is no surplus in the moving body, and

at the point of equilibrium motion ceases. If it be now asked, where

does this force ultimately go to, it is to be said that it comes from

God, and goes to God, who is the Final. The Sense gives only subordinate

answers, but the Reason leads us to the Supreme.

If the view adopted be true, Mr. Spencer's halving and halving again

"the rate of movement forever," is irrelevant. It is not a _mental

operation_ but an _actual fact_ which is to be accounted for. Take a

striking illustration. A ball lying on smooth ice is struck with a

hockey. Away it goes skimming over the glassy surface with a steadily

diminishing velocity till it ceases. It starts, it proceeds, it stops.

These are the facts; and the mental operation must accord with them.

There is put into the ball, at the instant of contact, a certain amount

of motor force. From that instant onward, that force flows out of the

ball into the resisting substances by which it is surrounded, until none

is left. And it is just as pertinent to ask how all the water can flow

out of a pail, as how all the motor force can flow out of a moving

substance. "The smallest movement is separated" by no more of "an

impassable gap from no movement," _than it is from a larger movement

above it_. That which will account for a movement four becoming two,

will account for a movement two becoming zero. The "puzzle," then, may

be explained thus. Time is the procession of events. Let it be

represented by a line. Take a point in that line, which will then mark

its division but represent _no period_. On one side of that point is

rest; on the other motion. That point is the point of contact, and

occupies no period. At this point the motion is maximum. The force

instantly begins to flow off, and continues in a steady stream until

none is left, and the body is again at rest. Here, also, we take a

point. This is the point of zero. It again divides the line. Before the

bisection is motion; after the bisection is rest. All this cannot be

perceived by the Sense, nor conceived by the Understanding. It is seen

by the Reason. Now observe the actual phenomenon. The ball starts,

proceeds, stops. From maximum to zero there is a steady diminution, or

nearly enough so for the experiment; at least the diminution can be

averaged for the illustration. Then comparing motion with time, the same

difficulty falls upon the one as the other. If the motion is halved, the

time must be; and so, "mentally," it is impossible to imagine how a

moment of time can pass. To the halving faculty--the Sense--this is

true, and so we are compelled to correct our course of procedure. This

it is. The Sense and Understanding being impotent to discover an

absolute unit of any kind, the Sense _assumes_ for itself what meets all

practical want--a standard unit, by which it measures parts in Space and

Time. So motion must be measured by some assumed standard; and as, like

time,--duration,--it can be represented by a line, let them have a

common standard. Suppose, then, that the ball's flight occupies ten

minutes of time. The line from m to z will be divided into ten exactly

equal spaces; and it will be no more difficult to account for the flow

of force from 10 to 9, than from 1 to 0. Also let it be observed that

the force, like time, is a unit, which the Sense, for its convenience,

divides into parts; but that neither those parts, nor any parts, have

any real existence. As Time is an indivisible whole, measured off for

convenience, so any given force is such a whole, and is so measured off.

All this appearing and measuring are phenomenal in the Sense. It is the

Reason which sees that they can be _only_ phenomenal, and that behind

the appearance is pure Spirit--God, who is primarily out of all

relation.

On page 58, near the close of his illustration of the chair, Mr. Spencer

says: "It suffices to remark that since the force as known to us is an

affection of consciousness, we cannot conceive the force as existing in

the chair under the same form without endowing the chair with

consciousness." This very strange assertion can only be true, provided a

major premiss, No force can be conceived to exist without involving an

affection of consciousness in the object in which it _apparently_

inheres, is true. Such a premiss seems worse than absurd; it seems

silly. We cannot learn that force exists, without our consciousness is

affected thereby; but this is a very different thing from our being

unable to conceive of a force as _existing_, without there is a

consciousness in the object through which it _appears_. If Mr. Spencer

had said that no force can be, without being exerted, and no force can

be exerted, without an affection of the consciousness of the exertor, he

would have uttered the truth. We would then have the following result.

Primarily all force is exerted by the Deity; and he is conscious

thereof. He draws the chair down just as really as though the hand were

visible. Secondarily spiritual persons are endowed by their Creator with

the ability to exert his force for their uses, and so I lift the chair.

The great error, which appears on every page of Mr. Spencer's book and

invalidates all his conclusions, shows itself fully here. He presents

images from the Sense, and then tries to satisfy the Reason--the faculty

which calls for an absolute account--by the analyses of that Sense. His

attempt to "halve the rate," his remark that "the smallest movement is

separated by an impassable gap from no movement," and many such, are

only pertinent to the Sense, can never be explained by the Sense, and

are found by the Reason to need, and be capable of, no such kind of

explanation as the Sense attempts; but that the phenomena are

appearances in _wholes_, whose partitions cannot be absolute, and that

these wholes are accounted for by the being of an absolute and infinite

Person--God, who is utterly impalpable to the Sense, and can be known

only by the Reason.

The improper use of the Sense mentioned above, is, if possible, more

emphatically exemplified in the remarks upon "the connection between

Force and Matter." "Our ultimate test of Matter is the ability to

resist." This is true to the Sense, but no farther. "Resist" what? Other

matter, of course. Thus is the sensuousness made manifest. In the Sense,

then, we have a material object. But Force is not object to the Sense

directly, but only indirectly by its effects through Matter. The Sense,

in its percept, deems the force other than the matter. Hence it is

really no more difficult for the Sense to answer the question, How could

the Sun send a force through 95,000,000 of miles of void to the Earth

and hold it, than through solid rock that distance? All that the Sense

_can do_ is to present the phenomena. It is utterly impotent to account

for the least of them.

In the following passage, on page 61, Mr. Spencer seems to have been

unaccountably led astray. He says: "Let the atoms be twice as far apart,

and their attractions and repulsions will both be reduced to one fourth

of their present amounts. Let them be brought within half the distance,

and then attractions and repulsions will both be quadrupled. Whence it

follows that this matter will as readily as not assume any other

density; and can offer no resistance to any external agents." Now if

this be true, there can be no "external agents" to which to offer any

"resistance." It is simply to assert that all force neutralizes itself;

and that matter is impossible. But the conclusion does not "follow." It

is evidently based on the supposition that the "attractions and

repulsions" are _contra_-acting forces which exactly balance each other,

and so the molecules are held in their position by _no_ force. Instead

of this, they are _co_-acting forces, which are wholly expended in

holding the molecules in their places. The repulsions, then, are

expended in resisting pressure from without which seeks to crowd the

particles in upon themselves and thus disturb their equilibrium; while

the attractions are expended in holding the particles down to their

natural distance from each other when any disturbing force attempts to

separate them. Hence, referring to the two cases mentioned, in the first

instance the power of resistance is reduced to one fourth, and this

corresponds with the fact; and in the second instance the power of

resistance is increased fourfold, and this corresponds with the fact.

We thus arrive at the end of Mr. Spencer's remarks concerning the

material Universe and of our strictures thereon. Perhaps the reader's

mind cannot better be satisfied as to the validity of these strictures

than by presenting an outline of the system furnished by the Reason, and

upon which they are based.

The Reason gives, by a direct and immediate intuition, and as a

necessary _a priori_ idea, God. This is a _spontaneous_, synthetical

act, precisely the same in kind with that which gives a simple _a

priori_ principle, as idea. In it the Reason intuits, not a single

principle seen to be necessary simply, but the fact that all possible

principles _must_ be combined in a perfectly harmonious unity, in a

single Being, who thereby possesses all possible endowments; and so is

utterly independent, and is seen to be the absolute and infinite Person,

the perfect Spirit. This act is no conclusion of the One from the many

in a synthetical judgment, but is entirely different. It is the

necessary seeing of the many in the One; and so is not a judgment but an

intuition, not a guess but a certainty. God, then, is known, when known

at all, not "by plurality, difference, and relation," but by an

_immediate_ insight into his unity, and so is directly known as he is.

And the whole Universe is, that creatures might be, to whom this

revelation was possible. Among the other necessary endowments which this

intuition reveals, is that of immanent power commensurate with his

dignity, and adequate to realize in actual creatures the necessary _a

priori_ ideas, which he also possesses as endowments. Power is, then, a

simple idea, incapable of analysis; and which cannot therefore be

defined, except by synonymous terms; and to which President Hopkins's

remark upon moral obligation is equally pertinent; viz: "that we can

only state the occasion on which it arises." From these data the _a

priori_ idea of the Universe may be developed as follows:--

God, the absolute and infinite Person, possesses, as inherent endowment

forever immanent in himself, Universal Genius; which is at once capacity

and faculty, in which he sees, and by which he sees, all possible ideas,

and these in all possible combinations or ideals. Thus has he all

possible knowledge. From the various ideal systems which thus are, he,

having perfect wisdom, and according his choice to the behest of his own

worth, selects that one which is thus seen to be best; and thereby

determines the forms and laws under which the Universe shall become. He

also possesses, as inherent endowment, all power; _i. e._ the ability to

realize every one of his ideals; but _not_ the ability to violate the

natural laws of his being, as to make two and two five. The ideal system

is only ideal: the power is simply power; and so long as the two remain

isolated, no-thing will be. Therefore, in order to the realization of

his ideal, it must be combined with the power; _i. e._, the power must

be organized according to the ideal. How, then, can the power, having

been sent forth from God, be organized? Thus. If the power goes forth in

its simplicity, it will be expended uselessly, because there is no

substance upon which it may be exercised. It follows, then, that, if

exercised at all, it must be exercised upon _itself_. When, therefore,

God would create the Universe, he sent forth two "pencils," or columns

of power, of equal and sufficient volume, which, acting upon each other

from opposite directions, just held each other in balance, and thus

force was. These two "pencils," thus balancing each other, would result

in a sphere of "space-filling force." The point of contact would

determine the first place in Space, and the first point in Time; from

which, if attainable, an absolute measure of each could be made. All we

have now attained is the single duality "space-filling force," which is

wholly homogeneous, is of sufficient volume to constitute the Universe,

and yet by no means _is_ the Universe. There is only Chaos, "without

form and void, and darkness" is "upon the face of the deep." Now must

"the Spirit of God move upon the face of the waters"; then through vast

and to us immeasurable periods of time, through cycle and epicycle, the

work of organization will go on. Ever moving under forms laid down in

the _a priori_ ideal, God's power turns upon itself, as out of the crush

of elemental chaos the Universe is being evolved. During this process,

whatever of the force is to act under the law of heat in the _a priori_

ideal, assumes that form and the heat force becomes; whatever is to act

under the law of magnetism, assumes that form, and magnetic force

becomes; so of light, and the various forms of matter. At length, in the

revolution of the cycles, the Universe attains that degree of

preparation which fits it for living things to be, and the life force is

organized; and by degrees all its various forms are brought forth. After

another vast period that point is reached when an animal may be

organized, which shall be the dwelling-place for a time of a being whose

life is utterly different in kind from any animal life, and man appears.

Now in all these vast processes, be it observed that God is personally

present, that the first energy was his, and that every subsequent

energizing act is his special and personal act. He organized the

duality, force. He then organized this force into heat-force,

light-force, magnetic-force, matter-force, life-force, and soul-force.

And so it is that his personal supervision and energy is actually

present in every atom of the Universe. When we turn from this process of

thought to the sensible facts, and speak of granite, sandstone, schist,

clay, herbage, animals, yes, of the thousand kinds of substance which

appear to the eye, it is to be remembered that all these are but _forms

to the Sense_ of that "reason-conception," force,--that primal duality,

which power acting upon itself becomes. Now as the machine can never

carve any other image than those for which it is specially constructed,

and must work just as it is made to work, so the Sense, which is purely

mechanical, can never do any other than the work for which it was made,

can never transcend the laws of its organization. It can only give

forms--results, but is impotent to go behind them. It can only say _that

things are_, but never say _what_ or _why_ they are.

Seen in the light of the theory which has thus been presented, Mr.

Spencer's difficulties vanish. Matter is force. Motion is matter

affected by another form of force. The "puzzle" of motion and rest is

only phenomenal to the Sense; it is an appearance of force acting

through another force. It may also be said that the Universe is solid

force. There is no void in it. There is no nook, no crevice or cranny,

that is not full of force. To seek, then, for some medium through which

force may traverse vast distances, is the perfection of superfluity.

From centre to circumference it is present, and controls all things, and

is all things. So it is no more difficult to see how force reaches forth

and holds worlds in their place, than how it draws down the pebble which

a boy has thrown into the air. It is no substance which must travel over

the distance, it is rather an inflexible rod which swings the worlds

round in their orbits. Whether, then, we look at calcined crags or

lilies of the valley, whether astronomy, or geology, or chemistry be our

study, the objects grouped under those sciences will be found to be

equally the results of this one force, acting under different laws, and

taking upon itself different forms, and becoming different objects.

That faculty and that line of thought, which have given so readily the

solution of the difficulties brought to view by Mr. Spencer's

examination of the outer world, will afford us an easier solution, if

possible, of the difficulties which he has raised respecting the inner

world. That which is not of us, but is far from us, may perchance be

imperfectly known; but ourselves, what we are, and the laws of our

being, may be certainly and accurately known. And this is the highest

knowledge. It may be important, as an element of culture, that we become

acquainted with many facts respecting the outer world. It cannot but be

of the utmost importance, that we know ourselves; for thus only can we

fulfil the behest of that likeness to God, in which we were originally

created. We seek for, we may obtain, we _have obtained_ knowledge in the

inner world,--a knowledge sure, steadfast, immutable.

It seems to be more than a mere verbal criticism, rather a fundamental

one, that it is not "our states of consciousness" which "occur in

succession"; but that the modifications in our consciousness so occur.

Consciousness is _one_, and retains that oneness throughout all

modifications. These occur in the unity, as items of experience affect

it. Is this series of modifications "of consciousness infinite or

finite"? To this question experience _can_ give no answer. All

experiments are irrelevant; because these can only be after the faculty

of consciousness is. They can go no further back than the _forms_ of the

activity. These they may find, but they cannot account for. A law lies

on all those powers by which an experiment may be made, which forever

estops them from attaining to the substance of the power which lies back

of the form. The eye cannot examine itself. The Sense, as mental

capacity for the reception of impressions, cannot analyze its

constituents. The Understanding, as connective faculty concluding in

judgments, is impotent to discover why it must judge one way and not

another. It is only when we ascend to the Reason that we reach the

region of true knowledge. Here, overlooking, analyzing all the conduct

of the lower powers, and holding the self right in the full blaze of the

Eye of self, Man attains a true and fundamental _self-knowledge_. From

this Mount of Vision we know that infinity and finiteness have no

pertinence to modifications of consciousness, or in fact to any series.

We attain to the further knowledge that this series is, _must be_,

limited; because the constituted beings, in whom it in each case

inheres, are limited, and had a beginning. It matters not now to inquire

how a self-conscious person could be created. It is sufficient to know

that one has been created. This fact involves the further fact that

consciousness, as an actuality, began in the order of nature, after the

being to whom it belongs as endowment, or, in other words, an

organization must be, before the modifications which inhere in that

organization can become. The attainment of this as necessary law is far

more satisfactory than any experience could be, were it possible; for we

can never know but that an experience may be modified; but a law given

in the intuition is immutable. The fact, ascertained many pages back,

that the subject and the object are identical under the final

examination of the Reason, enables us to attain the present end of the

chain. The question is one of fact, and is purely psychological. It

cannot be passed upon, or in any way interfered with, by logical

processes. It is only by examination, by seeing, that the truth can be

known. Faraday ridiculed as preposterous the pretension that a vessel

propelled by steam could cross the ocean, and demonstrated, to his

entire satisfaction, the impossibility of the event. Yet the Savannah

crossed, and laughed at him. Just so here, all arguing is folly. The

question is one of fact in experience. And upon it the soul gives

undoubted answer, as we have stated. Nor is it so difficult, as some

would have us believe, to see how this may be. Consciousness is an

indivisible unity, and, as we have before seen, may best be defined as

the light in which the person intuits his own acts and activities. This

unity is abiding, and is ground for the modifications. It is, then,

_now_, and the person now knows what the present modification _is_. The

person does not need to look to memory and learn what the former

modification was. It immediately knows what the modification _is_ now.

Thus a simple attainment of the psychological truth through a careful

examination dispels as a morning mist the whole cloud of Mr. Spencer's

difficulties. Well might President Hopkins say, "The only question is,

what is it that consciousness gives? If we say that it does thus give

both the subject and the object, that simple affirmation sweeps away in

a moment the whole basis of the ideal and skeptical philosophy. It

becomes as the spear of Ithuriel, and its simple touch will change what

seemed whole continents of solid speculation into mere banks of German

fog." We have learned, then, that it is not possible, or necessary,

either to "perceive" or "conceive" the terminations of consciousness,

because this involves the discovery, by _mechanical_ faculties, of their

own being and state before they became activities on the one hand, which

is a contradiction, and on the other an utter transcending of the sphere

of their capability, the attempt to do which would be a greater folly

than would be that of the hand to see Jupiter. But we have intuited the

law, which declares the necessity of a beginning for us and all

creatures; and we ever live in the light of the present end. When, then,

Mr. Spencer says that "Consciousness implies perpetual change and the

perpetual establishment of relations between its successive phases," we

know that he has uttered a fundamental psychological error, in fact,

that almost the opposite is the truth. Consciousness is the permanent,

the abiding, the changeless. It is the light of the personal Eye. Into

it all changes come; but they are only _incidental_. In the finite and

partial person, they come, because such person _must grow_; and so,

because of his partiality and incompleteness, they become necessary

incidents; but let there be a Person having all knowledge, who therefore

cannot learn, having all perfection, who therefore cannot change, and it

is plain that these facts in no way interfere with his consciousness.

All variety is immanent in its light, and no change can come into it

because _there is no change to come_; but this Person sees _all_ his

endowments _at once_, in the unity of this his light, just as we see

_some_ of our endowments in the unity of this our light. The change is

not in the consciousness, but in the objects which come into it. This

view also disposes of the theory that "any mental affection must be

known as like these foregoing ones or unlike those"; that, "if it is not

thought of in connection with others--not distinguished or identified by

comparison with others, it is not recognized--is not a state of

consciousness at all." Such comparison we have found only incidental in

consciousness, pertaining to things in the Sense and Understanding and

not essential. Thus does a true psychology dissipate all these

difficulties as a true cosmology explained the perplexities "of Motion

and Rest."

Take another step and we can answer the question "What is this that

thinks?" It is a spiritual person. What, then, is a spiritual person? A

substance--a kind of force--the nature of which we need inquire about no

further than to know that it is suitable to the use which is made of it,

which is organized, according to a set of constituting laws, into such

spiritual person. The substance without the laws would be simple

substance, and nothing more. The laws without the substance would be

only laws, and could give no being having no ground in which to inhere.

But the substance as ground and the complete set of laws as inhering in

the ground, and being its organization when combined, become a spiritual

person who thinks. The _ego_, that is the sense of personality, is only

one of the forms of activity of this being, and therefore cannot be said

to think. The pages now before us are all vitiated by the theory that

"successive impressions and ideas constitute consciousness." Once attain

to the true psychology of the person, and learn that consciousness is as

stated above,--an abiding light into which modifications come,--and

there arises no difficulty in believing in the reality of self, and in

entirely justifying that belief by Reason. Yea, more, from such a

standpoint it is utter unreason, the height of folly, to doubt for an

instant, for immanent and central in the light of Reason lies the solemn

fact of man's selfhood. We arrive, then, directly at Mr. Spencer's

conclusion, that "Clearly, a true cognition of self implies a state in

which the knowing and the known are one--in which subject and object are

identified," and we _know_ that such a state is an actuality. Mr. Mansel

may hold that such an assertion is the annihilation of both, but he is

wholly wrong. The Savannah has crossed the Atlantic.

We attain, then, exactly the opposite result from Mr. Spencer. We have

seen that "Ultimate Scientific Ideas are all" presentative "of

realities" which can "be comprehended." We have, indeed, found it to be

true, that, "after no matter how great a progress in the colligation of

facts and the establishment of generalizations ever wider and

wider,--after the merging of limited and derivative truths in truths

that are larger and deeper, has been carried no matter how far,--the

fundamental truth remains as much beyond reach as ever." But having

learned this, we do not arrive at the conclusion that "the explanation

of that which is explicable does but bring out into greater clearness

the inexplicableness of that which remains behind." On the other hand we

know that such a conclusion is erroneous, and _that the method by which

it is reached is a false method, and utterly irrelevant to the object

sought_. Could this lesson but be thoroughly learned, Mr. Spencer's

work, and our work, would not have been in vain. Only by a method

differing from this IN KIND--a method in which there is no "colligation

of facts," and no "generalizations" concluded therefrom, but a simple,

direct insight into Pure Truth--can "the fundamental truth" be known;

and thus it may be known by every human soul. "_God made man in his own

image._" In our scheme there is ample room for the man of Science, with

the eye of Sense, to run through the Universe, and gather facts. With

telescope and microscope, he may pursue them, and capture innumerable

multitudes of them. But having done this, we count it folly to attempt

to generalize truth therefrom. But holding up the facts in the clear

light of Reason, and searching them through and through, we _see_ in

them the immutable principle, known by a spontaneous, immediate,

intuitive knowledge to be immutable, and thus we "_know the truth_."

"THE RELATIVITY OF ALL KNOWLEDGE."

In the opening of this chapter, Mr. Spencer states the result, which, in

his opinion, philosophy has attained as follows: "All possible

conceptions have been one by one tried and found wanting; and so the

entire field of speculation has been gradually exhausted without

positive result; the only result arrived at being the negative one above

stated--that the reality existing behind all appearances is, and must

ever be, unknown." He then sets down a considerable list of names of

philosophers, who are claimed by Sir William Hamilton as supporters of

that position. Such a parade of names may be grateful to the feelings of

the Limitists, but it is no support to their cause. The questions at

issue are of such a nature that no array of dignities, of learning, of

profound _opinions_, can have a feather's weight in the decision. For

instance, take Problem XLVII, of the first book of Euclid. What weight

have human opinion with reference to its validity? Though a thousand

mathematicians should deny its truth, it would be just as convincing as

now; and when a thousand mathematicians assert its truth, they add no

item to the vividness of the conviction. The school-boy, who never heard

of one of them, when he first reads it, knows it must be so, and that

this is an inevitable necessity, beyond the possibility of any power or

will to change. On principles simple, fixed, and final, just like those

of mathematics, seen by the same Eye and known with the same

intellectual certainty, and by logical processes just as pure,

conclusive, _demonstrative_ as those of geometry, _and by such alone_,

can the questions now before us be settled. But though names and

opinions have no weight in the final decision, though a demonstration is

demanded and must be given, still it is interesting to note the absence

of two names, representatives of a class, which must ever awaken, among

the devout and pure-hearted, attention and love, and whose teachings,

however unnoticed by Mr. Spencer, are a leaven working in the minds and

hearts of men, which develop with continually increasing distinctness

the solemn and sublime truth, that the human mind is capable of absolute

knowledge. Plato, with serious, yea, sad countenance, the butt of jeer

and scoff from the wits and comedians of his day, went about teaching

those who hung upon his lips, that in every human soul were Ideas which

God had implanted, and which were final truth. And Jesus Christ, with a

countenance more beautifully serious, more sweetly sad, said to those

Jews which believed on him, "If ye continue in my word, then are ye my

disciples indeed; _and ye shall know the truth_, and the truth shall

make you free." It may seem to men who grope about in the dismal cavern

of the animal nature--the Sense and Understanding--wise to refuse the

light, and reject the truths of the Pure Reason and the God-man, and to

call the motley conglomeration of facts which they gather, but cannot

explain, philosophy; but no soul which craves "the Higher Life" will,

can be satisfied with such attainments. It yearns for, it cries after,

yea, with ceaseless iteration it urges its supplication for the highest

truth; and it shall attain to it, because God, in giving the tongue to

cry, gave also the Eye to see. The Spiritual person in man, made in the

very image of God, can never be satisfied till, stripped of the weight

of the animal nature, it sees with its own Eye the Pure Reason, God as

the Highest Truth. And to bring it by culture, by every possible

manifestation of his wondrous nature, up to this high Mount of Vision,

is one object of God in his system of the Universe.

The teaching of the Word--that august personage, "who came forth from

God, and went to God," has been alluded to above. It deserves more than

an allusion, more than any notice which can be given it here. It is

astonishing, though perhaps not wholly unaccountable, that the writings

of the apostles John and Paul have received so little attention from

the metaphysicians of the world, as declarations of metaphysical truths.

Even the most devout students of them do not seem to have appreciated

their inestimable value in this regard. The reason for this undoubtedly

is, that their transcendent importance as declarations of religious

truth has shone with such dazzling effulgence upon the eyes of those who

have loved them, that the lesser, but harmoniously combining beams of a

true spiritual philosophy have been unnoticed in the glory of the nobler

light. It will not, therefore, we trust, be deemed irreverent to say

that, laying aside all questions of the Divinity of Christ, or of the

inspiration of the Bible, and considering the writings of John and Paul

merely as human productions, written at some time nobody knows when, and

by some men nobody knows who, they are the most wonderful revelations,

the profoundest metaphysical treatises the world has ever seen. In them

the highest truths, those most difficult of attainment by processes of

reflection, are stated in simple, clear language, and _they answer

exactly to the teachings of the Reason_. Upon this, President Hopkins

says: "The identity which we found in the last lecture between the

teaching of the constitution of man and the law of God, was not sought.

The result was reached because the analysis would go there. I was myself

surprised at the exactness of the coincidence." Nor is this coincidence

to be observed simply in the statement of the moral law. In all

questions pertaining to man's nature and state, the two will be found in

exact accord. No law is affirmed by either, but is accorded to by the

other. In fine, whoever wrote the Book must have had an accurate and

exhaustive knowledge of Man, about whom he wrote. Without any reference

then to their religious bearings, but simply as expositions of

metaphysical truths, the writings of the two authors named deserve our

most careful attention. What we seek for are laws, final, fixed laws,

which are seen by a direct intuition to be such; and these writings are

of great value, because they cultivate and assist the Reason in its

search for these highest Truths.

One need have no hesitation, then, in rejecting the authority of Mr.

Spencer's names, aye, even if they were a thousand more. We seek for,

and can obtain, that which he cannot give us--a demonstration; which he

cannot give us because he denies the very existence of that faculty by

which alone a demonstration is possible. As his empiricism is worthless,

so is his rationality. No "deduction" from any "_product_ of thought, or

process of thought," is in any way applicable to the question in hand.

Intuitions are the mental actions needed. Light is neither product nor

process. We pass over, then, his whole illustration of the partridge. It

proves nothing. He leads us through an interminable series of questions

to no goal; and says there is none. He gives the soul a stone, when it

cries for bread. One sentence of his is doubtless true. "Manifestly, as

the _most_ general cognition at which we arrive cannot be reduced to a

more general one, it cannot be understood." Of course not. When the

Understanding has attained to the last generalization _by these very

terms_, it cannot go any farther. But by no means does his conclusion

follow, that "Of necessity, therefore, explanation must eventually bring

us down to the inexplicable. The deepest truth which we can get at must

be unaccountable. Comprehension must become something other than

comprehension, before the ultimate fact can be comprehended." How shall

we account for the last generalization, and show this conclusion to be

false? Thus. Hitherto there have been, properly speaking, no

comprehensions, only perceptions in the Sense and connections in the

Understanding. "The sense _distinguishes_ quality and _conjoins_

quantity; the understanding _connects_ phenomena; the reason

_comprehends_ the whole operation of both." The Reason, then, overseeing

the operations of the lower faculties, and possessing within itself the

_a priori_ laws in accordance with which they are, _sees_ directly and

immediately why they are, and thus comprehends and accounts for them. It

sees that there is an end to every process of generalization; and it

then sees, what the Understanding could never guess, that _after_--in

the order of our procedure--the last generalization there is an eternal

truth, in accordance with which process and conclusion were and must be.

There remains, then, no inexplicable, for the final truth is seen and

known in its very self.

The passages quoted at this point from Hamilton and Mansel have been

heretofore examined, and need no further notice. We will pass on then to

his subsequent reflections upon them. It is worthy of remark, as a

general criticism upon these comments, that there is scarcely one, if

there is a single expression in the remainder of this chapter, which

does not refer to the animal nature and its functions. The illustrations

are from the material world, and the terms and expressions are suited

thereto. With reference to objects in the Sense, and connections in the

Understanding, the "fundamental condition of thought," which Mr. Spencer

supplies, is unquestionably valuable. There is "likeness" as well as

"relation, plurality, and difference." But observe that both these laws

alike are pertinent only to the Sense and Understanding, that they

belong to _things in nature_, and consequently have no pertinence to the

questions now before us. We are discussing _ideas_, not _things_; and

those are simple, and can only be seen, while these are complex, and may

be perceived, distinguished, and conceived. If any one shall doubt that

Mr. Spencer is wholly occupied with things in nature, it would seem that

after having read p. 80, he could doubt no longer. "Animals," "species

or genus," "mammals, birds, reptiles, or fishes," are objects by which

he illustrates his subject. And one is forced to exclaim, "How can he

speak of such things when they have nothing to do with the matter in

hand? What have God and infinity and absoluteness to do with 'mammals,

birds, reptiles, or fishes'? If we can know only these, why speak of

those?" It would seem that the instant they are thus set together and

contrasted, the soul must cry out with an irrepressible cry, "It is by

an utterly different faculty, and in entirely other modes, that I dwell

upon God and the questions concerning him. These modes of the animal

nature, by which I know 'mammals,' are different in kind from those of

the spiritual person, by which I know God and the eternal truth." And

when this distinction becomes clearly appreciated and fixed in one's

mind, and the query arises, how could a man so confound the two, and

make utter confusion of the subject, as the Limitists have done, he can

hardly refrain from quoting Romans I. 20 _et seq._ against them.

Let us observe now Mr. Spencer's corollary. "A cognition of the Real as

distinguished from the Phenomenal must, if it exists, conform to this

law of cognition in general. The First Cause, the Infinite, the

Absolute, to be known at all, must be classed. To be positively thought

of, it must be thought of as such or such--as of this or that kind." To

begin with the law which is here asserted, is _not_ a "general" law, and

so does not lie upon all cognition. It is only a special law, and lies

only upon a particular kind of cognition. This has been already

abundantly shown; yet we reproduce one line of proof. No mathematical

law comes under his law of cognition; neither can he, nor any other

Limitist, make it appear that it does so come. His law is law only for

things in nature, and not for principles. Since then all ideas are known

in themselves--are _self-evident_, and since God, infinity, and

absoluteness are ideas, they are known in themselves, and need not be

classed. So his corollary falls to the ground. Can we have any "sensible

experience" of God? Most certainly not. Yet we can have just as much a

sensible experience of him as of any other person--of parent, wife, or

child. Did you ever see a person--a soul? No. Can you see--"have

sensible experience of"--a soul? No. What is it, then, that we have such

experience of? Plainly the body--that material frame through which the

soul manifests itself. The Universe is that material system through

which God manifests himself to those spiritual persons whom he has made;

and that manifestation is the same in kind as that of a created soul

through the body which is given it. It follows then,--and not only from

this, but it may be shown by further illustration,--that every other

person is just as really inscrutable to us as God is; and further, that,

if we can study and comprehend the soul of our wife or child, we can

with equal certainty study, and to some extent comprehend, the soul of

God. Or, in other words, if man is only an animal nature, having a Sense

and Understanding, all personality is an insoluble mystery; all

spiritual persons are alike utterly inscrutable. And this is so,

because, upon the hypothesis taken, man is destitute of any faculty

which can catch a glimpse of such object. A Sense and Understanding can

no more see, or in any possible manner take cognizance of, a spiritual

person than a man born blind can see the sun. Again, we say he is

destitute of the faculty. Will Mr. Spencer deny the fact of the idea of

personality? Will he assert that man has no such notion? Let him once

admit that he has, and in that admission is involved the admission of

the reality of that faculty by which we know God, for the faculty which

cognizes personality, and cognizes God, is one and the same.

Although we do not like certain of Mr. Spencer's terms, yet, to please

him, we will use them. Some conclusions, then, may be expressed thus:

God as the Deity cannot be "classed"; he is unique. This is involved in

the very terms by which we designate him. Yet we cognize him, but this

is by an immediate intuition, in which we know him as he is in himself.

"We shall see him as he is," says the apostle; and some foretastes of

that transcendent revelation are vouchsafed us here on earth. But the

infinite Person, _as person_, must be "assimilated" with other persons.

Yet his infinity and absoluteness, _as such_, cannot be "grouped." And

yet again, _as qualities_, they can be "grouped" with other qualities.

Unquestionably between the Creator, _as such_, and the created, _as

such_, "there must be a distinction transcending any of the distinctions

existing between different divisions of the created." God as

self-existent differs in kind from man as dependent, and this difference

continues irrevocable; while that same God and that same man are _alike_

in kind _as persons_. This is true, because all spiritual persons are

composite beings; and while the essential elements of a spiritual person

are common to created persons and the uncreated Person, there are

_other_ characteristics, _not essential_ to personality, which belong

some to the created, and some to the uncreated, and differentiate them.

Or, in other words, God as person, and man as person, are alike. Yet

they are diverse in kind, and so diverse in kind that it is out of the

range of possibility for that diversity to be removed. How can this be

explained? Evidently thus. There are _qualities_ transfusing the

personality which cannot be interchangeable, and which constitute the

diversity. Personality is _form_ of being. Qualities transfuse the form.

Absoluteness and infinity are qualities which belong to one Person, and

are such that they thereby exclude the possibility of their belonging to

any other person; and so they constitute that one to whom they belong,

unique and supreme. Dependence and partiality are also qualities of a

spiritual person, but are qualities of the created spiritual person, and

are such as must always subordinate that person to the other. In each

instance it is, "_in the nature of things_," impossible for either to

pass over and become the other. Each is what he is by the terms of his

being, and must stay so.

But from all this it by no means follows that the dependent spiritual

person can have no knowledge of the independent spiritual Person. On the

other hand, it is the high glory of the independent spiritual Person,

that he can create another being "in his own image," to whom he can

communicate a knowledge of himself. "Like as a father pitieth his

children, so Jehovah pitieth them that fear him." Out of the fact of

his Father-hood and our childhood, comes that solemn, and, to the loving

soul, joyful fact, that he teaches us the highest knowledge just as

really as our earthly parents teach us earthly knowledge. This he could

not do if we had not the capacity to receive the knowledge; and we could

not have had the capacity, except he had been able, in "the nature of

things," and willing to bestow it upon us. While, then, God as "the

Unconditioned cannot be classed," and so as unconditioned we do not know

him "as of such or such kind," after the manner of the Understanding,

yet we may, do, "see him as he is," do know that he is, and is

unconditioned, through the insight of the Reason, the eye of the

spiritual person, and what it is to be unconditioned.

We now reach a passage which has filled us with unqualified amazement.

As much as we had familiarized ourselves with the materialistic

teachings of the Limitists, we confess that we were utterly unprepared

to meet, even in Mr. Spencer's writings, a theory of man so ineffably

degrading, and uttered with so calm and naive an unconsciousness of the

degradation it involved, as the following. Although for want of room his

illustrations are omitted, it is believed that the following extracts

give a fair and ample presentation of his doctrine.

"All vital actions, considered not separately but in their ensemble,

have for their final purpose the balancing of certain outer processes by

certain inner processes.

"There are unceasing external forces, tending to bring the matter of

which organic bodies consist, into that state of stable equilibrium

displayed by inorganic bodies; there are internal forces by which this

tendency is constantly antagonized; and the perpetual changes which

constitute Life may be regarded as incidental to the maintenance of the

antagonism....

"When we contemplate the lower kinds of life, we see that the

correspondences thus maintained are direct and simple; as in a plant,

the vitality of which mainly consists in osmotic and chemical actions

responding to the coexistence of light, heat, water, and carbonic acid

around it. But in animals, and especially in the higher orders of them,

the correspondences become extremely complex. Materials for growth and

repair not being, like those which plants require, everywhere present,

but being widely dispersed and under special forms, have to be formed,

to be secured, and to be reduced to a fit state for assimilation....

"What is that process by which food when swallowed is reduced to a fit

form for assimilation, but a set of mechanical and chemical actions

responding to the mechanical and chemical actions which distinguish the

food? Whence it becomes manifest, that, while Life in its simplest form

is the correspondence of certain inner physico-chemical actions with

certain outer physico-chemical actions, each advance to a higher form of

Life consists in a better preservation of this primary correspondence by

the establishment of other correspondences. Divesting this conception of

all superfluities, and reducing it to its most abstract shape, we see

that Life is definable as the continuous adjustment of internal

relations to external relations. And when we so define it, we discover

that the physical and the psychial life are equally comprehended by the

definition. We perceive that this, which we call intelligence, shows

itself when the external relations to which the internal ones are

adjusted begin to be numerous, complex, and remote in time and space;

that every advance in Intelligence essentially consists in the

establishment of more varied, more complete, and more involved

adjustments; and that even the highest achievements of science are

resolvable into mental relations of coexistence and sequence, so

cooerdinated as exactly to tally with certain relations of coexistence

and sequence that occur externally....

"And lastly let it be noted that what we call _truth_, guiding us to

successful action and the consequent maintenance of life, is simply the

accurate correspondence of subjective to objective relations; while

_error_, leading to failure and therefore towards death, is the absence

of such accurate correspondence.

"If, then, Life in all its manifestations, inclusive of Intelligence in

its highest forms, consists in the continuous adjustment of internal

relations to external relations, the necessarily relative character of

our knowledge becomes obvious. The simplest cognition being the

establishment of some connection between subjective states, answering to

some connection between objective agencies; and each successively more

complex cognition being the establishment of some more involved

connection of such states, answering to some more involved connection of

such agencies; it is clear that the process, no matter how far it be

carried, can never bring within the reach of Intelligence either the

states themselves or the agencies themselves."

Or, to condense Mr. Spencer's whole teaching into a few plain every-day

words, Man is an animal, and only an animal, differing nowhat from the

dog and chimpanzee, except in the fact that his life "consists in the

establishment of more varied, more complete, and more involved

adjustments," than the life of said dog and chimpanzee. Mark

particularly the sententious diction of this newly arisen sage. Forget

not one syllable of the profound and most important knowledge he would

impart. "Life in all its manifestations, inclusive of Intelligence in

its highest forms, consists in the continuous adjustment of internal

relations to external relations." See, there is not a limit, not a

qualification to the assertion! Now turn back a page or two, reader, if

thou hast this wonderful philosophy by thee, and gazing, as into a cage

in a menagerie, see the being its author would teach thee that thou art.

From the highest to the lowest forms, life is one. In its lower forms,

life is a set of "direct and simple" "correspondences." "But in animals,

_and especially in the higher orders of them_," and, of course, most

especially in the human animal as the highest order, "the

correspondences become extremely complex." As much as to say, reader,

you are not exactly a plant, nor are you yet of quite so low a type as

the chimpanzee aforesaid; but the difference is no serious matter. You

do not differ half as much from the chimpanzee as the chimpanzee does

from the forest he roves in. All the difference there is between you and

him is, that the machinery by which "the continuous adjustment of

internal relations to external relations" is carried on, is more

"complex" in you than in the chimpanzee. He roams the forest, inhabits

some cave or hollow tree, and lives on the food which nature

spontaneously offers to his hairy hand. You cut down the forest,

construct a house, and live on the food which some degree of skill has

prepared. He constructs no clothing, nor any covering to shield him from

the inclemency of the weather, but is satisfied with tawny, shaggy

covering, which nature has provided. You on the contrary are destitute

of such a covering, and rob the sheep, and kill the silk-worm, to supply

the lack. But in all this there is no _difference in kind_. The

mechanism by which life is sustained in you is more "complex," it is

true, than that by which life is sustained in him; there arise,

therefore, larger needs, and the corresponding "intelligence" to supply

those needs. But sweet thought, cheering thought, oh how it supports the

soul! Your life in its highest form is only this animal life,--is only

the constructive force by which that "extremely complex" machinery

carries on "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external

relations." All other notions of life are "superfluities."

Reader, in view of the teaching of this new and widely heralded sage,

how many "superfluities" must you and I strip off from our "conception"

of life! And with what bitter disappointment and deep sadness should we

take up our lamentation for man, and say: How art thou fallen, oh man!

thou noblest denizen of earth; yea, how art thou cast down to the

ground. But a little ago we believed thee a spiritual being; that thou

hadst a nature too noble to rot with the beasts among the clods; that

thou wast made fit to live with angels and thy Creator, God. But a

little ago we believed thee possessed of a psychical life--a soul; that

thou wouldst live forever beyond the stars; and that this soul's life

was wholly occupied in the consideration of "heavenly and divine

things." A little ago we believed in holiness, and that thou,

consecrating thyself to pure and loving employments, shouldst become

purer and more beautiful, nobler and more lovely, until perfect love

should cast out all fear, and thou shouldst then see God face to face,

and rejoice in the sunlight of his smiling countenance. But all this is

changed now. Our belief has been found to be a cheat, a bitter mockery

to the soul. We have sat at the feet of the English sage, and learned

how dismally different is our destiny. Painful is it, oh reader, to

listen; and the words of our teacher sweep like a sirocco over the

heart; yet we cannot choose but hear.

"The pyschical life"--the life of the soul, "the immortal spark of

fire,"--and the physical life "are _equally_ definable as the continuous

adjustment of internal relations to external relations." We had supposed

that intelligence in its highest forms was wholly occupied with the

contemplation of God and his laws, and the great end of being, and all

those tremendous questions which we had thought fitted to occupy the

activities of a spiritual person. We are undeceived now. We find we have

shot towards the pole opposite to the truth. Now "we perceive that this

which we call Intelligence shows itself when the external relations to

which the internal ones are adjusted begin to be numerous, complex, and

remote in time or space; that _every advance in Intelligence essentially

consists in the establishment of more varied, more complete, and more

involved adjustments; and that even the highest achievements of science_

are resolvable into mental relations of coexistence and sequence, so

cooerdinated as _exactly to tally_ with certain relations of coexistence

and sequence that occur externally." In such relations consists the life

of the "caterpillar." In such relations, _only a little "more

complex,"_ consists the life of "the sparrow." Such relations only does

"the fowler" observe; such only does "the chemist" know. This is the

path by which we are led to the last, the highest "truth" which man can

attain. Thus do we learn "that what we call _truth_, guiding us to

successful action, and the consequent maintenance of life, is _simply_

the accurate correspondence of subjective to objective relations; while

error, leading to failure and therefore towards death, is the absence of

such accurate correspondence." What a noble life, oh, reader, what an

exalted destiny thine is here declared to be! The largest effort of

thine intelligence, "the highest achievement of science," yea, the total

object of the life of thy soul,--thy "psychial" life,--is to attain such

exceeding skill in the construction of a shelter, in the fitting of

apparel, in the preparation of food, in a word, in securing "the

accurate correspondence of subjective to objective relations," and thus

in attaining the "_truth_" which shall guide "us to successful action

and the consequent maintenance of life," that we shall secure forever

our animal existence on earth. Study patiently thy lesson, oh human

animal! Con it o'er and o'er. Who knows but thou mayest yet attain to

this acme of the perfection of thy nature, though it be far below what

thou hadst once fondly expected,--mayest attain a perfect knowledge of

the "_truth_," and a perfect skill in the application of that truth, _i.

e._ in "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external

relations"; and so be guided "to successful action, and the consequent

maintenance of life," whereby thou shalt elude forever that merciless

hunter who pursues thee,--the grim man-stalker, the skeleton Death. But

when bending all thy energies, yea, all the powers of thy soul, to this

task, thou mayest recur at some unfortunate moment to the dreams and

aspirations which have hitherto lain like golden sunlight on thy

pathway. Let no vain regret for what seemed thy nobler destiny ever

sadden thy day, or deepen the darkness of thy night. True, thou didst

deem thyself capable of something higher than "the continuous

adjustment of internal relations to external relations"; didst often

occupy thyself with contemplating those "things which eye hath not seen,

nor ear heard"; didst deem thyself a son of God, and "a joint-heir with

Jesus Christ," "of things incorruptible and undefiled, and which fade

not away, eternal in the heavens"; didst sometimes seem to see, with

faith's triumphant gaze, those glorious scenes which thou wouldst

traverse when in the spirit-land thou shouldst lead a pure spiritual

life with other spirits, where all earthliness had been stripped off,

all tears had been wiped away, and perfect holiness was thine through

all eternity. But all these visions were only dreams; they wholly

deluded thee. We have learned from the lips of this latest English sage

that thy god is thy belly, and that thou must mind earthly things, so as

to keep up "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external

relations." Such being thy lot, and to fulfil such a lot being "the

highest achievement of science," permit not thyself to be disturbed by

those old-fashioned and sometimes troublesome notions that "_truth_" and

those "achievements" pertained to a spiritual person in spiritual

relations to God as the moral Governor of the Universe; that man was

bound to know the truth and obey it; that his "errors" were violations

of perfect law,--the truth he knew,--were _crimes_ against Him who is

"of too pure eyes to behold iniquity, and cannot look upon sin with the

least degree of allowance"; that for these crimes there impended a just

penalty--an appalling punishment; and that the only real "failure" was

the failure to repent of and forsake the crimes, and thus escape the

penalty. Far other is the fact, as thou wilt learn from this wise man's

book. As he teaches us, the only "error" we can make, is, to miss in

maintaining perfectly "the continuous adjustment of internal relations

to external relations,"--is to eat too much roast beef and plum-pudding

at dinner, or to wear too scanty or too thick clothing, or to expose

one's self imprudently in a storm, or by some other carelessness which

may produce "the absence of such accurate correspondence" as shall

secure unending life, and so lead to his only "failure"--the advance

"towards death." When, then, oh reader! by some unfortunate mischance,

some "error" into which thine ignorance hath led thee, thou hast

rendered thy "failure" inevitable, and art surely descending "towards

death," hesitate not to sing with heedless hilarity the old Epicurean

song, "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die."

Sing and be gay

The livelong day,

Thinking no whit of to-morrow.

Enjoy while you may

All pleasure and play,

For after death is no sorrow.

Thou hast committed thine only "error" in not maintaining "the accurate

correspondence"; thou hast fallen upon thine only "failure," the

inevitable advance "towards death." Than death no greater evil can

befall thee, and that is already sure. Then let "dance and song," and

"women and wine," bestow some snatches of pleasure upon thy fleeting

days.

Delightful philosophy, is it not, reader? Poor unfortunate man, and

especially poor, befooled, cheated, hopeless Christian man, who has

these many years cherished those vain, deceitful dreams of which we

spoke a little ago! To be brought down from such lofty aspirations; to

be made to know that he is only an animal; that "Life in all its

manifestations, inclusive of Intelligence in its highest forms, consists

in the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external

relations." Do you not join with me in pitying him?

And such is the philosophy which is heralded to us from over the sea as

the newly found and wonderful truth, which is to satisfy the hungering

soul of man and still its persistent cry for bread. And this is the

teacher, mocking that painful cry with such chaff, whom newspaper after

newspaper, and periodical after periodical on this side the water, even

to those we love best and cherish most, have pronounced one of the

profoundest essayists of the day. Perhaps he can give us some sage

remarks upon "laughter," as it is observed in the human animal, and on

that point compare therewith other animals. But, speaking in all

sincerity after the manner of the Book of Common Prayer, we can but say,

"From all such philosophers and philosophies, good Lord deliver us."

Few, perhaps none of our readers, will desire to see a denial in terms

of such a theory. When a man, aspiring to be a philosopher, advances the

doctrine that not only is "Life in its simplest form"--the animal

life--"the correspondence of certain inner physico-chemical actions with

certain outer physico-chemical actions," but that "_each advance to a

higher form of Life_ consists in a better preservation of this primary

correspondence"; and when, proceeding further, and to be explicit, he

asserts that not only "the physical," _but also "the psychical life_ are

_equally_" but "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to

external relations"; and when, still further to insult man, and to utter

his insult in the most positive, extreme, and unmistakable terms, he

asserts "that even the highest achievements of science are resolvable

into mental relations of coexistence and sequence, so cooerdinated as

exactly to tally with certain relations of coexistence and sequence that

occur externally,"--that is, that the highest science is the attainment

of a perfect cuisine; in a word, when a human being in this nineteenth

century offers to his fellows as the loftiest attainment of philosophy

the tenet that the highest form of life cognizable by man is an animal

life, and that man can have no other knowledge of himself than as an

animal, of a little higher grade, it is true, than other animals, but

not different in kind, then the healthy soul, when such a doctrine is

presented to it, will reject it as instantaneously as a healthy stomach

rejects a roll of tobacco.

With what a sense of relief does one turn from a system of philosophy

which, when stripped of its garb of well-chosen words and large

sounding, plausible phrases, appears in such vile shape and hideous

proportions, to the teachings of that pure and noble instructor of our

youth, that man who, by his gentle, benignant mien, so beautifully

illustrates the spirit and life of the Apostle John,--Rev. Mark Hopkins,

D. D., President of Williams College. No one who has read his "Lectures

on Moral Science," and no lover of truth should fail to do so, will

desire an apology for inserting the following extract, wherein is

presented a theory upon which the soul of man can rest, as at home the

soldier rests, who has just been released from the Libby or Salisbury

charnel-house.

"And here, again, we have three great forces with their products. These

are the vegetable, the animal, and the rational life.

"Of these, vegetable life is the lowest. Its products are as strictly

conditional for animal life as chemical affinity is for vegetable, for

the animal is nourished by nothing that has not been previously

elaborated by the vegetable. 'The profit of the earth is for all; the

king himself is served by the field.'

"Again, we have the animal and sensitive life, capable of enjoyment and

suffering, and having the instincts necessary to its preservation.

_This_, as man is now constituted, _is conditional for his rational

life_. The rational has its roots in that, and manifests itself only

through the organization which that builds up.

"_We have, then, finally and highest of all, this rational and moral

life, by which man is made in the image of God._ In man, as thus

constituted, we first find a being who is capable of choosing his own

end, or, rather, of choosing or rejecting the end indicated by his whole

nature. This is moral freedom, _and in this is the precise point of

transition from all that is below to that which is highest_. For

everything below man the end is necessitated. Whatever choice there may

be in the agency of animals of means for the attainment of their

end,--and they have one somewhat wide,--they have none in respect to the

end itself. This, for our purpose, and for all purposes, is the

characteristic distinction, so long sought, between man and the brute.

Man determines his own end; the end of the brute is necessitated. Up to

man everything is driven to its end by a force working from without or

from behind; but for him the pillar of cloud and of fire puts itself in

front, and he follows it or not, as he chooses.

"In the above cases it will be seen that the process is one of the

addition of new forces, with a constant limitation of the field within

which the forces act.... It is to be noticed, however, that while the

field of each added and superior force is narrowed, yet nothing is

dropped. Each lower force shoots through, and combines itself with all

that is higher. Because he is rational, man is not the less subject to

gravitation and cohesion and chemical affinity. He has also the organic

life that belongs to the animal. In him none of these are dropped; _but

the rational life is united with and superinduced upon all these_, so

that man is not only a microcosm, but is the natural head and ruler of

the world. He partakes of all that is below him, _and becomes man by the

addition of something higher_.... Here, then, is our model and law. Have

we a lower sensitive and animal nature? Let that nature be cherished and

expanded by all its innocent and legitimate enjoyments, for it is an

end. But--and here we find the limit--let it be cherished _only as

subservient to the higher intellectual life_, for it is also a means."

The italics are ours.