Satisfactory, true, and self-sustained as is this theory,--and it is one

which like a granite Gothic spire lifts itself high and calm into the

atmosphere, standing firm and immovable in its own clear and

self-evident truth, unshaken by a thousand assaulting materialistic

storms,--we would buttress it with the utterances of other of the

earth's noble ones; and this we do not because it is in any degree

needful, but because our mind loves to linger round the theme, and to

gather the concurrent thought of various rarely endowed minds upon this

subject. Exactly in point is the following--one of many passages which

might be selected from the works of that profoundest of English

metaphysicians and theologians, S. T. Coleridge:--

"And here let me observe that the difficulty and delicacy of this

investigation are greatly increased by our not considering the

understanding (even our own) in itself, and as it would be were it not

accompanied with and modified by the cooeperation of the will, the moral

feeling, and that faculty, perhaps best distinguished by the name of

Reason, of determining that which is universal and necessary, of fixing

laws and principles whether speculative or practical, and of

contemplating a final purpose or end. This intelligent will--having a

self-conscious purpose, under the guidance and light of the reason, by

which its acts are made to bear as a whole upon some end in and for

itself, and to which the understanding is subservient as an organ or the

faculty of selecting and appropriating the means--seems best to account

for that progressiveness of the human race, _which so evidently marks an

insurmountable distinction and impassable barrier between man and the

inferior animals, but which would be inexplicable, were there no

other difference than in the degree of their intellectual

faculties_."--_Works_, Vol. I. p. 371. The italics are ours.

The attention of the reader may with profit be also directed to the

words of another metaphysician, who has been much longer known, and has

enjoyed a wider fame than either of those just mentioned; and whose

teachings, however little weight they may seem to have with Mr. Spencer,

have been these many years, and still are received and studied with

profound respect and loving carefulness by multitudes of persons. We

refer to the apostle Paul, "There is, therefore, now no condemnation to

those who are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the flesh, but after

the spirit." That is, who do not walk after the law of the animal

nature, but who do walk after the law of the spiritual person, for it is

of this great psychological distinction that the apostle so fully and

continually speaks. "For they that are after the flesh do mind the

things of the flesh; but they that are after the spirit, the things of

the spirit. For the minding of the flesh is death, but the minding of

the spirit is life and peace; because the minding of the flesh as enmity

against God, for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can

be." _Romans_ VIII. 1, 5, 6, 7. This I say, then, "Walk in the spirit

and fulfil not the lust of the flesh. For the flesh lusteth against the

spirit, and the spirit against the flesh: and these are contrary the one

to the other."--_Galatians_ V. 16, 17.

Upon these passages it should be remarked, by way of explanation, that

our translators in writing the word spirit with a capital, and thus

intimating that it is the Holy Spirit of God which is meant, have led

their readers astray. The apostle's repeated use of that term, in

contrasting the flesh with the spirit, appears decisive of the fact that

he is contrasting, in all such passages, the animal nature with the

spiritual person. But if any one is startled by this position and thinks

to reject it, let him bear in mind that the law of the spiritual person

in man and of the Holy Spirit of God is _identical_.

The reader will hardly desire from us what his own mind will have

already accomplished--the construction in our own terms, and the

contrasting of the system above embodied with that presented by Mr.

Spencer. The human being, Man, is a twofold being, "flesh" and "spirit,"

an animal nature and a spiritual person. In the animal nature are the

Sense and the Understanding. In the spiritual person are the Reason, the

spiritual Sensibilities, and the Will. The animal nature is common to

man and the brutes. The spiritual person is common to man and God. It is

manifest, then, that there is "an insurmountable distinction and

impassable barrier" not only "between man and the inferior animals," but

between man as spiritual person, and man as animal nature, and that this

is a greater distinction than any other in the Universe, except that

which exists between the Creator and the created. What relation, then,

do these so widely diverse natures bear to each other? Evidently that

which President Hopkins has assigned. "Because he is rational, man is

not the less subject to gravitation and cohesion and chemical affinity.

He has also the organic life that belongs to the plant, and the

sensitive and instinctive life that belongs to the animal." Thus far his

life "is the correspondence of certain inner physico-chemical actions

with certain outer physico-chemical actions,"--undoubtedly "consists in

the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations";

and being the highest order of animal, his life "consists in the

establishment of more varied, more complete, and more involved

adjustments" than that of any other animal. What, then, is this life

for? "This, as man is now constituted, is _conditional for his rational

life_." "The rational life is united with and _superinduced upon all

these_." As God made man, and in the natural order, the "flesh," the

animal life, is wholly subordinate to the "spirit," the spiritual life.

And the spirit, or spiritual person of which Paul writes so much,--does

this also, this "Intelligence in its highest form," consist "in the

continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations"? Are

the words of the apostle a cheat, a lie, when he says, "For if ye live

after the flesh, ye shall die; but if ye through the spirit"--_i. e._ by

living with the help of the Holy Spirit, in accordance with the law of

the spiritual person--"do mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live?"

And are Mr. Spencer's words, in which he teaches exactly the opposite

doctrine, true? wherein he says: "And lastly let it be noted that what

we call truth," &c., (see _ante_, p. 168,) wherein he teaches that "if

ye live after the flesh," if you are guided by "_truth_," if you are

able perfectly to maintain "the accurate correspondence of subjective to

objective relations," "ye shall not surely die," you will attain to what

is _successful action_, the preservation of "life," of "the continuous

adjustment of internal relations to external relations," of the animal

life, and thus your bodies will live forever--the highest good for man;

but if you "mortify the deeds of the body," if you pay little heed to

"the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations,"

you will meet with "_error_, leading to failure and therefore towards

death,"--the death of the body, the highest evil which can befall

man,--and so "ye shall" not "live." Proceeding in the direction already

taken, we find that in his normal condition the spiritual person would

not be chiefly, much less exclusively, occupied with attending to "the

continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations," but

would only regard these in so far as is necessary to preserve the body

as the ground through which, in accordance with the present dispensation

of God's providence, that person may exert himself and employ his

energies upon those objects which belong to his peculiar sphere, even

the laws and duties of spiritual beings. The person would indeed employ

his superior faculties to assist the lower nature in the preservation of

its animal life, but this only as a means. God has ordained that through

this means that person shall develop and manifest himself; yet the life,

continuance in being, of the soul, is in no way dependent on this means.

Strip away the whole animal nature, take from man his body, his Sense

and Understanding, leave him--as he would then be--with no possible

medium of communication with the Universe, and he, the I am, the

spiritual person, would remain intact, as active as ever. He would have

lost none of his capacity to see laws and appreciate their force; he

would feel the _bindingness_ of obligation just as before; and finally,

he would be just as able as in the earlier state to make a choice of an

ultimate end, though he would be unable to make a single motion towards

putting that choice into effect. The spiritual person, then, being such

that he has in himself no element of decomposition, has no need, for the

preservation of his own existence, to be continually occupied with

efforts to maintain "the accurate correspondence of subjective to

objective relations." Yet activity is his law, and, moreover, an

activity having objects which accord with this his indestructible

nature. With what then will such a being naturally occupy himself? There

is for him no danger of decay. He possesses within himself the laws and

ideals of his action. As such, and created, he is near of kin to that

august Being in whoso image he was created. His laws are the created

person's laws. The end of the Creator should be that also of the

created. But God is infinite, while the soul starts a babe, an

undeveloped germ, and must begin to learn at the alphabet of knowledge.

What nobler, what more sublime and satisfactory occupation could this

being, endowed with the faculties of a God, find, than to employ all his

power in the contemplation of the eternal laws of the Universe, _i. e._

to the acquisition of an intimate acquaintance with himself and God; and

to bend all his energies to the realization by his own efforts of that

part in the Universe which God had assigned him, _i. e._, to accord his

will entirely with God's will. This course of life, a spiritual person

standing in his normal relation to an animal nature, would pursue as

spontaneously as if it were the law of his being. But this which we have

portrayed is not the course which human beings do pursue. By no means.

One great evil, at least, that "the Fall" brought upon the race of man,

is, that human beings are born into the world with the spiritual person

all submerged by the animal nature; or, to use Paul's figure, the spirit

is enslaved by the flesh; and such is the extent of this that many,

perhaps most, men are born and grow up and die, and never know that they

have any souls; and finally there arise, as there have arisen through

all the ages, just such philosophers as Sir William Hamilton and Mr.

Spencer, who in substance deny that men are spiritual persons at all,

who say that the highest knowledge is a generalization in the

Understanding, a form of a knowledge common to man and the brutes, and

that "the highest achievements of science are resolvable into mental

relations of coexistence and sequence, so cooerdinated as exactly to

tally with certain relations of coexistence and sequence that occur

externally." It is this evil, organic in man, that Paul portrays so

vividly; and it is against men who teach such doctrines that he thunders

his maledictions.

We have spoken above of the spiritual person as diverse from, superior

to, and superinduced upon, the animal nature. This is his _position_ in

the logical order. We have also spoken of him as submerged under the

animal nature, as enslaved to the flesh. By such figures do we strive to

express the awfully degraded _condition_ in which every human being is

born into the world. And mark, this is simply a natural degradation. Let

us then, as philosophers, carry our examination one step farther and

ask: In this state of things what would be the fitting occupation of the

spiritual person. Is it that "continuous adjustment"? He turns from it

with loathing. Already he has served the "flesh" a long and grievous

bondage. Manifestly, then, he should struggle with all his might to

regain his normal condition to become naturally good as well as morally

good,--he should fill his soul with thoughts of God, and then he should

make every rational exertion to induce others to follow in his

footsteps.

We attain, then, a far different result from Mr. Spencer. "The highest

achievements of science" for us, our "truth," guiding us "to successful

action," is that pure _a priori_ truth, the eternal law of God which is

written in us, and given to us for our guidance to what is truly

"successful action,"--the accordance of our wills with the will of God.

What we now reach, and what yet remains to be considered of this

chapter, is that passage in which Mr. Spencer enounces, as he believes,

a new principle of philosophy, a principle which will symmetrize and

complete the Hamiltonian system, and thus establish it as the true and

final science for mankind. Since we do not view this principle in the

same light with Mr. Spencer, and especially since it is our intention to

turn it upon what he has heretofore written, and demolish that with it,

there might arise a feeling in many minds that the whole passage should

be quoted, that there might be no doubt as to his meaning. This we

should willingly do, did our space permit. Yet it seems not in the least

necessary. That part of the passage which contains the gist of the

subject, followed by a candid epitome of his arguments and

illustrations, would appear to be ample for a fair and sufficiently full

presentation of his theory, and for a basis upon which we might safely

build our criticism. These then will be given.

"There still remains the final question--What must we say concerning

that which transcends knowledge? Are we to rest wholly in the

consciousness of phenomena? Is the result of inquiry to exclude utterly

from our minds everything but the relative; or must we also believe in

something beyond the relative?

"The answer of pure logic is held to be, that by the limits of our

intelligence we are rigorously confined within the relative; and that

anything transcending the relative can be thought of only as a pure

negation, or as a non-existence. 'The _absolute_ is conceived merely by

a negation of conceivability,' writes Sir William Hamilton. 'The

_Absolute_ and the _Infinite_,' says Mr. Mansel, 'are thus, like the

_Inconceivable_ and the _Imperceptible_, names indicating, not an object

of thought or of consciousness at all, but the mere absence of the

conditions under which consciousness is possible.' From each of which

extracts may be deduced the conclusion, that, since reason cannot

warrant us in affirming the positive existence of what is cognizable

only as a negation, we cannot rationally affirm the positive existence

of anything beyond phenomena.

"Unavoidable as this conclusion seems, it involves, I think, a grave

error. If the premiss be granted, the inference must doubtless be

admitted; but the premiss, in the form presented by Sir William Hamilton

and Mr. Mansel, is not strictly true. Though, in the foregoing pages,

the arguments used by these writers to show that the Absolute is

unknowable, have been approvingly quoted; and though these arguments

have been enforced by others equally thoroughgoing, yet there remains to

be stated a qualification, which saves us from that scepticism otherwise

necessitated. It is not to be denied that so long as we confine

ourselves to the purely logical aspect of the question, the propositions

quoted above must be accepted in their entirety; but when we contemplate

its more general, or psychological aspect, we find that these

propositions are imperfect statements of the truth; omitting, or

rather excluding, as they do, an all-important fact. To speak

specifically:--Besides that _definite_ consciousness of which Logic

formulates the laws, there is also an _indefinite_ consciousness which

cannot be formulated. Besides complete thoughts, and besides the

thoughts which, though incomplete, admit of completion, there are

thoughts which it is impossible to complete, and yet which are still

real, in the sense that they are normal affections of the intellect.

"Observe in the first place, that every one of the arguments by which

the relativity of our knowledge is demonstrated, distinctly postulates

the positive existence of something beyond the relative. To say that we

cannot know the Absolute, is, by implication, to affirm that there _is_

an Absolute. In the very denial of our power to learn _what_ the

Absolute is, there lies hidden the assumption _that_ it is; and the

making of this assumption proves that the Absolute has been present to

the mind, not as a nothing but as a something. Similarly with every step

in the reasoning by which this doctrine is upheld. The Noumenon,

everywhere named as the antithesis of the Phenomenon, is throughout

necessarily thought of as an actuality. It is rigorously impossible to

conceive that our knowledge is a knowledge of Appearances only, without

at the same time conceiving a Reality of which they are appearances; for

appearance without reality is unthinkable." After carrying on this train

of argument a little further, he reaches this just and decisive result.

"Clearly, then, the very demonstration that a _definite_ consciousness

of the Absolute is impossible to us, unavoidably presupposes an

indefinite consciousness of it." Carrying the argument further, he says:

"Perhaps the best way of showing that, by the necessary conditions of

thought, we are obliged to form a positive though vague consciousness

of this which transcends distinct consciousness, is to analyze our

conception of the antithesis between Relative and Absolute." He follows

the presentation of certain "antinomies of thought" with an extract from

Sir William Hamilton's words, in which the logician enounces his

doctrine that in "correlatives" "the positive alone is real, the

negative is only an abstraction of the other"; or, in other words, the

one gives a substance of some kind in the mind, the other gives simply

nothingness, void, absolute negation. Criticizing this, Mr. Spencer is

unquestionably right in saying: "Now the assertion that of such

contradictories 'the negative is _only_ an abstraction of the

other'--'is _nothing else_ than its negation'--is not true. In such

correlatives as Equal and Unequal, it is obvious enough that the

negative concept contains something besides the negation of the positive

one; for the things of which equality is denied are not abolished from

consciousness by the denial. And the fact overlooked by Sir William

Hamilton is, that the like holds, even with those correlatives of which

the negative is inconceivable, in the strict sense of the word."

Proceeding with his argument, he establishes, by ample illustration, the

fact that a "something constitutes our consciousness of the Non-relative

or Absolute." He afterwards shows plainly by quotations, "that both Sir

William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel do," in certain places, "distinctly

imply that our consciousness of the Absolute, indefinite though it is,

is positive not negative." Further on he argues thus: "Though Philosophy

condemns successively each attempted conception of the Absolute; though

it proves to us that the Absolute is not this, nor that, nor that;

though in obedience to it we negative, one after another, each idea as

it arises; yet as we cannot expel the entire contents of consciousness,

there ever remains behind an element which passes into new shapes. The

continual negation of each particular form and limit simply results in

the more or less complete abstraction of all forms and limits, and so

ends in an indefinite consciousness of the unformed and unlimited."

Thus he brings us to "the ultimate difficulty--How can there possibly be

constituted a consciousness of the unformed and unlimited, when, by its

very nature, consciousness is possible only under forms and limits?"

This he accounts for by by hypostatizing a "raw material" in

consciousness which is, must be, present. He presents his conclusion as

follows: "By its very nature, therefore, this ultimate mental element is

at once necessarily indefinite and necessarily indestructible. Our

consciousness of the unconditioned being literally the unconditioned

consciousness, or raw material of thought, to which in thinking we give

definite forms, it follows that an ever-present sense of real existence

is the very basis of our intelligence." ...

"To sum up this somewhat too elaborate argument:--We have seen how, in

the very assertion that all our knowledge, properly so called, is

Relative, there is involved the assertion that there exists a

Non-relative. We have seen how, in each step of the argument by which

this doctrine is established, the same assumption is made. We have seen

how, from the very necessity of thinking in relations, it follows that

the Relative itself is inconceivable, except as related to a real

Non-relative. We have seen that, unless a real Non-relative or Absolute

be postulated, the Relative itself becomes absolute, and so brings the

argument to a contradiction. And on contemplating the process of

thought, we have equally seen how impossible it is to get rid of the

consciousness of an actuality lying behind appearances; and how, from

this impossibility, results our indestructible belief in that

actuality."

The approval which has been accorded to certain of the arguments adduced

by Mr. Spencer in favor of his especial point, that the Absolute is a

positive somewhat in consciousness, and to that point as established,

must not be supposed to apply also to that hypothesis of "indefinite

consciousness" by which he attempts to reconcile this position with his

former teachings. On the contrary, it will be our purpose hereafter to

show that this hypothesis is a complete fallacy.

As against the positions taken by Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel,

Mr. Spencer's argument may unquestionably be deemed decisive. Admitting

the logical accuracy of their reasoning, he very justly turns from the

logical to the psychological aspect of the subject, takes exception to

their premiss, shows conclusively that it is fallacious, and gives an

approximate, though unfortunately a very partial and defective

presentation of the truth. Indeed, the main issue which must now be made

with him is whether the position he has here taken, and which he puts

forth as that peculiar element in his philosophical system, that new

truth, which shall harmonize Hamiltonian Limitism with the facts of

human nature, is not, when carried to its logical results, in

diametrical and irreconcilable antagonism to that whole system, and all

that he has before written, and so does not annihilate them. It will be

our present endeavor to show that such is the result.

Perhaps we cannot better examine Mr. Spencer's theory than, first, to

take up what we believe to be the element of truth in it, and carry out

this to its logical results; and afterwards to present what seem to be

the elements of error, and show them to be such.

1. "We are obliged to form a positive though vague consciousness of"

"the Absolute." Without criticizing his use here of consciousness as if

it were a faculty of knowledge, and remembering that we cannot have a

consciousness of anything without having a knowledge commensurate with

that consciousness, we will see that Mr. Spencer's assertion is

tantamount to saying, We have a positive knowledge that the Absolute is.

It does not seem that he himself can disallow this. Grant this, and our

whole system follows, as does also the fallacy of his own. Our argument

will proceed thus. Logic is the science of the pure laws of thought, and

is mathematically accurate, and is absolute. Being such, it is law for

all intellect, for God as well as man. But three positions can be taken.

Either it is true for the Deity, or else it is false for him, or else

it has no reference to him. In the last instance God is Chaos; in the

second he and man are in organic contradiction, and he created man so;

the first is the one now advocated. The second and third hypotheses

refute themselves in the statement of them. Nothing remains but the

position taken that the laws of Logic lie equally on God and man. One of

those laws is, that, if any assertion is true, all that is logically

involved in it is true; in other words, all truth is in absolute and

perfect harmony. This is fundamental to the possibility of Logic. Now

apply this law to the psychological premiss of Mr. Spencer, that we have

a positive knowledge that the Absolute is. A better form of expression

would be, The absolute Being is. It follows then that he is in a _mode_,

has a _formal_ being. But three hypotheses are possible. He is in no

mode, he is in one mode; he is in all modes. If he is in no mode, there

is no form, no order, no law for his being; which is to say, he is

Chaos. Chaos is not God, for Chaos cannot organize an orderly being, and

men are orderly beings, and were created. If he is in all modes, he is

in a state of utter contradiction. God "is all in every part." He is

then all infinite, and all finite. Infinity and finiteness are

contradictory and mutually exclusive qualities. God is wholly possessed

of contradictory and mutually exclusive qualities, which is more than

unthinkable--it is absurd. He is, must be, then, in one mode. Let us

pause here for a moment and observe that we have clearly established,

from Mr. Spencer's own premiss, the fact that God _is limited_. He must

be in one mode to the exclusion of all other modes. He is limited then

by the necessity to be what he is; and if he could become what he is

not, he would not have been absolute. Since he is absolute, he is, to

the exclusion of the possibility of any other independent Being. Other

beings are, and must therefore be, dependent on and subordinate to him.

Since he is superior to all other beings he must be in the highest

possible mode of being. Personality is the highest possible mode of

being. This will appear from the following considerations. A person,

possesses the reason and law of his action, and the capacity to act,

within himself, and is thus a _final cause_. No higher form of being

than this can be needed, and so by the law of parsimony a hypothesis of

any other must be excluded. God is then a person.

We have now brought the argument to that point where its connection with

the system advocated in this treatise is manifest. If the links are well

wrought, and the chain complete, not only is this system firmly grounded

upon Mr. Spencer's premiss, but, as was intimated on an early page, he

has in this his special point given partial utterance to what, once

established, involves the fallacy not only of all he has written before,

but as well of the whole Limitist Philosophy. It remains now to remark

upon the errors in his form of expressing the truth.

2. Mr. Spencer's error is twofold. He treats of consciousness as a

faculty of knowledge. He speaks of a "vague," an "indefinite

consciousness." Let us examine these in their order.

_a._ He treats of consciousness as a faculty of knowledge. In this he

uses the term in the inexact, careless, popular manner, rather than with

due precision. As has been observed on a former page, consciousness is

the light in which the person sees his faculties act. Thus some feeling

is affected. This feeling is cognized by the intellectual faculty, and

of this the person is conscious. Hence it is an elliptical expression to

say "I am conscious of the feeling." The full form being "I am conscious

that I know the feeling." Thus is it with all man's activities. Applying

this to the case in hand, it appears, not that we are conscious of the

Absolute, but that we are conscious that the proper intellectual

faculty, the Pure Reason, presents what absoluteness is, and that the

absolute Person is, and through this presentation--intuition--the

spiritual person knows these facts. We repeat, then, our position:

consciousness is the indivisible unity, the light in which the person

sees all his faculties and capacities act; and so is to be considered as

different in kind from them all as the peculiar and unique endowment of

a spiritual person.

_b._ Mr. Spencer speaks of a "vague," an "indefinite consciousness." The

expression "vague consciousness" being a popular and very common one,

deserves a careful examination, and this we hope to give it, keeping in

mind meantime the position already attained.

The phrase is used in some such connection as this, "I have a vague or

undefined consciousness of impending evil." Let us analyze this

experience. In doing so it will be observed that the consciousness, or

rather the seeing by the person in the light of consciousness, is

positive, clear, and definite, and is the apprehension of a feeling.

Again, the feeling is positive and distinct; it is a feeling of dread,

of threatening danger. What, then, is vague--is undefined? This. That

cause which produces the feeling lies without the reach of the cognitive

faculties, and of course cannot be known; because what produces the

feeling is unknown, the intellectual apprehension experiences a sense of

vagueness; and this it instinctively carries over and applies to the

feeling. Yet really the sense of vagueness arises from an ignorance of

the cause of the feeling. Strictly speaking, then, it is not

consciousness that is vague; and so Mr. Spencer's "_indefinite_

consciousness, which cannot be formulated," has no foundation in fact.

But this may be shown by another line of thought. Consciousness is

commensurate with knowledge, _i. e._, man can have no knowledge except

he is conscious of that knowledge; neither can he have any consciousness

except he knows that the consciousness is, and what the consciousness

is, _i. e._, what he is conscious of. Now all knowledge is definite; it

is only ignorance that is indefinite. When we say that our knowledge of

an object is indefinite, we mean that we partly know its

characteristics, and are partly ignorant of them. Thus then also the

result above stated follows; and what Mr. Spencer calls "_indefinite_

consciousness" is a "_definite_ consciousness" that we partly know, and

are partly ignorant of the object under consideration.

In the last paragraph but one, of the chapter now under consideration,

Mr. Spencer makes a most extraordinary assertion respecting

consciousness, which, when examined in the light of the positions we

have advocated, affords another decisive evidence of the fallacy of his

theory. We quote it again, that the reader may not miss of giving it

full attention. "By its very nature, therefore, this ultimate mental

element is at once necessarily indefinite and necessarily

indestructible. Our consciousness of the unconditioned being literally

_the unconditioned consciousness_, or _raw material of thought_, to

which in thinking we give definite forms, it follows that an

ever-present sense of real existence is the very basis of our

intelligence." Upon reading this passage, the question spontaneously

arises, What does the writer mean? and it is a question which is not so

easily answered. More than one interpretation may be assigned, as will

appear upon examination. A problem is given. To find what the "raw

material of thought" is. Since man has thoughts, there must be in him

the "raw material of thought"--the crude thought-ore which he smelts

down in the blast-furnace of the Understanding, giving forth in its

stead the refined metal--exact thought. We must then proceed to attain

our answer by analyzing man's natural organization.

Since man is a complex, constituted being, there is necessarily a

logical order to the parts which are combined in the complexity. He may

be considered as a substance in which a constitution inheres, _i. e._,

which is organized according to a _set_ of fixed laws, and that set of

laws may be stated in their logical order. It is sufficient, however,

for our purpose to consider him as an organized substance, the

organization being such that he is a person--a selfhood, _self-active_

and capable of self-examination. The raw material of _all_ the

activities of such a person is this organized substance. Take away the

substance, and there remains only the set of laws as _abstract_ ideas.

Again, take away the set of laws, and the substance is simple,

unorganized substance. In the combining of the two the person becomes.

These, then, are all there is of the person, and therefore in these must

the raw material be. From this position it follows directly that any

capacity or faculty, or, in general, every activity of the person, is

the substance acting in accordance with the law which determines that

form of the activity. To explain the term, form of activity. There is a

_set_ of laws. Each law, by itself, is a simple law, and is incapable of

organizing a substance into a being. But when these laws are considered,

as they naturally stand in the Divine Reason, in relation to each other,

it is seen that this, their standing together, constitutes ideals, or

forms of being and activity. To illustrate from an earthly object. The

law of gravitation alone could not organize a Universe; neither could

the law of cohesion, nor of centripetal, nor centrifugal force, nor any

other one law. All these laws must be acting together,--or rather all

these laws must stand together in perfect harmony, according to their

own nature, thus constituting an ideal form, in accordance with which

God may create this Universe. For an illustration of our topic in its

highest form, the reader is referred to those pages of Dr. Hickok's

"Rational Psychology," where he analyzes personality into its elements

of Spontaneity, Autonomy, and Liberty. From that examination it is

sufficiently evident that either of these alone cannot organize a

person, but that all three must be present in order to constitute such a

being. There are, then, various forms of activity in the person, as

Reason, Sensibility, and Will, in each of which the organized substance

acts in a mode or form, and this form is determined by the set of

organizing laws. Consciousness also is such a form. The "raw material of

thought," then, must be this substance considered under the peculiar

form of activity which we call consciousness, but _before the substance

thus formulated has been awakened into activity by those circumstances

which are naturally suited to it, for bringing it into action_. Now,

by the very terms of the statement it is evident that the substance thus

organized in this form, or, to use the common term, consciousness

considered apart from and prior to its activity, can never be known _by

experience_, i. e., _we can never be conscious of an unconscious state_.

"Unconditioned consciousness" is consciousness considered as quiescent

because in it have been awakened no "definite forms"--no "thinking." "In

the nature of things," then, it is impossible to be conscious of an

"unconditioned consciousness." Yet Mr. Spencer says that "our

consciousness of the unconditioned," which he has already asserted and

proved, is a "positive," and therefore an active state; is identical

with, is "literally the unconditioned consciousness," or consciousness

in its quiescent state, considered before it had been awakened into

activity, which is far more absurd than what was just above shown to be

a contradiction.

To escape such a result, a less objectionable interpretation may be

given to the dictum in hand. It may be said that it looks upon

consciousness only as an activity, and in the logical order after its

action has begun. We are, then, conscious, and in this is positive

action, but no definite object is present which gives a form in

consciousness, and so consciousness _returns upon itself_. We are

conscious that we are conscious, which is an awkward way of saying that

we are self-conscious, or, more concisely yet, that we are conscious;

for accurately this is all, and this is the same as to say that the

subject and object are identical in this act. The conclusion from this

hypothesis is one which we judge Mr. Spencer will be very loath to

accept, and yet it seems logically to follow. Indeed, in a sentence we

are about to quote, he seems to make a most marked distinction between

self-consciousness and this "consciousness of the unconditioned," which

he calls its "obverse."

But whatever Mr. Spencer's notion of the "raw material of thought" is,

what more especially claims our attention and is most strange, is his

application of that notion. To present this more clearly, we will quote

further from the passage already under examination. "As we can in

successive mental acts get rid of all particular conditions, and replace

them by others, but cannot get rid of that undifferentiated substance of

consciousness, which is conditioned anew in every thought, there ever

remains with us a sense of that which exists persistently and

independently of conditions. At the same time that by the laws of

thought we are rigorously prevented from forming a conception of

absolute existence, we are by the laws of thought equally prevented from

ridding ourselves of the consciousness of absolute existence: this

consciousness being, as we here see, the obverse of our

self-consciousness." Now, by comparing this extract with the other,

which it immediately follows, it seems plain that Mr. Spencer uses as

synonymous the phrases "consciousness of the unconditioned,"

"unconditioned consciousness," "raw material of thought,"

"undifferentiated substance of consciousness," and "consciousness of

absolute existence." Let us note, now, certain conclusions, which seem

to follow from this use of language. We are conscious "of absolute

existence." No person can be conscious except he is conscious of some

state or condition of his being. Absolute existence is, therefore, a

state or condition of our being. Also this "consciousness of absolute

existence"--as it seems _our_ absolute existence--is the "raw material

of thought." But, again, as was shown above, this "raw material," this

"undifferentiated substance of consciousness," if it is anything, is

consciousness considered as capacity, and in the logical order before it

becomes, or is, active; and it further appeared that of this quiescent

state we could have no knowledge by experience. But since the above

phrases are synonymous, it follows that "consciousness of absolute

existence" is the "undifferentiated substance of consciousness," is a

consciousness of which we can have no knowledge by experience, is a

consciousness of which we can have no consciousness. Is this

philosophy?

It would be but fair to suppose that there is some fact which Mr.

Spencer has endeavored to express in the language we are criticizing.

There is such a fact, a statement of which will complete this criticism.

Unquestionably, in self-examination, a man may abstract all "successive

mental acts," may consider himself as he is, in the logical order before

he _has experiences_. In this he will find "that an ever-present sense

of real existence is the very basis of our intelligence"; or, in other

words, that it is an organic law of our being that there cannot be an

experience without a being to entertain the experience; and hence that

it is impossible for a man to think or act, except on the assumption

that he is. But all this has nothing to do with a "consciousness of the

unconditioned," or of "absolute existence"; for our existence is not

absolute, and it is _our_ existence of which we are conscious. The

reality and abidingness of _our_ existence is ground for _our_

experience, nothing more. Even if it were possible for us to have a

consciousness of our state before any experience, or to actually now

abstract all experience, and be conscious of our consciousness

unmodified by any object, _i. e._ to be conscious of unconsciousness,

this would not be a "consciousness of absolute existence." We could find

no more in it, and deduce no more from it, than that our existence was

involved in our experience. Such a consciousness would indeed appear

"unconditioned" by the coming into it of any activity, which would

give a form in it; but this would give us no notion of true

unconditionedness--true "absolute existence." This consciousness, though

undisturbed by any experience, would yet be conditioned, would have been

created, and be dependent upon God for continuance in existence, and for

a chance to come into circumstances, where it could be modified by

experiences, and so could grow. While, then, Mr. Spencer's theory gives

us the fact of the notion of the necessity of our existence to our

experience, it in no way accounts for the fact of our consciousness of

the unconditioned, be that what it may.

But to return from this considerable digression to the result which was

attained a few pages back, viz: that what Mr. Spencer calls

"_indefinite_ consciousness" is a "_definite_ consciousness" that we

partly know, and are partly ignorant of the object under consideration.

Let this conclusion be applied to the topic which immediately concerns

us,--the character of God.

But three suppositions are possible. Either we know nothing of God, not

even that he is; or we have a partial knowledge of him, we know that he

is, and all which we can logically deduce from this; or we know him

exhaustively. The latter, no one pretends, and therefore it needs no

notice. The first, even if our own arguments are not deemed

satisfactory, has been thoroughly refuted by Mr. Spencer, and so is to

be set aside. Only the second remains. Respecting this, his position is

that we know that God is and no more. Admit this for a moment. We are

conscious then of a positive, certain, inalienable knowledge that God

is; but that with reference to any and all questions which may arise

concerning him we are in total ignorance. Here, again, it is apparent

that it is not our consciousness or knowledge that is vague; it is our

ignorance.

We might suggest the question--of what use can it be to man to know that

God is, and be utterly and necessarily, yea, organically ignorant of

what he is? Let the reader answer the question to his own mind. It is

required to show how the theory advocated in this book will appear in

the light of the second hypothesis above stated.

Man knows that God is, and what God is so far as he can logically deduce

it from this premiss; but, in so far as God is such, that he cannot be

thus known, except wherein he makes a direct revelation to us, he must

be forever inscrutable. To illustrate. If the fact that God is, be

admitted, it logically follows that he must be self-existent.

Self-existence is a positive idea in the Reason, and so here is a second

element of knowledge respecting the Deity. Thus we may go on through

all that it is possible to deduce, and the system thus wrought will be

The Science of Natural Theology, a science as pure and sure as pure

equations. Its results will be what God must be. Looking into the

Universe we will find what must be corresponding with what is, and our

knowledge will be complete. Again, in many regards God may be utterly

inscrutable to us, since he may possess characteristics which we cannot

attain by logical deductions. For instance, let it be granted that the

doctrine of the Trinity is true--that there are three persons in one

Godhead. This would be a fact which man could never attain, could never

make the faintest guess at. He might, unaided, attain to the belief that

God would forgive; he might, with the profound and sad-eyed man of

Greece, become convinced that some god must come from heaven to lead men

to the truth; but the notion of the Trinity could never come to him,

except God himself with carefulness revealed it. Respecting those

matters of which we cannot know except by revelation, this only can be

demanded; and this by inherent endowment man has a right to demand; viz:

that what is revealed shall not contradict the law already "written in

the heart." Yet, once more, there are certain characteristics of God

that must forever be utterly inscrutable to every created being, and

this, because such is their nature and relation to the Deity, that one

cannot be endowed with a faculty capable of attaining the knowledge in

question. Such for instance are the questions, How is God self-existent,

how could he be eternal, how exercise his power, and the like? These are

questions respecting which no possible reason can arise why we should

know them, except the gratification of curiosity, which in reality is no

reason at all, and therefore the inability in question is no detriment

to man.

By the discussion which may now be brought to a close, two positions

seem to be established. 1. That we have, as Mr. Spencer affirms, a

positive consciousness that the absolute Being is, and that this and all

which we can logically deduce from this are objects of knowledge to us;

in other words, that the system advocated in this volume directly

follows from that premiss. 2. That any doctrine of "indefinite

consciousness" is erroneous, that the vagueness is not in consciousness,

but in our knowledge; and further, that the hypothesis of a

consciousness of the "raw material of thought" is absurd.

"THE RECONCILIATION."

It would naturally seem, that, after what is believed to be the thorough

refutation of the limitist scheme, which has been given in the preceding

comments on Mr. Spencer's three philosophical chapters, the one named in

our heading would need scarce more than a notice. But so far is this

from being the case, that some of the worst features in the results of

his system stand out in clearest relief here. Before proceeding to

consider these, let us note a most important admission. He speaks of his

conclusion as bringing "the results of speculation into harmony with

those of common sense," and then makes the, for him, extraordinary

statement, "Common Sense asserts the existence of reality." In these two

remarks it would appear to be implied that Common Sense is a final

standard with which any position most be reconciled. The question

instantly arises, What is Common Sense? The writer has never seen a

definition, and would submit for the reader's consideration the

following.

Common Sense _is the practical Pure Reason_; it is that faculty by which

the spiritual person sees in the light of consciousness the _a priori_

law as inherent in the fact presented by the Sense.

For the sake of completeness its complement may be defined thus:

Judgment is the practical Understanding; it is that faculty by which

the spiritual person selects such means as he thinks so conformed to

that law thus intuited, as to be best suited to accomplish the object in

view.

A man has good Common Sense, who quickly sees the informing law in the

fact; and good judgment, who skilfully selects and adapts his means to

the circumstances of the case, and the end sought. Of course it will not

be understood that it is herein implied that every person who exercises

this faculty has a defined and systematic knowledge of it.

The reader will readily see the results which directly follow from Mr.

Spencer's premiss. It is true that "Common Sense asserts the existence

of a reality," and this assertion is true; but with equal truth does it

assert the law of logic; that, if a premiss is true, _all that is

logically involved in it is true_. It appears, then, that Mr. Spencer

has unwittingly acknowledged the fundamental principle of what may be

called the Coleridgian system, the psychological fact of the Pure

Reason, and thus again has furnished a basis for the demolition of his

own.

It was said above that some of the evil results of Mr. Spencer's system

assumed in this chapter their worst phases. This remark is illustrated

in the following extract: "We are obliged to regard every phenomenon as

a manifestation of some Power by which we are acted upon; phenomena

being, so far as we can ascertain, unlimited in their diffusion, we are

obliged to regard this Power as omnipresent; and criticism teaches us

that this Power is wholly incomprehensible. In this consciousness of an

Incomprehensible Omnipresent Power we have just that consciousness on

which Religion dwells. And so we arrive at the point where Religion and

Science coalesce." The evils referred to may be developed as follows:

"We are obliged to regard every phenomenon as a manifestation of some

Power by which we are acted upon." This may be expressed in another form

thus: Every phenomenon is a manifestation of some Power by which we are

acted upon. Some doubt may arise respecting the precise meaning of this

sentence, unless the exact signification of the term phenomenon be

ascertained. It might be confined to material appearances, appreciable

by one of the five senses. But the context seems to leave no doubt but

that Mr. Spencer uses it in the wider sense of every somewhat in the

Universe, since he speaks of "phenomena" as "unlimited." Putting the

definition for the term, the sentence stands: Every somewhat in the

Universe is "a manifestation of some Power by which we are acted upon."

It follows, then, that there is no somewhat in the Universe, except we

are acted upon by it. Our being arises to be accounted for. Either we

began to be, and were created, or the ground of our being is in

ourselves, our being is pure independence, and nothing further is to be

asked. This latter will be rejected. Then we were created. But we were

not created by Mr. Spencer's "some Power," because it only _acts upon

us_. In his creation, man was not acted upon, because there was no man

to be acted upon; but in that act a being was originated _who might be

acted upon_. Then, however, we came into being, another than "some

Power" was the cause of us. But the act of creating man was a somewhat.

Every somewhat _in_ the Universe is "a manifestation of some Power."

This is not such a manifestation. Therefore the creation of man took

place outside the Universe. Or does Mr. Spencer prefer to say that the

creation of man is "a manifestation of some Power acting upon" him!

The position above taken seems the more favorable one for Mr. Spencer.

If, to avoid the difficulties which spring from it, he limits the term

phenomenon, as for instance to material appearances, then his assertion

that phenomena are unlimited is a contradiction, and he has no ground on

which to establish the omnipresence of his Power.

But another line of criticism may be pursued. Strictly speaking, all

events are phenomena. Let there be named an event which is universally

known and acknowledged, and which, in the nature of the case, cannot be

"a manifestation of some Power by which we are acted upon," and in that

statement also will the errors of the passage under consideration be

established. The experience by the human soul of a sense of guilt, of a

consciousness of ill-desert, is such an event. No "Power" can make a

sinless soul feel guilty; no "Power" _can relieve a sinful soul from

feeling guilty_. The feeling of guilt does not arise from the defiance

of Power, _it arises from the violation of Law_. And not only may this

experience be named, but every other experience of the moral nature of

man. In this connection let it be observed that Mr. Spencer always

elsewhere uses the term phenomenon to represent material phenomena in

the material universe. Throughout all his pages the reader is challenged

to find a single instance in which he attempts to account for any other

phenomena than these and their concomitants, the affections of the

intellect in the animal nature. Indeed, so thoroughly is his philosophy

vitiated by this omission, that one could never learn from anything he

has said in these pages, that man had a moral nature at all, that there

were any phenomena of sin and repentance which needed to be accounted

for. In this, Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel are just as bad as he.

Yet in this the Limitists have done well; it is impossible, on the basis

of their system, to render such an account. To test the matter, the

following problem is presented.

To account, on the basis of the Limitist Philosophy, for the fact that

the nations of men have universally made public acknowledgment of their

guilt, in having violated the law of a superior being; and that they

have offered propitiatory sacrifices therefor, except in the case of

those persons and nations who have received the Bible, or have learned

through the Koran one of its leading features, that there is but one

God, and who in either case believe that the needful sacrifice has

already been made.

Another pernicious result of the system under examination is, that it

affords no better ground for the doctrine of Deity's omnipresence than

_experience_. Mr. Spencer's words are: "phenomena being, _so far as we

can ascertain_, unlimited in their diffusion, we are obliged to regard

this Power as omnipresent." Now, if he, or one of his friends, should

happen to get wings some day, and should just take a turn through space,

and should happen also to find a limit to phenomena, and, skirting in

astonishment along that boundary, should happen to light upon an open

place and a bridge, which invited them to pass across to another sphere

or system of phenomena, made by another "Power,"--said bridge being

constructed "'alf and 'alf" by the two aforesaid Powers,--then there

would be nothing to do but for the said explorer to fly back again to

England, as fast as ever he could, and relate to all the other Limitists

his new experience; and they, having no ground on which to argue against

or above experience, must needs receive the declaration of their

colaborator, with its inevitable conclusion, that the Power by which we

are here acted upon is limited, and so is not omnipresent. But when,

instead of such a fallacious philosophy, men shall receive the doctrine,

based not upon human experience, but upon God's inborn ideas that

phenomena are limited and God is omnipresent, and that upon these facts

experience can afford no decision, we shall begin to eliminate the real

difficulties of philosophy, and to approach the attainment of the unison

between human philosophy and the Divine Philosophy.

Attached to the above is the conclusion reached by Mr. Spencer in an

earlier part of his work, that "criticism teaches us that this Power is

wholly incomprehensible." We might, it is believed, ask with pertinence,

What better, then, is man than the brute? But the subject is recurred to

at this time, only to quote against this position a sentence from a

somewhat older book than "First Principles," a book which, did it

deserve no other regard than as a human production, would seem, from its

perfect agreement with the facts of human nature, to be the true basis

for all philosophy. The sentence is this: "Beloved, let us love one

another, for love is of God; and every one that loveth, is born of God,

_and_ KNOWETH GOD."

But the gross materialism of Mr. Spencer's philosophy presents its worst

phase in his completed doctrine of God. Mark. A "phenomenon" is "a

manifestation of some Power." "In this consciousness of an

Incomprehensible Omnipresent Power we have just that consciousness on

which Religion dwells. And so we arrive at the point where Religion and

Science coalesce." An "Incomprehensible Omnipresent Power" is all the

Deity Mr. Spencer allows to mankind. This Power is omnipresent, so that

we can never escape it; and incomprehensible, so that we can never know

the law of its action, or even if it have a law. At any moment it may

fall on us and crush us. At any moment this globe may become one vast

Vesuvius, and all its cities Herculaneums and Pompeiis. Of such a Deity

the children of men may either live in continual dread, or in continual

disregard; they may either spend their lives clad in sackcloth, or

purple and fine linen; bread and water may be their fare, or their table

may be spread like that of Dives; by merciless mortification of the

flesh, by scourges and iron chains, they may seek to propitiate, if

possible, this incomprehensible, omnipresent Power; or, reckless of

consequences, they may laugh and dance and be gay, saying, we know

nothing of this Power, he may crush us any moment, let us take the good

of life while we can. The symbols of such a Deity are the "rough and

ragged rocks," the hills, the snow-crowned mountains Titan-piled; the

avalanche starting with ominous thunder, to rush with crash and roar and

terrible destruction upon the hapless village beneath it; the flood

gathering its waters from vast ranges of hills into a single valley,

spreading into great lakes, drowning cattle, carrying off houses and

their agonized inhabitants, sweeping away dams, rending bridges from

their foundations, in fine, ruthlessly destroying the little gatherings

of man, and leaving the country, over which its devastating waters

flowed, a mournful desolation; and finally, perhaps the completest

symbol of all may be found in that collection of the united streams and

lakes of tens upon tens of thousands of miles of the earth's surface,

into the aorta of the world, over the rough, rocky bed of which the

crowded waters rush and roar, with rage and foam, until they come

suddenly to the swift tremendous plunge of Niagara.

It should be further noticed, that this philosophy is in direct

antagonism with that of the Bible,--that, if Spencerianism is true, the

Bible is a falsehood and cheat. Instead of Mr. Spencer's "Power," the

Bible presents us a doctrine of God as follows: "And God said unto

Moses, I AM THAT I AM. And he said, Thus shalt thou say unto the

children of Israel, I AM hath sent me unto you."--_Exodus_ IV. 14. This

declaration, the most highly metaphysical of any but one man ever heard,

all the Limitists, even devout Mr. Mansel, either in distinct terms, or

by implication, deny. That other declaration is this: "Beloved, let us

love one another: for love is of God; and every one that loveth is born

of God, and knoweth God. He that loveth not, knoweth not God; _for God

is love_."--1 _John_ IV. 7, 8. Direct as is the antagonism between the

two philosophies now presented, the later one appears in an especially

bad light from the fact, that, being very recent and supported by a mere

handful of men, its advocates have utterly neglected to take any notice

of the other and elder one, although the adherents of this may be

numbered by millions, and among them have been and are many of the

ablest of earth's thinkers. True, the great majority of Bible readers do

not study it as a philosophical treatise, but rather as a book of

religious and spiritual instruction; yet, since it is the most

profoundly philosophical book which has ever been in the hands of man,

and professedly teaches us not only the philosophy of man, but also the

philosophy of God, it certainly would seem that the advocates of the new

and innovating system should have taken up that one which it sought to

supplant, and have made an attempt, commensurate with the magnitude of

the work before them, to show its position to be fallacious and

unworthy of regard. Instead of this they have nowhere recognized the

existence even of this philosophy except in the single instance of a

quotation by Mr. Mansel, in which he seems tacitly to acknowledge the

antagonism we have noted. In Mr. Spencer's volume this neglect is

especially noteworthy. Judging from internal evidence, one would much

sooner conclude that it was written by a Hindu pundit, in a temple of

Buddha, than by an Englishman, in a land of Bibles and Christian

churches. Now, although the Bible may stand in his estimation no higher

than the Bahgavat-Gita, yet the mere fact that it is, and that it

presents a most profound philosophy, which is so largely received in his

own and neighboring nations, made it imperative upon him not only to

take some notice of it, but to meet and answer it, as we have indicated

above.

Another fault in Mr. Spencer's philosophy, one which he will be less

willing to admit, perhaps, than the above, and, at the same time, one

which will be more likely forcibly to move a certain class of mind, is,

that it is in direct antagonism to human nature. Not only is the Bible a

falsehood and a cheat, if Mr. Spencer's philosophical system is true,

but human nature is equally a falsehood and a cheat. To specify. Human

nature universally considers God, or its gods, as persons; or, in other

words, all human beings, or at least with very rare exceptions,

spontaneously ascribe personality to Deity. This position is in no wise

negatived by the fact of the Buddhist priesthood of India, or of a class

of philosophical atheists in any other country. Man is endowed with the

power of self-education; and if an individual sees, in the religion in

which he is brought up, some inconsistency, which he, thinking it, as it

may be, integral, for philosophical reasons rejects, and all religion

with it, he may educate himself into speculative atheism. But no child

is an atheist. Not even Shelley became such, until he had dashed against

some of the distorted and monstrous _human_ theologies of his day. But

counting all the Buddhists, and all the German atheists, and all the

English atheists, and all the American atheists, and all other atheists

wherever they may be found, they will not number one tenth of the human

race. On what ground can the unanimity of the other nine tenths be

accounted for? There appears none possible, but that the notion that God

is a person, _is organic in human nature_. Another equally universal and

spontaneous utterance of mankind is, that there is a likeness, in some

way, between God and man. There are the grossest, and in many instances

most degrading modes of representing this; but under them all, and

through them all, the indelible notion appears. The unanimity and

pertinacity of this notion, appearing in every part of the globe, and

under every variety of circumstance, and reappearing after every

revolution, which, tearing down old customs and worships, established

new ones, can without doubt only be accounted for on the precise ground

of the other,--that the notion _is organic in man_. A third utterance of

the human race, standing in the same category with these two, is, that

the Deity can be propitiated by sacrifice. This also has had revolting,

yea most hideous and unrighteous forms of expression, even to human

sacrifices. But the notion has remained indestructible through all ages,

and must therefore be accounted for, as have been the others. Over

against the I AM, which human nature presents and the Bible supports;

over against Him in whose image man and the Bible say man was created;

and over against Him who, those two still agreeing witnesses also

affirm, is moved by his great heart of Love to have mercy on those

creatures who come to him with repentance, Mr. Spencer gives us, as the

result of _Science_, an incomprehensible omnipresent _Power_; only a

Power, nothing more; and that "utterly inscrutable." For our part,

whatever others may do, we will believe in human nature and the Bible.

On the truthfulness of these two witnesses, as on the Central Rock in

the Universe, we plant ourselves. Here do we find our Gibraltar.

Mr. Spencer further says that on the consciousness of this Power

"Religion dwells." Now, so far is this assertion from according with the

fact, that on his hypothesis it is impossible to account for the

presence of religion as a constitutive element of the human race.

Religion was primarily worship, the reverential acknowledgment, by the

sinless creature, of the authority of the Creator, combined with the

adoration of His absolute Holiness; but since sin has marred the race,

it has been coupled with the offering in some forms of a propitiatory

sacrifice. But if the Deity is only Power; or equally, if this is all

the notion we can form of him, we are utterly at a loss to find aught in

him to worship, much less can we account for the fact of the religious

nature in us, and most of all are we confounded by the persistent

assertion, by this religions nature, of the personality and mercy of

God, for Power can be neither personal nor merciful.

Mr. Spencer proceeds to strengthen as well as he can his position by

stating that "from age to age Science has continually defeated it

(Religion) wherever they have come into collision, and has obliged it to

relinquish one or more of its positions." In this assertion, also, he

manifests either a want of acquaintance with the facts or a failure to

comprehend their significance. Religion may properly be divided into two

classes.

1. Those religions which have appeared to grow up spontaneously among

men, having all the errors and deformities which a fleshly imagination

would produce.

2. The religion of Jesus Christ.

1. From the three great ideas mentioned above, no Science has ever

driven even the religions of this class. It has, indeed, corrected many

_forms of expression_, and has sometimes driven _individuals_, who

failed to distinguish between the form, and the idea which the form

overlies, into a rejection of the truth itself.

2. Respecting the religion of Jesus Christ, Mr. Spencer's remark has no

shadow of foundation. Since the beginning of its promulgation by

Jehovah, and especially since the completion of that promulgation by

our Saviour and his apostles, not one whit of its practical law or its

philosophy has been abated; nay, more, to-day, in these American States,

there may be found a more widespread, thoroughly believed, firmly held,

and intelligent conviction of God's personality, and personal

supervision of the affairs of men, of his Fatherhood, and of that

fatherhood exercised in bringing "order out of confusion," in so

conducting the most terrible of conflicts, that it shall manifestly

redound, not only to the glory of himself, but to the very best good of

man, so manifestly to so great a good, that all the loss of life, and

all the suffering, is felt to be not worthy to be compared to the good

achieved, and that too _most strongly by the sufferers_, than was ever

before manifested by any nation under heaven. The truth is, that, in

spite of all its efforts to the contrary, criticism has ever been

utterly impotent to eliminate from human thinking the elements we have

presented. Its utmost triumph has been to force a change in the form of

expression; and in the Bible it meets with forms of expression which it

ever has been, is now, and ever shall be, as helpless to change as a

paralytic would be to overturn the Himalaya.

The discussion of the topic immediately in hand may perhaps be now

properly closed with the simple allusion to a single fact. Just as far

as a race of human beings descends in the gradations of degradation,

just so far does it come to look upon Deity simply as power. African

Fetishism is the doctrine that Deity is an incomprehensible power,

rendered into the form of a popular religion; only the religion stands

one step higher than the philosophy, in that it assumes a sort of

personality for the Power.

On page 102 the following extract will be found: "And now observe that

all along, the agent which has effected the purification has been

Science. We habitually overlook the fact that this has been one of its

functions. Religion ignores its immense debt to Science; and Science is

scarcely at all conscious how much Religion owes it. Yet it is

demonstrable that every step by which Religion has progressed from its

first low conception to the comparatively high one it has now reached,

Science has helped it, or rather forced it to take; and that even now,

Science is urging further steps in the same direction." In this passage

half truths are so sweepingly asserted as universal that it becomes

simply untrue. The evil may be stand under two heads.

1. It is too philosophical. Mr. Spencer undertakes to be altogether too

profound. Since he has observed that certain changes for the better have

been made in some human religions, by the study of the natural sciences,

he jumps to the conclusion that religion has been under a state of

steady growth; and of course readily assumes--for there is not a shadow

of other basis for his assertion--that the "first" "conception" of

religion was very "low." This assumption we utterly deny, and demand of

Mr. Spencer his proof. For ourselves we are willing to come down from

the impregnable fortresses of the Bible upon the common ground of the

Grecian Mythology, and on this do battle against him. In this we are

taught that the Golden Age came _first_, in which was a life of spotless

purity; after which were the silver and brazen ages, and the Iron Age in

which was crime, and the "low conception" of religion came _last_. How

marked is the general agreement of this with the Bible account!

2. But more and worse may be charged on this passage than that it is too

philosophical. Mr. Spencer constructs his philosophy first and cuts his

facts to match it. This is a common mistake among men, and which they

are unconscious of. Now the fact is, Science was _not_ "the agent which

effected the purification." Religion owes a very small debt to Science.

Science can never be more than a supplement, "a handmaid" to Religion.

Religion's first position was not a low one, but nearly the highest.

Afterwards it sunk very low; but men sunk it there. Science never

"helped it" or "forced it" one atom upwards. Science alone only degrades

Religion and gives new wings and hands to crime. This will be

especially manifest to those who remember what Mr. Spencer's doctrine of

Science is. He says: "That even the _highest_ achievements of Science

are resolvable into mental relations of coexistence and sequence, so

cooerdinated as exactly to tally with certain relations of coexistence

and sequence that occur externally." Of course the highest _object_ of

Science will be "_truth_"; and this, our teacher tells us, "is simply

the accurate correspondence of subjective to objective relations." To

interpret. A science of medicine, a science of ablutions, a science of

clothing, a science of ventilation, a science of temperature, and to

some largely, to many chiefly, a science of _cookery_ do, combined,

constitute Science, and the preservation of the body is its highest

attainment. Is this Science "the agent which has effected the

purification of Religion?" What then is the truth?

"Lo this have I found, that God hath made man upright; but they have

sought out many inventions."--_Eccl._ VII. 29. The first religion was a

communion with God. The Creator taught man, as a father would his

children. But when man sinned, he began to seek out many inventions, and

sank to that awful state of degradation hinted at in the fragmentary

sketches of the popular manners and customs of the times of

Abraham,--_Gen._ XII. XXV.; which Paul epitomizes with such fiery vigor

in the first chapter of Romans, and which may be found fully paralleled

in our own day. At the proper time, God took mankind in hand, and began

to develop his great plan for giving purity to religion. So he raised up

Moses, and gave to Israel the Levitical law. Or if Mr. Spencer shall

deny the biblical account of the origin of the five books of Moses, he

at least cannot deny that they have a being; and, placing them on the

same ground of examination and criticism as Herodotus, that they were

written more than a thousand years before the Christian era. Now mark.

Whoever wrote them, they remained as they were first framed, and no one

of the prophets, who came after, added one new idea. They only

emphasized and amplified "The Law." So far then as this part of

Religion was concerned, Science never helped a particle. Yea, more, the

words to Moses in the wilderness were never paralleled in the utterances

of man before the Christian era.

"In the fulness of time God sent his own Son." However defective was the

former dispensation, he, who appeared to most of the men of his day as

only a carpenter's son, declared to mankind the final and perfect truth.

As the system taught by Moses was not the result of any philosophical

developments, but was incomparably superior to the religion of the most

civilized people of the world, at whose court Moses was brought up, and

was manifestly constructed _de novo_, and from some kind of revelation,

so this, which the carpenter's son taught, was incomparably superior to

any utterance which the human soul had up to that time, or has since,

made. It comes forth at once complete and pure. It utters the highest

principles in the simplest language. Indeed, nothing new was left to say

when John finished his writing; and the canon might well be closed. And

since that day, has Religion advanced? Not a syllable. The purest water

is drank at the old fountain. But it will be said that the cause of

Religion among men has advanced. Very true, but Science did not advance

it. You can yet count the years on your fingers since men of Science

generally ceased to be strenuously hostile to Religion. Religion, in

every instance, has advanced just where it has gone back, and drank at

the old fountains. Who, then, has purified Religion? God is "the agent

which has effected the purification." God is he to whom Religion owes

"its immense debt," not Science. He it is who has brought her up to her

present high position.

When, now, we see how completely Mr. Spencer--to use a commonplace but

very forcible phrase--has "ruled God out of the ring," how impertinent

seems his rebuke, administered a few pages further on, in the passage

beginning, "Volumes might be written upon the impiety of the pious," to

those who believe that God means what he says, and that men may know

him. These men at least stand on a far higher plane than he who teaches

that an "incomprehensible omnipresent Power" is all there is for us to

worship, and his words will sound to them like the crackling of thorns

under a pot.

There does not appear in this chapter any further topic that has not

already been touched upon. With these remarks, then, the examination of

this chapter, and of Mr. Spencer's First Principles, may be closed.

CONCLUSION.

If it has ever been the reader's lot to examine Paley's "Evidences of

Christianity," or the "Sermons of President Dwight on the Existence of

God"; and if he has risen from their perusal with a feeling of utter

unsatisfaction, enduring the same craving for a sure truth harassing as

before, he will have partly shared the experience which drove the author

forward, until he arrived at the foundation principles of this treatise.

Those works, and all of that class are, for the object they have in

view, worthless; not because the various statements they make are

untrue, not because elegant language and beauty of style are wanting;

but because they are radically defective in that, their _method_ is

irrelevant to the subject in hand; because in all the arguments that

have been or can be brought forward there is nothing decisive and final;

because the skeptic can thrust the sharp sword of his criticism through

every one of them; because, in fine, the very root of the matter, their

method itself is false, and men have attempted to establish by a series

of arguments what must be ground for the possibility of an argument, and

can only be established by the opposite, the _a priori_ method. Though

the Limitist Philosophy has no positive value, it has this negative one,

that it has established, by the most thorough-going criticism, the

worthlessness of the _a posteriori_ processes of thought on the matter

in hand. Yea, more, the existence of _any_ spiritual person cannot be

proved in that way. You can prove that the boy's body climbs the tree;

but never that he has a soul. This is always taken for granted. Lest the

author should appear singular in this view, he would call the attention

of the reader to a passage in Coleridge's writings in which he at once

sets forth the beauty of the style and incompetency of the logic of Dr.

Paley's book. "I have, I am aware, in this present work, furnished

occasion for a charge of having expressed myself with slight and

irreverence of celebrated names, especially of the late Dr. Paley. O, if

I were fond and ambitious of literary honor, of public applause, how

well content should I be to excite but one third of the admiration

which, in my inmost being, I feel for the head and heart of Paley! And

how gladly would I surrender all hope of contemporary praise, could I

even approach to the incomparable grace, propriety, and persuasive

facility of his writings! But on this very account, I feel myself bound

in conscience _to throw the whole force of my intellect in the way of

this triumphal car_, on which the tutelary genius of modern idolatry is

borne, even at the risk of being crushed under the wheels."

Instead of the method now condemned, there is one taught us in the Book,

and the only one taught us there, which is open to every human being,

for which every human being has the faculty, and respecting which all

that is needed is, that the person exercise what he already has. The boy

could not learn his arithmetic, except he set himself resolutely to his

task; and no man can learn of God, except he also fulfils the

conditions, except he consecrate himself wholly to the acquisition of

this knowledge, except his soul is poured out in love to God; "for every

one that _loveth, is born of God, and knoweth God_." We come then to the

knowledge of God by a direct and immediate act of the soul. The Reason,

the Sensibility, and the Will, give forth their combined and highest

action in the attainment of this knowledge. As an intellectual

achievement, this is the highest possible to the Reason. She attains

then, to the Ultima Thule of all effort, and of this she is fully

conscious. Nor is there awakened any feverish complaining that there are

no more worlds to conquer. In the contemplation of the ineffable

Goodness she finds her everlasting occupation, and her eternal rest.

Plainly, then, both Reason and Revelation teach but a single, and that

the _a priori_ method, by which to establish for man the fact of the

being of God. Let us buttress this conclusion with other lines of

thought.

Reader, now that it is suggested to you, does it not seem in the highest

degree improbable, that the most important truths which can pertain to

man, truths which do not concern primarily the affairs of this life, but

of his most exalted life, the life of the spiritual person as the

companion of its Creator, should be based upon an inferior, less

satisfactory, and less adequate foundation of knowledge, than those of

our childhood's studies, of the arithmetic and the algebra? The boy who

cons the first pages of his arithmetical text-book, soon learns what he

knows to be _self-evident_ truths. He who should offer to _prove_ the

truth of the multiplication-table, would only expose himself to

ridicule. When the boy has attained to youth, and advanced in his

studies, the pages of the algebra and geometry are laid before him, and

he finds new and higher orders of self-evident truths. Would any

evidence, any argument, strengthen his conviction of the validity of the

axioms? Yea, rather, if one should begin to offer arguments, would he

not instinctively and rightfully feel that the confession was thereby

tacitly made, that self-evidence was not satisfactory; and would he not,

finding his spontaneous impulse, and his education, so contradictory, be

_liable_ to fall into complete skepticism? If now there be this

spontaneous, yea, abiding, yea, unalterable, yea, universal conviction

respecting matters of subordinate importance, can it be possible,--I

repeat the question, for it seems to carry with it irresistibly its own

and the decisive answer,--can it be possible that the decisions of

questions of the highest moment, that the knowledge of the principles of

our moral being and of the moral government to which we are amenable,

and most of all of the Governor who is at once Creator, Lawgiver, and

Judge, is not based on at least equally spontaneous, yea, abiding, yea,

unalterable, yea, universal convictions? And when the teacher seemingly,

and may it not with truth be said _actually_, distrusting the

reliability of such a conviction, goes about to bolster up his belief,

and the belief of his pupil, in the existence of God, and thereto rakes

together, with painstaking labor, many sticks and straws of evidence,

instead of looking up to the truth which shines directly down upon him

with steady ineffable effulgence, is it at all strange that the

sharper-eyed pupil, keenly appreciating the contradiction between his

spontaneous conviction and his teaching, should become uncertain which

to follow, a doubter, and finally a confirmed skeptic? If, then, it is

incredible that the fundamental principles of man's moral nature--that

to which all the other elements of his being are subordinate, and for

which they were created--are established on inferior grounds, and those

less satisfactory than the grounds of other principles; and if, on the

other hand, the conviction is irresistible, that they are established on

the highest grounds, and since the truths of mathematics are also based

on the highest ground, self-evidence, and since there can be none higher

than the highest, it follows that the moral principles of the Universe,

so far as they can be known by man, have _precisely the same foundation

of truthfulness as the principles of mathematics--they are_

SELF-EVIDENT.

But some good Reader will check at the result now attained because it

involves the position that the human Reason is the final standard of

truth for man. Good reader, this position is involved, and is true; and

for the sake of Christ's religion it must be taken. The only possible

ground for a thoroughly satisfactory and thoroughly unanswerable

Christian Philosophy, is the principle that _The human Reason is the

final standard of truth for man_.

It has been customary for the devout Bible-reader to esteem that book as

his final standard; and to such an extent in many instances has his

reverential regard for it been carried, that the expression will hardly

be too strong for truth, that it has become an object of worship; and

upon the mind of such a one the above assertion will produce a shock.

While the author would treat with respect every religious feeling, he

would still remind such a person that the Bible is the moral school-book

of the spiritual person in man, which God himself prepared for man's

use, and must in every case be inferior and subordinate to the being

whom it was meant to educate; and furthermore, that, by the very fact of

making man, God established in him the standard, and the right to

require that this fact be recognized. Mark, God made the standard and

thus established the right. This principle may be supported by the

following considerations:

1. The church universally has acted upon it; and none have employed it

more vigorously than those who have in terms most bitterly opposed it.

One of the class just referred to affirms that the Bible is the standard

of truth. "Admit," says a friend standing by, "that it would be if it

were what it purports to be; but what evidence is there that this is the

case." Thereupon the champion presents evidence from the fathers, and

evidence from the book itself; and finally closes by saying, that such

an array of evidence is ample to satisfy any _reasonable_ man of its

truth and validity. His argument is undoubtedly satisfactory; but if he

has not appealed to a reasonable man, _i. e._ to the Reason, _i. e._, if

he has not acknowledged a standard for _the_ standard, and thus has not

tacitly, unconsciously and yet decisively employed the Reason as the

highest standard of truth, then his conduct has for us no adequate

expression.

2. Nicodemus and Christ, in express terms, recognized the validity of

this standard. Said the ruler to Christ, "We know that thou art a

teacher come from God: for no man can do these miracles that thou doest,

except God be with him."--_John_ III. 2. In these words, he both

recognized the validity of the standard, and the fact that its

requirements had been met. But decisively emphatic are the words of our

Saviour: "If I had not done among them the works which none other man

did, they had not had sin: but now have they both seen and hated both me

and my Father."--_John_ XV. 24. As if he had said, "While I appeared

among them simply as a man, I had no right to claim from them a belief

in my mission; but when I had given them adequate and ample evidence of

my heavenly character, when, in a word, I had by my works satisfied all

the rational demands for evidence which they could make, then no excuse

remained for their rejection of me."

The doctrine of this treatise, that man may know the truth, and know

God, is one which will never be too largely reflected upon by the human

mind, or too fully illustrated in human thought. In no better strain can

we bring our work to a close than by offering some reflections on those

words of Jesus Christ which have formed the title of our book.

"Then said Jesus to those Jews which believed on him, 'If ye continue in

my word, _then_ are ye my disciples indeed; and ye shall know the truth,

and the truth shall make you free.'"--_John_ VIII. 31, 32. Throughout

all the acts of Christ, as recorded in John and especially during the

last days of his life, there may be traced the marks of a super-human

effort to express to the Jews, in the most skilful manner, the nature

and purport of his mission. He appeared to them a man; and yet it would

seem as if the Godhead in him struggled with language to overcome its

infirmities, and express with perfectest skill his extraordinary

character and work. But "he came unto his own, and his own received him

not." Being then such, even the Divine Man, Jesus Christ possessed in

his own right _an absolute and exhaustive metaphysic_. We study out some

laws in some of their applications; he knew all laws in all their

applications. In these his last days he was engaged in making the most

profound and highly philosophical revelations to his followers that one

being ever made to another. Or does the reader prefer to call them

religious? Very well: for here Religion and Philosophy are identical.

Being engaged in such a labor, it is certain that no merely human

teacher ever used words with the careful balancing, the skilful

selection, the certain exactitude, that Jesus did. Hence in the most

emphatic sense may it be said, that, whether he used figurative or

literal language, he meant just what he said. The terms used in the text

quoted are literal terms, and undoubtedly the passage is to be taken in

its most literal signification. In these words then, in this passage of

the highest philosophical import, is to be found the basis of the whole

_a priori_ philosophy. They were spoken of the most important truths,

those which pertain to the soul's everlasting welfare; but as the

greater includes the less, so do they include all lesser science. In

positive and unmistakable terms has Christ declared the fact of

knowledge. God knows all truth. In so far as we also know the truth, in

so far are we like him. And mark, this is knowledge, a purely

intellectual act. Love is indeed a _condition_ of the act, but it is not

the very act itself.

On this subject it is believed that the Christian church has failed to

assert the most accurate doctrine. Too generally has this knowledge been

termed a spiritual knowledge, meaning thereby, a sort of an impression

of happiness made upon the spiritual sensibility; and this state of

bliss has been represented as in the highest degree desirable. Beyond

all question it is true, that, when the spiritual person, with the eye

of Reason, sees, and thus knows the truth, seeing it and knowing it

because his whole being, will, and intellect is consecrated to, wrapt in

the effort, and he is searching for it as for hid treasures, there will

roll over his soul some ripples of that ineffable Delight which is a

boundless ocean in Deity. But this state of the Sensibility follows

after, and is dependent upon, the act of love, and the act of knowledge.

There should be, there was made in Christ's mind, a distinction in the

various psychical modifications of him who had sold all that he had to

buy the one pearl. The words of Christ are to be taken, then, as the

words of the perfect philosopher, and the perfect religionist. Bearing,

as he did, the destiny of a world on his heart, and burdened beyond all

utterance by the mighty load, his soul was full of the theme for which

he was suffering, he could speak to man only of his highest needs and

his highest capabilities. The truth which man may know, then, is not

only eternal,--all truth is eternal,--but it is that eternal truth most

important to him, the _a priori_ laws of the spiritual person and of all

his relations. The what he is, the why he is, and the what he ought to

become, are the objects of his examination. When, then, a spiritual

person has performed his highest act, the act of unconditional and

entire consecration to the search after the truth, _i. e._ to God; and

when, having done this he ever after puts away all lusts of the flesh,

he shall in this condition become absorbed, wrapt away in the

contemplation of the truth; then his spiritual eye will be open, and

will dart with its far-glancing, searching gaze throughout the mysteries

of the Universe, and he will know the truth. Before, when he was

absorbed in the pursuit of the things of Sense, he could see almost no

_a priori_ principles at all, and what he did see, only in their

practical bearing upon those material and transitory things which perish

with their using; but now balancing himself on tireless pinion in the

upper ether, anon he stoops to notice the largest and highest and most

important of those objects which formerly with so much painful and

painstaking labor he climbed the rugged heights of sense to examine, and

having touched upon them cursorily, to supply the need of the hour, he

again spreads his powerful God-given wings of faith and love, and soars

upward, upward, upward, towards the eternal Sun, the infinite Person,

the final Truth, God. Then does he come to comprehend, "to KNOW, with

all saints, what is the height and depth and length and breadth of the

love of God." Then do the pure _a priori_ laws, especially those of the

relations of spiritual persons, _i. e._ of the moral government of God,

come full into the field of his vision. Then in the clear blaze, in the

noonday effulgence of the ineffable, eternal Sun, does he see the Law

which binds God as it binds man,--that Law so terrible in its demands

upon him who had violated it, that the infinite Person himself could

find no other way of escape for sinning man but in sending "his

only-begotten Son into the world." And he who is lifted up to this

knowledge needs no other revelation. All other knowledge is a child's

lesson-book to him. All lower study is tasteless; all lower life is

neglected, forgotten. He studies forever the pure equations of truth; he

lives in the bosom of God. Such an one may all his life-long have been

utterly ignorant of books. A poor negro on some rice plantation, he may

have learned of God only by the hearing of the ear, but by one act, in a

moment, in the twinkling of an eye, he has passed all the gradations of

earthly knowledge, and taken his seat on the topmost form in heaven. He

received little instruction from men; but forevermore God is his

teacher.

This of which we have been speaking is, be it remembered, no rhapsody of

the imagination. It is a simple literal fact respecting man's intellect.

It is the same in kind, though of far nobler import, as if upon this act

of consecration there should be revealed to every consecrated one, in a

sudden overwhelming burst of light, the whole _a priori_ system of the

physical Universe. This is not so revealed because it is not essential,

and so would only gratify curiosity. The other and the higher is

revealed, because it is essential to man's spiritual life.

In the culminating act, then, of a spiritual person, in the unreserved,

the absolute consecration of the whole being to the search after truth,

do we find that common goal to which an _a priori_ philosophy inevitably

leads us, and which the purest, Christ's, religion teaches us. Thus does

it appear that in their highest idea Philosophy and Religion are

identical. The Rock upon which both alike are grounded is eternal. The

principles of both have the highest possible evidence, for they are

self-evident; and, having them given by the intuition of the Reason, a

man can cipher out the whole natural scheme of the Universe as he would

cipher out a problem in equations. He has not done it, because he is

wicked; and God has given him the Bible, as the mathematical astronomy

of the moral heavens, as a school-book to lead him back to the goal of

his lost purity.

How beautiful, then, art thou, O Religion, supernal daughter of the

Deity! how noble in thy magnificent preeminence! how dazzling in thy

transcendent loveliness! Thou sittest afar on a throne of pearl; thy

diadem the Morning Stars, thy robe the glory of God. Founded is thy

throne on Eternity; and from eternity to eternity all thy laws are

enduring truth. Sitting thus, O Queen, more firmly throned than the

snow-capped mountains, calmer than the ocean's depths, in the surety of

thy self-conscious integrity and truth, thou mayest, with mien of

noblest dignity, in unwavering confidence, throw down the gauntlet of

thy challenge to the assembled doubters of the Universe.

It may be that to some minds, unaccustomed to venturing out fearlessly

on the ocean of thought, with an unwavering trust in the pole-star truth

in the human soul, certain of the positions attained and maintained in

this volume will seem to involve the destruction of all essential

distinction between the Creator and the created. If the universe is a

definite and limited object, some created being may, at some period,

come to know every atom of it. Moreover, if there is a definite number

of the qualities and attributes--the endowments of Deity, some one may

learn the number, and what they are, and come at length to have a

knowledge equal to God's knowledge. Even if this possibility should be

admitted,--which it is not, for a reason to appear further on,--yet it

would in no way involve that the creature had, in any the least degree,

reduced the difference in _kind_ which subsists between him and the

Creator. A consideration of the following distinctive marks will, it

would seem, be decisive upon this point.

God is self-existent. His creatures are dependent upon him.

Self-existence is an essential, inherent, untransferable attribute of

Deity; and so is not a possible attainment for any creature. Every

creature is necessarily dependent upon the Creator every moment, for his

continuance in being. Let him attain ever so high a state of knowledge;

let him, if the supposition were rational, acquire a knowledge equal to

that of Deity; let him be endowed with all the power he could use, and

he would not have made, nor could he make an effort even, in the

direction of removing his dependence upon his Creator. In the very

height of his glory, in the acme of his attainment, it would need only

that God rest an instant, cease to sustain him, and he would not be, he

would have gone out, as the light goes out on a burner when one turns

the faucet.

Again, the mode by which their knowledge is attained is different in

kind; and the creature never can acquire the Creator's mode. The Deity

possesses his knowledge as a necessary endowment, given to him at once,

by a spontaneous intuition. Hence he could never learn, for there was no

knowledge which he did not already possess. Thus he is out of all

relation to Time. The creature, on the other hand, can never acquire any

knowledge except through processes; and, what is more, can never review

the knowledge already acquired, except by a process which occupies a

time. This relation of the creature to Time is organic; and this

distinction between the creature and Creator is thus also irremovable.

Another organic distinction is that observed in the mode of seeing

ideals. The Divine Reason not only gives ideas, _a priori_ laws, but it

gives all possible images, which those laws, standing in their natural

relations to each other, can become. Thus all ideals are realized to

him, whether the creative energy goes forth, and power is organized in

accordance therewith, or not. Here again the creature is of the opposite

kind. The creature can never have an idea until he has been educated by

contact with a material universe; and then can never construct an ideal,

except he have first seen the elements of that ideal realized in

material forms. To illustrate: The infant has no ideas; and there is no

radical difference between the beginning of a human being and any other

created spiritual person. He has a rudimentary Reason, but it must grow

before it can make its presentations, and the means of its education

must be a material system. Let a spiritual person be created, and set in

the Universe, utterly isolated, with no medium of communication, and it

would stay forever just what it was at the beginning, a dry seed. The

necessity of alliance with a material Universe is equally apparent in

the mature spiritual person. Such a one cannot construct a single ideal,

except he have seen all the elements already in material forms. He who

will attempt to construct an ideal of any _thing_, which never has been,

as a griffin, and not put into it any form of animals which have been on

earth, will immediately appreciate the unquestionableness of this

position. Therefore it is that no one can, "by searching, find out God."

The creature can only learn what the Creator declares to him.

Still another element of distinction, equally marked and decisive as

those just named, may be mentioned. The Deity possesses as inherent and

immanent endowment Power, or the ability of himself to realize his

ideals in objects. Thus is he the Creator. If this were not so, there

could have been no Universe, for there was no substance and no one to

furnish a substance but he. The creature, on the other hand, cannot

receive as a gift, neither attain by culture the power to create. Hence

he can only realize his ideals in materials furnished to his hand.

Pigments and brushes and chisels and marble must be before painters and

sculptors can become.

Each and every one of the distinctions above made is _organic_. They

cannot be eliminated. In fact their removal is not a possible object of

effort. The creature may _wish_ them removed; but no line of thought can

be studied out by which a movement can be made towards the attainment of

that wish. It would seem, then, that, such being the facts, the fullest

scope might fearlessly be allowed to the legitimate use of every power

of the creature. Such, it is believed, is God's design.

THE END.

Transcriber's Note:

Archaic/multiple spellings and punctuation of the original have been

maintained.